# PERSPECTIVES ABOUT TRUTH.
# INTRODUCTION

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Truth was always a central notion in philosophy. From an analytical perspective, the classical truth theories aimed to discover the underlying nature of truth. For example, the correspondence theory considers truth to be a relation between truth-bearers and truthmakers, while, the coherence theory of truth takes truth as being coherent with a specific set of beliefs. On the other hand, deflationary theories of truth - in general - tend to argue that there is no substantive nature of truth. According to those, truth can be defined in a trivial manner and its role is – at most – a logical one, the truth predicate being a purely logical device.

It seems that despite the differences between various truth theories, one common point is that they all have to face a common problem: semantic paradoxes. The Liar paradox (L:'This sentence is false'), there are different solutions for this paradox, but none of them can be generally applied. Some of them are too restrictive (for example Tarski's) and some of them have to face the Revenge of the Liar (as does the Kripkean one).

Usually truth theories face different issues and each of them has its own weak points. For example, minimalism - a deflationary approach - seems to have to embrace dialetheism in order to be able to provide a proper solution to the Liar. Theories based on correspondence have a hard time to provide relevant truthmakers for certain groups of sentences. The coherence theory of truth face the specification and transcendence objections.

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In addition to this, truth is only one of the semantic notions. These notions – as truth, meaning, reference, satisfaction – form a family circle and they are strongly linked and sometimes considered interdefinable. For example, a deflationist about truth has a hard time in explaining meaning, since they cannot use truth to do this – because of circularity. This brief presentation points out that truth is still a central notion in the analytical philosophy and there are many unanswered questions regarding this concept.

The first edition of *Perspectives about Truth* took place fully online from June 20 to June 22 last year. It aimed to provide an opportunity for researchers from different fields of (mostly) philosophy to talk about truth and other related notions. There were different panels from analytic philosophy (*Truth and other semantic notions; Modal truth*) to continental philosophy (*Truth and Metaphysics*), political philosophy (*Post-truth*), ethics (*Truth and Ethics*), philosophy of culture (*Cultural heritage and memory*), anthropology studies (*What do we do with the hard truths? Ethical and theoretical challenges for the anthropology of unpleasant realities; Communication and social studies*).

The four articles published in this special number of *Studia Philosophia UBB* are all somehow related to truth. Most of them focus on the notion from an analytical perspective, while one is based on continental philosophy. The first three of them were also presented during the already mentioned conference, while the last one is a different topic than the one presented to the event[1].

The first two articles were part of the panel entitled *Truth and other semantic notions*, that was focusing on the relation between semantical notions from an analytical perspective. Oprea's article – *Davidson on truth* – as the title suggests, focuses on the Davidsonian perspective of truth. Davidson's approach explains the concept of meaning using the concept of truth. By taking truth primitive, Davidson tried to use the T-schema in natural languages and explained meaning based on truth-conditions. Oprea aimed to critically analyse and counterargue Davidson's perspective. Paradoxes, hypotheses and performatives are some of the weaknesses pointed out by the author. By these, it seems that Davidson's perspective is too narrow to explain all the sentences of a natural language.

Goldberg's article – *Kantian views of empirical truth* – focuses not only on the Kantian perspective, but also on Carnap's, Kuhn's, Davidsonian and Quinean ones. The Kantian view takes the truth of an empirical claim depending on the truth of non-empirical ones. The author provides a critical analysis on the already mentioned views.

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[1] Paula Tomi's presentation during the conference has to be sent for publication to another journal.

Bondor's talk was part of the *Cultural heritage and memory* panel. The article focuses on the reconstruction of hermeneutical truth. In modern hermeneutics truth is strongly linked to the authorial intention and might be understood as correctness. The author argues that the authorial intention represents a limit of interpretation which is meant to prevent the risks of arbitrariness and hermeneutical relativism.

The last article – *Logical and rhetorical structure of news* – is a case study that mainly focuses on analytical philosophy and logic. Cotoară, Marouani and Tomi focus on three articles' structures in order to provide an analysis of their objectiveness. Their analysis does not focus exclusively on truth notion, but the notions that represent the aim of their work are strongly liked to the notion of truth. Their main aim was to point out the logical and rhetorical differences between different types of articles, mainly informative and evaluative ones.