A SARTREAN TYPOLOGY OF VIOLENT AGENTS

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ABSTRACT. This paper provides a classification of violent agents according to the manner in which they relate to their own goals. By interpreting Jean-Paul Sartre's discussion of violence in *Notebooks for an Ethics*, I show that violent agents may be classified into four categories that I call "defenders of the given order," "instruments of a higher power," "mineralized subjects" and, finally, "unchained subjects." I also show how each of these four categories of violent subjects represents a particular manner of, in Sartre's words, "refusing time" or, in other terms, of refusing to change or to adjust to the situation one finds oneself in.

Keywords: violence, typology, violent agent, Jean-Paul Sartre

1. Introduction

In this paper, I propose a classification of violent agents based on Jean-Paul Sartre's discussion of violence in his *Notebooks for an Ethics*.[2] Unlike those of other existing typologies (e.g. those of Michel Wieviorka[3]), the categories I propose here do not refer to the status that a person must have in order for them to *subsequently* be likely to *turn to* violence[4]. What I am interested in is classifying violent agents

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[2] Jean-Paul Sartre, *Notebooks for an Ethics*, translated by David Pellauer, Chicago University Press, 1992, especially pp. 170-215. Henceforth abbreviated as *Notebooks*.

[3] See Michel Wieviorka, "Violence and the Subject," in *Thesis Eleven*, 73/2003, Sage, 42-50; Michel Wieviorka, *Violence. A New Approach*, translated by David Macey, Sage, 2009.

[4] Let me add that Sartre's discussions of violence in his *Critique of Dialectical Reason* are also focused especially on the preconditions or antecedents of violence.

according to their attitude during the violent act itself, and more particularly, according the manner in which they relate to their goals. Though extremely rich in both theoretical content and powerful examples, Sartre's analysis of violence in the *Notebooks* is not aimed at providing a typology of violence agents and, moreover, it is fragmentary and unsystematic. Therefore, my attempt to provide a Sartrean typology of violent agents will use as guide a systematization of Sartre's discussion that I provided elsewhere.[5]

According to this systematization, the main insight of Sartre's discussion is that we should adopt a non-instrumental view of violence, one undergirded by the idea that violent behavior does not fit neatly into the means/ends logic of pragmatic behavior. More specifically, by mostly focusing on Sartre's examples and on Sartre's own analyses of these examples, Jeler (2020) has shown that, when compared to pragmatic behavior, violent behavior implies a modification of the agent's attitude towards their goals. Jeler (2020) also identified four types of such modifications, and these will provide the theoretical basis for the four categories of violent agents I will detail below.

The typology I propose here is directly linked to a recurrent theme in Sartre's discussion of violence in the *Notebooks*. Sartre repeatedly asserts that violence implies a "refusal of time." By this, he does not mean to say that the violent agent refuses to admit the existence of time in general or that it rejects socially objective time in some way. Rather, this "refusal of time" is, for Sartre, a plastic way of saying that the violent agents refuse to change. However, in Sartre's text, there is a whole variety of manners in which this "refusal of time" or refusal of change is linked to violence. Indeed, violent agents are sometimes said to refuse time by denying that their goals might change along with the means employed for reaching them ("if the end is something to be *rejoined*, if in some sense it has a sufficiency of being, then it is independent of the means. So here one can choose any means for attaining it" — *Notebooks*, 183); in other places, violent agents seem to refuse time by wanting to immediately get to the sought end (the violent person, Sartre says, "wants everything and wants it immediately, like Anouilh's Antigone" — *Notebooks*, 173); or by choosing to live in the short term ("In a word, violence is the choice to live in the short term, and to do so in terms of the instantaneous and eternal nature of the end" — *Notebooks*, 179); or by creating the irremediable, one of the most constant elements of violence being, in Sartre's words, "a need to fight time by the creation of the irremediable, generally by means of destruction (because every

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construction is *destroyable*, whereas destruction cannot be wiped out)" (*Notebooks*, 189); or, finally, this refusal of time is most straightforwardly a refusal to change, in the sense that violent agents refuse to adjust to the given situation ("I'm taking an *oath*. Whatever happens, I will not change" — *Notebooks*, 214, translation slightly modified). In what follows, I will not claim that all of these manners of refusing time/refusing to change are reducible to a single one. Instead, I intend to point out that, just like the typology proposed here may help put some order among the various figures of violent agents depicted in Sartre's text, it would likely be helpful — at least from an exegetical point of view — to show that each of these figures is compatible with a particular manner of "refusing time," i.e. of the refusal, by the subject, to change or to adjust to the given situation.[6] Therefore, I will argue that, according to Sartre, one of the characteristics of violent agents is that of refusing to recognize that the situation they find themselves in requires any adjusting or any change on their part or, in any case, of denying the legitimacy of such a requirement.[7] Thus, for each of the four categories of violent agents presented below, I will briefly indicate the manner in which the violent behavior implies a refusal to adjust to the situation at hand.

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[6]   Indeed, this is what sets apart my interpretation of the connection between violence and the "refusal of time" from that provided by James Dodd, *Violence and Phenomenology*, Routledge, 2009, 66-69.

[7]   My insistence to spell out the refusal of time implied in violent behavior along the lines of the refusal of the agent to change or to adjust to their situation is based on the conviction that Sartre's discussion of violence in the *Notebooks* is heavily influenced by his previous presentation of the "passionate anti-Semite" in *Réflexions sur la question juive*. I am taking the liberty of quoting a long and beautiful fragment from this book here because it shows in what sense the "passionate anti-Semite" refuses to change: "The rational man groans as he gropes for the truth; he knows that his reasoning is no more than tentative, that other considerations may supervene to cast doubt on it. He never sees very clearly where he is going; he is "open"; he may even appear to be hesitant. But there are people who are attracted by the durability of a stone. They wish to be massive and impenetrable; they wish not to change. Where, indeed, would change take them? We have here a basic fear of oneself and of truth. What frightens them is not the content of truth, of which they have no conception, but the form itself of truth, that thing of indefinite approximation. It is as if their own existence were in continual suspension. But they wish to exist all at once and right away. They do not want any acquired opinions; they want them to be innate. Since they are afraid of reasoning, they wish to wad the kind of life wherein reasoning and research play only a subordinate role, wherein one seeks only what he has already found, wherein one becomes only what he already was" (Jean-Paul Sartre, *Anti-Semite and Jew*, translated by George J. Becker, with a new preface by Michael Walzer, Schocken Books, 1995, 12-13). Note the similarity between how the anti-Semites "wish to exist all at once and right away" and the fragment quoted above about how the violent person "wants everything and wants it immediately."

2. Four categories of violent agents

Four types of modifications of the manner in which the violent agents relate to their own goals are identified by Jeler (2020, 243-254). In the first type, the violent agent no longer sees the goal as something to be produced, but as something that is already there, already present, and therefore the agent only needs to eliminate the obstacles that tend to conceal this already present goal. In the second type, the violent agent sees the goal as something to be produced, but this goal is not produced by means that are at our disposal; rather, they are produced by means that exceed human means of production, namely by a deeper — usually metaphysical — causality. (Though clearly distinct, for reasons that I will not reproduce here, both of these types of relationship between agent and goals may be subsumed under the same category of "non-productive attitude.") The third type of relationship between violent agent and goals involves the exacerbation of a proximate goal at the expense of more distant goals of the agent: this is called the "counter-productive attitude" because, by the means chosen in order to reach a proximal goal, the violent agent actually renders impossible the realization of their more distant goals. Finally, the fourth type is called "anti-productive attitude" because it involves the active refusal of the goal one had previously set for oneself: the agent does not only abandon the previously set goal, but also makes sure that this abandoning is irremediable (e.g. by destroying the very means that would be needed for reaching that particular goal).

It is on this quadripartite distinction that the typology of violent agents proposed here is based. We will now move on to discuss, in turn, the four categories of violent agents, namely violent agents as "defenders of the given order," as "instruments of a higher power," as "mineralized subjects" and, finally, as "unchained subjects." What each of these categories refers to will become clear as the discussion progresses.

2.1. The violent agent as defender of the given order

The first type of violence identified in Jeler (2020, 243-247) refers to the combination of two assumptions made by the violent agent: a) that their goal is not a future state of affaires that needs to be produced, but an already-present, already-given state of affairs; and b) that certain obstacles are concealing or risk to conceal this already-given state of affairs and, consequently, that the violent agent needs to eliminate these obstacles that stand in the way of the full disclosure of the already-present state of affairs. The violent act itself fulfills this second role of pushing aside or obliterating of the concealing obstacles.

With the help of certain indications from Sartre's *Notebooks*, we can state that the figure of the violent agent that corresponds to this type of violence is that of the "defender of the given order," where, as I will try to emphasize below, the term "given" must be taken to refer both to something that is already present and to the intrinsic "givenness," the disclosing character of truth. Let us see how, for Sartre, the first of these two meanings leads to the second:

> Violence is Manichean. It believes in an order of the world that is given yet concealed by bad wills. It suffices to destroy the obstacle for this order to appear, and this applies to the anti-Semitism that would liberate the order of the world by destroying the Jew, as well as to the surrealist who would make the surreal appear at the horizon of his destructions. (*Notebooks*, 174)

The "order of the world" that the violent agent strives for is not something that is yet to be realized or produced, but something that is presupposed by the violent agent as being already there, already given; and whatever seems to contest or to conceal this given order needs to be destroyed. Obviously, this latter assumption might be doubly false: on one hand, against appearances, the others may, in fact, not contest in any way the given order; on the other hand, even if the others do indeed contest the given order, they may have very good reasons to do so. But the important point is that, for my analysis here, it does not matter whether the assumption made by the violent agent is true or false: to enquire about the truth or falsity of this assumption boils down to asking questions about the antecedents of violence (about how the violent act in question has come about) or about the legitimacy of that violent act. But this enquiry would go beyond the scope of this paper: as already emphasized, my interest here lies in classifying the attitudes of agents during the violent act itself (and especially their attitude with respect to their goals), and not with enquiring about the antecedents or legitimacy of violence.

One might remark that, up until this point, I have only talked about the reaction of a subject when the order they defend is contested by someone else. But this seems to be a far cry from the idea that, in this kind of violence, the assumed already-present goal is or risks being concealed by certain obstacles and that it is against this concealment that the violent behavior reacts (on the assumption that, in Sartre's words from the above quotation, "it suffices to destroy the obstacle for this order to appear"). In other words, there seems to be a significant distance between *contesting* an "order of the world" and *concealing* it. This difficulty is only apparent. Indeed, once the violent subject has presupposed that an "order of the world" is already given, any manner of contesting this order is *nothing more than a mystification*. When one assumes that that particular "order of the world" is given, one is implicitly assuming that it is given once and for all, that it is not subject to change. It cannot be dented or altered in any way, except by tricking the others into

not seeing that it is there or into seeing it in a different, falsifying light. Therefore, the only way in which this alleged order may be altered is by mystification, by falsifying it in the eyes of the others. Any contestant of the given order is thus implicitly a falsifier, a forger. This is why the defender of the given order is also, at the same time and inextricably, a defender of truth.[8] The "givenness" of the order defended by the violent agent inevitably denotes its intrinsic truthfulness.

We may call "conservative" violence the kind of violence that is characteristic of the subjects belonging to the "defender of the given order" category. Offensive wars that take a past order as the benchmark provide examples of conservative violence because their aim is that of restoring the "real" territory of a country. Violent repressions of worker strikes are another example in which actors assume the figure of the defender of the given order. Among the many instances of conservative violence, we may also list acts of terrorism making claims of independence or self-determination of historical provinces.

Before we move on, let us briefly indicate in what way the violent agents belonging to this category may be said to "refuse time." The "defenders of the given order" do not adjust to the situation they are in because *they see no reason why they should do so*. For them, the situation appears entirely clear: the order that regulates the situation is already given and this order only needs to be uncovered; the resistance that the agent encounters in that situation is nothing more than an attempt to conceal or to give a false image of that underlying order and, in the violent agent's view, such falsifying attempts need to be crushed. The defenders of the given order thus refuse to adjust because, in their eyes, the situation does not require any adjustment.

2.2. The violent agent as instrument of a higher power

The second type of modification of the violent agent's manner of relating to their goal identified in Jeler (2020, 247-249) consists in assuming that the goal is something to be produced, but not by the violent agent; rather, it is to be produced by a deeper causality, one that differs from ordinary human means of production. The role played by the agent's violent act here is that of "paving the way" for the coming into effect of this deeper causality.

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[8] This point is highlighted by one of Sartre's examples. Suppose I am debating a subject with someone but, even though I am certain that I am right in this discussion, the interlocutor seems to be more intelligent or is more skilled at defending their point. In such a case, Sartre states, the other's arguments will appear to me as "only ruses, misleading appearances" and I feel that I am "mystified" (*Notebooks*, 213).

Because it constitutes the prime exemplification for this type of violence, I will briefly look here at one of Sartre's examples that has also been discussed in Jeler (2020), namely the case of a well-known moment of the Albigensian Crusade. As the town of Béziers — that harbored both heretics and Catholics — was being taken by the besieging crusaders, the leader of the crusade reportedly endorsed the indiscriminate killings of the people of Béziers, the reason being that "God will recognize his own." Sartre comments on this case as follows:

> One counts on God to make the choice, to carry things through. Hence man has only to destroy. The principle of *human* justice is: allow ten guilty men to escape rather than destroy one innocent person. That of a justice that has confidence in Providence is: destroy ten innocent victims rather than allow one guilty person to escape. The innocent person will get his reward because God *will make amends* (he will give him eternal life) (*Notebooks*, 183).

As has been shown in Jeler (2020, 247-248), in this case violence marks the abandoning of any human means of doing justice (as these human means — based on enquiries, testimonies, proofs etc. — would have risked leaving some heretics unpunished). Instead, by doing away with all human means of doing justice, the Crusaders allegedly set the conditions for the appearance of divine justice, that would recognize the Catholics from the heretics and reward them accordingly. This kind of violence is thus characterized by the refusal or the abandoning of all human means of producing a given goal (justice, in the Béziers case) in order to pave the way for a different type of causality, one beyond our control (here, a divine one), by which the sought end is produced.

The violent subjects that accomplish this sort of violence thus act as if they were mere instruments of a higher power. But it is important to stress that violent agents as "instruments of a higher power" should not be confused with utterly submissive agents, i.e. agents that are essentially devoid of initiative insofar as they only enforce the will of the higher authority they are representing. To instantiate the latter category, it might be argued — though this is far from certain — that the soldiers of the Third Reich that ruthlessly killed civilians while belonging to the *Einsatzgruppen* of the Eastern front only did what the chain of command ordered them to or that Eichmann only enforced the *Führer*'s will (in the juridical system of the Third Reich, the *Führer*'s will — even when expressed only in an oral manner — had the status of law). But in such cases (if, indeed, there is any validity in interpreting them in this way), the goal set by the higher authority was reached by the action of Eichmann or of the soldiers of the *Einsatzgruppen*. In contrast, by their refusal of human means of production, the violent agents belonging to the category of "instruments of a higher power" do not properly enact or enforce the will of a higher

authority; rather, they *invoke* or *conjure* a higher power that will carry the act through. It is this different power — one that is beyond their control — that sees the goal produced. By their violent acts, the "instruments of the higher power" merely set the stage or prepare the conditions so that this higher power may come into effect — this is, indeed, very different from merely executing orders received from a higher authority.

This sort of violence usually appears when, in a given situation, no clear path for reaching the sought end is available for the subject. For example, in the Béziers massacre, no clear manner in which one could have punished *all* and *only* the heretics was readily available because the ordinary human enquiries for finding out who was and who was not a heretic would likely have lead to at least some misidentifications. Faced with this shortage of means for reaching the sought end, the leader of the crusade turns to God who — and this is his hope, or rather his faith — will unfailingly succeed in punishing all and only the heretics. This sort of violence may be termed "strategic violence," given that it is meant to forge a path towards the desired end in a situation in which all paths seem to be blocked, i.e. in which no ordinary human means for reaching that goal seem to be available; thus, by turning violent, one *hopes* that some sort of intervention beyond our control will end up realizing the goal we are seeking, even though the situation at hand does not give any hints as to the manner in which the goal might be attained.[9] The violent act thus turns a blind eye towards the evidence that the path towards the goal is blocked and invokes some sort of deeper forces that, even though they are not visible in the given situation, will hopefully end up realizing the goal. The hope therefore is that the goal will be produced not because of the means available in the situation, but *despite* these means:[10] by explicitly destroying these means (e.g. by killing the witnesses from Béziers that could have been questioned about the religious beliefs of other inhabitants), one invokes some unseen force or element that might come into play and see the goal produced.[11]

It is important to emphasize that violent agents as "instruments of a higher power" do not necessarily require an explicit representation of the higher authority they invoke in their behavior, nor of the manner in which this authority would

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[9] "I do not count on what is known but on what is unknown, there is *hope* in violence and *certitude* in a lawful operation. Recourse to magic" (*Notebooks*, 172). This recourse – albeit a non-explicit one – to a non-human power is what distinguishes this form of violence from another one which consists in pursuing the sought end at all costs. For the latter, see the "mineralized subject" category below.

[10] I paraphrase here a remark made by Vladimir Jankélévitch, *Henri Bergson*, translated by Nils F. Schott, Duke University Press, 2015, 138, about Bergson's theory of the organ-obstacle presented in his *Creative Evolution*, translated by Arthur Mitchell, Dover Publications, 1998.

[11] "But here again, I am confident about something behind what I have destroyed, a Me behind me" (*Notebooks*, 183).

allegedly reach the desired goal. In the case of the Béziers massacre, such an explicit representation exists (with God being the higher authority, and his unfailing judgment being the mechanism by which justice is achieved); but an explicit representation of this sort is not a necessary requirement for this type of violence. Indeed, cases involving such an explicit representation of the higher power and cases in which the agents exhibit a complete ignorance of the nature and manner of acting of this higher power should be seen as the two ends of a continuum. Many concrete cases probably fall somewhere between these two extremes: for example, many acts of religious terrorism may arguably be placed on the line between these two extremes.

But what about the manner in which this kind of agent may be said to refuse to change? The "instruments of a higher power" do not adjust to the given situation because, in their view of the situation, *any adjusting would entail missing the pursued goal*. If the besiegers of Béziers had tried to employ human means of making justice, some heretics would certainly have gone unpunished; as noted, in cases of "strategic" violence, all ordinary human means of reaching the pursued goal seem blocked. Any attempt to adjust to the situation — i.e. any attempt to try to keep using ordinary, pragmatic means for reaching the pursued goal — seems to be doomed from the start.

The violent act thus puts an end to any potential attempt to adjust to the situation and tries to forge a new path, one that is not available to human means of producing the sought end and that the violent agent is no longer in control of. The "instruments of the higher power" thus refuse to adjust to the situation because, in their view, instead of getting them closer to the goal, any such adjustment seems to actually prevent them from reaching it.

2.3. The mineralized subject

The third kind of modification of the violent agents' attitude with respect to their goal identified in Jeler (2020, 250-253) bears the name of "counter-productive attitude" and it consists in the exacerbation of a proximate goal to the point that it hinders or renders impossible the reaching of other — more distant or existentially more important — goals of the agent.

In this kind of violence, the agents present themselves as being guided by the following unyielding decision: "I will reach this (proximate) goal even if it is the last thing I do." This might be called "obsessive" violence insofar as it involves the fixation of the agent on one particular goal at the expense of others. Imagine, for example, a man that is about to go with his wife at the opera. But he gets so intent on leaving the house at a particular hour so as not to be late for the show, that he snaps at his wife for taking too long to get ready to leave. And he has his nervous

outburst even though he knows that it might well spoil the entire evening; therefore, his fixation on a proximate goal (leaving the house on time) hinders the grander goal (having a pleasant evening). His conduct may be described as: "I will leave the house at the right hour even if it is the last thing I do this evening (i.e. even if this means that the rest of the evening gets ruined)." This hypothetical man thus loses perspective and no longer takes into account the fact that the proximate goal is itself just a means for a more distant or more important goal.

I call this type of violent subject a "mineralized subject," following an indication of Sartre's from his *Réflexions sur la question juive*, where he states that the passionate anti-Semite chooses "for his personality the permanence of rock [*la permanence minérale*]."[12] Once the violent agent's proximate goal is set, they are determined to reach it at any cost, even if it means ruining the higher goals in view of which that proximate goal has been set in the first place. As shown by my hypothetical example above, the man is determined that, with respect to his proximate goal, he will not change his mind no matter what. It is this inflexibility, this pledge not to change one's mind that the expression "mineralized subject" is meant to denote. The mineralized subject may sacrifice their more distant and more important goals for the sake of a proximate one only if for them the necessity of reaching this proximate goal has become an undisputable fact, i.e. only if they have become determined that, with respect to that proximate goal, they are no longer free to change their minds. In other words, only if, as far as reaching the proximate goal is concerned, the subject has acquired the unchangeable nature or the permanence of stone.

Rape might exemplify this type of violence, as Sartre indicates (*Notebooks*, 180). In certain (but surely not all) cases of rape, by fixating on the proximate goal (possessing the victim), the rapist is giving up on all the other goals he may have had with respect to the victim (a longer term relationship with mutual affection, potentially marriage etc.). In this sort of cases, the rapist possesses the victim even if this implies cutting all subsequent ties with her (i.e. even if, with regard to that person, this is "the last thing" he ever does). Other cases of obsessive violence involving "mineralized subjects" are the violence or killings committed *in order to make a* (social or political) *point*. In such cases the "even if it's the last thing I do" sometimes takes a definitive meaning, for example when killings intending to make a point are followed by the suicide of the killer.

Let me add that a limiting-case here is constituted by violent acts committed in order to protect one's very survival. In cases in which one is protecting one's very survival, many distant or higher goals may be renounced precisely because, if one fails to reach the proximate goal (i.e. surviving), the distant goals become out of the

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[12] Sartre, *Anti-Semite and Jew*, Schocken Books, 1995, 19.

question. Here, the cost of success in reaching the proximate goal of surviving is usually smaller than the cost of failure. (But, let us state, this is not always the case: had Socrates saved his life by fleeing, his legacy might have been somewhat different.)

As for the manner in which they "refuse time" or refuse to change, the "mineralized subjects" do not adjust to the situation they are in because *they no longer see themselves as being free to do so*. They are absolutely determined not to change their mind with respect to the proximate goal pursued. They "took an oath" to reach this proximate goal, even if this means sacrificing their more distant or higher goals. The proximate goal is thus exacerbated to the point that adjusting becomes out of the question.

2.4. The unchained subject

The final kind of modification of the violent agents' attitude outlined in Jeler (2020, 253-254) consists in the active refusal, by the agents, of their previously set goal. This attitude — termed "anti-productive" — may not be reduced to the abandoning of a previous goal in favor of new goals; rather, it consists in rendering the previously set goal unreachable. The example on which the analysis of this attitude is based comes from Sartre's *Notebooks* and it refers to someone who wants to obtain sweet water by mixing water and sugar in a glass; however, after losing patience, this person throws the glass and breaks it, thus not only giving up on the previously set goal, but also making sure that the goal is not obtained.

The important point is that here one *destroys* one's goal. This attitude thus consists in the subject's refusal to be determined by that goal or to be subjected to the limitations imposed by that determination (e.g. by the necessity of *waiting* for the sugar to dissolve in the above example). By this active refusal of being identified with or determined by their goal, the subjects are actually refusing their own facticity (*Notebooks*, 175). The destruction of one's previously set goal is the manifestation of one's desire to become a pure subjectivity, a pure subject unlimited by concrete goals and by the means required for reaching them, i.e. unlimited by concrete determinations. I will call this type of subject the "unchained subject" both because it is a subject that wants to be liberated from concrete goals and the means required for reaching them, and because this desire to become a pure subjectivity is marked by a destructive and uncontrolled behavior towards the very means by which the previously set goal was to be attained. This unchained subject corresponds to the type of violence involved in Hegel's Master/Slave dialectic, at least if we take

seriously the idea[13] that in fighting for recognition the Master rises above all determinations of life:

> the *exhibition* of itself as the pure abstraction of selfconsciousness consists in showing itself to be the pure negation of its objective mode, or in showing that it is fettered to no determinate *existence*, that it is not at all bound to the universal singularity of existence, that it is not shackled to life.[14]

However, it must be noted that rendering one's goal unreachable may be done not only by destroying the means that are necessary for reaching the goal, but also by performing acts that greatly exceed the given goal. To put it otherwise, one may also annihilate one's goal through excess, by going so much further than one's goal that the latter becomes utterly irrelevant or bygone. This is the case, for example, in killing sprees in which pure violence replaces any goals that one might initially have had. Completely unnecessary and unrestrained massacres of civilians or prisoners during wartime operations thus fall into this category of uncontrolled violence performed by unchained subjects (see, e.g., the My Lai massacre during the Vietnam War). But such cases should not be seen merely as acts of cruelty. Cruel acts may be said to be done for the perpetrator's pleasure, whereas, in the acts of the unchained subject, violence is done for the sake of violence. This uncontrolled violence does not seem to aim at anything or, to put it otherwise, it is done for the sake of *nothing*, it only marks the refusal of the perpetrators to be defined by any determinate goals or, to borrow Hegel's terms, their refusal to be fettered to a "determinate existence" or "shackled to life."

Of course, it has to be admitted that it may often be difficult — or even impossible — to determine when particular acts of violence have become entirely dissociated from any goals that the perpetrator may initially have had. I thus completely agree with Wieviorka that "it is not always easy to strike a balance between the meaning, which may be distorted, partly lost or reduced, for example, to an ideological form as it may be, that is expressed through violence, and the savagery and cruelty of the violence itself, which can appear to have nothing to do with its meaning."[15]

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[13] See, e.g., Alexandre Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel. Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit*, assembled by Raymond Queneau, edited by Allan Bloom, translated by James H. Nichols Jr., Cornell University Press, 1980; James Mensch, "Violence and Selfhood," in *Human Studies*, 36/2013, Springer, 25-41.

[14] Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, edited and translated by Terry Pinkard and Michael Baur, Cambridge University Press, 2018, 111.

[15] Wieviorka, *Violence A New Approach*, Sage, 2009, 125.

As for their manner of refusing time or of refusing to change, the "unchained subjects" do not adjust to the situation they are in because *they have nothing to adjust to anymore*. Once they revoked their goal, what could they adjust to? The concrete destruction of their goals marks the supreme form of refusal to adjust, i.e. the refusal to "put up" with any limitation imposed by the world to the unchained subject. In the previous three cases, we were dealing with situations that did not seem to require adjusting or that seemed to present a shortage of means for reaching a goal or seemed to require sacrificing distant goals for the sake of proximate ones; here, along with the concrete annihilation of our goal, the world itself loses its ability to demand adjusting from the subjects' part. Thus, the world itself gets reduced to the status of a correlate of purely destructive acts.

3. Conclusion

Based on some of Sartre's examples of violence in the *Notebooks* and on the systematization done in Jeler (2020) of four kinds of modifications of one's manner of relating to one's goal in violent behavior, this paper identified four types of violence, namely conservative, strategic, obsessive and uncontrolled violence. But the core of the paper consisted in showing that the subjects that perform these acts may be grouped into the four categories of defenders of the given order, instruments of a higher power, mineralized and, finally, unchained subjects. Moreover, I have also attempted to render more precise Sartre's repeated claim that violence implies a "refusal of time" by showing that, in their respective ways, the agents of each of these four categories are characterized by a refusal to change or to adjust to the situation at hand.

Acknowledgement