

## THE WORLD-RELATEDNESS OF AFFECTIVITY: HEIDEGGER AND RICHIR

Dominic Nnaemeka EKWEARIRI\*

**ABSTRACT.** My investigation reveals that Heidegger's account of affectivity – though his grammatical determination included an ontical dimension or otherwise lived, personal experiences – is overshadowed by a dense ontology that cannot enable real phenomenal experience. This is why he could not account for other affective states such as emotions, feelings and the role of the body in affectivity. Besides, in that account we are lost when we seek to answer the question of whether moods are “one” or “many”. My aim is to point out how these deficiencies in Heidegger's account of mood could be overcome in Richir's account of affectivity, where indeterminate background feelings (affectations) could give rise to a determinate and occurrent emotion (affects). The advantage of this move is a rich ontic account of affectivity where not only the body but also sense/meaning of affective episodes play a robust role in an encounter of world events. If Richir reproached Heidegger for existential solipsism, one could now reproach the former for existentiell/phenomenal solipsism. In the end I suggest that these two core but opposite aspects of affectivity (the ontological and the ontic) belong to the same reality: Dasein is not just in the world (ontology), but also the world is in Dasein (ontic/phenomenological).

**Keywords:** mood, affection, affect, Heidegger's ontology, Richir's *Leib* and *sense*.

### Introduction

A first methodological remark is the question of why Richir's first phenomenological analysis of affectivity took Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* as starting point, even though it was Husserl who in the phenomenological tradition had made the first detailed analysis of the affective life. Husserl's extensive analyses of affectivity in the *Logical Investigations*<sup>1</sup> have shown that intentionality is intrinsic to affective experiences. Such mediation makes it clear that the affective act is not just (like Descartes) a movement of the soul<sup>2</sup> in itself; neither is it (like Michel Henri) a feeling in the sense of *sentiment* that reduces the affective experience to the auto-apperception of the self and not to something else. Thus pain is, so to speak, a self-experience and nothing of

---

\* Katholisch-Theologische Fakultät, Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität, Münster, Germany; Department of Philosophy, Institut für Transzendentalphilosophie und Phänomenologie, Bergische Universität Wuppertal, Wuppertal, Germany; Marc-Richir-Archiv, Bergische Universität Wuppertal, Wuppertal, Germany, [ekweariri@uni-muenster.de](mailto:ekweariri@uni-muenster.de); [dominicemfr@gmail.com](mailto:dominicemfr@gmail.com)

<sup>1</sup> Edmund Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen. Erster Band: Prolegomena zur reinen Logik*, Hohenstein Elmar (ed.), Den Haag: Nijhoff 1975 (HUA XVIII).

<sup>2</sup> René Descartes, *Les passion de l'âme*, Introduction and remarks by Pascale D'Arcy, Paris: Flammarion 1996, p. 117.



the things in the world.<sup>3</sup> Rather, for Husserl, the affective act goes beyond the interior dimension of subjectivity since it touches upon the objects of the world. This world-referentiality of affectivity owes its articulation therefore to Husserl's analysis. The affective act is something that goes beyond itself to represent an object in the world. So in mourning the object of mourning is represented that reaches into the world. In this way, affectivity can be distinguished from such non-intentional acts as sensations or feelings (sentiment) or the movement of the soul that may not be about anything specific or determinate. So we see that Husserl had already articulated affectivity in terms of interiority and exteriority on which Richir will later fall back to formulate his analysis of the immanence and transcendence<sup>4</sup> of affectivity. Another work on affectivity can be found in Husserliana XX111. In the latter case, Richir was able to make a profound discovery in phenomenology. Of great importance was the discovery of *phantasia*,<sup>5</sup> through which he opened up his own original path to the question of affective world-disclosure. Primarily – we have already mentioned this – his first access to affectivity, as Carlson<sup>6</sup> explained, took place

through Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit*. As we shall see, Heidegger's masterpiece is about a special approach to the world, beyond all *subjectivity* in the face of an *objective world* (intentionality). This is because for him, *Dasein* does not have to go into interiority first in order to be able to get into the world afterwards. It is unthinkable without the constitution of *being-in-the-world*.

Heidegger's doctrine on affectivity – denoting, as Elpidorou indicates, “an ontological structure”, which is “a way, the human way, of existing in the world and through which all aspects of human existence ... must necessarily be understood”<sup>7</sup> – aims at developing world-referentiality that is rooted in the ontological difference. But one sees therein that precedence is given to ontology, though the ontic aspect was also thematised. This ontological precedence becomes apparent not only in the case of the conceptual labelling which takes place with findingness<sup>8</sup> (*Befindlichkeit*) and mood (*Stimmung*) but also in the difficulty to confer a rich ontic dimension to mood. One sees there as well the mightiness of *being*, in other words of ontology which Heidegger could not escape, as the present analysis will endeavour to outline. This implies *inter alia* the difficulty

<sup>3</sup> Michel Henri, „*Phénoménologie et psychanalyse*”, in P. Férida und J. Schotte (editors), in *Psychiatrie et Existence, Décade de Cerisy*, Grenoble: Éditions Jérôme Millon 1991 [1989].

<sup>4</sup> We shall not touch upon these aspects in the present paper.

<sup>5</sup> We shall see that Richir's positive contribution to the affective life builds on and is directly related to the *phantasia*. We shall have time to say more on this.

<sup>6</sup> Sacha Carlson, « *Le langage, l'affectivité et le hors langage (Richir, Heidegger)* » in *Divination : Studia culturologica* series, vol. 41., 2015.

<sup>7</sup> Andreas Elpidorou, “On Affect: Function and Phenomenology” in *HUMANA.MENTE: Journal of Philosophical Studies*, 11(34) 2018, 155-184, p. 162.

<sup>8</sup> In line with Haugeland, we shall translate *Befindlichkeit* as findingness. John Haugeland, *Dasein Disclosed: John Haugeland's Heidegger*, Rouse Joseph (ed.) Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England, 2003.

of ontologically and ontically delineating the singularity and plurality of mood. How are the phenomenal, the feeling aspects of affectivity, which often – on Richir’s account – are not expressible with language, to be differentiated from those aspects that not only describe a certain way of being in relation to the world but also require language for their articulation? How can for instance the transformation of a *deep, diffuse affective state* into a *concrete and specific emotion* be accounted for without lumping all these different aspects in one pot as mood?

Richir’s development of affectivity highlights, precisely in this context, two connected but delimited parts: “Affection” and “Affects”. With this unparalleled development Richir could not only illuminate the correlation between plurality and singularity of affectivity – which also involve the *phenomenological* and the *symbolic* in order to remain faithful to Heidegger (we could also speak of the ontic and the ontological) – but also respond to the difficulty how Heidegger’s doctrine on affectivity could have differentiated mood from the concrete emotion. This is the positive or constructive aspect. Moreover from Richir’s confrontation with Heidegger emerges a negative or destructive side, in which the latter was heavily criticized. In the context of this critic, corpo-

reality (*Leiblichkeit*) was not only thematised as necessary for the receptivity of affectivity but also as *sense/meaning<sup>9</sup>-confering* instance of each affective experience. If for Heidegger, affectivity relates how *Dasein* has always *been in the world*, for Richir this world that is opened is nothing other than *sense* (capturing the indeterminate aspects of affection) or *meaning<sup>10</sup>* (capturing the determinate aspect of affects).

To achieve what has been described above, the paper is divided into three parts. The first is concerned with the schema of *Dasein*’s existential analytic, where the basic constitution of *being-in-the-world* and its consequences for the existential understanding of *Dasein* come to light. At the same time “findingness and the ontological *a priori* of world-relatedness” as well as the “difference between findingness and mood” will be thematised. In the second part we turn comprehensively to the investigation into whether mood is a singularity or a plurality, a problem that arises from a closer study of Heidegger. We conclude that Heidegger could not systematically discriminate those phenomenal moments in which affectivity could be understood as plural and singular respectively. This was the reason not only of his failing to account for feelings and emotions, but also for the ontological condensation of his

---

<sup>9</sup> *Sense* at this stage could be understood as that which every phenomena bears and wants to express; sense is a more primitive, and more basic aspect of meaning since it cannot yet be expressed with words, in a given language, given its indetermination. To do this we would require reflection. Meaning refers to those phenomena that words of languages could express. Thus on Richir’s account, all affective acts are all about the world and the world is nothing

other than a plurality (*sense*) or a singularity (*meaning*).

<sup>10</sup> This thesis has been defended in a recent dissertation. Cf. Dominic Ekweariri, *Leib und Leiblichkeit bei Marc Richir*, Inaugural-Dissertation zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades der Philosophie im Fachbereich A Geistes und Kulturwissenschaften der Bergischen Universität Wuppertal 2021.

doctrine of affectivity which made him to lump every dimension of affectivity under the concepts of mood/findingness. The third part addresses the negative and the constructive sides of Richir's examination of affectivity.

Critical of Richir's critic of Heidegger as guilty of existential solipsism, we, in the concluding section, ask if Richir himself could not be guilty of phenomenal solipsism – a question which paves the way for us to give an example of how contraries, in this case Heideggers' condensed immobile ontology and Richir's spontaneous and dynamic phenomenology, could be reconciled with each other.

## 1

### The schema of existential analytics of *Dasein*

Heidegger's mood/findingness (affectivity) finds its initial context in the existential analytic of *Dasein*. Therein the basic ontological constitution of this "who"<sup>11</sup> ascribed

entity (*Seiende*) – it is all about *Dasein's* ontological constitution and not those of present-at-hand (*vorhanden*) and ready-to-hand (*zuhanden*) entities – was thematised and turned out to be *being in the world*.<sup>12</sup>

Furthermore the ontological mode of *Being-in* implies to begin with neither a consciousness nor an affiliated concept of *Leiblichkeit* (corporeality). This would make the body to have a primacy over the world, which according to Heidegger would be a kind of naivety: to think that mankind was "first and foremost a mental thing which is then subsequently displaced into space."<sup>13</sup> Neither consciousness nor *corporeality* can ontically replace or exhaust this *a priori* of *Being-in*. World-relatedness is accordingly possible since "*Dasein*" "is" "as a *Being-in-the-world*". This is a declaration of ontological primacy. *In order words cognition of things or emoting must not presuppose an outside and inside since Dasein already cognizes ever since it is in the world. The question remains unanswered as to how extent cognition or affectivity could be thematised in a dense ontology without interiority.*<sup>14</sup>

<sup>11</sup> This characteristic of *Dasein* differentiates itself from all others whose essence result from *being what* or *essentia*. Instead, the ontological nature of *Dasein's* Being is portrayed as an Existence. This explains why it cannot be understood as "properties present-at-hand of some entity which 'look' so and so and is itself present-at-hand" but in its Being. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, Translated by Macquarrie, John & Robinson, Ed-ward, Blackwell, 1962, p. 67/42; Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, Tübingen:Max Niemeyer Verlag 2006, pp. 53. Henceforth when I cite the german version, I adapt the translations as mine.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 53, 130.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 56.

<sup>14</sup> This supposition receives an unequivocal confirmation from Heidegger who insists on the primacy of the ontological constitution: "When *Dasein* directs itself towards something and grasps it, it does not somehow first get out of an inner sphere in which it has been proximally encapsulated, but its primary kind of Being is such that it is always 'outside' alongside entities which it encounters and which belong to a world already discovered". Heidegger continues: "Nor is any inner sphere abandoned when *Dasein* dwells alongside the entity to be known, and determines its character; but even in this 'Being-outside' alongside the object, *Dasein* is still 'inside', if we understand this in the correct

The next move for Heidegger is the question: How can a phenomenological version of the original unified structure of *Dasein* (*Grundverfassung von Dasein*) be explained? Such a phenomenological layer should explain how *Dasein's* "mode of *being*" *there* (*da*) in the world is opened up – a gap which is filled by the investigation of "findingness" (*Befindlichkeit*), "understanding" (*Verstehen*) and "discourse" (*Rede*) and sometimes "falling" (*Verfallen*). So the question arises whether the affective life would not be pre-theoretically corrupt since *Dasein* is *always already* its *there*, familiar with its *there*, *from day to day*.

#### **Findingness and the ontological a priori of world-relatedness**

It has to be explicitly emphasised that "findingness" occupied a very important place in Heidegger's account of affectivity. Heidegger regrets that the programmatic function which findingness played in the history of affectivity has been forgotten since after Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. Scheler<sup>15</sup> was an exception in this

direction. This forgetfulness has some consequences for philosophy: on the one hand, affects and feelings missed their "goal" and turned out to be "psychological" and "accompanying phenomenon"<sup>16</sup>; on the other hand, the "underlying ontological interpretation of the affective" lost the exigency for which it has been known since Aristotle's *Rhetoric*<sup>17</sup>. This Aristotelian approach (*Rhetorik*. 11. 1.8-11) captured the social-worldly, existential dimension of affectivity which is the basis of Heidegger's ontological investigation. Findingness therefore seeks to liberate *affectivity* from psychological characteristics, and instead emphasizes its world-relatedness through which *Dasein*<sup>18</sup> unveils itself. That is why every understanding or each translation of *Befindlichkeit* (findingness) in the sense of disposition<sup>19</sup> is to be rejected. Heidegger coins a vocabulary "to disclose" to express this world-relatedness of *Dasein* via findingness. Disclosure (*Erschlossenheit*) neither refers to the perception of an object via intentionality. Rather the disclosing of findingness is "already" (*je schon*) accomplished. This

---

sense; that is to say, it is itself 'inside' as a Being-in-the-world which knows". Heidegger, *op.cit.*, 1962, p. 89/ 62. Cognition replaces for us Macquarrie and Robinson' "knowing". It is clear that Heidegger resists the distinction between inner and outside body. But the question remains, if such a move could do justice to the indeterminacy and determinacy of affectivity.

<sup>15</sup> Consider for instance Scheler's works: *The Nature of Sympathy*, Brunswick N.J., 2009 [1913] or *Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values: A New Attempt toward the Foundation of an Ethical Personalism*, Evanston, 1973 [1912-1916].

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 139.

<sup>17</sup> Aristotle, *The Art of Rhetoric*, translated by Freese, John Henry. London: Heinemann, 1926, p. 179.

<sup>18</sup> Heidegger, *op.cit.*, 2006, p. 136.

<sup>19</sup> See Macquarrie and Robinson's translation of *Being and Time* (1962) and Mayr's translation of the *Zollikon Seminar*. Martin Heidegger, *Zollikon Seminar*, translated by Franz Mayr, Illinois: Northwestern Univ. Press, 2000. However Haugeland distances himself from such an attribution of mental states and disposition and instead sustains the ontological density of *Befindlichkeit* (*findingness*). Heidegger himself warns that "Befindlichkeit is very far from something like the finding of a mental state." Heidegger, *op.cit.*, 2006, p. 136.

“already” is far from revealing what *findingness* discloses but brings one back to *beenness* (ontology). The problem with such a move for Richir is that affectivity is so much saturated with ontology – which is always already disclosed: therein lies the grain of passivity which forms part of Richir’s critic – that one wonders if room could be made for its phenomenological character; part of this concern is also the question whether the complexity of the affective life could be successfully captured without thematising

the role of corporeality, especially if the body is understood as *Leib*.<sup>20</sup>

However we do not know yet how findingness and mood<sup>21</sup> are connected. Though they are closely related, they express nevertheless varying subtleties.

### **Difference between *Findingness and Mood***

To differentiate between findingness and mood is first of all to make the distinction between “ontological” and “ontic” as

---

<sup>20</sup> To better understand the meaning of *Leib*, it is essential to distinguish it from another correlate term *Körper* as Husserl and Helmuth Plessner did. Helmuth Plessner wrote: “A person is always at the same time *Leib* (head, torso, extremities with everything that is in them) [...] and has this *Leib* as this *Körper*.” Helmuth Plessner, „*Ausdruck und menschliche Natur*”, in *Gesammelte Schriften*, 10Bde., Bd. VII, Frankfurt 1982, p. 238. The difference between the two concepts cannot be captured in English language without descriptions since the two concepts are translated as body. The body as *Körper* stands for an inanimate organism, a kind of exteriority that is conveyed to me through perception. It is, so to speak, that which is already tangible and touchable in the symbolic institution (i.e. culture). The body as *Körper*, for example, describes an object that can be reified, which one can own and manipulate. The term body as *Leib* is roughly understood to mean a *corps vivant* (Merleau-Ponty). In contrast to the body *Körper*, the body as *Leib* concerns the human being as an experiencing, living subject. It stands for the living - namely for living processes that cannot be possessed, but can only be experienced. To localize the body in the dimension of *being* (*Sein*), as Plessner did, makes it a place of events, encounters, of living, where one can feel everything that can be experienced such as laughing, crying, joy,

envy, pain, etc. This dimension of *Leib*, refer “at the same time” to “experiences in which nature announces itself in us - 'nature' insofar as the impulses of hunger, thirst, love, desire, etc.” Thomas Fuchs, „Zwischen Leib und Körper”, in M. Hähnel *et al* (editors), in *Leib und Leben: Perspektiven für eine neue Kultur der Körperlichkeit*, 2013, p. 84.

<sup>21</sup> This substantive, in German (*Stimmung*) is derived from the verb „to tune” (*Stimmen*), refers to the bringing in tune with each single notes of a musical instrument where a musician for instance tunes the strings of his guitar so that they could fit in relation to one another and produce the perfect tonality. For Heidegger even *not being tuned* (*Ungestimmtheit*) belongs to essential character of mood. So, the fact that Dasein’s mood changes suddenly or that Dasein appears as untuned is even the justification for Dasein’s mood, its tunedness in a way: “apparently *never there* and *yet there* is exactly that Un-tunedness in which we are *neither badly nor goodly tuned*. But in this ,neither nor’ we are never *not tuned*.“ Martin Heidegger, *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik*, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann 1983, p. 102, *My translation*. This *backside* of mood fits to the general project of *Being and Time* where Heidegger complains of the forgetfulness of *Being*. Although *it is there*, yet we have *forgotten the question of Being* or extremely thingified it.

these unequivocally point to the ontological difference. According to Heidegger: "What we ontologically show with the title *findingness* is ontically the most known and *the most ordinary (Alltäglichsste)*: mood, tunedness (*Gestimmtsein*)."<sup>22</sup> How is this to be understood? The dialogue between Heidegger and Peter Meier-Classen can be of help to us here: "Ontological means 'interpreting the doctrine of Being', ontic means 'concerning Being' ". Since Heidegger introduces this to mark the difference between the not objective entital Being and the entities appearing to it as so and so, one can relate the ontological to Being itself and the ontic to entities themselves. Only in this context is the sentence cited from the dialogue with Peter Meier-Classen meaningful: "Although *Dasein* is *ontically the nearest to us*, certainly we are even this *Dasein*, in spite of that or exactly because of that it is *ontologically the farthest to us*."<sup>23</sup> Whereas findingness (which is far from us) is tied to the ontological, mood (which is near to us) depicts the ontical and concerns the everydayness of *Dasein*.<sup>24</sup> Since "Being [...] comes prior to entity"<sup>25</sup>, *the ontological is from the outset a priori*. However findingness is ontically<sup>26</sup> expressed in mood.

Mood happens neither outside of *Dasein* nor in a part of its private inner subjectivity. Contrariwise, *Dasein* finds itself in

mood, a mode of 'this or that way': "moods are the how, according to which one is 'this or that way' "<sup>27</sup>. 'This or that way' means for example, that a sad person sees the world in a way. The world appears to him in a particular (singular) light that is not possible in the case of a happy person, for whom the world also appears in a singular, or from a particular, light.

## 2.

### Is mood (Affectivity) a singularity/ determination or a plurality/ an indetermination?

If above Heidegger is concerned with a specific light in which the world appears to *Dasein* in mood, does he not then give the impression that mood would be available to one in a singular ("this" or "that") way? How are diffuse and indeterminate affective situations (plurality) to be accounted for? Are these not also moods? Are moods then determined or indeterminate, singular or plural? There is no clear answer to this in Heidegger since in Heidegger moods seem to be both. We also know that there is an indecisive aspect of affectivity in Heidegger which is not immediately explicit; let us first illustrate this indecisiveness as it is given in facticity before we go to answer the question whether affectivity are singular or plural.

<sup>22</sup> Heidegger, 2006, *op.cit.*, 2006, p. 134.

<sup>23</sup> Peter Meier-Classen im Gespräch mit Martin Heidegger, <http://www.meier-classen.ch/interviews/heidegger.htm>. Internet access on the 5.5.2020.

<sup>24</sup> Andreas Elpidorou, Moods and Appraisals: How the Phenomenology and Science of Emotions Can Come Together, in *Human Studies*, 36 (4), 2013, 565-591.

<sup>25</sup> Heidegger, *op.cit.*, 2006, p. 134.

<sup>26</sup> The different and familiar affective ways become evident in everyday life. Through these affective ways *Dasein* relates with the world. The „affective ways“ are depicted as mood.

<sup>27</sup> Heidegger, *op.cit.*, 1983, p. 101.

So the indecisiveness (whether moods are singular or plural) becomes evident in case of *Dasein's* facticity or thrownness which for Heidegger captures both the aspect of *Being* and its evasion (*non-Being*), disclosure and concealment<sup>28</sup>. Though *thrown* means that *Dasein* finds itself there<sup>29</sup> where it is, and has no choice, Heidegger refuses to reduce what "is "evident" in findingness, by measuring it against the apodictic certainty of a theoretical cognition of something which is purely present-at-hand."<sup>30</sup> We have seen that Heidegger denies cognition access to the facticity of *Dasein*. In other words, though the facticity of the affective position of *Dasein* stares us in the face, this does not mean that *Dasein* has access to this affectively charged situation in which it is thrown. He illustrates this movement with the concept of „turning away" (*Abkehr*).<sup>31</sup> The concept depicts that that which mood has disclosed as facticity goes beyond what is recognizable and accessible to *Dasein*. There is always a "more" (Phenomenally what mood discloses is not to be "compared with what *Dasein* is acquainted with, knows, and believes 'at the same time' when it has such as mood"<sup>32</sup>), a "surplus" to mood's disclosure, although this *more* or *surplus* also escapes us.

In this way the backside (tunedness versus untunedness, thrownness and turning away) which we have already mentioned resurfaces again. What does this backside tell us? That affectivity also corresponds to a plurality, a *more*? That to every return (*Hinkehr*) corresponds also a turning away (*Abkehr*)? At this stage, Heidegger's account leaves us indecisive. We do not know precisely, if for Heidegger affectivity could be spoken of in the singular or in the plural. There are indications for both. However, Heidegger has no systematic way of accounting for these indeterminate and determinate aspects of the affective life. Later we shall turn to the whole structure of Richir's phenomenology to give reasons for these inadequacies.

The time has come for us to respond to the question of the singularity or plurality of affectivity. We approach the subject using two important moods as examples, which are given an important place in Heidegger: these are fear and anxiety. In order to respond to the questions that are important to us we shall treat their *disclosing contents* or *methods of disclosure*.

At first glance, mood appears in Heidegger as one that is "already there"<sup>33</sup> and something "that has the character of 'there'"<sup>34</sup>. The character of "there" refers to

<sup>28</sup> Heidegger, *op.cit.*, 2006, pp. 134, 135.

<sup>29</sup> Slaby called facticity "the unshakable condition of sheer 'being there' " and refuses understanding of it as "ways of finding oneself in the world" [Mathew James Ratcliffe, "Why Mood Matters", in Mark A. Wrathall (editor), *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger's Being and Time*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp 157-76] since such fails "to capture the full drama of factual situatedness, its 'hardness' "

Jan Slaby, "More than a Feeling: Affect as Radical Situatedness", in *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, XLI, 2017, 7-26, here p. 12, 13.

<sup>30</sup> Heidegger, *op.cit.*, 2006, 175/136, my translation.

<sup>31</sup> Heidegger, *op.cit.*, 1962, p. 174.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, 1962, p. 175.

<sup>33</sup> Heidegger, *op.cit.*, 1983, p. 91.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 95.

a *definitive* affective state that bears a *particular situational* name. He, however, shows that a *certain known situation* can also trigger off a certain behaviour. Fear, sadness, joy, hope, despair, weariness etc. are some examples that may correspond to a familiar event or a certain temporal context.<sup>35</sup>

Heidegger analysed fear in terms of: “that in the face of which we fear”, “fearing” and “that about which we fear”. In the first subtitle, the “fearful” turned out to be the “that in the face of which we fear”; it has the character of “threat” and it can, in turn, be fearful in diverse ways (as *present-at-hand*, as *ready-to-hand*, or as *co-Dasein*). Rather than expressing plurality the diversity expresses a specificity, a given determination that we derive from its properties: “1. What we encounter has detrimentality as its kind of involvement. It shows itself within a context of involvements. 2. The target of this detrimentality is a *definite* range of what can be affected by it; thus the detrimentality is itself made *definite*, and come from a *definite region*. 3. The region itself is *well known* as such, and so is that which is coming from it; but that which is coming from it has something ‘queer’ about it.”<sup>36</sup> With all of this, however, we see that in fear, the world appears in a *specific, definite*, affectively coloured view that enables a *certain* field of action. This is exactly what is meant in the second subtitle of *Fearing as*

*such*: “Fearing as a slumbering possibility of finding oneself being-in-the-world” for it gives a *specific* access to the world. This fear is not a case of a shadowiness but, as Jan Slaby expresses, “consists in a *specific affective awareness* of something as threatening”<sup>37</sup>. More so, in the third, “that about which we fear”, the disclosure has the purpose of “uncovering *Dasein* predominantly in a private way”<sup>38</sup>. Besides this disclosure of fear goes hand in hand with a closure. That means that *Dasein* does not have access to moods such as grief or joy whenever it fears. In the case of a person who is sad, the same can be observed: “He closes himself off, he becomes inaccessible.” His inaccessibility is explicit since “*the way we can be with him and he with us is different*. It is this sadness that determines this ‘how’ we are together.”<sup>39</sup> In other words, sadness as a mood is the specific way of opening the world to us. That is why it is part of the sadness of this sad person to be with us in his mood in a peculiar way that is not a usual way to be with. *This again shows that in Heidegger mood corresponds to a singularity, i.e. a determined<sup>40</sup> mode of “this or that way”, of relationship to the world.*

This interpretation becomes complicated, however, as soon as we continue our reading of Heidegger’s *Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik*: „At the same time it expresses that it is, in a way, not there. Strange, mood

<sup>35</sup> Heidegger, *op.cit.*, 2006, p. 345.

<sup>36</sup> Heidegger, *op.cit.*, 1962, p. 179.

<sup>37</sup> Jan Slaby, *Gefühle und Weltbezug*, Paderborn: Mentis, 2008, p. 132.

<sup>38</sup> Heidegger, *op.cit.*, 2006, p. 141.

<sup>39</sup> Heidegger, *op.cit.*, 1983, p. 99.

<sup>40</sup> Heidegger distinguishes three types of boredom. The first is explicitly understood with a

*determinate content*. With this first type (“getting bored of...”), there is a “certain boring” that implies for instance *this or that*, i.e. *this writing style, that way of reading this book* Heidegger, *op.cit.*, 1983, p. 172. However, this first type must be distinguished from the second, as we will shortly do.

is something that *is there* and at the same time *not there*.”<sup>41</sup> This reminds us again of the pairs of terms with which mood was already associated: tunedness and untunedness, returning and turning away, disclosure and closure. Each opposite pair forms Heidegger’s understanding of mood and is reflected in the essence of *Dasein*: “If mood is something that has the character of *being there* and *not-being there*, then it has to do with the innermost essence of human existence, with its *Dasein*.”<sup>42</sup>

This intertwining in mood itself approximates what appears in Robert Musil’s description of mental life, the nature of which is descriptively difficult because it is interwoven.<sup>43</sup> Mental and affective lives can hide within it unorganized and unspecified states: “The peculiar way in which feeling is both *present* and *not-present* can be expressed through a comparison that one has to imagine its growing and becoming based on the image of a forest, and not based on the image of a tree”<sup>44</sup>. The attribution of “present” and “not present” correspond to Heidegger’s terms: “being there (*Da-sein*) and “not being there” (*nicht Da-sein*). Musil goes on to discriminate between feelings and moods. Whereas feeling goes hand in hand with “something specific” (this understanding differs in a robust manner from Richirs depiction of affections), “that arises from a situation in life,

has a goal and is expressed in a more or less unambiguous behaviour”, mood is the opposite: “it is *comprehensive, aimless, spread out, inactive*, contains in all clarity something *indeterminate* and is ready to pour itself onto any object.” For Musil, feeling is a determinate way of relating-to-something; it draws us into action. But mood “only lets us participate behind a *coloured window*.”<sup>45</sup> On this ground, we can hypothetise Heidegger’s presence and non-presence above as referring to the indeterminacy of mood.

But can this claim be justified in Heidegger’s thoughts? Heidegger wrote that “that in the face of which one is anxious” is incapable of having an involvement; its threatening does not have “the character of a *definite* detrimentality...which reaches it with definite regard to a special factual potentiality-for-Being. *That in the face of which one is anxious is completely indefinite*.”<sup>46</sup> In other words, there is not concrete directedness to an object, to a specific event in anxiety. Anxiety therefore sees “not a specific ‘here’ and ‘there’ from which the threatening approaches.”<sup>47</sup> The threatening is “nowhere” and brings with it a sense of “uncanniness” and “not being home”. Hence we speak of the indeterminacy of anxiety. Same is true of the second and the third form of boredom.<sup>48</sup> *Based on this example, one can say that mood also contains a plurality. We mean in that sense diverse affective contents*

<sup>41</sup> Heidegger, *op.cit.*, 1983, p. 91.

<sup>42</sup> Heidegger, *op.cit.*, 2006, p. 95-96.

<sup>43</sup> Robert Musil, *Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften*, Novel/vol. 11, Reinbeck am Hamburg: Rowohlt Verlag, 1978, p. 1169.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, p.1171.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1197.

<sup>46</sup> Heidegger, *op.cit.*, 1962, p. 231.

<sup>47</sup> Heidegger, *op.cit.*, 2006, p. 186.

<sup>48</sup> The second type of boredom happens, even when nothing boring is available (you cannot even name for example “this or that book” as actually boring); it has the „character of *I do not know what* [...] so if we say: in the second case, there is nothing boring, then that means now: There is no *assignable* entity or rather no *determinate* connection between such thing which bores us directly.” Heidegger, *op.cit.*,

– *interwoven in each other – that do not yet have a specific name.* Is anxiety then really understood that way, as purely indeterminate? There are clues in Heidegger that anxiety is both like a determinate “emotion” (in the sense of our normal way of saying that “this or that person is anxious about an information”) as well as an indeterminate feeling<sup>49</sup> in the senses analysed in Heidegger above. Thus we see also that mood, despite its determinate understanding, *could also be indeterminate and plural in Heidegger.*

In so doing affectivity is rendered ambiguous in Heidegger’s account. The ambiguity resides precisely in the fact that mood appeared to *possess on the one hand a specific<sup>50</sup> concrete content (e.g. fear, love, jealousy, joy etc.) and that it refers on the other hand to diffuse, nebulous affective situations.* Heidegger seemed to have emotions in his mind while articulating some of the moods. He lumped both in one pot, though

the connection between mood and emotions were never worked-out<sup>51</sup>. So for the “fact that fear is directed at a specific worldly entity can be taken as evidence in support of the claim that fear, even in Heidegger’s understanding, is an emotion and not a mood.”<sup>52</sup> Even when Heidegger speaks of alteration or *the awakening* of affective episodes from neutral, not yet accessible, but shadow-like background findingness that seem just inaccessible to us, it is still obvious that he wants to account for how moods (e.g. the basic mood of anxiety) could serve as the basis out of which other moods (e.g. fear) could emerge. Thus fear “is grounded rather in anxiety, which in turn is what first makes fear possible.”<sup>53</sup> Anxiety, depicted as “not-at-home” is for Heidegger the “more primordial phenomenon” than fear.<sup>54</sup> But fear itself can in turn be altered into other moods: it can become “alarm”, “dread” and “terror,”<sup>55</sup> in the same way like

---

1983, p. 172-173, my translation. The third type, “the profound boredom”, also has a deeper original vagueness, which is evident in the expression: “it is boring” (or read as: “one is bored of it”), whereby the “it” (*es*) and that “one” (*man*) show an anonymous indefiniteness. *Ibid.* p. 204.

<sup>49</sup> Heidegger did not account for feeling; he rather lumped all forms of affectivity together in the catch-word “mood”.

<sup>50</sup> This recalls the “appraisal theories” in the philosophy of emotion, where for instance Lazarus in his “molecular appraisals” speaks of the “core relational theme” which expresses how an emotion articulates a certain kind of well-being. Anger und Anxiety for example express: “a demeaning offense against me” and my “facing uncertain, existential threat “respectively, whereas love and jeal-

ousy express “desiring or participating in affection, usually but not necessarily reciprocated” and “wanting what someone else has” respectively. Jesse Prinz, *Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion*, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004, p. 14. Each emotion has its specific object or its concrete content to which it is intentionally related. We fear the threatening in the world which springs from a *specific direction*.

<sup>51</sup> Andreas Elpidorou & Lauren Freeman, “Affectivity in Heidegger I Moods and Emotions in Being and Time,” in *Philosophy Compass* 10/10 2015, pp. 661-671, here p. 668. DOI: 10.1111/phc3.12236

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 668.

<sup>53</sup> Heidegger, *op.cit.*, 1962, p.230.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 234.

<sup>55</sup> Heidegger, *op.cit.*, 2006, p. 142.

boredom.<sup>56</sup> In all these instances, Heidegger is only concerned of the transformation of mood into other moods. For Elpidorou and Freeman, the different variations in the case of fear, “further supports” the “pronouncement”: fear, even in Heidegger’s account “is an emotion, and not a mood.”<sup>57</sup> Thus we can see that Heidegger’s account of affectivity is problematic in several ways.

### Difficulties with Heidegger’s account of affectivity and its ontological condensation

Despite Heidegger’s enormous contribution to the affective life, one can safely conclude that the articulation of affectivity still remains *problematic* in his account. First, as we have seen, he could not systematically discriminate those phenomenal moments in which affectivity could be understood as plural and singular respectively. He was at the verge of understanding how a determinate affective episode (eg. emotions) could emerge from indeterminate affective episodes (e.g. feelings). To that extent he remained like the biblical Moses, who saw the Promised Land but could not step into it. Secondly, though the analysis of findingness/mood revealed that

phenomenon was not completely forgotten by Heidegger, yet this analysis of mood was merged into the Being of entities in conforming to the general plan of *Being and Time*. If “phenomena” was “understood” in the light of Being, then that which mood (affectivity) should articulate phenomenologically was buried in the ontological constitution of Being<sup>58</sup>, as if it were *implicit* like Kant’s formal intuitions of time and space, and could only have to be made phenomenologically *explicit*.<sup>59</sup> In a word ontology prevails in Heidegger’s account of affectivity such that no room is accorded the *phenomenal*.

Richir’s critical reading of Heidegger gives us at least four clues to this claim of ontological density in Heidegger’s articulation of affectivity. First, according to Richir, the subject of affectivity, *Dasein*, is not a phenomenological but an ontological category, full of existence and empty of interiority and experience. Thus mood cannot justifiably open the world of *Dasein* if it blanks out or closes ontic experiential (or otherwise phenomenal) aspects and the affective interior life (designated by Augustine as *motus animae* and *passio animae*<sup>60</sup>). Consider also Maine de Biran’s concern with the intimate mode of our sensual Being,

<sup>56</sup> In many instances, Heidegger points to the transformation of boredom into other forms (Heidegger, *op.cit.*, 1983, p. 206) or to the transformation of the first and second forms of boredom into the third form (*Ibid*, p. 208). The case of the transformation of profound boredom into despair also finds a place here (*Ibid*, p. 211)

<sup>57</sup> Elpidorou & Freeman, *op.cit.*, 2015, p. 668.

<sup>58</sup> Heidegger, *op.cit.*, 1983, pp. 90, 91.

<sup>59</sup> John Haugeland, *Dasein Disclosed: John Haugeland’s Heidegger*, Rouse Joseph (ed.)

Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England 2013, p. 70.

<sup>60</sup> Aurelius Augustus. 2017. *The Trinity*, edited by John R Rotelle, New York: New City Press; Augustine Aurelius. 1998. *The City of God*, edited and translated by R. W. Dyson, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Johannes Brachtendorf. 1997. Cicero and Augustine on the Passions, in *Revue des Études Augustiniennes*, 43 (1997), 289-308.

its familiarity, its capacity to colour things or images, its evocation of affective shadows in us etc. which for Richir is very essential for affectivity<sup>61</sup>. Since for Richir interiority is crucial for an account of mood – for him only this interiority makes the phenomenological encounter of the world possible<sup>62</sup> – and since it is lacking in Heidegger's *Dasein*, Richir attributes an existential solipsism<sup>63</sup> to the performance of Heidegger's moods. Secondly, this existential solipsism is also expressed in the temporal restriction of affectivity in *beenness* (*Gewesensheit*). According to Richir, findingness (*Befindlichkeit*), as “based primarily on the past” (*Gewesenheit, Vergangenheit*<sup>64</sup>) captures the completed finality of affectivity: that it is locked up in the past. Besides the temporality of *findingness* (*Befindlichkeit*) modifies the temporality of *mood* (*Stimmung*) which belongs to the future and the present<sup>65</sup> and thereby making mood (the phenomenological) to be based/dependent on findingness (the ontological). Because of the ontological density/primacy of affectivity<sup>66</sup> in the past, Richir accused Heidegger's affectivity of “fundamental passivity”<sup>67</sup> which is illus-

trated in profound boredom or in the eternal repeatability of anxiety since the present and future are already exhausted in beenness<sup>68</sup> and in the fact that this repeatability causes a paralysis of *sense* which lies beyond the present. From this we could go to a third clue: If the ontological has the upper hand in affectivity and if affectivity portrays *Dasein* as lying in the past/beenness, it also means that the subject is lacking in the capacity to receive (transpassibility, if we fall back to Henri Maldiney<sup>69</sup>) in the face of an event. Because each event (such as an encounter of the other as person) brings with it something unpredictable, unexpected and surprising that only transpassibility can make subjectively liveable, Heidegger's account of affectivity, residing in the lethargy of an ontological condensation and in beenness, is lacking not only in the capacity of receiving events<sup>70</sup>, but also in the articulation of an encounter of the other. With this we come to a fourth clue, namely that, for Richir, the term „Being with” (*Mitsein*) was more of a verbal solution, an abstract existential rather than one that articulates a concrete experience<sup>71</sup>.

<sup>61</sup> Pierre Maine de Biran, *Mémoire sur la décomposition de la pensée, Œuvres complètes* (volumes 111), Paris : Vrin 1988, p.92.

<sup>62</sup> Marc Richir, « *Stimmung, Verstimmung et Leiblichkeit dans la Schizophrenie* », in Manuel R.D. (editor), *Conferencias de Filosofia 11*, Campo das Letras, 2000, 61.

<sup>63</sup> See this citation: „Anxiety individualizes *Dasein* and thus discloses it as '*solus ipse*' ” (Heidegger, *op.cit.*, 1962, pp 188-189; Marc Richir, *Méditations Phénoménologiques*, Grenoble : Jérôme Million, 1992, p. 41).

<sup>64</sup> Heidegger, *op.cit.*, 2006, p. 340.

<sup>65</sup> Heidegger, *op.cit.*, 1962, p. 390.

<sup>66</sup> That “mood is always already there”, as Heidegger always says, is a clue to this dense ontology in Heidegger's investigation of affectivity.

<sup>67</sup> Richir, *op.cit.*, 1992, p. 43.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>69</sup> Henri Maldiney, *Penser l'homme et la folie*, Grenoble: Éditions Jérôme Million Maldiney, 1991, p. 17.

<sup>70</sup> Richir, *op.cit.*, 1992, pp. 48-49.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 41.

### 3. Recuperating the phenomenality of affectivity through corporeality

The above problematics give rise to the question how one could then recuperate the phenomenon from a condensed metaphysics/ontology of affectivity? This question has been posed and responded to elsewhere, in relation to the perception of artworks<sup>72</sup>. In line with our concerns in this paper, we only emphasize that it is only the phenomenological, which is required, according to Richir, for the *aporias* of the metaphysical/ontological, and which understands itself as the *reverse side* (*l'envers*) of the metaphysical/ontological – in contrast to Heidegger's understanding of it as "the science of the Being of entities"<sup>73</sup> – that can accord us access to the phenomenon that is buried in ontology and thereby recuperating the *phenomenality* of affectivity. In so doing, Richir does not place a ban on the ontological, but recognises the mutual tension

between the two worlds (the phenomenological and the ontological), while at the same time highlighting that they were different registers and ought to be kept apart. With this, he is able to account for – this is the first problematic above – what seems lacking in Heidegger, i.e. showing how affective states could be both indeterminate (plural) and determinate (singular). The indetermination of affectivity (e.g. feelings, affections) is grounded on what he calls the basis of phenomenology: corporeality (the platonian *chora*, i.e. *Leiblichkeit*) and the *phantasia-affectio*<sup>74</sup>; the determinate affectivity (e.g. the emotion of love, jealousy etc.) is articulated by what he calls the symbolic institution<sup>75</sup>. He understands the movement from one register (the indeterminate) to the other (the determinate) as an *architectonic transposition* which further could be explained in terms of a movement from pre-reflectivity of affective states to their reflective cognition (in emotional episodes).

<sup>72</sup> Dominic Ekweariri, "Appreciation of Art as a Perception sui generis: Introducing Richir's Concept of the "Perceptive" Phantasia", in *Front. Psychol.*, 12:576608, 2021, doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.576608.

<sup>73</sup> Heidegger, *op.cit.*, 1962, p. 61.

<sup>74</sup> Dominic Ekweariri, « *La Χώρα (Leiblichkeit) comme la base de la phénoménologie* », in Alexander Schnell (editor), *Annale de Phénoménologie*, Association Internationale de Phénoménologie, 2020, pp. 326-356.

<sup>75</sup> For Richir the symbolic institution refers to the "totality of symbolic systems" – such as language, rites, action, practice, emotions, representations, representations such as in art or in the media, etc. – which code "being,

actions, belief and thought " of people without the latter having intentionally or consciously selected or decided to do so. They are always there since our *being in the world*. Marc Richir, *L'expérience du penser : Phénoménologie, philosophie, mythologie*. Grenoble : Éditions Jérôme Million 1996, p. 14. For an elaborate and extensive reading see also Flock, Philip Bastian, *Das Phänomenologische und das Symbolische: Marc Richirs Phänomenologie der Sinnbildung in Auseinandersetzung mit dem symbolischen Denken*, Inaugural-Dissertation zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades der Philosophie im Fachbereich A Geistes und Kulturwissenschaften der Bergischen Universität Wuppertal 2017.

To overcome the ontological condensations above, Richir, while following Sartre's criticism of Heidegger<sup>76</sup> for failing to give a detailed account of corporeality (*Leiblichkeit*), hinted that not only that *corporeality* could accord interiority – Husserl's *Innenleiblichkeit* – to the subject of affectivity; but also it renders *the phenomenological encounter of the world/and events affectively possible* and thereby overcoming what Heidegger's treatment of *Mitsein* (intersubjectivity) has failed to articulate: concrete experience and the robustness of emotional face to face encounters<sup>77</sup>. I have argued elsewhere against Richir that it is untenable to totally deny Heidegger's ontological condensation (of being-in-the-world) of all levels of embodiment for some obvious reasons: Heidegger wanted to avoid a *Cartesian dualism* between inside and outside which would for instance see in *blushing* (*Erötten*) caused by an embarrassing condition a psychic and a somatic phenomenon, and there psychologising

and technologising/objectifying<sup>78</sup> *Dasein*. He wanted to show how the body is immersed/embedded in the world with a sense of *immediacy*.<sup>79</sup> Reading, writing for instance, are forms of the body's *being in the world*. Blushing might mirror how *Dasein* stands in relationship to his co-*Dasein* (in *Mitsein*) in the world.

Nevertheless, such an account will not mirror how the subject of blushing got affectively "infected"/ "contaminated" or how subjects come to share their joys together via emotional contagion or even how I come to understand the emotion of the other via empathy. This is the subtle point that Richir wants to explain when he speaks of *affective communicative contagion* by which bodily subjects experience a *circulation of affectivity*<sup>80</sup> running unbrokenly from one inner-body to its outside-body and then to the other's inner-body and her outside body via feeling (*ressentir*). I experience joy which I bodily communicate to the person

<sup>76</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Zollikoner Seminare*. Medard Boss (editor), Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann 1987.

<sup>77</sup> In line with Richir's criticisms of the *Mitsein*, we add those of Gallagher and Jacobson. They criticized Heidegger's intersubjectivity for not thematizing the face to face encounter. Schau Gallagher & Rebecca Seté Jacobson, Heidegger and social cognition, in J. Kiverstein & M. Wheeler (Eds.), *Heidegger and cognitive science*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2012, pp. 213–245. The importance of the face to face encounter has been affirmed in recent studies of collective intentionality and shared emotions. See Shaun Gallagher, *The practice of mind: Theory, simulation or primary interaction?*, in *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 8(5–7) 2001, 83–108; Shaun Gallagher, *How the body shapes the mind*. Oxford: Clarendon Press 2005; Colwyn Trevarthen, *Communication and Cooperation in Early Infancy:*

*A Description of Primary Intersubjectivity*, in M. Bullowa (Ed.), *Before Speech: The Beginning of Interpersonal Communication*. Cambridge: UP 1979.

<sup>78</sup> Kevin Aho, "Acceleration and Time Pathologies", in *Time and Society*, 16(1) 2007, pp. 25-42. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0961463X07074100> accessed on: 8. 3. 2021; See also Kevin Aho, *Heidegger's Neglect of the Body* Albany, NY: Sunny Press 2009.

<sup>79</sup> Peters Meindert, "Heidegger's embodied others: on critique of the body and 'intersubjectivity,'" in *Being and Time*", in *Phenom Cogni Sci*, 18 2019, Springer's Phenom, pp. 441-459; <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-018-9580-0> accessed on: 27.02.2021.

<sup>80</sup> Marc Richir, « *Des phénomènes du langage* », in Maria José Cantista (Editor), in *Perspectivas o sujeito et racionalidade*, Porto: Campo de Letras 2005°, pp. 95-107, p. 96.

around me. S/he immediately experiences this same joy and I immediately embody his/her joy as I experience that s/he experienced a great joy. While running through and permeating the embodied subjects the prevailing emotion is experienced in a way that directly short-circuits<sup>81</sup> “language” (*langue*<sup>82</sup>), though mobilizing the “language phenomenon” (*langage*<sup>83</sup>).

According to the last statement above, if corporeality makes a phenomenological encounter of the world affectively possible, then a corporeal affectivity has to articulate the dimension of sense<sup>84</sup> *in the making* (*sens se faisant*). The world that is affectively opened to me, is a world that confers sense (or an inchoate meaning), even in the encounter of the other. In *Meditations Phénoménologiques* Richir writes that that which is experienced, such as the joy between two humans, is nothing other than the sense itself, “as incarnated in corporeality”.<sup>85</sup> Since the sense depicts for Richir that which

is affectively lived in the body, and since this affective sense does not articulate what belongs to the order of being, but that which exceeds our capacity to be,<sup>86</sup> we can say it is that which, given its enigmatic character, relativizes the ontological order of pure determination. The order of being is exceeded for instance in the fact that when you communicate yourself affectively to me in the context of an intersubjective encounter, you do not yourself master all your joy or your sadness: in other words, the indeterminate sense of your affective state partly escapes you; on the other hand, in any way I might react to your affective communication, I would not have mastered my reactions; your affective state “wins me despite me, and invades me to rejoice or to despair.”<sup>87</sup> This means also that the sense which the affective communication is all about escapes or overwhelms me. This *sense in the making*, in its indeterminacy, is to affections, what meaning in its determinacy, is to affects.

<sup>81</sup> Richir, *op.cit.*, 2000, p.63.

<sup>82</sup> This refers to the traditional representations or signs that every language carries. Thus the signs of the language “designate objects intuited in perception or imagination”; “they are, as Husserl says, purely symbolic” (Richir, *op.cit.*, 2000, p. 96). The words “rot”, “rouge”, “red” in both German, French and English respectively are signs for the a specific colour that represents blood in the world. The signs therefore require a symbolically institutionalized language in order to “express” the objects/or categories of *being* which they designate in the world.

<sup>83</sup> Richir understands language phenomenon as *plural phenomena*. It refers to those phenomena which can only be understood in relation to *sense in the making*. They have already opened themselves to the subject and are also trying to establish themselves.

<sup>84</sup> *Sense in the making* is what every language phenomenon (*langage*) carries, while seeking to express itself. It is thus conveyed by the language phenomenon without which it cannot be. It is that which emerges each time I have an idea or a feeling and I want to communicate. Richir describes sense in the making as an enigma because on the one hand I embody it and on the other hand it escapes me. (Richir, *op.cit.*, 2006a, p. 96-97). To escape me implies simply that I cannot employ language to capture it since there is an aspect of it that is evasive. The most primitive aspect of meaning is evasive and non-positional; it appears to us as *sense*.

<sup>85</sup> Richir, *op.cit.*, 1992, p. 36.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 49.

<sup>87</sup> Richir, *op.cit.*, 2000, p. 62.

### Affectivity as Affection and Affects

If we now turn to the completely positive development of affectivity in Richir, we are dealing with two concepts. The first is that of “affection” (*l’affection* or what Richir calls elsewhere “mood” or “primitive mood”<sup>88</sup>). So that we would be well positioned to understand the place of *affection* in Richir’s phenomenology, let us note that Richir accords corporeality – which he had understood as the platonian *chora* – a dualistic character: corporeality is *schematic* and *proto-ontological*; or it is the “milieu” of *phantasia* and *affections*. We shall not be able to give a detailed account of these concepts here.

By proto-ontological he means that most primitive form of corporeality that escapes positionality in a historical time. Rather than capturing something that could be located in the historical past or future, Richir says that in the proto-ontological, the *transcendental past* (*the immemorial*) and the *transcendental future* (*the immature*) intersect in a distance (*en écart*). Inspired by Levinas’s *immemorial* which proposed a form of temporal phenomenon beyond<sup>89</sup> the limitations of Heidegger’s *being* and positional finitude of time, Richir depicts the

proto-ontological as the archaic ground of affectivity in its most obscurely objectless and fleeting movement, where all forms of *fixed temporality* (e.g. historical past/beennes) and *being* is relativized.<sup>90</sup> So the proto-ontological characterizes the register of corporeal affective events, which is more original than Heidegger’s affectivity (mood / findingness). For Richir this proto-ontological is the very lively indeterminate basis/background of *being-in-the-world*. It is never in *act* but implies *a potency to be* and goes beyond all possibilities that would be *thetically* accessible to the subject in the *present*. The name for the phenomenon at play at this level of operation is *affection*.

Phenomenological schematism which, in accord with Richir’s interpretation of Plato’s *Timeus*, results from the shaking of the *chora* (*corporeality*) by the elements, leaves the traces of the *phantasmata* (In *Timeus*,<sup>91</sup> this refers to the state of dream, with one leg in the world of being and the other in the world of non-being; though it seems to depict an *image* about something, it is nevertheless not in any part of the world), i.e. the *phantasia*<sup>92</sup> in it. The *phantasia* has nothing of its own, not even that of which it is supposed to be image. The

<sup>88</sup> Richir *op.cit.*, 2006a, p. 96.

<sup>89</sup> Emmanuel Levinas, *Autrement qu’être ou au-delà de l’essence*, Paris : Kluwer Académic 1978, p. 141. See also Paulette Kayser, Emmanuel Levinas : *La trace du féminin*, Paris : Presse universitaire 2000.

<sup>90</sup> Marc Richir, *Fragments phénoménologique sur le temps et l’espace*, Grenoble : Éditions Jérôme Million 2006.

<sup>91</sup> Platon, “Timaios”, Otto Apelt (editor), in *Platon Sämtliche Dialoge*, volume VI. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag 1993, p. 52/152.

<sup>92</sup> The *phantasia* is distinguished by Husserl from imagination. While the *phantasia* is involved in the representation of an interior object the imaginations functions in the presentation of an external object (*Bildsujet*) via a copy (*Bildobjekt*). Later, Husserl vacillated, undecided, between conferring the *phantasia* an internal object (*Bildobjekt*) or not, while ending up for the former. Richir’s radicalisation of phenomenology is in part due to his refusal of any *Bildobjekts* and intentionality for the *phantasia*. The result is that henceforth

phenomenological schematismus therefore indicates that only movements of instability and always fleeting, changing *appearances*<sup>93</sup> are captured in the archaic non-thetic body (*Leib*). Thus the body in its most archaic form is schematic and ontologic or simply put: *phantasia-affection*, because the apperception of *phantasia* implicates the apperception of *affection*. When I listen to music for instance, it is a corporeal activity in which the embodied music wants to communicate/speak something to me. What it wants to speak is objectless (pre-reflexiv) as fleeting appearances (*phantasia* which is the basis of what we have described above as *sense and language phenomenon*) I cannot thetically position as this or that (*language*) in the moment of just enjoying the music. However, I just enjoy the music. But this fleeting appearance of a certain objectless

world (*phantasia*) goes hand in hand with a corresponding fleeting affection of the mind (*affection*) which I cannot describe as this or that emotion. It is simply a sort of *primitive feeling*<sup>94</sup> – distinguishable from collective feelings<sup>95</sup> – stirred up in the body by the music I have incarnated. Perhaps one could say, as Sartre did of emotional consciousness, “that this feeling is “at first non-reflective, and upon that plane it cannot be consciousness of itself”<sup>96</sup> or, as Hans Bernhard Schmid writes, “the feeling is not a localized experience, it is a feeling which one feels, to use Descartes’ expression, “as if they were in the soul.”<sup>97</sup>

If Richir later claimed that affection *does not coincide with itself*, but remains in contact with itself, albeit “*through a distance* that opens up in it,”<sup>98</sup> it is because he wants to describe a primitive aspect of affectivity

---

the *phantasia* forms the archaic base of phenomenology from which the intentionality of objects could be generated through an architectonic transposition. This happens through the movement of the imagination. See Edmund Husserl, *Phantasie, Bildbewusstsein, Erinnerung: Zur Phänomenologie der anschaulichen Vergegenwärtigungen*, Eduard Marbach (editor), Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff; Alexander Schnell, *Le sens se faisant: Marc Richir et la refondation de la phénoménologie transcendentale*, Bruxelles : Édition Ousia 2011, pp. 65-66. See also Dominic Ekweariri, *Leiblichkeit comme ouverture au monde chez Marc Richir*, in *Studia Phenomenologica* 2021, in the press.

<sup>93</sup> Marc, Richir, *Phénoménologie en Esquisses : Nouvelles Fondations*, Grenoble: Éditions Jérôme Million 2000.

<sup>94</sup> Richir, *op.cit.* 2006, p. 277: “second affect appearing exogenous “as distinct from “second concrete but primitive... endogenous affect.” This citation shows that affection is not yet concrete and cannot explain any category of

*being* at this stage. It depicts the interior immediacy of a pre-reflexive affective movement of the soul as evident feeling.

<sup>95</sup> At this stage we are articulating not a collective’s feelings, as defended by Hans Bernhard Schmid following Max Scheler, in which feelings as body-related are “shared among the members in the way of the member’s plural pre-reflective self-awareness of their emotional concerns as theirs.” Hans Bernhard Schmid, “Collective Emotions, Phenomenology, Ontology, and Ideology: What should we learn from Max Scheler’s War Propaganda”, in *Thaumàzein*, 3 2015, pp. 103-119, here p. 108; doi: /10.13136/thau.v3i0.44; See also Scheler, *op.cit.*, 2009 [1913];

<sup>96</sup> Jean-Paul Sartre, *Esquisse d’une théorie des émotions*. Paris : Hermann ; Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions, trnas, P. Mairet, London: Routledge Classics, 1938/2004, p. 34.

<sup>97</sup> Schmid, *op.cit.*, 2015, p. 108.

<sup>98</sup> Richir, *op.cit.*, 2000, p. 312.

that subverts the metaphysical/ontological, through its indeterminacy,<sup>99</sup> an indetermination which roots it profoundly in the primordial layer of *phantasia*. The distance (*écart*) mentioned above, has been recently understood in Richirian phenomenology as the hermeneutical key<sup>100</sup> to interpret the *excess of phenomenon*, i.e. the indetermination of lived experience as it occurs in affectivity, sense/meaning, perception etc. In the context of Richir's criticisms of Heidegger, this distance is precisely the distance that was lacking in Heidegger's analysis – with the consequence that affectivity is grounded in the past, finalised time frame as a whole, as with *profound boredom*. The indetermination of affection characterizes the plurality of affective phenomenon because it expresses the plurality of *indeterminate but determinable* worlds<sup>101</sup> opened to the feeling subject. If according to Richir, the indetermination of affectivity is rooted in *phantasiai-affections*, which as we have seen, is purely corporeal, then it means that this account should serve as a positive corrective to the inadequacies of the Heideggerian account we have highlighted. In doing so, the *phenomenal* would have been recuperated.

However, the fact that “affection” portrays the dimension of *indeterminate* background feelings (Richir uses “*é-motion*” to emphasize its eternal mobility) does not

mean that “affection” cannot be *determined*. Through a transposition it becomes<sup>102</sup> affects, just as the “second affect second appearing exogenous”<sup>103</sup> functions as a “kickstart” (*Anstoß*) that gives rise to external sensation. This transposition can take place through an imagination or via a reflective activity. Only then can affection recognise itself and could be articulated by *language*. We cite Richir in details to this regard:

If one wonders about the phenomenology of affection, it happens that the latter seems *originally innocent or naive*, that it cannot be recovered..., if not later, or too late, in affect, therefore that it surprises, or “betrays” some unexpected movement of the “soul”, and that, however, as soon as it recovers itself, it “knows” itself, knows that it is it which has been transposed into the corresponding affect, which is present.<sup>104</sup>

In the above passage, Richir describes affection as an originally naïve, evasive phenomenon that is only recovered through some conscious acts of the mind. In that moment affects betrays the innocence and the evasiveness of affections, which occurs in a temporalization “absent”/without present (*sans présent*), by making them objects of cognition, changing their temporality from being “absent” to being present. The

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 311.

<sup>100</sup> Dominic Ekweariri, *op.cit.*, *Leib und Leiblichkeit bei Marc Richir*, 2021.

<sup>101</sup> Sacha Carlson, « Le langage, l'affectivité et le hors langage (Richir, Heidegger) », in *Divination : Studia culturologica* series, vol. 41, 2015, p. 63.

<sup>102</sup> Slaby has defended the thesis that moods (and background feelings) are less specific, but through a gradual dynamical transformation they could turn to be more specific

emotions. (Slaby, *op.cit.*, 2008, pp. 166-167) But one of the huge differences with Richir is that Slaby defended the idea that background feelings are intentional.

<sup>103</sup> Marc Richir, *Fragments Phénoménologique sur le Temps et l'Espace*, Grenoble: Éditions Jérôme Million 2006, p.277.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*, p.311. My translation.

consequence is that, in that sense, I could describe what my feelings of hearing music are like when I use a particular, *determinate* concept to describe what I feel about the music. For example I could say it is a sorrowful song in which sorrow describes a determinate ocurent emotion (*i.e.* the “second concrete but primitive endogenous affect”) that could be attributed to my stand in relation with the world. In affects, no longer do I describe what I feel with *sense* or *language phenomenon*. Rather affects are captured by the description of language or words, reflectively – and the corresponding language used confers *meaning or value* to the affective episode and this meaning/value thereby describes how I stand in relation to the world. Sorrow, joy, love, jealousy, contempt are emotions which describe the world in a *determinate sense*. All this takes place in *becoming conscious* – this is richirian version of the Heideggerian *awakening of mood* mentioned in an earlier section – of feelings that are formed in affection which now bear an identity. So this second dimension marks the *singularity of the world of affectivity* as it articulates the dimension of the symbolic institution. With this, we have responded to the question posed above, how singularity and plurality correspond together in affectivity in which Heidegger lumped mood and emotions together in one pot.

### In the guise of a Conclusion

In summary, based on these *two worlds* (the plural/indeterminate/phenomenal and the singular/determinate/ontological) open to us, we could say that Richir represents the first while Heidegger represents the second. If Richir is attributed the *ontic phenomenological dimension* and Heidegger the *ontological dimension*, one can ask whether Richir himself does not fall into another type of ditch: *phenomenal solipsism* because of his emphasis on the ontic/phenomenological aspect of affectivity. We do not have sufficient space to go into this question. Suffice it to say that not only is *Dasein in the world* (ontology), but also the world is in *Dasein* (ontic). The World is in *Dasein*, when he, for instance, participates in an aesthetic experience: “He ceases to be his ordinary self, and the picture or building, stature, landscape, or aesthetic actuality is no longer outside of him.”<sup>105</sup> “No longer outside of him” indicates that the world is in *Dasein* and to that extent too, *Dasein* is transformed; he is stirred. In such moments, “the power of Being grasps and holds our attention, releases us to the thing in such a way that we become one with the thing. Then *we think from* rather than at the thing”<sup>106</sup>. “Thinking from” also indicates the appropriation of that world which is now in us.

---

<sup>105</sup> Berenson Bernard, *Aesthetic and History*, New York: Pantheon, 1948, p. 93.

<sup>106</sup> David Martin, *The Humanities through the arts*. NY: Mc Graw Hill, 1974, p. 98.

Contrariwise, *Dasein* is in the world through his bodily, affective coloration of it. This is why we evoke emotions corresponding to specific social institutions: the comedian's work, even if s/he herself/himself were sad,<sup>107</sup> is to colour the ambience of the audience with a mixture of fun, laughter, joy, exhilaration etc. In the context of a funeral ceremony, attendees are to bring grief, sadness and mourning. Stewards, sales persons, receptionists etc. colour their work space with cheerfulness, courtesy and friendliness to make their customers feel at home. This is the functional aspect of emotion that Sartre hinted in his *Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions* when he wrote that emotion "is a transformation of the world."<sup>108</sup> Let us note that it is all about our transformation of the world, our coloration of it through the emotions. The emotions arise often when everything in the world appear so exacting, when we are faced with difficulties, though we must have to act. He continues: "So then we try to change the world... to live it as though the relations between things and their potentialities were not governed by deterministic processes but by magic."<sup>109</sup> The keynote here is magical and emotion portrays the world in terms of magic. The world we encountered before we coloured it with a given emotion is different from the one we now see from a certain point of view. Elpidorou comments on this citation showing that emotional consciousness does not bring a material transformation of the world since the world continues to be the world. From that material perspective the world remained unchanged.

Nevertheless, it is our emotional consciousness of disgust, for instance, which "changes innocuous objects into repulsive ones," whereas our emotional consciousness of "anxiety renders familiar situations overwhelming,"<sup>110</sup> the same way our emotional consciousness of joy evoked by the comedian, sees everything optimistically. This is a way *Dasein* can be in his world, he transforms the world with emotional consciousness. All these show, as Richir wrote, that affectivity is susceptible to being symbolically instituted in every society.<sup>111</sup>

If *Dasein* is in the world (ontology) and the world is in *Dasein* (ontic/phenomenality), then all accounts of affectivity should not be one-sided but endeavour to include both sides. This is what Richir, following the phenomenological tradition since Husserl, has done to complement the densely rich ontological account of Heidegger.

## References:

- Aho, Kevin, "Acceleration and Time Pathologies", in *Time and Society*, 16(1) 2007, 25-42.  
 Aho, Kevin, *Heidegger's Neglect of the Body*. Albany, NY: Sunny Press 2009.  
 Aristotle, *The Art of Rhetoric*, translated by Freese, John Henry. London: Heinemann 1926.  
 Aurelius Augustinus, *The City of God*, R. W. Dyson (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1998.  
 Aurelius Augustinus, *The Trinity*, edited by John R Rotelle, New York: New City Press 2017.  
 Berenson, Bernard. *Aesthetic and History*. New York: Pantheon 1948.

<sup>107</sup> Richir, *op.cit.*, 2000, 66.

<sup>108</sup> Sartre, *op.cit.* 1939/2004, p. 39-40.

<sup>109</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>110</sup> Elpidorou, *op.cit.*, 2018, p. 165.

<sup>111</sup> Richir, *op.cit.*, 2000, 67.

- Brachtendorf Johannes, Cicero and Augustine on the Passions, in *Revue des Études Augustiniennes*, 43, 289-308.
- Descartes René, *Les passion de l'âme*, Introduction and remarks by Pascale D'Arcy, Paris: Flammarion 1996.
- Fuchs Thomas „*Zwischen Leib und Körper*“, in M. Hähnel et al (ed.), *Leib und Leben: Perspektiven für eine neue Kultur der Körperlichkeit* 2013.
- Dominic Ekweariri, *Leib und Leiblichkeit bei Marc Richir*, Inaugural-Dissertation zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades der Philosophie im Fachbereich A Geistes- und Kulturwissenschaften der Bergischen Universität Wupper-tal 2021.
- Dominic Ekweariri, "Appreciation of Art as a Perception Sui Generis: Introducing Richir's Concept of the "Perceptive" *Phantasia*", in *Front. Psychol.*, 12:576608, 2021, doi: [10.3389/fpsyg.2021.576608](https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2021.576608).
- Dominic Ekweariri, "*Leiblichkeit comme ouverture au monde chez Marc Richir*", in *Studia Phenomenologica* 2022, in the press.
- Elpidorou Andreas, "Moods and Appraisals: How the Phenomenology and Science of Emotions Can Come Together", in *Human Studies*, 36 (4), 2013, 565-591.
- Elpidorou Andreas, "On Affect: Function and Phenomenology" in *HUMANA.MENTE: Journal of Philosophical Studies*, 11(34) 2018, 155-184.
- Elpidorou Andreas. & Freeman Lauren, "Affectivity in Heidegger 1: Moods and Emotions in Being and Time", in *Philosophy Compass*, 10/10, 2015, 661-671.
- Gallagher Shaun, "'The prac-tice of mind: Theory, simulation or primary interaction?'" in *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 8(5-7) 2001, 83-108.
- Gallagher Shaun, *How the body shapes the mind*. Oxford: Clarendon Press 2005.
- Gallagher Shaun & Jacobson Rebecca Seté, "Heidegger and social cognition", in J. Kiverstein & M. Wheeler (Eds.), in *Heidegger and cognitive science*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2012, pp. 213-245.
- Haugeland John, *Dasein Disclosed: John Hauge-land's Heidegger*, Rouse Joseph (ed.) Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts and London 2013.
- Heidegger Martin, *Being and Time*, Translated by Macquarrie, J. & Robinson, E., Oxford: Blackwell 1962.
- Heidegger Martin, *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik*, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann 1983.
- Heidegger Martin, *Zollikoner Seminare*, Medard Boss (ed.), Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann 1987.
- Heidegger Martin, *Zollikon Seminar*, translated by Franz Mayr, Illinois: Northwestern Univ. Press, 2000.
- Heidegger Martin, *Sein und Zeit*. Tübingen:Max Niemeyer Verlag 2006.
- Levinas Emmanuel, *Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence*, Paris : Kluwer Academic 1978.
- Husserl Edmund, *Logische Untersuchungen, Erster Band: Prolegomena zur reinen Logik*, Holenstein Elmar (ed.), Den Haag: Nijhoff 1975 (HUA XVIII).
- Husserl Edmund, *Phantasie, Bildbewusstsein, Erinnerung: Zur Phänomenologie der anschaulichen Vergegenwärtigungen*. Eduard Marbach (ed.) Den Haag : Martinus Nijhoff 1980.
- Kayser Paulette, *Emmanuel Levinas : La trace du féminine*, Paris : Presse universitaire 2000.
- Maine de Biran Pierre, *Mémoire sur la décomposition de la pensée : Œuvres complètes* (volumes 111), Paris : Vrin 1988.
- Maldiney Henri, *Penser l'homme et la folie*. Grenoble: Éditions Jérôme Million 1991.
- Martin, F. David, *The Humanities through the arts*. NY: Mc Graw Hill 1974
- Michel Henri, „*Phénoménologie et psychanalyse*“, in P. Férida und J. Schotte (editors), in *Psychiatrie et Existence, Décade de Cerisy*, Grenoble: Éditions Jérôme Millon 1991 [1989].
- Musil Robert, *Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften*. Novel/vol. 11. Reinbeck am Hamburg: Rowohlt Verlag 1978.
- Peters, Meindert E., "Heidegger's embodied others: on critique of the body and ,intersubjectivity', in: *Being and Time*", in *Phenom Cogni Sci*, Springer's Phenom 18 2019, pp. 441-459;
- Platon, "Timaios", Otto Apelt (editor), in *Platon Sämtliche Dialoge*, volume VI. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag 1993.

- Plessner, Helmuth, „*Ausdruck und menschliche Natur*“, in *Gesammelte Schriften*, 10Bde., Bd. VII, Frankfurt 1982.
- Prinz Jesse, *Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion*, Oxford: University Press 2004.
- Ratcliffe Matthew, „Why Mood Matters, in *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger's Being and Time*“, Mark A. Wrathall(ed.), Cambridge: University Press 2013, 157-76.
- Richir Marc, *Méditations Phénoménologiques : Phénoménologie et phénoménologie du langage*. Grenoble: Jerome Million 1992.
- Richir Marc, « *Stimmung, Verstimmung et Leiblichkeit dans la Schizophrenie* », in *Conferencias de Filosofia 11*, Manuel R.D. (ed.), Campo das Letras 2000.
- Richir Marc, « *Des phénomènes du langage* », in *Perspectivas o sujeto et racionalidade*, Maria José Cantista (ed.), 95-107. Porto: Campo de Letras 2006a.
- Richir Marc, *Fragment phénoménologique sur le temps et l'espace*, Grenoble : Jérôme Million 2006.
- Sartre Jean-Paul, *Esquisse d'une théorie des émotions*, Paris : Hermann; Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions, P. Mairet (trans.), London: Routledge Classics, 1939/2004.
- Scheler Max, *The Nature of Sympathy*, Brunswick N.J, 2009 [1913]
- Scheler Max, *Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values: A New Attempt toward the Foundation of an Ethical Personalism*, Evanston, 1973 [1912-1916].
- Schmid Hans Bernhard, „Collective Emotions, Phenomenology, Ontology, and Ideology: What should we learn from Max Scheler's War Propaganda“, in *Thaumàzein*, 3 2015, pp. 103-119.
- Slaby Jan, *Gefühle und Weltbezug*, Paderborn: Mentis 2008.
- Slaby Jan, *More than a Feeling: Affect as Radical Situatedness*, *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, XLI, 2017, 7-26.
- Schnell, Alexander, *Le sens se faisant: Marc Richir et la refondation de la phénoménologie transcendante*, Bruxelles : Édition Ousia 2011.
- Trevarthen C, „Communication and Cooperation in Early Infancy: A Description of Primary Intersubjectivity“, in M. Bullowa (ed.), in *Before Speech: The Beginning of Interpersonal Communication*, Cambridge: UP 1979.

