

# Statistical Analysis of the Election Results of Urban Representatives in Hungary between 1848 and 1918\*

József PAP

*Department of History, Eszterházy Károly Catholic University*

E-mail: [pap.jozsef@uni-eszterhazy.hu](mailto:pap.jozsef@uni-eszterhazy.hu)

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**Abstract.** In this paper, I will introduce our research results concerning the election of urban representatives. I focused on two issues: 1. What was the connection between the district and the representative, was he an outsider or a member of the local elite? 2. Can we identify groups whose representatives followed similar party preferences during elections at the time of the Dual Monarchy? The analysis is based on statistical methods. I conclude that the performance of candidates did not depend on the political attitudes of a given district. The causes of the given phenomena cannot be identified by macro-level research, but the macro-level research helps the local research by the establishment of categories within which the given local phenomena can be interpreted. The tables of this paper facilitate the national comparison of local research results.

**Keywords:** election, urban representatives, Dual Monarchy, statistical analysis, voting districts.

**Rezumat: Analiza statistică a rezultatelor alegerilor reprezentanților orașelor în Ungaria între 1848 și 1918.** Studiul prezintă rezultatele cercetării noastre privind alegerea deputaților urbani. Mă voi concentra pe două aspecte: 1. Care a fost legătura dintre circumscripție și deputat, dacă deputatul a fost un străin sau un membru al elitei locale? 2. Dacă putem identifica grupuri ai căror reprezentanți au urmat preferințe similare de partid în timpul alegerilor din timpul Monarhiei Duale? Analiza se bazează pe metode statistice. Am ajuns la concluzia că performanța candidaților nu depindea de atitudinile politice al unui anumit cerc electoral. Cauzele fenomenelor nu pot fi identificate prin cercetare la nivel

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macro, dar cercetarea la nivel macro ajută cercetarea locală prin stabilirea unor categorii în cadrul cărora fenomenele locale pot fi interpretate. Tabelele acestei lucrări facilitează compararea națională a rezultatelor cercetării locale.

**Cuvinte cheie:** alegeri, deputați orășenești, Monarhia Austro-Ungară, analiză statistică, circumscripții electorale.

In this paper, I will introduce our research results concerning the election of urban representatives. I shall approach my sample from a macro-level and shall try to identify tendencies to which the results of the examination of local elections can be compared. I will focus on two primary issues: 1. What was the connection between the district and the representative, was he an outsider or a member of the local elite? 2. Can we identify party groups whose representatives followed similar party preferences and expectations during elections at the time of the Dual Monarchy? My analysis is based on statistical methods and I will illustrate the limits of the statistical approach as well.

*The mandate number of the representatives*

The first question we must answer concerns the size of the urban representatives' parliamentary group. I based my answer on the mandates which belonged to settlements that enjoyed their own independent right to vote and that sent representatives to the Parliament between 1848 and 1918. The 102 district variations<sup>1</sup> had 1,393 full cycles, but not taking by-elections or interim elections into consideration in several districts, I could count 1,542 mandates. As a result of the elections, 759 representatives accessed the Parliament from urban areas, thus each representative served 2 cycles or terms on average. The following chart shows the distribution of the mandate numbers. I used all available data concerning national elections to prepare the table including 7,696 elections, 3,282 elected representatives, and there was no data available in the case of 29 elections.<sup>2</sup> It is important to note that the representatives listed in the table could serve in other districts than those indicated during their political career.

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<sup>1</sup> I took all mentions of districts separately into consideration, thus Dumbrăveni (Erzsébetváros) is listed as Dumbrăveni (Erzsébetváros) I and II until 1878 and later it was listed as one district, therefore I identified three district variations in this case.

<sup>2</sup> I corrected the data as compared to the first version of the study, as I originally worked with data pertaining to 7,557 elections, 3,184 elected representatives, and 82 unknown mandates.

| Mandate number | Urban districts only |                            | Taking full career into consideration |                              | National data |
|----------------|----------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------------------|------------------------------|---------------|
|                | Person               | Rate proportion allocation | Person                                | Rate, proportion, allocation |               |
| 1              | 426                  | 56,1%                      | 304                                   | 40,0%                        | 47,8%         |
| 2              | 148                  | 19,5%                      | 145                                   | 19,1%                        | 22,2%         |
| 3              | 68                   | 9,0%                       | 86                                    | 11,3%                        | 11,3%         |
| 4              | 59                   | 7,8%                       | 71                                    | 9,3%                         | 7,3%          |
| 5              | 22                   | 2,9%                       | 42                                    | 5,5%                         | 3,9%          |
| 6              | 16                   | 2,1%                       | 31                                    | 4,0%                         | 2,6%          |
| 7              | 6                    | 0,8%                       | 19                                    | 2,4%                         | 1,6%          |
| 8              | 8                    | 1,1%                       | 16                                    | 2,0%                         | 0,9%          |
| 9              | 4                    | 0,5%                       | 21                                    | 2,7%                         | 0,7%          |
| 10             | 2                    | 0,3%                       | 9                                     | 1,1%                         | 0,6%          |
| 11             | -                    | -                          | 7                                     | 0,9%                         | 0,4%          |
| 12             | 1                    | 0,1%                       | 4                                     | 0,5%                         | 0,2%          |
| 13             | -                    | -                          | 2                                     | 0,3%                         | 0,1%          |
| 14             | -                    | -                          | 1                                     | 0,1%                         | 0,3%          |
| 15             | -                    | -                          | 1                                     | 0,1%                         | 0,09%         |
| 16             | -                    | -                          | -                                     | -                            | 0,06          |
| 17             | -                    | -                          | -                                     | -                            | 0,06          |
| Total          | 759                  | 100%                       | 759                                   | 100%                         | 100%          |

Table 1.: The mandate number of representatives in different district types 1848–1918<sup>3</sup>

The table reveals that after taking national election results into consideration, in addition to the 1,542 mandates, we can add 710 other successful elections. Thus, in light of their full political career, urban representatives were more stable participants of Hungarian politics than their counterparts elected from the counties. Those with four or more mandates are significantly overrepresented. The standard actors of the political arena often received urban mandates during a certain period of their lives. Further on, I will discuss this phenomenon especially applicable to Transylvania in greater detail.

It is worthwhile to take a look at the distribution diagram of representatives who only completed one mandate as well.

<sup>3</sup> For the list of the members of Hungarian Parliament, see: Dániel Ballabás-József Pap-Judit Pál, "Képviselők és főrendek a dualizmus kori Magyarországon II.: Az országgyűlés tagjainak archontológiája" [The members House of Commons and ] (Eger: Líceum, 2020).




Figure 1: The distribution of representatives fulfilling only one mandate according to cycles (persons)

After the high starting numbers, the signs of stabilization can be discerned as of 1875. The especially high figures of the 1896 and 1906 elections can be explained by domestic political considerations. Those who were elected in these two years could not win again and the same applies to representatives gaining mandates at the 1910 election. Data referring to 1910 is naturally high, since first time representatives did not have a chance to run in another election. In comparison to national figures, the post-1875 stabilization process can be more clearly identified in urban districts, but the 1896 and especially the 1906 election significantly restructured the personal relations in urban areas.<sup>4</sup>

#### *The local ties of representatives*

Success at the local or national election depended upon whether the given representative entered national politics from the local elite or arrived at that position from the opposite direction, as a result of a so-called “representative import”. It is also important to identify settlements in which the politicians arrived from the local or national elite. We can also ask the question: was there any difference between the electoral success of local people and that of the outsiders?

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Pap’s diagram at József Pap, “Az első népképviselők és a népképviselés kezdetei Magyarországon” [The first popular representatives and the beginnings of popular representation in Hungary], *AETAS* 31 (2016): 36.

The establishment of a clear connection between representatives and the given cities requires substantial local research heretofore performed only to a certain extent. Our research group focused on Transylvania<sup>5</sup> and the Partium.<sup>6</sup> Judit Pál developed an examination criteria system which can make the analysis of local ties more differentiated. Her primary focus was not on the greater environment of the representative, but she separated the representatives coming from the country gentry or aristocracy from that of the middle class. She established a separate category for non-burgesses belonging to the nobility representing the surroundings of the city or maintaining strong ties with it. She also proved that establishing categories is difficult, regardless of the availability of the respective information. A case in point is Béla Lukács, a representative of Gherla (Szamosujvár), later Dumbrăveni (Erzsébetváros), who was born in Transylvania, but lived in Budapest and, according to kinship ties, he had a strong local commitment as well. The situation is similar in the case of the officials who moved away from their place of birth. "While I allocated them into the Transylvania representatives' category and their official duty played a major role in their election, separate rubrics cannot be established for each and every representative."<sup>7</sup> In another study, Pál attempted to categorize the representatives according to place of birth, origin of the family, residence, place of activity, estate, and family connections. If all indicators were connected to a voting district, she would rank the representative in the "displays full commitment" category and the applicability of three indicators referred to "close commitment." Those who moved away from their place of birth, representatives with loose or weak commitment as owners of neighbouring lands, and aliens were allocated into separate categories.<sup>8</sup> As far as Transylvania was concerned, Hungarian representatives were given special attention. Within the category of aliens or outsiders, Judit Pál was able to establish several clearly visible groups,

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<sup>5</sup> Judit Pál, "The Representation of Transylvanian Towns in Parliament in the Period 1878–1910," *Transylvanian Review* 22. (2013): 46–67.

<sup>6</sup> Ákos Szendrei, "Országgyűlési képviselők párthovatartozása és társadalmi háttere a dualizmuskori Debrecenben, Nagyváradon és közös vonzókörzeteikben," [Political party affiliation and social background of parliamentary representatives in Debrecen, Nagyvárad and their surroundings in the Dualist Period], *AETAS* 31 (2016): 76–101.

<sup>7</sup> Judit Pál, "Az erdélyi városok képviseletének alakulása a kiegyezés után – a képviselők helyi kötődése" [Representations of Transylvania towns after the Compromise, the local ties of representatives], in *Szám- (és betű) vetés. Tanulmányok Faragó Tamás tiszteletére* [Papers in honor of Tamás Faragó] ed. Péter Őri (Budapest: KSH Népeségtudományi Kutatóintézet, 2014), 82–83.

<sup>8</sup> Judit Pál, "Választók, választási részvétel és választói magatartás Székelyföldön a dualizmus korában," [Voters, voting participation, and voter conduct in Székely Land during the Dualist Era] *AETAS* 31 (2016): 64–65.

including that of ministers, undersecretaries, high rank ministry officials; writers, journalists, editors; bankers, entrepreneurs, owners of large estates and influential lawyers.<sup>9</sup>

I cannot undertake such a comprehensive analysis, because the data pertaining to the question is primarily informative. If I were to follow Pál's criteria, I could allocate the representatives into three groups: close commitment, partial commitment, and outsiders. A more refined approach requires a thorough analysis of the given careers. Currently available data, however, can facilitate a macro-level analysis identifying the main tendencies.

In the case of the 1.512 elections (I took into consideration the repeated term within a cycle only once), 951 representatives (64%) showed close ties, 102 representatives (7%) had weak ties and 435 representatives (29%) were considered outsiders. I recorded unknown data in 35 cases, and they are not included in this distribution. Regarding the non-urban districts, 3,220 cases (54%) showed close ties, and in 654 instances, the representative displayed a weak connection or commitment level to the district, while in 819 cases, he was an outsider, which amounts to 14%. The rate of unknown connection is still high, with 1,540 cases at 26%. Further on, I will display this data more accurately. It is noteworthy, however, that if we omit the unknown information (close ties 73%, weak connection 8%, and outsider 18%), we obtain values very similar to those of the counties of Székely Land.<sup>10</sup> Thus, we can substantiate the results of Pál Judit, namely that the rate of outsider representatives was higher in the towns than in the county districts in a national context.

The grouping of a multitude containing several elements can be performed by cluster analysis. This procedure arranges the given components into groups by identifying their features or variables and, based on their respective similarities, it forms the given groups or clusters. The resulting clusters must be named and described by the researcher. During the cluster analysis, I used the k cluster procedure.<sup>11</sup> I took into consideration all elections of representatives, as I wanted to identify how many times an outsider or local politician could gain

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<sup>9</sup> Judit Pál, "A Székelyföld metamorfozisa" [The metamorphosis of Székely Land], in *Székelyföld története III. 1867–1990* [History of Székely Land III. 1867–1990], eds. Nándor Bárdi, Judit Pál (Székelyudvarhely: MTA BTK-EME-HRM, 2016), 101.

<sup>10</sup> Pál, "Választók, választási részvétel," 65.

<sup>11</sup> On the applied statistical method vide: Iván Falus, János Ollé, "Az empirikus kutatások gyakorlata. Adatfeldolgozás és statisztikai elemzés" [The practice of empirical research. Data processing and statistical analysis], (Budapest: Nemzeti Tankönyvkiadó, 2008), 246–261., László Sajtos, Ariel Mitev, "SPSS Kutatási és adatelemzési kézikönyv" [Research and data analysis] (Budapest: Alinea Kiadó, 2007), 283–327.

representation from a specific district. The comparison required the standardization of the data via the calculation of the percentage-based distribution. My calculation was based on the potential number of mandates, thus, in the case of the districts that lost their independent or autonomous status in 1878, the maximum number was 4 in Transylvania, and 5 in Hungary. Based on a preliminary test required by the procedure, I established four groups for categorizing the urban districts, as the following table indicates:

|                                   | A district significantly relying on an outsider political elite | A district relying on a closely committed local elite and outsiders as well | A district relying on local elite with strong and weak commitment | A district relying on closely committed local elite |
|-----------------------------------|---|---|---|---|
| Close connection (medium value %) | ,29   | ,61   | ,55   | ,90   |
| Weak commitment (medium value %)  | ,05   | ,03   | ,29   | ,01   |
| Outsider (medium value %)         | ,65   | ,36   | ,16   | ,09   |
| Number of districts               | 13  | 36  | 12  | 41  |

Table 2.: Clusters established according to the local commitment of representatives

A dominant segment of the districts relied on either closely or weakly committed representatives. In 12 districts, the rate of outsiders was definitive, and they played a major role in 36 additional districts. The exact distribution of the districts is shown by the following table:

| A district significantly relying on an | A district relying on a closely committed local elite and outsiders as | A district relying on local elite with strong and weak | A district relying on closely committed local |
|--|--|--|---|
|--|--|--|---|

| outsider<br>political elite   | well  | commitment   | elite  |
|---|---|--|--|
| Abrud<br>(Abrudbánya),<br>Békés, Cegléd,<br>Cluj (Kolozs),<br>Csongrád,<br>Jászberény,<br>Ocna Sibiului<br>(Vízakna),<br>Orăștie<br>(Szászváros),<br>Pápa, Sic<br>(Szék), Szentes,<br>Vlăhița<br>(Oláhfalu),<br>Вршац<br>(Versec) | Arad (Arad), Banská<br>Bystrica<br>(Besztercebánya), Brașov<br>(Brassó) I., Bratislava<br>(Pozsony) II., Brețcu<br>(Bereck), Buda I., Cluj-<br>Napoca (Kolozsvár) I.,<br>Dumbrăveni<br>(Erzsébetváros),<br>Esztergom, Gherla<br>(Szamosújvár),<br>Hajdúböszörmény,<br>Hódmezővásárhely,<br>Kecskemét I.,<br>Kiskunhalas, Komarno<br>(Komárom), Kremnica<br>(Körmöcbánya), Miskolc<br>I., Nagykőrös, Odorheiu<br>Secuiesc<br>(Székelyudvarhely),<br>Oradea (Nagyvárad),<br>Pest IV. - V., Rijeka<br>(Fiume), Sopron,<br>Szarvas, Temeswar<br>(Temesvár), Кикинда<br>(Nagykikinda), Нови<br>Сад (Újvidék), Сента<br>(Zenta)<br><br>Higher level rate of<br>outsiders than the group<br>average:<br><br>Bălgrad (Gyulafehérvár)<br>II., Bratislava (Pozsony)<br>I., Debrecen I, Košice<br>(Kassa), Sfântu<br>Gheorghe<br>(Sepsiszentgyörgy),<br>Szeged I, Târgu Secuiesc<br>(Kézdivásárhely) | Baja, Bălgrad<br>(Gyulafehérvár),<br>Banská Štiavnica -<br>Banská Belá<br>(Selmecebánya-<br>Bélabánya),<br>Békéscsaba, Brașov<br>(Brassó) II.,<br>Dumbrăveni<br>(Erzsébetváros)II.,<br>Eger, Gyöngyös, Győr,<br>Kiskunfélegyháza,<br>Sibiu (Nagyszeben) II.,<br>Székesfehérvár | Bălgrad<br>(Gyulafehérvár)I.<br>Buda II.,<br>Budapest I-IX.,<br>Cluj-Napoca<br>(Kolozsvár) II.,<br>Debrecen II-III.,<br>Dumbrăveni<br>(Erzsébetváros)I.,<br>Gherla<br>(Szamosújvár) I-<br>II., Gyula, Hațeg<br>(Hátszeg),<br>Hunedoara<br>(Vajdahunyad),<br>Ilieni (Ilyefalva),<br>Kecskemét II.,<br>Krupina<br>(Korpona),<br>Makó, Miercurea<br>Ciuc<br>(Csíkszereda),<br>Miskolc II.,<br>Nyíregyháza,<br>Pécs, Pest I-III.,<br>Pukanec<br>(Bakabánya),<br>Satu Mare<br>(Szatmárnémeti),<br>Sibiu<br>(Nagyszeben) I.,<br>Szeged II., Târgu<br>Mureș<br>(Marosvásárhely<br>I-II.), Сомбор<br>(Zombor),<br>Суботица<br>(Szabadka) I-II.,<br>Зрењанин<br>(Nagybecskerek) |

Table 3.: Local commitment of representatives, the allocation  
of voting districts into clusters

The above listing, with some restrictions, matches our earlier information, thus districts which we knew earlier were placed into the

relevant group.<sup>12</sup> A potential discrepancy can result from the differing elections results in different time periods in certain settlements. Therefore, such results can be categorized into different groups, depending on an examination focus pertaining either to the whole period of the Dual Monarchy or to certain time periods. I preferred to treat the Age of the Dual Monarchy in a uniform manner, and I did not break it up into separate periods.

Professional researchers usually explain the role of outsiders in two ways. In case of Transylvania, the term “representative import” can be applicable, and, in other cases, the election of a given politician can be justified by his significant connection capital and potential interest assertion capability. While in the first case the given voting district is considered a “rotten borough”, subordinated to national political interests and to the interests of the politicians of the governing party along with carpetbaggers,<sup>13</sup> in the second instance, the voters follow a deliberate interest assertion agenda and discard the leading figures of the local elite in favour of a nationally known politician.<sup>14</sup> The two explanations can provide conflicting interpretations or results, as voting behaviour can be either anachronistically traditional or modern, while promoting self-interest.

The above data suggests that such a phenomenon was more frequent in urban districts than in the county constituencies and the respective causes can only be identified by local research efforts. Whereas the previous explanation tends to apply to voting districts in Transylvania, the latter can explain the voting behaviour in Debrecen and Oradea (Nagyvárad). Further research can focus on the differing features and attributes of periods consecutively following each other and can find justification for the differences discernible in the voting districts of a given settlement. Local results can be compared to categories established with the clustering method.

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<sup>12</sup> Pál, “Választók, választási részvétel,” 61.; Judit Pál, “Representation of the Transylvanian Towns in the Hungarian Parliament and Town MPs after the Austro-Hungarian Compromise (1866–1875)” in *Elites and Politics in Central and Eastern Europe (1848–1918)*, eds. Judit Pál and Vlad Popovici (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2014).

<sup>13</sup> Pál, “Az erdélyi városok,” 85. Although working with a relatively small number of components, Judit Pál, in her study, identified a close connection between the rate of outsiders and the size of the voting population in the given district *ibid.* p. 89.; Iván Bertényi jun., 2008: “Képviselői import Erdélyben, avagy az unió egyik velejárója?” [Representative import in Transylvania, or a feature of the Union?] in *Tradíció és modernizáció a XVIII–XIX. században* [Tradition and modernisation in the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries], eds. Erzsébet Bodnár, Gábor Demeter (Debrecen: Hungarovox Kiadó, 2008), 202–213.

<sup>14</sup> András Cieger, “A politikus mint hivatás a 19. századi Magyarországon” [Political careers in Hungary in the 19<sup>th</sup> century], *Korall*, 42 (2010): 96–98.; Szendrei, “Országgyűlési képviselők,” 89.

Next, we have to probe whether the rate of outsider or out of district representatives showed any correlation with the composition and population number of the given voting district. Such data can be considered as indicators of a modernization process. In order to answer the question, I used a correlation-based method, or bivariate correlation, and examined the data pertaining to the 1900 election.<sup>15</sup>

|                                 | Discrepancy of voter number from the average value | According to previous legislation | Manor and estate | Income | Professionals | Füstök (100 (chimneys, households) voters at least in a district) |
|---------------------------------|--|-----------------------------------|------------------|--------|---------------|---|
| Pearson correlation coefficient | -,329  | ,313                              | ,347             | -,342  | ,163          | ,340  |
| Significance level              | ,003   | ,004                              | ,001             | ,002   | ,146          | ,002  |

Table 4.: The connection between representatives coming from outside the voting districts and voter data pertaining to the 1900 election

The inquiry reveals that the lower voter number, the elector groups representing more traditional economic activities (the rate of voters based on previous legislation, property, or *füstök* is higher) contributed to a higher number of outsider candidates. Conversely, voters with an income obtained from more developed economic activities, tended to vote for the local candidates. The rate of the intellectuals, which could refer to those both modern and traditional, did not influence the results of the elections. Furthermore, the table shows that the two values related to Transylvania, the previous rights and the *füstök* established a correlation with the rate of outsider candidates. However, this was not only applicable to Transylvania, but occurred there more often. The exploration of nationwide voting districts justifies and substantiates the assertion of Judit Pál concerning the towns of Transylvania. Accordingly, “in towns which had the rank of the city in

<sup>15</sup> In order to perform the inquiry, the numerical values have to be placed on an identical scale. Regarding the census structure, I determined the given values as the percentage of the voting population in 1900. The number of eligible voters was established as a percentage value of the discrepancy from the average voting district population in 1900. In 1901 the average voter number of the 81 districts was 2048. The two extreme values were provided by the 7<sup>th</sup> district of Bereck and Budapest. In the case of Bereck, the 166 voters showed a value 1 882, less than the average indicating a -92% discrepancy, while the 7<sup>th</sup> district of Budapest, with 10 515 voters, which exceeded the average with 8 467 amounting to a +413% difference. For more information on the examination method, vide: Falus, Ollé, “Az empirikus kutatások,” 178–186.; Sajtos, Mitev, “SPSS,” 205–243.

name alone, and a high portion of the population was involved in agriculture, and was illiterate”, the outsiders or strangers appeared in higher numbers.<sup>16</sup>

We must point out, however, that this is only one of the possible explanations, since, although a connection can be discerned among the various factors, it cannot stand for an explanation for everything, as the correlation coefficients refer to a somewhat weaker than medium correlation. Consequently, other factors influenced the development of the election results. Moreover, in a significant segment of towns, this was not the most important factor that influenced the outcome.

The local and external or outsider representatives can be examined from another angle, namely that of the potential differences between the average length of the term. In order to perform this inquiry, I did not focus on the number of the cycles, but on the days of the fulfilled intervals. Also, the persons listed in more than one voting district were excluded from the examination. Such a correlation can be explored with single angle variance analysis.<sup>17</sup> This approach focuses on the applicability of the significant difference regarding the features of various groups, in this case the commitment or ties with the given voting district. Although, because of the spatial restrictions, I cannot provide a detailed introduction, I can safely discern a significant difference between the data of local and outsider representatives. The following table shows the various categories:

|                   | Item number | Average (%) | Minimum (%) | Maximum (%) |
|-------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Strong local ties | 472         | -,050591    | -,9868      | 4,9453      |
| Weak local ties   | 27          | ,122073     | -,9608      | 1,6740      |
| Outsider          | 164         | ,189149     | -,9944      | 6,6994      |
| Total             | 663         | ,015743     | -,9944      | 6,6994      |

Table 5.: The correlation between the representatives’ ties to districts and the length of the mandate

Consequently, on average, local representatives served for a shorter time, while strangers or outsiders held on to their mandate longer. It can be surmised that parliamentary representation was only a temporary concern for local politicians, while influential outsider politicians had significantly longer careers as representatives. The first difference disclosed by the statistical analysis, the differing length of urban and rural mandates, was justified by the more significant role that outsider candidates played in the urban elections. Since the latter, serving for a longer time in Parliament, were considered to be professional politicians, their constituents highly

<sup>16</sup> Pál, “Az erdélyi városok,” 89.

<sup>17</sup> Regarding the method, vide: Sajtos, Mitev, “SPSS,” 163–177.

valued their ability to represent or assert voter interests. Representatives with local ties served fewer terms and, after the completion of their mandate, they returned to the original community.

The real difference was not between the urban and rural voting districts, but between locals and outsiders. Representatives maintaining ties with the local towns and counties performed similarly in the legislature, as the national political role was considered a stepping stone in their political career or the crowning of their achievement before retiring from political life. The latter appears to be more likely to have been the case in the towns. While a comparative inquiry between outsiders and locals has to be performed, presently there is insufficient data available.

#### *Election results in the voting districts*

In the following, I shall explore the election results obtained in the various voting districts, in order to identify groups that produced identical scores. In the present case, I would restrict my contribution to raising the particular problem and to identifying the respective tendencies, since a full explanation requires substantial local history-oriented research. At any rate, in the past years, we have amassed an amount of data that facilitates the analysis of the election results in light of the full era. Once again, I relied on the cluster analysis method.

In the inquiry, I can only include the settlements in which all the election results posted during the Age of the Dual Monarchy are known. Since this is valid in case of all settlements, all communities can be included in the examination. One problem, however, relates to the changes in the voting district of the given representative. Thus, I have to make two corrections in the case of the election results posted before 1878. If a settlement was granted the right to vote for representatives (Braşov (Brassó), Sibiu (Nagyszeben)) I focused on the districts from which the given constituency was formed. Although two districts from Dumbrăveni (Erzsébetváros), Bălgrad (Gyulafehérvár), and Gherla (Szamosújvár) were merged or combined in 1877, I could take into consideration the pre-1878 results, as the voting outcome in the merged districts was basically identical. Similarly, in the case of Budapest, it was relatively easy to create an accurate connection between the pre- and post-1878 districts, since the election results before 1878 did not show much change. At the same time, I omitted the communities that lost their previous election authorization after 1878, and such previous four cycles were followed by another 10, and the latter conditions or circumstances were typical of the given settlement during the period of the Dual Monarchy. Since, in the 1861 National Assembly, Transylvania could not

be represented, the starting date of the inquiry is 1865. Accordingly, 1 134 election results were posted in 81 districts. The cluster analysis, however, requires further steps as well. As in each cycle, we could only rely on one result, we could not include the outcomes of the by-elections in the inquiry. Nevertheless, the outcomes of the by-elections were basically repeated at the next national election. I disregarded the representatives who switched political parties, since a representative transferred from one party to another by his own will, and such a change did not reflect the party preferences of the voters of the given district unless the constituents accepted the given representative's party preference and the respective individual was voted for; if not, someone else received the mandate. Such a simplified model does not weaken the relevance of the party preference-specific election results in a given district.

In order to perform the inquiry, the parties were identified by rank number which facilitates the standardization process. I grouped the respective parties according to their attitude toward major political and public law issues determining political life after 1867, during the time of the Dual Monarchy. The resulting party clusters can be analysed now<sup>18</sup> as I placed the parties that obtained mandates on a five variable (1,2,3,4,5) scale. No. 1 referred to the party family that accepted the Compromise comprised of the Deák Party, the Liberal Party, and National Work Party. Number 5 represented the opposition that rejected the Compromise. Those without a political party were assigned No. 3, symbolizing the transition between the previous two extremes. I allocated the right-wing opposition parties or opposition parties of 67 stepping out of their former governmental position along with the People's Party in between the governing party and the centre and marked them with no 2., and the mandates of the so-called democratic opposition were positioned between the centre and the independents under no. 4. Furthermore, anti-Semitic representatives, or those coming from districts dominated by ethnic nationalities, were also placed in the centre, since their political activity was not determined by the public law issues determining the given party structures.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Without simplification, theoretically almost 7 000 variations can be differentiated during the five elections, which, following the party cluster-based approach, were limited to 120 options.

<sup>19</sup> The following method was applied: József Pap, "Az 1887 és 1905 közötti országgyűlési választások eredményeinek statisztikai vizsgálata" [Statistical examination of the results of parliamentary elections between 1887 and 1905] in *Tanulmányok a dualizmus kori magyar parlamentarizmus történetéből* [Papers on the history of Hungarian parliamentaryism in the age of Dualism], ed. József Pap (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 2014), 73–96.; József Pap, "Parliamentary Representatives and Parliamentary Representation in Hungary (1848-1918)" (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2017) 99–103.

Since there is a high amount of data and the method of hierarchical cluster analysis cannot be used, I once again relied on the k-means cluster analysis procedure. Based upon the preliminary inquiries, I performed three cluster analyses.<sup>20</sup> I was compelled to omit the results of the 1905 and 1906 election, as these can significantly distort the long-term tendencies. The results of the analysis are shown by the following table:

|                                     | Voting districts dominated by voters preferring the governing party  | Voting districts which supported the opposition at the beginning and later displayed the dominance of voters preferring the governing party                                    | Voting district with preference of the opposition   |
|-------------------------------------|--|--|---|
| Number of districts                 | 44   | 20   | 17  |
| Districts meeting the group average | Abrud (Abrudbánya), Arad (Arad), Bălgrad (Gyulafehérvár), Banská Bystrica (Besztercebánya), Banská Štiavnica - Banská Belá (Selmecbánya-Bélabánya), Braşov (Brassó) II-II., Bratislava (Pozsony) I-II., Breţcu (Bereck), Budapest I-IX. Dumbrăveni (Erzsébetváros), Cluj-Napoca (Kolozsvár) I-II. Kremnica (Körmöcbánya), Gherla (Szamosújvár), Miskolc I., Ocna Sibiului (Vízakna), Pápa, Rijeka (Fiume), Sfântu Gheorghe (Sepsiszentgyörgy), Sibiu (Nagyszeben) I-II., Sic (Szék), Sopron, Szeged I., Temeswar (Temesvár), Vlăhiţa (Oláhfalú), Вршац (Versec), Зрењанин (Nagybecskerek), Нови Сад (Újvidék), Сомбор (Zombor) | Békéscsaba, Csongrád, Debrecen III., Esztergom, Gyula, Komarno (Komárom), Košice (Kassa), Oradea (Nagyvárad), Pécs, Szarvas, Кикинда (Nagykikinda), Суботица (Szabadka) I-II., | Békés, Cegléd, Debrecen I., Gyöngyös, Hajdúböszörmény, Hódmezővásárhely, Kecskemét I., Kecskemét II., Kiskunfélegyháza, Makó, Nagykőrös, Nyíregyháza, Szeged II., Szentes |

<sup>20</sup> Due to the content-based restrictions of the study, we can only present the most important statistical manoeuvres.

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|---|---|---|---|
| Districts not meeting the group average | Baja, Győr, Miskolc II.,<br>Târgu Mureş<br>(Marosvásárhely) I.<br>Cause of the discrepancy:<br>Victory of the opposition<br>in 1901 | Debrecen II.,<br>Jászberény, Odorheiu<br>Secuiesc<br>(Székelyudvarhely),<br>Satu Mare<br>(Szatmárnémeti),<br>Székesfehérvár, Târgu<br>Mureş<br>(Marosvásárhely II.,<br>Târgu Secuiesc<br>(Kézdivásárhely),<br>Cause of the<br>discrepancy: Victory of<br>the opposition in 1910 | Eger, Kiskunhalas,<br>Сента (Zenta)<br>Cause of the<br>discrepancy: Victory of<br>the governing party in<br>1901 and 1910 |
|---|---|---|---|

Table 6.: Voting district clusters reflecting party preference

As a result of clustering or group formation, two groups can be established, whose members or components show similar tendencies. A segment of towns showed orientation toward the governing party, while a smaller group was considered to be the bastion of the opposition. One group positioned in the middle was characterised by unstable party preferences. We must also note the districts in which certain settlements (Debrecen, Târgu Mureş (Marosvásárhely), Miskolc and Szeged) showed discrepancies to differing extents. The explanation requires micro-analysis, due to a potentially significant connection of the voting behaviour of communities with differing populations.

Furthermore, the party preferences of towns did not significantly differ from those of the surrounding area. Settlements and communities in Transylvania and Northern and Western Hungary tended to support the governing party, while Hungarian voters in the Great Plains supported the opposition, or did not prove to be a stable base for the governing party.

The following table shows the rates corresponding to the respective cycles:

| Parliamentary cycle | "67-er" Party cluster |     | "Right wing opposition" |    | Politically neutral parties |    | "Democratic opposition" |   | Party cluster supporting independence |     |
|---------------------|-----------------------|-----|-------------------------|----|-----------------------------|----|-------------------------|---|---------------------------------------|-----|
| 1865–1868           | 59                    | 73% | -                       | -  | 2                           | 2% | -                       | - | 20                                    | 25% |
| 1868–1872           | 42                    | 52% | -                       | -  | 3                           | 4% | -                       | - | 36                                    | 44% |
| 1872–               | 43                    | 53% | 3                       | 4% | 2                           | 2% | -                       | - | 33                                    | 41% |

|               |     |     |    |     |    |     |   |    |     |     |
|---------------|-----|-----|----|-----|----|-----|---|----|-----|-----|
| 1875          |     |     |    |     |    |     |   |    |     |     |
| 1875–<br>1878 | 64  | 79% | 1  | 1%  | 4  | 5%  | - | -  | 12  | 15% |
| 1878–<br>1881 | 43  | 53% | 9  | 11% | 7  | 9%  | - | -  | 22  | 27% |
| 1882–<br>1884 | 41  | 51% | 9  | 11% | 7  | 9%  | - | -  | 24  | 30% |
| 1884–<br>1887 | 50  | 62% | 7  | 9%  | 8  | 10% | - | -  | 16  | 20% |
| 1887–<br>1892 | 50  | 62% | 6  | 7%  | 5  | 6%  | - | -  | 20  | 25% |
| 1892–<br>1896 | 49  | 60% | 12 | 15% | 1  | 1%  | - | -  | 19  | 23% |
| 1897–<br>1901 | 63  | 78% | 6  | 7%  | -  | -   | - | -  | 12  | 15% |
| 1901–<br>1905 | 51  | 63% | 3  | 4%  | 4  | 5%  | 1 | 1% | 22  | 27% |
| 1905–<br>1906 | 28  | 35% | 15 | 19% | 1  | 1%  | 2 | 2% | 35  | 43% |
| 1906–<br>1910 | -   | -   | 18 | 22% | 2  | 2%  | 2 | 2% | 59  | 73% |
| 1910–<br>1918 | 52  | 64% | 3  | 4%  | 1  | 1%  | 2 | 2% | 23  | 28% |
| Összesen      | 636 | 56% | 92 | 8%  | 47 | 4%  | 7 | 1% | 353 | 31% |

Table 8.: The performance of party clusters in the urban elections during the period of the Dual Monarchy

The table reveals that the so-called party cluster of 67 had significantly more mandates than it could be deduced from the voting district clusters, since most uncertain voters tended to incline toward the governing party. Conversely, supporters of independence could not win at every election in their base settlement.

The last question we need to answer concerns the potential connection between the party preference of the given district and elected representative's ties to the respective constituency. The following cross-table can provide the answer:<sup>21</sup>

<sup>21</sup> For more information on the process, vide: Sajtos, Mitev, "SPSS," 137–163.

|  | Voting district with preference of the governing party | Voting districts which supported the opposition at the beginning and later displayed the dominance of voters preferring the governing party | Voting district with preference of the opposition |      |
|--|--|---|---|------|
| A district significantly relying on an outsider political elite                          | 54,5%  | 18,2%   | 27,3%   | 100% |
| A district significantly relying on closely committed local elite and outsiders          | 53,1%  | 25%   | 21,9%   | 100% |
| A district significantly relying on a closely and weakly committed local political elite | 54,5%  | 18,2%   | 27,3%   | 100% |
| A district significantly relying on a closely committed local elite                      | 55,6%  | 29,6%   | 14,8%   | 100% |
| Total  | 54,3%  | 24,7%   | 21%   | 100% |

Table 8.: Correlation between the origin of the representatives and the party preference of the district

Due to the small size of the sample (81 districts that can be explored), the cross-table analysis cannot be performed;<sup>22</sup> the table illustrates that there was no significant difference between the party preference of the given districts and that of the distribution shown by all constituencies. There was no correlation between these two factors, as local and outsider representatives appeared to a similar extent in the constituencies dominated by the opposition and the governing party. Although a connection can be identified between the level of modernization pertaining to a given district and the emergence of outsider representatives, the respective extent is not too significant

<sup>22</sup> The procedure requires that a minimum of 20% of the cells contain more than 5 components, and this cross-table cannot meet this criterion.

All in all, I can thus conclude that the performance of outsider candidates did not depend on the political attitudes of a given district. While no single dominant justifying factor can be identified, it is rather unique that it could be the mark of the traditional or modern voting behaviour. The situation provides a perfect illustration for the limits of the macro-level statistical approach. The exact causes of the given phenomena cannot be identified by macro-level research, as micro-level research is needed for the realization of this goal. Settlements belonging to voting districts with differing attitudes and behavioural patterns can be of special interest for further research. The respective triggering factors can be disclosed via an accurately sensitive and sophisticated research as well. Macro-level research can help local research by the establishment of categories within which the given local phenomena can be interpreted. Moreover, tables compiled via statistical methods facilitate the national comparison of local research results, and the target areas of potential control tests can be identified easier.