



STUDIA UNIVERSITATIS

BABEȘ-BOLYAI



EUROPAEA

4/2015

**STUDIA
UNIVERSITATIS BABEŞ-BOLYAI**

STUDIA EUROPAEA

**4 / 2015
December**

STUDIA UNIVERSITATIS BABEȘ-BOLYAI STUDIA EUROPAEA

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF:

Prof. Dr. Nicolae PĂUN

EXECUTIVE EDITORS-IN-CHIEF:

Conf. Dr. habil. Sergiu MIȘCOIU, miscoiu@yahoo.com

Conf. Dr. Georgiana CICEO

EXECUTIVE EDITORS:

Lect. Dr. Laura HERTA

Lect. Dr. Ovidiu VAIDA

EDITORIAL BOARD:

Babeș-Bolyai University:

Prof. Dr. Ovidiu PECICAN

Prof. Dr. Marius JUCAN

Prof. Dr. Vasile PUȘCAȘ

Conf. Dr. Alina ANDREICA

Conf. Dr. Mircea MANIU

Conf. Dr. Carmen LAZĂR

Conf. Dr. Valentin NAUMESCU

Lect. Dr. Monica MERUȚIU

Lect. Dr. Șerban VĂEȚIȘI

Lect. Dr. Miruna BALOSIN

Lect. Dr. Ciprian BOGDAN

Lect. Dr. Christian SCHUSTER

Lect. Dr. Adrian CORPĂDEAN

Prof. Dr. Dr.h.c. Reinhard MEYERS, WWU Münster

Prof. Dr. Albert van GOUDOEVER, Utrecht

Prof. Dr. Alfredo CANAVERO, Univ. degli Studi di Milano

Prof. Dr. Chantal DELSOL, Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques, Paris

Prof. Dr. Michael O'NEILL, Nottingham Trent University

Prof. Dr. Philippe CLARET, Université Bordeaux IV, Montesquieu

Conf. Dr. Michael IANCU, Institut Maimonide, Montpellier

Lect. Dr. Karen SCHLUETTER, Otto von Guericke University, Magdeburg

Dr. Hygin KAKAI, Université Abomey-Calavi, Benin

Conf. Dr. Adrian BASARABA, West University, Timișoara

Prof. Dr. Dr.h.c. Basarab NICOLESCU, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris

Prof. Anna KRASTEVA, Nouvelle Université Bulgare, Sofia

Dr. Sergiu GHERGHINA, Goethe University, Frankfurt-am-Main

Prof. Dr. Roberto Di QUIRICO, University of Cagliari

YEAR
MONTH
ISSUE

(LX) 2015
DECEMBER
4

S T U D I A
UNIVERSITATIS BABEȘ-BOLYAI
STUDIA EUROPAEA

4

EDITORIAL OFFICE: Hasdeu no. 51, 400015 Cluj-Napoca, ROMANIA
Phone +40 264 405352

SUMAR – CONTENTS – SOMMAIRE – INHALT

DIANA-GABRIELA REIANU

Mainstreaming the Gender Dimension in the Europe 2020 Strategy.....5

DELIA POP-FLANJA

Europe 2020 Strategy - Responding To (Un)Employment With Education.....19

RADA CRISTINA IRIMIE

Digital Agenda for Romania, Progress Towards 2020 Targets.....35

V A R I A

MARIA-CRISTINA COLEAȘĂ

The European Union's Involvement in Conflict Resolution in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Georgia. A Comparative Analysis.....67

IRINA DERCACI

The Conceptualization of Identities in the Orthodox Church of Bessarabia.
The Trans-Ethnic Orthodoxy.....81

DARIUS A. TENT

Social Entrepreneurship.....97

ILEANA NICOLETA SĂLCUDEAN

The Convergent Motions of the Social Dimension and the Cultural
Dimension National and European Blueprints..... 109

RALUCA ABASEACA

Les dynamiques des cycles de protestations. Le cas de la Roumanie..... 135

BOOK REVIEWS

LUIZA-MARIA FILIMON

Jordan Gheorghe Bărbulescu, *Noua Europă. Identitate și Model European*,
Iași: Polirom Publishing House, 2015.....159

MONICA MERUȚIU

Philip Vos Fellman, Yaneer Bar-Yam, Ali A. Minai (Eds.), *Conflict and
Complexity: Countering Terrorism, Insurgency, Ethnic and Regional Violence*,
New York, Heidelberg, Dordrecht, London: Springer, 2015.....167

MAINSTREAMING THE GENDER DIMENSION IN THE EUROPE 2020 STRATEGY

Diana-Gabriela Reianu*

Abstract:

The purpose of this paper is to underline the importance of the gender dimension, which, unfortunately, was not specifically addressed in any of Europe 2020's seven flagship initiatives. In spite of the fact that European Union has specific priorities and objectives regarding gender equality, clearly emphasized in the Strategy for equality between women and men, the gender dimension was omitted from those five quantifiable targets, except as regards the employment rate. Hence, the paper aims to emphasize the link between the Commission's Strategy for equality between women and men (2010-2015), which is the best attempt to define a set of strategic objectives and indicators for gender-related issues, and the Europe 2020 Strategy, which puts forward a set of measures that will generate a smarter, more sustainable and more inclusive model across the European Union, by analyzing each of them, and to highlight that, in order to achieve the Europe 2020 targets, there is a sharp need for mainstreaming gender equality in the Europe 2020 Strategy.

Keywords: Europe 2020, gender, equality

Introduction

Gender equality is one of the European Union's founding principles, the principle of equal pay for equal work dating back to the beginnings of the European Community in 1957 when it became a provision of the Treaty of Rome (Article 119). This principle was successfully invoked in 1975 to defend Gabrielle Defrenne¹, an air hostess working for the Belgian national airline, who brought an action for compensation for the loss she had suffered in terms of salary, allowance on termination of service and pension as a result of the fact that air hostesses and male members of the air

* Dr. Diana-Gabriela Reianu is a Lecturer with the Department of European Studies and Governance, Faculty of European Studies at Babeş-Bolyai University.


Contact: diana.reianu@ubbcluj.ro.

¹ [<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:61975CJ0043&from=EN>], 8 August 2015.

crew performing identical duties did not receive equal pay. The rights stemming from this case were an unshakable legacy for women in the European Union and led to the adoption of the first European directives on gender equality.

Nowadays, surveys show that almost all Europeans (94%) agree that equality between women and men is a fundamental right, and around three in five Europeans (62%) think that inequalities between men and women are widespread in their own country. Most of the respondents (91%) agree that tackling inequality between men and women is necessary to establish a fairer society, while a similar proportion (89%) agree that equality between men and women will help women become more economically independent².

QB11. Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.



Source: Special Eurobarometer 428, *Gender equality*; fieldwork: 29 November to 9 December 2014 (Wave EB82.4), p. 30.

Despite of the importance of gender equality at EU level and among Europeans, the *Europe 2020 Strategy*, adopted by the European Council on 17 June 2010 and designed to deliver high levels of employment, high

² Special Eurobarometer 428, *Gender equality*; fieldwork: 29 November to 9 December 2014 (Wave EB82.4), p. 7.


productivity and social cohesion, while reducing the impact on natural environment, omitted to refer to the gender dimension into the implementation of each of the seven flagship initiatives. Considering that there is a priority for this strategy to achieve its goals, mainstreaming the gender dimension into the implementation of its initiatives remains an important issue, the proper application of the *Europe 2020 Strategy* must be consistent with the *Strategy for equality between women and men*.

Europe 2020 Strategy: general remarks

Europe 2020 Strategy clearly defines where EU wants to be by 2020, including five headline targets in the areas of employment, research and development, climate change and energy, education, poverty and social exclusion. By 2020, “75% of the population aged 20-64 should be employed, 3% of the EU’s GDP should be invested in R&D, the ‘20/20/20’ climate/energy targets should be met (including an increase to 30% of emissions reduction if the conditions are right), the share of early school leavers should be under 10% and at least 40% of the younger generation should have a tertiary degree, and 20 million less people should be at risk of poverty”³. In order to catalyze progress under each priority theme, the Commission set up seven flagship initiatives, *Innovation Union*, *Youth on the move*, *A digital agenda for Europe*, *Resource efficient Europe*, *An industrial policy for the globalization era*, *An agenda for new skills and jobs*, and *European Platform against poverty*, initiatives that commit both the EU and the Member States.

There are three scenarios for Europe by 2020, described in the Strategy. In the first scenario, Europe is able to make a full return to earlier growth path, regain competitiveness and boost its productivity. In the second scenario, Europe will have suffered a permanent loss in wealth and a sluggish growth rate, while in the third one Europe will face a decline with high levels of unemployment and social distress.

³ European Commission, *Europe 2020. A European strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth*, COM(2010) 2020, Brussels, p. 3.



Source: European Commission, *Europe 2020. A European strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth*, COM(2010) 2020, Brussels, p. 7.

According to the Commission, in 2014, EU was on track to reach some of its headline targets for 2020 but has fallen behind with regards to others. While substantial progress was made in the area of education, climate and energy, the employment, R&D and poverty targets will remain challenging. For instance, besides the fact that, in the area of employment, the national targets are not sufficiently ambitious to cumulatively reach the EU 2020 target (the fulfillment of all national targets will bring the overall EU-28 employment rate up to 74% instead of 75% which is the Europe 2020 target), the employment trends reversed after 2008 as a result of the economic crisis. By 2013, the indicator had a deviation of 6.6% from the Europe 2020 target, registering only 68.4%. Also, the trends include "a growing gap between the best and the least well performing Member States

and a widening gap between regions inside and across Member States [...], growing inequalities in the distribution of wealth and of income”⁴.

To overcome these difficulties, specialists stressed the need to recognize the costs of non-equality and underlined the links between gender equality, economic growth, and employment. Gender equality should be seen as an investment because “gender equality means utilization of all human capital investments, access to a full range of skills and it returns on personal investment in human capital”⁵. Also, gender equality “can be seen as a tool for sustainable demographic development and states”, studies showing “a positive correlation between gender equality and economic growth”⁶.

In this context, an analysis of the *EU Strategy for equality between women and men* is required, in order to point out how it can reinforce the objectives established in the *Europe 2020 Strategy*.

EU Strategy for equality between women and men (2010-2015): objectives and key actions

EU Strategy for equality between women and men 2010-2015, adopted by the European Commission in September 2010, lays down the program of the Commission with five priority areas: equal economic independence for women and men; equal pay for work of equal value; equality in decision-making; dignity, integrity and an end to gender-based violence; and promoting gender equality beyond the EU. So, the strategy sets out priorities including equal economic independence, pay, labour market opportunities and access to decision-making positions, the need to promote women’s dignity and stop gender-based violence, addressing, in addition, horizontal issues as gender roles, the legislative framework and tools for promoting gender equality.

Equal economic independence is one priority area of EU’s strategy emerged from the belief that “getting more women on to the labour market helps counterbalance the effects of a shrinking working-age population,

⁴ European Commission, *Taking stock of the Europe 2020 Strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth*, COM(2014) 130 final, Brussels, p. 21.

⁵ Swedish Presidency of the European Union, Division for Gender Equality, *Conference report “What does gender equality mean for economic growth and employment?”*, Strasbourg, 2009, p. 6.

⁶ *Ibidem*.

thereby reducing the strain on public finances and social protection systems, widening the human capital base and raising competitiveness”⁷, being also considered as a step forward in reaching the target established by Europe 2020 of 75% employment rate for women and men. In order to achieve the equal economic independence objective, the strategy included some key actions, namely the promotion of female entrepreneurship and self-employment, the assessment of remaining gaps in entitlement to family-related leave, the promotion of gender equality in all initiatives on immigration and integration of migrants etc. An overview of the outcome of these actions shows that, in 2014, the percentage of women in employment was 63.5%, being still 11.5% off the Europe 2020 target for total employment. Also, the employed women are still four times more likely to be working part-time than employed men, while the proportion of inactive young women remains double that of young men⁸. Specialists consider that “part-time work is associated both with problems of entry into the labour market – and thus with a form of disguised employment – but also with the involvement of men and women in other forms of activity ranging from education to caring”⁹.

The second priority included in the strategy, a principle enshrined in the EU Treaties, is the one of equal pay for equal work and work of equal value. It seems that the gender pay gap in the European Union, or the average difference between men’s and women’s hourly gross earnings across the economy as a whole, registered 16.4% (in 2012), varying from 30% in some countries (such as Estonia) to 9.7% (in Romania) and 2.5% (in Slovenia)¹⁰. In trying to figure out the causes of this phenomenon, the European Commission stated that, besides the question of equal pay for equal work, “there is a gap between women’s educational attainment and professional development, thus special attention should be paid to the

⁷ European Commission, *Strategy for equality between women and men 2010-2015*, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2011, p. 12.

⁸ European Commission, *Report on equality between women and men 2014*, pp. 7-8.

⁹ Francesca Bettio, Jill Rubery, and Mark Smith, “Gender, flexibility, and new employment relations in the European Union”, in Mariagrazia Rossilli (ed.), *Gender Policies in the European Union*, New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2000, p. 138.

¹⁰ Eurostat, *Structure of Earnings Survey*.

transition between education and the labour market”, mentioning the segregation in the labour market as “women and men still tend to work in different sectors/jobs”¹¹. Women are over-represented in fields of study that are linked to traditional female roles, and in certain job sectors as health care, education, health, public administration, many of them working part-time or under atypical contracts which means that their jobs tend to be less well paid or to be seen as of lower value¹². Women remain under-represented in sectors such as engineering, science, mathematics, computing etc. Statistics show that “only 29 of every 1000 female graduates have a computing-related degree and only four go on to work directly in ICT”¹³. While women represent 59% of new graduates, 46% of PhD degree holders are women, 33% of researchers, 20% of highest academic staff and only 11% of heads of universities or assimilated institutions. Likewise, the women are “overrepresented in the teaching force but underrepresented in management positions, including in higher education”¹⁴, and “the most under-represented source of entrepreneurship, with only 30% of new start-ups in Europe established by women”¹⁵.

The Commission’s key actions in this field include the support in finding ways to improve transparency of pay, the support of equal pay initiatives at the workplace and the encouragement of women to enter non-traditional professions.

Equality in decision-making is an objective set out in the strategy, given the fact that women continue to be under-represented in decision-making positions, in national parliaments, in ministers, as board members of the companies or presidents of the board. In order to achieve this objective, the Commission will monitor the target for women in top level decision-making positions in research and the progress towards greater participation by women in committees, expert groups, in European Parliament elections etc.

¹¹ European Commission, *Strategy for equality...*, p. 16.


¹² See Ellie Scambor et al., “Men and gender equality: European insights”, in *Men and masculinities 2014*, Vol. 17(5), p. 556, DOI:10.1177/1097184X14558239, [<http://jmm.sagepub.com/content/17/5/552.refs>], 29 September 2015.

¹³ European Commission, *Report on equality...*, p. 13.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 14.

Representation of women in the European Parliament, 1979-2014



Source: European Commission, *Report on equality between women and men 2014*, p. 11.

The fourth objective of the strategy is dignity, integrity and an end to gender-based violence. Gender-based violence is “violence that is directed against a person because of his or her gender (including gender identity/expression) or that affects persons of a particular gender disproportionately; it can be physical, sexual, economic and/or psychological in nature and includes violence in close relationships”¹⁶.

Statistics show that “on average, every minute of every day in Europe, 7 women are victims of rape or other sexual assault, 25 are victims of physical violence and 74 are victims of sexual harassment”¹⁷, violence against women being listed as a major concern among Europeans. Thus, the Eurobarometer indicates that Europeans are most likely to say that “violence against women” (59%) is the gender inequality issue that should

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 23.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*.

be dealt with the most urgently, followed by “women being paid less than men for the same work” (53%)¹⁸. A very small minority, only 1% of Europeans, say that none of the nine* inequalities require urgent attention¹⁹.

The key actions of the Commission in this field would include, through other measures, the adoption of a specific strategy on combating violence against women supported by a wide campaign on this issue.

Gender equality in external actions is the last objective that makes a connection between EU’s efforts in this field and the spread of those efforts around the world. The Commission’s efforts are directed towards the encouragement of partner countries to promote gender equality in international fora, in candidate and potential candidate countries, in countries part of the European Neighborhood Policy and countries outside Europe through policy dialogue and assistance. Also, the Commission will monitor the implementation of the EU Plan of Action on Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment in Development (2010-2015). The 2014 report on the Action Plan shows that “gender mainstreaming was enhanced in 20 different policy sectors”²⁰, but, however, progress remains slow and uneven in many areas.

The link between the Strategy on gender equality and EU 2020 Strategy

The analysis of the *Strategy on gender equality* and the *2014 Report* proves that gender equality is a major concern at EU level and at the member states level, materialized in the form of specific objectives and targets that need to be achieved in a timeline period.

Despite this fact, unfortunately, the *EU 2020 Strategy* does not include an explicit gender equality pillar. The flagship initiatives address little

¹⁸ Special Eurobarometer 428, *Gender equality...*, p. 11.

* The list of the inequalities mentioned in the survey includes: Facing prejudice because of preconceived ideas about the image and role of women and men; The unequal sharing of household tasks between men and women; The low number of women in positions of power in politics and businesses; Women being paid less than men for the same work; Women being more likely to be poor than men; Women receiving lower pensions than men; Violence against women; Tackling lower life expectancy amongst men; Higher dropout rate amongst boys in education.

¹⁹ Special Eurobarometer 428, *Gender equality...*, p. 73.

²⁰ European Commission, *Report on equality...*, p. 28.

attention to gender equality, this issue being only tackled among the EU 2020 policies regarding labour market and employment. These policies deal with two of the priorities set in the *Gender Equality Strategy*, the economic independence of women and the equal pay for equal work and work of equal value.

The economic independence of women is an objective assumed by the Commission in the *European Platform against Poverty and Social Exclusion*²¹, one of the seven initiatives of the *Europe 2020 Strategy*, being also the first priority set in the *Strategy on equality between women and men (2010-2015)*. Women's economic independence is considered an important issue, and it is mentioned in both strategies, being known that poverty and exclusion from the labour market go hand in hand, women being generally more at risk than men when talking about poverty, the gender divide being clearly visible here. So, the European Commission placed the fight against poverty at the heart of its economic, employment and social agenda – the *Europe 2020 Strategy*, setting as one of its targets that 20 million less people should be at risk of poverty. Therefore, the European Platform against Poverty and Social Exclusion initiative presents how different policies will contribute to this ambitious goal of reducing poverty and increasing inclusion, making a link between the *Europe 2020 Strategy* and the *Strategy on equality* by specifying that “gender equality policies, in line with the new Strategy on equality between women and men for 2010-2015, are needed to address the gender income gap that is visible in most age groups, and leads to higher rates of poverty in the female population, both in work and out of work”²².

The *EU Agenda for New Skills and Jobs*²³, another flagship initiative of the *Europe 2020 Strategy*, sets out as key priorities: better functioning labour markets, a more skilled workforce, better job quality and working conditions and stronger policies to promote job creation and demand for labour. Its aim is to present a set of concrete actions in order to improve flexibility and security in the labour market (flexicurity), to help people in

²¹ European Commission, *The European Platform against Poverty and Social Exclusion: A European framework for social and territorial cohesion*, COM(2010) 758 final, Brussels.

²² *Ibidem*, p. 10.

²³ European Commission, *An Agenda for new skills and jobs: A European contribution towards full employment*, COM(2010) 682 final, Strasbourg.

achieving the right skills for the jobs and to improve the quality of jobs and the working conditions. This initiative approaches the gender equality dimension through mentioning that the flexicurity policies should be adapted to the post-crisis context “in order to accelerate the pace of reform, to reduce labour market segmentation, support gender equality and make transitions pay”²⁴. Also, it emphasizes the need for internal flexibility (adjustment of work organization and working time) which will allow men and women to combine work and care commitments, “enhancing in particular the contribution of women to the formal economy and to growth, through paid work outside the home”²⁵.

The *Digital Agenda*, which proposes to better exploit the potential of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) in order to foster innovation, economic growth and progress, mentions women as a specific target when it comes to increasing participation in technical and digital education and training, declaring that, given the number of women between the ages of 15-24, “it is necessary to improve the attractiveness of the ICT sector for professional use and in particular for the production and design of technology”²⁶.

Youth on the move, the EU initiative to unleash the potential of young people, stresses the need for quality education and training, successful labour market integration and more mobility of young people, mentioning that young women are particularly at risk of failing into the segmentation trap “where many young workers experience a sequence of temporary jobs alternating with unemployment, with little chance of moving toward a more stable, open-ended contract and incomplete contributions to pension provisions”²⁷.

Finally, the Europe 2020 flagship initiative, *Innovation Union*²⁸, underlines that gender considerations should be fully taken into account in the strategies that Member States should have in place to train enough researchers to meet their national R&D targets and to promote attractive

²⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 2.

²⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 5.

²⁶ European Commission, *A Digital Agenda for Europe*, COM(2010) 245 final, Brussels, p. 25.

²⁷ European Commission, *Youth on the Move*, COM(2010) 477 final, Brussels, p. 35.

²⁸ European Commission, *Europe 2020 Flagship Initiative. Innovation Union*, COM(2010) 546 final, Brussels, pp. 9-11.

employment conditions in public research institutions, one of its commitments making reference to gender balance in research careers.

Conclusions

Despite the European and national efforts to promote gender equality, gender inequalities in Europe still exist with: “women still paid on average around 16% less than men per hour of work across the entire economy; women continuing to be underrepresented in leadership positions, including decision-making functions in politics and in corporate boardrooms – with women holding only 27% of seats in national parliaments and governments, 18% of board seats, and 3% of CEO positions; violence against women remaining an issue, with an estimated 20-25% of women in Europe having been victims of physical violence at least once in their lives; persisting stereotypes of traditional gender roles meaning that women still carry a disproportionate share of the burden of housework and of caring for children, the elderly and other dependants”²⁹.

Even though the *Strategy for equality* “proclaims a close link to *Europe 2020*, in all aspects and flagship initiatives, especially with regard to designing and implementing the appropriate national measures”, one main concern remains the “consistency between implementation of the principles of the *Strategy for equality* and the main instruments of *Europe 2020*, especially the seven flagship initiatives and the guidelines, since these will be carried out at the EU level as well as in the Member States”³⁰. Such as, the *Agenda for New Skills and Jobs*, one of the seven flagship initiatives within *Europe 2020*, which focuses on modernizing labour markets and empowering people by developing their own skills³¹, will fail unless it will enforce equality between women and men and women’s economic independence, as delivered in the *Strategy for equality*. Same scenario for the *European Platform against poverty* which addresses the assertion of social and territorial cohesion such that “the benefits of growth and jobs are widely

²⁹ Special Eurobarometer 428, *Gender equality...*, p. 4.

³⁰ European Economic and Social Committee, *The gender dimension in the Europe 2020 Strategy*, SOC/471, Brussels, 2013, p. 6.

³¹ European Commission, *Europe 2020...*, p. 4.

shared and people experiencing poverty and social exclusion are enabled to live in dignity and take an active part in society”³².

Therefore, as European Economic and Social Committee opinioned, “it is essential to mainstream the gender dimension and insert specific measures into the objectives, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of policies developed under the umbrella of *Europe 2020*”³³.

Bibliography:

1. European Commission, *A Digital Agenda for Europe*, COM(2010) 245 final, Brussels.
2. European Commission, *An Agenda for new skills and jobs: A European contribution towards full employment*, COM(2010) 682 final, Strasbourg.
3. European Commission, *Europe 2020. A European strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth*, COM(2010) 2020, Brussels.
4. European Commission, *Europe 2020 Flagship Initiative. Innovation Union*, COM(2010) 546 final, Brussels.
5. European Commission, *Report on equality between women and men 2014*.
6. European Commission, *Strategy for equality between women and men 2010-2015*, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2011.
7. European Commission, *Taking stock of the Europe 2020 Strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth*, COM(2014) 130 final, Brussels.
8. European Commission, *The European Platform against Poverty and Social Exclusion: A European framework for social and territorial cohesion*, COM(2010) 758 final, Brussels.
9. European Commission, *Youth on the Move*, COM(2010) 477 final, Brussels.
10. European Economic and Social Committee, *The gender dimension in the Europe 2020 Strategy*, SOC/471, Brussels, 2013.
11. Eurostat, *Structure of Earnings Survey*.
12. Rossilli Mariagrazia (ed.), *Gender Policies in the European Union*, New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2000.

³² *Ibidem*.

³³ European Economic and Social Committee, *The gender dimension...*, p. 1.

13. Scambor Ellie et al., "Men and gender equality: European insights", in *Men and masculinities 2014*, Vol. 17(5), pp. 552-577, DOI: 10.1177/1097184X14558239.
14. Special Eurobarometer 428, *Gender equality*; fieldwork: 29 November to 9 December 2014 (Wave EB82.4).
15. Swedish Presidency of the European Union, Division for Gender Equality, *Conference report "What does gender equality mean for economic growth and employment?"*, Strasbourg, 2009.
16. [<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:61975CJ0043&from=EN>], 8 August 2015.
17. <http://ec.europa.eu>.

EUROPE 2020 STRATEGY - RESPONDING TO (UN)EMPLOYMENT WITH EDUCATION

Delia Pop-Flanja*

Abstract:

In this article, we analyse the response that education strategies and student mobility programmes can offer to the requirements of the Europe 2020 strategy. The main aspects brought forward are the current results obtained in the domains of education and employment, the outcomes of the mobility programmes and the issue of brain drain, with particular emphasis placed on Romania's situation from these perspectives.

Keywords: Europe 2020, education, internationalisation, employment, brain drain, Romania

Introduction

In a context of economic instability and to address the challenges ahead, the European Commission launched in 2010 *Europe 2020 - A European strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth*. The new strategy set goals that can be interpreted as being clear and, to a certain extent, quantifiable. The two domains and the goals pertaining to them that we bring into discussion in this paper are employment and education, and the interconnections that exist between them. One of the headline targets of the strategy is for 75 % of the population aged 20-64 to be employed. As to what education is concerned, the European Commission envisages the reduction to below 10% of early school leaving and for at least 40% of the representatives of the younger generation to obtain a tertiary degree.¹

As education and employment are strongly related, one of the seven initiatives of the Commission, *Youth on the move*, focuses not only on the

* Dr. Delia Pop-Flanja, Faculty of European Studies, Babeş-Bolyai University.
Contact: delia.flanja@euro.ubbcluj.ro.

¹ European Commission (2010), *Europe 2020 - A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth*, Brussels, accessed on 03.11.2015 at: [<http://ec.europa.eu/eu2020/pdf/COMPLET%20EN%20BARROSO%20%20%20007%20-%20Europe%202020%20%20EN%20version.pdf>], p. 3.

quantity of the young people who stay in school, but also on the outcomes of the educational system and its response to the needs of the labour market. The progress of European employment rates of 69% on average for those aged 20-64 is encouraging, but we must keep in mind that, apart from the fact that this percentage is lower and the working hours are fewer than in other parts of the world, it only represents an average. In addition to the regional gaps, there are also gender gaps that must be taken into account, as in the case of women only 63% are employed, compared to a percentage of 76% in the case of men.² Also, the initiative of offering *better integration for migrants in the work force*³ might prove to be even more challenging both from a social perspective and from a financial one in the context of the current migratory waves from outside Europe. At the moment, the main concerns focus on more stringent needs such as relocation, expertise, equipment, shelter or medical supplies⁴, but the plans ahead cannot be made without bearing education or employability in mind.

Returning to the Flagship initiative *Youth on the move*, one of the goals to be attained in education is *to enhance the performance and international attractiveness of Europe's higher education institutions and raise the overall quality of all levels of education and training in the EU*. The Erasmus, Erasmus Mundus, Tempus and Marie Curie programmes should be envisaged as means of promoting entrepreneurship⁵.

Reforms and internationalisation in Romanian education

But, how far is Romania from reaching the goals set by the European Commission? We shall begin with the actions undertaken by our country in this direction, such as the higher education reforms. In an article on Romanian higher education in the interval 2009–2013, Adrian Curaj, Ligia Deca and Cezar Mihai Hâj bring forward the law of education adopted in 1995 (Law 84/1995) and the autonomy conferred to higher education institutions by this law. The reason for discussing this law is to

² *Ibidem*, pp. 6-11.

³ *Ibidem*, p. 9.

⁴ European Commission - Press Release, *State of Play: Measures to Address The Refugee Crisis*, 4 November 2015, accessed on 03.11.2015 At: [[Http://Europa.Eu/Rapid/Press-Release_Ip-15-5958_En.Htm](http://Europa.Eu/Rapid/Press-Release_Ip-15-5958_En.Htm)]

⁵ European Commission (2010), *Europe 2020 - A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth*, Brussels, p. 11.

set a context, as this autonomy is considered to have positive outcomes, but the limitations that it has when it comes to personnel or financial policies is considered to have a negative effect on the employability of young people as higher education staff.

The authors also present an initiative of the World Bank, who offered support to higher education in Romania, directed at tackling the problems caused by the limited public resources in the domain of public higher education, namely the creation of a student loan scheme. This initiative materialised in the creation of an Agency for Student Loans and Scholarships but, unfortunately, the loan system was not functional.⁶

Furthermore, Romania together with the World Bank launched in December 2015 the Romanian Secondary Education Project (ROSE), financed to support 1.6 million Romanian students of *both pre-university and higher education*. According to Elisabetta Capannelli, World Bank Country Manager for Romania and Hungary, it is *the largest World Bank project in the Europe and Central Asia region to support education*. The project does not address only academic factors that lead to school dropout, but also personal factors *through remedial activities, tutoring, counseling, extracurricular activities, internships, summer bridge programs and learning centers*.⁷

In the same volume, Ligia Deca, Eva Egron-Polak and Cristina Ramona Fiț discuss the novelty brought by the Law of National Education of 2011 regarding the free movement of the members of academic communities and the introduction of university classification, which is perceived as an instrument of transparency that makes the Romanian system more comprehensible at the European level. The authors also examined the available statistics on student mobility and their conclusion is that, at the national level, the records are not sufficiently clear, due to the different definitions that are given to mobility and to the lack of centralisation of the existing databases. Two main sources that can be taken

⁶ Adrian Curaj; Ligia Deca and Cezar-Mihai Hâj (2015), "Romanian Higher Education in 2009–2013. The Bologna Process and Romanian Priorities in the Search for an Active European and Global Presence", in Adrian Curaj et alii (editors), *Higher Education Reforms in Romania. Between the Bologna Process and National Challenges*, Heidelberg: Springer, pp. 6-14.

⁷ The World Bank, press release (2015), *Romania Launches Project to Increase Students' Chances of Successfully Transitioning to Tertiary Education*, 3 December 2015, accessed on 15.11.2015 at: [<http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2015/12/03/romania-launches-project-to-increase-students-chances-of-successfully-transitioning-to-tertiary-education>]

into consideration when making an analysis of the student motility are the data set based on the numbers given by universities and the data collected by the National Institute of Statistics, and these data are not always compatible. Staff mobility is also considered to be valuable, as it does not only contribute to the increase of student mobility but also to raising awareness and increasing attractiveness of the Romanian educational system. However, the current system is considered to be faulty at sending and also at attracting international staff members.⁸

A study on the internationalisation strategies of 92 public and private universities in Romania revealed that only 19 universities have set clear and detailed objectives on internationalisation, 15 do not have in their organisational chart a department of international relations, 43 have vague or no information on institutional internationalisation strategies, and 30 mention internationalization of education only in general terms, but do not have concrete targets. As to what foreign languages are concerned, one of the problems identified in the study refers to the relatively small number of programmes taught in English. However, this aspect differs from one higher institution to the other, as some institutions provide programmes in French, German, Italian etc. The situation is more promising when it comes to the requirement of taking foreign languages courses as part of the study programme. Nevertheless, in spite of this focus on foreign language competence in the case of students, members of academic and non-academic staff are not being offered language trainings in most institutions.

The conclusion of the study is that, despite the strengths of Romanian universities, such as the recognition abroad, the high quality international programmes, the high level of employability of graduates, the partnerships with the private sector, Romania's geographical position or the inexpensiveness of student accommodation possibilities, internationalisation is regarded primarily in terms of mobility and institutional partnerships, with a main focus on quantitative aspects,

⁸ Ligia Deca; Eva Egron-Polak and Cristina Ramona Fiț (2015), "Internationalisation of Higher Education in Romanian National and Institutional Contexts", in Adrian Curaj et alii (editors), *Editors Higher Education Reforms in Romania. Between the Bologna Process and National Challenges*, Heidelberg: Springer, pp. 131-137.

whereas other forms are less emphasized or are transmitted in a less coherent manner.⁹

Another aspect that should be taken into account when discussing internationalisation and that we consider to require improvement refers to the recognition of the diplomas obtained by students undertaking double degree programmes. These programmes could represent an example of the difficult endeavours that a student must undertake in order to continue his or her studies in Romania, upon taking advantage of the opportunity of studying abroad. For example, students who obtain bachelor degree diplomas in a partner university as a result of studying the final year at that particular university might not manage to return to their home university in due time to obtain an equivalence for their studies, to take the graduation exams or to defend the graduation thesis at their home universities. As a result, according to the current regulations, they have to address the *National Centre for Diploma Recognition and Equivalence* in order to obtain recognition of their diplomas¹⁰. Because of the big number of applications, it takes a rather long time to issue the certificate / attestation in recognition of studies, and this can cause problems for their applications for master degree studies.

Mobility programmes and employability

Next, we are going to discuss to what extent do students consider that the experience of studying abroad increases their employability opportunities and if their perceptions are in line with those of the employers.

As previously stated, one of the key goals on the Europe 2020 is to increase employability. Hence, we are going to bring forward the capacity of student motilities to address this goal, based on the results of *the Erasmus Impact Study Effects of mobility on the skills and employability of students and the internationalisation of higher education institutions*. The study, the largest of its kind, was published in 2014 and it involved nearly 80000 respondents, both

⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 138-145.

¹⁰ Ministry of National Education and Scientific Research, National Centre for Recognition and Equivalence of Diplomas, accessed on 10.10. 2015 at: [<http://cnred.edu.ro/en/#recognition-of-studies-for-admission-to-university-in-Romania>]

students and businesses representatives.¹¹ With reference to the relevance of the experience abroad for employability in the perception of the employers, there is a significant increase of 27% from 2006 to 2013, reaching a percentage of 64%. These findings can be interpreted both as an increase in the awareness on the benefits of studying abroad or as a shift in the requirements on the labour market. Also, it is noteworthy that some mobile student showed personality traits that can increase their employability even before going abroad, as individuals predisposed to openness and adaptability are more interested into studying abroad. Nonetheless, the study registered a significant difference in the findings on the real effects of the mobility and the perception that the subjects had on these effects.

Approximately 81% of the Erasmus students estimated that they improved the above-mentioned employability factors, whereas the results of the survey revealed an improvement in only 52% of the cases. As to what knowledge skills are concerned, it is interesting to notice that the percentage of higher education institutions respondents who declared to have observed certain improvements in the mobile students' soft skills such as confidence and adaptability is extremely high, and it is actually higher than the percentage of the students themselves who have declared to have registered an improvement of these skills – 99% versus 90%. Since there is clearly a difference between findings and perceptions, these last reports should be interpreted cautiously. However, as these soft skills are difficult to be quantified, the perception of the outcomes should not be ignored, as it leads to increased self-confidence. Also, as progresses have been noticed at an institutional level, we can conclude that the improvement of these skills, even if not quantified, did occur.¹²

Work placements have a more direct effect on employability as they have the advantage of providing not only more or less measurable skills improvement, but also work experience. According to the study, more than one in three former Erasmus students, beneficiaries of work placements,

¹¹ European Commission - Press release (2014), *Erasmus Impact Study confirms EU student exchange scheme boosts employability and job mobility*, 22 September 2014, accessed on 11.11.2015 at: [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-1025_en.htm].

¹² European Commission (2014), *The Erasmus Impact Study. Effects of mobility on the skills and employability of students and the internationalisation of higher education institutions*, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union., pp. 4-17.

was offered a job by their host company and they also developed entrepreneurship skills. Furthermore, five years after graduation, the unemployment rate of mobile students was 23% lower than that of non-mobile students.¹³

Another finding of the study, referring to the students' social life, reveals that 27% of Erasmus alumni had met their current life partner during their stay abroad.¹⁴ This aspect also has an indirect effect on employability as we are entitled to presume, even if the survey does not give evidence on this fact, that life partners were in many cases of different nationality, which could increase the interest of the alumni into leaving and working abroad.

An earlier study, the 2010 *Employers' perception of graduate employability* Flash Eurobarometer study by the Gallup Organization, requested by the European Commission, undertaken in 7036 companies of the 27 EU Member States of that time, as well as Norway, Iceland, Croatia and Turkey, also brings interesting insights into the issue of young graduates employability. More than half of the recruited employees of the companies who took part in this study carried out business or economic studies and engineering¹⁵ According to the above presented *Erasmus Impact Study Effects* [...], the top five fields of study among all mobile student and alumni groups were Business Studies and Management (21% to 25%), followed by Engineering and Technology, Languages and Philosophical Sciences as well as Social Sciences, which occupied the second to fourth places with only marginal differences per student group, representing 10% to 14% of the various groups of mobile students and 12% to 19% of the mobile alumni groups.¹⁶ Correlating the results of these two studies, we can conclude that they reveal not necessarily an increase in employability due to mobility, but an increase in employability as students who undertake motilities are studying mostly in the domains where companies are interested to recruit from.

¹³ *Ibidem*, p. 17.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 18.

¹⁵ The Gallup Organization (2010), *Employers' perception of graduate employability*, Flash Eurobarometer study requested by the European Commission, November 2010, accessed on 15.11.2015 at: [http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_304_en.pdf], p. 4.

¹⁶ European Commission, *The Erasmus Impact Study*, p. 37.

Approximately 70% of the graduate recruiters rather disagreed that it was very important that new recruits had studied or worked abroad. This experience was mostly appreciated by recruiters with international contacts or by employers in the industry sector.¹⁷ Conversely, teamwork skills, communication skills or the ability to adapt, that were considered by employers to be highly required by the employers, are skills that can be acquired or enhanced due to mobility programmes, which could connect mobility and employability.

According to the survey, the top five skills and capabilities required for today's employees, listed in the order of importance were team working skills, sector-specific skills, communication skills, computer skills and ability to adapt to and act in new situations. Foreign language skills merely occupied the 11th position.¹⁸ Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that there are considerable variations in the scores obtained in different countries.

Interestingly, when asked about the skills that graduates should possess in the next 5-10 years, the rankings proved to be different, sector-specific skills, communication and foreign language competence gaining ground and team working and ability to adapt to and act in new situations losing ground. This is a perspective that higher education institutions should keep in mind when elaboration their curricula in order to prepare graduates for the labour market.¹⁹

The cooperation between the companies surveyed and higher education institutions to discuss curriculum design and study programmes was considered to be rather low.²⁰ Employers' perceptions, even if they are the result of more or less *impressionistic reactions*²¹, should be thoroughly taken into consideration in the domain of education. In Romania's case, the percentage of the respondents who had never cooperated with higher education institutions to discuss curriculum design and study programmes or in the recruitment of their graduates was of 45%. However, since the report of 2010, collaboration between higher education institutions and the

¹⁷ The Gallup Organization, *op. cit.*, p.6.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 12.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 19.

²⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 7.

²¹ Simon Sweeney, *Going Mobile: Internationalisation, mobility and the European Higher Education Area*, York: Higher Education Academy, 2012, accessed on 03.11.2015 at: [https://www.heacademy.ac.uk/sites/default/files/resources/going_mobile.pdf]

business environment has increased, and there are also some universities that can be given as examples of good practice.²² Correlating the educational system with labour market requirements is part of The National Plan for Research, Development and Innovation for the period 2007-2013²³ and there has also been, according to Eurostat statistics, a slight increase in the percentage of youth employment from 20 to 29 years from 54% in 2010 to 55,2% in 2014.²⁴

The lack of dynamism is considered to be one of the deficiencies of the Romanian educational system, especially since the labour market has evolved rapidly in the past years, at a pace at which higher education institutions find it difficult to keep up with. The educational system cannot develop separately from the necessities of the business environment and from the standards set at the European and international levels. An evolution that cannot be overlooked is the professor-student communication and the inclusion of online tools.²⁵

Early school leaving

Another target of the Europe 2020 strategy is to reduce the rate of early leavers from education and training to less than 10%. Even if this rate has not been reached yet, as in 2013 the indicator stood at 12%, there is an evolution from the 14.7% of 2008, which allows us to conclude that the goals of the strategy are realistic in this domain. Analysing the statistical figures for Romania, it registers a percentage of 18.1% on the scale of early leavers from education and training in 2014, an improvement from 19.6% in 2005. Still, Romania registered an inconsistent evolution from 2005, as in 2008 it scored the lowest percentage, of 15,9%, lower than Norway and the

²²Babeş-Bolyai University of Cluj-Napoca official website, University of Bucharest official website, accessed on 03.11.2015 at: [<http://centre.ubbcluj.ro/fundraising/>], [<http://infoub.unibuc.ro/index.php/cariera>]

²³ Government of Romania, Ministry of Education and Research, The National Plan for Research, Development and Innovation for the period 2007-2013, accessed on 15.11.2015 at: [http://www.euraxess.gov.ro/plan_EN.pdf]

²⁴Eurostat statistics, *Youth employment from 20 to 29 years*, accessed on 20.11.2015 at: [<http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/submitViewTableAction.do>]

²⁵ Costel Negricea; Nicoleta Dumitru and Tudor Edu (2011), "Betwen Hope and Reality the Role of Romanian Universities in the Student Employer Relationship," in *Holistic Marketing Management Journal, Holistic Marketing Management*, vol. 1(1), pp. 52-59, p. 56.

United Kingdom, whereas in 2010 it scored 19.3%. In 2014, Romania occupied an unfortunate 5th position, after Turkey, Spain, Malta and Iceland. At the level of the Member States, tertiary educational attainment for the age group 30-34 reached its target of 40% only in the case of women, as it scored 41.2% in 2013; the situation is different in the case of men where the progress is slower (36.9% in 2013). As ten countries already reached the target for both women and men, we can presume that the European targets can be met by 2020 for most countries. Romania is situated on one of the last positions and in 2014 it reached a percentage of only 25%. In this case, however, there is a clear evolution from 2005, when the country scored only 11.4%, and was situated last²⁶. According to Dina Maria Luț, Member States should consider a more preventive approach such as *teacher education, continuing professional development and quality early childhood education and care*.²⁷

In a study on the causes and consequences of early school leaving conducted among students enrolled in lower secondary schools and their parents from Centre, North-East and South-Muntenia Regions of Romania in two waves: 2011 and 2013, Claudiu Ivan and Iulius Rostas conclude that “*there is a significant correlation between school dropout and: limited family support, non-inclusive school environment, low grades the transition from one stage of education to another or pertaining to a vulnerable group.*”²⁸ The risk for school dropout is much higher in the case of Roma students, which led them to consider that education policies should focus more on offering equal opportunities to people from different ethnic groups and that social inequalities continue to exist in schools.

Brain drain and brain circulation

This leads the discussion to another aspect highly debated with reference to student mobility, namely the issue of brain drain, defined as

²⁶Eurostat statistics, *Europe 2020 indicators*, accessed on 01.11. 2015 at: [<http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/europe-2020-indicators>]

²⁷ Dina Maria Luț, “Romanian Education and Training System in the Context of European Strategic Framework: a Comparative Analysis”, in *Anale. Seria Stiinte Economice*, vol. XVIII/Supplement, Timișoara: Eurostampa, 2012, pages 255-263, p. 258.

²⁸ Claudiu Ivan and Iulius Rostas (2013), *Early School Leaving: causes and consequence*, Roma Education Fund, accessed on 15.11.2015 at: [http://www.romaeducationfund.hu/sites/default/files/publications/early_school_leaving_causes_and_effects_2013.pdf], p. 16.

*the emigration of highly trained or qualified people from a particular country*²⁹.

The question that arises is if mobile students develop skills that increase their capacity of getting employed, hence, becoming more valuable on the labour market of their home countries, do countries respond with suitable employment offers?

A study on brain drain within EU countries for the interval 2003-2014, undertaken within the Erasmus+ Programme, shows that Romania is situated on an unfortunate 3rd place, after Poland and Germany on the brain drain scale. UK and Germany are in an interesting position, as they score high both for brain drain and brain gain. However, this migration of professionals is not a *zero-sum game*. In Romania's case, 26496 professionals moved to another EU country after obtaining a qualification here, whereas reports on brain-gain indicate a number of 582 professionals moved here after obtaining their qualifications in another EU country, so the resulted difference is of -25914.³⁰ It is noteworthy that these numbers are difficult to quantify as job mobility must also be taken into consideration and some people might return to their home countries and bring additional knowledge and value. Nevertheless, in Romania's case, the big difference between incoming and outgoing professionals clearly indicates a brain drain situation, in spite of possible variations in numbers.

Whereas international mobility programmes increase awareness on the specificities of the host country or the beneficiary's competencies in working in a foreign or intercultural environment, they should not be judged as sources of brain drain. They do make people more aware of their possibilities, but the incapacity of the home countries to offer proper employment for professions is what mostly causes individuals to work and also to become permanent residents of a foreign country, without bringing the added value to the country of origin.

Dennis Abbott, the spokesperson of Androulla Vassiliou - European Commissioner for Education, going against the affirmation that the Erasmus programme is a cause of brain drain, prefers to call this process

²⁹ Oxford Dictionaries, accessed on 03.11.2015 at:

[<http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/brain-drain>]

³⁰ Claudiu Creangă, official website Erasmus-plus.ro (2014), *Movement in EU: Countries to where the European brains move*, 27 August 2014, accessed on 03.11.2015 at: [<http://erasmus-plus.ro/movement-in-eu-countries-european-brains/>]

*brain circulation*³¹, rather than *brain drain*.³² Hence, brain drain from Romania can also be explained by the incapacity of the young graduates to get employed in their fields of study. For example, a study undertaken by UNICEF revealed that in 2012 only 76% of the graduates from Industry, Construction and Architecture fields work in this sector.³³

Conclusions

In order to provide guidelines for the implementation of Romania's National Reform Programme (NRP)³⁴, the Council of the European Union issued a set of recommendations. Unfortunately the forecast on Romania's compliance with the provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact is not a positive one. Regarding employment, some improvements have been registered in 2014, but it continues to be low in the case of women, young people, old people and Roma. A step that has been taken to tackle youth unemployment is the Youth Guarantee scheme. In the area of education, with early school leaving rates above EU average and a participation in lifelong learning below average, the relevance of higher education for the labour market is not adequate. The lifelong learning national strategy, the national strategy for reducing early school leaving and the drafted strategy on tertiary education to increase the relevance of higher education have been saluted, but a swift implementation is required.³⁵

³¹ The term *brain circulation* was introduced by Johnson and Regets in 1998, with reference to the return of Taiwanese and Korean researchers from the US.

Rasha Istaiteyeh, *Economic Development and Highly Skilled Returnees: The impact of human capital circular migration on the economy of origin countries: The case of Jordan*, Kassel, Kassel University Press, 2011, p. 30.

³² Rikke Mathiassen (2015), *Expert: Erasmus programme causes "brain drain"*, October 9, 2014, *Euroscope*, accessed on 03.11.2015 at: [<http://publications.eupeintheworld.com/expert-student-exchange-encourages-young-brains-flee-southern-europe/>]

³³ Pierre Valery; Constantin-Şerban Iosifescu; Ciprian Fartusnic; Tudorel Andrei; Claudiu Hertşeliu, Final report for UNICEF, *Cost of non-investment in Education in Romania*, Bucharest, November 2014, accessed on 04.11.2015 at:

[<http://www.unicef.org/romania/Cost.Noninvest.web.pdf>], p. 48.

³⁴ Government of Romania, *National Reform Programme 2015*, Bucharest, April 2015, accessed on 02.10.2015 at: [http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/csr2015/nrp2015_romania_en.pdf].

³⁵ Official Journal of the European Union, *Council Recommendation of 14 July 2015 on the 2015 National Reform Programme of Romania and delivering a Council opinion on the 2015 Convergence*

Hence, the possibility of Romania and of the European Union as a whole to comply with the Europe 2020 strategy requirements in the domains of education and employment is uncertain and the goals are somewhat difficult to attain, as, despite the acknowledged and important steps forward that have been taken, among other aspects, communication between education institutions and the labour market continues to be deficient. Nevertheless, the progress that has been made so far allows us to regard the outcomes of the strategy from an optimistic perspective, even if its final goals will not be reached by 2020.

Bibliography:

1. Babeş-Bolyai University of Cluj-Napoca official website, accessed on 03.11.2015 at: [<http://centre.ubbcluj.ro/fundraising/>].
2. Creangă, Claudiu (2014), official website Erasmus-plus.ro, *Movement in EU: Countries to where the European brains move*, 27 August 2014, accessed on 03.11.2015 at: [<http://erasmus-plus.ro/movement-in-eu-countries-european-brains/>].
3. Curaj, Adrian; Deca, Ligia and Hâj, Cezar-Mihai (2015), “Romanian Higher Education in 2009–2013. The Bologna Process and Romanian Priorities in the Search for an Active European and Global Presence”, in Adrian Curaj et alii (editors), Editors *Higher Education Reforms in Romania. Between the Bologna Process and National Challenges*, Heidelberg: Springer, 1-24.
4. Deca, Ligia; Egron-Polak, Eva and Fiț, Cristina Ramona (2015), “Internationalisation of Higher Education in Romanian National and Institutional Contexts”, in Adrian Curaj et alii (editors), Editors *Higher Education Reforms in Romania. Between the Bologna Process and National Challenges*, Heidelberg: Springer, 127-148.
5. European Commission - Press release, *State of Play: Measures to Address the Refugee Crisis*, 4 November 2015, accessed on 03.11.2015 at: [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5958_en.htm].
6. European Commission (2010), *Europe 2020 - A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth*, Brussels, accessed on 03.11.2015 at:

Programme of Romania, 18.08.2015, accessed on 03.11.2015 at:

[http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/csr2015/csr2015_council_romania_en.pdf]

- [<http://ec.europa.eu/eu2020/pdf/COMPLET%20EN%20BARROSO%20%20%20007%20-%20Europe%202020%20-%20EN%20version.pdf>].
7. European Commission (2014), *The Erasmus Impact Study. Effects of mobility on the skills and employability of students and the internationalisation of higher education institutions*, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union.
 8. European Commission - Press release (2014), *Erasmus Impact Study confirms EU student exchange scheme boosts employability and job mobility*, 22 September 2014, accessed on 11.11.2015 at: [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-1025_en.htm].
 9. Eurostat statistics, *Youth employment from 20 to 29 years*, accessed on 20.11.2015 at: [<http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/submitViewTableAction.do>].
 10. Eurostat statistics, *Europe 2020 indicators*, accessed on 01.11. 2015 at: [<http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/europe-2020-indicators>].
 11. Government of Romania, *National Reform Programme 2015*, Bucharest, April 2015, accessed on 02.10.2015 at: [http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/csr2015/nrp2015_romania_en.pdf].
 12. Government of Romania, Ministry of Education and Research, *The National Plan for Research, Development and Innovation for the period 2007-2013*, accessed on 15.11.2015 at: [http://www.euraxess.gov.ro/plan_EN.pdf].
 13. Istaiteyeh, Rasha (2011), *Economic Development and Highly Skilled Returnees: The impact of human capital circular migration on the economy of origin countries: The case of Jordan*, Kassel, Kassel University Press.
 14. Ivan, Claudiu and Rostaş, Iulius (2013), *Early School Leaving: causes and consequence*, Roma Education Fund, accessed on 15.11.2015 at: [http://www.romaeducationfund.hu/sites/default/files/publications/early_school_leaving_causes_and_effects_2013.pdf].
 15. Luţ, Dina Maria (2012), "Romanian Education and Training System in the Context of European Strategic Framework: a Comparative Analysis", in *Anale. Seria Stiinte Economice*, vol. XVIII/Supplement, Timișoara: Eurostampa, 255-263.
 16. Mathiassen, Rikke (2014), *Expert: Erasmus programme causes "brain drain"*, October 9, 2014, *Euroscope*, accessed on 03.11.2015 at:

- [<http://publications.europeintheworld.com/expert-student-exchange-encourages-young-brains-flee-southern-europe/>].
17. Ministry of National Education and Scientific Research, National Centre for Recognition and Equivalence of Diplomas, accessed on 10.10. 2015 at: [<http://cnred.edu.ro/en/#recognition-of-studies-for-admission-to-university-in-Romania>].
 18. Negricea, Costel; Dumitru, Nicoleta and Edu, Tudor (2011), "Between Hope and Reality the Role of Romanian Universities in the Student Employer Relationship," in *Holistic Marketing Management Journal*, *Holistic Marketing Management*, vol. 1(1), 52-59.
 19. Official Journal of the European Union, *Council Recommendation of 14 July 2015 on the 2015 National Reform Programme of Romania and delivering a Council opinion on the 2015 Convergence Programme of Romania*, 18.08.2015, accessed on 03.11.2015 at: [http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/csr2015/csr2015_council_romania_en.pdf].
 20. Oxford Dictionaries, accessed on 03.11.2015 at: [<http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/brain-drain>].
 21. Sweeney, Simon (2012), *Going Mobile: Internationalisation, mobility and the European Higher Education Area*, York: Higher Education Academy, accessed on 03.11.2015 at: [https://www.heacademy.ac.uk/sites/default/files/resources/going_mobile.pdf].
 22. The Gallup Organization (2010), *Employers' perception of graduate employability*, Flash Eurobarometer study requested by the European Commission, November 2010, accessed on 15.11.2015 at: [http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_304_en.pdf].
 23. The World Bank, press release (2015), *Romania Launches Project to Increase Students' Chances of Successfully Transitioning to Tertiary Education*, 3 December 2015, accessed on 15.11.2015 at: [<http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2015/12/03/romania-launches-project-to-increase-students-chances-of-successfully-transitioning-to-tertiary-education>].
 24. University of Bucharest official website, accessed on 03.11.2015 at: [<http://infoub.unibuc.ro/index.php/cariera>].
 25. Varly, Pierre; Iosifescu, Constantin-Șerban; Fartusnic, Ciprian; Andrei, Tudorel; Herțeliu, Claudiu (2014), Final report for UNICEF, *Cost of non-*

investment in Education in Romania, Bucharest, November 2014, accessed on 04.11.2015 at: [<http://www.unicef.org/romania/Cost.Noninvest.web.pdf>].

DIGITAL AGENDA FOR ROMANIA, PROGRESS TOWARDS 2020 TARGETS

Rada Cristina Irimie*

Abstract:

The present article shall provide the reader with a presentation of the main points of the Digital Agenda for Romania, as well as brief pieces of information on how it is to be implemented in Romania in the following years. The first part of the article shall offer a short presentation of the Digital Agenda for Romania, by reference to the Digital Agenda for Europe and by placing the latter in the context of the Europe 2020 Strategy of which it is a part. Another part shall refer to the main institutions in charge with creating the framework of implementation of the Digital Agenda for Romania, namely the Ministry for Communication and Information Security and the Agency for the Digital Agenda for Romania. Within this section, the author shall also deal with the Digital Agenda for Romania website, which can be seen as a means of managing the implementation process within the country. A third part of the article shall present in extenso the main aspects of the National Strategy for the Digital Agenda for Romania, along with the directions and the trajectories to be followed, the expected results and the means of achieving them. Finally, the article shall present examples on how the Digital Agenda for Romania created evolutions in the field in recent months.

Keywords: Internet, Digital Agenda, Romania, information, communication.

Presentation of the Digital Agenda for Romania

In an age of constant electronic development, when the accessing of public services is made via the Internet worldwide, Romania has to learn to adapt to this new technological advancement at a quick pace. This means that electronic systems needs to be extended to a large variety of topics –

* Rada Cristina Irimie is Ph.D candidate at the Faculty of European Studies, Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca.
Contact: radairimie@yahoo.com

governance, education, culture, healthcare, social media, cloud and open data systems, etc. Given that Romania is a member of the European Union, it needs to adapt its many fields to the requirements formulated by the European officials, and this includes also the electronic and technological domains.

The Digital Agenda for Romania has been created as a form of accommodating the provisions of the Digital Agenda for Europe within a Romanian level. In order to be able to implement the document, a National Strategy has been voted upon, which comprises several directions of actions and activities to be developed in order to reach intended expectations for the 2014-2020 period of time.

The Digital Agenda for Romania (*Agenda Digitală pentru România*) needs to be understood in the larger context provided by the Digital Agenda for Europe 2014-2020. The Digital Agenda for Europe is one of the seven pilot-initiatives of the Europe 2020 Strategy on a European Union level, and defines the major role that Information Technology and Communications is likely to play in the achievement of the Europe 2020 objectives.

This Digital Agenda for Romania contains, in fact, the main elements of the European Agenda, adapted to the Romanian case. This adaption was necessary in order for Romania to be able to access the approximately 30 billion euros, available in the form of cohesion and structural funds, which have been allotted to the country by the European Commission for the 2014-2020 interval¹. Just like in the case of any other European Union document, the transposition of the provisions of the Digital Agenda for Europe, in Romania, had to be done by the creation of a framework which could accommodate the format. Thus, the National Strategy on the Digital Agenda for Romania had been created, under the direct supervision of the Romanian Ministry for Communication and Information Security.

According to the Romanian Ministry for Communication and

¹ Adrian Vasilache, *Guvernul a aprobat Strategia privind Agenda Digitală pentru România 2020: Necesarul de investiții IT&C este de 3.9 miliarde de euro*, 2015, [<http://economie.hotnews.ro/stiri-telecom-19859288-guvernul-aprobat-strategia-privind-agenda-digitala-pentru-romania-2020-necesarul-investitii-fost-redus-3-9-miliarde-euro-2-4-miliarde-euro-pana-2020-htm>], 30 June 2015.

Information Security, Romanian authorities have to invest 3.9 billion euros in order to be able to implement the provisions of the Agenda. The direct impact of such an investment would be an increase by 13% of the GDP, an increase in the availability of jobs by 11% and the reduction of costs within public administration by 12% in the 2014-2020 interval².

The achievement of this large amount of money is to be done mostly through European funds. According to Morovan³, 850 million euros were likely to be obtained through Investment Operational Programmes, to be divided as follows, for several areas:

| <i>Name of the area of investment</i> | <i>Sum (euros)</i> | <i>Percentage</i> |
|--|--------------------|-------------------|
| <i>E-Governance and Interoperability</i> | 100.000.000 | 12% |
| <i>Cloud computing and social media</i> | 30.000.000 | 3% |
| <i>ITC in Education</i> | 85.000.000 | 10% |
| <i>ITC in Healthcare</i> | 50.000.000 | 6% |
| <i>ITC in Culture</i> | 15.000.000 | 2% |
| <i>ITC in E-commerce</i> | 70.000.000 | 8% |
| <i>ITC in Research and Innovation</i> | 5.000.000 | 1% |
| <i>Broadband technology</i> | 495.000.000 | 58% |
| Total | 850.000.000 | 100% |

In order to eliminate the significant disparities existing between the necessary investments through the Operational Programme and the needed budget, public institutions had to make sure that they accessed all available complementary financial tools, such as budgeted investments, financed by

² Andreea Hanganu, *Strategia Națională privind Agenda Digital 2020 a fost aprobată de Guvern*, 2015, [<http://digitaldiplomacy.ro/strategia-nationala-privind-agenda-digitala-pentru-romania-2020-a-fost-aprobata-de-guvern/>], 30 June 2015.

³ Ioana Morovan, *O nouă variantă a Strategiei privind Agenda Digitală pentru România 2014-2020*, 2014, [http://arhiva.euractiv.ro/uniunea-europeana/articles%7CdisplayArticle/articleID_2625_2/O-noua-varianta-a-Strategiei-privind-Agenda-Digitala-pentru-Romania-2014-2020-publicata.html], 14 July 2015.

the World Bank and the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development, as well as public-private partnerships⁴.

The implementation of the Digital Agenda for Romania is dependent also on the manner in which the country officials give the appropriate destinations to the European Union funds available for the country. However, it appears that this financial issue has been a severe issue to deal with and eventually stalled the implementation of the Digital Agenda.

Given that the Digital Agenda for Romania is part of a larger European Union programme - Europe 2020 Strategy implying the absorption of funds for the 2014-2020 time frame, Romania has to devise proficient tools that will be able to deal with the incoming large amount of money. However, back in 2014, the European Commission manifested lack of confidence in the manner in which Romanian public institutions dealt with the funds allotted. The European Union officials expressed their concern on the fact that the Ponta Government (May 2012-present) did not accomplish the ex-ante conditions established by the Brussels officials on combating fraud in public acquisitions and in sectorial strategies, and has been engaging in a dis-balanced approach towards the usage of the funds⁵.

The allotting of money suggested by the Romanian authorities from the 2014-2020 funds "showed large discrepancies between the proposed budget to face the severe competition challenges, as far as the research-development sector is concerned, as it is rather a small one, compared with the challenges and obligations corresponding to the economic operators, and the promotion of local and regional infrastructures, contributing thus

⁴ Ioana Morovan, *O nouă variantă a Strategiei privind Agenda Digitală pentru România 2014-2020*, 2014, [http://arhiva.euractiv.ro/uniunea-european/articles%7CdisplayArticle/articleID_2625_2/O-noua-varianta-a-Strategiei-privind-Agenda-Digitala-pentru-Romania-2014-2020-publicata.html], 14 July 2015.

⁵ Claudiu Zamfir, *Comisia Europeană critică iarăși Guvernul pentru strategia fondurilor UE 2014-2020: Suntem îngrijorați de alocările dezechilibrate. Nu ați îndeplinit condiționalitățile. Riscurile care se văd de la Bruxelles la București*, 2014, [<http://economie.hotnews.ro/stiri-eurofonduri-17422643-exclusiv-comisia-europeana-critica-iarasi-guvernul-pentru-strategia-fondurilor-2014-2020-suntem-ingrijorati-alocarile-dezechilibrate-nu-ati-indeplinit-conditionalitatile-riscurile-care-vad-bruxelles-b.htm>], 13 July 2015.

less directly to the Europe 2020 Strategy or to the specific country recommendations”⁶.

As far as the sector of public acquisitions was concerned, the European Commission warned about the lack of transparency displayed by Romanian public institutions in the process – “The transparency of public acquisition procedures is endangered by a lack of coherence and consistency in the permits issues by various institutions. The mechanisms used to detect and prevent conflicts of interests need to be implemented efficiently, despite the source of financing”⁷.

The measures implemented throughout the Digital Agenda for Romania, and implicitly through the National Strategy for the Digital Agenda for Romania, shall concern the following aspects:

- Ensuring the access of citizens and organizations to e-Governance services;
- Improving Internet access through wider coverage of the broadband electronic communication networks;
- Increasing the degree of Internet usage;
- Promotion of electronic commerce;
- Increasing the number of transborder electronic public services;
- Increasing the available digital content and the development of the IT & C infrastructure in the fields of education, healthcare and culture;
- Supporting the increase in added-value in the IT & C domain by supporting research –development practices, as well as innovation in the field⁸.

⁶ Claudiu Zamfir, *Comisia Europeană critică iarăși Guvernul pentru strategia fondurilor UE 2014-2020: Suntem îngrijorați de alocările dezechilibrate. Nu ați îndeplinit condiționalitățile. Riscurile care se văd de la Bruxelles la București*, 2014, [<http://economie.hotnews.ro/stiri-eurofonduri-17422643-exclusiv-comisia-europeana-critica-iarasi-guvernul-pentru-strategia-fondurilor-2014-2020-suntem-ingrijorati-alocarile-dezechilibrate-nu-ati-indeplinit-conditionalitatile-riscurile-care-vad-bruxelles-b.htm>], 13 July 2015

⁷ *Ibidem*.

⁸ Andreea Hanganu, *Strategia Națională privind Agenda Digital 2020 a fost aprobată de Guvern*, 2015, [<http://digitaldiplomacy.ro/strategia-nationala-privind-agenda-digitala-pentru-romania-2020-a-fost-aprobata-de-guvern/>], 30 June 2015.

Thus, it can be stated that the contents of the Digital Agenda for Europe have been transposed and adapted to the Romanian case, in the form of the Digital Agenda for Romania. This means that the contents of the Digital Agenda for Europe have been adapted to the Romanian case and this led to the creation of the Digital Agenda for Romania. The contents are not identical, although there might be similarities. In general, as is the case with any other European Union –related issued document, the contents will be adapted to the national specifics, before being transposed in a domestic document.

Institutions in Charge with the Management of the Digital Agenda for Romania

There are two main institutions which are directly responsible for the management and implementation of the Digital Agenda for Romania.

The first is the Ministry for Communication and Information Security, which can be found at the following link: www.mcsi.ro. The second is the Agency for the Digital Agenda for Romania, an institution functioning subordinated to the Ministry above mentioned, which can be accessed at the following link: www.aadr.ro.

Image no. 1. Agenția pentru Agenda Digitală a României⁹


Agentia pentru Agenda Digitala a Romaniei (A.A.D.R.), institutie publica de specialitate a administratiei publice centrale, cu personalitate juridica, in subordinea Ministerului pentru Societatea Informatiionala are rolul de a opera sisteme informatice la nivel national destinate guvernarii electronice.

A.A.D.R. are rolul de a gestiona si opera sistemul e-guvernare (S.E.N.) disponibil la adresa www.e-guvernare.ro, Sistemul Electronic de Achizitii Publice (S.E.A.P.) disponibil la adresa www.e-licitatie.ro, Sistemul informatic pentru atribuirea electronica a autorizatiilor de transport international rutier de marfa si pentru atribuirea electronica a traseelor nationale din programele de transport prin serviciile regulate judetene si interjudetene (S.A.E.T.) disponibil la adresa www.autorizatiauto.ro si Sistemul National Electronic de Plata online cu cardul a taxelor si impozitelor (S.N.E.P.) disponibil la adresa www.ghiseul.ro si a Punctului de Contact Unic electronic (P.C.U.e) disponibil la adresa <http://www.edirect.e-guvernare.ro>.

Prin intermediul acestui web-site, echipa AADR doreste sa mentina un contact permanent cu cetateni, reprezentanti ai mediului de afaceri, ai institutiilor publice si presei.

Noutati

- Programul oficial de Internship al Guvernului României
Data 08.04.2015 16:49
- Valoarea taxelor si impozitelor platite cu cardul in Romania a urcat la aproape 175 milioane lei in 2014, sustinuta de o crestere de peste 2,5 ori a platilor online
Data 23.01.2015 10:31
- Sistem informatic colaborativ pentru mediu performant de desfasurare al achizitiilor publice- SICAP' - SMIS 48625.
Data 25.11.2014 12:24

Evenimente

Another element to be mentioned here is the website named Digital Agenda for Romania, to be accessed to the following link: www.digitalagenda.ro.

In this part, the author shall refer not only to the main institutions empowered to manage the Digital Agenda for Romania programme, as well as to the website created for this reason and bearing the same name.

The reference to the website as an entity which is in charge with this management is important as it presents the main achievements of the programme, as well as the improvements added to it in time.

The Ministry for Communication and Information Security

The role of the Ministry for Communication and Information Security (also known as the Ministry for an Informational Society (*Ministerul pentru Societatea Informatiională*)) is the main institution in charge with adapting and creating the implementation framework for the Digital Agenda for Romania. The Ministry had also a particular role, as it was in charge with preparing the specific environment before the actual Agenda

⁹ Agenția pentru Agenda Digitală a României (A.A.D.R.), [http://aadr.ro/aadr_0_2.html], 1 July 2015.

was agreed to. Thus, in 2011, the Ministry organized three debates on the Digital Agenda: in Timișoara (October 3rd 2011), Iași (October 6th 2011) and Cluj (October 11th 2011). Within these meetings, attended by representatives of the major companies (IBM, Microsoft, Ernst& Young, Cisco Romania, SNR-Radiocom, etc.) interested in creating a favorable environment for the development of the provisions of the Digital Agenda, several topics have been discussed.

The first meeting was held in Timișoara, on the 3rd October 2011 and dealt with innovating and developing the European digital platform.

The topics under discussion concerned the means of simplifying the distribution of the creative content through digital means, the issuing of digital signatures in Romania, the establishment of a European platform on cyber-crime, stimulating ITC private investments, creating new electronic services based on cloud computing and the development of the electronic public services¹⁰.

The second meeting was held in Iași, on the 6th October 2011 and featured the issue of eliminating digital barriers. In this sense, the topics approached have been: the means of attracting European funds and encouraging investments in the broadband sector, creating the NGA (Next Generation Access Network), promoting a higher rate of women participation in the IT&C sector, integrating the eLearning system in the national policies of modernizing education and professional development and creating a European framework for the IT& professionals, with the aim of increasing their competences and mobility in Europe¹¹.

The third meeting took place in Cluj, on 11th October 2011 and dealt with the issue of ITC research and education. The participants debated issues related to the means of accessing European Union research funds for the ITC field, elaborating pilot projects through the Competition and Innovation programme (a programme developed at the time in Romania gathering researchers writing research projects to be then implemented through European funds), introducing the "New competences at the work

¹⁰ Ministerul Comunicării și Securității Informațiilor (MCSI) a, *Inovarea și dezvoltarea platformei europene digitale*, 2011, [<http://www.mcsi.ro/Minister/Agenda-Digitala/Agenda-Digitala-Timisoara>], 5 July 2015.

¹¹ Ministerul Comunicării și Securității Informațiilor (MCSI) b, *Eliminarea barierelor digitale*, 2011, [<http://www.mcsi.ro/Minister/Agenda-Digitala/Agenda-Digitala-Iasi>], 5 July 2015.

place” initiative, which would feature digital literacy as a priority in professional development, and establishing long term policies concerning digital literacy and informatics’ competences¹².

The above mentioned topics are particularly important, as they point out to the effort made by the Ministry (as a public institution) and the private companies taking part in accommodating the European currently debates at the time concerning the Digital Agenda. Also, they highlight the awareness existing and manifesting in Romania with regard to the issues which were in deep need of development – digital literacy, e-learning, etc.

The Agency for the Digital Agenda for Romania

The Agency for the Digital Agenda for Romania (*Agenția pentru Agenda Digitală pentru România*) is a public institution of the central administration, subordinated to the Ministry for Communication and Information Security. The Agency was created by Government Decree No. 1132/2013 and has the role of operating the informational systems available on a national level, connected to electronic governance¹³.

In a more extensive and precise manner, this role concerns the management and operation of several national “e-” services:

- The National E-Governance System (S.E.N.), available at www.e-guvernare.ro;
- The Electronic System of Public Acquisitions (S.E.A.P.) available at www.e-licitatie.ro;
- The informatic system in charge with the electronic attribution of international transport of goods’ authorizations and with the electronic attribution of the national itineraries within the transport services related to the county and inter-county networks (S.A.E.T.), available at www.autorizatiauto.ro;
- The National Electronic System of Electronic Payment by Card of Taxes (S.N.E.P.), available at www.ghiseul.ro;

¹² Ministerul Comunicării și Securității Informațiilor (MCSI) c, *Cercetarea și educarea în TIC*, 2011, [<http://www.mcsi.ro/Minister/Agenda-Digitala/Agenda-Digitala-Cluj>], 5 July 2015.

¹³ Agenția pentru Agenda Digitală a României (A.A.D.R.), [http://aadr.ro/aadr_0_2.html], 1 July 2015.

- The Single Contact Point (*Punctul de Contact Unic – P.C.U.*) available at www.edirect.e-guvernare.ro¹⁴

The mission and the objectives of the Agency are also highly important and worth mentioning in the following paragraphs. The mission refers to the increasing of citizens' comfort in the usage of such electronic services, through the increase in performance of public administration. In this regard, the team coordinating the Agency for the Digital Agenda for Romania intends to maintain a close and constant interaction between citizens, representatives of the business environment, public institutions and the media¹⁵.

The objectives formulated by the Agency concern mainly the means of improving the services offered to the citizens. Thus, the Agency for the Digital Agenda for Romania focuses on developing the following objectives:

- Constant development and improvement of the e-governance systems (e-governance, electronic payment, electronic system for public acquisitions, the electronic system for public transport, as mentioned above);
- The regulation of those activities which are specific to the supplying of governance systems through electronic means;
- The implementation, coordination and operation on a national level of the information and communication services, with the aim of providing services destined to electronic governance;
- Creating proposals of normative acts which can improve the legislation available in the field of public services through electronic means, as well as in the field concerning the evolution of the informational society;
- Providing specific consultancy for national, regional and international institutions and organizations;
- Accomplishing research, studies, analyses, project development tactics as well as training courses in the areas concerning such e-governance systems;

¹⁴ Agenția pentru Agenda Digitală a României (A.A.D.R.), [http://aadr.ro/aadr_0_2.html], 1 July 2015.

¹⁵ *Ibidem.*

- Keeping an eye on the interoperability of electronic governance apps (applications);
- Achieving and maintaining a constant increase in the quality of those public services provided¹⁶.

Finally, the Agency has been founding its evolution and development on several major principles, which point out to the strong control that the Agency exerts on the e-governance services' market within Romania, as well as to the need to provide both the individual, as well as the private sector representatives (especially companies) with high quality services, on international standards. These principles highlight the need to orient any policy development on the added-value of the e-governance services, to protect competition mechanisms, in order to avoid providing services which are similar to those provided by the IT free market, to be effect-oriented, in order to be able to identify clear targets and achieve positive results for each, to achieve the existence of the central access point which would facilitate an easier access e-governance information and services, for both the individual and companies, and to provide interoperability and re-use of data, between the e-governance systems of different public institutions¹⁷.

The Agency for the Digital Agenda for Romania is important also from another perspective – that of itself being a supplier of a legislative framework in which electronic services function. Thus, those interested in finding more about the manner in which the above mentioned electronic services are regulated in Romania, as well as the additional elements existing in the field, one only has to access the website of the Agency – www.aadr.ro, the section referring to legislation and will find sufficient data there – both national and European pieces of legislation. These pieces concern the general management regulation of electronic governance – related services, but also aspects such as the free access to public interest information (Law No. 544/ 12th October 2001), measures to ensure transparency in the exercise of public functions (Law No. 161/ 19th of April 2003), the means of attributing public acquisition contracts, the

¹⁶ Agenția pentru Agenda Digitală a României (A.A.D.R.), [http://aadr.ro/aadr_0_2.html], 1 July 2015.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*.

concessioning of public works and of concession contracts (Decree No. 34/2006), the means of collecting statistical data concerning the Single Electronic Contact Point (Decree No. 542/ 2003), the electronic signature (Law No. 455/2001), the regulation of public transport services (Law No. 92/2007), to mention but a few of the topics to be found on the website¹⁸.

As far as the pieces of European legislation are concerned, they are several directives and regulations issued by the European Parliament or the European Commission on the issues of re-usage of information within a public framework (Directive 2003-98-ec), the steps to be followed in the attribution of acquisition contracts (Regulation No. 1177/2009R), the European framework on electronic signatures (Directive 1999/CE), etc¹⁹.

The “Digital Agenda for Romania” website

The “Digital Agenda for Romania website is important from several points of view. Firstly, it contains news related to the topic - the implementation and/or development of new projects, competitions, news about the decisions taken within the European Union framework on the Digital Agenda for Europe, which could also impact Romania, etc.

Examples of the projects and competitions include “The Europas” – the European Awards for Technological Start-ups, launching “eSkills for jobs 2015 Romania” campaign, the Riga Statement on Digital Competences, issued on the occasion of the “eSkills for jobs 2015-2016” campaign, launched on a European Union level and intended to raise awareness on the lack of proportion in digital competences within the European Union countries, the beginning of cooperation between the Romanian Ministry of Communication and Information Security and the Center for Electronic Governance of the Republic of Moldova, etc²⁰. Secondly, the website contains the section named General Framework – “*Cadru General de Acțiune*”, which is particularly noteworthy as it refers to specific issues, providing details and then connecting them with documents or initiatives currently under debate. Examples of these initiatives include: the 2020

¹⁸ Digital Agenda for Romania, *Cadru general de acțiune*, 2015, [<http://digitalagenda.ro/cadru-de-actiune/>], 30 June 2015.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*.

²⁰ *Ibidem*.

Europe Strategy, 2020 Digital Agenda for Europe, the concepts of “e-governance” and the usage of broadband connections, the accessing of online services, the main pillars of the Digital Agenda for Europe to be used in electronic services (1. The Single Digital Market, 2. Interoperability and standards, 3. Confidence and Security, 4. High speed Internet, 5. Research and innovation, 6. The improvement of digital competences, 7.

The use of IT and communication skills to deal with social changes), etc²¹. The usage of this part of the website is destined to those interested in finding more about the documents and strategies that led to the creation of the Digital Agenda for Romania, as well as brief statements on the main issues of interest to the country. Another benefit of this section of the website is the user-friendly interface, as it provides data to a both specialized and non-specialized public.

Thus, the Digital Agenda for Romania website, available at the following link: <http://digitalagenda.ro> is an interface between the end user and the existing framework on the topic. This interface is constantly updated (twice a month at least – given that there are not so many news and projects in the field to refer to) and represents a great means of information on the evolutions in the field.

Image no. 2: The website of the Digital Agenda for Romania²²



²¹ Digital Agenda for Romania, *Cadru general de acțiune*, 2015, [<http://digitalagenda.ro/cadru-de-actiune/>], 30 June 2015

²² *Ibidem*.

The topics referred to concern issues such as: fragmented digital markets, lack of interoperability, rise of cyber-crime and low confidence within the networks, lack of investment in networks, insufficient efforts as far as research and development are concerned, lack of digital competences, and the issue of lost opportunities in the solving of societal competences²³.

Although the website should be dealing with the manner in which the Digital Agenda for Romania is being implemented, the references available concern only the situation for 2010 (there references deal with broadband connections, Internet access, the accessing of online services among the total population as well as among the Internet users, the available e-governance services, electronic commerce and e-business strategies)²⁴.

Another element worth mentioning concerning this website is the annex containing legislative proposals issued by the European Commission together with the dates when these proposals should be presented to the public (or had already been presented to the public). The dates range between 2010 and 2013.

The initiatives suggested referred to the main pillars of electronic services. Thus, they concern:

- the emergence of *a dynamic and single digital market* (e.g. one directive concerned the management of collective rights on the institution of a pan-European system which could be used to provide licenses for the usage of online rights, another one referred to the facilitation of the digitalization process and the dissemination of orphan cultural works within Europe, etc.),
- *the means of ensuring interoperability and standardization* (e.g. proposals to reform the norms of implementation of IT standards within Europe, with the aim of allowing the usage of the standards already created by different for a and consortia in the field, reports regarding the feasibility of measures which could determine the

²³ Digital Agenda for Romania, *Cadru general de acțiune*, 2015, [<http://digitalagenda.ro/cadru-de-actiune/>], 30 June 2015

²⁴ *Ibidem*.

major economic actors to provide licenses on the information concerning interoperability, etc.);

- *confidence and security* (e.g. proposals of measures which can prevent cyber-attacks, the proposal of a Regulation on the modernization of the European Agency on the Security of Data and Information Networks (ENISA), etc.);
- *free, ultra-fast access to Internet* (e.g. proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the European Council to establish the first programme of policies in the field of radio frequency, etc.);
- *the increase in the levels of digital literacy, digital competences and inclusion* (e.g. suggesting digital competences and literacy in the Regulation on the European Social Fund 2014-2020), and
- *advantages of IT and communication skills within the European Union society* (e.g. revision of the directive concerning the public access to data concerning the environment, a proposal of a directive on the development of maritime e-services, etc.) (Digital Agenda for Romania, 2015).

The National Strategy on the Digital Agenda for Romania

Romania has shown interest and availability throughout time in the implementation of the Digital Agenda for Europe provisions. Thus, in October 2013, Foreign Affairs Secretary of State George Ciamba highlighted, in the meeting of the General Affairs Council, held in Luxembourg, the efforts made by Romania in further developing the research and innovation sectors, especially given their role in stimulating economic growth and competition (the research and innovation fields are important domains included in the Digital Agenda)²⁵.

Also in 2013, the Portal of Participatory Democracy discussed the importance of implementing the provisions of the Digital Agenda for Europe in Romania, in the soon-to-become, the Digital Agenda for Romania. In this sense, the Portal stressed the need to accomplish

²⁵ Ministerul Afacerilor Externe (MAE), *G. Ciamba a subliniat, la Luxemburg, susținerea României pentru Agenda Digitală a UE*, 2013, [<http://catania.mae.ro/romania-news/3496>], 13 July 2015.

interoperability between informatics systems, which was likely to lead to efficiency in communication, better coordination among those fields operating on informatic systems and increase the operational aspect of e-Governance systems used by citizens²⁶.

The European Council of October 2013 played a great role in creating the implementation framework for the Digital Agenda for Romania. At this event, Romania had defined as a strategic sector the field of information technology, which Romanian officials considered to be a competition cluster worth exploring, one likely to bring Romania in a competitive advantage with the other European Union countries²⁷. The choice of this field as a herald in the further development and implementation of the future Digital Agenda for Romania was owed to the economic benefits of the sector – in 2013, the high tech and medium tech industries contributed with 26% of the industry's added value, had hired approximately 25% of the total employees of the industry, had 84% expenses in the field of industrial innovation and research and had an 8% added value to the national GDP²⁸.

There have been several debates before the final version of the document on the National Agenda on the Digital Agenda for Romania has been issued. The draft of the document issued in July 2014 is the result of the Romanian authorities following the conditions and suggestions set by the European Commission representatives, who urged just a month before (in June 2014) that the document be modernized in agreement with the provisions of the National Strategy of Intelligent Specialization (*Strategia Națională de specializare inteligentă*)²⁹.

The National Strategy on the Digital Agenda for Romania (National

²⁶ Portalul Democrației Participative, *Strategia Națională privind Agenda Digitală pentru România*, 2013, [www.portaleromania.ro], 13 July 2015.

²⁷ Cristian Socol, *Analiza Agenda Digitală. De ce este importantă poziția României la Consiliul European*, 2013, [http://www.zf.ro/zf-24/analiza-agenda-digitala-de-ce-este-importanta-pozitia-romaniei-la-consiliul-european-11558408], 13 July 2015.

²⁸ *Ibidem*.

²⁹ Claudiu Zamfir, *Comisia Europeană critică iarăși Guvernul pentru strategia fondurilor UE 2014-2020: Suntem îngrijorați de alocările dezechilibrate. Nu ați îndeplinit condiționalitățile. Riscurile care se văd de la Bruxelles la București*, 2014, [http://economie.hotnews.ro/stiri-eurofonduri-17422643-exclusiv-comisia-europeana-critica-iarasi-guvernul-pentru-strategia-fondurilor-2014-2020-suntem-ingrijorati-alocarile-dezechilibrate-nu-ati-indeplinit-conditionalitatile-riscurile-care-vad-bruxelles-b.htm], 13 July 2015.

Strategy on the D.A.R. – in short) was issued through Government Decree 245/2015. The document transposes to the Romanian case the provisions of the Digital Agenda for Europe, one of the seven pilot initiatives of the Europe 2020 Strategy, and deals with the major role that the use of information technology and communications (ITC – in short) will have in achieving the Europe 2020 objectives.

There are four main areas targeted by the National Strategy on the D.A.R.:

- Direction 1. E-governance, interoperability, cybersecurity, cloud computing, open data, big data and social media – in these fields, the aims of the Strategy are to increase efficiency and reduce costs within the public sector, by modernizing public administration mechanisms;
- Direction 2. ITC in education, culture and healthcare – in these fields, the implementation of new technology will take place on a sector level;
- Direction 3. ITC in e-commerce, as well as research, development and innovation in ITC – these focus on highlighting Romania's comparative regional advantages, and support economic development in the private sector;
- Direction 4. Broadband and digital infrastructure services – in these fields, the Strategy is focused on providing social inclusion³⁰.

Each of these topics is approached in a chapter of its own, presenting firstly the European approach, followed by the Romanian one, and the main strategic lines of development to be achieved in the future. Additionally, each of these directions has its own aims and objectives to be accomplished.

| Directions ³¹ | Aims | Objectives |
|---|--|--|
| Direction 1 – E-governance, interoperability, cyber- | The aim is to achieve the objective of reforming the manner in which the | An increase in the transparency of public administration acts through the process of |

³⁰ Ministerul Comunicării și Securității Informațiilor (MCSI), *Strategia Națională privind Agenda Digitală pentru România*, 2014, [<http://www.mcsi.ro>], 3 July 2015.

³¹ *Ibidem*.

| | | |
|--|--|--|
| security, cloud computing, open data, big data and social media | government functions, allows access to information, involves the citizens and provides services to both external and internal clients, to the benefit of the government as well as well as of the clients it attends to. | providing informatized public services. |
| | | An increase in the number of cybersecurity networks and systems. |
| | | An increase of the access to digital public services. |
| | | Efficient public administrations and the decrease of their operational costs. |
| | | Improving the business environment. |
| | | Improving governance within the context of the beginning of the operationalization of public services. |
| Direction 2 – ITC in education, healthcare, culture and e-Inclusion | Investing in population knowledge and skills, with the aim of promoting society development. | Support in developing ITC competences |
| | | Providing social inclusion that would stimulate growth |
| | | Training the personnel involved in the learning and management process of the ITC –assisted activity |
| | | Developing the ITC infrastructure in the areas of education, healthcare and culture |
| Direction 3 - e-Commerce, ITC research-development and innovation | Perfecting the existing e-commerce framework, which would thus offer a clear legal framework for enterprises and consumers and would invest in innovation | E-commerce support for the accomplishment of economic growth and development on the single European digital market |
| | | Increasing the number of workplaces in the ITC sector |
| | | Building on the existing comparative advantages of regional Romania |

| | | |
|--|--|--|
| Direction 4 - Broadband communication infrastructure and digital services | Through the implications that the ITC sector has on economic growth, the broadband communication infrastructure has a great role in the future development of Romania, both on an economic level, as well as far as the improvement of social inclusion conditions is concerned. | The development of ITC broadband infrastructure for a complete and uniform regional coverage |
| | | Improving social inclusion through access to the broadband communication infrastructure |

The Strategy has been elaborated as a result of a cooperation effort between the Romanian Ministries of Communication and Information Security, that of Transportation, National Education, Healthcare and Finances, under the close supervision and guidance of the Romanian Government. In this regard, several action trajectories have been established for each of the four main directions, to be implemented by the specific ministry in charge with the respective field, as well as in cooperation with all other ministries which provide public services. In the case of cybersecurity, also the Ministry of Internal Affairs shall be involved.

In the following paragraphs the author shall refer to these action trajectories, in an effort to highlight the multidimensional approach of the National Strategy on the D.A.R., as well as the length at which the Strategy goes in order to provide solutions and cover all possible scenarios.

| |
|--|
| Direction 1. – e-Governance, Interoperability, Cyber security, Cloud Computing, Open Data, Big Data and Social Media³² |
| Action trajectories |
| Defining the informational perimeter of public services |
| Applying an institutional structure meant to support the implementation of e-Governance projects |

³² Ministerul Comunicării și Securității Informațiilor (MCSI), *Strategia Națională privind Agenda Digitală pentru România*, 2014, [<http://www.mcsi.ro>], 3 July 2015.

| |
|---|
| Promoting standards |
| Identifying data registries and their owners in order to facilitate interoperability |
| Promoting transparency and openness |
| Promoting e-Participation |
| Promoting interoperability |
| Legislation improvements |
| Consolidating institutional support and monitoring |
| Promoting cooperation and collaborating with public and private entities |
| Establishing a feedback and evaluation mechanism |
| Standardization efforts |
| Creating the concept of e-identity |
| Establishing communication portals |
| Promoting electronic public acquisitions |
| Establishing a disaffecting model |
| Improving governance through informatized public services |
| Promoting innovation |
| Establishing and implementing a national system of cybersecurity |
| Improving legislation |
| Consolidating the partnership between the public and private sectors |
| Consolidating the knowledge data bases |
| Consolidating research and development capacities in cyber security |
| Creating a cybersecurity infrastructure |
| Implementing the CERT-RO programme |
| Implementing security standards |
| Inter-institutional cooperation |
| Developing public awareness programmes both for the public administration as well as the private sector |
| Developing educational programmes |
| ITC competence training |
| Signing international cooperation agreements in order to improve the reaction capacity in case of major cyber attacks |
| Participating in international programmes and exercises in the field of cyber security |
| Promoting national interests in the field of security in the international cooperation formats in which Romania is a member |
| Consolidating the acquisition process for IT infrastructure within public institutions |
| Creating a single contact point or a single authentication access point |
| Creating and putting in practice components and services which make |

| |
|--|
| altogether the basic infrastructure. |
| Re-evaluating the administrative competences directly involved in the administration activity of the governmental Cloud |
| Consolidating Data Centers. |
| Defining the principles and the general business framework for the communication process within public institutions |
| Establishing key coordinators and teams in the communication process – the PR and communication Departments of the public institutions |
| Defining a communication plan adapted to each public institution |
| Projecting a type of conversation “from one to many” rather than repeatedly use “1 on 1” conversations – a cheaper and faster solution, being one of the most useful facilities of the social media environment. |
| Promoting public debates |
| Support for open governance, given that online social media platforms are based on the three fundamental principles of Open Data: transparency, participation and cooperation. |
| Support for the usage of Big Data in public administration. |
| Elaborating a legislative framework on the free access to public information |
| Implementing a national electronic system to collect relevant data |
| Identifying and implementing possibilities to combine and manage data |
| Using relevant standards and formats in the data presentation |
| Improving the means of accessing and the capacity to use and integrate the information generated by the Open Data towards the society |
| Educating the population in having a positive attitude towards the representatives of public administration providing Open Data. |
| Identifying possibilities to attract the necessary funds and partnerships with future support groups (the civil society, data and information donors and investors) |
| Creating online access to data and services: The Electronic System of Public Acquisitions (SEAP) The electronic system attributing transport authorizations (SAET) Expanding the possibility to fill in online fiscal forms. Ensuring free online access to national legislation. Developing electronic instruments to manage the procedures on achieving Romanian citizenship. Developing electronic instruments to manage the procedures connected to the creation of a non-profit moral person. The Integrated System of Electronic Access to Justice (SIAEJ). |

| |
|--|
| Identifying a procedure which would correlate the need of the public to have access to information and the publishing of relevant data |
| Creating and supporting the www.datedeschise.guv.ro platforms |
| Defining the data sets to be collected |
| Collecting data from multiple sources (papers, digital documents, access points to governmental networks, websites, social media, and available operational systems). |
| Defining the analysis process for the collected data sets |
| |
| Direction 2 – ITC in Education, Healthcare, Culture and eInclusion |
| Action trajectories |
| |
| Supplying adequate equipment and infrastructure in schools. |
| Training professors and teachers on ITC technologies |
| Provide training courses specific to the ITC activity, directly connected to the improvement of the learning process and digital competence quality. |
| Implementation efforts as far as ITC is concerned imply, on the one hand ensuring the institutional framework of the respective ITC product and the digitalizing and archiving of the educational content. |
| Including the Web 2.0 platforms in learning processes |
| Stimulating students in becoming more involved in the learning process |
| Encouraging the life-long-learning process |
| Increasing public awareness on the phenomenon of social exclusion. |
| Increasing awareness among family and friends in order to benefit from support in developing e-inclusion measures. |
| Facilitating communication among groups in order to develop social inclusion |
| Developing digital literacy in a uniform manner and using the Internet on a regional level. |
| Promoting the “learning together” system. |
| Involving human resources services from companies and public organizations in special campaigns and trainings. |
| Promoting Open Data as an opportunity for informal education. |
| Organizing training courses on the usage of the methodology on the development of digital competences. |
| Providing materials and programmed to facilitate the adapting capacity of trainers to the community needs. |
| Facilitating access and usage of tele-medicine equipment. |

Ensuring equal access to all citizens, especially those coming from vulnerable groups to quality and cost-effective medical services, through and integrated and long-distance delivery of medical services.

Providing interoperable and integrated services for clinical and emergency care.

An integrated platform allowing easy access/e-accessibility to all services, ensuring data confidentiality.

Promoting data sharing between healthcare services suppliers in order to ensure services focused on the patients and the medical performance indicators.

Monitoring and control of the above

A unitary approach of entry data, results, management and diagnosis service-related organization, as well as health related treatments, care, rehabilitation and promotion.

Increasing the level of information integration, in order to facilitate compliance with the conformity, monitoring and audit criteria.

Facilitating Cloud services in order to ensure smaller property costs, as well as increased delivery flexibility.

Ensuring data portability and live updates in order to provide more visibility to the way in which the government functions.

Analyzing a significant volume of data generated by the healthcare information system, which could be used to the benefit of the healthcare resources' management

Digitalizing Romanian cultural heritage

Achieving a minimal contribution to the European Library (europeana.eu)

Digitalizing cultural content, specific to Romanian communities

Adjusting digital cultural content to each region

Applying a modern ITC infrastructure in public libraries

Promoting cultural experiences through ITC

Increasing public awareness on the phenomenon of social exclusion

Increasing awareness among families and friends in order to benefit from support in the development of e-inclusion measures

Facilitating communication between the target groups with the aim of achieving social inclusion.

Promoting digital literacy and a uniform usage of the Internet on a regional level. Promoting the "learning together" system.

Involving Human Resources' services within companies and public organizations in special campaigns and trainings.

Promoting the Open Data concept as an opportunity for informal education.

Providing materials and programmes to facilitate the trainers' adapting capacity to cater to all community needs.

| Direction 3 – e-Commerce, ITC |
|--|
| Action trajectories |
| Improving the regulation framework to support the e-commerce system and the moving of <i>en detail</i> commerce in the online environment |
| Preparing the strategy and regulation framework with regard to copyright in Romania, in order to help develop the digital commerce sector |
| ITC support in order to create a uniform tax collection systems (e.g. VAT), in order for the latter not to become a barrier in the development of electronic commerce within Romania |
| Improving access to online systems |
| Supporting the development and the implementation of online payments and online delivery systems |
| Preparing a regulation framework which would allow the solving of litigations caused by online media, through the usage of tools which are also available in the online media, as well as outside the court room, as recommended by the European Union |
| Improving the communication and cooperation between CERT-RO, the institution in charge with cybersecurity in Romania, and the European Center for Cybersecurity (functioning within Europol), established in 2013. |
| Promoting development clusters, competition and the specialization of employees in the field, especially in the excellence centers of Bucharest, Cluj, Iași and Timișoara. |
| Continuous training and the usage of the ITC-based electronic infrastructure for inter-connecting, as well as facilitating the cooperation between the research teams from different geographical areas |
| Increasing the Romanian participation in international projects on ITC research-development-innovation, throughout European programmes and resources |
| Direction 4 – Broadband Communication Infrastructure and Digital Services |
| Action trajectories |
| Implementing the RoNET project |
| Later extensions of the inter-connecting and backbone networks (2014 - 2020) |
| Implementing monitoring mechanisms |
| Administrative and legislative proposals |
| Encouraging access to the existing passive infrastructure. |
| Improving transparency and coordination in the relevant civil works |

| |
|--|
| Simplifying the procedure to obtain authorizations |
| Establishment of procedures for new developments |
| The issuing of new norms on the NGA infrastructure for new constructions |

As can be easily seen, Direction 1 is the most extensive in providing trajectory actions. The other three directions are also important, but the explanation for the dimension of Direction 1 stems from the fact that it is the most ample and overwhelming one, serving thus as a model for the other three.

In the case of Direction 2 (the role that ITC plays in the development of education, healthcare and culture, the reader might observe the existence of similarities in the designed measures, or even a repetition of these measures. This is due to the fact that the respective measures can be equally applied in all three fields.

The Strategy established the following minimal indicators as target for Romania in 2020:

- At least 35% of the population will use e-governance systems;
- At least 60% of the population would use the Internet regularly;
- At least 30% of the population would shop online;
- At least 80% broadband coverage (speed of over 30 Mbps)³³.

These are very general expectations, as for each of the measures mentioned above to be implemented in the selected timeframe, the National Strategy has established its own expectations and percentages.

Nevertheless, one needs to be realistic about the future evolution of the Digital Agenda for Romania and the results it is likely to have.

According to Nicolae Oaca, telecommunication specialist, the objectives set through the National Strategy are an attempt to get Romania closer to the objectives set by the European Commission for 2020.

Drawbacks are likely to be registered in the coverage of high-speed networks, due to insufficient investment – low coverage will result in low usage, keeping Romania to back of the European Union line³⁴. In Oaca's

³³ Ministerul Comunicării și Securității Informațiilor (MCSI), *Strategia Națională privind Agenda Digitală pentru România*, 2014, [<http://www.mcsi.ro>], 3 July 2015.

³⁴ Luiza Sandu, *Ce schimbări poate produce Agenda Digitală pentru România?*, 2015, [http://www.marketwatch.ro/articol/14276/Ce_schimbari_poate_produce_Agenda_Digitala_pentru_Romania/], 13 July 2015.

words, “the (Romanian) government still considers telecommunications as a source of budget income, and not an engine of economic growth; as a result it not only refuses to invest in order to catch the other European Union countries from behind, but also takes money from the sector in order to fuel the <black holes> of national economy”³⁵.

Recent Evolutions of the Digital Agenda for Romania

The establishment of the Digital Agenda for Romania is highly beneficial, as was highlighted by Răzvan Cotovelea (2014), the Minister for Communication and Information Security, in a conference held in Bucharest, in October 2014, entitled “Digital Agenda 2014-2020 European Policies on the IT&C sector”³⁶. According to him, “Romania signed in August (2014) the document with the European Commission and at the present moment we have a clear image on the manner to implement structural and investment funds in the timeframe 2014-2020. Throughout the Digital Agenda one can clearly introduce the main public interventions to be financed in the following period of time: public funds, private funds, public-private partnership. [...] Last, but not least, we will consider 2015 the *année de grace* of the IT & C field in Romania, when things should start taking place.[...] We will support and apply for financing projects in the fields of research-development and professional training in the IT& C sector”³⁷.

According to Sorin Mihai Grindeanu, the current Minister for an Informational Society, “The National Strategy on the Digital Agenda for Romania has been a long awaited document by both the ITC market, as well as the public authorities. The next step consists of issuing policies and

³⁵ Luiza Sandu, *Ce schimbări poate produce Agenda Digitală pentru România?*, 2015, [http://www.marketwatch.ro/articol/14276/Ce_schimbari_poate_produce_Agenda_Digitala_pentru_Romania/], 13 July 2015.

³⁶ Fundația Națională a Tinerilor Manageri (FNTM), *Declarații de la evenimentul Agenda Digitala 2014-2020*, 2014, [<http://www.fntm.ro/comunicat-de-presa-agenda-digitala-2014-2020-2680.html>], 3 July 2015.

³⁷ Fundația Națională a Tinerilor Manageri (FNTM), *Declarații de la evenimentul Agenda Digitala 2014-2020*, 2014, [<http://www.fntm.ro/comunicat-de-presa-agenda-digitala-2014-2020-2680.html>], 3 July 2015.

programmes which would lead to a visible change in the usage of technology in Romania”³⁸.

Although the National Strategy on the Digital Agenda for Romania has been established only in July 2014, and further approved in April 2015 there have been certain evolutions to be noted.

The first is the “interoperability platform”, which is meant to connect existing electronic systems and is intended to be completely implemented with both public and local administration by the end of 2015.

According to Diana Voicu (2014), State Secretary in the Ministry of Communication and Information Security “there have been many investments between 2007- 2013 in different electronic systems, and now we must make them communicate between each other. It is imperative to build this platform [...] It remains to be seen who will manage it, how will the tasks be distributed so that national registries will be reunited in one place, in order to have data bases accessible both on a local and national level”³⁹.

The second evolution is to be seen as a pledge to development in the future, as it concerns the development of telemedicine solutions. At the time when Romanian joined the Digital Agenda efforts, there was already a telemedicine project. As Raed Arafat, State Secretary in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, said during the conference, “while we have managed to implement telemedicine capacity on ambulances, [...] and connected them in a system with the support of the Service of Special Telecommunications, allowing the contacting of the command center, and sending the EKG or other tests for analysis [...]”⁴⁰, there are endless possibilities to use telemedicine solutions in Romania. The first direction would be that of tele – radiology – given that not all Romanian hospitals have radiologists.

³⁸ Luiza Sandu, *Ce schimbări poate produce Agenda Digitală pentru România?*, 2015, [http://www.marketwatch.ro/articol/14276/Ce_schimbari_poate_produce_Agenda_Digitala_pentru_Romania/], 13 July 2015.

³⁹ Diana Voicu, *Platforma care va conecta sistemele electronice din administrație, funcțională până la finalul lui 2015*, 2014, [http://arhiva.euractiv.ro/uniunea-europeana/articles/%7cdisplayArticle/articleID_26669/Diana-Voicu-MSI-Platforma-care-va_conecta-sistemele-electronice-din-administratie-funcionala-pana-la-finalul-lui-2015.html], 3 July 2015.

⁴⁰ Fundația Națională a Tinerilor Manageri (FNTM), *Declarații de la evenimentul Agenda Digitală 2014-2020*, 2014, [<http://www.fntm.ro/comunicat-de-presa-agenda-digitala-2014-2020-2680.html>], 3 July 2015.

Another direction is that of spreading tele-medicine solutions in General Practitioner's clinics. Finally, tele-medicine could be implemented in Romania in the assistance of those home-treated patients, who are not always visited by the doctors, but rather by nurses and who are deprived of modern medical techniques. Tele-medicine is likely, in Arafat's opinion, to remedy all these problems⁴¹.

Given that one of the objectives set by the Digital Agenda for Romania concerns the increase in online services' accessing, Dorin Pena, General Manager of CISCO Romania highlights the fact that evolutions in the field are occurring very quickly – "there is an increase in the complexity of what interaction between informatics systems as well as the interaction with informatics systems mean, as there is a larger number of devices involved. If 10 years ago, the smartphone was a science fiction matter, today, a large majority of people owns one. [...] If one is to analyze the evolution of cyber-attacks, 10-15 years ago, they would be committed out of please or the rush of adrenaline (nowadays, motivations have changed, with the attacks being specifically directed towards affecting the evolution of processes"⁴².

A noteworthy evolution is the rate at which Romanians access and use the e-Governance services. According to Stan⁴³, in January 2015, one third of the population accessed such services, while the European average in this regard ranges at approximately 40%. Romanian authorities managed to significantly increase the degree of e-Governance services to approximately 31%, while the target by the end of 2015 ranges at 50%.

However, while this increase is considered a breakthrough in Romania, on a European Union level, the country still lags behind as the world e-governance index (resulting from the assessment of three factors – online services, telecom infrastructure and human capital) places it at the

⁴¹ Fundația Națională a Tinerilor Manageri (FNTM), *Declarații de la evenimentul Agenda Digitală 2014-2020*, 2014, [<http://www.fntm.ro/comunicat-de-presa-agenda-digitala-2014-2020-2680.html>], 3 July 2015.

⁴² *Ibidem*.

⁴³ Filip Stan, *Agenda Digitală 2014-2020: Circa o treime din populația României utilizează serviciile de e-Guvernare*, 2015, [http://www.romaniatv.net/agenda-digitala-2014-2020-circa-o-treime-din-populatia-romaniei-utilizeaza-serviciile-de-e-guvernare_196599.html], 13 July 2015.

level of 0.6060, while the European Union average for Eastern Europe is situated at 0.6333⁴⁴.

Conclusions

As can be seen from the above pages, Romanian authorities have been making strong efforts to accommodate the provisions of the Digital Agenda for Romania and create an actual change. The Ministry for Communication and Information Security played a great role in collecting points of views and suggestions for the future implementation of the Digital Agenda for Romania in the consultation meetings it organized in 2011, years before the actual coting of the National Strategy on the topic.

Afterwards, a specific Agency has been created – the Agency for the Digital Agenda for Europe, which will provide an umbrella of guidance and counselling for the implementation of the Digital Agenda. The main roles of this Agency concern the management of the existing e-services, improving services offered to the citizens and supplying a legislative framework in which electronic services function. The legislation present is dealing with both national and European Union cases.

The Digital Agenda for Romania also has a specific website called “Digital Agenda”, which contains news on projects and issues related to the topic, as well as basic information on the Agenda, and the framework in which it evolved, both on a European Union level as well as the national one.

The article explored also the National Strategy for the Digital Agenda for Romania, a document which has been voted by the Romanian Government in 2015 and has been creating effects ever since. The Strategy identified four main directions which are, in fact, four main domains in need of thorough improvement within Romania. Aspects such as interoperability, cybersecurity, open data and e-governance are particular fields where Romania needs to be aligned with European Union countries.

Additionally, it needs to develop ITC infrastructure and systems with regard to education, culture, healthcare, e-commerce, research-development and innovation. Finally, according to the National Strategy, the broadband and digital infrastructure services need to be developed in

⁴⁴ *Ibidem*.

Romania.

The trajectory actions, aims and objectives as they were established in the National Strategy are a direct result of the cooperation and dialogue existing between the Ministries and the many public administration institutions involved in the process.

The ending of the article refers to the echo that the Digital Agenda for Romania had since its implementation. The “interoperability platform” is meant to connect the existing e-services into a single data base to be accessed nationally, while there are possibilities to use the electronic services in telemedicine solutions as well as cybersecurity related ones.

Bibliography:

1. Agenția pentru Agenda Digitală a României (A.A.D.R.), [http://aadr.ro/aadr_0_2.html], 1 July 2015.
2. Digital Agenda for Romania (2015), *Cadru general de acțiune*, [<http://digitalagenda.ro/cadru-de-actiune/>], 30 June 2015.
3. Fundația Națională a Tinerilor Manageri (FNTM) (2014), *Declarații de la evenimentul Agenda Digitală 2014-2020*, [<http://www.fntm.ro/comunicat-de-presa-agenda-digitala-2014-2020-2680.html>], 3 July 2015.
4. Hanganu, Andreea (2015), *Strategia Națională privind Agenda Digital 2020 a fost aprobată de Guvern*, [<http://digitaldiplomacy.ro/strategia-nationala-privind-agenda-digitala-pentru-romania-2020-a-fost-aprobata-de-guvern/>], 30 June 2015.
5. Ministerul Comunicării și Securității Informațiilor (MCSI) a (2011), *Inovarea și dezvoltarea platformei europene digitale*, [<http://www.mcsi.ro/Minister/Agenda-Digitala/Agenda-Digitala-Timisoara>], 5 July 2015.
6. Ministerul Comunicării și Securității Informațiilor (MCSI) b (2011), *Eliminarea barierelor digitale*, [<http://www.mcsi.ro/Minister/Agenda-Digitala/Agenda-Digitala-Iasi>], 5 July 2015.
7. Ministerul Comunicării și Securității Informațiilor (MCSI) c (2011), *Cercetarea și educarea în TIC*, [<http://www.mcsi.ro/Minister/Agenda-Digitala/Agenda-Digitala-Cluj>], 5 July 2015.
8. Ministerul Comunicării și Securității Informațiilor (MCSI) (2014), *Strategia Națională privind Agenda Digitală pentru România*, [<http://www.mcsi.ro>], 3 July 2015.

9. Ministerul Afacerilor Externe (MAE) (2013), *G. Ciamba a subliniat, la Luxemburg, susținerea României pentru Agenda Digitală a UE*, [<http://catania.mae.ro/romania-news/3496>], 13 July 2015.
10. Morovan, Ioana (2014), *O nouă variantă a Strategiei privind Agenda Digitală pentru România 2014-2020*, [http://arhiva.euractiv.ro/uniunea-europeana/articles%7CdisplayArticle/articleID_26252/O-noua-varianta-a-Strategiei-privind-Agenda-Digitala-pentru-Romania-2014-2020-publicata.html], 14 July 2015.
11. Portalul Democrației Participative (2013), *Strategia Națională privind Agenda Digitală pentru România*, [www.portaleromania.ro], 13 July 2015.
12. Sandu, Luiza (2015), *Ce schimbări poate produce Agenda Digitală pentru România?* [http://www.marketwatch.ro/articol/14276/Ce_schimbări_poate_produce_Agenda_Digitala_pentru_Romania/], 13 July 2015.
13. Socol, Cristian (2013), *Analiza Agenda Digitală. De ce este importantă poziția României la Consiliul European*, [<http://www.zf.ro/zf-24/analiza-agenda-digitala-de-ce-este-importanta-pozitia-romaniei-la-consiliul-european-11558408>], 13 July 2015.
14. Stan, Filip (2015), *Agenda Digitală 2014-2020: Circa o treime din populația României utilizează serviciile de e-Guvernare*, [http://www.romaniatv.net/agenda-digitala-2014-2020-circa-o-treime-din-populatia-romaniei-utilizeaza-serviciile-de-e-guvernare_196599.html], 13 July 2015.
15. Vasilache, Adrian (2015), *Guvernul a aprobat Strategia privind Agenda Digitală pentru România 2020: Necesarul de investiții IT&C este de 3.9 miliarde de euro*, [<http://economie.hotnews.ro/stiri-telecom-19859288-guvernul-aprobat-strategia-privind-agenda-digitala-pentru-romania-2020-necesarul-investitii-fost-redus-3-9-miliarde-euro-2-4-miliarde-euro-pana-2020-htm>], 30 June 2015.
16. Voicu, Diana (2014), *Platforma care va conecta sistemele electronice din administrație, funcțională până la finalul lui 2015*, [http://arhiva.euractiv.ro/uniunea-europeana/articles%7CdisplayArticle/articleID_26669/Diana-Voicu-MSI-Platforma-care-va-conecta-sistemele-electronice-din-administratie-functionala-pana-la-finalul-lui-2015.html], 3 July 2015.

17. Zamfir, Claudiu (2014), *Comisia Europeană critică iarăși Guvernul pentru strategia fondurilor UE 2014-2020: Suntem îngrijorați de alocările dezechilibrate. Nu ați îndeplinit condiționalitățile. Riscurile care se văd de la Bruxelles la București*, [<http://economie.hotnews.ro/stiri-eurofonduri-17422643-exclusiv-comisia-europeana-critica-iarasi-guvernul-pentru-strategia-fondurilor-2014-2020-suntem-ingrijorati-alocarile-dezechilibrate-nu-ati-indeplinit-conditionalitatile-riscurile-care-vad-bruxelles-b.htm>], 13 July 2015.

THE EUROPEAN UNION'S INVOLVEMENT IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA AND GEORGIA. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Maria-Cristina Coleașă*

Abstract:

The article will present the European Union's involvement in the two conflict-ridden states of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Georgia. Secondly, it intends to provide a comparative analysis of the two case studies, both in terms of the distinct international status of the two states and of the particularities in the EU's involvement. The purpose of the article is to analyze the effectiveness of the EU's use of socialization as a means of tackling the two conflicts, as well as to provide a prognosis of the conflict resolution process. It also aims at analyzing the extent to which the use of socialization on its own is enough for the EU to ensure an effective peacebuilding process in its near abroad and whether other means of conflict resolution are needed to render the EU's involvement more successful.

Keywords: Bosnian fragmentation, secessionism in Georgia, socialization, conflict resolution, leverage

Introduction

The end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union produced political and social turmoil in the ex-Soviet republics seeking their independence – the countries in the Caucasus among them – and created the conditions for ethnic conflicts and separatist movements in Yugoslavia. The aim of this article is to provide a comparative analysis of the European Union's involvement in two conflict-ridden states, namely Bosnia-Herzegovina and Georgia.

After a brief presentation of socialization as the EU's main means of conflict resolution, the article provides a comparison between the two cases

* Maria-Cristina Coleașă has a Bachelor's Degree in International Relations and is currently a Master's student in Political Studies within the Faculty of European Studies at Babeș-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca.

Contact: crisa_2010@yahoo.com.

of EU involvement. Based on these findings, the conclusion comparatively presents the prospects of conflict resolution in the two cases, while also attempting to provide scholarly results for the following research questions: *Is the EU's approach to conflict resolution, based on the socialization of actors into a discourse of peace, effective enough to bring about a stable peace in its near abroad? Does the EU need to complement this approach with other, more coercive means of conflict resolution?*

EU means of conflict resolution

The European Union fits Joseph Nye's description of soft power, as it exhibits "the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments".¹ Other authors also refer to the EU as a normative power, which means that it has the capacity to "shape conceptions of what is normal in international relations by the force of ideas."² With regard to conflict resolution and peacebuilding in third countries, what the EU perceives as "normal behaviour" is expressed in Article I-3 of the Constitutional Treaty: "In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests. It shall contribute to peace, security, [...] solidarity and mutual respect among peoples [...]."³

The EU has at its disposal top and grassroots-oriented instruments for peacebuilding in third countries, both of which imply the socialization of actors into a "European" discourse, based on the promotion of peace.

Depending on the amount of leverage the EU enjoys in third countries, it combines to different degrees the "socialization of policy-makers in conflict regions into a European discourse"⁴ with the

¹ Joseph Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, New York: Public Affairs, 2004, p. x.

² Anna Michalski, "The EU as a Soft Power: the Force of Persuasion", in Jan Melissen (ed.), *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p. 126.

³ *Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe* [http://europa.eu/eu-law/decision-making/treaties/pdf/treaty_establishing_a_constitution_for_europe/treaty_establishing_a_constitution_for_europe_en.pdf], 7 November 2015.

⁴ Thomas Diez, Stephan Stetter, Mathias Albert, *The European Union and the Transformation of Border Conflicts. Theorising the Impact of Integration and Association*, p. 17 [<http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/Documents/college-social-sciences/government->

involvement of the civil society in peacebuilding, which certain authors term “constructive impact.”⁵ The former can be most successfully used in cases where the EU has more leverage on the political leaders and is even able to use conditionality to a certain extent – e.g. in relation with Association or candidate countries-, while the latter is employed where the political leadership is hostile to the EU's involvement and socialization at the people level is the most appropriate – or possible – way to disseminate European ideas. As the case studies will show, the degree in which these two socialization instruments are used highly impacts on the effectiveness of the EU's involvement in conflict resolution.

EU involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina

The EU's involvement during the war in Bosnia and in the first stages of peace implementation was very limited and unsuccessful, despite the perception of the Yugoslav Wars as being the “hour of Europe”, as stated by Jacques Poos in 1991.⁶ Yugoslavia's dissolution provoked inconsistency and cleavages in the international community.⁷ When Slovenia and Croatia first started to voice their wish for independence, all the major powers declared their support for maintaining the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. Several reasons account for this initial stance. The most important one was related to the danger that secessionist movements in Yugoslavia posed to the territorial integrity of the Soviet Union, which the West, for strategic reasons, wanted to preserve (e.g. the political stability that the Cold War provided both inside the Western states and internationally).⁸ Another reason was the belief that dealing with one

society/polsis/research/eu-border-conflict/wp01-eu-transformation-of-border-conflicts.pdf], 7 November 2015.

⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 15.

⁶ *Apud* Jacques Rupnik, “The Balkans as a European question”, in *Chaillot Papers*, no. 126, 2011, p. 18.

⁷ See for example, Laura Herta, “Intra-state Violence in Bosnia Herzegovina and the Mixed Reactions from the International Community - An Analysis of the Ambivalence of the Transatlantic World”, *Romanian Review of International Studies*, 2/2014, [http://dsi.institute.ubbcluj.ro/docs/revista/126_en.pdf], where the author emphasizes the ambivalences, discontinuities and mixed reactions to the Bosnian war.

⁸ Tom Gallagher, *The Balkans after the Cold War. From tyranny to tragedy*, London: Routledge, 2003, p. 34.

unitary state was much easier than dealing with several small states in the Balkans. However, while the official position of the European Community was in favor of maintaining Yugoslavia, the opinions of the Member States were divergent, with Germany and Belgium – supported by Austria, then a non-Member State - supporting the independence movements in Slovenia and Croatia on the basis of the principle of self-determination.⁹ Although the United States and the Soviet Union backed the anti-secessionist stance of the EC, this lack of a common European voice on the matter was a vulnerable point, as it allowed the Serb leadership in Belgrade to manipulate the actions of the West.

In the post-Dayton context, the EU was able to contribute to the consolidation of peace by launching its first European Security and Defence (ESDP) mission, EU Police Mission (EUPM) Bosnia. The EU took the opportunity to compensate for its lack of an effective intervention during the 1992-1995 war and to “demonstrate that the Union was finally ready to assume greater responsibility as a security actor in the Western Balkans.”¹⁰

When the EU took over, the country was still faced with organized crime, an ineffective police system and a democratic deficit caused by the way the Dayton Constitution distributed powers in the state.

The EU Police Mission in Bosnia has to be viewed in the larger frame of EU involvement in the country. The EU’s efforts comprise other instruments such as the Stabilization and Association Agreement signed between the EU and Bosnia, whose negotiation until 2008 provided the EU with more leverage on the Bosnian authorities. Also, the EUPM should not be regarded in the narrow sense of an instrument of police reform. It was not police reform *per se* which constituted the main goal of the EU’s mission, but more generally, state building. Morally speaking, the BiH police was known to have participated in the ethnic cleansing campaigns during the war. Even after the peace was signed, the police remained under considerable political influence, which led to incidents between the police

⁹ Peter Radan, *The Break-up of Yugoslavia and International Law*, London: Routledge, 2002, pp. 161-162.

¹⁰ Michael Merlingen, Rasa Ostrauskaite, *European Union Peace Building and Policing*, New York: Routledge, 2006, p. 60.

forces and the refugees returning to their homes after the war.¹¹ What makes police reform crucial for state consolidation in Bosnia is the centrality of the police system in the implementation of the political leaders' initiatives, many of which are based on nationalistic interests.

The EU chose to base its mission on the "principle of local participation in the reform process"¹², so that local authorities could have a say in the design of policies and could be explained why reform was important. As a soft power, the EU realized that the "local ownership" of the reforms had to increase in order for the mission to be perceived as trustworthy and unbiased by the locals.

The main measure adopted for enhancing the local ownership of the reform process was the creation of the Police Steering Board (PSB), "composed of the most senior local police managers as well as the head of the EUPM and other EUPM officers."¹³ The aim of this structure was to provide "fora in which the EUPM consulted with local police on reform priorities and projects and in which the progress of the reforms was jointly monitored, assessed and recommendations for further improvement were developed."¹⁴ We may recognize here the mechanisms of socialization employed by the EU. Through dialogue and cooperation, both EUPM and local staff were able to understand each other's viewpoints and the latter were given the opportunity to become acquainted with the best European practices.

Apart from its engagement with the police forces, the EUPM also attempted at engaging with the local population and disseminating best European practices at the society level. The aim was to increase the legitimacy of its actions and to make the mission be perceived as transparent and citizen-oriented. Such initiatives included campaigns for facilitating the cooperation between the citizens and the police in tackling crime and even "visits by and lectures to local schools and universities by

¹¹ Tija Memisevic, "EU conditionality in Bosnia and Herzegovina: police reform and the legacy of war crimes", in *Chaillot Papers*, no. 116, 2009, p. 57.

¹² Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

¹³ *Ibidem*, *loc. cit.*

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, *loc. cit.*

EUPM commanders and senior staff, who also organised training courses and competitions for schoolchildren.”¹⁵

EU involvement in Georgia

Many authors point to a very discrete, if not absent, political involvement in the secessionist conflicts from the 1990s to 2008. The EU’s priorities with regard to Georgia in the 1990s are well summarized by Damien Helly:

“Throughout the 1990s the European Union prioritized four main areas: support to transition towards a market economy, assistance in resolving the so-called frozen conflicts, contribution to domestic security and governance (including rule of law and democratization) and addressing social consequences of transition.”¹⁶

These priorities form what Iskra Kirova calls “an inoffensive, development centric logic, focusing on bottom-up non-politicized initiatives”, while “the EU did not have much of a security and political profile in the region.”¹⁷ This low political profile can be partly explained by the EU’s internal fragmentation, with certain Member States unwilling to antagonize Russia and partly by the EU’s interest in developing a distinct role in conflict resolution as compared to other international actors such as the UN, US, OSCE and Russia. While the latter were involved through military means on the ground¹⁸, the EU sought a more community-centred approach, meant to socialize the parties into a discourse of peace. Nathalie Tocci mentions a third reason for the EU’s low profile, namely the fact that

¹⁵ Srećko Latal, “Has policing changed? And if not, why not? – Local community perception” in Tobias Flessenkemper and Damien Helly (eds.), *Ten years after: lessons from the EUPM in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2002-2012 (Joint Report)*, Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2013, p. 56, [http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/EUPM_report.pdf], 5 November 2015.

¹⁶ Damien Helly, “EUJUST Themis in Georgia: an ambitious bet on rule of law”, in *Chaillot Papers*, no. 90 (*Civilian crisis management: the EU way*), 2006, p. 88, [<http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp090.pdf>], 10 November 2015.

¹⁷ Iskra Kirova, “Public Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution: Russia, Georgia and the EU in Abkhazia and South Ossetia” in *CPD Perspectives on Public Diplomacy*, Paper 7, 2012, p. 44 [<http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/sites/uscpublicdiplomacy.org/files/legacy/publications/perspectives/CPDPerspectivesConflict%20Resolution.pdf>], 8 November 2015.

¹⁸ Nathalie Tocci, *The EU and Conflict Resolution. Promoting Peace in the Backyard*, New York: Routledge, 2007, p. 140.

“Georgia’s conflicts – unlike those in the Balkans or in the Middle East – have not struck a moral chord amongst European publics.”¹⁹ We may add that during the 1990s, Georgia was not yet a close neighbour of the EU and therefore the conflicts in the entities and the organized crime in the region did not pose a direct threat to the Union.

The EU’s contractual relationship with Georgia, as a means of deploying its soft power, started with the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) signed in 1996 and entered into force in 1999. This was, however, a very loose agreement, containing no special clause related to conflict resolution. This contractual agreement was upgraded in 2004 with the inclusion of Georgia in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), meant to strengthen the country’s relations with the EU. The Action Plan signed through the ENP contains a special clause related to conflict resolution under Priority 6.²⁰

As Georgia’s inclusion in the ENP clearly signalled the country’s Western orientation, the entities became more reluctant to accept its peace proposals. Most European programs initiated through the ENP have been limited to Georgia, but could not be extended to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Thus, projects aimed at bringing the conflicting communities together have been rare and unsuccessful. The closer the relation between the EU and Georgia, the more committed the two entities were to their independence and the more suspicious of the EU’s intentions.

After the 2008 war, through its policy of “non-recognition and engagement”, the EU has sought to “open space for interaction with their populations and the local authorities while precluding that such contact could entail a change in the EU’s position on the non-recognition of the entities’ proclaimed independence.”²¹ The final aim has been “a diversification of narratives on conflict as a precondition for the long-term goal of conflict transformation.”²² Although the projects have involved specialists and NGOs from both sides of the conflict, the EU’s initiatives

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 148.

²⁰ *EU/Georgia Action Plan*, p. 10,

[http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/pdf/action_plans/georgia_enp_ap_final_en.pdf], 9 November 2015.

²¹ Kirova, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

²² *Ibidem*, *loc. cit.*

have remained largely unknown to the general public, which means that the socialization process has only impacted a small portion of the population: “largely confined to a small circle of active civil society participants with little trickle-down effect to broader segments of society.”²³

Under these circumstances, Russia had the opportunity to fully engage in the entities and to gain a level of trust among the population which the EU has never enjoyed.

A comparison between the two case studies

First of all, there is a significant difference as regards the international status of the two countries. Bosnia and Herzegovina, with its current organization, is a creation of the international community. Its territorial integrity is recognized, but so is its internal fragmentation. Bosnia’s problems stem both from its recent past, marked by ethnic conflict, and from the way in which its internationally agreed constitution arranged its internal organization. Therefore, the challenge for the EU is to influence the subject positions of the ethnic groups, so that grievances can no longer be exploited by politicians, but also to use its leverage in order to have the leadership accept the need for constitutional reform and the country’s reorganization. As far as Georgia is concerned, its territorial integrity is recognized by the international community (except Russia), but the question of the two entities’ status remains unresolved. While the EU has little difficulty acting in Georgia, it is hard for it to extend its influence on the territory of the entities. Any EU initiative is hampered by the danger of giving legitimacy to the *de facto* governments. Its policy of non-recognition, on the one hand, and the need for governmental approval in implementing certain projects, on the other hand, results in poor EU performance in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Because of the non-recognition policy, the EU is perceived as a “one-sided actor” favouring Georgia’s control over the entities. Abkhazians and Ossetians “consider that the engagement with Europe is possible only if it does not pursue the goal of integrating the two break-away republics into Georgia.”²⁴

²³ *Ibidem*, p. 48.

²⁴ Laura Herța, Alexandra Sabou, “Frozen conflicts in the South Caucasus and their impact on the Eastern Partnership: The case of Georgia and its break-away Republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia”, in Valentin Naumescu and Dan Dungaciuc (eds.), *The European Union’s*

Secondly, another difference concerns the external actors impacting on the two countries. In the case of Bosnia, the EU gradually became the only relevant actor and the only challenge has been the harmonization of its agenda with that of the local leaders. By contrast, in the case of the Georgian conflicts, the EU is rivalled by Russia, whose influence in the region is still unequalled. Whereas the EU has difficulty deploying its soft power in the entities, Russia is heavily engaged there through its recognition of their independence and through very effective public diplomacy instruments. Russia is a powerful, unitary actor having the interest of keeping any Western influence away from its borders. It can easily mobilize its hard power, as the 2008 war proved. The EU remains divided over the issue of whether to initiate measures which could affect Russia and it is definitely not prepared to engage in a conflict against the latter. Even if a certain strategy of conflict resolution was agreed upon at European level, the EU would still have to harmonize its initiatives with Georgia, which has until now proved problematic.

There is also a difference as to the type of contractual relationship that exists between the EU and the two countries. The Stabilization and Association Agreement signed with Bosnia is seen as a step towards future accession. While it is true that Bosnia is still far from fulfilling the criteria for becoming a candidate country, its potential candidate status enables the EU to better use its leverage. By contrast, the ENP and the Eastern Partnership (EaP) are "enlargement-light"²⁵ and it is hardly possible for Georgia to envisage becoming an EU Member State. Under these circumstances, it is difficult for the EU to convince Georgia of the need to review its conflict resolution strategies and to bring them in line with the European ones.

The EU clearly enjoys different levels of popularity in the targeted communities. In Bosnia, the EU's involvement is seen against the background of the local politicians' failure to design development measures at country-level. People are generally supportive of the country's EU orientation and are starting to pressure the political elite to design policies to improve the country's European prospects. By contrast, the EU

Eastern Neighbourhood Today, Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2015, p. 140.

²⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 55.

enjoys little popular support in the breakaway entities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the latter being particularly closed to international actors other than Russia. But even in Abkhazia's case, while some politicians may exhibit interest in the EU and in the diversification of external contacts, the population is not open to this option, not least because of the EU's absence on the ground. For example, when referring to the European Union's Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM), Laura Herța and Alexandra Sabou point out that

"Even though the mandate of the EU mission is to cover the entire territory of Georgia, one major pitfall is constituted by the fact that the EU monitors' access is denied by the *de facto* authorities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia throughout the territories under their control."²⁶

According to a former EUMM member, this constitutes

"A big challenge when it comes to implementing the mandate, maintaining the impartiality of the mission and assess[ing] the situation on both sides of the Administrative Boundary Lines (ABL)."²⁷

In Bosnia, the initial purpose was the socialization of the authorities – starting with the police force – into a European discourse and disseminating best practices at the top level. However, the result was different, with the police force and the politicians still largely adopting nationalistic stances, but with the civil society growing increasingly aware of the benefits of European integration. In Abkhazia, because of the non-recognition issue, the EU has mainly targeted NGOs, with the expectation of a spillover effect on the society at large. But here too the result was different. The civil society is still largely ignorant of the EU, as the NGOs' lack of transparency has prevented a large scale dissemination of ideas.

Instead, it was exactly the *de facto* political leadership, which the EU had tried to circumvent in its involvement, which showed some (if little) interest in the cooperation with the EU.

Conclusions: future prospects of conflict resolution

Taking everything into consideration, the EU's involvement in both conflicts has been limited and subject to interference from other actors. However, both during and after the conflict, the EU was more involved in

²⁶ Herța and Sabou, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

²⁷ Alexandra Martin, quoted in *ibidem*, *loc. cit.*

Bosnia than in Georgia. During the Bosnian War, although unsuccessful and marked by contradictions between the Member States, the European Community (EC) did attempt to mediate between the parties. The creation of the Badinter Commission in 1991, meant to find a compromise between the principles of territorial integrity and self-determination, is an example in this sense.

"In applying *uti possidetis* to the case of the former Yugoslavia, the EC accepted Badinter's recommendation that the inter-republican borders become the legally recognized borders of the new states."²⁸

By contrast, the launch of the EUMM in Georgia as a response to the 2008 war did not solve the problem of the two entities' status. As stated above, the EU's absence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia made it impossible for it to become more involved in conflict resolution.

In the post-conflict period, the EU's relation with Bosnia has been much more conducive to a successful socialization of the conflict parties than the relation between the EU and the breakaway entities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. As a result, the prospect of conflict resolution in Bosnia is higher than the one in Georgia.

In the case of Bosnia, due to its proximity to the EU and the prospect of becoming an EU Member State, there are chances that the nationalist stances might be overcome. However, a greater exposure of the political elite to the EU discourse will be necessary and political accountability has to be encouraged. The EU will need to focus more on the people level and to encourage the building of a stronger civil society, able to voice its interests and to check the politicians' nationalist agenda. At the same time, the EU will have to voice its conditions more strongly and clearly and no movement forward on Bosnia's way to integration should be made without the politicians' reconsideration of their discourse and policies.

As far as Georgia is concerned, the prospects of conflict resolution are quite low given the modest impact that the EU's policies have on the evolution of the conflict. The EU's presence on the ground through the European Union Monitoring Mission may safeguard the implementation of

²⁸ Nicholas Wheeler, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 248.

the ceasefire, but it is not enough to foster cooperation at the people level.

The EU is very much unknown to the general public in the entities.

The more the EU engages with Georgia, the more suspicious the population in the entities is that the EU's final goal is to bring them again under Georgia's control. For conflict resolution to be more effective, the EU would have to diversify its policies and to involve larger segments of the population.

While the EU's involvement in Bosnia stands better chances of success than in Georgia, one should bear in mind that even Bosnia still needs time to completely overcome the heritage of the war. Without constant and long-term EU involvement, the political elite will stick to its nationalist agenda, the process of state consolidation will be halted and the EU will lose its public support. The latter outcome is particularly dangerous, since Bosnia's "Europeanization" and pacification seems to rest on the civil society's mobilization. As for the other case, Russia's stance is unlikely to change and so is its position regarding Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Still unchanged will be the Member States' reluctance to antagonize Russia. It would be very difficult for the EU to reconcile its policies of non-recognition and engagement. Unless such a compromise is found, the Abkhazian authorities' support for a European orientation will fade, while the chances of reconciliation between Georgia and the closed entity of South Ossetia are even thinner.

Returning to our research questions, it is my argument that all of the above lead to the conclusion that the power of attraction and the use of socialization are not enough to ensure the adherence of third actors to the European discourse of peace. The EU needs to have a certain amount of leverage and to be able to provide third countries with attractive prospects in order to achieve its aims. This is precisely how Russia has managed to secure its control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia, while the EU's popularity in the entities and even in Georgia is low and unlikely to improve because of the lack of attractive European prospects. It is the use – or lack – of leverage that makes the difference between these two cases.

Also, it is the author's belief that in cases where the contractual agreement allows the EU to impose conditions, the latter should adopt a stronger stance in relation with the political leaderships and to establish

clear conditions for any benefits that the countries might enjoy from the Union.

Bibliography:

Books and chapters in books:

1. Herța, Laura; Sabou, Alexandra (2015), "Frozen conflicts in the South Caucasus and their impact on the Eastern Partnership: The case of Georgia and its break-away Republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia", in Valentin Naumescu and Dan Dungaciuc (eds.), *The European Union's Eastern Neighbourhood Today*, Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 116-153.
2. Gallagher, Tom (2003), *The Balkans after the Cold War. From tyranny to tragedy*, London: Routledge.
3. Merlingen, Michael; Ostrauskaite, Rasa (2006), *European Union Peacebuilding and Policing*, New York: Routledge.
4. Michalski, Anna (2005), "The EU as a Soft Power: the Force of Persuasion", in Melissen, Jan (ed.), *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 124-144.
5. Nye, Joseph (2004), *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, New York: Public Affairs.
6. Radan, Peter (2002), *The Break-up of Yugoslavia and International Law*, London, Routledge.
7. Tocci, Nathalie (2007), *The EU and Conflict Resolution. Promoting Peace in the Backyard*, New York: Routledge.
8. Wheeler, Nicholas (2000), *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society*, New York: Oxford University Press.

Studies in periodicals:

1. Memisevic, Tija (2009), "EU conditionality in Bosnia and Herzegovina: police reform and the legacy of war crimes", in *Chaillot Papers*, no. 116 (*War crimes, conditionality and EU integration in the Western Balkans*), 49-66.
2. Rupnik, Jacques (2011), "The Balkans as a European question", in *Chaillot Papers*, no. 126 (*The Western Balkans and the EU: 'The hour of Europe'*), 17-30.

Electronic materials:

1. Diez, Thomas; Stetter, Stephan; Albert, Mathias (2004), *The European Union and the Transformation of Border Conflicts. Theorising the Impact of Integration and Association*
[<http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/Documents/college-social-sciences/government-society/polsis/research/eu-border-conflict/wp01-eu-transformation-of-border-conflicts.pdf>], 7 November 2015.
2. *EU/Georgia Action Plan*
[http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/pdf/action_plans/georgia_enp_ap_final_en.pdf], 9 November 2015.
3. Helly, Damien (2006), "EUJUST Themis in Georgia: an ambitious bet on rule of law", in *Chaillot Papers*, no. 90 (*Civilian crisis management: the EU way*), 2006
[<http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp090.pdf>], 10 November 2015.
4. Kirova, Iskra (2012), *Public Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution: Russia, Georgia and the EU in Abkhazia and South Ossetia*, in *CPD Perspectives on Public Diplomacy*, Paper 7
[<http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/sites/uscpublicdiplomacy.org/files/legacy/publications/perspectives/CPDPerspectivesConflict%20Resolution.pdf>], 8 November 2015.
5. Latal, Srećko (2013), "Has policing changed? And if not, why not? – Local community perception", in Flessenkemper, Tobias; Helly, Damien (eds.), *Ten years after: lessons from the EUPM in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2002-2012 (Joint Report)*
[http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/EUPM_report.pdf], 5 November 2015.
6. *Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe* [http://europa.eu/eu-law/decision-making/treaties/pdf/treaty_establishing_a_constitution_for_europe/treaty_establishing_a_constitution_for_europe_en.pdf], 9 November 2015.

THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF IDENTITIES IN THE ORTHODOX CHURCH OF BESSARABIA. THE TRANS-ETHNICAL ORTHODOXY*

Irina Dercaci**

Abstract:

The blending of the national and the religious aspects which occurred in the regions of Central and Eastern Europe has not occurred in Bessarabia, where a transethnic orthodoxy is present (the same religious values are shared due to common religious belonging, even if the ethnicity is different). Thus, it is interesting to understand which theoretical model could explain this relationship or the relationship configuration of ethnical either confessional identity which are different or overlapped in the Orthodox Church of Bessarabia. Another question is to what extent the ethos associated to the orthodox community in Bessarabia, whose distinctive feature is the ethnic diversity, can be considered to be as a model for managing the cultural diversity, a unique model in the area of the Eastern Christianity, which generally has strong ethnical connotations in different countries.

Keywords: trans-etnical orthodoxy, confesional belonging, ethnic belonging, identity, Bessarabia

Introduction

The working hypothesis is that when there is a common religious affiliation, it normally is quite strong, even if there are also other elements included for describing cultural identity (ethnicity, language), they are distinct: in the Bessarabian Orthodox Church there are functional models to

* This work was supported by the project "Excellence academic routes in the doctoral and postdoctoral research – READ" co-funded from the European Social Fund through the Development of Human Resources Operational Programme 2007-2013, contract no. POSDRU/159/1.5/S/137926.

** Irina Dercaci is PhD candidate, West University of Timișoara, Romania.
Contact: irinadercaci@gmail.com.

manage diversity, based on a tradition of cohabitation with other ethnicities. Thus it is interesting to study the way these models are built and how the functional relationships are put in place in a space marked by a diversity of ethnic groups, as far as Romanians, Russians, Ukrainians, Gagauz people, Bulgarians etc., have distinct historical archetypes and different languages.

Concerning the elite's discourse and behavior, a comparative perspective became interesting: how different are the cultural realities, and consequently the discourses, formulas and positioning of the interwar period elite and of the modern, contemporary one, and how exactly is expressed the attitude towards the Orthodoxy and ethno-nation.

Ethnic diversity and religious unity

To explain the absence of national conflicts in the Bessarabian Orthodox Church, we refer to the ethnic cohabitation experience existing before 1918, and even during the the interwar period, and to the bilingualism accepted by intellectuals in the region. The formulas of managing diversity were accepted programmatically – in programs of some publications, in discourses of leaders / heirarchs – promoted by elite, which also were unhomogenous in certain periods of times. So, we can talk about a sort of local "tradition" of cohabitation.

The ethnic diversity of the territory is confirmed in 1812 by the Russian government too. Thus, in the context of endeavours oriented to set up a dioceses in Bessarabia, is cited also the argument regarding "the various tongues and customs of the multitudes of peoples (understood as nations – Author's note) living in this province," alongside of that of the "remoteness of this place from other Russian dioceses and because of various tongues and customs of peoples living in this province"¹. These elements are mentioned in the Letter of the Metropolitan Exarh Gavriil of August 6, 1812, addressed to the Admiral P.V.Ciceacov, in which the Exarh exposes its plan to create a diocese in the territory between Prut and Nistru and asks for support in this regard.

On the other hand, religious and ethnic diversity of this area was accepted by the local intelligentsia, and at the same time national elements

¹ The creation of the Eparchy of Chisinau and Hotin – 1813. Actas. (Dossier 224/1812, page 1-2), in *Arhivele Basarabiei, (Archives of Bessarabia)* 1929, Nr. 2, p. 34.

were valued. Although one of the objectives of the journal "Viața Basarabiei"², stated in its very first issue, was "the guidance of the sons of Bessarabia towards the ways of the Romanism and of Romanian national state"³, the desideratum of an inter-ethnic and inter-religious dialogue is programmatically expressed too. In the same first issue, another goal is made clear: "to create spiritual links between the inhabitants of Bessarabia *irrespective of their nationality and religion*"⁴. Exposure of this goal reflects the existence of several ethnic and religious groups as well as the possibility of cohabitation, and the lack of major conflicts.

Ecclesiastical press in the prewar and interwar period

In the prewar and interwar ecclesiastical press⁵, in journals or Yearbooks of Archdiocese of Chisinau, the presentation of diocesan institutions⁶ faithfully reflects the realities of the place, the existing

² The most important cultural journal from the postwar Bessarabia, published by the Cultural Association „Cuvânt moldovenesc” („The Moldovan Word”).

³ Pan. Halippa, „Un cuvânt înainte” („A Foreword”) in *Viața Basarabiei* (Life of Bessarabia), January 1932, Year 1, Nr. 1, p. 2.

⁴ Pan. Halippa, „Un cuvânt înainte” („A Foreword”) in *Viața Basarabiei* (Life of Bessarabia), January 1932, Year 1, Nr. 1, p. 2..(s.m.-I.D.).

⁵ Regarding the religious press, among religious publications from the prewar and interwar Bessarabia, we cite *Buletinul Eparhiei Chisinaului* (*Kisinevskaia Eparhialnaia Vedomosti*) (Journal of the Diocese of Chisinau) – the first religious journal Bessarabia (first published since 1867, is printed in Russian and Romanian till 1871, when the Romanian version is suspended); *Luminătorul*, *Jurnal Bisericesc*. The Journal *Luminătorul* is the official publication of the Diocese of Chisinau, is published in the period from 1908 to 1944.

⁶ From *Anuarul Arhiepiscopiei Chișinăului*, (The Yearbook of the Diocese of Chisinau), 1930, p. 21: „The Bessarabian diocese have had since 1867 a journalistic medium, «Revista eparhială a Chișinăului» („The Journal of Diocese of Chisinau”), to which all the churches subscribed; till 1872 it was printed in two languages: in Russian and Moldovan with Russian letters; (Moldovan was the name used in this region for the Romanian language – *Author’s Note*); the journal had two parts: the official and the no official one. Lately, which is since 1872, it appeared only in Russian until 1917 in May, when its name changed to «Glasul Bisericii Ortodoxe din Basarabia» (The Voice of the Orthodox Church from Bessarabia). On the other hand, the Bessarabian clergy has had since 1 of January 1908 another ecclesiastic journal «Luminătorul», written only in Moldovan, with Russian letters, and containing articles for the people to learn, and not only the clergy was subscribed but also many of the Romanian people from Bessarabia and from beyond the river Nistru. In the last times, over spring of 1918 both journals cease to appear. But, accordingly to the report written by a committee of

bilingualism. In the Yearbook of Chisinau Archdiocese 1930⁷, can be found the presentation of the Historical-Archeological ecclesiastic Society of Bessarabia and of Antiquities Museum, situated in the Diocesan House, Chisinau, "created on 4 April of 1904 at the initiative of local bishop", whose purpose is "to study the past of the life of the provincial church in its various manifestations and from different points of view, from the first appearance of Christianity." It cannot be deduced the clear attitude towards one administration or another, whereas the changes the administrations made and their consequences – as the change of the language in which the publications and documents were written, etc., - are exposed in a neutral tone.

Cultural activities and documents of the church are considered to be part of the patrimony, and ecclesiastical activity, irrespectively of what language they were written in: "The activity of the Society was considerable in the field of the historical science and archeology of church.

The periodic journal has published till the moment the following: 10 volumes in Russian, with an average length of 250 pages each, and since 1918 were published other 10 volumes of historical material in Romanian⁸ and other things in Russian. Currently the volume 21 is in press".

The same neutrality is also found in other texts, documents, ecclesiastical journals: in the Yearbook of Diocese of Chisinau and Hotin (Bessarabia), 1922, it is described the activity of the "Religious Books Printing House from Chisinau"⁹, where "were printed, besides various official and

clergimen and lego on 10 December 1918, Î. P. S. Nicodem approved that starting from 1 January 1919 both journals are to be substituted by only one journal of the diocese, of 64 pages, named «Luminătorul». Text available on-line at <http://www.moldavica.bnrm.md/biblielmo?e=d-01000-00---off-0periodice--00-1---0-10-0---0--0direct-10---4-----0-11--11-ro-50---20-about---00-3-1-00-0-0-11-1-0utfZz-8-00&a=d&cl=CL1.1.18&d=JD1725.10>, last accessed at 10.04.2015.

⁷ *Anuarul Arhiepiscopiei Chişinăului*, 1930, p. 21. (The Yearbook of the Diocese of Chisinau). Text available on-line at: <http://www.moldavica.bnrm.md/biblielmo?e=d-01000-00---off-0periodice--00-1---0-10-0---0--0direct-10---4-----0-11--11-ro-50---20-about---00-3-1-00-0-0-11-1-0utfZz-8-00&a=d&cl=CL1.1.18&d=JD1725.10>, last accessed at 17.04.2015.

⁸ The denominations of the language: „Romanian” and „Moldovan”, used in the same page alternatively demonstrate their use in free variation connexion.

⁹ *The Year Book of the Diocese of Chisinau and Hotin (Bessarabia)*: official edition / made by C.N. Tomescu, Secretary General of the Archdiocese of Chisinau and Hotin (based on official dates). – Ch.: Tip. Eparhială, 1922, 272 p.

particular Russian publications, others in Moldavian, as are for example: the lives of saints, religious books"; and after a break of twenty years it started to publish again "Many good works for the Romanian people, in its own language, with Slavic or Russian letters, and from 1919, with Latin letters.¹⁰ "The alleged identitarian concepts also reflect certain neutrality: the Romanian and Moldovan denomination used to refer to the same nation or language is used in free variation, and the use of Slavonic and Latin letters is only noticed.

In the first issue of "Luminatorul" ("The Illuminator"), in the *Information* - after announcing "the permission" to "bring to light" in the "Moldovan language" this magazine – it is stated in categorical terms the establishing of distance from the politics and it is explained the context of the publication in Moldovan language "Approved by the Order (Ukaz) of the Council of 20 December 1907, with no. 174,441 - according to the proposal of the Chamber of Deputies from the Diocese, from September 21, 1907, no. 8 – the permission is given to bring to light, (to publish) , starting from 1908, through the Council of the Orthodox Brotherhood of the Nativity of Christ from Chisinau – the religious journal "Luminatorul" - in the Moldovan language¹¹." Besides preaching Christian moral teachings, "it will show, for Moldovan people, documents related to the history of the ecclesiastical life of the Diocese of Chisinau"¹², but without any involvement of politics: "According to its program, "Luminatorul" will

¹⁰ *The Year Book of the Diocese of Chisinau and Hotin (Bessarabia)*: official edition / made by C.N. Tomescu, Secretary General of the Archdiocese of Chisinau and Hotin (based on official dates). – Ch.: Tip. Eparhială, 1922, p. XXV: „In the city existed an ecclesiastical typography between 1814 and 1883, founded by the Metropolitan Gavriil Bănulescu. Its first director was the monk Ignatie, brought from the Neamt Monastery from Moldova. Beside different official and particular Russian publications, here were published others in Moldovan too, for example: lives of saints, religious books. But since 1883 the typography ceased. 20 years later, the Bessarabian priests which wanted to publish *Moldovan* books decided to re-constitute the typography. Thus, in 1906 they brought to life the current typography (...) And since that date until now, they have been published many good things for the Romanian people, in its language, with Slavic or Russian letters, and from 1919 with Latin letters too, of any sort, and then others with musical notes , and it is today clasified as the first between the local typographies: here are published all the documents needed for the institutions and churches of the Diocese." (Emphasys added: I.D.)

¹¹ *Luminătorul*, Nr. 1, 1908, p. 77.

¹² *Luminătorul*, Nr. 1, 1908, p. 78.

follow only enlightening /teaching religious purposes, and will be separated of any sort of political themes."¹³

The Church and the valuing of the tradition in Bessarabia

The relationship between church and authorities in Bessarabia passed through different configurations, because the status of this territory has changed: from province to gubernia, and later it became a republic in the compenence of the Soviet empire. The Church suffered the consequences of transitions from one administration to another, from one language to another, nonetheless there was a certain freedom constantly, in terms of the rituals and traditions to follow, which have not been affected by the change of power.

In the marginal regions and provinces the role of the church is growing; the church became a stronger institution, increases the weight of religious affiliation in the identitarian construction. In Bessarabia, the church functioned as a powerful institution that gave value to the tradition, so that no amendments could be operated there, and there was no mandatory "pious spirit by the official power."

The process of Russification and politicization of the church were rejected until the interwar period: "Together with the landlords, the Moldavian church contributes to preserve the national consciousness, being influenced by the cultural activities of the Bishop Amfilohie Hotiniul, as well as the Bessarabian priests who were guided by the well-known founder of the Bessarabian Metropolitan, Gavriil Banulescu Bodoni, helped by the bishop Dimitrie, and both of them have had an important cultural role in Bessarabia - (...) Synod of Pobiedonostev and and the bishops sought to inspire official orthodoxy to our church in Bessarabia. Though, it remained faithful to old traditions settlement of the Moldovan people, and kept intact the treasur of its ancestral soul".¹⁴

After the annexation of Bessarabia by Russia in 1812, the new authorities accepted to keep the local ecclesial structures. The Essay of the Holy Synod for the founding of the Diocese of Chisinau and Hotin asks for certain independence and for the existing local structures to be preserved,

¹³ *Luminătorul*, Nr. 1, 1908, p. 78.

¹⁴ Pan. Halippa, „Cu gândul la Unirea Basarabiei” („Thinking of the Union of Bessarabia”), in *Life of Bessarabia*, 1932, Year 1, Nr. 3, p. 4.

etc¹⁵. Thus, it is explicitly mentioned: "in the management of the newly established Diocese, is requested for the Exarch Metropolitan to be allowed to follow local customs, since these will not be in contradiction with fundamental civil and ecclesiastical laws of Russia. (...) "¹⁶. This way, the following approach is stated: the absence of major contradictions and differences is the reason why the local Church has been granted a relative independence and freedom.

In August 1812 the foundation of a diocese has been approved, in which the "local customs" had to be respected; it was named Diocese of Chisinau and Hotin, and preserved the same organization. In 1814 in Chisinau it approved the opening of an exarch printing house. Also in 1814 the Theological Seminary has been set in Chisinau. In 1858 the official newspaper of the Bessarabian church has been issued, called *Vestitorul Eparhiei Chişinăului şi Hotinului* (The Herald of Diocese of Chisinau and Hotin), with texts in Romanian and Russian.

Nonetheless, the Russification process intensified lately, getting to the point of imposing to the Church of Bessarabia the use of Russian language as a compulsory language when holding the church services. In the interwar period, however, the *national church* became valued by the elites.

In the article "The utility of the Moldovan newspaper" signed by I. Pelivan, published in the first issue of the review *Basarabia*, the author draws some "claims": he says that Moldovans need their "*Romanian school and national church*"¹⁷. Also in the cover story of the third issue of the newspaper *Basarabia*, which was not signed (but Stefan Ciobanu said was written by I. Pelivan) and whose motto was "Awaken thee, Romanian, shake off thy deadly slumber, The scourge of inauspicious barbarian tyrannies"¹⁸, beside statements concerning the unity of religion, was expressed the discontent with the fact that the prayers (church services) were held mostly

¹⁵ „Înfiinţarea Eparhiei Chişinăului şi Hotinului – 1813” („Founding of the Diocese of Chisinau and Hotin - 1813”), in *Archives of Bessarabia*, 1929, Nr. 1, p. 34.

¹⁶ „Înfiinţarea Eparhiei Chişinăului şi Hotinului – 1813” („Founding of the Diocese of Chisinau and Hotin - 1813”), in *Archives of Bessarabia*, 1929, Nr. 1, p. 34.

¹⁷ Ion Pelivan, „Folosul gazetei moldoveneşti”, („The utility of Moldovan newspaper”) in *Basarabia*, 1906, nr. 1, *apud* Ştefan Ciobanu, „Din istoria mişcării naţionale în Basarabia” („From the history of the national movement in Bessarabia”), in *Life of Bessarabia*, January 1933, Year II, Nr. 1, p. 9.

¹⁸ Part of the lyric of the current Romanian anthem.

in Russian. "Only we, from Bessarabia, we are the most oppressed and miserable people, although we all profess *the same orthodox religion* as our masters - Russians. (...) That is only us who have no any authority, any national institutions. The Church, our only consolation, even this one has been turned away from us, and the service is now held more in Slovenian than in Moldovan"¹⁹. There have been many articles in which it was requested and justified the need to introduce Moldovan language in schools and in the church. Including after the opening of the Moldovan religious printing house of the Diocese, the newspaper staff continued to claime, asking for schools, churches and for other institutions of national character.

In the article "Russian Culture in Bessarabia took refuge in the family"²⁰, published in 1934 in the magazine *Viața Basarabiei (Life of Bessarabia)*, F. Săgeată presents the new realities in the weight (influence) of the Russian language and culture in schools and churches: "Russian language, then, has been chase out of school, church and public institutions, introducing instead Romanian"²¹. The bilingualism, nonetheless, due also to mixed families, continues to exist in the Bessarabian families, especially in the case of intellectuals: "The families of intellectuals from Bessarabia speak two languages: Russian and Romanian. (...) Families of Bessarabian intellectuals are also keepers of rich Russian libraries"²².

The conclusion of the author is that the Russian's culture influence is very strong, and reached an important segment of the population, the intellectuals, being absorbed in the family: "The family is the nest where sought protection all the traditions of the previous rulers. And as tradition can not change from one day to the next, it would take a long time to feel

¹⁹ Basarabia, 1906, nr. 3, *apud* Ștefan Ciobanu, „Din istoria mișcării naționale în Basarabia”, („From the history of the national movement in Bessarabia”), in *Life of Bessarabia*, January 1933, Year II, Nr. 1, p. 11. (Emphasys added: I.D.)

²⁰ F. Săgeată, „Cultura rusă în Basarabia s-a refugiat în familie”, (Russian Culture in Bessarabia took refuge in the family), *Viața Basarabiei*, 1934, nr. 4, p. 223.

²¹ F. Săgeată, „Cultura rusă în Basarabia s-a refugiat în familie”, (Russian Culture in Bessarabia took refuge in the family), *Viața Basarabiei*, 1934, nr. 4, p. 223.

²² F. Săgeată, „Cultura rusă în Basarabia s-a refugiat în familie”, (Russian Culture in Bessarabia took refuge in the family), *Viața Basarabiei*, 1934, nr. 4, pp. 224-225.

the wind of Romanian spirituality renewal."²³ The author explains why this influence persists, citing "the spiritual affinity for everything bears the seal of the Russian culture", which is "deeply rooted in the hearts of all members of these families and is a product of Russian tradition of live before the Union."²⁴

Elites, discourse and concepts of identity

The social functionality of Bessarabian elite's discourses is different: to legitimize positions, attitudes, attitudes, affiliations, identities.

In the article "From the history of the national movement in Bessarabia"²⁵, Ștefan Ciobanu presented elites existing before the Union of 1918, groups of intellectuals, their proximity to certain political parties, the groups structure. It also describes the behavior and ideological options leading (orienting) intellectuals of the time: Pan Halippa (which was part of the group of Bessarabian intellectuals and students at the University of Dorpat, along with P. Grosu, N. Bivol, V. Platonov, etc. Referring to other groups, the historian reminds the Bessarabian landowners who created a Moldovan national party that intended to promote nationalism, and a group around the National Democratic Party), together with C. Stere, I. Pelivan etc. These intellectuals managed to start a newspaper, "Basarabia", whose first issue was printed in 1906, in Romanian (texts were written with Cyrillic alphabet, and the title of the newspaper with Latin letters).

Regarding the behavior of elites (nobles/landlords/, priests, teachers and "professionals from different intellectual areas") from Bessarabia during the annexation by the Russian Empire, Pan. Halippa speaks about their *Moldovan consciousness*: they opposed to Russification's tendency and to absolutism, and supported the Romanian national cause in Bessarabia.

In the identitarian discourses in Bessarabia the notion of national identity and of cultural identity is in a relation of free variation. In S. Murafa's article, entitled "Who the Moldovans are? (From the history of the

²³ F. Săgeată, „Cultura rusă în Basarabia s-a refugiat în familie”, (Russian Culture in Bessarabia took refuge in the family), *Viața Basarabiei*, 1934, nr. 4, p. 226.

²⁴ F. Săgeată, „Cultura rusă în Basarabia s-a refugiat în familie”, (Russian Culture in Bessarabia took refuge in the family), *Viața Basarabiei*, 1934, nr. 4, p. 225.

²⁵ Ștefan Ciobanu, „Din istoria mișcării naționale în Basarabia”, (From the history of the national movement in Bessarabia) în *Viața Basarabiei*, ianuarie 1933, Anul II, Nr. 1, p. 3.

nation)"²⁶, published in May 1913, the political realities of the context are explained - the author remembers the ethnic belonging of Moldavians (part of the Romanian *people*), mapping Romanian living space: "But not the whole *nation* lives under the same leaders. Some of Romanians are subjects of Austro-Hungarian emperor, such as those from Transylvania, Banat, Crisana and Maramures, Bucovina, others live in Makedonia and Albania – former Turkish country until today; and we *Moldovans* from Bessarabia are faithful to His Imperial Excellency, Emperor of all the Russians, Nikolai Alexandrovich II. And only those from Moldova, Muntenia, Oltenia and Dobrogea are autonomous and make up their country, Romania."²⁷

Discourses in the interwar press are recalled /cited/ because they are representative for the specific to those period modes of conceptualization and questioning. This measure, or step, of building an identity image has been updated years later. In the contemporary period we have seen that in this action historians are involved too. Referring to the direct involvement of professional historians from the Republic of Moldova, which assume the role of "public intellectuals", in the formulation of identity discourse, in the process of building a collective identity (a generally valid phenomenon in the Eastern Europe, but in some regions with more intensity), Andrei Cusco and Igor Sarov²⁸ explain how exactly this involvement manifests itself, and the mechanisms of this "self-assumed militancy": "historians from Moldova in the late twentieth century and in the start of the millennium appear (show themselves) not as 'guardians' of an academic or scientific tradition "objective" in its essence. On the contrary, the professional historians are involved in symbolic competitions oriented to legitimize a certain "discours of nation", and their public positions can

²⁶ S. Murafa, „Cine-s moldovenii? (Din Istoria neamului)” (Who the Moldovans are? (From the history of the nation)), în *Cuvînt Moldovenesc*, Nr. 1, May, year 1913 (with Cyrillic script), p. 17.

²⁷ S. Murafa, „Cine-s moldovenii? (Din Istoria neamului)” (Who the Moldovans are? (From the history of the nation)), în *Cuvînt Moldovenesc*, Nr. 1, May, year 1913 (with Cyrillic script), p. 20. (Emphasys added: I.D.)

²⁸ Andrei Cușco, Igor Șarov, „Identitate, memorie și discurs istoric în Moldova postsovietică: o abordare critică”, (Identity, Memory and Historical Discourse in Post-Soviet Moldova: A Critical Approach), in: Svetlana Suveică, Ion Eremia et al. (ed.). *Istoriografie și politică în estul și vestul spațiului românesc (Historiography and Politics at the Eastern and Western Periphery of the Romanian Cultural Space)*. Chișinău / Oradea: Oradea University Press, 2009.

better be analysed from the positions of their implications in «field of battle» of the fight for «identity» and «memory»." ²⁹

More specifically, the identity discourse has similar coordinates: many elements, concepts used in the interwar discourses are valid in the postwar or contemporary discourse. Critics of the elites, of intellectuals which are not fighting enough for "the national needs of Moldovans" is part of the mode of rhetoric that have assumed /assimilated/ also the postwar intellectuals.

Citing the Ukaz (Decree) of February 17, under which "all nationalities of the Russian Empire, through their representative institutions (...) presented a whole range of applications, petitions, resolutions on their needs; according to their historical, national, economic situations, I. Pelivan mentions the behavior of the Bessarabian's elites, which he critically amends. "But in this era of extraordinary general awakening, at this unanimous and unprecedented in the Russian history attack to the bureaucracy, from all conscious and intellectual forces from the empire, irrespective of class or nationality – our Bessarabian intellectuals maintain the most shameful silence: not a word has been pronounced openly regarding the Moldovan national needs." ³⁰ The Bessarabian intellectuals, thus, from the beginning, are criticized for their alleged apathy, insufficient mobilization etc. It is a rhetoric that intellectuals reactivate in some socio-political contexts, punishing this way the passive behavior of the elites.

Regarding the reiteration of the critical discourse about the elite behavior in the postwar period, it is accompanied by the critic of the ideological positions of the intellectuals, the political proximity being equally criticized. In the postwar period, though, discourses can not be ideologically neutral.

²⁹ Andrei Cușco, Igor Șarov, „Identitate, memorie și discurs istoric în Moldova postsovietică: o abordare critică”, (Identity, Memory and Historical Discourse in Post-Soviet Moldova: A Critical Approach), in: Svetlana Suveică, Ion Eremia et al. (ed.). *Istoriografie și politică în estul și vestul spațiului românesc (Historiography and Politics at the Eastern and Western Periphery of the Romanian Cultural Space)*. Chișinău / Oradea: Oradea University Press, 2009, p. 73.

³⁰ Ion Pelivan, „Din Istoria Nouă a Basarabiei” („From the New History of Bessarabia”), *Life of Bessarabia*, [Russian Newspaper in Chișinău] from 15 of October 1905, No. 255/310, *apud Arhivele Basarabiei*, 1932, nr. 2, p. 112.

In the interwar period, however, existed /there were/ different attitudes, and groups of intellectuals involved in the city's life. It is worth to mention the intellectuals who have taken the aim, explicitly exposed in the first issue of "Doina of Dniester": "the revival of the national consciousness in these lands." This review - "a review of general culture and national propaganda" was "the Body of the company with the same name" and proposed "radical measures of correction and consolidation of the nation's destiny"³¹. Thus, the concern for the preservation of the identity was constant.

In a letter to the editorial board of the newspaper "Cuvânt moldovenesc" ("Moldovan word") of March 17, 1917, signed by several intellectuals from Bessarabia in Bolgrad (Ioniță Pelivan, Ștefan Ciobanu and Ionel Văluță) Russian Empire's policies in this province are described - the Russification of this territory by "the extirpation of mother tongue" and the destruction of the "national features": "The principle of national development of all peoples of Russia upheld by the current provisional government of the empire fills our hearts with joy and hope that our Moldavians from Bessarabia, which were in danger to have their maternal speech eradicated and national features destroyed by the old stepmother domination, would finally awaken to a new life and freedom"³². Beyond the updating of the claiming discourse, it is included the memory of diachronically suffered injustice.

Still, in 1905, in the review "Life of Bessarabia" ("Russian Newspaper in Chisinau"), I. Pelivan wrote about the inefficiency of the Russification and confirms that empire policies will change: "The experience of a century, though, which was made by bureaucracy to this purpose (the experience of Russification - my note - ID) of all nationalities in the empire, seems it need to convince all those who It have to, that interdiction of the tongue, and any means of forced Russification, are absolutely ineffective."³³

³¹ „Cuvânt introductiv” („Foreword”), in *Doina Nistrului*, June 1936, Year 1, Nr. 1, p. 1.

³² *Archives of Bessarabia*, 1930, nr. 1, p. 120

³³ Ion Pelivan, „Din Istoria Nouă a Basarabiei” („From the New History of Bessarabia”), *Life of Bessarabia*, [Russian Newspaper in Chișinău] from 15 of October 1905, No. 255/310, *apud Arhivele Basarabiei*, 1932, nr. 2, pp. 111.

The absence of the national conflict in the Bessarabian Orthodox Church

The model of the trans-ethnic orthodoxy is the only one functioning in Bessarabia, where the confessional belonging is cohesion, coagulation factor. The argument of the Moldovan Church – subordinated to the Moscow Patriarchy – is that its aim and mission is to keep the sense of common belonging of the Orthodox of the separatist regions of Moldova - Transdnistria and Gagauzia. Here the reactivation of the ethnic problems is functioning as a pressure factor: ethnic conflicts are reactivated due to political reasons. Given the fact that the ethnic connotation of the church in Moldova would have a potentially schismatic connotation, it renounced to confer ethnic connotations to the church symbols in order to avoid conflicts.

Thus we can talk about confessional unity in ethnic diversity. A project like "The Church of people" could not function as it does in other areas – because it would revive irredentist impulses etc. In Romania, however, as well as in Russia, the confessional belonging has ethnic connotations. In the study *“Romanian orthodoxy, between ideology of exclusion and sécularisation amiable”*³⁴, that aims to reveal the structural link between modernity and (radical) nationalism, expressed in the ethnocentric discourse which is still dominating Romanian Orthodoxy, respectively outlining its potential for exclusion - "the exclusionist potential"- Florin Lobonț speaks about the auto-centrism ideological impasse which still dominates orthodoxy „the deadlock of ideological self-centrism that still dominates our Orthodoxy”, because as the author puts it, the relationship between the State and State is a problematic one here. Florin Lobonț explains how the discriminatory potential is expressed: as far as a clear distinction between citizenship and nationality persists, and the nationality, the ethnic belonging is inseparable from orthodoxy - any citizen who does not belongs to Orthodoxy, and does not claim its affiliation to Orthodoxy, excludes himself, and can not claim the belonging to the nation.

³⁴ Florin Lobonț, „Romanian orthodoxy, between ideology of exclusion and sécularisation amiable”, in *Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies*, 8, 24 (Winter 2009), pp. 46-69.

In Bessarabia we can talk about trans-orthodoxy. (Florin Lobonț³⁵ spoke about an overlapping of the ethnic identity over religious identity and the discriminatory consequences for ethnic minority groups in Romania). In Bessarabia the split or the cleavage occurs for other reasons - political, ideological. Here, power relationships, about which Sorin Frunza says that they are "behind the claims on cultural identity"³⁶ are more evident.

In the volume *Skinny, people or nation? – about European political identity*³⁷, Victor Neumann explains "the inconsistencies between the idea of nation of the French, British and Dutch people on the one hand and that formulated by the Poles, Serbs, Romanian and Greek, on the other hand".

The historian says that "on the basis of the cultural differentialism", "the significance of *citoyenneté* or *Citizenship* of the West European political and legal languages is receiving a different interpretation in the Central and Eastern European cultures³⁸." After, the author interprets the differences regarding questioning of identities: "Instead of the idea of equality of all citizens, the central and Eastern European intellectuals preferred to promote the idea of an identity based on origin, continuity, blood (race), space and language. The latter aspect explains why actually the Central and Eastern European nation of yesterday and today are nothing more than a *Kulturnation*, that is, an ethnic nation, namely, a nation of the main ethnic group³⁹". Moreover, we could mention here that in some central and eastern European regions the national belonging is conditional on religious affiliation.

³⁵ Florin Lobonț, „Romanian orthodoxy, between ideology of exclusion and sécularisation amiable”, în *Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies*, 8, 24 (Winter 2009), pp. 46-69.

³⁶ Sandu Frunză, „Pluralism și multiculturalism” („Pluralism and multiculturalism”) in *Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies*, Nr. 9, (Winter 2004), p. 137.

³⁷ Victor Neumann, *Neam, popor sau națiune? - Despre identitățile politice europene*³⁷, („*Skinny, People or Nation? On the European Political Identities*”), Bucarest: Curtea Veche Publishing House, 2003.

³⁸ Victor Neumann, *Neam, popor sau națiune? - Despre identitățile politice europene*³⁸, („*Skinny, People or Nation? On the European Political Identities*”), Bucarest: Curtea Veche Publishing House, 2003, p. 10.

³⁹ Victor Neumann, *Neam, popor sau națiune? - Despre identitățile politice europene*³⁹, („*Skinny, People or Nation? On the European Political Identities*”), Curtea Veche Publishing House, Bucharest, 2003, p. 10.

In Bessarabia, however, the Orthodox religion becomes the basis for common identification and belonging; it is a religion /confession/ that transcends national boundaries, or rather does not overlap or coincide with ethnicity. The cultural-religious identity is more important in this multicultural space; ethnic conflicts and tensions caused by ideologies are diluted. Here the tradition functions as an "authority", called by the hierarchical structures in order to bring legitimacy. Traditional forms of social life are marked by rituals associated with this confession: religion is a unifying element favoring dialogue between ethnicities⁴⁰.

Bibliography:

1. Cemârțan, Romeo (2004), *Cazul Mitropoliei Basarabiei: interferențe politice și religioase*, Chișinău: Editura Alfa și Omega.
2. Ciobanu, Ștefan (1992), *Cultura românească în Basarabia sub stăpânirea rusă*, Chișinău: Editura enciclopedică "Gh. Asachi".
3. Cușco, Andrei; Șarov, Igor (2009), "Identitate, memorie și discurs istoric în Moldova postsovietică: o abordare critică", in Suveică, Svetlana; Eremia, Ion et al. (eds.), *Istoriografie și politică în estul și vestul spațiului românesc*, Chișinău/Oradea: Oradea University Press.
4. Frunză, Sandu (2004), "Pluralism și multiculturalism", in *Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies*, no. 9, 136-143.
5. Huntington, Samuel P. (1997), *Ciocnirea civilizațiilor și refacerea ordinii mondiale*, București: Editura Antet.
6. King, Charles (2002), *Moldovenii: România, Rusia și politica culturală*, Chișinău: Editura ARC.
7. Kymlicka, Will (2000), "Teorie politică occidentală și relații etnice în Europa de Est", in *Polis. Revista de Științe Politice*, no. 2, vol. 7, 5-72.

⁴⁰ Inclusively in the Statute of the Orthodox Church of Moldova (the Moldovan Metropolitan), is clearly accepted the ethnic/linguistic diversity: „In the churches of the Orthodox Church of Moldova the prayers are officiated in Romanian. In some parishes – in Slavon, Ukranian, Gagauz or Bulgarian languages, depending on the nationality and preferencies of the faithful from the respectiv parish”. The Government of the Republic of Moldova, DECISION Nr. 719 of 17.11.1993, concerning the approval of the *Statute of the Orthodox Church of Moldova* (the Moldovan Metropolitan), text available online at <http://lex.justice.md/index.php?action=view&view=doc&lang=1&id=304219>, last accessed at 25.04.2015.

8. Lobonț, Florin (2009), "Romanian orthodoxy, between ideology of exclusion and sécularisation amiable", in *Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies*, no. 24, vol. 8, 46-69.
9. Marga, Andrei (2014), *Religia în era globalizării*, București: Editura Academiei Române.
10. Murafa, S. (1913), "Cine-s moldovenii? (Din Istoria neamului)", in *Cuvînt Moldovenesc*, no. 1, 17-20.
11. Neumann, Victor (2003), *Neam, popor sau națiune? Despre identitățile politice europene*, București: Editura Curtea Veche.
12. Patriarhia Română (1993), *Adevărul despre Mitropolia Basarabiei*, București: Editura Institutului Biblic și de Misiune al Bisericii Ortodoxe Române.
13. Pelivan, Ion (1905), "Din Istoria Nouă a Basarabiei", in *Viața Basarabiei*, no. 255/310, apud *Arhivele Basarabiei* (1932), no. 2, 109-112.
14. Păcurariu, Mircea (1993), *Istoria Bisericii Ortodoxe Române*, Chișinău: Editura Știința.
15. Salat, Levente (2005), "Statul-națiune și provocările diversității", in *Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies*, no. 10, 4-11.
16. Săgeată, F. (1934), "Cultura rusă în Basarabia s-a refugiat în familie", in *Viața Basarabiei*, no. 4, 223-226.
17. Suttner, Ernst Christoph (2007), *Staaten und Kirchen in der Völkerwelt des östlichen Europas. Entwicklungen der Neuzeit*, Freiburg, Schweiz: Academic Press Fribourg.
18. Taylor, Charles (2002), *Die Formen des Religiösen in der Gegenwart*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.
19. Taylor, Charles (1999), "Politica Recunoașterii", in *Secolul 20. Europele din Europa*, no. 10-12/no. 1-3, 491-518.
20. Thual, François (1998), *Le douaire de Byzance. Territoires et identités de l'orthodoxie*, Paris: Ellipses.
21. Weeks, Theodor R. (2006), "Managing empire: tsarist nationalities policy", in Lieven, Dominic (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Russia. Volume 2: Imperial Russia, 1689–1917*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 27-44.

SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP

Darius A. Tent*

Abstract:

Social entrepreneurship is an increasingly important concept in the study of voluntary and nonprofit organizations as it turns out to be the updated version of the latter. Although the popularity of this concept is rapidly increasing within our days, little is known about what individual characteristics might describe a social entrepreneur or how social enterprises differentiate themselves from business enterprises. This paper suggests that social entrepreneurs nowadays are college-educated individuals that overstepped the entry-level business experience, are independent and constantly connected to the globalization process. So that we can suggest ways in which this important actor of the civil society can be better understood, and perhaps helped to flourish, we must first be able to identify him or her.

Keywords: social enterprise, traditional social sector, non-governmental organizations, entrepreneurial skills, voluntary action, social added value

The need for social entrepreneurship

At global level there is a desperate rush between societies to bring in new and innovative approaches in addressing some of the history's most persistent social problems. These problems are usually known as a tough social situations that are delicately but, yet inefficiently approached by the governments or market places¹.

Due to the fact that these topics were never making the top of any government's agenda, unless it was an electoral year, during history they have been the driven objective of nongovernmental organizations or civil society organizations. These are also known as the traditional saviors in

* Darius-Alexandru Tent, PhD Candidate, at the College of European Studies (BBU, Cluj-Napoca, Romania) is a specialist in International Relations and European Studies, a strategic management consultant and teacher of Business Studies at Transylvania College, the Cambridge International School in Cluj, Romania.

Contact: darius.a.tent@gmail.com.

¹ Frank J. McVeigh, Loreen Wolfer, *Brief history of social problems – A critical thinking approach*, Oxford: University Press of America, 2004, pp. 363 – 405.

terms of social problems. Their range of operations still is very complex, addressing issues from education and health services to environmental conservation.

By accessing the legal framework in any country, any person or company can build nongovernmental organizations and in essence they function independently from any government.

There are also cases in which governments totally or partially fund NGOs; still they maintain their nongovernmental status by excluding government representatives from membership in the organization. This terminology remains to be used only in the case of some organizations that pursue a wider social aim. We must keep in mind though that NGOs are not overtly political organizations such as political parties.

The main characteristic of this century is the speed with which goods, capital, labor and information move around the globe. This speed has also been transferred or applied to the manner in which social issues keep on multiplying in several corners of the world. Although the traditional social sector has had serious finances in addressing some of these global issues their rate of return has not been satisfactory.

Moreover the global social problems are becoming more acute, while their efficiency rate remains the same. All this seems to be due to the lack of entrepreneurial skills in approaching a matter that must be solved with very limited resources. Therefore it is not enough for us only to have at disposal finances and be willing to help. Additionally, we must have the proper entrepreneurial skills beside the big heart in order to transform these problems into feasible objectives. It is believed that social enterprises have this capacity as they emulate the behaviors of business enterprises, which aim for efficiency, performance, stability and flexibility².

A more sustainable impact can only be achieved if resources are handled in a way to seek performance by accounting every inflow / outflow, constantly seeking to improve their rate of return and decrease the

² Jonathan Boswell, *Social and Business Enterprises (RLE: Organizations): An Introduction to Organizational Economics*, 1976,

[<https://books.google.ro/books?id=0nKAAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA21&dq=social+and+business+enterprises&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CCIQ6AEwAWoVChMI7Lvg5M2WyAIVidYUCh0jSgpC#v=onepage&q=social%20and%20business%20enterprises&f=false>], 22 September 2015.

running costs. Nowadays without the right skill, the intention of doing a good can easily bring in bad consequences.

Taking in considerations the world wide situation described above, this provides social entrepreneurship with one of the histories grates chance to become the main engine in creating social added value.

With the taxation system as main tool to increase to governmental budget, the governments have come to realize during history that taxes can only be grown up to a limit³. Once they have crossed that limit they might cause riots and revolutions, while social problems don't have a limit of growth.

In fact these are growing with the speed of light and while governments keep on addressing the same problems for centuries, they neglect some of the updated features of these problems.

The growing number of MBA graduates that occupy upper management positions within the social sector, point out the increased interest towards this sector. Voluntary action has nowadays begun to be manifested by people which posses intellectual capital, management expertise and even talent in dealing with social problems. The inefficiency of the traditional social sector has also significantly contributed to the growing success of social entrepreneurship.

The new era has also marked the appearance of a new profile for the classical philanthropists. Unlike his or her ancestors, money is not given away for charity and then waits for someone to create a change in the world due to this. Instead they get involved, their follow the circuit of their money, measure their impact and conduct analyses in order to measure the efficiency of their actions. Better-said, modern philanthropist follows each stage his or her money goes through within the "chain of production".

The main difference between traditional social sector approaches and social entrepreneurial approaches can be defined at best through an analogy between demand and will. Demand is known as having the willingness to buy something, but in the same time being able to pay for it.

³Patrick James Caraga, *The Economic and Compliance Consequences of Taxations – A report on the Health of the Tax System in New Zealand*, 1998,

[<https://books.google.ro/books?id=0nKAAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA21&dq=social+and+business+enterprises&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CCIQ6AEwAWoVChMI7Lvg5M2WyAIVidYUCh0jSgpC#v=onepage&q=social%20and%20business%20enterprises&f=false>], 22 September 2015.

On the other side, a wish is defined as a willingness to acquire something but lacking the financial possibility to do so. That “something” lacking from the traditional social sector is known as entrepreneurial skills⁴.

In order to recover the time, which was lost by the traditional social system in fighting with the global social problems, social entrepreneurs work hand in hand with business enterprises, as sometimes the latter funds the actions of the first. Innovative partnerships have taken place between nonprofits and businesses, emerging into a formula that combines both social and commercial goals. In these alliances public agencies might also join in. Societies have started the race of finding the best ways for providing the most problem oriented goods and services offering in these businesses a great opportunity for experimenting with several organizational models. The achievement of the desired social impact relies on the development of effective performance management systems⁵.

Understanding social entrepreneurship

The academic literature defines the concept of social entrepreneurship in various ways, but the common root stands in the fact that some groups of stakeholders are more important than the shareholders. What this observation tries to underline is the clear difference between social enterprise and business enterprise.

While business enterprises are purely profit oriented businesses where the interests of the shareholders are followed in a biblical manor, when it comes to defining social enterprises it is all about using the resources you have at disposal for the sake of those for which you initially started this business, the people in need⁶.

⁴ David Bornstein, Susan Davis, *Social Entrepreneurship: What Everyone Needs to Know*, 2010, [https://books.google.ro/books?id=XC2vfM1ZjuwC&printsec=frontcover&dq=social+entrepreneurship&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CB4Q6AEwAGoVChMI4_mw0eaqxwIVh74UCh2VKQGE#v=onepage&q=social%20entrepreneurship&f=true], 14 August 2015.

⁵ David Bornstein, *How to Change the World: Social Entrepreneurs and the Power of New Ideas*, 2007, [https://books.google.ro/books?id=P_g8gVyuEgC&printsec=frontcover&dq=social+entrepreneurship&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CCYQ6AEwAWoVChMI6LHxrtWyxwIVhdUaCh1cjwG-#v=onepage&q=social%20entrepreneurship&f=false], 14 August 2015.

⁶ Bob Doherty, George Foster, Chris Mason, John Meehan, Karon Meehan, Neil Rothero and Maureen Royce, *Management for Social Enterprise*, New York: SAGE Publications Ltd., 2009, pp. 25-54.

Therefore common root of all definitions of social entrepreneurship is the creation of social value, rather than personal wealth. By starting with the idea that our business could have a positive change in the world we may describe social entrepreneurship as a set of business techniques aiming to find solutions to social problems. This concept may be applied to a variety of organizations of different sizes, aims, and beliefs.

From a different angle, social entrepreneurship could be seen as a gathering of many business people with solid experience in the fields of management, finance and human relations sharing their know-how and experience along with money and ideas, in order to generate social welfare by removing some of the existing problems. In my opinion, this is one of the most relevant definitions as it points out the difference between the state and a social enterprise, both aiming to provide social welfare.

While the first focuses on resources in order to make itself noticed, the latter focuses on the opportunity. One of the most important features of social entrepreneurship remains the fact that this tool which generates social value can flourish in any business, regardless if it's non-profit, in public or private sector⁷.

The social entrepreneurial spirit also gives us the opportunity to chip in for a new business environment in which not only that can become more enriched from a financial point of view, but in the same time can be highly motivating and self-esteem rewarding as your work help other tens, hundreds, thousands or millions of people around the world⁸.

We should imagine social entrepreneurship as a process through which citizens build or transform certain institution in order to provide advance up-to-date solutions to social problems such as poverty, illness, illiteracy, environmental destruction, human rights abuses and last but not least corruption, so that our lives would turn out for the best.

Unlike business enterprises, the opportunities available to a social entrepreneur are very diverse. In order to create a sustainable social enterprise it is not enough to merely combine concepts from social and

⁷ Bob Doherty, George Foster, Chris Mason, John Meehan, Karon Meehan, Neil Rothero and Maureen Royce, *Management for Social Enterprise*, New York: SAGE Publications Ltd., 2009, pp. 1-22.

⁸ Carmel McConnell, *The Happiness Plan – Simple steps to a happier life*, Ontario: Pearson Education, 2007, pp. 230-265.

commercial legislation. You must develop a new conceptual framework and tailor your strategies according the ethos of social entrepreneurship.

Although nowadays all social enterprises are relatively new or still emerging and some of them have not left the experiment status, their future success requires a strategic and systematic approach.

Understanding what makes a social enterprise a unique institution can come in hand when explaining the aims of this concept. Firstly, social enterprises have as a corner stone the social mission⁹.

As already mentioned above, personal interest is left behind for the interest of the community. Therefore, social entrepreneurs who do the day-to-day running of these businesses have made the common good their personal interest. Without this key ingredient the entire project cannot function properly or provide the expected results.

The traditional social sector has always relied on philanthropic support in order to conduct its activity. We cannot state that the cash flow records of a social enterprise are totally different when we analyze the main inflows. What is really different is the management of these financial resources.

A social entrepreneur will always know how much she or he needs in order to successfully run a business on a yearly basis in order to achieve its pre-established objectives, while in the case of nongovernmental organizations or civil society organizations every penny counts and any sum will do¹⁰.

The mission here does not have an exact aim. Therefore your rate of success shrinks significantly if your aiming to hit a target that you cannot see or foresee. The difference between the traditional social sector and social enterprises continues to accentuate as we discuss about the people who manage these institutions.

⁹ Benjamin Gidron, Yeheskel Hasenfeld, *Social Enterprises: An Organizational Perspective*, 2012, [https://books.google.ro/books?id=l1HK2dBzGhEC&pg=PA83&dq=social+mission+of+enterprises&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CCUQ6AEwAWoVChMIz_7zyeWWyAIVxkAUCh2QTAMo#v=onepage&q=social%20mission%20of%20enterprises&f=false], 02 September 2015.

¹⁰ Udai Prakash Sihna, *Economics of Social Sector and Environment*, 2007, [<https://books.google.ro/books?id=djijfij8ZxAC&pg=PA123&dq=traditional+social+sector&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CCQ6AEwAWoVChMIisz2nueWyAIVhFsUCh0keAHq#v=onepage&q=traditional%20social%20sector&f=false>], 25 August 2015.

In the majority of nongovernmental organizations or civil society organizations, mostly volunteers perform the basic day-to-day operations, while every managing director receives a regular paycheck; the process is totally reversed in the case of the latter. The main reward for most social entrepreneurs rarely relies on financial incentives, but more and more on intrinsic rewards.

They also rely on volunteers in order to efficiently run their business and achieve their objectives, therefore operating managers act as role models in terms of voluntary work. Social entrepreneurs focus more on helping those in need to get a qualification, find a job or get better, having in mind the concept that a person with an income will start motivating and supporting all her or his siblings¹¹.

Therefore to social mission of social enterprises is to help others stand on their own feet, become self sufficient and even provide support for others. The traditional social sector aims to solve the problems by simply covering them with short-term solutions, creating a constant dependency of those in need.

Moreover, social enterprises have more in common with business enterprises than with the traditional social sector. This can also explain while most of the sponsorships that come from business enterprises are directed towards projects coordinated by social entrepreneurs. After the recent economic crisis, even the money that is donated for the greater good must have a clear path following and end result.

Corporate social responsibility, although most of the times only performs window dressing for the image of the companies, has also made most companies realize, that it is extremely important to be able to measure what social impact the money you return in the society to address several social costs, will generate. Therefore nowadays is no longer sufficient to just give something in return for the externalities you have generated as a

¹¹ Leslie Crutchfield, Heather McLeod Grant, *Forces for Good – The Six Practices of High-impact Nonprofits*, 2012,

[<https://books.google.ro/books?id=Y34IBngAm1oC&printsec=frontcover&dq=traditional+social+sector&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CDcQ6AEwBWovChMIisz2nueWyAIVhFsUCh0keAHq#v=onepage&q=traditional%20social%20sector&f=false>], 10 September 2015.

company. More important has become the scale of the social impact, any business action, might generate¹².

The main advantage social enterprises have over business enterprises is that there will be no government standing in their way when merging in order to create monopolies.

In fact, in this scenario it is also in the interest of the government of each country to have as many monopolies as possible created through mergers, takeovers or even joint ventures, because this way every state will end up with powerful and skilled partners which will provide a significant aid in generating social welfare.

The challenge of scale can be a unique feature that describes social enterprises. Due to the scarcity of resources and the weight of the final goals the demand for efficient social programs often remains virtually limitless¹³. It might seem hard to record one million dollars revenue in some private sectors. Even more harder if not impossible, by looking in every social sector, might be to provide a feasible and long lasting solution to the problems of millions of people.

If in the case of business enterprises every progress is rewarded or every failure attracts a penalty, social enterprises do not have to put up with this pressure, as expectancies from the stakeholders are not of the same level. Of course the sums received and later used as budgets to implement these social programs might significantly rise or shrink depending on the final outcome. Also, the credibility of the social entrepreneurs in the eyes of their corporate partners play a significant role in how these sponsorships are allocated. Therefore pressure, although it's in a milder form, still exists even for businesses operating in the social sector.

In terms of governance the differences exist not only in comparison with the traditional social system, but also in the case of corporations. The

¹²Sri Urip, *CSR Strategies*, 2010,

[<https://books.google.ro/books?id=540rRIT4AFQC&printsec=frontcover&dq=CSR&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CCQQ6AEwAWoVChMIksTpi-yWyAIVhFwUCh1mJAg9#v=onepage&q=CSR&f=false>], 20 August 2015.

¹³Jill Kickul, Sophie Bacq, *Patterns in Social Entrepreneurship Research*, 2012,

[<https://books.google.ro/books?id=7TofTKzpozUC&pg=PA294&dq=scarcity+of+social+enterprises&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CCoQ6AEwAmoVChMI2Y7HuvKWYAIVBVIUCh3qxwbB#v=onepage&q=scarcity%20of%20social%20enterprises&f=false>], 15 August 2015.

board of leadership, the composition of the governing team and even the membership characteristic of social enterprises are building and operate under different principles¹⁴.

While many organizations with a single legal governing board often have multiple local advisory boards, depending in how many locations they operate, these sometimes play a de facto governing rule.

Founding fathers of a social enterprise along with the upper management might end up with adjusting their actions according to the will of the advisory boards which do not participate at the day-to-day running of a business and have no pressure on their shoulders in case the objectives are achieved or not.

On the other hand, when it comes to business enterprises, these operate according to the instructions provided by the managers, instructions that express the will and interest of the shareholders. Overall we can state that social enterprises are a hybrid combination between the traditional social sector and business enterprises. Although these navigate on philanthropic capital markets, they bring in major innovations and provide solutions to long lasting problems.

The pan-global marketing mentality of all social enterprises helps them operate based on their real strengths, but in the same time, due to the lack of finances, forces them to constantly improve their strengths in order to attract more and more partners from the business world in the fighting battle against inefficient or unprepared governments. Social entrepreneurship is about applying practical, innovative and market-oriented approaches to benefit the marginalized and the poor. A social entrepreneur is one who has created and leads an organization, whether for-profit or not, that is aimed at catalyzing large scale and systemic social change through the introduction of new ideas, methodologies and changes in attitude.

Conclusions

In the end, we can state that social capital is the single strongest predictor of a social entrepreneur. Social entrepreneurs rely much on their

¹⁴Bob Doherty, George Foster, Chris Mason, John Meehan, Karon Meehan, Neil Rothero and Maureen Royce, *Management for Social Enterprise*, New York: SAGE Publications Ltd., 2009, pp. 190-240.

connections and networks in the community to carry out their mission. But as suggested earlier, social capital could also be a result of, rather than a cause of, social entrepreneurial activity.

This article focuses on delivering an accurate contrast between the traditional social sector, private sector and public sector in such a way, so that the hybrid character of the modern social enterprises can easily be spotted. In addition it states and defines the sketch of the modern entrepreneur. This role within every society is not hard to get, but is extremely difficult to maintain.

In order to become such an entrepreneur a social change must be brought by your commitment with the help of an innovative product or service or a different approach.

Moreover, your initiative must spread and become successfully adapted to other settings. In order to reach that, the entrepreneur must be open to sharing the tools and techniques for successful adaptation. This initiative is very fragile and without the entrepreneur's full commitment in terms of time and energy, it will not be able to sustain itself.

Last but not least, the same entrepreneur acts as a role model for future social entrepreneurs, characterized through unquestionable integrity. On top of every social entrepreneur's agenda, the objective of engaging with a national and global network of similar entrepreneurs, should be written in capital letters.

Bare in mind the fact that you do not necessarily have to make large investment to start being a social entrepreneur. Your skills and experience might be more than suffice. For other persons, who have the right intentions, but also the financial possibility, your set of entrepreneurial skills along with some years of experience in management positions, can be the most important missing piece, in order to complete fragmented puzzle.

Acknowledgements

I acknowledge Prof. Univ. Dr. Vasile Puscas (PhD) for his permanent guidance, useful comments and suggestions given during my research and during editing this article.

Bibliography:**Books:**

1. Doherty, Bob; Foster, George; Mason, Chris; Meehan, John; Meehan, Karon; Rothero, Neil; Royce, Maureen (2009), *Management for Social Enterprise*, New York: SAGE Publications Ltd.
2. McVeigh, Frank J.; Wolfer, Loreen (2004), *Brief history of social problems – A critical thinking approach*, Oxford: University Press of America.
3. McConnell, Carmel (2007), *The Happiness Plan – Simple steps to a happier life*, Ontario: Pearson Education.
4. McVeigh, J. Frank; Wolfer, Loreen (2004), *Brief history of social problems – A critical thinking approach*, Lanham Maryland: University Press of America.

Electronic Materials:

1. Bornstein, David (2007), *How to Change the World: Social Entrepreneurs and the Power of New Ideas*,
[https://books.google.ro/books?id=P_g8gVyuEgC&printsec=frontcover&dq=social+entrepreneurship&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CCYQ6AEwAWoVChMI6LHxrtWyxwIVhdUaCh1cJwG-#v=onepage&q=social%20entrepreneurship&f=false], 14 August 2015.
2. Bornstein, David; Davis, Susan (2010), *Social Entrepreneurship: What Everyone Needs to Know*,
[https://books.google.ro/books?id=XC2vfM1ZjuwC&printsec=frontcover&dq=social+entrepreneurship&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CB4Q6AEwAGoVChMI4_mw0eaqxwIVh74UCh2VKQGE#v=onepage&q=social%20entrepreneurship&f=true], 14 August 2015.
3. Boswell, Jonathan (1976), *Social and Business Enterprises (RLE: Organizations): An Introduction to Organizational Economics*,
[<https://books.google.ro/books?id=0nKAAAAAQBj&pg=PA21&dq=social+and+business+enterprises&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CCIQ6AEwAWoVChMI7Lvg5M2WyAIVidYUCh0jSgpC#v=onepage&q=social%20and%20business%20enterprises&f=false>], 22 September 2015.
4. Caraga, Patrick James (1998), *The Economic and Compliance Consequences of Taxations – A report on the Health of the Tax System in New Zealand*,

- [<https://books.google.ro/books?id=0nKAAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA21&dq=social+and+business+enterprises&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CCIQ6AEwAWoVChMI7Lv5M2WyAIVidYUCh0jSgpC#v=onepage&q=social%20and%20business%20enterprises&f=false>], 22 September 2015.
5. Crutchfield, Leslie; Grant, Heather McLeod (2012), *Forces for Good – The Six Practices of High-impact Nonprofits*, [<https://books.google.ro/books?id=Y34lBngAm1oC&printsec=frontcover&dq=traditional+social+sector&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CDcQ6AEwBWoVChMlisz2nueWyAIVhFsUCh0keAHq#v=onepage&q=traditional%20social%20sector&f=false>], 10 September 2015.
 6. Gidron, Benjamin; Hasenfeld, Yeheskel (2012), *Social Enterprises: An Organizational Perspective*, [https://books.google.ro/books?id=l1HK2dBzGhEC&pg=PA83&dq=social+mission+of+enterprises&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CCUQ6AEwAWoVChMIz_7zyeWWyAIVxkAUCh2QTAMo#v=onepage&q=social%20mission%20of%20enterprises&f=false], 02 September 2015.
 7. Kickul, Jill; Bacq, Sophi (2012), *Patterns in Social Entrepreneurship Research*, [<https://books.google.ro/books?id=7TofTKzpozUC&pg=PA294&dq=scarcity+of+social+enterprises&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CCoQ6AEwAmoVChMI2Y7HuvKWyAIVBVIUCh3qxwbB#v=onepage&q=scarcity%20of%20social%20enterprises&f=false>], 15 August 2015.
 8. Prakash Sihna, Udai (2007), *Economics of Social Sector and Environment*, [<https://books.google.ro/books?id=djiJflj8ZxAC&pg=PA123&dq=traditional+social+sector&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CCQQ6AEwAWoVChMlisz2nueWyAIVhFsUCh0keAHq#v=onepage&q=traditional%20social%20sector&f=false>], 25 August 2015.
 9. Urip, Sri (2010), *CSR Strategies*, [<https://books.google.ro/books?id=540rRIT4AFQC&printsec=frontcover&dq=CSR&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CCQQ6AEwAWoVChMIksTpiyWyAIVhFwUCh1mJAg9#v=onepage&q=CSR&f=false>], 20 August 2015.

THE CONVERGENT MOTIONS OF THE SOCIAL DIMENSION AND THE CULTURAL DIMENSION. NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN BLUEPRINTS.

Ileana Nicoleta Sălcudean *

Abstract:

Globalisation, Europeanisation and the issues related to postmodernism have faced the Western European welfare states with a series of difficulties and challenges, but the social policy systems adapted to these challenges in various manners and confronted them. The socio-cultural diversity on the one hand, and the attempt to unify the national systems, on the other, are matters which have raised and continue to raise questions on the European level, both in what concerns the social and the cultural dimensions. Why are there social policies in the EU? How have the objectives of these policies developed and changed and how are they convergent with the cultural endeavors? What are the motions of the national, European and global prospects?

Starting from the path-dependency theory, we were trying to identify those distinctive marks which are challenges in the attempt to unify the systems from the New Member States with those from Western Europe. Later on these distinctive marks became cultural indicators. Concerning the New Institutionalism Theory and Neoclassical Sociology, the attempt was to analyze to what extent is the institutional framework organised by the cultural beliefs or by the common norms of the majority. Moreover, we shall attempt to discover the role played by the state in these exchanges of influence and how the European and global contexts affect the decision making process and that of national policy creation.

Keywords: social policies, cultural directions, national state, European Union

* Ileana Nicoleta Sălcudean is currently a lecturer at Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, in the Department of Cinema and Media Studies, Theatre and Television Faculty and an associate researcher in the Philosophy Department, History and Philosophy Faculty. She holds a PhD in Sociology with the thesis *Cultural Policies and Identity Constructions in the European Context*.

Contact: nicoleta.salcudean@gmail.com.

Introduction

A catchword in the EU vocabulary of social policies is *mainstreaming*. There have been discussions about "mainstreaming disability within EU employment and social policy"¹, then "mainstreaming of employment policies"², used also for racism³ and "mainstreaming the social dimension of the information society"⁴. Geyer considers that "mainstreaming is a form of privilege"⁵. In order to understand the relevance of the cultural approach in the European Union, the European directives and that of policy making in the EU and on a national level, I suggest an insight in the social field. The relevance of the national dimension appeared more significantly in the social policies also as a result of the enlargement of the EU. My thesis is that this fact was the underlying element for the launching of the cultural dimension as an emerging domain of the EU.

Grounds:

In the 1970s, in Holland, cultural policies have become a part of the Government's welfare policies due to the recession. This emphasises that there can be a connection between social and cultural policies and that culture can indeed and must support social development. In the case of Ireland, according to the study made by the Economic and Research Institute (ESRI), there is a connection between the economic and social setting and the participation to culture.⁶ National Economic and Social Forum (NESF) in the report *The Arts, Cultural Inclusion and Social Cohesion*, published in 2007, defines cultural inclusion as "being a part of social

¹ In 1999, the title of a document prepared by European Commission Directorate-Generale V (*Employment, Industrial Relations and Social Affairs*).

² Communication from the Commission on Community policies in support of employment (COM(1999) 774, 25th of January 1999, p 1, in Linda Hantrais, *Social Policy in the European Union*, 2nd edition, UK: MacMillan Press Ltd., 2000, p. 190 and p. 223.

³ Idem, p. 215 and p. 223.

⁴ Idem, p. 223 and p. 243.

⁵ Robert R. Geyer, *Exploring European Social Policy*, UK: Polity Press, 2000, p. 210.

⁶ *Compendium. Cultural Policies and Trends in Europe*. Ireland, 2009 – <http://www.culturalpolicies.net/web/ireland.php>, retrieved in September 2010.

inclusion”⁷. From the attempt to unify the Member States to the Open Method of Coordination there has been a process. A similar encounter will take place in the cultural domain regarding national identity versus European identity. The urge for the role of culture as a factor of social inclusion was initiated during the process of creating social policies.

The path of the social issues, the dilemmas regarding the European and national policies in this field are linked to culture, historical, geographic and religious determinations. These are the factors that shape the European social policies. The difficulties encountered in making efficient social policies were linked to the lack of a common perception of the core concepts and the social contexts in which the policies are created and implemented. The relevant directions of the social policies addressed by the EU and the analysis of the Member States with respect to these directives illustrates the distinctiveness of each country and the effects of “cultural *embedding*”⁸. The hypothesis demonstrated by Linda Hantrais is that national governments will have different reactions, different policies for common social issues.⁹ The differences are created by the different contexts, different cultures, different levels of government organisation, different priorities.

The need to tackle the social dimension appeared out of economic reasons, but gained a particular place on the European agenda. It is necessary to address the cultural approach through its indissoluble bond with the social area. The acknowledgement of the social dimension and of the diversity of the systems after establishing economic agreements and the need to include social policies depending on the cultural diversity lead to an increasing emphasis on the cultural dimension.

We propose an approach of the cultural dimension on the one hand as a cause¹⁰ – a framework for social policies, seen from the perspective of

⁷ “The Arts, Cultural Inclusion and Social Cohesion, 2007”, *Compendium. Cultural Policies and Trends in Europe*. Ireland - <http://www.culturalpolicies.net/web/ireland.php?aid=428>, 5 December 2010.

⁸ Linda Hantrais, *Social Policy in the European Union*, 2nd edition, UK: MacMillan Press Ltd., 2000, p. viii.

⁹ *Ibidem*.

¹⁰ The coordination of social security systems, mutual recognition of qualifications, family policies, as well as measures taken at EU level to reduce poverty are all justified somehow as a means to reduce barriers and achieve freedom of movement for workers within the Union.

the issues in the social area, and on the other hand as an effect – the result of such issues that lead to the inclusion of the cultural dimension on the agenda and among the priorities of the EU. The differences between the EU Member States regarding the work conditions, health and security, but also the perspective of the work legislation, as well as the relation between the European law and the national policies triggered a series of inquiries on the socio-cultural premises of each country, the historical context and the specific influences or patterns of thought.¹¹ The EU Member States have different starting points: the state organisation after the war may have contained the same ingredients in different countries, but their combination was utterly different¹². Wolfgang Streeck talks about “the Europe with variable geometry”, emphasising the voluntary condition based on which some Member States align for specific common goals, but also “a multi-speed Europe” which suggests reaching the same final destination eventually.¹³

However, the information shows that mobility within the EU is low. Although there is equivalence and recognition within the EU and coordination of social security systems - all these removing certain obstacles to freedom of movement, there are other difficulties that were slowing this process: difficulties associated with cultural and linguistic traditions. (in Linda Hantrais, *Social Policy in the European Union*, 2nd edition, UK: MacMillan Press Ltd., 2000, p. xiii.)

¹¹ Family policies, indirectly affected by labor rights were viewed with skepticism by the Member States in relation to an agreement based on a common policy, and the Commission, as well as the national governments preferred to monitor the situation, rather than to prescribe measures for family policy. (see Linda Hantrais, *Social Policy in the European Union*, 2nd edition, UK: MacMillan Press Ltd., 2000, p. xii.) A research about family structures and the responses given by various governments could provide direction for future research.

¹² Catherine Finer Jones, “Trends and developments in welfare states”, in Jochen Clasen (ed.), *Comparative Social policy: concepts, theories and methods*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1999, pp. 15-33, in Linda Hantrais, *Social Policy in the European Union*, 2nd edition, UK: MacMillan Press Ltd., 2000, p. 29.

¹³ The European Union is trying to prepare certain arrangements that can coordinate different tendencies shown by Member States. That will refer to a Europe of different dimensions, where some Member States are grouped for certain common purposes on a voluntary basis, leaving out those that do not want to be part of the common purpose. (Wolfgang Streeck, “Neo-Voluntarism: A New European Social Policy Regime?”, in *Governance in the European Union*, Gary Marks, Fritz W. Scharpf, Philippe C. Schmitter and Wolfgang Streeck (eds.), London: Sage Publications, 1996, p. 70.); Another term used is that of „multi-speed Europe” a term which implies that eventually all countries will reach the same destination, where they will be subject to a single system of supranational authority”

The solutions found by the different Member States for common problems, as well as their results reflect not only the different socio-economic conditions, but also the different political ideologies and mindsets about the legitimacy of state intervention¹⁴. Democracy and cultural diversity are the two coordinates that had a decisive role in the opponency of the nation state to the supranational governing.¹⁵ The comparative analysis of social policies, the examination of various institutional agreements, policy choices and results leads to "the identification of the determinants of culture".¹⁶ My endeavour is to discover the interconnections between the development of cultural policies in the EU and the creation and implementation of national policies, starting from a similar undertaking of the social policies. Furthermore, I follow the actual process of making social policies, its dynamics and the way some of the issues related to their implementation on a national level have been resolved.

Starting from the path-dependency theory, we were trying to identify those distinctive marks which are challenges in the attempt to unify the systems from the New Member States with those from Western Europe. Later on these distinctive marks became cultural indicators.

Concerning the New Institutionalism Theory and Neoclassical Sociology, the attempt was to analyze to what extent is the institutional framework organised by the cultural beliefs or by the common norms of the majority. Moreover, we shall attempt to discover the role played by the state in these exchanges of influence and how the European and global

(Wolfgang Streeck, "Neo-Voluntarism: A New European Social Policy Regime?", in *Governance in the European Union*, Gary Marks, Fritz W. Scharpf, Philippe C. Schmitter and Wolfgang Streeck (eds.), London: Sage Publications, 1996, p. 157).

¹⁴ Linda Hantrais, *Social Policy in the European Union*, 2nd edition, UK: MacMillan Press Ltd., 2000, p. ix.

¹⁵ Successful resistance of the nation-state to the supranational governance finds its legitimacy in historical association with democracy and <cultural diversity>. (Wolfgang Streeck, "Neo-Voluntarism: A New European Social Policy Regime?", in *Governance in the European Union*, Gary Marks, Fritz W. Scharpf, Philippe C. Schmitter and Wolfgang Streeck (eds.), London: Sage Publications, 1996, p. 66.)

¹⁶ Linda Hantrais, *Social Policy in the European Union*, 2nd edition, UK: MacMillan Press Ltd., 2000, p. viii.

contexts affect the decision making process and that of national policy creation.

1.1. *The model of social policies*

According to Fritz W. Scharpf, the welfare states are constitutionally bound by the <supremacy> of all European rules of integration, liberalisation and the law of competition and they ought to operate under the fiscal rules of the *Monetary Union*.¹⁷ Furthermore, he highlights that the attempts to bring under the European influence the national welfare systems are politically bound by the diversity of the national welfare states, which differ not only on the level of economic development, but also, even more significantly, in the normative aspirations and the institutional structures.¹⁸

In Wolfgang Streeck's opinion, the Monetary Union is rather an alliance between nationalism and neo-liberalism, and does not impose as evident the commitment of Member States for a supranational restoration of the internal political sovereignty.¹⁹ From the attempt to unify the Member States to the Open Method of Coordination there has been a process. Philippe C. Schmitter²⁰ considers a new form of multi-layer governing without clear distinctions regarding jurisdiction and identity which could erase the distinction between <high> and <low politics>. He considers that we shall need a new vocabulary when facing such development. The same opinion is shared by Wolfgang Streeck regarding a new type of political organisation, an international order, controlled by the

¹⁷ Fritz W. Scharpf 2002§6, "The European Social Model: coping with the challenges of diversity", Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung Working Paper 02/8, Köln: Max-Planck-Institute für Gesellschaftsforschung. URL: <http://www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de/pu/workpap/wp02-8/wp02-8.html>. , in Alfio Cerami, *Social Policy in Central and Eastern Europe. The Emergence of a New European Welfare Regime*, Berlin: Lit Verlag Dr. W. Hopf, 2006, p. 224.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*.

¹⁹ Wolfgang Streeck, "Neo-Voluntarism: A New European Social Policy Regime?", in *Governance in the European Union*, Gary Marks, Fritz W. Scharpf, Philippe C. Schmitter and Wolfgang Streeck (eds.), London: Sage Publications, 1996, p. 157.

²⁰ Philippe C. Schmitter, "Imagining the Future of the Euro-Polity with the Help of New Concepts", in *Governance in the European Union*, Gary Marks, Fritz W. Scharpf, Philippe C. Schmitter and Wolfgang Streeck (eds.), London: Sage Publications, 1996, p. 133.

intergovernmental relations between the sovereign nation states that serves as internal regulation for the transnational economy²¹. Streeck believes that on the long run the European social policies will be created on two levels – national and supranational, with complex interactions between them.²² The community will function as an “intergovernmental arrangement” and the sovereign nation states will appeal to the Community in a “mutual assurance commitment”.²³

Nation states play a key role in eliminating all obstacles for the alignment of the national economies to the European/global labor market.²⁴

Thus, as Geyer observes, the EU should not be considered a threat to the national welfare systems, but rather as a facilitator when facing challenges on a European or international level; rather than the harmonization, the European social policies could encourage the diversity of the national social policies.²⁵

The EU Two-Tier System: The Single Market Oriented²⁶

| <i>First-Tier</i> | <i>Second-Tier</i> |
|--|---|
| Common to all countries: market oriented with a single universal | Differentiated according to specific national |

²¹ The political and economic arrangements that develop in Western Europe, are entirely different from the developments of the national state, especially in relationship to the economy. It changes the discussion on how empty or full the glass is to what kind of glass are we talking about and how can it be used? (Wolfgang Streeck, “Neo-Voluntarism: A New European Social Policy Regime?”, in *Governance in the European Union*, Gary Marks, Fritz W. Scharpf, Philippe C. Shmitter and Wolfgang Streeck (eds.), London: Sage Publications, 1996, p. 65.)

²² Wolfgang Streeck, “Neo-Voluntarism: A New European Social Policy Regime?”, in *Governance in the European Union*, Gary Marks, Fritz W. Scharpf, Philippe C. Shmitter and Wolfgang Streeck (eds.), London: Sage Publications, 1996, p. 65.

²³ Wolfgang Streeck, *op. cit.*, pp. 66-67.

²⁴ In order to line up with the global division of labor the national economies can be assisted by the national governments as they remove any “artificial barrier”. (Wolfgang Streeck, “Neo-Voluntarism: A New European Social Policy Regime?”, in *Governance in the European Union*, Gary Marks, Fritz W. Scharpf, Philippe C. Shmitter and Wolfgang Streeck (eds.), London: Sage Publications, 1996, p. 68.

²⁵ Robert R. Geyer, *Exploring European Social Policy*, UK: Polity Press, 2000, p. 212.

²⁶ URL: <http://www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de/pu/workpap/wp02-8/wp02-8.html>, in Alfio Cerami, *Social Policy in Central and Eastern Europe. The Emergence of a New European Welfare Regime*, Berlin: Lit Verlag Dr. W. Hopf, 2006, p. 224.

| | |
|---|--|
| aspirations | |
| Legal | Semi-legal, tolerated |
| Mandatory | Optional |
| The economic field | The political field |
| Decisions taken by the Commission based on criteria set by regulating the Single Market | Decisions taken by the national governments based on requests from electorates |

Streck considers that the vertical intervention in the national systems will be less important in this *two-tier policy* system than the horizontal interaction between the national systems.²⁷

Further on it would be important to tackle on the progress of the social dimension in the EU, the various domains of social policy, the parameters of change in social policy; the relation between the economic and social dimension, between the Community and the Union, as well as the extent to which the Union has developed its competencies in social policies, in spite of the pressures made by various strong national interests, the threat to national sovereignty and the persistence of diversity in the welfare systems and practices, but also the perspectives of social policies' development in the 21st century, as the EU is being enlarged towards the East.²⁸

The major changes in the EU: the technology, the political and economical changes, the perspective of the enlargement towards the East, the socio-demographic currents emphasize the importance of social policies in the EU.²⁹

1.2. From Harmonization to the Open Method of Coordination

Since the foundation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome, the dominant political philosophy was the economic one.³⁰ The six initial Member States: Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxemburg and Holland had common terms

²⁷ Wolfgang Streeck, "Neo-Voluntarism: A New European Social Policy Regime?", in *Governance in the European Union*, Gary Marks, Fritz W. Scharpf, Philippe C. Schmitter and Wolfgang Streeck (eds.), London: Sage Publications, 1996, pp. 66-67.

²⁸ See also Linda Hantrais, *Social Policy in the European Union*, 2nd edition, UK: MacMillan Press Ltd., 2000, p. xiv.

²⁹ Linda Hantrais, *op. cit.*, p. viii.

³⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 1.

regarding initiatives and competition. Under such terms, an optimised distribution of resources was wished for, leading to an obstacle-free economic growth, which would have automatically led to social development.³¹ The issues tackled were similar: the qualification of the work force for the rapid modification of the labour market in the context of a wide-spread unemployment and social exclusion; raising the social and healthcare standards, especially for the elderly and retired population, the alteration of the inter-generation relations, and the need to adapt public expenditure to fulfill the EMU criteria.³²

Article 117 of the Treaty of Rome of 1957³³ introduces the principle of harmonisation of the social systems of the 6 initial Member States (although the article was ammended, rewritten, renumbered after the Treaty of Amsterdam, this principle was not ammended).³⁴ Each state had different social policies and different policy making processes. The necessity to tackle social reform increases. During the ensuing 20 years a more intense focus is laid on the social aspects.

In the 70s the undertakings in formation and education carried on, and also the attention continued to be cast on workers and women's rights or poverty-related issues, thus on a European level social progress monitoring networks were created. Until the middle of the 80s the pressure for more structured social policy increases. The attention to formation and education, minorities, the equality of opportunity, mobility will be absorbed by the cultural policies. Hereby, we can notice how issues raised by the process of social policy making determined both the acknowledgement of certain cultural implications, and the need to deal with the creation of cultural directives on the EU level.

Ramesh Mishra emphasizes the diversity in welfare patterns and the fact that there are numerous factors that influence social policies – for

³¹ *Ibidem*.

³² *Ibidem*, p. ix.

³³ See *Governing the European Union*, Simon Bromley (ed.), London, California, New-Delhi: Sage Publications in association with The Open University, 2001, UK: The Bath Press, Apendix, pp. 304-310.

³⁴ Linda Hantrais, *Social Policy in the European Union*, 2nd edition, UK: MacMillan Press Ltd., 2000, p. 22.

example technology.³⁵ Along with the attention for social policies and the progress in various sectors, we can notice the perpetuum mobile character of the EU. The recurrent movement depends on the political colour of those leading the EU institution at the moment of a certain decision, but also depending on the political regime of the key Member States in the EU.

Wolfgang Streeck gives an example in this respect linked to the Social Action Programme of 1972, which was an initiative of the social-democratic governments then leading the key European countries together with the syndicates, that boosted the efforts of the international organisations. Moreover, Streeck identifies the link to the old federalist agenda of state construction, cherished especially by the European Community.³⁶ Geyer notes that in domains such as health and security, vocational training, gender policies and mobility – the impact of European social policies is substantial. In others – like worker participation, poverty reduction and anti-discriminative policies – the impact is inessential.³⁷ The question risen is linked to the way the agenda of priorities is built up for the policies on the EU level. Here we can notice the importance of such social policies for the subsequent directives on culture. In the case of directives on culture, the same sectors of education, gender policies and mobility are the coordinates of unity on a European level. Based on the hitherto research, we consider that these are the only domains where common European cultural policies can be traced, the other indicators being linked to the cultural diversity and uniqueness of the Member States, being more difficult to make common policies.

The idea of creating a social space (*espace social*), introduced in 1981 by François Mitterrand was taken over by Jacques Delors when he became the President of the Commission in 1985. In the period before the signing of the Single European Act (SEA) there have been numerous debates on social policies. Delors's compromise was that he rejected the idea that the social dimension implies unification or consolidation, rather he promoted the

³⁵ Mishra Ramesh, *Society and Social Policy: theoretical perspectives on welfare*, London/Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1977, pp. 33-42.

³⁶ Wolfgang Streeck, "Neo-Voluntarism: A New European Social Policy Regime?", in *Governance in the European Union*, Gary Marks, Fritz W. Scharpf, Philippe C. Schmitter and Wolfgang Streeck (eds.), London: Sage Publications, 1996, pp. 74-75.

³⁷ Robert R. Geyer, *Exploring European Social Policy*, UK: Polity Press, 2000, p. 211.

idea of <coherence>.³⁸ At that moment it became clear that harmonisation was not possible and that new solutions were required. Delors's commitment to the social dimension was obvious. Any attempt to render a new depth to the Single Market, but which disregards this social dimension shall be foredoomed to failure.³⁹ The social dialogue is a core concept of his thinking. It was the syndicates and the employers that became the initiators of social policies, rather than the Commission. Geyer considers that the federalism elements are significant ingredients in Delors's vision of equable development.⁴⁰ In the second half of 1987, the Belgian presidency develops the idea of social policy on the "plinth" concept of social rights (*socle social*).

The Belgian Labour Minister carries on Delors's endeavours, and Jacques Delors continues to encourage the "social dialogue" platform.⁴¹

This desideratum perpetuates and is adopted by the cultural directives through the concept of cultural dialogue. In 8-9 December 1989 a meeting takes place in Strasbourg, where the leaders of the Member States, except for the UK, adopt on the 9th of December *the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers*. It is mentioned in the preamble that "the same importance must be given to both the social and the economic aspects"⁴². The difference between this document and *the European Social Charter* of the Council of Europe is that the references to medical care and social assistance, social services, etc. are made without a direct link to occupation. The similitudes between *the Community Charter* and *the European Social Charter* are that none has any force of law and thus is not

³⁸ J. Delors, "Preface" in *New Dimensions in European Social Policy*, J. Vandamme (ed.), London: Croom Helm, 1985, pp. ix-xx, p. xviii.

³⁹ J. Delors, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

⁴⁰ How could otherwise justify Delors his vision of a balanced economic and social development in EU without recognizing the elements of federalism? (Robert R. Geyer, *Exploring European Social Policy*, UK: Polity Press, 2000, p. 209) and Charter of Basic Social Rights for Weorkers (COM(89) 568 29th of November 1989) in Linda Hantrais, *Social Policy in the European Union*, 2nd edition, UK, MacMillan Press Ltd., 2000, p. 10, p. 20.

⁴¹ Delors considers economy to be the key factor in bringing progress in a society (Jacques Delors, *Conference on the Future of European Social Policy*, 1994, in Robert R. Geyer, *Exploring European Social Policy*, UK: Polity Press, 2000, p. 203).

⁴² Linda Hantrais, *Social Policy in the European Union*, 2nd edition, UK: MacMillan Press Ltd., 2000, p. 8.

binding for the signatories. We can still observe a rather clear direction from the economic towards the social.

Afterwards the Council invited the Community to prepare initiatives to adopt legal instruments as regards the social policies (which fall under the responsibility of the Community). There resulted an action programme with 47 initiatives for the development of the social dimension of the SEM.⁴³ The method of implementation was based on counselling, mediation through consultative boards and social dialogue. It can be noticed that this strategy shall also be adopted in the case of culture.

Stephen R. Thomas considers that social movements are provoked not only economically, socially, but also culturally and the *social question* is, in certain historical contexts, the development of a *cultural question*.⁴⁴ In the Commission of the European communities, *First report on the application of the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers* (COM (91) 511, 5th of December 1991), the discussions of the Luxemburg Council, assembled in June 1991, are resumed. The outcome of the implementation of the SEM programme has not registered any comparable progress as regards the public policies domain. In this and the following reports the three underlying principles of the initiatives of the Commission are emphasized: subsidiarity, the diversity of national systems, cultures and practices and the maintaining of the competitiveness of the assignments, confirming thus the secondary role of the social dimension.⁴⁵ The hardships in the national implementation of social policies are linked to the diversity of national systems, cultures and practices and this becomes the basis of new strategies of *hard law* and *soft law*. It becomes obvious that harmonisation is impossible.

1.3. *The social dimension and the cultural dimension*

The Social Policy Protocol, annexed to the Maastricht Treaty, mentions neither the harmonisation, nor the approximation; it rather

⁴³ Charter of Basic Social Rights for Workers (COM(89) 568, 29th of November 1989, in Linda Hantrais, *Social Policy in the European Union*, 2nd edition, UK: MacMillan Press Ltd., 2000, p. 10, p. 20.

⁴⁴ Stephen R. Thomas, "What are social movements today?", in *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society*, vol 9, no. 4, 1996, p. 580.

⁴⁵ Linda Hantrais, *Social Policy in the European Union*, 2nd edition, UK, MacMillan Press Ltd., 2000, p. 10, p. 20.

reaffirms the intention to respect national distinctiveness, recommending that these terms should not avert the Member States from maintaining or introducing their more extended own measures (article 2, 6). The role of the Commission is limited to encouraging the cooperation between Member States and facilitating the coordination of their undertakings in all the domains of social policy presented in the Protocol (article 5). Hereby, the endeavour of Delors is carried on: social dialogue and counselling. National distinctiveness plays a key role, laying emphasis once more on the need to approach the cultural dimension in the EU.

The Single European Market – SEM – was launched on 1 January 1993. The tension rose between national governments and the Community on social policies; certain social policies of the Community were not encountered on a national level. Furthermore, discussions started on the possibility of indenting national sovereignty.⁴⁶ A similar discussion will take place in the cultural domain regarding national identity versus European identity.

Thus result the *European Consolidated versions of the EU Treaty* and the *EC Treaty*, which includes the amendments made by the Treaty of Amsterdam, enfolding the social dimension – a key component of the European Integration process. Article 13 (new) encourages action in the refusal of discrimination based on sex, race, ethnicity, religion or religious belief, disabilities, age or social orientation.⁴⁷ Furthermore, emphasis is laid on the role of vocational formation and retraining as means of supporting the work force to adapt to the industrial and technological changes.⁴⁸

Strong bonds can be observed with the occupation of the work force, but also a continuation of the process of identifying issues which will eventually be taken over by other domains (in the case of retraining and

⁴⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 9.

⁴⁷ EU Treaties - http://europa.eu/eu-law/decision-making/treaties/index_en.htm, December 2015.

⁴⁸ The Council and the Commission produce reports regarding the employment situation. The Council is empowered to form a consultative status with the Employment Committee to monitor the employment situation and issue opinions in consultation with management and workers' representatives (see Linda Hantrais, *Social Policy in the European Union*, 2nd edition, UK: MacMillan Press Ltd., 2000, p. 17).

vocational formation – these will fall under the umbrella of *life long learning*, an educational strategy adopted by the Member States).⁴⁹

The consolidated EC Treaty includes a section linked to culture. The signatories of this treaty express their intention to encourage the thriving of the Member States' cultures, concurrently observing the regional and national cultural diversity and, in the meantime, bringing forth the common cultural heritage.⁵⁰

The signing and the ratification of the Treaty of Amsterdam lead to a formal appreciation of the core importance of occupation as a European level issue.⁵¹ Article 1 of this Social Policy Protocol amended article 117 of the Treaty of Rome, excluding the references to the harmonisation of social systems through the alleged confidence in the automatic improvement of social policies with the functioning of the common market. These have been replaced with specific objectives and emphasis was laid on the importance of taking into consideration the various national practices.⁵²

Nonetheless, there are no appointed institutions to create a common social policy. The fear to not infringe on national sovereignty is increasing.⁵³

The role of the Community continues to be a complementary supportive one, although France has made efforts to convince the other government leaders to assign an interventionist role to the Community.⁵⁴ In 1970, Shanks writes about the role of the Commission in the social field: as a "catalyst", an educator and factor of influence, coordinator of research, "standard-setter".⁵⁵ Twenty years later, against the framework of social exclusion, another Social Affairs Commissioner, Pádraig Flynn, used similar terms to describe the role of the Commission as a compensation

⁴⁹ Jacques Delors wrote the report "Learning: the Treasure Within"; 1996 became the Year of Lifelong Learning – J. Delors, 1996, *Learning: The treasure within*, Report to UNESCO of the International Commission on Education for the Twenty-first Century, UNESCO – <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0010/001095/109590eo.pdf>, June 2011.

⁵⁰ Title XII, article 151 – European Union Consolidated versions of the EU Treaty and the EC Treaty, with the changes of the Treaty of Amsterdam, in Linda Hantrais, *Social Policy in the European Union*, 2nd edition, UK: MacMillan Press Ltd., 2000, pp. 20, 226.

⁵¹ Linda Hantrais, *op. cit.*, p. ix.

⁵² *Ibidem*, p. 11.

⁵³ *Ibidem*, p. 13.

⁵⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 17.

⁵⁵ M. Shanks, *European Social Policy, Today and Tomorrow*, Oxford/ New York: Pergamon, 1977, p. 84.

office for information and "a catalyst for action".⁵⁶ Neill Nugent summarised the role of the Commission in six titles: initiator and developer of policies and legislation, executive functions, keeper of the legal framework, external representative and negotiator, mediator and conciliator and the conscience of the Union, its role being "both central and vital for the entire EU system".⁵⁷

At the end of the 80s, after 30 years of activity, the Community is no longer trying to convert the systems, but rather makes efforts to encourage the national policies to converge on a well-defined number of common objectives, without intervening in the systems which have created them from different traditions.⁵⁸ Following such debates, in 1992, the Commission removed from its agenda the harmonization of protection/social security systems and it emphasized the diversity of the Member States, the fact that they are deeply embedded in distinctive models, traditions and cultures.⁵⁹ The 1992 Council's recommendations regarding the objectives and policies of social protection acknowledged that harmonization was an unviable objective and was not endorsed by the Member States.⁶⁰ For the Consolidated EC Treaty of 1997, the Member States have confirmed once more that they were not prepared to surrender their national sovereignty in the social domain. *The Consolidated version of*

⁵⁶ "Preface" in "Towards a Europe of solidarity: combating social exclusion", *Social Europe Supplement*, 4/93, pp. 3-4, 1993, in Linda Hantrais, *Social Policy in the European Union*, 2nd edition, UK: MacMillan Press Ltd., 2000, p. 238.

⁵⁷ Neill Nugent, *The Government and Politics of the European Union*, USA: Duke University Press, 1994, p. 98, p. 122.

⁵⁸ The European Institute of Social Security, 1988, p. 9, in Linda Hantrais, *Social Policy in the European Union*, 2nd edition, UK: MacMillan Press Ltd., 2000, p. 26.

⁵⁹ O. Quintin, "The convergence of social protection objectives and policies: a contribution to solidarity in Europe", *Social Europe Supplement*, vol. 5, no. 92, 1992, pp. 9-12, in Linda Hantrais, *Social Policy in the European Union*, 2nd edition, UK: MacMillan Press Ltd., 2000, p. 25.

⁶⁰ The recommendation of the Council (on the 27th of July 1992) on the convergence of social protection objectives and policies, (92/442/EEC) (OJ L 245/49 26.8.92; Also, the "convergence" principle expressed in 1994 in *White Paper* (European social policies need to take into account and respect national differences) in Linda Hantrais, *Social Policy in the European Union*, 2nd edition, UK: MacMillan Press Ltd., 2000, p. 236 and Alfio Cerami, *Social Policy in Central and Eastern Europe. The Emergence of a New European Welfare Regime*, Berlin, Lit Verlag Dr. W. Hopf, 2006, p. 223.

the *EC Treaty* refers to convergence and economic performance (article 2), but does not expand over the social area.⁶¹

In the *EC Treaty*, The Council may make recommendations, but the Member States, on a national level operate the social policies following common objectives. The harmonisation of national legislation and orders is also excluded when referring to education, vocational training, youth (article 150 §4), culture (article 151 §5) and public health (article 152 §4c).⁶²

The emphasis is laid rather on the principle of subsidiarity and the supporting role of the Union. Sceptical views emerge: Laura Cram considers that the Commission is acting "purposeful opportunistic" in the social domain.⁶³

In the *European Commission, Social Action Programme 1998-2000* EMU creates the "necessary economic conditions to support the social progress"; it also includes matters on population ageing and its demographic implications, as well as the role of public policies in regard to the transition to the market economy of the countries joining the EU and the support in aligning their legislation on social issue in order to develop adequate social protection systems. Social policies ought to promote decent life standards and quality for all, in an active, inclusive and healthy society that encourages the access to occupation, agreeable working conditions and equal opportunities.⁶⁴ The European Court of Justice (ECJ) encourages national authority in social policies.

Social policies are the outcome of the time and space they were elaborated in. Social stratifications have repercussions on social policies. They were defined as the study of how, why and to what extent do different governments follow the various activity or inactivity paths.⁶⁵ The study of

⁶¹ Linda Hantrais, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

⁶² *Ibidem*.

⁶³ Laura Cram, *Policy-making in the European Union: conceptual lenses and the integration process*, London/New York: Routledge, 1997, p. 6.

⁶⁴ *European Commission, Social Action Programme 1998-2000*, OOEPEC, 1998 (COM(1998) 259, 29th of April 1998, p. 3, in Linda Hantrais, *Social Policy in the European Union*, 2nd edition, UK, MacMillan Press Ltd., 2000, p. 15.

⁶⁵ Arnold J. Heidenheimer, Hugh Hecló and Carolyn Teich Adams, *Comparative Public Policy: The Politics of Social Choice in America, Europe, and Japan* (3rd ed.), New York: St. Martins, 1990, p. 3, in Alfio Cerami, *Social Policy in Central and Eastern Europe. The Emergence of a New European Welfare Regime*, Berlin: Lit Verlag Dr. W. Hopf, 2006, p. 40.

various social policies implies making reference to a model. The difficulty in comparing social policies lays on the necessity to see beyond the national social system, cultural framework and personal opinions on what a society should be.⁶⁶ On the contrary, looking at these hardships related to the different cultural frameworks and definitions of society, one can distinguish the elements of uniqueness of each country, the cultural heritage and the manner of creating and implementing policies on a national level.

Each distinctive social protection system is a result of a lengthy process which reflects the idiosyncratic, socio-economic, political and cultural traditions, as well as the struggles of the administrative and financial structures.⁶⁷ Beyond the internal cultural implications which impose the organisation of the society, the external factors also have an influence. In the case of cultural policies, this is visible in what concerns globalisation and its effects on the internal factors.

Common values are perceived as a unifying force and these converge towards the European Social Model: democracy and individual rights, free collective negotiation, market economy, equal opportunities for all, social welfare and solidarity.⁶⁸ In Foucault's opinion, power is not something which can be taken into possession, but rather something which acts and manifests in a certain way, it is rather a strategy than a possession:

"Power must be analysed as something which circulates, or rather as something which only functions in the form of a chain... Power is employed and exercised through a net like organization. And not only do individuals circulate between its threads; they are always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and exercising this power. They are not only its inert or concentrating target; they are always the elements of its

⁶⁶ Alfio Cerami, *Social Policy in Central and Eastern Europe. The Emergence of a New European Welfare Regime*, Berlin: Lit Verlag Dr. W. Hopf, 2006, p. 40.

⁶⁷ Linda Hantrais, *Social Policy in the European Union*, 2nd edition, UK, MacMillan Press Ltd., 2000, p. 37.

⁶⁸ European Commission, A White Paper – European Social Policy. A Way Forward for the Union, OOEPC, 1994, (COM(94) 333, 27th of July 1994, p. 9, in Linda Hantrais, *Social Policy in the European Union*, 2nd edition, UK: MacMillan Press Ltd., 2000, p. 39.

articulation. In other words, individuals are the vehicles of power, not its point of application."⁶⁹

The post-communist countries entered the EU's gravity field at the meeting point of three main dimensions: the past dimension with long term repercussions on the democratization process, the EU with existing challenges and mutual influence transfer in the enlargement phenomenon, but also the larger dimension of globalisation with its economic and socio-cultural challenges. Some researchers consider that in this context it is essential to define the freedom in decision making on a national level.⁷⁰

Conclusions

Globalisation, Europeanisation and the issues related to postmodernism have faced the Western European welfare states with a series of difficulties and challenges, but the social policy systems adapted to these challenges in various manners and confronted them. There are no signs of collapse or convergence towards a given model. It seems that in the future these regimes shall maintain their "influence, dimension and distinctive elements"⁷¹.

The Open Method of Coordination (OMC)⁷² is a new approach to govern the European social policy and it was adopted at the end of the 1990s. It tries to offer a "substantial" solution to the dilemma of European social policy, where the EU plays a more powerful role in the coordination of the Member States' social policies while the Member States maintain their authority in the social policy. Applied in the case of some types of social policies, this governing pattern is also disposed in the cultural field.

⁶⁹ M. Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–1977*, London: Harvester Press, 1980, p. 98.

⁷⁰ Bob Deacon, Michelle Hulse and Paul Stubbs, *Global Social Policy. International Organizations and the Future of Welfare*, London: SAGE Publications, 1997, Ethan B. Kapstein and B. Milanovic, "Responding to globalization. Social policy in emerging market economies", *Global Social Policy*, 1 (2) , 2001, pp. 191-212, in Alfio Cerami, *Social Policy in Central and Eastern Europe. The Emergence of a New European Welfare Regime*, Berlin: Lit Verlag Dr. W. Hopf, 2006, p. 65.

⁷¹ Robert R. Geyer, *Exploring European Social Policy*, UK: Polity Press, 2000, p. 210.

⁷² M. Büchs, *New governance in European social policy: the open method of coordination*, Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p. 224, Palgrave Studies in European Politics - <http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/34136/>, retrieved in June 2011.

The final form of the Union shall be forged by years of disputes, negotiations and compromises of a great variety of actors. It can be expected that the social movements will be part of this ongoing process, gradually transforming the wider structures of the institutionalised power, at the same time being shaped by those emerging structures.⁷³

The European social policies are different from the national social policies; the Western social policies emerged from a variety of distinctive national factors. There are some challenges that play a key role in the formation of particular social policy regimes. They are related to: the development of civil, political and social rights related to citizenship, national unification strategies, the debates between capital and *labour*, the religious divisions, gender relations, the impact of war etc.⁷⁴

The nation state remains a "pivotal political entity in the integrated Europe"⁷⁵.

The social policies of today's Europe can be summarised as: 1. Obligations of international legislation to allow labour mobility across the borders, 2. Increasing interdependence with the players of other national systems, 3. Competition among the national systems for the mobile production factors.⁷⁶

If the European identity was defined depending on common values, the challenge we face nowadays is to include the dimension of cultural diversity as well, however maintaining the unity as a core value of the EU.

The relevance of the national dimension appeared more significantly in the social policies also as a result of the enlargement of the EU. This was the underlying element for the launch of the cultural dimension as an emerging domain of the EU.

⁷³ Gary Marks and Doug McAdam, "Social Movements and the Changing Structure of Political Opportunity in the European Union", in *Governance in the European Union*, Gary Marks, Fritz W. Scharpf, Philippe C. Schmitter and Wolfgang Streeck (eds.), London: Sage Publications, 1996, p. 120.

⁷⁴ Robert R. Geyer, *Exploring European Social Policy*, UK: Polity Press, 2000, p. 208.

⁷⁵ Wolfgang Streeck, "Neo-Voluntarism: A New European Social Policy Regime?", in *Governance in the European Union*, Gary Marks, Fritz W. Scharpf, Philippe C. Schmitter and Wolfgang Streeck (eds.), London: Sage Publications, 1996, pp. 66-67.

⁷⁶ Wolfgang Streeck, *op. cit.*, pp. 83-85.

At present, the incursion in the social field as a helping endeavour to support the economic challenges becomes the final aim of the economic objectives. It shall be seen if this shift of perspective is a desideratum or a reality. At the *European Forum on Social Policy* of 1996, the President of the European Commission, Jacques Santer declared: There can be no social progress without economic progress, but neither the reverse: the economic welfare cannot be built in a "social desert"⁷⁷.

However, the undertakings in the social domain were more political than legal.⁷⁸ A similar model was to be approached regarding the European cultural directives. Jacques Delors continued to encourage the platform for "social dialogue".⁷⁹ This desideratum perpetuates and is taken over by the directives on culture as the concept of cultural dialogue. The method of implementation was based on counselling, mediation through consultative boards and social dialogue. Stephen R. Thomas considers that social movements are provoked not only economically, socially, but also culturally and the *social question* is, in certain historical contexts, the development of a *cultural question*.⁸⁰

We have noticed the importance of social policies for the subsequent directives on culture. In the directives on culture the sectors of education, gender policies and mobility continue to be the coordinates that create unity on a European level. Based on the hitherto research, we consider that these are the only domains where common cultural policies can be made in the EU, the rest of the indicators being linked to the diversity and cultural uniqueness of the members states, and it is more difficult to develop common policies. The discussions related to the possibility of indenting national sovereignty in the process of social policy making⁸¹ are similar to those that will take place in the cultural domain regarding national identity

⁷⁷ Linda Hantrais, *Social Policy in the European Union*, 2nd edition, UK: MacMillan Press Ltd., 2000, p. 19.

⁷⁸ Linda Hantrais, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

⁷⁹ Jacques Delors, *Conference on the Future of European Social Policy*, 1994, in Robert R. Geyer, *Exploring European Social Policy*, UK: Polity Press, 2000, p. 203.

⁸⁰ Stephen R. Thomas, "What are social movements today?", in *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society*, vol. 9, nr. 4, 1996, p. 580.

⁸¹ Linda Hantrais, *Social Policy in the European Union*, 2nd edition, UK: MacMillan Press Ltd, 2000, p. 9.

versus European identity. There are two forces in Europe: a centrifugal one of the European Union which tends to repel the Member States from the decisional sphere of the EU and a centripetal one of the Member States, which tends to draw the member countries towards the center.⁸²

Some challenges that appeared in the process of social policy making shall be taken over by the cultural domain (it is the case of retraining and vocational formation – these shall fall under the incidence of the concept of *life long learning*, an educational strategy adopted by the Member States).⁸³

The socio-cultural diversity on the one hand, and the attempt to harmonise the national systems, on the other, are matters which have raised and continue to raise questions on a European level, both in what concerns the social and the cultural dimensions.

Bibliography:

Documents:

1. *Communication from The Commission to the European Parliament, The Council, The European economic and social Committee and The Committee of the Regions on a European agenda for culture in a globalizing world*, European Commission, 2007, online: <http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2007:0242:FIN:EN:PDF>, September 2010.
2. *Compendium. Cultural Policies and Trends in Europe*, online: <http://www.culturalpolicies.net/web/compendium.php>, September 2008.
3. *Compendium. Cultural Policies and Trends in Europe, Comparative overviews*, online: <http://www.culturalpolicies.net/web/comparisons.php>, October 2010.

⁸² Alfio Cerami, *Social Policy in Central and Eastern Europe. The Emergence of a New European Welfare Regime*, Berlin: Lit Verlag Dr. W. Hopf, 2006, p. 222.

⁸³ Jacques Delors wrote the report "Learning: the Treasure Within"; 1996 became the Year of Lifelong Learning – J. Delors, 1996, *Learning: The treasure within*, Report to UNESCO of the International Commission on Education for the Twenty-first Century, UNESCO – <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0010/001095/109590eo.pdf>, June 2011.

4. *Compendium. Cultural Policies and Trends in Europe, Cultural Statistics in Europe*, online: <http://www.culturalpolicies.net/web/statistics.php>, October 2010.
5. *Compendium. Cultural Policies and Trends in Europe, Monitoring Standards, Developments and Trends in Cultural Policy*, online: <http://www.culturalpolicies.net/web/monitoring.php>, November 2010.
6. *Compendium. Cultural Policies and Trends In Europe: a Compendium of Basic Facts and Trends*, online: <http://www.culturalpolicies.net/>, November 2008.
7. *Compendium. Cultural Policies and Trends in Europe. General objectives and principles of cultural policy*, 2010, online: <http://www.culturalpolicies.net/web/italy.php?aid=33>, October 2010.
8. *Compendium. Cultural Policies and Trends in Europe. Ireland*, 2009, online: <http://www.culturalpolicies.net/web/ireland.php>, November 2010.
9. *Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union*, online: <http://www.lexnet.dk/law/download/treaties/Eut-2007-revised.pdf>, October 2010.
10. *Cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue*, European Commission, 2010, online: http://ec.europa.eu/culture/our-policy-development/doc401_en.htm, November 2010.
11. *Culture and Education: Members, secțiunea 1*, European Parliament, online: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees/membersCom.do?language=EN&body=CULT>, October 2010.
12. *Declaration on European Identity*, Copenhagen, 14 December 1973, online: http://www.cvce.eu/obj/declaration_on_european_identity_copenhagen_14_december_1973-en-02798dc9-9c69-4b7d-b2c9-f03a8db7da32.html, Mai 2010.
13. *European Agenda for Culture*, 2010, the European Commission, online: http://ec.europa.eu/culture/our-policydevelopment/doc399_en.htm, October 2010.
14. *European Union Citizenship*, Flash Eurobarometer, The Gallup Organization, Hungary, 2008, online:

- http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_213_sum_en.pdf, December 2010.
15. *Open Method of Coordination*, Europa, online: http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/open_method_coordination_en.htm, November 2010.
 16. *Politica Socială [Social Politics]*, Seria Micromonografii - Politici Europene, online: http://www.ier.ro/documente/formare/Politica_sociala.pdf, March 2011.
 17. *The international dimension*, European Commission, 2010, online: http://ec.europa.eu/culture/our-policy-development/doc403_en.htm, November 2010.
 18. *The Arts, Cultural Inclusion and Social Cohesion, 2007, Compendium. Cultural Policies and Trends in Europe. Ireland*, online: <http://www.culturalpolicies.net/web/ireland.php?aid=428>, December 2010.
 19. *Tratatele Uniunii Europene*, online: <http://www.lexnet.dk/law/subjects/treaties.htm>, September 2008.
 20. *Tratatul de la Maastricht*, online: <http://www.eurotreaties.com/maastrichtec.pdf>, Mai 2010.

Specialized articles:

1. Archibald, Peter (2009), "Globalization, Downsizing and Insecurity: Do We Need to Upgrade Marx's Theory of Alienation", *Critical Sociology*, vol. 35, no. 3, online: <http://crs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/refs/35/3/319>, March 2010.
2. Baudrillard, Jean (2005), "Divine Europe", *Telos*, no. 131, New York: Telos Press.
3. Beckert, Jens (2010), "Diversion, Social Interaction and Solidarity", *Research Perspectives*, Munchen: Max Planck Society.
4. Beckert, Jens (2010), "Globalization and Knowledge", *Research Perspectives*, Munchen: Max Planck Society, Munchen.
5. Beckert, Jens (2010), "Legal Order in a Global World", *Research Perspectives*, Munchen: Max Planck Society.
6. Bína, Vladimír, IJdens, Teunis, *Social participation and cultural policy: a position paper*, online:

- http://www.boekman.nl/documenten/projecten_OCW08_position%20paper.pdf, May 2011.
7. Bryner, Gary B. (2003), "Public Organizations and Public Policies", Peters, B. Guy and Pierre, Jon (eds.) *Handbook of Public Administration*, London: Sage Publications, online: http://books.google.com/books?id=KAsW3bjHK2IC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false, January 2011.
 8. Delanty, G. (2003), *Is There a European Identity?*, Centre for World Dialogue, online: <http://www.worlddialogue.org/content.php?id=269>, December 2010.
 9. Jayasuriya, K. (2001), "Globalization and the Changing Architecture of the State: the Regulatory State and the Politics of Negative Coordination", *Journal of European Public Policy*, vol. 8, no. 1.
 10. Kitsuse, John I., Spector, Malcolm (1973), "The Labeling of Social Problems", *Social Problems*, vol. 20, no. 4.
 11. Mair, Peter (2007), "Political Parties and Party Systems," CESES, online: http://ceses.cuni.cz/CESES-93-version1-6_1_2.pdf, September 2010.
 12. Meyer, John W. (1980), "The World Polity and the Authority of the Nation-State", *Studies of the Modern World-System*, Bergesen, A. (ed.), New York: Academic Press, online: <http://www.sociology.emory.edu/globalization/theories02.html>, August 2011.
 13. Meyer, John W., Boli, John, Thomas, George M., Ramirez, Francisco O. (1997), "World Society and the Nation-State", *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 103, no. 1, online: <http://www.sociology.emory.edu/globalization/theories02.html>, June-July 2011.
 14. Thomas, Stephen R. (1996), "What are social movements today?", in *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society*, vol. 9, no. 4, online: <http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2FBF02904370.pdf#page-1>, April 2013.
 15. Trubek, David M. și Trubek, Louise G. (eds.) (2005), "Hard and Soft Law in the Construction of Social Europe: the Role of the Open Method of Co-ordination", *European Law Journal*, vol. 11, no. 3, online: <http://www.law.wisc.edu/ils/wisgar/hardandsoftlaw.pdf> - June 2011.

Books:

1. Bălan, Sergiu, *Concepția lui M. Foucault asupra relațiilor de putere*, course online:
[//cogito.ucdc.ro/sitev/nr_2v2/CONCEPTIA%20LUI%20Mroen.pdf](http://cogito.ucdc.ro/sitev/nr_2v2/CONCEPTIA%20LUI%20Mroen.pdf),
November 2008.
2. Büchs, M. (2007), *New Governance in European Social Policy: the Open Method of Coordination*, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills, online: <http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/34136/>, June 2011.
3. Cerami, Alfio (2006), *Social Policy in Central and Eastern Europe. The Emergence of a New European Welfare Regime*, Berlin: Lit Verlag Dr. W. Hopf.
4. Cram, Laura (1997), *Policy-making in the European Union: conceptual lenses and the integration process*, London/New York: v Routledge, online: http://books.google.ro/books?id=uhshN_1SBOoC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false, March 2013.
5. Featherstone, Kevin, Radaelli, C. M. (eds.) (2003), *The Politics of Europeanization*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
6. Foucault, Michel (1998), *Ordinea Discursului*, București: Eurosong and Book, online: <http://www.scribd.com/doc/14153337/Michel-Foucault-Ordinea-Discursului>, June 2011.
7. Foucault, Michel (1980), *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–1977*, London: Harvester Press.
8. Geyer, Robert, R. (2000), *Exploring European Social Policy*, UK: Polity Press.
9. Hantrais, Linda (2000), *Social Policy in the European Union*, 2nd edition, UK: MacMillan Press.
10. Hayward, Jack, Page, Edward, C.,(eds.) (1995), *Governing the New Europe*, Cambridge UK: Polity Press.
11. Levine, Donald, Simmel, Georg, Morris, Janowitz (eds.) (1972), *Georg Simmel: On individuality and social forms*, Chicago: Chicago University Press,
online:
http://books.google.ro/books?id=mfs2YgEACAAJ&dq=Levine,+Donald,+%27Simmel:+On+individuality+and+social+forms%27&hl=en&ei=mAviTvFHYGpsgbFuSNBA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&redir_esc=y,
December 2009.

12. Marga, Andrei (2004), *Cotitura culturală. Consecințele filosofice ale tranziției*, Cluj: University Press.
13. Marks, Gary, Scharpf, W. Fritz, Schmitter, C, Philippe, Streeck Wolfgang (eds) (1996), *Governance in the European Union*, London: Sage Publications.
14. Neill Nugent (1994), *The Government and Politics of the European Union*, USA: Duke University Press.
15. Ovey, Joey-David (2002), *Between Nation and Europe, Labour, the SPD and the European Parliament 1994-1999*, Opladen: Leske-Budrich.
16. Ramesh, Mishra (1977), *Society and Social Policy: theoretical perspectives on welfare*, London/ Basingstoke: Macmillan.
17. Shanks, M. (1977), *European Social Policy, Today and Tomorrow*, Oxford/ New York: Pergamon.
18. Vandamme, J. (ed.) (1985), *New Dimensions in European Social Policy*, London: Croom Helm.
19. Weber, Max (1947), *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, Glencoe: The Free Press and the Falcon's Bring Press, online: <http://taodesigns.tripod.com/weber/weber47.html>, November 2009.

LES DYNAMIQUES DES CYCLES DE PROTESTATIONS. LE CAS DE LA ROUMANIE*

THE DYNAMICS OF PROTEST CYCLES. THE CASE OF ROMANIA

Raluca Abăseacă**

Résumé:

Cet article analyse l'impact des changements socio-économiques sur la dynamique de la participation politique, en mettant en exergue les continuités et les ruptures entre les mouvements altermondialistes et les «mouvements de la crise économique.» A partir d'une perspective plus large, notre analyse se concentre sur les processus de diffusion, de cadrage global, d'internalisation des mouvements globaux dans le cas de la participation politique de la Roumanie post-communiste.

Mots-clés: protestations, altermondialisme, crise économique, diffusion, transnational

Abstract:

This article analyzes the impact of socio-economic changes on the dynamic of political participation, by taking into account the continuities and the breaks between the anti-globalization movements and the "movements of the economic crisis." From a broader perspective, our main purpose is to focus on the processes of diffusion, global framing, internalization of global movements in the case of political participation in post-communist Romania.

Keywords: protests, anti-globalization, economic crisis, diffusion, transnational

* Cette recherche a été soutenue financièrement par le Programme Opérationnel Sectoriel pour le Développement des Ressources Humaines 2007-2013, ainsi que par le Fond Social Européen dans le cadre du projet POSDRU/159/1.5/S/132400 ayant le titre "Jeunes chercheurs de success – développement professionnel dans un contexte interdisciplinaire et international".

** Raluca Abăseacă is a Joint PhD Candidate in Political Science at Babes-Bolyai University and at Free University of Brussels, Belgium
Contact: Raluca.Abaseaca@ulb.ac.be.

Introduction

Après vingt-cinq ans depuis l'effondrement des régimes communiste, la Roumanie, comme tous les pays de l'Europe centrale et orientale, semble avoir passée par des transformations socio-économiques importantes, est membre des institutions internationales et s'est adaptée aux règles de l'économie globale. En liaison avec ce nouveau contexte créé par les changements socio-économiques, les formes de participation politique ont, elles aussi, beaucoup changées. Pendant l'hiver de 2012 et pendant l'automne de 2013, la Roumanie postcommuniste s'est confrontée à deux vagues de protestations politiques. Comme dans le cas d'autres pays de l'Europe centrale et orientale, celles-ci ont émergé spontanément et ont été à grande échelle, surtout pour un pays plutôt passif, qui, par rapport à la Pologne, à la Hongrie ou la République Tchèque, ne pouvait pas compter sur la tradition et l'héritage d'une résistance organisée pendant le régime communiste, ni sur l'héritage des nouveaux mouvements sociaux, ou sur des syndicats forts qui pourraient soutenir les actions des activistes.

Vu les demandes des manifestants de 2012 et de 2013, qui touchent la question de la justice sociale, économique et écologique et l'usage par les protestataires roumains de divers répertoires d'actions empruntés à l'étranger, la première impulsion serait de considérer les manifestations de 2012 et 2013 comme une réponse directe à la crise économique et financière et aux mesures d'austérité adoptées par les élites locales, appuyées par les institutions globales. Néanmoins, même si la crise économique avait créé plus d'opportunités politiques pour l'émergence et le regroupement des réseaux militants, cette mobilisation ne s'est pas produite dans le vide et les adhérents ne viennent pas de nulle part et ne sont pas de profanes.¹ Ainsi, le rôle des réseaux et des pratiques préexistants, les contacts transnationaux ne doivent pas être négligés, même dans le cas des mobilisations qui sont vues comme spontanées.

Après une courte mise en revue du cadre méthodologique et théorique, une première partie de notre article va interroger les changements et les dynamiques des structures militantes des mouvements altermondialistes jusqu'aux « mouvements de la crise économique ».

Prenant en compte une perspective à long terme qui pourra

¹ Daniel Gaxie, « Les logiques du recrutement politique », *Revue française de science politique*, vol.20, no. 1, 1980, pp. 5-45.

mettre en avant les dynamiques des formes de participation dans le temps (la période d'entre 2000 et 2013), la deuxième partie de cet article se penche sur la question de la diffusion et de la localisation des actions contestataires dans la Roumanie postcommuniste. En dépit de l'accent mis sur le cas de la Roumanie, notre article a pour but de mettre en avant des questions plus générales, comme celle de la reconfiguration des structures militantes dans des périodes de changements socio-économiques.

Méthodologie

Notre démarche est basée sur l'analyse des événements protestataires (*protest event analysis*). Tout premièrement, nous définissons un événement protestataire comme une assemblée dans l'espace public d'au moins trois personnes qui ont des revendications ciblées envers une institution ou envers un acteur collectif². Vu le fait que nous privilégions une perspective à long terme, qui pourra mettre en avant la transformation des formes de participation, la consultation des archives électroniques des principaux journaux locaux et nationaux roumains pour la période d'entre 2000 et 2013, approche qui peut compléter l'enquête de terrain que nous avons menée parmi les activistes roumains en 2012 et en 2013, nous semble un point de départ nécessaire. Nous devons garder à l'esprit que cette approche implique plusieurs problèmes méthodologiques. Surtout, la politisation ou « l'idéologisation » de plusieurs publications font que certains événements soient représentés comme étant plus radicaux ou violents qu'ils l'ont vraiment été ou inversement, que certains actions soient ignorées ou prises en compte seulement d'une manière superficielle.

Plusieurs variables ont été retenus pour chaque événement : la date, le lieu, la durée, les participants, les causes et les revendications des participants, la cible des revendications des participants, les répertoires d'actions et les réactions des autorités. Afin de mettre l'accent sur le processus d'internalisation, de diffusion et d'externalisation, nous faisons référence au cadrage local, national ou global des revendications, aux cibles des mobilisations et aux imaginaires des protestataires, aux choix entre les autorités locales, nationales et globales qui sont tenues pour responsables par les protestataires pour un certain problème.

² Charles Tilly, *Popular Contention in Great Britain 1758-1834*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995, p. 36.

Cadre théorique

En nous intéressant à la question de la transnationalisation de l'activisme et de la diffusion des idées et des pratiques militantes d'un pays à l'autre, nous devons commencer par esquisser le cadre théorique de notre démarche et par un court état de l'art sur la littérature visant l'action collective transnationale.

Premièrement, la littérature remarque l'importance accrue des alliances et des réseaux transnationaux à partir de la fin des années 1990, qui sont relativement indépendants des institutions et des organisations formelles et attachés à la démocratie directe, à des tactiques créatives de protestations et aux expériences personnelles des militants³. Cela reste une particularité des mouvements post-1990, en liaison avec le processus de mondialisation. Avant cela, les mobilisations collectives en réaction au développement économique du XIX qui avaient réuni des réseaux anarchistes, communistes et socialistes et qui se revendiquaient des luttes internationales, voyaient l'Etat national comme la cible centrale et ceci en dépit du niveau de coordination au niveau supranational des militants engagés dans les réseaux. Le rôle stratégique de l'Etat-nation pour les groupes contestataires se revendiquant de l'internationalisme va changer à partir de 1968 et va s'intensifier pendant des mobilisations altermondialistes dès la fin des années 1990. Dans le cas des dernières, la cible des protestations contre les institutions internationales et pour la distribution économique va dépasser le cadre de l'Etat-nation⁴, même si la coordination va rester au niveau local et au niveau national⁵. Dans le même temps, les vagues de protestations qui émergent à la fin des années 1990 sont intimement liées à l'accroissement de l'importance des moyens de communication de masse et aux liaisons directes et indirectes créées grâce aux réseaux sociaux, ainsi qu'aux opportunités politiques ouvertes par les

³ Jeffrey S Juris, Alexander Khasnabish (eds), *Insurgent Encounters, Transnational Activism, Ethnography, and the Political*, London: Duke University Press, 2013, p. 12.

⁴ Donatella Della Porta, Sidney Tarrow, *Transnational Protest and Global Activism*, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004, p. 7.

⁵ Paul Routhledge, „Resisting and Reshaping the Modern: Social Movements and the Development Process” pp. 263 -279, in R.J. Johnson, P.J. Taylor, M.J. Watts (eds.), *Geographies of global change: remapping the world in the late twentieth century*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996.

institutions internationales⁶. Ainsi, le succès de la mobilisation de Seattle de 1999, qui devient un symbole des mouvements pour la justice globale⁷, est favorisé par la visibilité médiatique.

En outre, selon Della Porta et Tarrow, l'activisme transnational a été favorisé par plusieurs facteurs, tant externes, qu'internes aux mouvements.

Un facteur extérieur aux mouvements contestataires vise les changements dans la politique internationale d'après l'effondrement des régimes communistes de l'Europe centrale et orientale, qui ouvrent la région à de nouveaux acteurs collectifs non étatiques, tant faisant partie de la société civile, que de l'économie. Ce processus est accompagné de l'importance accrue des réseaux de communication, de la flexibilisation des emplois spécifique aux sociétés post-industrielles et de la réduction du prix des transportations. Un autre facteur, plutôt interne, consiste dans la reconnaissance par les activistes de l'importance du niveau supranational dans l'acquisition de certains objectifs ou dans l'imposition d'une forme de pression sur les élites politiques locales. Cette autoréflexivité des activistes, basée sur la réalisation de plusieurs objectifs et conquêtes, change la construction des cadres (« frames ») et l'imaginaire des activistes. Le troisième facteur vise les activités liées à la création des alliances au niveau supranational et à la constitution des identités afférentes, en relation avec ce processus⁸.

Dans le même temps, selon les mêmes auteurs, ils existent trois ensembles de processus liés la constitution d'un activisme transnational. Le premier concerne des références faites par les activistes aux symboles internationaux et globaux pour les conflits internes, en réponse à la pression supranationale et étrangère (« global framing » et « internalization »). Un autre ensemble se concentre sur les liaisons entre la contestation globale et celle interne, soit par le transfert des revendications d'un espace envers l'autre, soit par la coordination de la contestation à un niveau différent de celui auquel elle a été lancée (« diffusion » et

⁶ Jackie Smith, *Social Movements for Global Democracy*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008, pp. 94-95.

⁷ Jeffrey Juris, *Networking Futures: The Movements Against Corporate Globalization*, Durham: Duke University Press, 2008, p. 33.

⁸ Donatella Della Porta, Sidney Tarrow, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-10.

« changement d'échelle »)⁹. Dans le même temps, selon Tarrow, les institutions internationales créent les opportunités politiques pour la diffusion des revendications des acteurs contestataires. Vu le fait que le processus de diffusion résulte de l'interaction des activistes avec les institutions et les pratiques que ceux-ci contestent, les opinions des activistes reflètent indirectement la position et le statut de ces institutions mêmes.¹⁰ Le troisième ensemble de processus est situé complètement à l'échelle internationale et vise la projection des revendications internes envers les acteurs et les institutions internationales (« externalisation » et création d'alliances entre les acteurs des divers pays)¹¹.

De ce courte mise en revue, on peut remarquer que les distinctions tranchantes entre le niveau local, celui national et celui global sont simplificateurs et ignorent les interactions entre les trois niveaux. S'ils existent des problèmes érigés par les mouvements sociaux qui restent locaux ou nationaux, ils peuvent être encadrés (« framed ») dans des termes globaux, en fonction de l'imaginaire des activistes et des contacts directs ou indirects entre des activistes de plusieurs pays. Dans le même temps, les mouvements sociaux peuvent mettre en exergue des problèmes globaux ou transnationaux, mais employer des symboles nationaux ou locaux afin de les faire compréhensibles au niveau local ou rélevants pour la politique nationale.

Entre l'altermondialisme et les mouvements de la crise. Quelles continuités?

Plusieurs chercheurs ont mis en avant le caractère transnational des critiques de la globalisation néolibérale faites par les mouvements altermondialistes. Pour certaines voix, les similitudes entre les mouvements altermondialistes de divers pays démontrent que les changements économiques des dernières décennies et plus précisément la mondialisation néolibérale créent le cadre des mobilisations. Au centre de la mondialisation néolibérale, expression employée même par les activistes

⁹ *Ibidem*.

¹⁰ Sidney Tarrow, "Dynamics of Diffusion. Mechanisms, Institutions, and Scale Shift." pp. 204-219 in R.K. Givan, K.M. Roberts, and S. Soule (eds.), *The Diffusion of Social Movements. Actors, Mechanisms and Political Effects*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 33.

¹¹ Donatella Della Porta, Sidney Tarrow, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-10.

altermondialistes de l'Ouest pour justifier leurs actions et leurs positionnements, se trouve la notion de libéralisme économique qui considère l'Etat comme un vecteur de contraintes et d'entraves à la compétition mondiale, de sorte que l'initiative privée et la concurrence sont les principaux moteurs de la prospérité. Dans ce paradigme, l'accent mis sur la croissance économique par les élites politiques et financières est accompagné de la régression des protections sociales¹².

En addition à cet image plutôt générale sur les conditions économiques de l'émergence des mouvements altermondialistes, plusieurs analystes ont mis l'accent sur l'importance du niveau local ou national¹³, car en dépit de l'apparence de l'unité des mouvements altermondialistes, l'échelle des réponses contestataires aux symboles de la globalisation économique varient et se localisant¹⁴. Dans les pays de l'Europe de l'Ouest, la construction des coalitions, des solidarités et des identités transnationales n'a pas été un résultat automatique des transformations socio-économiques des dernières décennies. Donc, même si les transformations liées à l'économie globale ont une influence sur les représentations, les revendications et les identités des acteurs sociaux, il faut mettre en avant les particularités du contexte local, car « la lutte contre la globalisation ne procède pas de la confluence des mêmes ruisseaux d'un pays à un autre, ni n'a suivi partout les mêmes méandres »¹⁵. Donc, plutôt que de penser que les transformations socio-économiques entraînent des mouvements transnationaux, il faut se centrer sur les traditions militantes de chaque pays, car tant dans le contexte du début des années 2000, que dans le contexte de la crise économique de 2008, c'est prioritairement la dynamique des espaces nationaux qui avait conduit les groupes contestataire à chercher dans l'action internationale un cadre pour leurs

¹² *Ibidem*.

¹³ Gwyn Williams, *Struggles for an Alternative Globalization. An Ethnography of Counterpower in Southern France*, London: Ashgate, 2008, p. 19.

¹⁴ Javier Auyero, "Relational Riot. Austerity and Corruption Protest in the Neoliberal Era", *Social Movement Studies* (2), pp. 117-46.

¹⁵ Isabelle Sommier, Olivier Fillieule et Éric Agrikolianski, « Les altermondialistes entre national et global » en Isabelle Sommier, Olivier Fillieule et Éric Agrikolianski (coord.), *Généalogie des mouvements altermondialistes en Europe. Une perspective comparée*, Paris: Karthala, coll. Science politique comparative, 2008, pp. 12-20.

actions¹⁶. Dans le même temps, ce sont les contextes nationaux qui contraignent la possibilité de l'articulation des actions transnationales¹⁷.

Si le contexte national a une grande influence sur les idées, les pratiques et le développement des mouvements altermondialistes de divers pays, cela va se répéter dans le cas des mobilisations survenues dans le contexte de la crise économique de 2008. En fonction de la tradition de la résistance de chaque pays, les mobilisations contre l'austérité ont été centrées autour des syndicats et de la question des droits des ouvriers ou autour de nouveaux mouvements sociaux.

En dépit des différences entre les diverses protestations qui apparaissent dans le contexte de la crise économique, celles-ci sont liées par plusieurs traits communs. Pour faire une synthèse, la mobilisation des protestataires autonomes par rapport aux acteurs politiques, y compris des groupes et des réseaux d'activistes impliqués dans les cycles de mobilisations précédentes, l'importance des réseaux sociaux comme *Facebook* ou *Twitter* dans la mobilisation et l'utilisation des tactiques performatives, comme l'occupation physique des espaces publics représentent des similitudes évidentes « des mouvements de la crise » qui débutent avec les révoltes d'Islande de 2008¹⁸. Dans le même temps, contrairement aux sommets alterglobalistes, la dimension nationale des dernières protestations est très importante, ces mouvements (de *Occupy Wall Street* et jusqu'au mouvement des indignés) adressant des demandes plutôt aux autorités locales et nationales qu'à celles transnationales. Donc, les derniers mouvements manquent la dimension transnationale des mobilisations altermondialistes, qui ont été l'occasion pour la coopération de plusieurs acteurs sociaux très différents, comme les écologistes et les syndicats et ont dirigé leurs critiques envers les organisations financières internationales et dans le même temps, ils manquent l'internationalisme de

¹⁶ Eric Agrikolianski, Isabelle Sommier, *Radiographie du mouvement altermondialiste, le second Forum social européen*, Paris: La Dispute, 2005, p. 39.

¹⁷ Charles Tilly, *Social Movements, 1768-2004*, Boulder: Paradigm Press, 2004, pp. 25-29.

¹⁸ Donatella Della Porta, Alice Mattoni, "Patterns of Diffusion and the Transnational Dimension of Protest in the Movements of the Crisis: An Introduction" in Donatella Della Porta, Alice Mattoni (eds.) *Social Movements in Times of Crisis*, London: ECPR Press, 2014, p. 4.

l'ancienne gauche¹⁹. Comme Brancati le prouve, l'évolution des récentes manifestations révèle le fait que les frustrations sociales concernant les mauvaises performances économiques sont dissimulés dans des protestations prodémocratiques, vu que la perception collective superpose l'activité économique et la nature du régime politique.²⁰ Dans le même temps, pour plusieurs auteurs, il devient évident que la crise financière est liée à celle politique, vu le fait que les mesures néolibérales entraînent une vision minimaliste sur la démocratie et les citoyens²¹, en raison des réductions des interventions publiques qui puissent balancer le marché et de sa vision élitiste sur la participation citoyenne et sur la favorisation des lobbies et des intérêts financiers²².

Le cas de la Roumanie. Entre global et particularités locales

En dépit de l'importance de l'action collective dans la chute du régime communiste et du fait que les transitions vers la démocratie ont souvent été accompagnées de protestations²³, la littérature sur l'espace postcommuniste a largement ignorée les actions contestataires et les critiques de la direction prise par la transition. Cela s'explique par le fait que, d'une part, les études sur la transition dans l'espace postcommuniste se sont centrées surtout sur le rôle joué par les élites politiques dans la démocratisation²⁴, ou sur les institutions, la création des partis étant vue souvent comme l'élément le plus important de stabilisation. En s'attachant aux conséquences du changement de système et assez peu aux logiques d'action des acteurs, les études relevant de la transition démocratique ont souvent présenté les individus comme subissant la fin du système de type soviétique sans

¹⁹ Jiří Navrátil, Ondřej Cisar, Towards a "Non-Global Justice Movement"? Two paths to re-scaling the left contention in the Czech Republic, in (eds.) D. Della Porta, A. Marttoni, *The Transnational Dimension of Protest: From the Arab Spring to Occupy Wall Street*, London: ECPR Press, 2013, p. 26.

²⁰ Dawn Brancati, "Pocketbook Protests: Explaining the Emergence of Pro-Democracy Protests Worldwide", *Comparative Political Studies* 47 (11), 2014, pp. 1503-1530.

²¹ Colin Crouch, *Post-Democracy*, Cambridge: Polity, 2008, pp. 1-43.

²² Wolfgang Streeck, *Du temps acheté. La crise sans cesse ajournée du capitalisme démocratique*, Paris: Gallimard, coll. « NRF Essais », 2014, p. 49.

²³ Charles Tilly, *Sidney Tarrow, Contentious politics*, Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2006, pp. 2-11.

²⁴ John Highely, Robert Gunther, *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

pouvoir agir sur le nouveau. Si des études portant sur la question de l'action collective contestataire dans l'espace postcommuniste existent, elles se concentrent presque exclusivement sur l'extrême droite, en raison de la résurgence du nationalisme après la fin du communisme²⁵.

La critique du néolibéralisme qui a été centrale pour les mouvements altermondialistes de l'Europe de l'Ouest dès les années 1990 a été très marginale dans l'Europe postcommuniste pendant la première décennie de la transition. Pour expliquer cette marginalisation, tout d'abord il faut prendre en compte les caractéristiques de la société civile de l'Europe centrale et orientale d'après la chute du mur de Berlin, qui, en vue d'un essai de rompre avec le passé communiste et en vue de l'influence des dissidents anticommunistes, est dominée d'une tradition libérale. La littérature remarque que, si dans les années 1970 et 1980, le terme de « société civile » dénotait plutôt des mouvements constitués en dehors du pouvoir politique et contre l'Etat communiste, la société civile de l'Europe centrale et orientale apparaît dans les années 2000 comme un ensemble de structures associatives partenaires des structures de gouvernance, en relation avec les institutions internationales²⁶.

Deuxièmement, la littérature remarque que la fin du système communiste a été perçue surtout comme une forme de chute économique²⁷ et qu'elle a été largement soutenue par les masses et « le devoir moral » des élites politiques de construire des institutions capitalistes, considérées comme l'ordre naturel²⁸ dans un contexte international très favorable à la transition envers l'économie de marché²⁹. En fait, dans cette région, les problèmes économiques, sociaux et environnementaux de l'Europe Centrale et Orientale ont été associés au manque de capitalisme et à

²⁵ Katherine Verdery, *What was socialism, and what comes next?*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996, pp. 68-80.

²⁶ Dominique Colas, « La « société civile: un spectre qui hante l'Europe communiste et postcommuniste » in Stéphane Courtois (ed.), *Sortir du communisme, changer d'époque : après la chute du Mur*, Paris : Presse Universitaire de France, 2011, p. 67.

²⁷ Petr Kopeski, *Cas Mudde, Uncivil Society? Contentious Politics in Post-communist Europe*, London: Routledge, 2003, p. 28.

²⁸ Gil Eyal, "Anti-Politics and the Spirit of Capitalism: Dissidents, Monetarists and the Czech Transition to Capitalism." *Theory and Society* (29), pp. 49-92.

²⁹ David Pollack, Jan Wielgoths, *Dissent and opposition in communist Eastern Europe: Origins of civil society and democratic transition*, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2004, pp. 1-45.

l'application déficitaire de celui-ci, en relation avec l'infrastructure de l'ancien régime communiste³⁰. Donc, les discours critiques envers la globalisation néolibérale qui avaient animé les mouvements altermondialistes de l'Europe de l'Ouest sont marginaux et attardés dans l'Europe centrale et orientale.

Le cas de la Roumanie comporte des similitudes et des différences par rapport aux autres pays de la région. En outre, une particularité de la Roumanie consiste dans le fait que, si la synthèse entre le libéralisme politique et celui économique avait été une contextualisation du projet néolibéral dans tous les pays postcommunistes, la traduction du néolibéralisme en Roumanie a été moins étatique et redistributive que dans l'Europe de l'Ouest et même dans les autres pays de l'Europe centrale et orientale³¹. Tout en adaptant le néolibéralisme aux conditions locales, les élites locales roumaines sont allées au-delà de la simple reproduction de ses caractéristiques, menant à une radicalisation de celui-ci³². Dans ce contexte, les réseaux et les protestations qui pourraient être considérés comme une localisation des mouvements altermondialistes de l'Europe de l'Ouest ont été plutôt marginaux dans la Roumanie postcommuniste.

En dépit de la marginalisation, les mouvements altermondialistes de l'Europe de l'Ouest ont eu un impact sur la Roumanie postcommuniste.

Un des premiers aspects sur lesquels nous devons nous pencher dans l'analyse de la transnationalisation de l'activisme de la Roumanie postcommuniste vise la question de la diffusion des pratiques militantes et des idées de l'étranger, vu le fait que l'importation des pratiques spécifiques à d'autres espaces, «la diffusion médiée»³³ a été très importante pour la constitution des groupes contestataires dans toute l'Europe centrale et orientale. La critique de la mondialisation économique, la référence à la société civile mondiale et l'accent mis sur les réseaux

³⁰ Gáspár Miklós Tamas, "A Capitalism Pure and Simple", *Left Curve*, no. 32, 2006.

³¹ Cornel Ban, *Dependentă și dezvoltare: economia politică a capitalismului românesc*, Cluj-Napoca: Editura Tact, 2014, pp. 1-21.

³² David Phinnemore, "Romania and Euro-Atlantic Integration since 1989: A Decade of Frustration?", in Duncan Light and David Phinnemore (eds), *Post-Communist Romania – Coming to Terms with Transition*, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001, pp. 245-269.

³³ Marco Giugni, "Explaining Cross-National Similarities Among Social Movements" in: Smith, Jackie and Johnston, Hank (eds.), *Globalization and Resistance: Transnational Dimensions of Social Movements*, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2002.

horizontaux et participatifs ont été les caractéristiques de quelques petits groupes contestataires formés au début des années 2000. La première vague de mobilisation altermondialiste touche la Roumanie postcommuniste en 2002. Celle-ci est liée aux programmes du Forum Social Européen, intéressé à l'élargissement de l'Union Européenne vers l'Europe postcommuniste. Dans ce contexte, des participants potentiels étaient recherchés. Les premiers à rejoindre la structure du Forum Social Européen ont été des syndicalistes et des ex-communistes, avec une socialisation politique datant de l'ancien régime communiste. Ces premiers groupes internalisent plusieurs particularités des mouvements altermondialistes de l'Europe de l'Ouest, même si dans le même temps ils ignorent la dimension antihiérarchique des mouvements occidentaux³⁴. Ce petit groupe organise des forums locaux et une branche locale de la plate-forme altermondialiste ATTAC, assez visible et influente dans plusieurs pays de l'Europe de l'Ouest comme l'Allemagne, la France ou la Belgique. La deuxième vague de mobilisation altermondialiste, qui, à part quelques campagnes spécifiques, se distance des ONG libéraux, s'organise autour de groupes punkistes et de réseaux d'artistes et d'intellectuels, en liaison avec les mouvements de l'Europe occidentale et qui s'articulent autour de l'Indymedia Romania, plate-forme lancée en 2003³⁵.

La consultation de l'archive de la plate-forme met en avant les références faites par les activistes engagés dans *Indymedia Romania* aux mouvements de squatters occidentaux, à des manifestations et des événements de l'étranger - Common ground meeting³⁶ de 2004 de Bulgarie, à l'appui des fermiers locaux qui luttent contre la mondialisation, le meurtre de l'activiste italien Carlo Giuliani, tué par la police pendant le contre-Sommet de Genève de 2001³⁷, la repression policière pendant les mobilisations de Genève³⁸, le Forum Social Européen de Grèce de 2006 etc.-, ou à des tactiques militantes spécifique à d'autres espaces, comme *Reclaim*

³⁴ Agnes Gagy, *op.cit.*, p. 69.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ „Intalnire in Bulgaria”, *Indymedia Romania*, <http://admin.romania.indymedia.org/ro/2004/05/141.shtml>, 1 février 2015.

³⁷ „Carlo Giuliani in Memoriam : actiune la Iasi”, *Indymedia Romania*, 2005, <http://admin.romania.indymedia.org/ro/2005/07/931.shtml>, 1 février 2015.

³⁸ „Martorii revendica adevarul Geneva 2001”, *Indymedia Romania*, <http://admin.romania.indymedia.org/ro/2006/01/1193.shtml>, 1 février 2015.

the Street ou les camps autogérés allemands. Tous ces aspects montrent l'impact des événements de l'étranger pour l'imaginaire des activistes roumains. L'importance des liaisons entre les altermondialistes de l'Europe de l'Ouest et ceux locaux sont mises en avant aussi par les journaux locaux.

En citant les rapports faits par le Service Roumain d'Informations, *Ziarul de Iasi* souligne les essais des activistes étrangers de propager dans la Roumanie, par la musique et par les réseaux de communication, des idées anarchistes, pacifistes et antifascistes.³⁹

Dans le même temps, plusieurs aspects idéologiques caractérisant les mouvements altermondialistes de l'Europe de l'Ouest se retrouvent dans le cas d'*Indymedia Romania*. Des actions centrées sur la promotion d'une autre manière de vivre, basée sur le végétarisme, le rejet du consumérisme et de l'automobilisme⁴⁰, le pacifisme, des manifestations et des actions contre le racisme et contre les déportations des émigrants, la mise en relief de la situation de l'émigrant de l'Europe de l'Est sont tous encadrées d'une manière globale, étant regardés comme des effets des problèmes globaux. L'encadrement global des actions collectives des réseaux altermondialistes des années 2000 vise la résistance des activistes contre la mondialisation économique, plus particulièrement contre les conséquences locales des processus globaux, donc contre les effets de la mondialisation: le consumérisme, l'automobilisme, des guerres, le corporatisme. Dans le même temps, le processus d'internalisation des cadres globaux entre en relation avec la diffusion des pratiques militantes de l'étranger. L'usage des symboles globaux pendant des actions contestataires de la Roumanie postcommuniste devient une pratique assez commune dans les années 2000. Des actions comme *Reclaim the Streets*, *Reclaim the Fields*, *Critical Mass*, *Foods not Bombs* font référence à un cadre et à des symboles globaux.

L'une des premières formes d'actions collectives de la Roumanie postcommuniste qui gagne l'intérêt de plusieurs journalistes roumains et qui est plus visible dans l'espace public roumain prend la forme des mobilisations contre la guerre d'Iraq. Même si l'engagement dans des

³⁹ „In Romania actioneaza cateva zeci de anarhisti”, *Ziarul de Iasi*, 2002, <http://www.ziaruldeiasi.ro/national-extern/sri-in-romania-actioneaza-citeva-zeci-de-anarhisti-ni2nqv>, 1 février 2015.

⁴⁰ „Ziua europeana fara masini la Cluj”, *Indymedia Romania*, Septembre 2004, <http://admin.romania.indymedia.org/ro/2004/09/461.shtml>, 1 Avril 2015.

protestations contre la guerre d'Iraq et Afghanistan a été marginale, celui-ci représente un moment important, car il reflète les changements des formes de participation politique, des critiques tournées envers les élites nationales, pendant la Révolution roumaine de 1989 envers des processus et des acteurs globaux. Plus précisément, les protestations organisées par des écologistes et par des anarchistes au début des années 2000 internalisent les cadres globaux de référence aux acteurs étrangers et transnationaux. Dans ce sens, en mars 2003 a eu lieu une démonstration contre la guerre d'Iraq à Bucarest, organisée autour du slogan "Non à la guerre, pas en notre nom" et qui réunit environ 100 personnes affichant des messages divers comme "Les bombes des Américains ne sont pas des babioles pour les femmes d'Irak!", "Si vous les tuez, au moins ne leur donnez pas de Coca Cola" et des drapeaux rouge-noir⁴¹. Dans la même période, en réaction à la guerre d'Iraq, à Cluj-Napoca est organisée une action *Food Not Bombs* qui réunit environ 80 personnes, ainsi qu'à Timisoara et à Craiova où participent également des activistes d'Angleterre et de France⁴².

Le sommet de l'OTAN 2008 a été l'occasion pour une transnationalisation des protestations et dans le même temps, un évènement qui a rendu visible dans l'espace public des groupes marginaux.

Quelques mois avant le sommet d'avril, plusieurs journaux annonçaient la préparation d'une protestation à Bucarest et une coordination entre les anarchistes étrangers et les anarchistes locaux, qui ont été contactés par les premiers⁴³. En l'absence des ressources nécessaires et la possibilité de s'appuyer sur la tradition d'un militantisme pacifiste, des activistes roumains ont dû dépendre du support international.

Après ces premières formes de localisation dans la Roumanie postcommuniste des mouvements altermondialistes, un autre cycle important de protestations commence à partir de 2012. Contrairement aux mobilisations du début des années 2000, les protestations de l'hiver de 2012 (« l'hiver roumain ») contre un projet de loi visant la privatisation du

⁴¹ „Raport actiuni anti-razboi, martie 2003”, *Indymedia Romania*, 2004, <http://admin.romania.indymedia.org/ro/2004/07/254.shtml>, 1 février 2015.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ „Anarhistii germani ameninta in romana cu proteste anti-NATO la Bucuresti”, *Ziare*, 2008, <http://www.ziare.com/stiri/ancheta/anarhisti-germani-ameninta-in-romana-cu-proteste-anti-nato-la-bucuresti-278878>, 1 février 2015.

système de santé ont premièrement pris la forme d'une critique des élites politiques nationales. Dans cette lignée, elles ont été présentées dans les journaux nationaux comme des manifestations contre le président de la Roumanie, Traian Basescu⁴⁴, non pas comme des mobilisations contre les mesures d'austérité adoptées dans la plupart des Etats dans le contexte de la crise économique. Néanmoins, certains journaux citent des déclarations des protestataires qui font référence aux coupures budgétaires⁴⁵. D'une manière contraire, les journaux étrangers ont encadré les protestations de 2012 comme étant liées aux mesures d'austérité et aux autres vagues de mobilisations des pays du Sud de l'Europe. Selon Reuters, des milliers de Roumains sont descendus dans les rues pour protester contre la loi de santé et les mesures d'austérité adoptées par le gouvernement⁴⁶. «Les gens sont descendus dans les rues de plusieurs villes pour exprimer leur mécontentement contre les mesures d'austérité et contre le plan de réforme du système de santé, note Euronews⁴⁷. Dans le même temps, on ne peut pas ignorer le fait que des messages et des slogans des protestataires comme « nos droits ne sont pas votre profit », « solidarité avec la Grèce », « contre FMI »⁴⁸, « nous sommes les Indignés de la Roumanie », « démocratie réelle maintenant », donc l'usage des symboles et des idées globaux, démontrent une forme de transnationalisation indirecte des protestations de 2012 et ceci en dépit de l'accent mis sur la critique des élites nationales. Normalement,

⁴⁴ „Referendum 2012. Proteste anti-Basescu la Universitate si Cotroceni”, *Libertatea*, 2012, <http://www.libertatea.ro/detalii/articol/referendum-2012-rezultat-basescu-universitate-protest-406178.html>, 1 février 2015, « Proteste anti-Basescu in Bucueresti. Jandrmii i-au imprastiat pe manifestantii din Piata Universitatii. Zeci de persoane au fost retinute », *Gândul*, 2012, <http://www.gandul.info/stiri/video-proteste-antibasescu-in-bucuresti-jandarmii-i-au-imprastiat-pe-manifestantii-din-piata-universitatii-zeci-de-persoane-au-fost-retinute-update-9147053>, 1 février 2015.

⁴⁵ „Piata Universitatii, cele mai violente proteste de la Mineriate”, *Hotnews*, 2012, <http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-esential-11216836-noi-mitinguri-loc-sambata-pentru-sustinerea-lui-raed-arafat-bucuresti-alte-orase-din-tara.htm>, 1 février 2015.

⁴⁶ Laura Holban, Mihai Draghici, „Proteste in Bucuresti. Reuters: mii de oameni protestează împotriva măsurilor de austeritate”, *Gândul*, 2012, <http://www.gandul.info/stiri/proteste-in-bucuresti-reuters-mii-de-romani-protesteaza-impotriva-masurilor-de-austeritate-9147602>, 1 février 2015.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ Des processus d'externalisation ont eu lieu que les privatisations et les transformations socio-économiques sont vues comme faisant partie des politiques de privatisations de FMI.

ils existent plusieurs signes de l'internalisation: les références à l'ancien Parti Communiste Roumain, à la mobilisation anticommuniste de Piata Universitatii de 1990, l'association entre Traian Basescu et Nicolae Ceausescu etc.

Le regard tourné envers les élites politiques locales, dominant lors de « l'hiver roumain », va changer pendant les protestations contre ACTA, qui vont le suivre un mois plus tard. Les manifestations contre ACTA, en solidarité avec les mobilisations de l'Europe de l'Ouest, donc encadrées, dès le début des mobilisations, dans un contexte global, ont réuni environ 300 manifestants à Bucarest, 200 à Iasi, 50 personnes à Ploiesti et Craiova, 200 à Timisoara 1000 à Cluj-Napoca⁴⁹. Depuis 2008, l'accord avait soulevé de nombreux critiques partout en Europe mais surtout dans les pays du sud, à la fois en raison de la nature de l'accord, que des conditions dans lesquelles il vit le jour. Donc, tant le fait que l'accord est le produit des négociations d'un "club" des pays du Nord, ayant des vues similaires sur la lutte contre la contrefaçon, que l'impact du traité sur la vie privée des gens ont été des aspects importants dans la mobilisations des gens de toute l'Europe. Dans le cas de la Roumanie, certains participants portaient des masques en papier Anonymous, qui sont devenus un symbole de la révolte partout dans le monde, similaires à ceux circulant sur l'Internet et ils dirigent leurs critiques et demandes aussi envers les instances européennes, remarquant que tous les documents ont été signés à huis clos⁵⁰ et les effets du traité sur la vie privée des individus. Plusieurs demandes et critiques des protestataires roumains on été dirigées aussi envers les élites nationales, comme les messages « voleurs comme au Parlement ne peuvent être trouvés ni sur le torrent" ou "Nous exhortons les politiciens de refuser définitivement de signer le traité d'ACTA au nom de la Roumanie" le démontrent⁵¹. Aussi, les liaisons faites par certains protestataires entre la

⁴⁹ „Aproximativ 300 de persoane protestează la București față de aplicarea ACTA”, *Ziarul Financiar*, 2012, <http://www.zf.ro/eveniment/aproximativ-300-de-persoane-protesteaza-la-bucuresti-fata-de-aplicarea-acta-9226984>, 1 février 2015.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ „Proteste impotriva ACTA in mai multe orase ale tarii. La Bucuresti au manifestat cateva sute de oameni”, *hotnews*, 2012, <http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-esential-11481423-proteste-impotriva-acta-mai-multe-orase-ale-tarii-40-mii-oameni-anuntat-prezenta-mitingul-din-bucuresti-pest-25-mii-cluj.htm>, 1 février 2015.

censure imposée pendant le régime communiste et l'ACTA est un cas typique de l'internalisation des questions globales.

Regardées comme des manifestations pro-démocratiques⁵², les protestations de 2013 ont commencé comme une mobilisation environnementaliste orchestrée prioritairement par des jeunes appartenant à la classe moyenne et peu de temps après ont évolué dans des protestations contre la corruption, la démagogie des élites politiques internes et le manque de transparence institutionnelle. Pour six mois, chaque dimanche, de milliers de personnes de toutes les grandes villes de la Roumanie et de la diaspora roumaine de tout le monde ont manifesté leur désapprobation contre l'exploitation minière de Rosia Montana, projet initié par la multinationale canadienne Rosia Montana Gold Corporation et fortement soutenu par les élites politiques nationales. Après six mois de manifestations, la pression de l'opinion publique a contraint les hommes politiques à rejeter le projet.

Tout premièrement, les manifestations de 2013 peuvent être vues comme liées aux protestations globales en ce qui concerne trois aspects: le manque de leaders officiels du groupe informel *Uniti Salvăm (Unis, nous sauvons)*, engagé dans l'organisation des protestations, le caractère non-violent, l'importance dans la mobilisation des réseaux sociaux comme *Facebook* ou *Twitter*, les relations entre les activistes roumains et des activistes étrangers, surtout espagnols, grecques ou turcs, les tactiques de l'occupation des places publics. Dans le même temps, les revendications des protestataires ont porté sur deux aspects: les intérêts économiques de la corporation étrangère et la corruption des élites politiques nationales qui avaient soutenu le projet au nom des avantages personnels. Même si des groupes et des personnes s'assurant une critique anticapitaliste et anti-impérialiste ont été présents dans la rue⁵³ et même si plusieurs commentateurs ont mis en avant « le péril » de l'anticapitalisme et de

⁵² Claudia Ciobanu, "Romania's struggle for democracy is encapsulated in a village", *The Guardian*, 2013, <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/05/romania-struggle-democracy-rosia-montana>, 1 février 2015.

⁵³ Voir „Manifestul Mâna de Lucru: Roșia Montană e mai mult decât Roșia Montană”, *Critic Atac*, 2013, <http://www.criticatac.ro/23416/manifestul-mana-de-lucru-roia-montan-mai-mult-decit-roia-montan/>, 1 février 2015.

l'antioccidentalisme de cette nouvelle génération cosmopolite⁵⁴, la critique de la corruption et du manque de respect de l'Etat de droit par les élites politiques nationales a été centrale, comme une enquête par questionnaire menée en 2013 parmi les activistes d'*Uniti Salvăm* nous a démontré. Cela peut être démontré inclusivement par le support d'une partie des activistes d'*Uniti Salvăm* de la campagne pour les élections européennes de Monica Macovei, figure politique connue pour sa rhétorique anticorruption. L'encadrement des revendications des protestataires reflète le manque de confiance dans les élites politiques nationales et la crise de la démocratie représentative de la Roumanie⁵⁵. Des messages et slogans comme « Toate partidele a ceeași mizerie » (« tous les partis sont la même misère ») ont fait recette tant en 2012, qu'en 2013.

En guise de conclusion, on peut remarquer que la Roumanie postcommuniste s'est confrontée à l'émergence des cycles de protestations dans le même temps que les autres pays de l'Europe et suivant la même dynamique: de la transnationalisation des luttes spécifique aux mouvements atermoindialistes vers l'accent mis sur les élites politiques nationales pendant les mouvements qui émergent après la crise économique. De l'autre part, dans un pays sans une forte tradition de résistance, les processus de diffusion deviennent plus importants pour l'émergence et le développement des groupes contestataires que dans les pays de l'Europe de l'Ouest. Dans le même contexte, les acteurs s'assurant une critique des autorités globales ont eu peu d'influence sur la dynamique des processus contestataires des dernières années.

⁵⁴ Dan Tapalaga, „Ce am vazut la protestul anti-Rosia Montana”, *hotnews*, 2013, <http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-opinii-15502279-vazut-protestul-anti-rosia-montana.htm>, 1 février 2015.

⁵⁵ Sonja Zmerli, Newton Kenneth, José Ramón Montero, “Trust in People, Confidence in Political Institutions, and Satisfaction with Democracy” in Jan W. Van Deth, José Ramón Montero, Anders Westholm, *Citizenship and Involvement in European Democracies: A Comparative Analysis*, Routledge, London, pp. 35-65; Sergiu Gherghina, *Party Organization and Electoral Volatility in Central and Eastern Europe. Enhancing Voter Loyalty*, Routledge, Oxon, 2014.

Bibliographie:

1. Agrikolianski, Eric, Sommier, Isabelle (2005), *Radiographie du mouvement altermondialiste, le second Forum social européen*, Paris: La Dispute.
2. Auyero, Javier, "Relational Riot. Austerity and Corruption Protest in the Neoliberal Era", *Social Movement Studies* (2).
3. Ban, Cornel (2014), *Dependentă și dezvoltare: economia politică a capitalismului românesc*, Cluj-Napoca: Editura Tact.
4. Bracanti, Dawn (2014), "Pocketbook Protests: Explaining the Emergence of Pro-Democracy Protests Worldwide", *Comparative Political Studies* 47 (11).
5. Colas, Dominique (2011), « La « société civile: un spectre qui hante l'Europe communiste et postcommuniste » in Stéphane Courtois (ed.), *Sortir du communisme, changer d'époque : après la chute du Mur*, Paris : Presse Universitaire de France.
6. Crouch, Colin (2008), *Post-Democracy*, Cambridge: Polity.
7. Della Porta, Donatella, Mattoni, Alice (2014), "Patterns of Diffusion and the Transnational Dimension of Protest in the Movements of the Crisis: An Introduction" in Donatella Della Porta, Alice Mattoni (eds.) *Social Movements in Times of Crisis*, London: ECPR Press.
8. Della Porta, Donatella, Tarrow Sidney (2004), *Transnational Protest and Global Activism*, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
9. Eyal, Gil, "Anti-Politics and the Spirit of Capitalism: Dissidents, Monetarists and the Czech Transition to Capitalism." *Theory and Society* (29). Gagy, Agnes (2013), "The Shifting Meaning of 'Autonomy' in the East European Diffusion of the Alterglobalisation Movement: Hungarian and Romanian experiences", in Cristina Flesher Fominaya, Laurence Cox, *Understanding European Movements: New Social Movements, Global Justice Struggles, Anti-austerity Protest*, London: Routledge.
10. Juris, Jeffrey, Khasnabish, Alexander (2013), *Insurgent Encounters, Transnational Activism, Ethnography, and the Political*, London: Duke University Press.
11. Juris, Jeffrey (2008), *Networking Futures: The Movements Against Corporate Globalization*, Durham: Duke University Press.

12. Klein, Noemi (2014), "Occupy Wall Street: Lessons from Anti-Globalization Protests", *Rabble*, October 2012., <http://rabble.ca/columnists/2011/10/occupy-wall-street-lessons-anti-globalization-protests>, 10 septembrie 2014.
13. Kopeski, Petr, Mudde, Cas (2003), *Uncivil Society? Contentious Politics in Post-communist Europe*, London: Routledge.
14. Navratil, Jiří, Cisar, Ondřej (2014), Towards a "Non-Global Justice Movement"? Two paths to re-scaling the left contention in the Czech Republic, in (eds.) D. Della Porta, A. Marttoni, *The Transnational Dimension of Protest: From the Arab Spring to Occupy Wall Street*, London: ECPR Press.
15. Phinnemore, David (2001), "Romania and Euro-Atlantic Integration since 1989: A Decade of Frustration?", in Duncan Light and David Phinnemore (eds), *Post-Communist Romania – Coming to Terms with Transition*, Basingstoke: Palgrave.
16. Pollack, David, Wielgohs, Jan (2004), *Dissent and opposition in communist Eastern Europe: Origins of civil society and democratic transition*, Aldershot, Ashgate.
17. Routhledge, Paul (1996), „Resisting and Reshaping the Modern: Social Movements and the Development Process” in R.J. Johnson, P.J. Taylor, M.J. Watts (eds.), *Geographies of global change: remapping the world in the late twentieth century*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
18. Smith, Jackie (2008), *Social Movements for Global Democracy*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
19. Sommier, Isabelle, Fillieule, Olivier, Agrikolianski, Eric (2008), « Les altermondialistes entre national et global » en Isabelle Sommier, Olivier Fillieule et Éric Agrikolianski (coord.), *Généalogie des mouvements altermondialistes en Europe. Une perspective comparée*, Paris: Karthala, coll. Science politique comparative.
20. Streeck, Wolfgang (2014), *Du temps acheté. La crise sans cesse ajournée du capitalisme démocratique*, Paris: Gallimard, coll. « NRF Essais ».
21. Tarrow, Sidney, "Dynamics of Diffusion. Mechanisms, Institutions, and Scale Shift" in R.K. Givan, K.M. Roberts, and S. Soule (eds.), *The Diffusion of Social Movements. Actors, Mechanisms and Political Effects*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

22. Tilly, Charles (2004), *Social Movements, 1768-2004*, Boulder: Paradigm Press, 2004.
23. Tilly, Charles (1995), *Popular Contention in Great Britain 1758-1834*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
24. Tilly, Charles, Tarrow, Sidney (2006), *Contentious politics*, Boulder: Paradigm Publishers.
25. Verdery, Katherine (1996), *What was socialism, and what comes next?*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
26. Williams, Gwyn (2008), *Struggles for an Alternative Globalization. An Ethnography of Counterpower in Southern France*, London: Ashgate.
27. Zmerli, Sonja, Kenneth, Newton Montero, José Ramón, "Trust in People, Confidence in Political Institutions, and Satisfaction with Democracy" in Jan W. Van Deth, José Ramón Montero, Anders Westholm, *Citizenship and Involvement in European Democracies: A Comparative Analysis*, Routledge, London

Articles de presse:

1. „Intalnire in Bulgaria", *Indymedia Romania*, <http://admin.romania.indymedia.org/ro/2004/05/141.shtml>, 1 février 2015.
2. „Carlo Giuliani in Memoriam : actiune la Iasi", *Indymedia Romania*, 2005, <http://admin.romania.indymedia.org/ro/2005/07/931.shtml>, 1 février 2015.
3. „Martorii revendica adevarul Geneva 2001", *Indymedia Romania*, <http://admin.romania.indymedia.org/ro/2006/01/1193.shtml>, 1 février 2015.
4. „In Romania actioneaza cateva zeci de anarhisti", *Ziarul de Iasi*, 2002, <http://www.ziaruldeiasi.ro/national-extern/sri-in-romania-actioneaza-citeva-zeci-de-anarhisti~ni2nqv>, 1 février 2015.
5. „Ziua europeana fara masini la Cluj", *Indymedia Romania*, Septembre 2004, <http://admin.romania.indymedia.org/ro/2004/09/461.shtml>, 1 Avril 2015.
6. „Raport actiuni anti-razboi, martie 2003", *Indymedia Romania*, 2004, <http://admin.romania.indymedia.org/ro/2004/07/254.shtml>, 1 février 2015.

7. „Anarhistii germani ameninta in romana cu proteste anti-NATO la Bucuresti”, *Ziare*, 2008,
<http://www.ziare.com/stiri/ancheta/anarhisti-germani-ameninta-in-romana-cu-proteste-anti-nato-la-bucuresti-278878>, 1 février 2015.
8. „Referendum 2012. Proteste anti-Basescu la Universitate si Cotroceni”, *Libertatea*, 2012,
<http://www.libertatea.ro/detalii/articol/referendum-2012-rezultat-basescu-universitate-protest-406178.html>, 1 février 2015,
9. « Proteste anti-Basescu in Bucueresti. Jandrmii i-au imprastiat pe manifestantii din Piata Universitatii. Zeci de persoane au fost retinute », *Gândul*, 2012, <http://www.gandul.info/stiri/video-proteste-antibasescu-in-bucuresti-jandarmii-i-au-imprastiat-pe-manifestantii-din-piata-universitatii-zeci-de-persoane-au-fost-retinute-update-9147053>, 1 février 2015.
10. „Piata Universitatii, cele mai violente proteste de la Mineriade”, *Hotnews*, 2012, <http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-esential-11216836-noi-mitinguri-loc-sambata-pentru-sustinerea-lui-raed-arafat-bucuresti-alte-orase-din-tara.htm>, 1 février 2015.
11. Laura Holban, Mihai Draghici, „Proteste in Bucuresti. Reuters: mii de oameni protestează împotriva măsurilor de austeritate”, *Gândul*, 2012, <http://www.gandul.info/stiri/proteste-in-bucuresti-reuters-mii-de-romani-protesteaza-impotriva-masurilor-de-austeritate-9147602>, 1 février 2015.
12. „Aproximativ 300 de persoane protestează la București față de aplicarea ACTA”, *Ziarul Financiar*, 2012,
<http://www.zf.ro/eveniment/aproximativ-300-de-persoane-protesteaza-la-bucuresti-fata-de-aplicarea-acta-9226984>, 1 février 2015.
13. „Proteste impotriva ACTA in mai multe orase ale tarii. La Bucuresti au manifestat cateva sute de oameni”, *hotnews*, 2012,
<http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-esential-11481423-proteste-impotriva-acta-mai-multe-orase-ale-tarii-40-mii-oameni-anuntat-prezenta-mitingul-din-bucuresti-pest-25-mii-cluj.htm>, 1 février 2015.
14. Claudia Ciobanu, “Romania's struggle for democracy is encapsulated in a village”, *The Guardian*, 2013,

<http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/05/romania-struggle-democracy-rosia-montana>, 1 février 2015.

15. „Manifestul Mâna de Lucru: Roșia Montană e mai mult decât Roșia Montană”, *Critic Atac*, 2013,
<http://www.criticatac.ro/23416/manifestul-mana-de-lucru-roia-montan-mai-mult-decit-roia-montan/>, 1 février 2015.
16. Dan Tapalaga, „Ce am vazut la protestul anti-Rosia Montana”, *hotnews*, 2013, <http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-opinii-15502279-vazut-protestul-anti-rosia-montana.htm>, 1 février 2015.

Iordan Gheorghe Bărbulescu, *Noua Europă. Identitate Și Model European*, Iași: Polirom Publishing House, 2015, 623 p.

Luiza-Maria Filimon*

Professor Iordan Gh. Bărbulescu's *New Europe* covers the latest additions brought to the ever evolving project of the European Union after the successful ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2007. One of the main tenets of the book revolves around the fact that this was the rational step towards the establishment and consolidation of a federation comprised of nation-states. *New Europe* is a scholarly journey into the intricacies of a European Union that is trying to become more transparent for its citizens.

At the same time, *New Europe* constitutes a valuable academic work in support of the idea also advanced by the Vice President of the Convention on the Future of Europe, Giuliano Amato, that: "The Lisbon Treaty does not shut the door to a future of enduring European constitutionalism. To the contrary, it paves the way for it"¹. This newest comprehensive textbook on the European Union is a testament to the enduring notion of European unity which has on one hand surpassed the expectations of those familiar with a Europe of nation-states characterised by strife, enmity and war while on the other, remained true to the founding fathers' idea of building a "Europe of the people". In other words, a "federal Europe"².

From the economic communities of the '50s to the political union proclaimed at Maastricht, EU has in the words of the author: "imposed a new model of development – the social-liberal one – which places the

* Luiza-Maria Filimon holds a B.A. in International Relations and European Studies (2011) and an M.A. in History (2013), from the Faculty of History and Political Science, "Ovidius" University of Constanta. Currently she is a Phd Student with The National School of Political and Administrative Studies, Bucharest.

Contact: luiza.filimon@gmail.com.

¹ Giuliano Amato, "Preface", in Stefan Griller, Jacques Ziller (eds.), *The Lisbon Treaty: EU Constitutionalism without a Constitutional Treaty*, Horn, Austria: Springer-Verlag Wien, 2008, p. x.

² Iordan Gheorghe Bărbulescu, *New Europe. Identity and European Model*, Iași: Polirom Publishing House, 2015, p. 51.

citizen at its core, instead of the state or of the market. The rationale behind this being that peace and social wellbeing, dialogue and negotiation are preferred in face of alternatives such as violence, confrontation, war and poverty³. Moreover, since as Habermas argues, European member states “are no longer able to provide their members with the goods and benefits they have come to expect”, it becomes the EU’s responsibility “to generate a qualitatively different set of authoritative commands from those generated by Europe’s nation-states”⁴.

The book is divided into three parts covering across twelve chapters, wide-ranging aspects of European issues, varying from the concept of the “European idea” and its historical and theoretical origins in the first part, to its implementation through vertical integration and federalism, and horizontal enlargement and unification in the second part, while the third part expands on the notion of Europe as a valid and feasible social framework of sustainable development. Consequently, in the first chapter, Professor Bărbulescu takes a closer look at the first European projects of federalist inspiration, the ideas of unity and integration as the foundation for the European Community and European Union, respectively, the constructive debate between the puritan supporters of federalism and the pragmatic functionalists. Moreover, the second part is dedicated to the Romanian contributions to the European idea: from Aurel Popovici’s federal plan to the Danubian Confederation Plan, to the Economic Community of the Little Entente and last but not least, to the Balkan Entente as an effective model of federal association.

Chapter two explores the theories and models of integration both from the international relations perspective as well as from the point of view of political sciences. It analyses the intergovernmental paradigms – either in its classic or liberal forms – taking into account the realist and neorealist foundations. It continues with federalism, covering its traditional forms as well as neofederalism. The chapter also offers an overview of other theories of integration as such functionalism, neofunctionalism,

³ *Ibidem*, p. 21.

⁴ Habermas referred to by Glyn Morgan, *The Idea of a European Superstate: Public Justification and European Integration*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005, p. 143.

theories of interdependence, structural neorealism, institutionalism, neoliberalism, consociationalism, theories of governance or constructivism⁵.

The following six chapters argue in great detail about how European integration and federalisation have developed simultaneously while mutually consolidating themselves. This claim is thoroughly investigated starting from the third chapter, which explores the EU objectives (achieving continental long-term peace through economic unification, which afterwards expands into political unification, democratisation and the construction of an European social identity) and actors (the role of the national actor and of the European institutions in the European Union, coupled with the network of interdependencies pertaining to a system that has more of a federal outlook than one strictly belonging to a traditional international organisation)⁶.

The fourth chapter focuses on the method of integration, studied in all of its aspects: unification, integration, cooperation, enlargement, consolidation, deepening. Moreover, in weighting between integration versus cooperation, the author pays particular attention to the process of enhanced cooperation which “enables participating States to organise greater cooperation than that initially provided for by the Treaties under the policy concerned”⁷. The author considers enhanced cooperation to be the key to the betterment of a European Union of 28 states, which also happens to represent the most heterogeneous configuration so far in the history of the European construction. In so far as the nature of integration is concerned, the chapter expands on the EU’s unitary nature, political dimension, as well as on the judicial aspects, with considerate attention being paid to the conventional origins of the European Communities and of the European Union law⁸. In addition, the chapter researches the merits of European progressiveness as an engine for improving the mechanisms of integration and of enabling the process of democratisation by maintaining the institutional balance awarded through the foundational treaties⁹.

Chapter five is dedicated to the new European judicial order

⁵ Iordan Gheorghe Bărbulescu, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 117.

⁷ ***, “Enhanced cooperation”, 2010 [<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV:ai0018>], 27.06.2015.

⁸ Iordan Gheorghe Bărbulescu, *op. cit.*, p. 137.

⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 166.

comprised of primary legislation – the treaties as the basis for all EU action¹⁰, secondary legislation – with its binding legal instruments (the regulations, directives, decisions) and non-binding instruments (resolutions, opinions)¹¹. – as well as the jurisprudence of the European Justice Court (EJC) with an emphasis to the cornerstone decisions promulgated by the EJC¹². Chapter six identifies and defines the Union’s formal and material competences with an emphasis on their origins, classification, and characterisation. The author also compares and contrasts the European competences to the national ones as far as their irreversibility, attribution and exercitation are concerned¹³.

Other competences are analysed in a similar manner: from the exclusive (“the EU alone is able to legislate and adopt binding acts in these fields”) to the shared (“the EU and Member States are authorised to adopt binding acts in these fields”) and supporting respectively (“the EU can only intervene to support, coordinate or complement the action of Member States”, see also subsidiarity)¹⁴. The second part analyses the European policies regarded as the implementation of the material competences of the EU, beginning with the objectives and means, through to the instruments and limits of European policies, common polities and actions. It addresses the role of the Lisbon Treaty in clarifying the problems related to these policies as well as the role of the national parliaments in the EU. The framework for integration of the regional and local policies in the context of the European ones, is also mentioned in view of Protocol (No. 2) on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality of the Lisbon Treaty¹⁵.

If the previous chapters addressed the issue of federalisation through integration – i.e.: vertical European development – chapter seven concentrates on the horizontal development – i.e.: European unification through the enlargement of the European Union. Professor Bărbulescu

¹⁰ ***, “EU law” [http://europa.eu/eu-law/index_en.htm], 27.06.2015.

¹¹ ***, “Legislation” [<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/collection/eu-law/legislation/recent.html>], 27.06.2015.

¹² Jordan Gheorghe Bărbulescu, *op. cit.*, p. 167.

¹³ *Ibidem*, p. 223.

¹⁴ ***, “Division of competences within the European Union”, 2010 [<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV:ai0020>], 27.06.2015.

¹⁵ Jordan Gheorghe Bărbulescu, *op. cit.*, p. 223, p. 257.

analyses the process of enlargement understood in its double alterity: of a political necessity as well as of a historical opportunity. This follows with a presentation of the accession criteria – the European association agreements and accession negotiations – and the candidate states. The chapter highlights both from a historical and a pedagogical perspective, the particularities of this process, the global, inclusive and evolving nature of European unification, the pre-accession strategy, the consolidated strategy for pre-accession and the accession partnership¹⁶.

Chapter eight approaches the impact of the enlargement and unification processes from a comparative perspective, presenting on one hand, the situation in the European Union prior to the 2004-2007 accession waves and on the other hand, assessing the situation in the Central and Eastern European states. In order to more aptly portray the effects of enlargement and unification on the European common policies, the chapter follows with an in-depth radiography of the EU funding, its budgetary policy, agriculture, socio-economical cohesion, commerce policy, the common transport policy, justice and internal affairs, immigration, the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy¹⁷.

With chapter nine, the author expands in a comprehensive manner, on the idea of Europe as representing a new framework for society based in the federalist-intergovernmental institutional model. The chapter defines the vectors, identifies the dominant actors, and justifies the reasons that stood behind the process of adopting and promoting the federal model in the European public discourse. The second half is devoted to defining concepts such as intergovernmental, asymmetrical and multi-level federalism, as well as to pointing out the inevitable shortcomings inherent to the intergovernmental method of reforming a multidimensional EU – process started in the early aughts, with the European Convention on the Future of Europe¹⁸.

Chapter ten follows with an extensive overview of the social-economical model of the European Union. The author methodically presents the economical unification and integration from two points of

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 259.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 284.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 325.

view: historical and conceptual. It begins with an analysis of the European Coal and Steel Community and the Common Market up to the Single European Act and the Internal Market followed by the Maastricht Treaty and the Single Market. The chapter also takes into account the crises, the enlargement and development of the Single Market, its insufficient consolidation, the lack of a common economic policy, the appearance of the Internal Market and Single Market respectively. From the conceptual perspective, the author presents the above mentioned concepts as well as the mechanisms that have allowed the jump from the Common Market to the Internal Market, all while taking into account the Lisbon Treaty provisions and amendments. In addition, the author explores the Economic and Monetary Policy and the Economic and Monetary Union (from the economic policies to the specific instruments, the excessive deficit, the corrective measures, etc.), the monetary policy (European Central Bank and the European System of Central Banks, with the British and Danish exceptions), the three phases of the Economic and Monetary Union as well as all the contemporaneous mandates resulted from the Lisbon Treaty. The second part of the chapter covers the social dimension of the European Union regarded by the author as the most important component of the European model of society while also as a referent for social-liberal European policies. Along with peace and cooperation, the social dimension completes the “trifecta” of the European Model. The institutionalised framework of participation for the civil society is perceived to be of utmost importance for the legitimacy and sustainability of this construction¹⁹.

Chapter eleven provides an extensive review of the political system of the European Union and of its main vectors divided in the following categories: political Europe versus federal Europe, technical government versus political government, multi-speed Europe versus one-speed model, neoliberalism versus the social model, the role of the EU in the world and its common values. It focuses both on the internal dimension – the area of liberty, security and justice – and on the external aspects: the common diplomacy and legal personality of the Union. The chapter also presents and exemplifies the values and principles of the EU: democracy, respect of human rights, member states equality, respect for national identity, sincere cooperation, solidarity and transparency. Following this, the author moves

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 355-356.

towards a thorough presentation of the European treaties' political evolution up to the Lisbon Treaty, while also addressing the rights safeguarded by the EU and the member states' and third parties' obligations to respect fundamental rights and liberties. Professor Bărbulescu concludes the chapter with an objective rendering of the new political reality constituted by the European Union through its two core dimensions: intergovernmentalism and constitutionalisation. A testament to the states' inbuilt fight for power, intergovernmentalism is framed through the voting shares and voting power issues – in other words, the author highlights the states' over and underrepresentation in the Council, as well as the choice for the decision making process (consensus or qualified majority). Regarding it as central to the idea of a new Europe, the chapter concludes with a presentation of the European model and supranational governance. Also carefully presented are inter-institutional dialogue and the means for increasing the efficiency of the EU as well as the development of new areas of competence ascribed to the citizen's, the national parliaments', the regions' or the local communities'²⁰.

This comprehensive enterprise culminates with an investigation of the European Union after the Lisbon Treaty by exploring the debate between such fundamental aspects as those related to the national versus supranational, intergovernmental versus federal, or the debates on the form of the union: confederation versus federation, international treaty versus European constitution²¹. "Europe has become federal through integration and has become united through enlargement based on a social market economy model of development", states Professor Bărbulescu. The new Europe is a political one with a strong social market economy – currently tested by the Greek case – which promotes among its member states and in the international life, the values of democracy, rule of law, equality, solidarity, respect of fundamental rights in the spirit of loyalty to the European Union and to the states in equal parts. Through its actions, the European Union represents a political and judicial synthesis of a federation of nation-states defined and regulated through a material Constitution²².

Professor Bărbulescu's *New Europe. Identity and European Model* –

²⁰ *Ibidem*, pp. 431-432.

²¹ *Ibidem*, p. 570.

²² *Ibidem*, p. 593.

first volume from the *New Europe* book cycle – is a key source of scholarly work on the European Union, as well as being the first local, most up-to-date pedagogical handbook for specialists and students in the field of European studies alike. In spite of the optimistic view on the future evolution of the European Union and its overall net benefits for the European citizens and member states alike, the author is careful to underline in a balanced manner the crises, critiques and yet to overcome shortcomings of a political union that has still to grow both into its own potential as well as accept and adopt to the inherent limitations faced by the socio-political-economical constructions of the present.

Philip Vos Fellman, Yaneer Bar-Yam, Ali A. Minai (Eds.), *Conflict and Complexity: Countering Terrorism, Insurgency, Ethnic and Regional Violence*, New York Heidelberg Dordrecht London: Springer, 2015, 292 p.

Monica Meruțiu*

The foundations of this complex and comprehensive volume were laid back in 2006 by the three editors, Philip Vos Fellman, Yaneer Bar-Yam, Ali A. Minai and it was built with contributions of experts in a wide variety of disciplines, such as political science, economics, history, sociology, geography, psychology, mathematics, computer science, and physics, to name just a few. This diversity of their elaborated perspectives stands from the beginning as a distinctive characteristic, distinguishing this volume from other approaches on similar topics, and consequently transforming it in a unique contribution.

The analyses encompassed in this edited volume focus on stringent problematics of our time, from terrorism and battlefield warfare, to ethnic and regional violence; while at the same time they stand and illustrate an effort to make a significant contribution in combating terrorism, as well as ethnic and regional violence.

The dense volume is structured in three main parts; the first part comprises six chapters, and the next two parts encompass five chapters each.

Part I of the book offers a theoretical background and tackles rather theoretical ideas.

The first chapter, "Modeling Terrorist Networks: The Second Decade" written by Philip Vos Fellman, one of the three editors of this collective work, has its origins in a previous work prepared for a NATO conference in 2003 and its major goal consisted in elucidating how the techniques of nonlinear dynamical systems modeling, combined with first

* Monica Meruțiu is Lecturer in International Relations within the Department of International Relations and German Studies, Faculty of European Studies, Babeș-Bolyai University.

Contact: monica.merutiu@mail.ubbcluj.ro.

principles of counter-intelligence, could provide solutions to the various problems of the structure of terrorist networks. The present study written a decade later benefits from an updated perspective and while many of the former principles remain the same, there have been major improvements in modeling terrorist networks, while the development of computational power has made possible a better understanding of the complexity of terrorist networks.

Chapter two, "Complex Systems Studies and Terrorism", authored by Czeslaw Mesjasz, is an insight into the systems methods that are relevant to the study of terrorism and the particular modalities in which they can be applied. It is argued that analyses resulted from Complex Adaptive Systems, consisting of various models for identifying and predicting terrorist activities, could bring significant contributions both to the research on how to deal with terrorism as a form of warfare, as well as for studying terrorism as a sociopolitical phenomenon.

The next chapter, "The Psychology of Terrorism", by Elena Mastors provides, as the title suggests, a significant study on the psychological dimension of the terrorist phenomenon, focusing on the motivations and characteristics of terrorists, and the specific stages of their radicalization and recruitment processes. The conclusions underline the idea of the imperativeness of interviewing terrorists, as well as conducting research on terrorism, and making appeal to the interdisciplinary approaches in order to cover to a wider extent this complex area of study.

In chapter four, "A Framework for Agent-Based Social Simulations of Social Identity Dynamics", M. Afzal Upal approaches the agent-based model to the social identity dynamics, considered to be imperative for our understanding of the terrorists' actions and our potential to countering their recruitment methods.

The next chapter, "DIME/PMESII Models", by Dean S. Hartley III, focuses on the complex model DIME/PMESII in order to provide an analysis of counter-terrorism strategies. The acronym PMESII refers to the Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, and Infrastructure variables that describe the status of a situation, while the acronym DIME refers to the levels of power that a (nation) state has to influence the PMESII state.

In the last chapter of the first part, “Net-Centric Logistics: Complex Systems Science Aims at Moving Targets”, Thomas Ray illustrates how a complex systems-based logistics could help prevent terrorists in a more pragmatic manner compared to the traditional centralized model. One of the most important conclusions is that “whereas in the past, preemptive battle tactics meant destruction of the enemy’s will to fight, we find today that violent suppression only makes stronger the roots of future conflict. When utter destruction is impossible, victory can be realized only by sustained cooperation” (p. 146).

In Part II of the volume the chapters are dedicated to applications and case studies based on complex systems approaches.

Thus Maurice Passman in chapter seven, “A Fractal Concept of War”, moves beyond the traditional model of war to one based on fractals, considered to better reflect and assume the complex dimensions of warfare in our contemporary world.

In the next chapter, “Disrupting Terrorist Networks: A Dynamic Fitness Landscape Approach”, authors Philip Vos Fellman, Jonathan P. Clemens, Roxana Wright, Jonathan Vos Post, and Matthew Dadmun claim that one of the most fruitful scientific approaches to the study of terrorism has been network analysis; especially if applied for disrupting the flow of communications. Their arguments illustrate the ways in which “optimal decision-making for terrorist networks might be constrained” and apply the fitness landscape approach to the formal mechanics of decision theory.

Chapter nine, “Comparison of Approaches for Adversary Modeling Decision Support for Counterterrorism” by Barry Ezell and Gregory S. Parnell, summarizes several methods used for risk analysis, stressing the need to integrate terrorism risk analysis into the intelligence cycle. It reviews some of the most common techniques: logic trees, influence diagrams, Bayesian networks, systems dynamics, and game theory, providing technical descriptions, references, as well as the benefits and limitations of each technique. It is underlined that intelligent adversaries remain a fundamental component of terrorism risk analysis and that the modeling of potential adversary attacks on homeland security is an essential opportunity to support national decision makers responsible for homeland security decisions.

Chapter ten, "The Landscape of Maritime Piracy and the Limits of Statistical Prediction" by Philip Vos Fellman, Dinorah Frutos, Thanarerk Thanakijssombat, Pard Teekasap, and Britten Schearuses is a quantitative study that explores whether there is a "learning curve" in the activity of maritime piracy. As the authors confess in the Introduction, they were able "to draw a variety of useful conclusions about maritime piracy and to draw a series of useful conclusions about the nature of this activity" and consequently they have also been able "to place the quantitative results in context, thus hopefully contributing to the successful diminution of Somali piracy" (p. 200).

In "Identities, Anonymity and Information Warfare" Stuart Jacobs, Lou Chitkushev, and Tanya Zlateva approach an interesting and poignant topic, that is identity and anonymity in cyber-warfare, as „modern information warfare embodies many different forms and types, using various computer devices and applications as weapons" (p. 221). The authors conclude that modern electronic societies can no longer allow anonymity to be generally accepted and that industries and societies need to insist that electronic infrastructures and services require authentication of network access and network-based activities. They make the claim that "removing the cover of anonymity will increase the difficulty of perpetrating attacks (including spam, phishing etc.) by cyber-criminals, terrorists, and those involved in information warfare" (p. 230).

Finally, the five chapters in Part III, titled "Broader Horizons", provide deep analyses to conflict in its diverse forms of manifestation and with its many sources: environmental factors, consequences of the climate change, socioeconomic issues, overpopulation, ethnic violence, religious and political turmoils.

In chapter twelve, "The Geography of Ethnic Violence", Alex Rutherford, May Lim, Richard Metzler, Dion Harmon, Justin Werfel, Shlomiya Bar-Yam, Alexander Gard-Murray, Andreas Gros, and Yaneer Bar-Yam We are considering the conditions of peace and violence among ethnic groups, in order to test a theory designed to predict the locations of violence and interventions that can promote peace, taking the former Yugoslavia, India, and Switzerland as main examples. Their analysis illustrate that peace "does not depend on integrated coexistence", but rather on "well-defined topographical and political boundaries separating

linguistic and religious groups”, and it supports the hypothesis that “violence between groups can be inhibited by both physical and political boundaries”; e.g. the area of the former Yugoslavia “where during widespread ethnic violence existing political boundaries did not coincide with the boundaries of distinct groups, but peace prevailed in specific areas where they did coincide” (p. 235).

Marco Lagi, Karla Z. Bertrand, and Yaneer Bar-Yam discuss in chapter thirteenth, “Food Security and Political Instability: From Ethanol and Speculation to Riots and Revolutions”, the role of food prices in producing political instability, taking as illustrative examples the violent protests in North Africa and the Middle East in 2011 as well as earlier riots in 2008 that coincided with higher rates in global food prices. The arguments claim that protests not only reflect the political failings of governments, but also “the sudden desperate straits of vulnerable populations”, and consequently that “if food prices remain high, there is likely to be persistent and increasing global social disruption” (p. 249).

This topic is addressed in the next chapter as well, “South African Riots: Repercussion of the Global Food Crisis and US Drought”, authored by Yavni Bar-Yam, Marco Lagi, and Yaneer Bar-Yam that analyze the impact of food prices in South Africa, arguing on the importance of food prices in social unrest worldwide and the suffering of poor populations, relating to the example of food prices in South Africa that have doubled since 2006, increases that are directly associated with the periods of extreme violence.

This theme is continued in the next chapter, “Conflict in Yemen: From Ethnic Fighting to Food Riots”, in which authors Andreas Gros, Alexander S. Gard-Murray, and Yaneer Bar-Yam examine the rioting triggered by food prices in Yemen, an area considered a global terrorist base for Al-Qaeda, where manifestations of violence are threatening the social order, and overall a country with an active terrorist presence. The authors show that the socioeconomic origins of violence have changed in the sense that if prior to 2008 violence can be attributed to inter-group conflict between ethnically and religiously distinct groups, from 2008 on “the increasing global food prices triggered a new wave of violence that spread to the endemically poor southern region with demands for government change and economic concessions” (p. 269).

The last chapter, "Complexity and the Limits of Revolution: What Will Happen to the Arab Spring?" by Alexander S. Gard-Murray and Yaneer Bar-Yam reviews the case of the Arab Spring, by relating to analysis on the Middle East and North Africa, providing a complex systems framework, and inferring that "in the absence of stable institutions or external assistance, new governments are in danger of facing increasingly insurmountable challenges and reverting to autocracy" (p. 281). The premises the authors hold are that revolutions have the potential to disrupt societies, they emphasize the complex challenge of forming a functional government and consequently underline the need to identify patterns across all revolutions and past unrest that may enrich our understanding of present crises. Therefore they construct and propose a theory of governmental change from the perspective of complex systems, which can be used not only to explain but perhaps even anticipate the consequences of revolutions.

Conflict and Complexity: Countering Terrorism, Insurgency, Ethnic and Regional Violence is a volume that embodies a complex approach to emphasize the need to add to the classical methods of analyzing, understanding, and combating terrorism and conflict (such as intelligence, statistical and game-theoretic modeling, and military operations) of new methods that has become evident in recent years.

Consequently, the current volume analyses such efforts- the application of network modeling and analysis to terrorism and conflict, as well as many other complex systems concepts, chaotic dynamics, self-organization, emergent patterns, and fractals that have also been applied, generating important results.