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NATIONALISM AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

Guest Editors’ Foreword

IRINA TOMESCU-DUBROW, JOSHUA K. DUBROW AND KAZIMIERZ M. SLOMCZYNSKI

Cross-National Studies: Interdisciplinary Research and Training Program (CONSIRT) of The Ohio State University and the Polish Academy of Sciences

This issue is rooted in the Conference Nationalism and Conflict: Interdisciplinary Methodological Approaches held in Warsaw, Poland, December 10 – 15, 2012. The purpose of the Conference was to bring together scholars from different disciplines on the topic of nationalism and conflict. In multiethnic societies, nationalism often leads to ethnic tension that ranges from open domestic conflict to more subtle forms, such as prejudice and discrimination. We invited papers that examine causes and consequences of both nationalism and ethnic tensions. We sought interdisciplinary perspectives on identifying where, when, how and why such tensions emerge, including remarkable instances of absence of tension, and even ethnic cooperation. Extant research on nationalism is seriously constrained by an overwhelmingly discipline-specific approach. To overcome this shortcoming, the conference aimed to explore creative methodologies that (a) recognize elements common across disciplines and (b) allow for the unique contributions of specific disciplines, sociology and political science in particular. Both the articles and opinion pieces selected for this issue of Studia Sociologia come from, or are inspired by, this conference.

The substantive questions that become increasingly important are: How is national identity formed in multiethnic societies? To what extent does strong national identity lead to conflict and protest behavior? Under what circumstances is national identity in conflict with supra-national identity? We also pose methodological questions: What are the sources of social science knowledge

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1 Institute of Philosophy and Sociology PAN and the CONSIRT program of the Ohio State University and the Polish Academy of Sciences, correspondence e-mail: tomescu.1@osu.edu.
about national identities and conflicts? What is the role of public opinion surveys and other types of data? The conference reacted to these and other questions from an interdisciplinary perspective. In broad terms, nationalism is defined here as involving individuals’ strong identification with a political, economic and/or social entity, “nation” (Spira, 1999). Under this understanding, it is nationalism that creates national identity, which in some cases equates with ethnic identity. Conceptually, identity is a complex phenomenon. Although research on group identity – ethnic identity in particular – has grown exponentially in the past few decades, there is as yet no consensus on the definition of this concept or how to measure it (Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston, and McDermott, 2006). We do not intend to enter into the debate or to offer yet another novel approach to group identity. Tajfel’s definition is a good starting point: it says that identity is “that part of the individual’s self concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group(s) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership” (Taifel, 1981: 255). It contains its affective component and concerns the degree to which individuals feel “attached” to a particular collectivity.

Articles in this issue are devoted to diversified topics of nationalism and identity: acceptance of Slovene’s minority rights in Italy (Paolo Segatti and Simona Guglielmi), commitment to places of origin of Palestinians from a refugee camp in the West Bank (Dorota Woroniecka-Krzyżanowska), the redefinition of nationhood in Germany in relation to the Muslim minority (Katarzyna Andrejuk), variation in nationalism and support for European Union integration by elites and masses across thirteen countries (Carolyn Smith Keller), the influence of national identity on well-being among youth in Bulgaria and Romania (Radosveta Dimitrova, Carmen Buzea, Vanja Ljubic and Venzislav Jordanov), and national identification of Hungarian minorities living in certain regions of Romania, Slovakia, Serbia, and Ukraine (Valér Veres). All these topics involve social, political and economic contexts where nationalism and identity are manifested. Articles in this issue show that in a so-called age of globalization, with its seemingly relentless cultural, political and economic homogenization, nationalism and ethnic identity have thrived in multiple forms and locales. One general lesson from this issue of Studia Sociologia is that nationalism and national identities have not only negative effects, such as forced assimilation of minority cultures into a national majority culture, but also positive effects in a sense of the linkage to European Union integration or influencing well-being of some segments of the population.

The opinion pieces complement the articles in this issue. First, John Mueller deals with the impact of democracy and market capitalism on extreme nationalism and fundamentalist religion. Modernization influences the relationship between government institutions and national and religious identities. Government regulation of ethnicity and religion in the form of unequal treatment by the
state and restrictions on practice and/or legislation for or against specific groups continues. As Fox stresses "[g]overnment restriction and regulation of minority religions is often a sign of the dominant religion's influence in a state" (Fox, 2006: 538). However, these restrictions and regulations make the potential rise of destructive forms of extreme nationalism and of fundamentalist religion unlikely to prevail.

Future studies on nationalism, identity and conflict on the global scale require an improvement in methodology of cross-national studies. Recognizing this need, we include two opinion pieces dealing with methodological issues. Robert M. Kunovich recommends that researchers should measure contextual variables not only for multiple geographic regions but also non-geographic contexts, such as occupations and organizations. Sandra T. Marquart-Pyatt proposes to combine structural equation modeling that includes latent variables with multilevel or hierarchical linear modeling.

We would like to point out that both the articles and the opinion pieces in this issue are diversified with respect of disciplinary approaches. Most papers represent the mainstream of sociology, but some have obvious interdisciplinary tones. John Mueller’s opinion piece is as relevant to sociologists as it is to political scientists. Segatti’s and Guglielmi’s article, as well as that by Smith Keller, belong not only to sociology but also to political science. Woroniecka-Krzyżanowska’s study is based on ethnographic materials, and integrates sociological and anthropological interpretations. Andrejuk’s analyses of the notions of citizenship and nationhood involve legal analyses of the past and current legislation. The paper by Dimitrova et al represents sociology of youth and has clear implications for social and educational policies. In his paper, Veres combines sociology and social psychology. Such diversity of disciplinary approaches is accompanied, in the articles, by variety of quantitative and qualitative methodologies.

REFERENCES

NATIONAL MINORITY AND ACCEPTANCE OF MINORITY RIGHT BY THE MAJORITY: THE CASE OF SLOVENIANS IN ITALY

PAOLO SEGATTI1 AND SIMONA GUGLIELMI2

ABSTRACT. The central idea of this article is that the reasons to claim a minority right may be more important than the right itself. In other words, it might be that the majority group tends to be more reactive to the reasons put forward to claim a right than the actual content of that right. Specifically, we hypothesize that some Italian speaking might oppose the right of the Slovenians to manifest their presence in the city centre when this right is claimed on the basis of traditional topoi of the Slovenian national narrative. We provide empirical support for this hypothesis by analyzing a study on the Slovene minority in Italy, conducted in 2006 and 2008. Our analyses seem to show that a symbolic collective right, as the bilingual signposts are, may be more likely accepted if the argument in favour does not echo the standard national narrative. People care not only about the actual content of the right, but also the reasons put forward to claim that right. This suggests that there is room, even in a place deeply divided in the past, to develop arguments in defence of the linguistic, cultural and national pluralism that still characterizes many areas of Central and Eastern Europe that are based on liberal values and are different from those engendered by received national narratives.

Keywords: minority rights, Slovenian minority in Italy, national narratives

Introduction

The concept of national minority is one that scholars and politicians do not yet agree on, as the European Council’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, the principal legal instrument designed to protect minority’s rights, openly admits. The Member states of the Council of Europe differ in the way they define the communities or groups entitled to be considered a national minority. But the framework binds each state to respect the individual and collective rights of people that can be identified as part of a

1 Università degli Studi di Milano, e-mail: paolo.segatti@unimi.it.
2 Università degli Studi di Milano, e-mail: simona.guglielmi@unimi.it.
minority group. Usually the criteria of identification consider a person as a member of a national minority group if he or she is a citizen of the state but does not share the same language, culture or traditions of other citizens, and if he or she manifests in some way the will to protect his or her diversity. In Central and Eastern Europe, where the state and cultural boundaries quite often do not overlap, a supplementary criterion is often added: the minority group members should be part of a larger national community that has its own state. Thus, to be a national minority it is necessary to have a kin state, an external homeland.

Helpful as these criteria may have been in extending the protection net for people that feel to be different from their co-citizens, they are clearly inadequate to account for the politics of national minority rights. Who decides which minority rights should be claimed or accepted? Who defines the cultural boundaries separating minority and majority groups? Who defines through which institutions and procedures a minority group member will benefit of its collective rights? Who gains from the consolidation of the organization framework that claims to represent the minority’s rights?

These and other questions cannot be answered unless we abandon a view according to which all actors involved in the protection/integration game (minority group, state and external homeland institutions) are conceived as unitary actors, as given entities. This was the seminal suggestion Rogers Brubaker (1996) advanced years ago. He rightly claimed that in order to grasp the dynamic nature of the triadic nexus between a national minority, the state and its kin state it was necessary to conceive each actor as:

continuously contested political fields. (…) What we summarily call national minorities, nationalizing states, and external homeland (…) are dynamic and relational concepts and should not be reified or treated in a substantialist fashion (Brubaker, 1996:60).

The macro context to which he was referring was Central and Eastern Europe, where the consequences of the mismatch between state and cultural boundaries are still visible today. Here still now a state may be perceived by its elite as well as by the minority as a nationalizing state, “a nation state at not sufficient degree, (a state that needs) to remedy this perceived defect” (Brubaker, 1996: 63). In a similar vein the external homeland state could be perceived as a state that includes the ancestral land of the other state minority, or a state that still has to include within its political boundaries large swaths of what national narratives consider the historical settlement of its ethno-nation. In both cases the external homeland state might be expected to take responsibility for its “co-ethnics” although they are citizens of other states.
Brubaker explicitly refers the notion of political field to the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. For Bourdieu a political field was a field where different forces and stances compete with each other to transform at its own an advantage in the power relation (Bourdieu, 2000). A political field is then different from other fields, such as the cultural or the religious or the artistic ones, because the resources available for the power competition and their rules are different. The interesting point raised by Brubaker is that he claims that a national minority is the outcome of competition and conflict different as to the size, but similar as to the dynamic, to those characterizing a state. This view represents a change in respect to the primordial perspective, according to which a national minority simply represents only a periphery culture that, thanks its strong cultural identity, was able to survive the massive process of homogenization and standardization enacted by the central state. To understand how national minority survives or integrates one needs to look at its internal politics as well as at the political interplay between the minority, the state and the external homeland, as Rokkan, among others, was suggesting decades ago.

A similar non-substantialist as well as non-romantic perspective is at the bottom of the Laitin (2007, 1999) cascades or tipping model of language shift. Laitin developed his model to explain under what conditions a minority group member, in his case a monolingual Russian speaking resident in a non-Russian ex-Soviet republic after the Soviet empire’s collapse, may shift to the majority language. It is a model helpful to understand the process of integration between two former distinct linguistic groups. But its analytical core might also be applied to explain how the political game of minority rights protection works. The two games are often conceived to obtain two opposite results: on one hand integration or, even worse, assimilation, and on the other hand survival of the minority’s cultural peculiarities through separation. But this may be a sort of misconception based on the assumption that between integration and protection there is always a zero sum game, which may not be the case if we consider how and why individuals in both camps advance their claims making salient one or another aspect of their diversities or similarities. In the end, as again Brubaker claimed, the true opposite pole to the minority rights protection claims is the idea that minority members should be forced to be similar to the majority, not the idea that they might eventually become similar, preserving what they want of their diversity (provided that they have the right to do that), but also sharing other traits with the majority. In Brubaker’s notion, each collective actor is in itself a political field.

The Brubaker notion and the Laitin model share two things. In both cases each collective entity (state, external homeland and national minorities) can be analytically conceived as the outcome of a coordination game based on interdependent choices by individuals. Individuals coordinate their action on
the basis of what they perceive is the action of others, within each collective entity and between them. Secondly, in both cases the role of political entrepreneurs is decisive since they define the size of the payoff between different choices. To use the example of David Laitin (2007: 55-56), a nationalizing state elite can increase “the cost of out-group acceptance”, as for instance the Italian fascism regime did in the interwar period prohibiting the use of German, Slovenian or Croat even in church. But minority political entrepreneurs might also manipulate the payoff costs related to the “in-group status”. For example, minority families willing to improve their children’s linguistic competence in the majority language may be stigmatized as betraying their national roots if they decide to send their children to post-school activities with curricula in the majority language. Or political entrepreneurs might manipulate the in-group status favouring a protection system where individuals can benefit from the collective rights only if they accept to share a corporate definition of their group, a situation that inevitably increases their power.

Political entrepreneurs are then crucial because they can alter the payoff costs of each individual choice. They can make the choice to integrate more likely. In the same vein, they can also influence which aspects of the cultural diversity should be protected and how it may be transformed into a right claim. But they are even more decisive, since they provide the reasons why particular minority rights should be protected.

This brings us to the central question of this paper. We think that the reasons to claim a minority right may be more important than the right itself. In other words, it might be that the majority group tends to be more reactive to the reasons put forward to claim a right than the actual content of that right. The evidence comes from a survey study on the Slovene minority in Italy, conducted in 2006 and 2008. Before illustrating the data, some words on the context.

**Historical context and problem statement**

**The Slovene minority in Italy**

Slovenians became part of the Italian state, as the Germans of South Tyrol, the Croats in Istria and the Italian speaking population of what Italians call Venezia Giulia after the First World War, as a consequence of the collapse of the former Habsburg empire (for a analysis of the two minorities see Segatti and Gugliemi, forthcoming, 2013). Slovenians and other minorities were severely repressed during the Fascist period. Starting from the 1920s, the fascist regime adopted linguistic school policies aimed to turn all minorities into Italians. As to the ambition itself, the fascist policies were not different from the linguistic homogenization policies adopted by other Central European states at that time. The real difference was as the degree of violence applied.
After World War Two, Italy lost large part of the Venezia Giulia. The communist regime in Yugoslavia “convinced” a few hundred thousand Italians to move from Istria to Italy or elsewhere. A significant part of them settled in what remained of the interwar Venezia Giulia, the Trieste and Gorizia provinces, intermixing with the resident Slovene minority.

In the decades after the World War Two a system of protection of the German and Slovenian national rights was slowly built. But differences between the two systems were large from the beginning, and they remained quite different. In South Tyrol the model of protection is based on a self government (the Autonomous province of Bözen/Bolzano) that enjoys significant margins of autonomy from the central state. According to some scholars the system of minority rights developed in South Tyrol is a de facto multinational state (Toniatti, 1994). Within this model, the most important institution is the so-called “ethnic census”. Every ten years, every resident in South Tyrol has to declare which linguistic group he or she belongs to (German, Italian or Ladino, a small alpine minority). As a consequence, all public sector jobs are strictly allocated according to the proportional size of the three groups. This implies that we know exactly how many residents in South Tyrol have declared to be part of the German minority over the year. In 2011, for example, they amounted to 314,604 persons.

The Slovene minority’s protection system did not develop as self-government, but as an array of legal instruments that only the 2001 law, (No. 38/2001, ”Norms for the protection of the Slovene linguistic minority of the Friuli - Venezia Giulia region,” February 23, 2001) made coherent across the boundaries of the province of Trieste, Gorizia, and Udine. The law protects the minority’s rights: a) without any self-declaration of being Slovenian, and b) according to the residence of the citizen in the municipalities included in the area of Friuli of the Venezia Giulia region, where most of the Slovenians actually live. According to the 2001 law a municipality can be included in this area on request of at least 15% of the citizens inscribed in the electoral lists, or at the proposal of one third of the local councilors.

Given the lack of any census-based information, any count of how many Slovenians are in Italy is tentative. Rough estimations indicate between 60,000 to 100,000 Slovenians, which means between 5% to 10% of the total population of the Friuli - Venezia Giulia region.

Differences between the German and Slovenian minority protection system produces even more important consequences. Differently from a German living in South Tyrol, everyone who feels Slovenian and wants to protect their diversity does not need to declare themselves as Slovenian. In addition, the Slovenian community is a political field where parties and groups compete about the best policies to defend Slovenian rights and about what the cultural boundaries of the minority are. In the case of the South Tyrolean minority only one rassemblement party (the SVP) has the monopoly of representation.
All in all, the Slovene minority looks like a set of individuals whose in-group membership is not a pre-condition to benefit from collective rights, since identification with the group is the outcome of a private choice. On the contrary, the German minority appears to be similar to a corporate body whose membership is indeed the precondition to benefit from the collective rights, since identification with the group is the outcome of a formal decision.

The difference between the two minority protection models seems to impact how minorities’ group members interact with the rest of Italians. According to a few survey studies (Segatti and Guglielmi, forthcoming; Susič et al. 2010), the number of Slovenian speakers who declare having dual identities (Italian and Slovenian) is increasing while in South Tyrol integration is made possible only on the basis of a strict separation between the two groups, a sort of ethno-linguistic pillarisation (Palermo, 1994).

These results, coupled with others showing an increase of Italian speaking families and mixed families that send their children to Slovenian schools, are to some extent remarkable, considering how tense the relations between Slovenians and Italians in Trieste and Gorizia were in the decades immediately after World War Two (Sivini, 1970). Many Italians living in Trieste and Gorizia were actually refugees from the small cities of what is now the Slovenian seashore. They were expelled between 1945 and 1954, when the London agreement ended the partition of part of pre-war Venezia Giulia in two zones, one under Allied Military Government administration (Trieste and six small municipalities) and the other under Yugoslav administration (Capodistria/ Koper, Isola/Izola, Pirano/Piran and the Quieto/Mirna valley in Istria).

In this context of divisive memories an issue remains unsettled: Slovenians’ right to signal their presence through signposts that are also in Slovenian, in the city centre of Trieste and Gorizia. Bilingual signposts are everywhere, even in the urban periphery of Trieste and Gorizia, but not downtown in the two cities. Many Italians, and maybe half of the Italian speaking inhabitants of Trieste and Gorizia, do not accept bilingual signposts, although only a portion of them seems to care about the issue. According to two studies conducted by Segatti and Guglielmi in 2006 and 2008 (Segatti, 2009) one out five Italian respondents in Trieste and Gorizia declared to have bad feelings when someone was talking in Slovenian in a bus and, not unpredictably, one out of four when someone was talking in a postal office or in some local government office.

Bad feelings and opposition are clearly rooted in the past conflicts and the enduring collective memories of them. But there are some interesting aspects of this opposition that are worthwhile to underline, since they highlight the main argument of this paper. We think that some Italian speaking might oppose the right of the Slovenians to manifest their presence in the city center when this right is claimed on the basis of traditional *topoi* of the Slovenian national narrative.
The Adriatic Eastern coast was a linguistically and culturally fragmented area, but linguistic fragmentation reflected a partially uneven spatial distribution. Most of the Italians used to live in the cities, although many of them were also peasants. Most of the Slovenians and Croats used to live in the countryside, although at the beginning of the last century Trieste was the largest Slovenian city. This different territorial distribution was also coupled with a different cultural perception of the political meaning of the urban-rural cleavage. Italians thought, as it is usual in many Mediterranean cultures, that the land surrounding the city belongs to the city. Slavic culture-based spatial representation insists, on the contrary, that it was the land surrounding the cities that owns the city (Ara and Magris, 1977). Secondly, under the Austrian empire the national conflict between Italians, and Slovenian and Croats very soon developed around the control of the municipalities that were in charge of the school system and its curricular language. Claus Gatterer, an Austrian journalist, said that every school at that time became quickly a “national bulwark” of the national conflict (quoted in Ara, 1991: 269). These patterns of conflict deeply influenced the respective national narratives and identities.

According to Worsdörfer (2004: 56), from the very beginning many Slovenian national precursors characterized the idea of a Slovenian identity with reference to a territory defined by clear etnična meja (ethnic border). In the past century, one of the leaders of Yugoslav communism, the Slovenian Edvard Kardelj, restated the argument with stronger overtones. Refreshing old romantic stereotypes, he claimed that “the nationality of a territory is rooted on the peasants’ language, culture, independently from what the cities’ inhabitants used to think” (Worsdörfer, 2004: 69). On the other side, Italians of the Eastern Adriatic coast developed a national identity based on a notion that being Italian is a matter of personal choice, not of ethnicity or religion or territorial roots (Ara and Magris, 1987). Thus the nationalistic argument (Worsdörfer, 2004) that Italians in Trieste and in the region were devoid of any real territorial roots, and the Italian presence in the Eastern Adriatic coast was only a sheer invention of Fascism appeared and still appears frightening. Anecdotal evidence suggests that similar arguments are still aired in some quarters of the Slovenian ideological spectrum, while among Italians survives the old stereotyping of Slovenians as mostly a rural nation.

Research hypothesis and data

Given this background, our hypothesis is that opposition to the specific right to have bilingual signposts in the center of Trieste and Gorizia might depend less upon the actual content of the right, than upon the reasons given to this clam.
Data for this paper were collected within the framework of the project "Identità, culture civiche e politiche a confronto. Una ricerca sull’Euroregione adriatica/ Identity, civic and political cultures compared: A research on Adriatic Euroregion" co-financed by the Community Initiative Programme INTERREG IIA Italy-Slovenia, Structural Funds 2000-2006 (Segatti, 2009).

A telephone survey was administered in 2006 and then in 2008 in the Italo-Slovene borderland. The target population was composed of the residents in Friuli Venezia Giulia in Italy and in the administrative Slovenian areas close to the interstate border. A stratified random sample was designed to represent the target population by age, gender and geographic areas, while quota sampling was used to select members of Slovene minority in Friuli Venezia Giulia, through a question regarding the language the respondents’ mother was using with the respondent.

Analyses presented in this article are based on a subset of the Italian sample (2006 wave), inhabitants of Provinces of Gorizia and Trieste, members of Italian majority who declared their mother-tongue was Italian; they amount to 581 respondents.

**Analysis**

The study contains information on the attitudes of Italian speakers towards Slovenians and vice versa. On the basis of this survey we were able to observe that a significant portion of respondents whose mother-tongue is Slovenian want more integration with Italy, and half feel Slovenian as well as Italian, although they are attached to the Slovenian identity to the same degree as the Slovenians of Slovenia. The study finds that almost half of the sample of Italian speaking inhabitants of Trieste and Gorizia were against the right of Slovenians to have signposts also in Slovenian in the center of the two cities. As we say previously, our expectation is that this opinion might be linked to the narratives frames legitimating the minority’s rights claims. In order to test this hypothesis, we conducted a split-ballot experiment.

As it is well known, the main advantage of experimental design consists in the possibility to manipulate the independent variables to analyze their effects on the dependent variable. Various techniques have been implemented to combine the framework of experimental designs with the inferential power of population based sampling, like split-ballot-experiments, scenario-technique, and factorial survey. In our split-ballot experiment, we randomly selected subgroups from our 2006 Italian mother-tongue respondents subsample. Then we asked their opinion about how important it was for them to have or not bilingual signposts (in Slovenian and in Italian) in the centre of Gorizia and Trieste. Afterwards, one half of the subsample, randomly selected, was asked:
“Bilingual signposts should be allowed in the city centre of Trieste/Gorizia to indicate that also the centre of the city is part of the Slovenian ethnic territory. Do you agree or disagree with this statement?” (Version A). The other half of the subsample was asked: "Bilingual signposts should be allowed in the city centre of Trieste/Gorizia to guarantee to every Slovenian speaking Italian citizen the visibility of own language. Do you agree or disagree with this statement?” (Version B). At the end of the split ballot experiment we asked the respondent to tell us how important the issue was for them.

As one can see, we manipulated the reasons that justify the right of having bilingual signposts in the centre of Gorizia and Trieste. Version A was designed to prompt reasons close to the Slovenian national narratives, and focused on the idea that national rights are rooted in the supposed ethnicity of a territory, independently of what people living there think of themselves. Respondents to Version B were prompted with a liberal reason, since it justified the right of having bilingual signposts on the basis of individual rights that are recognized to every Italian citizen regardless of their language. Table 1 shows the experimental results, distinguished between those who care about the issue and those who do not.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason of bilingual signposts</th>
<th>To indicate Slovenian ethnic territory</th>
<th>To guarantee the visibility of minority language as individual right</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Issue important</td>
<td>Not important</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>40.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td>51.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (N)</td>
<td>100% (93)</td>
<td>100% (203)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The story is simple to tell. Among those who do not consider this issue important, talking about Slovenian ethnic territory rather than about individual rights makes no difference. On the contrary, among those who feel that this topic is important, providing different reasons for the right to have bilingual signposts makes a difference. While the difference is not very large, it is large enough to suggest that our argument that people care not only about the actual content of the right but also about the reasons put forward to claim that right holds.
In fact, different reasons determine different reactions. Respondents are more likely to accept the bilingual signposts in city centres when they are exposed to reasons that emphasize individual rights than when they are prompted by "ethno-national" reasons. The experiment does not provide evidence that a more liberal justification is able to modify the balance between opposite opinions. Italians still harbour past mistrusts. As a consequence of the liberal justification that Slovenians have a right to claim bilingual signposts as Italian citizens, positions in favour of bilingualism increase by 14 percentage points, from 31% to 45%. The increase suggests the reasons proposed by those who speak on behalf of a minority are not interchangeable. In the context of the relationship between the Italian majority and the Slovene minority, attempts to argue about the minority's rights in terms of ethnic territory may backfire. Perhaps this happens because the notion of ethnic territory has played such a central role in the national narratives that nurtured the conflict between Italians and Slovenians. Talking about rights on the basis of ethnic territorial claims may frighten Italians to a greater extent than the idea that Slovenians have the right, as individuals, to make their presence and language visible.

**Conclusion**

Brubaker, in his seminal work from the 1992, laid down the conceptual basis of a political theory of minority rights. The core of it was the notion that all entities involved in the nexus between state, national minority and external homeland should be thought of as political fields, where different agents act on what others are doing or saying. From this perspective, the minority is not simply a hostage of the interstate policies and politics. Its internal forces - the argument they use when they claim their rights - can make a difference, at least in the case of a democratic regime. The case of Slovenians in Italy seems to fit this model. Slovenians were severely oppressed by the Fascist regime that wanted to assimilate them, turning with violence a Slovenian into an Italian. The attempt was a complete failure, and it also backfired after World War Two, when the communist regime in Yugoslavia -- in Soviet style -- “persuaded” many Italians to abandon their homes. After the war, majority and minority were deeply divided by opposite memories, constantly nurtured by their respective national narratives. The Slovenian narrative was often based on the notion that Italians in the region were completely alienated from the territory. Most of them were told that they were former Slovenians assimilated in the Italian culture, or immigrants from Italy when the Italian State came in 1918. In contrast, the narrative went, the territory itself was a land marked by self-evident signs of Slovenian ethnicity.
Our survey experiment seems to show that a symbolic collective right, as the bilingual signposts are, may be more likely accepted if the argument in favour does not echo the standard national narrative. People care not only about the actual content of the right, but also about the reasons put forward to claim that right. If our results should be confirmed in other studies one could say that there is room, even in places deeply divided in the past, to develop arguments in defence of the linguistic, cultural and national pluralism that still characterizes many areas of Central and Eastern Europe that are based on liberal values and are different from those engendered by received national narratives.

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IDENTITY AND PLACE IN EXTENDED EXILE:
THE CASE OF A PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CITY-CAMP

DOROTA WORONIECKA-KRZYŻANOWSKA¹

ABSTRACT². Though commonly assumed to be holding this status temporarily, according to current UNHCR statistics almost three quarters of refugees worldwide find themselves in a situation of protracted, long-term exile. Protracted exile poses a major challenge to earlier dominant academic theories that refer to refugee dilemmas with the metaphor of uprootedness and longing. The identity situation of long-term refugees is far more complex, yet it remains understudied. This article contributes to the understanding of protracted displacement through the case study of al-Am’ari, a Palestinian refugee camp located in the West Bank. Since their establishment in the aftermath of the 1948 war, Palestinian refugee camps have been symbols of national suffering and served as commemorative sites dedicated to pre-exilic locations in parts of historical Palestine. However, the interpretation of this suffering, as well as of camps’ commemorative functions, changed over time and was marked with the perceived tension between commitment to places of origin and growing domestication of, as well as attachment to, al-Am’ari. The coexistence of these seemingly contradicting sentiments can be explained with the concept of “mediated locality,” defined here as a structure of feeling territorialised in a place that acts as a symbolic representation of another site, to which individuals or groups feel attached. The empirical basis for this concept draws on eight months of ethnographic fieldwork conducted in the al-Am’ari camp at intervals between January 2010 and August 2012.

Keywords: Palestinian refugees, exile, refugee camp, commemoration, place, identity

¹ Graduate School for Social Research, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, Poland, e-mail: dorota.woroniecka@gmail.com.
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Introduction

According to the Human Security Report Project, there has been a consistent trend in regard to global state-based armed conflicts in the aftermath of World War Two. While in 1946, 47% of the conflicts were intra-state, by 2005 this figure rose up to 100% (HSRP, 2008). This profound change, among others, led Mary Kaldor (1999) to introduce a distinction between old and new wars based on differences in goals, financing and methods of warfare. According to the author, the new war financing and methods are characterized by decentralized war economies dependant on external resources and the use of guerrilla warfare techniques and instilling terror. As the aim of new wars “is to control the population by getting rid of everyone of a different identity” (Kaldor, 1999:9), combatants mainly target civilians.

Targeting civilians often involves mass expulsion of local populations. This in turn leads to growing number of refugees and internally displaced persons, estimated in 2011 by UNHCR at 25.9 million, a figure that does not include the five million registered Palestinian refugees who fall under the mandate of UNRWA. Following this trend, the 20th century was proclaimed “the century of refugees” (Loescher, 1993), the name current statistics prove to be fitting to the next century as well. What seems to be a relatively new trend, however, is the increasing number of refugees who find their condition protracted. Current UNHCR (2011) statistics show that almost three quarters of the total refugee population (7.1 million) live in a situation of protracted, or extended and long-term, exile. If we add to that the number of Palestinian refugees, the global population of long-term refugees is at least 12.1 million people.

These significant changes on the ground need to be followed by a revision of dominant theories and assumptions on refugees. There has been a tendency within the field of refugee studies, among others, to treat displacement as an anomaly in an otherwise stable and sedentary society (Malkki, 1995; Turton, 2005). Consequently, “one finds in this literature the assumption that to become uprooted and removed from a national community is automatically to lose one’s identity, traditions, and culture” (Malkki 1995:508; Malkki, 1997; Chatty, 2010). Refugees are often thought to be living in a condition of social limbo, passively waiting for return. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this concept is at times extended to include long-term refugees, as seems to be the case in Arjun Appadurai’s

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3 The HSRP (2008) distinguishes between two main types of armed conflict: (1) state-based conflicts, where at least one national government is involved; and (2) non-state conflicts fought by paramilitary groups, warlords, and other such non-state actors.

4 UNRWA – the United Nations Relief and Work Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East established in 1949. It provides education, healthcare, work and relief for Palestinian refugees, as well as it collects and runs a comprehensive database on Palestinian refugees and refugee camps.
belief that quasi-permanent refugee camps are “context-produced rather than context-generative” (Appadurai, 1996:193). Though the above-mentioned assumptions have been challenged in general, they remain ill-equipped to understand the situation of refugees living in protracted exile. For both camp and non-camp refugees, the relation between identity and place becomes increasingly complex in the situation of protracted exile. Long-term refugees often seem to be torn between the feeling of belonging to the places of origin and growing domestication of, and attachment to, sites of contemporary residence - refugee camps. These place-oriented sentiments are often portrayed as a zero-sum game, where the intensification of one is at the cost of the other (Zetter, 1999).

In this article I introduce a different interpretation of dilemmas faced by camp refugees living in extended exile, based on the concept of “mediated locality.” I define mediated locality as feeling territorised in a place that acts as a symbolic representation of another site, to which individuals or groups feel attached. I argue that quasi-permanent refugee camps can function as sites of commemoration, the habitation of which may be treated by the refugees as a proof of commitment to their pre-exilic locations. I address questions of how a refugee camp becomes a symbolic representation of refugees’ places of origin and how the fact of its inhabitation permits residents to retain the link with pre-exilic communities and locations. My interpretation is based on spending eight months on ethnographic fieldwork in al-Am’ari, a Palestinian refugee camp in the West Bank. Before addressing these issues, in the following sections I introduce the basic socio-historical context of al-Am’ari camp and discuss my data and methods.

**Al-Am’ari Refugee Camp in the West Bank**

As a result of the 1948 war around 780,000 people of the Arab population of Palestine left their homes fleeing from Israeli paramilitary groups fighting for the establishment of the state of Israel (Sharoni and Abu Nimer, 2008). For some of the refugees who had reached Ramallah/al-Bireh area in the West Bank, in 1949 the International Committee of the Red Cross established a refugee camp, later to be known as al-Am’ari. UNRWA, a UN agency founded to provide work and relief to Palestinian Arab refugees, took responsibility of the camp in the following year. Gradually the Agency replaced tents with provisional housing. Over the years, as camp inhabitants realized that their stay in al-Am’ari was likely to be extended, they began to improve housing conditions by themselves. It was done to a large extent without any formal control by UNRWA or other local institutions and the result is overpopulation of the camp (less than half a meter separates most shelters), bad ventilation and an inadequate infrastructure.
During their sixty-five years long exile West Bank refugees have lived under the condition of permanent uncertainty and insecurity. The political situation on the ground has been changing constantly, rendering “their refugee situation an ongoing rather than a temporary one” (Rosenfeld, 2002:522). The relative stability under Jordanian administration (1948-67) was followed by the years of direct Israeli occupation (1967-80 under military government; 1981-87 civic administration) the opposition to which led to the eruption of the first intifada in 1987. Throughout the six years of uprising the camp community remained actively engaged in resistance, what was met with harsh measures on behalf of Israeli military forces, including prolonged curfews, massive arrests, frequent house searches and general harassment, some of a physically violent nature. As a result of the Oslo Accords, an agreement that brought the first intifada to an end in 1993, al-Am‘ari camp found itself in Area A under sole control of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA)5. Only seven years after the agreement, however:

Palestinian resistance was engendered once again by a series of excess and contradictions, most of which were produced as a result of the division Israel made between the administration of the population [which was assigned to the PNA – DWK], on the one hand, and the control of space [which remained under Israeli authority – DWK], on the other (PNA, 2008: 172).

Though unlike the first uprising, during the second intifada Israeli counterinsurgency measures did not focus primarily on the camps, their consequences left a deep mark on al-Am‘ari community.

Today the total number of registered Palestinian refugees is as high as 5 million of which more than 1.4 million live in 58 refugee camps existing in the Gaza Strip, West Bank, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon6. Al-Am‘ari is one of 19 refugee camps located in the West Bank and is home to approximately 6,000 persons7. The camp population is very young: the age average is 26.6 years,

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5 According to Oslo Accords, the Occupied Territories were to be divided into three respective zones. In all of them the PNA took responsibility of civic institutions dealing with the Palestinian population, whereas in terms of security and policing their status has been different. In Area A, which includes all Palestinian cities and their surroundings, the PNA has been given the jurisdiction and sole responsibility of maintaining order. In Area B, which comprises many West Bank towns and villages, the PNA’s duty was to maintain public order, while security had been the matter of Israeli forces. Finally, Area C, which consists mostly of Israeli settlements, roads connecting settlements with each other and with Israel proper and the so-called ‘security zones’ (areas of strategic importance to Israel), was subjected to full Israeli civil and military control, except over Palestinian civilians (Gordon, 2008).


7 All data on al-Am‘ari presented in this section come from the UNRWA’s official al-Am‘ari Refugee Camp Profile.
with 55.4% of al-Am'ari residents being under 24 years old. The unemployment rate is 27.5%, while almost three-quarters of the camp active labour force work in private enterprises (71%), 17% in public sector and 8% in UNRWA. Approximately one-fourth of camp inhabitants acquired some sort of secondary education, with 6.2% holding a university degree or a diploma from one of the community colleges operating in the West Bank. Within the Palestinian Autonomy al-Am'ari camp is especially famous for its football team, a real champion in the Palestinian league. The camp is also renowned for its well-established NGO infrastructure, wide variety of activities for children and adults alike and an ability to attract visitors and foreign aid.

Data and methods

This article draws on eight months of fieldwork in the al-Am’ari camp conducted at intervals between January 2010 and August 2012. For the whole period of my fieldwork I lived inside al-Am’ari and I was involved in its community life, which allowed me to conduct participant observation on a daily basis. During four subsequent research trips I made fifty recorded in-depth interviews with camp inhabitants8 and was engaged in countless informal conversations; I acquired statistical data on al-Am’ari from local and regional UNRWA offices; I gathered various sort of textual data, such as brochures and books published and disseminated by camp organizations, two dissertations in social sciences written by camp inhabitants on aspects of living in a refugee camp and other documents produced by both individuals and camp institutions; I recorded substantial amount of visual data on internal and external spatial arrangements, posters, graffiti, children drawings and the like.

The Troubled Relation between Identity and Place during Extended Exile

As noted by Gupta and Ferguson (1997), at least since the mid-1990s the commonly assumed isomorphic relation between place, identity and culture has become increasingly criticized and challenged in the field of anthropology. According to the authors we are currently living in "a world where identities are increasingly coming to be, if not wholly deterritorialized, at least differently territorialized" (Gupta and Ferguson, 1997: 37), while "the irony of these times is that as actual places and localities become ever more blurred and indeterminate, ideas of culturally and ethnically distinct places becomes perhaps even more

8 Out of fifty interviews five were held in English and forty-five in Arabic. In the case of thirty one Arabic language interviews I used the help of a research assistant, while fourteen I conducted entirely on my own.
salient” (Gupta and Ferguson, 1997: 37). Despite the much-debated mobility of people across space, commonly encapsulated in the concept of globalization, the idea of homeland – be it individual, ethnic or national – remains a very powerful symbol readily used in the process of political mobilization (Smith, 1999). This ongoing practice of attaching places to particular ideologies reflects “the power places have to call forth an emotional response in us, a power which is especially potent when skilfully and artfully linked to the ideology of nationalism” (Turton, 2005:258).

Gupta and Ferguson (1997) argue that – though increasingly a common experience – the dilemmas of de-territorialization are still lived in their most advanced form by refugees, migrants and other stateless people, who form a vanguard in inventing creative ways of reconstructing links between identity and place. If this condition is to spread over other social groups and become a norm rather than an exception, then it is perhaps even more compelling reason to study those groups for whom it has already become part of the experience. For refugee studies, on the other hand, a final departure from the one-dimensional conceptualization of the relation between identity and place, often limiting it down to refugees’ persistent nostalgia for the places of origin, is also a much-needed development given discipline’s criticism for pathologizing displacement by giving into sedentarist thinking (Malkki, 1995; Malkki, 1997; Turton, 2005; Chatty, 2010). According to Malkki, to adopt such a narrow conceptualization is “to blind oneself to the multiplicity of attachments that people form to places through living in, remembering, and imagining them” (1997:72). As Clifford Geertz (1996) argues, the very assumption that territorialization of identities is inherent to the human condition seems to go unquestioned:

[for it is still the case that no one lives in the world in general. Everybody, even the exiled, the drifting, the diasporic, or the perpetually moving, lives in some confined and limited stretch of it – “the world around here” (Geertz, 1996:262).

Several studies have shown that refugees in various social and cultural contexts are pre-occupied with maintaining continuity with their pre-exilic social and physical worlds (Colson, 1971; Zetter, 1994; Malkki, 1995; Parkin, 1999; Hirschon, 2001; Hammond, 2004). The variety of practices aiming at retaining these links – for example by cherishing elements of the pre-exilic heritage, fostering the feeling of belonging to the places of origin or maintaining social relations with former fellow villagers - have also been widely described in the Palestinian context (Peteet, 2005; Gren, 2009; Chatty, 2010; Gambian, 2012). In the case of protracted exile, refugees’ relation to place has often been characterized as a tension between continuous attachment to original locations and growing
domestication of residential sites in exile. The relation between the two is commonly understood as inversely proportional and time-dependent, following the pattern where the initial attachment to pre-exilic home is gradually giving ground to adaptation to exile and domestication of the sites of contemporary residence (Zetter, 1999).

However, as some studies have shown, the relation between place and identity in protracted exile is far more complex (Malkki, 1997; Zetter, 1999; Peteet, 2005; Feldman, 2006; Agier, 2011; Gambian, 2012), particularly for refugees who, despite the passage of time, continue to inhabit a very specific urban and social setting of a refugee camp. As shown by Liisa Malkki (1996) on the example of Hutu refugees living in Tanzania, the experience of inhabiting a refugee camp is an important factor structuring refugees' understanding of exile and their relation to the places of origin; refugee status and aspirations for return play a more central role in the social worlds of camp dwellers than in those of town refugees.

Though humanitarianism is commonly accused of silencing refugees' political and historical claims (Malkki, 1996; Agamben, 1998), it "also and often unintentionally, can open new spaces of visibility" (Feldman, 2008:500). Refugee camps – these contained spaces designed to organize and bring assistance to people fleeing danger – are in themselves embodiments of the very concept of forced migration and as such can be creatively used by refugees and national politicians alike to increase the visibility of the national cause. This particular potential on behalf of refugee camps has been recognized by Ilana Feldman who argues that in the Palestinian context "refugee camps – while by no means "ordinary" dwelling spaces – exemplify the capacity of mundane spaces, objects, and practices to operate as forms of visible commemoration" (Feldman, 2008:507).

A refugee camp becomes a symbolic representation of refugees' places of origin such that the act of its inhabitation allows residents to retain the link with pre-exilic communities and locations. As victims of forced displacement, camp refugees find themselves in a particular kind of social limbo: they wait for return and the ability to resume their ordinary lives, while they remain "outside of the places and outside of the time of a common, ordinary, predictable world" (Agier, 2002:323) of the host population. With the passage of time, however, refugees address this initial condition of social limbo in their attempts to organize life anew in exile. Part of this process consist of re-territorialization that is an "effort to create new localized residential communities" (Appadurai, 2003 [1996]:345) in the camp. Through the process of re-territorialization the camp does not become simply an alternative, or a substitute, to refugees' places of origin. Rather it becomes their symbolic representation characterized by a particular form of locality through which the trauma of displacement is mediated by the experience of exile and encampment.
I adopt Arjun Appadurai’s definition of locality “as a phenomenological property of social life, a structure of feeling that is produced by particular forms of intentional activity and that yields particular sorts of material effects” (1996: 182). In the course of exile the camp becomes a mediated locality of refugees’ places of origin, a symbolic representation of their pre-exilic locations. The camp operates as a site of commemoration, a site where the initial trauma of war and displacement is transformed into suffering caused by extended exile, where the elements of pre-exilic geographies of origin are re-created both spatially and socially and where refugee identity is territorialized and fostered.

Refugee camp as a lieu de mémoire

Though the camps were established to manage and provide assistance to its inhabitants, along with these formally recognized purposes they began to operate as sites of commemoration of the Palestinian refugees’ cause. As visible embodiments of exile, the camps asserted a special symbolic and political status not only for the refugees, but also for the Palestinian nation in general. They began to function as lieux de mémoire, whose role is to “stop time, to block the work of forgetting” (Nora, 1989:19) about the injustice done to generations of refugees and the Palestinian national project. Given their symbolic significance, there has been a continuous concern over camps’ prime means of visibility, namely their physical appearance and material conditions. Refugees are active participants of the international refugee regime, conscious of the need to argue the authenticity of their suffering in front of the international community and donor organizations, if they are to secure future financial aid and political recognition (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2010). This endeavor is particularly challenging for refugees in the situation of protracted exile, when their “refugee credentials” – and hence the potential to attract resources - are very likely to be questioned (Malkki, 1996; Gambian, 2012).

Since the very emergence of al-Am’ari, its inhabitants realized camp’s role as a physical embodiment of their refugee status and the aspirations of return. There has been a conviction, which is present to certain extent till this day, that those refugees who stay in camps are likely candidates for an eventual return. In the early years of al-Am’ari’s existence some people consciously chose to settle in the camp, while in the following decades some families decided to remain in the camp for that reason. According to my interviewees, the camp’s capacity as a form of visible commemoration stems from both its internationally recognized status – as a site administered by the UN and inhabited by people holding refugee cards – and the poor living conditions prevailing at the site. In that sense “the very conditions of people’s daily lives (...) articulate both displacement and desire to return home” (Feldman, 2008:509) and the camp becomes an easily readable sign of the injustice done to Palestinian refugees, which urges those in power to relieve its inhabitants of their suffering.
Given its symbolic meaning, the very appearance of the camp’s space has been a subject of conflict and negotiation. In many Palestinian refugee camps in the Middle East, the concern over maintaining their provisional appearance led to fierce opposition, on behalf of both refugees and host populations, to any major improvements of living conditions there (Peteet, 2005, Feldman, 2008, Gambian, 2012), a phenomenon that according to Tamari was informed by a “mistaken philosophy among Palestinians that the more miserable the camp residents, the more their political position will be enhanced” (Tamari, 1999:84). Al-Am’ari has not been different in that respect. During an interview with the director of UNRWA services in the camp he mentioned that for al-Am’arians one of the hardest moments in camp’s history was when UNRWA began to replace tents with cement housing units in the middle of 1950s. Whereas the tent has been regarded a universal symbol of the provisional character of refugee status, the more “solid” cement houses were perceived as visible signs of permanency, potentially threatening the cause of return.

As the time passed, however, people began to organize their lives anew in the camp, followed by investment in housing and infrastructure. This process, which intensified in the end of 1970s and the beginning of 1980s, was – according to many of my respondents – limited by UNRWA who controlled all construction works in the camp and issued a formal ban on building dwellings higher than one floor. One of my interviewees justified this decision on behalf of UNRWA by the need to maintain the “camp-like” appearance of al-Am’ari:

they didn’t allow to make high buildings, because it is a camp, if someone sees that the camp is like two, three floors, he will say that it is not a camp (…) anybody can live in these buildings [that are in al-Am’ari now]

Following the Oslo Accords of 1993, UNRWA eased its control over construction works in the camp, for example by amending the ban to allow building two-storey houses. Since 1993, the Agency has not been very strict in exercising its powers in that domain and nowadays up to 60% of dwellings have more than two floors. With its densely populated cement houses and paved narrow alleys filled with shops and local enterprises, al-Am'ari does not resemble a popular image of a refugee camp, as a provisional arrangement of tents or makeshift shelters set up somewhere aside of the regular urban landscape of the host population. The question arises as to whether these changes in al-Am’ari’s appearance really threatened its camp status as well as its symbolic function as a site of commemoration of the Palestinian refugees’ cause.
The transposition of suffering

Camp residents’ idea of what makes al-Am’ari a refugee camp changed over the years. While in the beginning (meaning the 1950s and ‘60s) the camp-character of al-Am’ari was mainly represented through the overall aura of temporariness manifested in the camp’s appearance; its understanding gradually evolved into that of a space defined by habitation of people holding refugee status. When I asked my respondents directly what makes al-Am’ari a refugee camp after 64 years have passed, most pointed out that they, the refugees, continue to live there. In an interview with a twenty-one-year old woman from al-Am’ari, when I asked her whether considerable improvements in camp’s space could threaten al-Am’ari’s character as a refugee camp, she strongly disagreed and asserted:

We are refugees, because it is not our country. For everyone there is a homeland, everyone should be in his place, in his homeland. Because of that we will remain a camp. Wherever we will go, wherever we will come from, we will remain a camp.

What is made clear in this statement is that the camp’s existence and endurance is defined by refugees’ presence at the site. As such, the camp cannot be transformed or cancelled and it is to last until the refugees are allowed back to their pre-exilic locations.

How could this shift in understanding of what makes al-Am’ari a refugee camp be understood from a theoretical perspective? It seems that by the very act of inhabiting the highly politicized and symbolized site of a refugee camp, its dwellers are labelled as refugees as well as they assert their refugee identity through residence in this spatial embodiment of exile. Adapting Paul Connerton’s (1989) argument about the capacity of bodily practices to fulfil commemorative and mnemonic functions, the act of inhabiting a camp may be interpreted as a physical and symbolic continuation of the initial expulsion, as a means of daily reliving the suffering caused by the exile. According to Greenberg, “to remember the traumatic past is, at least to some extent, to experience the suffering caused by the original wound” (Greenberg, 2005: 93). This particular understanding of commemoration resonates with Palestinian camp refugees’ own practices and interpretations. Many Palestinian camp refugees believe that staying in the conditions of the camp - often miserable despite the described improvements - is a form of steadfastness, of expressing their commitment to the places of origin, as well as of not agreeing for the contemporary status quo.

As noted by Gambian (2012) in the case of Palestinian refugees, suffering in its existential dimension is crucial for their sense of identity and understanding of history. By emphasizing their loss and suffering, both that related to expulsion...
and life in the camp, camp inhabitants aim to restore continuity with their pre-exilic lives and localities. Avishai Margalit has argued that reliving the past can take the form of displacing “that which brought the trauma about with a different object that is somehow associated with the object of the past” (Margalit, 2002: 126). In that case, the suffering caused by prolonged exile and encampment can to some extent replace the trauma of the initial flight, while it remains its natural consequence. The experience of loss and displacement is mediated through the experience of encampment, namely living in a space designed by definition as a temporary and imperfect substitute of refugees’ original locations.

**The refrain of home**

It is not only the suffering through which the camp becomes a representation of refugees’ places of origin. In the case of many Palestinian camps researchers have noted refugees efforts to re-create both communities and places of origin in the space of the camp (Bisharat, 1997; Peteet, 2005; Gren, 2009; Chatty, 2010). In the chaos of the 1948 war, people often fled in groups so that when they reached a safe place family members and former neighbours tended to settle next to each other. Therefore many camps began to resemble a patchwork-like structure of neighbourhoods representing pre-exilic locations (and often named accordingly), where former co-villagers or fellow townspeople lived in both physical and social proximity. The process of refugees’ settling in al-Am’ari took a very similar path. Till this day four of camp neighbourhoods are called after their inhabitants’ places of origin (Na’ane, Annaba, Abu Shushe and Malha quarters) and, even though their initial homogenous composition has diversified, these names continue to be used as important markers of camp’s space. During first decades after camp’s establishment al-Am’ari refugees functioned mainly within the pre-1948 social networks, while in the course of exile these loyalties gradually gave ground to broader camp solidarity. Nevertheless, at present there are three heritage societies whose role is to integrate al-Am’arians of shared origin (namely: Society of Lid, Society of Na’ane and Society of Annaba) and organize various activities to nurture pre-exilic traditions and distinct local identities.

This practice of “re-creating certain aspects of home imbues the camp with form and meaning otherwise absent in exile” (Parmenter, 1994:67). This is to say that retaining links with the pre-exilic past is not simply a past-oriented attempt to secure continuity of identity (which may otherwise be felt lacking in the context of exile), but it can also be a future-oriented and instrumental strategy of accustoming oneself to life in exile. In her analysis of the latter on the example of camp refugees in Gaza, Ilana Feldman used Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) concept of “territorial refrain” through which a particular space is being organized
and domesticated. According to the author “the repeated articulation of memories participates in and animates a refrain of home that shapes people’s experiences of their communities, of themselves, of their past and of their future” (Feldman, 2006:15). The elements of pre-exilic life are necessary building blocks of the process of domesticating camp’s space and organizing life anew in exile. Particularly for refugees living in unstable political contexts, it is the past that represents safety and well-being and therefore can serve as a stable point of reference both individual and group identity can rest upon. For the West Bank refugees their extraordinary long exile has been marked by ongoing crises of military, political, economic, and at times humanitarian, character (Gordon, 2008). In the situation of ever-changing circumstances, the imagined geographies of pre-exilic home as well as the theme of return, form a stable point of reference for al-Am’arians’ contemporary identities and a powerful vision they can adhere to.

In the case of prolonged exile, refugees’ efforts to domesticate the camp’s space, initially focused around re-creating aspects of pre-exilic home, take a variety of forms. In general each camp comes into existence as a result of some historical event (which caused the expulsion), but it also defines a framework for a new social life to begin. With the passage of time and through the efforts of individual refugees and local camp institutions, strong social ties develop between camp inhabitants (Hamzeh, 2001). It has been particularly visible in the case of West Bank refugee camps, where ongoing political crises – such as first and second intifadas – resulted in intensification of local vis-à-vis family bonds, in a society that is traditionally known for the prevalence of family ties over friendly and neighbourly ones (Hanafi, 2007). Many individual camps emerged as new social entities, characteristic not only of inner-cohesiveness, but also of sharp boundaries separating them from the outside world (Johnson, 2007). It was certainly the case in al-Am’ari, where under difficult circumstances the largely ad hoc grouping of people fleeing danger transformed itself into a strong local community its inhabitants grew attached to.

Aside from the fact that staying in the camp strengthens their case as Palestinian refugees, many of the people I talked with emphasized their attachment to al-Am’ari; the camp has become their place of belonging, the place they are going to defend if necessary. My thirty-two-year old male interviewee expressed it in a following way:

Belonging, that’s it, belonging. In my life I got used to the camp life (...) the camp became my city, my village. And what is more, al-Am’ari, it is all about coming back, to our country, as long as we are living in the camps our cause will continue to be heard and seen. But if we went, went out of the camps, we would wipe out any right to ourselves.
What is particularly interesting in this statement is that there seems to be no inconsistency between being strongly attached to the camp as a place of one’s belonging, and in the same time treating one’s presence in this place as a proof of belonging (or right) to another space.

**Territorialization of refugee identity**

Despite the passage of time and thanks to the continuous effort on behalf of camp inhabitants, al-Am'ari remains a refugee camp, where the themes of exile, refugeedom and right to return continue to play a key role in forming local camp identity and binding the community together. Maurice Halbwachs argued "that it is through their membership of a social group (...) that individuals are able to acquire, to localize and to recall their memories" (Connerton, 1989:36). Al-Am'arians form a strong camp community bounded by common memories of the pre-1948 Palestine, experiences of exile and aspirations for return. By living in both physical and social proximity camp inhabitants are able to foster their common refugee identity through daily practices of communicative memory. As noted by Assmann, every individual memory constitutes itself in communication with others' where the others are “not just any set of people, rather they are groups who conceive their unity and peculiarity through a common image of their past” (Assman, 1995:127). Al-Am'arians' individual memories are shaped through communication and daily encounters with fellow refugees, a grassroots process that leads to production of highly localized narratives of the pre-exilic lands, somehow independently from, or parallel to, the official discourses instigated by state institutions and political parties (Khalili, 2004).

Many al-Am'arians realize that the camps’ capacity as a site of commemoration is directed both outwards - that is to the Palestinian nation and the international community - and inwards to keep successive generations of camp inhabitants committed to the pre-exilic Palestine and the cause of return. When I asked my thirty-two-year old interviewee whether he would like his children to move out from the camp, which in practice often means living in better conditions, he said that he would prefer them to stay. He explained himself by saying that in general camp inhabitants should be encouraged to remain steadfast in the camp, as it is the only way of securing the Palestinian cause. In the further course of the interview he explained that steadfastness in the camp is not only a matter of sending a message to the world, but it is also about keeping future generations aware of the injustice that was done to them. According to him, while living in the camp children begin to ask themselves questions:
Tomorrow he will ask himself: why am I in the camp and not in a village or a city? Because he knows that he has a village, the Jewish drove him out of it and he has the right to come back.

By living in this highly politicized and historicized space new generations of camp inhabitants are brought up in the culture of not forgetting their original lands and contemporary rights. Many people I talked with had expressed a conviction that refugees living outside the camp, particularly those residing in good conditions, are more likely to give up the cause of return, though the verification of this claim is beyond the scope of this research.

Conclusion

Given the prevailing trends of forced displacement, quasi-permanent refugee camps become increasingly common forms of refugee settlement. Taking into account these developments, Michel Agier has argued that “the background model of research on present-day camps is that of the Palestinian camp” (2011:188), understood not as a makeshift place of waiting, but rather as a site of emplacement endowed with potential for creating new hybrid identities. This is to say that even in the situation of a seemingly total de-territorialization, namely forced displacement, people do employ various practices of place-making. With the passage of time and thanks to the efforts of its inhabitants, camps emerge as new socio-spatial entities. Contrary to what may be a common assumption and an often employed interpretation in studies on refugees, domestication of camps’ space does not have to mean fading attachment to places of origin. My research findings suggest that camp’s space may be constructed and understood as a symbolic representation of refugees’ places of origin, while refugees’ relation to that space, and the emergent camp community, as a mediated locality through which the pre-exilic past is being lived in exile.

In this article I distinguish four aspects of this phenomenon on the example of al-Am’ari refugee camp in the West Bank. First is the camp’s capacity to fulfil the role of a national lieu de mémoire, a physical embodiment of exile that serves particular commemorative functions for local, national and international audiences. Second, for some refugees the very fact of inhabiting a camp may be treated as an extension of the initial trauma of displacement and therefore an expression of the continuous commitment to their places of origin. Third, in the process of domesticating the camp’s space and forming a camp community, elements of pre-exilic physical and social worlds have been re-created in al-Am’ari, what allowed for retaining some form of continuity with the pre-1948 past. Fourth, the camp is a place where the refugee identity of its inhabitants has become territorialized and can be expressed and fostered on daily bases.
I argue that, apart from its contribution to understanding the condition of prolonged encampment, the phenomenon of mediated locality is an interesting case for exploring possible relations between identity and space, a topic that is very much debated in contemporary anthropology and sociology.

REFERENCES


MUSLIM IMMIGRATION AND ITS INFLUENCE ON THE REDEFINITION OF NATIONHOOD IN GERMANY

KATARZYNA ANDREJUK

ABSTRACT. The objective of my article is to describe how immigration modifies the political vision of nationhood – citizenship – basing on the example of Germany. Since the 1960s, Germany has been a land of immigration for numerous ethnic groups. The economic development and need for blue-collar workers in various sectors of German industry attracted immigrants from poorer countries of Southern Europe and Asia. Many of them came from a Muslim cultural background. The largest group of Muslim immigrants originated from Turkey; other groups included Muslims from regions of former Yugoslavia. They were supposed to stay in Germany only temporarily, and this assumption was mirrored by the name this group was given: “guest workers” (Gästarbeiters). However, in spite of the efforts made by the German government, many Muslim immigrants did not return to their countries when the period of economic prosperity was over. A second and third generation of immigrant children was born. Currently, the Turkish diaspora constitutes 80% of German Muslims; their population is estimated at 2.5 - 3 million. This forced a shift in the German policy of citizenship. Before Germany became a country of immigration, it developed an “ethnic” model of citizenship (as opposed to the “civic” French model, as described by Brubaker), which was granted to individuals with German parents (jus sanguinis). This strict model was loosened, and citizenship legislation amendment in 2000 enabled the children of Muslim immigrants to acquire German citizenship. After a decade of functioning of the new citizenship model, it has proved to contribute to a conversion from an ethnic to a multicultural and cosmopolitan community. I outline the prevailing divisions in German society: they are no longer based on citizenship, but rather on economic factors: access to employment, housing conditions and education opportunities. I also compare the development of the notions of citizenship and nationhood in Germany to the changes in other European countries, such as France and Sweden, which occurred in the same time.

Keywords: citizenship reform, immigration, Muslim diasporas, Germany

1 Institute of Philosophy and Sociology - PAN, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, e-mail: katarzyna.andrejuk@gmail.com.
The mass migration flows to European countries, which occurred in the second half of the 20th century, challenged the vision of a traditional nation-state. This confrontation was especially sharp in countries like Germany, where the notion of nationhood had very strong ethnic connotations. The clash of cultures seemed particularly interesting in case of Muslim immigrants, who personified the most exotic and unknown aspects of "the Other": different religion, style of life, language and cultural tradition far from the European one.

The article has the following order. First I discuss most significant sociological theories concerning current changes in the institution of citizenship and national belonging in the age of migrations. Then I describe the history of Muslim diasporas in Germany. I concentrate on the migration flows in the 1960s and 1970s, because these waves formed the fundamentals of today's Muslim communities in Germany. I analyze immigrants’ educational achievements and their situation on the labour market, which leads to a conclusion about inheriting the low social and economic status of parents by the second and third generation of Muslims living in the Federal Republic. The main part of the article examines changes of citizenship and immigration law in the 1990s and 2000s. I describe how the changes in the legal framework influenced social activities of Muslim immigrants. Two main questions are posed: whether the citizenship reform can be acknowledged as a success and whether it changed the socio-economic (class) divisions in German society.

Citizenship and participation: overview of sociological approaches

Since the 1990s, even before the German reform of naturalization law, numerous sociologists have analyzed the contemporary global transformations of citizenship regimes on the example of Germany. The Federal Republic forms a fascinating illustration of intricate relationships between laws of naturalization and a nature of a political community. In the public discourse, it had been traditionally perceived as a nationally homogeneous country for many years. Even after the inflow of immigrants in the 1960s it has been publicly stated that “Germany is not a country of immigration” – a formula which has been called a “German self-denial” (Kolb, 2008). The rules of citizenship acquisition constituted an important part of the prevailing vision of the German nation.

As Rogers Brubaker (1990) noticed, in the age of the nation-state, the politics of citizenship has been also a politics of nationhood; in consequence, all debates about citizenship bring down the debates about nationhood. He argued that German idea of citizenship presupposed a political membership which is simultaneously a membership in a cultural community, united by a language, tradition, “national character” and common descent. Originally, the German model of membership in a community presumed that nationhood was
constituted by ethnocultural unity and expressed in a form of political agreement. Brubaker opposed the German vision of nationhood: “particularist, organic, differentialist and Volk-centered” to the French concept of nationhood – “universalist, rationalist, assimilationist and state-centered”. He linked this specific understanding of nationhood with two phenomena: German Romanticism and Prussian reforms (Otto Bismarck and his politics which led to the unification of German states in the 19th century). However, it was also argued that this model influenced German provisions on citizenship which had been in force since 1913 and had endured until the reforms which amended the law partially in 1990 and then more radically in 2000 (Brubaker, 1990: 5–16; 1992: 3-17). In Brubaker’s approach, differences in citizenship practices and policies, observed in various European states, are the result of different visions of nationhood in particular states. This article argues that the abovementioned rule is also applicable to changes in citizenship law of one specific country: the radical amendments of law are the consequence of modifications in defining nationhood.

The institution of a state citizenship is also influenced by the developments on the international level. The changing patterns of community allegiance have been described as postnational citizenship (Soysal, 1995). Postnational citizenship derives its legitimacy from universal human values rather than national belonging. Yasemin Soysal (1997), describing a fundamental modification in the understanding of citizenship, perceives it as a consequence of three processes. First is intensification of transnational discourse and internationalization of human rights within such organizations as United Nations or Council of Europe. Second is the growing recognition of the right of an individual to cultivate his own culture and identity. Third is the partial loss of sovereignty by the nation-states caused by emergence and widening competences of international organizations like the European Union. These new challenges reshape the traditional institution of citizenship, because “rights that were once associated with belonging in a national community have become increasingly abstract and legitimated at the transnational level, within a larger framework of human rights” (Soysal 1997: 1 – 2). Participation and membership in community life is no longer determined only by the possession of national citizenship; Soysal illustrates it on the example of Muslim immigrants in Germany, stating that members of the Turkish diaspora living in Germany, even without a formal passport of the Federal Republic, make claims on Berlin’s authority structures and participate in municipal institutions (Soysal 1997: 1, 6).

Similarly to Soysal, Saskia Sassen (2002) argues that the process of nationalizing citizenship which one observed over the last two centuries, is finished. Yet, partial denationalization of citizenship takes place. A significant aspect of this phenomenon is increasing acceptance to multiple allegiances and dual citizenship. The process of denationalization of citizenship is, *inter alia*, the effect of economic
globalization: states attempt to resolve their conflicts peacefully, avoiding war because of economic pressure from internationally-operating companies, and they no longer need dedicated patriotic soldiers. Citizens' loyalty is less crucial to the state than in the times of warfare (Sassen 2002). In Sassen's approach, the reinvention of citizenship takes place mostly in denationalized spaces such as global multicultural cities with large immigrant populations.

Christian Joppke tried to reconcile the theoretical approaches of Brubaker and Soysal, stating that two fundamental modes of community belonging have been visible in Germany since the 1960s until (at least) the end of 1990s. The first mode, traditional ethnic citizenship, existed only for native Germans, who formed the most exclusive part of the society. The second mode, postnational membership, was available for immigrants as a partial substitution of Staatsburgerschaft - full participation in the host society. Joppke characterizes the German reunification (1990) as a breakthrough moment for citizenship regime. The period between 1950 and 1990 was characterized by the most intensive remigration of ethnic Germans from Russia to their homeland. After "demise of ethnic diaspora to redeem", as Joppke argued, there no longer existed a rationale for maintaining the model of ethnic citizenship. The fundamental changes in the perception of citizenship and naturalization appeared thus a long time before the most radical reform of naturalization law in 2000 (Joppke, 1999).

**History of Muslims in Germany**

Muslims have been present in Germany since the 17th century, when first Turks came as war prisoners. In the Interwar period, Muslims who lived in Germany were mostly students or asylum seekers. The large wave of Muslim immigration started after the World War Two, in the period of economic prosperity (1960). Germany signed international agreements enabling the arrival of labour force (Gastarbeiter) from other countries. The agreements were signed i.a. with: Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963), Tunisia (1965) and Yugoslavia (1968) (Nalborczyk 2005). The economic immigration included also substantial inflows from non-Muslim southern European countries, such as Italy, Spain and Greece; their integration in the second or third generation occurred more successful than in the case of Muslim immigrants. Gastarbeiter were unqualified immigrants, they were hired for blue collar jobs in the secondary segment of the labor market, often in the heavy industry and building industry. They came mostly from rural areas of their respective countries (for example religious region of Anatolia in Turkey), and they settled in German metropolises: Berlin, Köln, Munich and Hamburg. The clash they experienced was not only a clash between Turkish and German culture, but also between countryside lifestyles and life in European big cities.
The recession in Germany 1973-1974 caused the government to officially finish the guest worker recruitment. The immigrants were encouraged to return to their home countries, e.g. by financial incentives. However, contrary to the political intentions and expectations of the German government, not many immigrants took advantage of this chance; moreover, the immigrants (mostly men) were joined by their families, wives and children. Muslim immigrants were no longer guests; they settled down and developed diasporas. The unexpected consequences of the labour migration were famously summed up by an Austrian writer Max Frisch: “we wanted labour force but people came instead”.

Today the Turks are the majority of the Muslim community in Germany. The Turkish diaspora constitutes 80% of German Muslims. Their population is estimated at 2.5 - 3 million and over 1.5 million Turks are treated as foreigners because they are not naturalized (Table 1). Besides, the most numerous Muslim groups are Muslims from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, Iran, Morocco, Lebanon. Smaller groups include immigrants from Pakistan, Syria, and Tunisia. However, the typical Muslim in Germany is of Turkish descent. This ethnic minority played the most important role in shaping the image of a contemporary German Muslim and influencing the German immigration and citizenship policies.

### Table 1.

**Foreign-born Muslims in Germany by country of origin**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries of origin</th>
<th>Number of foreign-born Muslims in Germany</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Europe, of which:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>7,262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Yugoslavia</td>
<td>346,917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Turkey</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,506,410</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Asia of which:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>1,136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>5,826</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of CIS</td>
<td>6,163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>32,915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South/Southeast Asia, of which:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>34,885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>3,772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>India</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,297</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia/Malaysia</td>
<td>26,091</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.
Muslim community in Germany is very fragmented and heterogeneous. The complicated character of the Muslim community is induced not only by different countries of origin of Muslim immigrants, but also by divisions in particular Muslim groups. The largest Muslim diaspora, Turks, is much diversified as well. Majority of the Turks are Gärtarbeiter and their children (or grandchildren), but there are also asylum seekers, leaving their countries for political reasons. Such group is e.g. Kurds from Turkey (and Iraq). Most of German Muslims are Sunni, which is a main branch of Islam in Turkey and Bosnia. However, there are also groups of Alevi Muslims, who are liberal and prone to the integration processes, easily accepting cultural values of Western societies. Besides, there are groups of the most conservative branch, Shia Muslims, who emigrate mostly from Iran. In consequence, the tie that binds Muslim communities in Germany, is the public image of Muslims. What is common for different members of the Muslim group, is that they are all perceived as “Ausländer”, foreigners and strangers.

**Muslims in education and on the labour market**

Muslims in Germany stem from poor backgrounds, as the first generation of immigrants were usually uneducated blue-collar workers. This low social status is often inherited by second and also third generation. Currently ethnic divisions in Germany overlap with class divisions. Descendants of immigrants from African or Asian countries (counting Turkey as a part of Asia) are less educated than ethnic Germans and their situation on the labour market is worse – in terms of wages, positions and unemployment rate.
Exclusion begins in the educational institutions. Results of PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment) show that immigrant pupils’ achievements are significantly lower (compared to natives) in key school subjects such as mathematics, reading and science. In many cases it is a consequence of poor knowledge of the language of instruction, because in cases of some minorities (e.g. Turks) children of immigrants do not speak German at home (OECD, 2003). Immigrants in Germany generally tend to have lower education than natives. However, the disparities between average level of education are especially significant when we compare native Germans and Turkish immigrants. The number of ethnic Turks born in Germany (second or third generation) who passed the *Abitur* – High School Final Exam – is 50% lower than the average figure reported for native Germans. This difference exists in spite of the fact that second and third generation is generally better educated than the Turks who came from their home country in the 60 and 70 (those born in Germany have *Abitur* twice as often as the first generation immigrants) (Woellert, Kröhnert, Klingholz 2009).

German official statistical data on employment does not distinguish between different religious backgrounds; neither does it provide the information on nationality of ethnic affiliation of the explored population. However, it is estimated that unemployment rate among immigrants and immigrant descendants is about twice as high as for the whole population. Groups especially endangered with unemployment are those of Turkish, Serbian and Russian descent (Woellert, Kröhnert, Klingholz 2009). In some federal states the unemployment among young Muslims during the difficult period in the labor market increased to about 30 percent (Anwar, Blaschke, Sander 2004). Numerous immigrants escape from unemployment by establishing their own firms. Self-employment is very popular among Muslim minorities. For example, Turks are twice as likely to take up self-employment as any other minority group in Germany (Constant, Shachmurove and Zimmermann, 2007).

Members of ethnic minorities, especially those of Turkish descent, are also pushed towards the unskilled occupations; immigrants are under-represented in stable and well-paid jobs and outnumber the native Germans in unskilled and menial jobs (Kogan, 2003). These findings have led Kogan to the conclusion about the formation of an ethnic underclass in Germany. Members of alluvial minorities earn less even when they obtain a job. The research has shown that there are significant wage gaps between native Germans and immigrants. Those gaps exist also between natives in Germany and citizens with immigration background (in case of men, they are even higher for those who are naturalized than for immigrants without German citizenship) (Aldashev, Gernandt and Thomsen, 2008).
Similar patterns of socio-economic marginalization and alienation are observed within immigrant Muslim minorities in other European countries. It was explored in the comparative study of the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, published in 2006. In many European Union Member States the rates of unemployment among immigrant groups in the first decade of 21st century were much higher than the average for the host society. For example, Belgian official data has shown that the unemployment rate for members of Turkish and Moroccan diaspora was 38%, while at the same time the unemployment rate in Belgium was 7%. In the United Kingdom Muslims had the highest unemployment rate (13%) and it even increased in case of Muslim women (18%). In the Netherlands, 16% of foreigners and their descendants did not have a job, while the unemployment rate in the host society oscillated between 6 and 7%. The OECD Report stated that in many European countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany and the Netherlands – there are huge differences in school performance existing between pupils from native populations and those from the immigrant background (EUMC, 2006: 45, 53).

As the figures on economic and educational marginalization show, the underachievement of Muslim minorities in these areas is the crucial problem of integration politics. The change of naturalization regime which occurred in 1990 and in 2000 can be also understood as a political attempt to reduce the sharp class divisions between majority and immigrant minorities. The symbolic inclusion of different groups into the German nation was expected to translate into the economic and educational inclusion.

**Changes in citizenship and immigration law**

The politics of integration practically did not exist in the first decades of presence of Muslim *Gastarbeiter* in Germany; its substitute was “Multikulti”, which allowed immigrants to live their separate lives and in fact deepened their alienation. The immigrants were supposed to return to their home countries after their work contracts expire. Muslim immigrants were permitted to live as they wanted, however the extreme *laissez-faire* politics (lack of positive integration efforts) led to the complete isolation of this group and creation of “parallel universes”. Muslim immigrants lived in Germany, but settled in separate poor districts and shopped in ethnic shops owned by other immigrants. Many of them did not learn to speak German. They did not participate in public life because they did not have German citizenship. They had no voting right and could not be elected as members of state bodies. The German *jus sanguinis* only allowed that children born to German parents obtained German citizenship. It has been identified with a vision of an “ethnic nation” (Brubaker, 1992) – “community of descent”, restrictive towards non-German immigrants, based on common history, tradition, culture and language.
This connection of ethnic descent and citizenship became particularly controversial in the 1990s (Hailbronner, 2012). Large numbers of immigrants from Eastern Europe and Russia arrived in Germany; they and their families were entitled to privileged acquisition of German citizenship. Some of them had never been to Germany before, but they obtained a legal and social status far superior to that of "Muslim immigrants" who had lived in the country for decades.

Some changes in naturalization rules were introduced in years 1990-1993. The amendment of Citizenship Law provided for the possibility of naturalization after 15 years of residence – in case of first generation immigrants and after 8 years – in case of immigrant children born in Germany. This increased the naturalization rate; just in a year, 45,000 immigrants from the first and second generation applied for and obtained German citizenship.

A political idea which triggered the breakthrough changes in citizenship and naturalization regime was the concept of a core (leading) culture – Leitkultur. It was introduced by Bassam Tibi, a Muslim scientist working in Germany. Tibi stated that contemporary processes of globalization of structures (in economy, politics, transport and communication) are not necessarily followed by universalization of values in different communities. In consequence, radical fragmentation of society occurs. Tibi proposed a solution which he called a core culture formed as a connection of values (Werte-Verbindlichkeit) as opposed to "randomness of values" (Wertebeliebigkeit). The core values of the Leitkultur were defined as democracy, laicism, enlightenment, human rights and civil society (Tibi, 1998: 153 – 154). The term was then popularized by the Christian – Democratic member of Bundestag, Friedrich Merz. The concept of Leitkultur enabled the redefinition of "nation" as a community based on common democratic values, mutual respect and tolerance, rather than on blood and common ancestors.

The old citizenship regulations, implemented in 1913, were fundamentally amended in 2000 when the new citizenship legislation came into force. The reform was initiated by the leftist coalition of SPD (Social Democratic Party of Germany) and the Greens Party, which came to power in 1998. The project of the new citizenship law reflected a long-time policy of the Social Democrats, who attempted to pass the liberalized laws on naturalisation back in 1982 and 1989; the previous attempts were not successful because of the conservative majority in the parliament (Howard, 2008: 47). In 1999 the right side of political scene, represented by CDU-CSU (Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union), opposed the changes too. It was argued that the new law would pose a threat to the German identity, that it would induce wild waves of immigration and lead radical Muslim parties into the German parliament. Eventually, in order to win the majority support in Bundesrat, the government complied with some reservations of conservative critics, and limited the permissibility of dual citizenship (Ingram and Triadafilopoulos, 2010: 374-375).
The new law introduced the *jus soli* principle: since then, a child of foreign parents could acquire German citizenship on the condition that one parent had legally had her habitual residence in Germany for eight years and that he or she had a residence permit. An „optional model” of citizenship was implemented: the applicant had to choose one nationality. Dual citizenship was not accepted. The reform created an obligation for those who had dual citizenship as children to decide between the age of eighteen and twenty three which nationality to keep and which to abandon (*Optionspflicht* – art. 29 of the *Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz*). Current research has shown that in most cases (88%) the young adults opt to choose German citizenship, and they are supported by their immigrant parents in this decision. In the decision-making process, pragmatic reasoning seems to dominate. Young people choose German citizenship because they want to retain all their rights connected with the national citizenship (86,4%), as well as the rights connected with the European Union citizenship (85,3%), which is granted automatically to every citizen of the EU Member State. Less important in the option decision was the "feeling of being German" (53,3%) (Weinmann, Becher and Gostomski, 2012; Worbs, Scholz and Blicke, 2012).

The citizenship law introduced in 2000 changed the notion of nationhood in Germany. The country shifted from a traditional "jus sanguinis" model to "jus soli". This was widely perceived as a shift from an ethnic nation towards civic nation. Naturalisation process was facilitated: foreigners were entitled to naturalisation after a residence period of eight years instead of fifteen years. The applicant should "confirm his or her commitment to the free democratic constitutional system" of the Federal Republic of Germany and declare that he has never pursued or supported any activities subverting this democratic order; the applicant should have a permanent right of residence or a residence permit; he should be able to ensure his own subsistence and the subsistence of his dependents without taking advantage of the state benefits; he should give up or lose the previous citizenship; he should not have criminal record. The applicant’s spouse and children could be naturalized together irrespective of whether they have been residents for 8 years.

This legislation was supplemented by the new immigration law (*Zuwanderungsgesetz*) which was introduced in 2004. The new Immigration Act put emphasis upon integration requirements, including the right to naturalization dependent upon a proof of sufficient knowledge of the German language. Citizenship applicants who completed an integration course (language course, German history and political system) obtained an additional privilege: the required time of lawful residence for naturalization has been reduced for them from eight to seven years (Hailbronner, 2012).

The citizenship law was once again amended in 2007. The change concerned the naturalization requirements - standards of knowledge of the German language were specified. New regulations envisaged obligatory provision
of German language certificate – only few exceptions were made for some special categories of immigrants. The new law also envisaged adoption of integration tests (Hailbronner, 2012).

Statistics on naturalization show that five years after the new law was introduced, its popularity is declining. Fewer immigrants obtain German citizenship. The most significant drops in the number of naturalization were registered in years 2001-2003 and 2006-2008 (Table 2). K. Hailbronner counted that the declining interest in full legal integration resulted in a decrease of acquisitions of citizenship of more than 40% between 2000 and 2011. For example in 2010, only 26,190 Turkish nationals were naturalized, 9,898 came from African countries and 26,155 from Asia (including 5,227 from Iraq and 3,044 from Iran) (Hailbronner, 2012).

In spite of the critical evaluation of new citizenship regime and proclaiming its failure at attracting citizenship applicants, some official data oppose the pessimistic view of unsuccessful integration. The records from different EU Member States show that the naturalization rate in Germany is much higher than in many other European countries (Table 2). Citizenship acquisitions are at similar level in Europe’s biggest immigration countries: Germany, France and the United Kingdom. There is also a noticeable difference between Germany as a multicultural state and homogeneous states of Central and Eastern Europe – like Poland, Slovakia or Lithuania, where the number of naturalizations is incomparably lower. This variance is significant even if we take into account the difference in population of the respective countries. The lowering number of citizenship applications in Germany may be explained partially by the fact that most of the members of minority groups have taken advantage of the new naturalization regime in the first years after the new law was enforced. Contemporary migration to Germany does not reach the size of 1960s and 1970s migration flows, the “naturalization market” is saturated and the interest in citizenship applications is understandably smaller than 10 or 20 years ago.

In terms of political participation of Muslim Germans, available figures provide for a diversified and ambiguous picture of civic and political activity of the group. During the last decade, German activists of Turkish descent have put themselves on a map of German politics. One of the most prominent German Turkish politicians Cem Özdemir, was a Member of European Parliament until 2009. Currently there are five German-Turkish deputies in Bundestag (including three women), who represent mostly liberal parties (the Greens, SPD, the Left party). On the other hand, there are no official quantitative data about the number of naturalized citizens voting in the federal or local elections. Nevertheless, research has been done by Meral G. Yalcin about various forms of political participation (including writing letters to politicians, participation in a public discussion, working in a political office or in a committee, writing a letter to
the media, belonging to a political party, taking part in a citizen initiative, financial donation to a political group, signing a petition, participation in a demonstration, participation in a strike) of the immigrant youth in Germany. It occurs that participation in such actions varies among different ethnic groups: the Turks seem to participate less than European minorities – Italians and Greeks. Nevertheless, highest rate of political participation occurred among immigrants who obtained German citizenship or applied for it (Yalcin 2009: 7-8). Liberal politics of naturalisation and growing number of citizenship acquisitions may thus enhance political activity of the group in other fields.

The reforms of citizenship and immigration law in Germany were a part of a more general trend in European countries: towards the modification and adaptation of naturalization rules in order to meet the needs of immigrant (most often Muslim) communities. For example, majority of the Western European countries have accepted dual citizenship with exceptions of Austria, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands. Besides, states began to transform the habitually vague naturalization requirements that needed administrative interpretation into clearly defined criteria with uniform methods of assessment (Goodman, 2010: 12, 22). In France the Guigou law introduced in 1998 granted the automatic right to French citizenship to children born in France who have foreign parents. According to the amended law, they become French citizens at the age of eighteen if they still reside in France and do not refuse citizenship. The annual rate of naturalization is circa 5% of the foreign population (Bertossi, Hajjat, 2013). Also Swedish Citizenship Act was significantly amended in 2001. Sweden decided to allow dual citizenship. The principle of domicile became a significant element of naturalization law. Immigrant children were permitted to obtain Swedish citizenship in a simplified notification procedure if they did not possess any other citizenship. For other applicants, a regular procedure remained, with a requirement of a permanent residence permit or at least a certain period of residence (Bernitz, 2012). The redefinitions of nationhood incorporated in naturalization acts transformed the traditional ethnic states into multicultural open polities.

### Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU country</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>180.3</td>
<td>154.5</td>
<td>140.7</td>
<td>127.2</td>
<td>117.2</td>
<td>124.6</td>
<td>113.0</td>
<td>94.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td>71.9</td>
<td>84.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>139.9</td>
<td>168.8</td>
<td>154.8</td>
<td>147.9</td>
<td>132.0</td>
<td>137.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>53.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
On the other hand, the lessening interest in naturalizations is partly connected to other processes happening in German society. The integration and membership in a community is not restricted to the civic dimension ("political integration"). The fundamental division between the community of native German and Muslim communities is no longer based on citizenship, but it is visible in other aspects. I categorize them into three dimensions (Herrman, 2012). I distinguish cultural, security and labour dimension.

1. Cultural dimension: the religion, Islam, is sometimes perceived as opposite to the European culture, especially in conservative visions where Europe is linked with the Christian heritage. Cultural differences also embrace different customs. The most controversial aspect of Muslim tradition is the position of women in Islam, often perceived as subordinated to men, and traditional visions of family governed by a husband. Other disputable aspects of Muslim culture are ritual animal slaughter, or visibility of religious symbols (such as hijab) in the public sphere.

2. Security dimension: after terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001, and then in bomb attacks in London (2005), the Muslims have been seen as a threat to public safety. Fear of Islamic fundamentalism caused exacerbation of policies against immigrants. Germany sent some Muslim activists back to their countries of origin from the German territory. Such actions even strengthened the public image of a Muslim as extreme religious activists. Moreover, Germany was involved in the war in Iraq (on American side) and this enhanced the anxiety of Islamist violence.

3. Labour dimension: Muslim immigrants came to Germany in the period of economic prosperity, but did not return to their home countries when the market crisis begun. Today, they are the group of German society which is most endangered with unemployment and economic marginalization.

The interaction between these three aspects is complicated, they coexist and different modes of marginalization seem to strengthen each other, causing some kind of "cumulative marginalization". In various decades, different elements of the multidimensional marginalization played the main role. At first, cultural
dimension was emphasized: it was manifested e.g. by the discussion in 1990s about the hijab in public schools (Oestreich, 2005). In years 2001-2006 the “safety” dimension seemed the most important. However, the Muslim riots in France (and to a lesser extent in Germany) caused that the labour market dimension grabbed more attention. As a consequence of the economic meltdown in 2009, financial crisis and increasing unemployment, the labour dimension seems to be the most important division between the German majority and the Muslim minorities nowadays.

These divisions are reflected in the public opinion, which appears sceptical about the existing institutional frames of multiculturalism. The surveys of the Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach have shown that the percentage of native Germans who believe that many children of immigrant descent at German public schools might cause major problems even grew – from 47% in 1997 to 67% in 2008. IFD surveys also revealed most people in the host society think that Muslims immigrants do not accept the common values and basic convictions of the German society. Only 18% of the respondents perceived Muslim immigrants as a group which shares the values of the dominant majority (Abali, 2009). A decade after the implementation of the revolutionary changes in citizenship law, Germany still seems to be a society in transition, reluctant toward multiculturalism and immigrants. The social distance between ethnic Germans and naturalized Turks apparently stems from factors other than citizenship and state allegiance.

**Conclusion**

The example of Germany proves that the vision of nationhood is dynamic and depends on demographic changes in the society. The reform of citizenship law in 2000 has fundamentally changed the public image of nationhood in Germany: it became more open and hospitable towards different minority groups. However, the legal notion of a cohesive nation (civic or ethnic) embodied in naturalization rules, does not equal the social cohesion, which is the main objective of integration and citizenship politics. The prevailing inequalities and divisions between host society and ethnic or religious minorities – even naturalized – are based on socio-economic factors. The citizenship and immigration did not manage to remove at once all obstacles in this area. Contrary to the change of legal status, alterations in socio-economic status of immigrant groups may require more time. However, recent studies of the Federal Ministry of Migration and Refugees prove that naturalized immigrants achieve better results and higher degrees in education.

Apart from civic (political) dimension, there are other aspects of community life where Muslim immigrants are seen as “Others”. This is why the reform of citizenship and immigration law was not a sufficient change.
Redefinition of nationhood also coincided with the processes of Europeanisation and globalization. New patterns of collective identity were introduced (citizenship of the European Union), which weakened the importance of nationhood and national citizenship. The shift towards multiple identities is also manifested in the current political debate in Germany which focuses on the possibility of acceptance of dual citizenship to a larger extent.

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ELITE ATTITUDES, MASS NATIONALISM AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: A MULTI-LEVEL APPROACH

CAROLYN SMITH KELLER

ABSTRACT. While elites have played an important role in European Union (EU) integration, more research is needed on the impact of public opinion. In this paper I analyze individual and country-level variation in the relationship between nationalism and support for EU integration across 13 EU countries with data from 2007 and 2009, that is, from before and after the global economic crisis. I use two components of in the Integrated and United (IntUne) data set: (a) the samples comprised of members of the general public (i.e. masses), and (b) the samples comprised of national level parliamentarians. Findings suggest that elites are more supportive of EU integration than the masses regardless of the country’s level of economic and political development. For both elites and the general public, higher nationalism is correlated with stronger support for EU integration.

Keywords: nationalism, European integration, elites and the general public

Introduction

Until recently, the study of European integration has largely been qualitative, with much attention given to the impact and influence of elites (Cowles, Caporaso and Risse, 2007; Ott and Vos, 2009; Phinnemore, 2009). This is primarily due to the significant role politicians have played in the drafting and signing of European treaties. For example, the Treaty of Rome that established the European Economic Community in 1958 lacked input from the larger public. Over time, however, elite-driven integration processes have started to change, a shift that is also reflected in the literature. While early studies of EU integration centered on the influence of heads of states and high level politicians, more recently scholars have begun to look at the roles of legislatures and, increasingly, of political parties.

1 Keene State College, e-mail: ckeller@keene.edu.
One crucial aspect – the influence of public opinion – continues to be understudied. The general public is the one voting national politicians in and out of office, and is voicing preferences for EU-related issues, such as its enlargement or greater political integration. As Zito and Schout (2009) argue, to date EU integration studies are largely macro and fail to incorporate a general understanding of the role that the masses play. Kaiser’s stance is even stronger: EU studies, he argues, are “in a sorry state of affairs” (2009: 36), because scholars have failed to generate theoretically grounded arguments and have generally ignored the role of civil society in promoting and inhibiting integration throughout the past 60 years.

There are notable exceptions to this situation, and the number of scholars who include public opinion into analyses of European integration is growing. The work of Schmidt (2007), Steenbergen, Edwards and de Vries (2007), Haller (2009), Sanders and Toka (2013) is especially relevant here, as it gives due attention to nationalism in the general population. This body of research suggests that the issue of contemporary EU integration raises complex questions about the relationship between attitudes of political elites and nationalism in the masses and, in terms of policy implications, suggests that the impasse between them must be rectified for integration to continue.

Traditionally, researchers have either focused on the role of elites, or on the general public. Regarding elites, thanks to their significant political power, historically they have been viewed as the main supporters and practitioners of EU integration (Hooghe and Marks, 2008). In a tangible way, political elites are the ones who do the integration. Yet, the mandate for further integration is an open empirical question. Political science focuses on structural and electoral factors that aid or hinders elites’ influence on EU integration. For example, elites are held to account by their constituents and political parties relative to the country’s electoral system and depending on the level of consensus within their party (Steenburger et al., 2007; Gabel and Scheve, 2007). The general public, on the other hand, vote and protest to make their voices heard. Most recently, masses across Europe have protested austerity measures. Public opinion can directly influence elite opinions (Carruba, 2001; Sanders and Toka, 2013).

I ask the following research questions:

1. How do elite opinions differ from those of the general population with regards to European integration?
2. What individual and country factors influence levels of support for EU integration?
3. What role does nationalism play in shaping attitudes toward further EU integration?
Following Sanders and Toka (2013), I address these questions using data from EU countries with different levels of development, length of EU membership and sentiments towards Europe. Specifically, I use two components of the Integrated and United (IntUne) data set: (a) the 2007 and 2009 samples comprised of members of the general public (i.e. masses), and (b) the 2007 and 2009 samples comprised of national level parliamentarians. Hence, I am able to capture a crucial time, namely the immediate precedent and aftermath of the global economic crisis.

Theory and hypotheses on support for EU integration

Education, Gender and Age
Gabel and Palmer (1995) analyze Eurobarometer data from the original six EU (ECSC) members and find that support for EU integration is positively related with personal potential benefit from “liberalized markets for goods, labor and money” (Gabel and Palmer, 1995: 3; see also Gabel and Whitten, 2009). Educational attainment is positively correlated with EU support (Anderson and Reichart, 1995). Gender and age matter, too: men are generally more supportive of the EU than women, and age has a linear, negative relationship with EU support (Andersen and Reichert, 1995; Nelsen, Guth and Highsmith, 2010).

Political Ideology
Many studies on perceptions of EU integration focus on political factors. Anderson (1998) finds that in older EU member-states, political party affiliation is the strongest determinant of support: parties leaning to the far left or far right are less supportive than moderate parties. Anderson also argues that the economic determinants of support for EU integration moderate this relationship.

Carey (2002) suggests that levels of nationalist sentiment trump political party affiliation, such that high levels of nationalist sentiment lead to lower support for EU integration. Marks et al. (2002) ranks party groups along issues of political and economic integration and finds that extreme left and Communist parties are strongly opposed to integration while liberal and social democratic parties strongly support integration. Nelsen et al. (2010) find that neoliberals are the most supportive of the EU across member states.

Other research analyzes the extent of the division between political parties within countries and finds that increased polarization is associated with a decrease in support for EU integration (Hooghes et al., 2005). In this research I will assess whether political parties continue to favour European integration, and the extent to which political ideology plays in impacting elite and mass opinion.
Many hypotheses regarding cross-national differences in support for EU integration have been tested (Kopecky and Mudde, 2002; Hooghe, 2003; Hooghe and Marks, 2004). Countries with more secure economic and political conditions can benefit from further European integration, but, as the recent global economic crisis showed, their ties to lesser developed European nations puts them at risk. Regarding military security issues, some countries are geographically positioned in a way that makes them more susceptible to interstate conflict; those countries may therefore be more supportive of further integration (Hooghes, 2003). Issues regarding economic and democratic development and length of EU membership should influence levels of support for European integration.

**The Relationship between Elites’ and the General Public’s Support for EU Integration**

Analyses of the relationship between elites’ and masses’ support for European integration (Haller, 2007; Bijsmansa and Altides, 2007; Carruba, 2001) have led to two competing theories– the policy mood theory, and the cues theory. Carruba neatly summarizes these theories: “The policy mood argument claims political elites would be responding to electoral pressure, while the cue-taking argument claims political elites would be shaping weakly held public preferences” (Carruba, 2001:144). Some research suggests that political elites are generally more tolerant than the general public. As Jackman (1972) argues, “political elites or influentials demonstrate a level of tolerance [for minority groups] over and above that which would be expected from a knowledge of their social status alone” (Jackman, 1972: 754). Others suggest that elites are more active in promoting integration, while the general public takes a more passive role (Gabel and Palmer, 2006).

**Nationalism and EU Integration**

The relationship between nationalism and European integration has received significant attention among scholars. A main focus of this literature is on European supra-nationalism and why a European identity has not surpassed the national identity of individuals across the EU (Cowles, Caporaso and Risse 2001; Bruter 2004; Fligstein, Polyakova and Sandholtz, 2011). As EU integration increases individuals should identify more and more with the EU. As Risse (2001) argues, “If more and more competences are transferred to the EU level and made subject to joint decision-making involving supranational institutions... when EU developments more and more erode national sovereignty, one would at least assume challenges to given nation-state identities” (Risse, 2001: 200). Generally speaking, EU integration is a process that theoretically could produce a new type of supranationalism, which could supersede and repress nationalism.
Rather than EU identity replacing national identity, it seems that the two manage to coexist (Fligstein et al., 2011; Buter, 2004). Fligstein et al. (2011) show that individual interaction with the EU is very important in determining whether one develops an EU identity. People who have more local contacts, jobs and political affiliations continue to think and feel more nation-oriented; only those who regularly interact with supranational institutions have stronger European-level identity. Fligstein et al. argue that attitudes towards immigrants and nationalism are qualitatively distinct: “the question ‘Do I have a European identity?’ is not identical to the question ‘Who counts as a European?’” (Fligstein et al., 2011: 21). Thus, attitudes towards EU integration are analytically distinct from nationalism.

There are studies that find that nationalism, as expressed in political parties, is positively correlated with EU integration. Hooghe and Marks (2008) find that as EU integration issues become politicized in elections, identity and political parties significantly impact EU support levels.

**Hypotheses**

Based on the theoretical discussions summarized above, I propose the following testable hypotheses:

H1. Elites will be more supportive of EU integration than the masses both before (2007) and after (2009) the first stage of the economic crisis.

H2. Support for EU integration by elites and masses will decrease from 2007 to 2009 because of the economic crisis.

H3a. Strong nationalists will be less supportive of EU integration than weak nationalists.

H3b. Demographics matter, as men, political leftists, and those with higher levels of education will support European integration more than women, political rightists and those with lower levels of education.

H4. Countries’ level of development, as captured by the Human Development Index, will impact support for EU integration. Specifically, more developed countries will be less supportive of European integration than countries with lower levels of economic development, *ceteris paribus*.

H5. Length of EU membership matters, as the EU member countries older EU member-states will be less supportive of EU integration than Western Europe.

**Data and analysis**

To test the above hypotheses, I use data from the Integrated and United (IntUne) project, funded by the EU and coordinated by the University of Siena (www.intune.it). The project focused on European citizenship and its main
dimensions: citizenship, representation and scope of government. IntUne has collected and analyzed empirical data on mass and political and bureaucratic elites’ attitudes, as well as media content and deliberative polling results, in seventeen European Union member and candidate countries. I restrict my analyses to the 2007 and 2009 IntUne surveys on the general public and on political elites. These surveys cover 13 European Union countries: Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, and Spain. For the political elites, the survey has a sample from 60 to 90 persons drawn from national level parliamentarians for each country. For the masses, a representative sample of around 1,000 individuals per country is included.

For my dependent variable I generate a scale of support for European integration from four questionnaire items that appear in the Elite and Mass surveys in both the 2007 and 2009 waves. These items are:

1. Regarding the character of the European Union in 10 years. Tell me whether you approve or disapprove of a unified tax system in Europe.
2. Regarding the character of the European Union in 10 years. Tell me whether you approve or disapprove of a common system of social security.
3. Regarding the character of the European Union in 10 years. Tell me whether you approve or disapprove of a single foreign policy toward outside countries.
4. Regarding the character of the European Union in 10 years. Tell me whether you approve or disapprove of more help for regions with economic or social difficulties.

Each of the four items has four response categories: (1) Strongly Disapprove (2) Disapprove (3) Approve and (4) Strongly Approve. The items are useful because they treat European integration as a process that has political, economic and social ramifications. By combining the responses into one factor, I am able to successfully estimate a fairly holistic “EU integration” variable.

I combine the items using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). Since this technique requires metric variables, I first use the midpoint of the cumulative distribution of each item going into the factor to assign each response category a certain score. Using CFA Bartlett scores of a factor were assigned to each individual, generating a continuous dependent variable that theoretically ranges from 0 to 100. In each of the measurement models, I assess the goodness of fit of the CFA and conclude that each model is acceptable with the RMSEA <0.03 in all models and the CFI > 0.98.

My nationalism measure is so-called “civic nationalism”. I define and operationalize civic nationalism similarly to Marquart-Pyatt (2011). Respondents were asked to answer each of the following five questions:
In your view, how important is each of the following to be a true national?
1. To share the culture
2. To follow and respect the laws of the country
3. To master the language
4. To share the culture
5. To be a legal citizen

To generate a measure of civic nationalism, I combine individual responses to the five items, again relying on confirmatory factor analysis. Individuals chose how important they believe each of these items to be and I again combined them using CFA and generated Bartlett scores so that a higher score signifies greater latent civic nationalism.

Regarding other independent variables on the individual-level, I include gender, educational attainment, and political ideology.

For gender, I code male as 1 and female as 0.

Education: For the masses, I generate four educational categories based on the number of years of schooling: 8 years or less signify elementary level education (reference category), 9, 10 or 11 years mean incomplete secondary level of education, 12 to 14 years refer high school education, and above 14 years indicate university or post-tertiary level of education. In the case of elites, I use a dichotomous variable to distinguish between those who have a university degree (1) and those who do not (0).

Political ideology: Given the diverse nature of political parties across European countries, I rely on individual assessments to a question that asks where respondents would place themselves on a scale of 0-10 with 0 being very left and 10 being very right. After reverting the scale, I group these scores into three categories, with 0-3 being right (reference category); 4-7 being moderate, and 8-10 being left.

For country level variables I include Western Europe (WE) versus Central and East Europe (CEE, reference category) and the Human Development Index (HDI) that includes indicators of wealth, health, and education.

Conceptually, the models look like this:

**MASS**
Individual-level: $Y_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j}\text{NATIONALISM} + \beta_{2j}\text{SEX} + \beta_{3j}\text{EDUCATION} + \beta_{4j}\text{POLITICALIDEOLOGY} + e_{ij}$
Country-level: $\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{0j} + \gamma_{01}(\text{WE}_j) + \gamma_{02}(\text{HDI}_j) + u_{0j}$

**ELITE**
Individual-level: $Y_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j}\text{NATIONALISM} + \beta_{2j}\text{SEX} + \beta_{3j}\text{EDUCATION} + \beta_{4j}\text{POLITICALIDEOLOGY} + e_{ij}$
Country-level: $\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{0j} + \gamma_{01}(\text{WE}_j) + \gamma_{02}(\text{HDI}_j) + u_{0j}$
Findings

First, I look at levels of support for EU integration in each of the four domains: a unified tax system, a European-wide social security system, a European-wide foreign policy and further economic aid to member states who are facing economic crises for both the Elite (parliamentarian) sample and for a representative sample of individuals across my 13 EU countries. The findings are presented in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues related to EU Integration</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mass Opinion</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax Code</td>
<td></td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>58.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Security</td>
<td></td>
<td>74.9</td>
<td>75.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Policy</td>
<td></td>
<td>74.6</td>
<td>74.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Aid to Member-States</td>
<td></td>
<td>86.3</td>
<td>86.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Elite Opinion</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax Code</td>
<td></td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>61.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Security</td>
<td></td>
<td>67.0</td>
<td>69.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Policy</td>
<td></td>
<td>86.7</td>
<td>86.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Aid to Member-States</td>
<td></td>
<td>88.1</td>
<td>90.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Among both the general public and elites one observes very high levels of prospective EU integration. Even with the economic recession, it seems that elites and masses still view the prospect of further integration favorably. Given the current euro crisis and bailout, perhaps the most surprising result in Table 1 is that for both the masses and elites, individuals are more supportive of helping out other member-states than any other type of further integration. Furthermore, this level of support increases for both masses and elites from 2007 and 2009. The most notable difference between the two groups is in regards to foreign policy. In 2007 and 2009 over 85% of elites want to increase EU integration in this dimension while less than 75% of the masses want the same. However, the masses are more supportive of further integration around social security than political elites. With this exception, elites are in fact more supportive of European integration than the masses. Thus the hypothesis H1 is generally supported.
However, in neither the mass nor the elite samples do I find significant variation from 2007 to 2009; thus, I have no support for hypothesis H2. Even with the economic recession, the overall level of support for EU integration does not change much, if anything it increases over time. In addition, it is worthwhile to note that there are not any major gaps between mass and elite attitudes along this line.

In my next set of analyses, I conduct multi-level regression comparing individual and country variation in support for EU integration. Tables 2 and 3 present the results for the masses in 2007 and in 2009, respectively.

### Table 2.

**Two-Level Models of Attitudes Towards EU Integration:**

**The Masses, 2007**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>s.e.</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>s.e.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism (scale)</td>
<td>3.141***</td>
<td>0.540</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.150***</td>
<td>0.540</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>3.208***</td>
<td>0.378</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.209***</td>
<td>0.377</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left a</td>
<td>1.823***</td>
<td>0.575</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.828***</td>
<td>0.545</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate a</td>
<td>0.393</td>
<td>0.479</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.396</td>
<td>0.479</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University b</td>
<td>2.342***</td>
<td>0.706</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.342***</td>
<td>0.706</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School b</td>
<td>0.704</td>
<td>0.716</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.703</td>
<td>0.726</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incomplete secondary b</td>
<td>0.291*</td>
<td>0.691</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.292</td>
<td>0.691</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>-11.041*</td>
<td>4.834</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>9.935*</td>
<td>4.467</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.461</td>
<td>3.345</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>9789</td>
<td>9789</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groups</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parameter</td>
<td>Variance</td>
<td>χ² (df)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Variance</td>
<td>χ² (df)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country-level random effect</td>
<td>0.115</td>
<td>138.01 (8)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.109</td>
<td>136.40 (8)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual-level random effect</td>
<td>0.185</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.185</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. The reference group for political ideology is right  
b. The reference group for education is elementary

As Table 2 shows, I have found that for the masses, nationalism, as defined in this paper, is positively associated with EU integration. A one unit increase in civic nationalism significantly raises one’s level of support for EU integration by 3.14 points. I also find that males, rather than females are more
supportive of EU integration. Individuals with left political ideology compared to individuals in the reference group with right political ideology are more supportive of EU integration. However, individuals with moderate political views do not differ significantly from individuals with right political views. Having a university degree, relative to those with only an elementary level, provides a 2.34 point increase in EU integration support.

Regarding cross-country differences, the empty model (not reported) shows variation in support for EU integration at the group level (i.e. attributable to country-level variables). With highly correlated country-level variables and because of a small level-two sample size (13), I look at the effect of HDI and of Western Europe separately. I find, as expected, that countries with lower levels of development are more supportive of the EU. The effect of Western Europe is also as hypothesized: negative and significant.

Table 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>s.e.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>1.986***</td>
<td>0.358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>3.051***</td>
<td>0.420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left a</td>
<td>3.471***</td>
<td>0.688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate a</td>
<td>1.839***</td>
<td>0.501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University b</td>
<td>2.227**</td>
<td>0.786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School b</td>
<td>-.189</td>
<td>0.832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary b</td>
<td>-.344</td>
<td>0.778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>-10.533*</td>
<td>4.970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>-8.389*</td>
<td>4.051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>9.410*</td>
<td>4.593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>8877</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Groups</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Variance</th>
<th>χ² (df)</th>
<th>Variance</th>
<th>χ² (df)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country-level random effect</td>
<td>0.109</td>
<td>126.59(8)</td>
<td>0.103</td>
<td>126.35(8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual-level random effect</td>
<td>0.196</td>
<td>0.196</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a The reference group for political ideology is right
b The reference group for education is elementary
For 2009, I have found that the predictors for individual variation in support for EU integration do not change much. Those with higher levels of nationalism, males, higher educated and those from left orientations are more supportive of EU integration than women, less educated and those with right political ideologies. Regarding the country-level variables, HDI and WE are statistically significant and in the expected direction. As level of development goes up, I find less support for EU integration. Western European countries are less supportive of EU integration than CEE countries. This is likely related to the effect of length of EU membership (see Slomczynski and Tomescu-Dubrow, 2010 for the full argument).

Table 4 shows the results for models for Elites in 2007 and 2009 using similar predictors to the general public. Since no country-level predictors were significant, I present regression models clustered by country and generating robust standard errors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>2007 B</th>
<th>2007 se</th>
<th>2009 B</th>
<th>2009 se</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>3.942**</td>
<td>1.544</td>
<td>2.696*</td>
<td>1.202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>-.269</td>
<td>2.706</td>
<td>.645</td>
<td>1.970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left a</td>
<td>14.209***</td>
<td>3.515</td>
<td>15.467**</td>
<td>5.258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate a</td>
<td>9.282***</td>
<td>2.468</td>
<td>9.120**</td>
<td>3.502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University b</td>
<td>4.266</td>
<td>6.250</td>
<td>-1.835</td>
<td>2.905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-11.882***</td>
<td>7.092</td>
<td>-1.803</td>
<td>5.415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>790</td>
<td>820</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a The reference group for political ideology is right
b The reference group for education is other than university

Again, I find that nationalism is positively associated with EU integration. A one unit increase in nationalism will increase support for EU integration by 3.99 points in 2007 and 2.70 points in 2009, other things equal. For elites, I find no support for gender differences. Here, political ideology seems to be the main determinant of levels of support for EU integration. Compared to the reference category of right orientation, both left-leaning and moderate-leaning persons are more supportive of EU integration. Relative to right ideology, those on the left are expected to have a score of 15.47 points higher. For moderates the analogous value is 9.12.
Conclusion

Overall, my analysis shows mixed support for my initial hypotheses. Regarding EU integration, there is no significant variation in attitudes towards EU integration across the EU countries of this study. I find clear support that nationalism, as measured here, impacts EU integration. The hypothesis on gender did not have empirical support. Education is a key determinant of level of support for EU integration. However, across the elite and mass samples the main predictor is political ideology, and this holds across Europe.

An interesting line of scholarship of the EU points to a dual process model, where the masses impact elite opinion and, simultaneously, elites impact public opinion (Steenbergen et al., 2007; Hooghe 2003; Ray 2003). We can envision that political elites respond to the pressures of voters, but that their influence on mass attitudes will be greater than the other way around. Such effects could be explored using, for example, lagged effects of support of nationalism grouped by political ideology. If the elites are trying to cue the masses or if the masses are generating some sort of policy mood, time is needed for this to occur. Recent research on elite and mass cueing provides empirical support for the idea of the dual process model and finds that political party affiliation impacts both elite and mass sentiments (Sanders and Toka, 2013). Future research could add to the literature by examining the relationship between mass nationalism and attitudes that elites and the general public hold about further EU integration.

REFERENCES


THE INFLUENCE OF NATIONALISM AND NATIONAL IDENTITY ON WELL-BEING OF BULGARIAN AND ROMANIAN YOUTH

RADOVETA DIMITROVA¹, CARMEN BUZEA², VANJA LJUJIC³, AND VENZISLAV JORDANOV⁴

ABSTRACT⁵. This study compared high school youth from two major cities in Bulgaria and Romania, by examining differences in nationalism and national identity and their joint influence on well-being. We tested the hypothesis that nationalism activates a sense of national identity, which in turn increases well-being. Participants for this study – 178 adolescents of Bulgarian ethnic background and 211 adolescents of Romanian ethnicity – were sampled from two public high schools in Sofia (Bulgaria) and two public high schools in Brasov (Romania). They provided data on their nationalistic attitudes and national identity, life satisfaction, positive and negative affect and anxiety. Results showed that Bulgarians reported higher nationalism (most notably national feelings and national superiority) and national identity than Romanian youth. We found a good fit for a path model in which strong feelings of nationalism lead to strong national identity in both groups. However, under the chosen model specification nationalism and identity were related to enhanced well-being of Romanian youth only, a relationship that needs further examination. We discuss our results and their implications in the concluding section of the paper.

Keywords: nationalism, national identity, psychological well-being, Romanian youth

¹ University of Tilburg, e-mail: r.dimitrova@tilburguniversity.edu.
² Transylvania University of Brasov, e-mail: carmen.buzea@unitbv.ro.
³ Leiden University, e-mail: v.ljujic@gmail.com.
⁴ National Sports Academy, Sofia, e-mail: venzislavjordanov@gmail.com.
⁵ The authors are extremely grateful to Mrs. Roza Krasteva, Mrs. Igliga Nedelcheva, Mrs. Silvia Balardjieva, Mr. Stefan Aranyosi, Mr. Dorel Agache, all school personal and students in schools in Sofia and Brasov for their help in carrying out the study.
Introduction

This study addresses the question of whether youth from Bulgaria and Romania, two neighbour countries with a similar post-communist history, differ in their feelings of nationalism, national identity and well-being. With few exceptions (Dekker, Malova, and Hoogendoorn, 2003; Mastrotheodoros et al., 2012; Oppenheimer and Midzic, 2011), most research on nationalism and national identity involves only one national group in one country, despite the plea to compare groups in different societies. Studies of nationalism and national identity in different European countries can provide insight into the role of context for national attitudes as well as their influence on individual well-being. There is much interest in understanding feelings of national culture belonging in children and youth in Europe (Gallagher and Cairns, 2011; Mertan, 2011; Reizábal and Ortiz, 2011), a most prominent segment of the population with large potential impact as future adults in their respective countries (European Commission, 2009).

Both Bulgaria and Romania represent intriguing contexts for the study of nationalism and national identity for two main reasons. First, both countries have undergone a difficult period of economic and political transition, witnessing the rise of ethno-nationalism and national identity (Volgyi, 2007). Second, both countries have a historical record of ethnic tensions with their minority population, which strengthened interethnic hostilities and national attitudes (Dimitrov, 2000; Mihailescu, 2005). Such features may be particularly salient in affecting youths’ sense of nationalism and identity. Although studies have been conducted with either Bulgarian (Dimitrova, Chasiotis, Bender, and van de Vijver, 2013) or Romanian youth (Veres, 2010), no research so far has compared national attitudes, national identity and well-being across the two countries.

A framework to understand differences in nationalism in Bulgaria and Romania is provided by the national attitude model, introduced by Dekker, Malova and Hoogendoorn (2003). The model holds that individual’s nationalism - that is, feeling a sense of belonging to a particular “nation” with a common origin - can be explained by a strong concern about one’s political, economic, social, and cultural future; a low sense of positive self-identity and highly negative attitudes toward national or ethnic minorities living within the country. We expect that this process would be more salient among youth from Bulgaria, where lower socio-economic development, severely assimilative policies and internal threat for ethnic minorities have been observed, than among Romanian youth (Dimitrova, Buzea, Ljujic, and Jordanov, 2013). Differences between Bulgarian and Romanian youth in national attitudes and identity are therefore predicted. In line with the national attitude model, we tested associations among national attitudes, national identity and well-being in the case of Bulgarian and Romanian youth. Data for this project come from 178 high school students of Bulgarian ethnic background in Sofia, and 211 high school students of Romanian ethnic background in Brasov.
Theoretical background

Nationalism, Identity and Well-Being

Theory and research have identified different meanings of nationalism as an ideology, a movement, a process of nation-state building, and an individual's political orientation. We use the conceptualization of nationalism as an individual's attitude reflecting the amount of affection and feeling of favourableness for a certain object, namely the nation state (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980). Related to that, the national attitude model (Dekker et al, 2003), defines nationalism as feeling a sense of belonging to a particular “nation”, wanting to keep that “nation” as pure as possible, and desiring to establish and/or maintain a separate and independent state for that particular nation. On the basis of differences in type and strength of affiliation, the model proposes five prototypical national attitudes: national feeling (feeling of belonging to one's own people and country); national liking (liking one's people and country); national pride (being proud of one's people and country), national preference (preferring one's people and country over others) and national superiority (feeling that one's people and country are superior to others).

To refine the investigation of national attitudes determinants, scholars have differentiated specific factors affecting the strengths and levels of nationalism. Most scholars agree that nationalism has its roots in historical experiences (Calhoun, 1997; Smith, 1995) and therefore, involves the right to territorial self-determination and interethnic relations (Brown, 2000). In countries where heterogeneity is related to ethnic minority groups, work based on the threat theory (Sears and Jessor, 1996) assumes that the sheer number of minority groups threatens the national way of life and enhances both anti-minority sentiments and strengthens in-group cohesion by increasing nationalist sentiments (Stephan and Stephan, 2000). An individual who develops negative attitudes toward ethnic minorities living within that country will tend to develop an attitude of nationalism (Kleinpenning and Hagendoorn, 1993). Closely related to these attitudes toward out-groups living within the country, concern about political, economic, social, and/or cultural future has been proposed as determinant of national attitudes. Also, individual's sense of positive self-identity serves as an affective determinant, such that low sense of positive self-identity (as a result from a failure of one's "old" ideology in the case of former communist countries) motivates individuals to develop extremely positive national attitudes (Blank, 1997; Bloom, 1990).

National or ethnic identity, a central issue for adolescents, has been defined as a process of maintaining positive distinctiveness, and feelings associated with a sense of national/ethnic group membership (Phinney and Ong, 2007). In this sense, the term is conceptually different from nationalism, with the latter dealing primarily with attitudes and strong sense of belonging to a particular national state. It has been suggested that national identity relates to
psychological well-being and adjustment. Across different cultural groups, strong sense of national identity has been repeatedly found to be associated with enhanced levels of well-being (Smith and Silva, 2011) and adaptive psychosocial functioning (Schwartz, Zamboanga, Wiesskirch, and Rodriguez, 2009). However, in contrast to the widely investigated relation between identity and well-being, little research has been devoted to how national attitudes impact psychological outcomes (Walsh and Tartakovsky, 2011). An exception is the study conducted by Reeskens and Wright (2010) who found evidence for the premise that identification with one’s nation-state fosters subjective well-being. In the present study we are interested in attitudes in the national domain (nationalism) as well as attitudes in the ethnic culture domain (national identity) and how these domains relate to well-being of Bulgarian and Romanian youth.

**Historical Context**

Following the collapse of communism in the 1990s in Central and South-Eastern Europe, both Bulgaria and Romania have undergone a difficult period of economic and political transition, which has also witnessed the rise of ethno-nationalism along with problems of national identity (Volgyi, 2007). The countries’ joining the European Union (EU) on 1 January 2007 brought some 30 million new citizens to the EU. It also set off significant migration flows to the West, as many Bulgarian and Romanian citizens left their countries in search of better life opportunities.

While there are similarities between Bulgaria and Romania – particularly in terms of past communist history and EU transition, there are also some important differences in economic development and interethnic relations. First, Bulgaria presents lower economic development than Romania as documented by relatively low purchasing power parity (GDP) and higher unemployment rates, whereas in Romania the economy registers much more positive growth due to a strong export performance and higher GDP (The World Fact Book, 2011). Moreover, in Romania the real growth rate is 2.5% in 2010 placing the country on 134th place in comparison to the world, whereas in Bulgaria lists 160th with the growth rate of 1% in 2011. Additionally, scholars have also argued that the lack of economic development combined with 500 years of Turkish occupation, followed by 45 years of Soviet domination, have left Bulgarians without experience in self-government, yet with a sense of pessimism and passivity that makes them less likely to change, and to protest (Greenberg and Erdinç, 1999).

A second important difference between Bulgaria and Romania regards ethnic relations and treatment of national minorities, which are likely to matter for national attitudes. Bulgaria has a historical record of ethnic tensions and policy of repression and assimilation of its Muslim population, like renaming campaigns in the late 1980s, which forced nearly one million people with Turkish
surnames to adopt Bulgarian names (Dimitrov, 2000). The presence of the Turkish minority and followers of Islam in the country, a religion and country which Bulgarians for centuries have associated with economic backwardness and historical occupation has continuously strengthened interethnic hostilities (Petkova, 2002). Discrimination attitudes and perceived threat are also present in the Bulgarian context in which official integration measures for national minority groups (Turkish and Roma) are rather scarce (Maeva, 2005). Related to that, 2005 marked the appearance of a new phenomenon in the political landscape of Bulgaria with the overwhelming success of nationalist right-wing party called *Ataka*. Using populist anti-Turk slogans this nationalist coalition has managed to attract the respectable 24% of the votes in the Bulgarian parliamentary (Genov, 2010).

In Romania, the interethnic relations between mainstream Romanians and members of major national minorities with Hungarian and Roma background are the result of a complicated history with numerous political and territorial disputes (Mihailescu, 2005) and interethnic conflicts (Andersen, 2005). The right of primogeniture in Transylvania (i.e., the right to own a land populated for the first time) and discrimination faced over the history by each ethnic group (i.e., by Romanians during the Hungarian occupation in Transylvania or by Hungarians during the communist regime) are subjects of partisan interpretations (Mihailescu, 2005). The latter interpretations refer to the fact that Hungarians believe that they have the right on Transylvanian land and suffered a bigger discrimination during the communist regime, compared with the discrimination suffered by Romanians under Hungarian occupation, whereas the Romanians hold the same believes for their community.

In the recent history of Romanian-Hungarian relations, interethnic clashes in the mid of March 1990 show that tensions among the two groups exist (Andersen, 2005). Yet, there is an improvement in the perception of interethnic relations in Transylvania, where our data were collected: 64% of Romanians and 70% of Hungarians consider that interethnic relations are better than under the communist regime (Ethnobarometer, 2000). Also, interethnic tensions have been observed between mainstream Romanians and the second-largest ethnic group living in Romania, after Hungarians, the Roma minority. Roma have traditionally suffered from severe discrimination, and the assimilation policy carried out by the communist regime led to the extinction of many of their cultural traditions and occupations, including nomadic lifestyle. After the fall of the Romanian communist regime in 1989, Roma were recognized officially as national minority and allocated one seat in Parliament. Compared to the Hungarian minority, the Roma are generally poorer, less educated and living geographically isolated and/or segregated from non-Roma. Discrimination and prejudice toward Roma are frequent phenomena on the Romanian public agenda and stereotyping speeches of political leaders are often present in political debates. It is telling that in 2010
the parliament considered a bill seeking to replace the term "Roma" with the historically pejorative term "Tigan" (Wolfe-Murray, 2010), which it eventually rejected. On the other hand, mainstream Romanians disapprove of the xenophobic discourse and expulsion of Romanian Roma migrants from Western Europe.

In summary, Bulgaria and Romania share certain historical experiences, yet they also differ with regard to issues such as the extent of policies of forced assimilation of national ethnic minority groups and the post-1989 socioeconomic situation. These similarities and differences are particularly interesting when studying nationalism and national identity in the context of youth from these two countries. There are enough reasons to affirm that how to address national attitudes and national identity is a big issue for these countries which started the process of democratization after 1989 but also for Europe, as a whole, according with its need for stability and security.

**Research questions and hypothesis**

This study addresses two research questions:

1. **Do youth in Bulgaria and Romania differ with respect to their national attitudes and national identity?** In line with the national attitude model (Dekker et al., 2003), the severely assimilative policies and generally lower socioeconomic development in Bulgaria, we predict stronger national attitudes and national identity for Bulgarian than for Romanian participants (Hypothesis 1).

2. **To what extent do national attitudes and national identity affect psychological outcomes among youth in the two countries?** Consistent with prior work (Reeskens and Wright, 2010; Schwartz et al., 2009) we use the national attitude model to test how youths’ psychological outcomes are influenced by their attitudes toward their nation and culture of origin (Figure 1). In line with the hypothesized model and previous research, we expect direct relations between a) national attitudes and national identity; b) national attitudes, national identity and psychological well-being (Hypothesis 2).

**Data**

Participants for this study – 178 adolescents of Bulgarian ethnic background and 211 adolescents of Romanian ethnicity – were sampled from two public high schools in Sofia (Bulgaria) and two public high schools in Brasov (Romania). We chose the schools based on diversity of teaching track (academic and vocational) as we wanted to have as much as possible representative schools in the general school population in both countries. All schools were public, therefore fairly representative of the overall school population in the areas where we gathered the data. Respondents were asked to indicate their ethnicity by choosing or stating their ethnic background (e.g., Bulgarian, Romanian, other).
Data and methods

Data collection took place from June to October 2012. Students were recruited in classrooms after informing local school personnel about the purpose and methods of the study. In addition to written instructions enclosed in the questionnaires, detailed verbal instructions were given in each class. Students were assured that participation was entirely voluntary and confidential and that they could discontinue their participation at any time.

Participants were on average 17 years old (SD = 0.75, see Table 1). The two samples differed with respect to gender, with more boys in the Romanian than the Bulgarian group, $\chi^2(1, N = 388) = 5.40, p < .05$. Groups differed slightly with respect to age, with Romanians being one year older than Bulgarians, $F(1, 388) = 5.11, p < 0.05$. The samples differed in parental socio-economic status (SES), with more educated parents in the Bulgarian than in the Romanian sample, $\chi^2(1, N = 347) = 47.76, p < 0.001$; see Table 1). Since the samples differed in SES, age, and gender, the effects of these demographic variables on nationalism, national identity, and well-being outcomes were examined to test the need to control for them in consequent comparative analyses. Girls were found to report higher scores on national identity ($F(1, 307) = 5.57, p < 0.01$) and anxiety ($F(1, 307) = 16.19, p < 0.001$) compared to boys. There was only one marginally significant correlation between SES and nationalism, ($r(373) = -0.11, p < .03$), whereas age was negatively associated with nationalism, $r(377) = -0.17, p < 0.001$. SES, gender and age were statistically controlled for in subsequent analyses.
Measures

Demographic Characteristics. Information about participant’s age, gender, ethnicity, and family SES was collected.

Nationalism was measured with fifteen item scale created by Dekker et al. (2003). Sample items composing the scale were “In general, I prefer to live in Bulgaria/Romania than any other country”, “In general, Bulgarian/Romanian are better than people with other nationalities” etc. Cronbach’s alphas were $\alpha = 0.88$ (Bulgarian) and $\alpha = 0.92$ (Romanian).

National Identity was measured with eight-item scale adapted from Dekker et al.’s scale (2003). Sample items were: “I feel that I am part of my ethnic culture (e.g. Bulgarian/Romanian)”; “I am proud to be a member of my ethnic group” and “I am happy to be a member of my ethnic group”. Responses given on five-point Likert scale ranged from 1 (totally disagree) to 5 (absolutely agree). Cronbach’s alphas were $\alpha = 0.82$ (Bulgarian) and $\alpha = 0.87$ (Romanian). Because nationalism and national identity may share common conceptualizations, we performed two multigroup confirmatory factor analyses to test the adequacy of both scales as separate latent factors. Results showed satisfactory scalar invariance as indicated by the measurement intercepts model across cultural groups for both constructs of nationalism ($\chi^2(11, N = 389) = 45.68, p < 0.001, \text{CFI} = 0.966, \text{RMSEA} = 0.080$) and national identity, $\chi^2(51, N = 389) = 177.09, p < 0.001, \text{CFI} = 0.933, \text{RMSEA} = 0.080$.¹

Psychological Well-Being. In our conceptualization, well-being refers to various types of evaluations, both positive and negative, including reflective cognitive evaluations, such as life satisfaction, interest and engagement, and affective reactions to life events, such as joy, sadness, anxiety. We apply one of the most widely used approaches of subjective well-being introduced by Diener (1984), who proposed that judgments of life satisfaction could be made by combining positive and negative affect. Consideration of these indicators is particularly warranted due to the growing evidence that subjective well-being is a desirable goal for nations, in that it produces beneficial societal outcomes (which in our case may be relevant for the development of national identity and nationalism), whereas anxiety and prolonged negative states tend to produce undesirable societal outcomes (Diener, 2006). Consequently, well-being was measured with three scales. First, The Satisfaction with Life scale (SWLS; Diener, Emmons, Larsen, and Griffin, 1985, Ponizovsky, Dimitrova, Schachner, and van de Schoot, 2013) using 5 items evaluated on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) was administered. Sample items are “In most ways my life is close to my ideal” and “I am satisfied with life” and showed an internal consistency of $\alpha = .72$ (Bulgarian) and $\alpha = .74$ (Romanian). Second, The Positive and Negative

¹
Affective Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, and Tellegen, 1988) was used. Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they experienced each of 20 positive affect (PA) and negative affect (NA) descriptors by using a 5-point Likert scale ranging from very slightly to extremely. The internal consistencies for PA and NA in the two groups were $\alpha = .80/.83$ (Bulgarian) and $\alpha = .88/.86$ (Romanian). Third, The Generalized Anxiety Symptoms (GAD) subscale from the Screen for Child Anxiety Related Emotional Disorders (SCARED; Birmaher et al., 1997) was used to assess general anxiety symptoms. The GAD consists of 9 items scored on a three-point scale: 1 (almost never), 2 (sometimes), and 3 (often). Sample items are: “I worry about whether others will like me”, “I worry about things working out for me”, “I worry about how well I do things” etc. GAD showed an internal consistency of $\alpha = .86$ (Bulgarian) and $\alpha = .78$ (Romanian).

Results

Before addressing our hypotheses, we obtained descriptive statistics for all groups in the respective countries (see Table 1). We then examined differences in national attitudes and national identity between Bulgarian and Romanian groups, using multivariate analyses of covariance (Hypotheses 1). Finally, we tested the influence of national attitudes and national identity on psychological outcomes in Bulgarian and Romanian groups (Hypothesis 2) using a multigroup path analysis (Arbuckle, 2009). Fit indices adopted to interpret the model fit were the $\chi^2$ test, the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA; recommended value $\leq 0.08$) and the comparative fit index (CFI; recommended value $\geq 0.90$) (Browne and Cudeck, 1993; Marsh, Hau, and Grayson, 2005).

Comparisons on National Attitudes and National Identity

We conducted a MANCOVA with group (2 levels) as independent variable, national attitudes, national identity and well-being as dependent variables and SES, gender and age as covariates. The multivariate test was significant, Wilks’ lambda = 0.93, $F(1, 373) = 4.21$, $p < 0.001$, (partial) $\eta^2 = 0.065$. The analyses revealed a significant group effect for national attitudes, identity and well-being. Specifically, Bulgarian youth reported higher scores on nationalism attitudes ($F(1, 373) = 10.94$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = 0.029$), national identity, ($F(1, 373) = 6.63$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = 0.018$) and lower on negative affect ($F(1, 373) = 7.67$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = 0.020$) and anxiety ($F(1, 373) = 6.25$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = 0.017$) than their Romanian peers. There were no significant group differences on life satisfaction and positive affect scales (Table 1).
Table 1

Means (and Standard Deviations) of Samples

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Bulgarian</th>
<th>Romanian</th>
<th>Group comparisons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age, M (SD)</td>
<td>16.87 (0.72)</td>
<td>17.04 (0.76)</td>
<td>$F(1, 388) = 5.15$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender, n (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boys</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>$\chi^2(1, N = 388) = 5.40$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Girls</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>$\chi^2(1, N = 374) = 47.76^{***}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>3.37 (0.88)</td>
<td>3.15 (0.83)</td>
<td>$F(1, 373) = 10.94^{***}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National identity</td>
<td>4.05 (0.81)</td>
<td>3.84 (0.77)</td>
<td>$F(1, 373) = 6.62^{**}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWLS</td>
<td>4.95 (1.26)</td>
<td>4.91 (1.06)</td>
<td>$F(1, 373) = 0.029$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>3.45 (0.81)</td>
<td>3.34 (0.67)</td>
<td>$F(1, 373) = 1.69$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1.78 (0.73)</td>
<td>1.93 (0.70)</td>
<td>$F(1, 373) = 7.67^{***}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAD</td>
<td>1.85 (0.49)</td>
<td>1.93 (0.37)</td>
<td>$F(1, 373) = 6.25^{**}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. SWLS = Satisfaction with Life Scale; PA = Positive Affect; NA = Negative Affect; GAD = Generalized Anxiety; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.

In a further step, we performed additional analyses to see whether there might be group differences in specific components of nationalistic attitudes between Bulgarian and Romanian groups. We ran a second MANCOVA with group (2 levels) as independent variable, attitudes of national feelings, pride, preference and superiority as dependent variables and SES, gender and age as covariates. Results showed significant group differences for national feelings ($F(1, 374) = 12.98, p < 0.001, \eta^2 = 0.034$) and superiority ($F(1, 374) = 33.35, p < 0.001, \eta^2 = 0.083$) subscales. Bulgarian youth scored significantly higher than Romanians on strong nationalistic feelings (Bulgarian $M = 4.26$, $SD = 1.03$ vs. Romanian $M = 3.85$, $SD = 1.12$) and national superiority (Bulgarian $M = 3.35$, $SD = 0.88$ vs. Romanian $M = 2.90$, $SD = 0.91$).

In summary, in line with what the national attitude model would predict, we found that Bulgarian participants showed significantly higher scores on national attitudes (most notably national feelings and superiority) and national identity than their Romanian peers. We can therefore conclude that the model was able to account for cross-cultural differences in mean scores.

**Association of National Attitudes, Identity and Psychological Outcomes**

Preliminary analyses included bivariate correlations among all study variables (Table 2). As can be seen from Table 2, national identity and nationalism were positively correlated and presented significant relations with well-being.
outcomes in both groups. Next, we tested our second hypothesis in a path model using AMOS (Arbuckle, 2009).

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Bulgarian Adolescents</th>
<th>Romanian Adolescents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.</td>
<td>2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. National</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>identity</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Nationalism</td>
<td>0.38***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. SWLS</td>
<td>0.22**</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. PA</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. NA</td>
<td>-0.33***</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. GAD</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. SWLS = Satisfaction with Life Scale; PA = Positive Affect; NA = Negative Affect; GAD = Generalized Anxiety; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.

Multigroup analyses testing direct relations among national attitudes, national identity and psychological outcomes in Bulgarian and Romanian groups were computed. The configural invariance model showed an excellent fit ($\chi^2(36, N = 389) = 47.63, p < 0.093$, RMSEA = 0.029 and CFI = 0.991) where all more restrictive models showed a poorer fit (Table 3). The associations of national attitudes and national identity within both groups were statistically significant.

The path model shows that strong feelings of nationalism lead to strong national identity in both groups (Figure 2). In addition, both groups showed important differences in association among variables. The path coefficients between identity and psychological outcomes were significantly different among groups: the standardized regression weights of the association between identity and overall well-being were significant for the Romanian group only. As can be seen from Figure 2, national identity was directly related to well-being and mediated the link between nationalism and well-being of Romanian rather than Bulgarian youth.6

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6 We also performed alternative path model including national identity and nationalism in one latent variable, as suggested by the reviewer. The initial unconstrained model did not showed a good fit, ($\chi^2(16, N= 389) = 67.71, p < .001$, CFI = .750, RMSEA = .091). Although the model substantially improved by adding several modification indices, ($\chi^2(12, N= 389) = 25.28, p < .001$, CFI = .936,
Fig. 2. Path Model of Nationalism, National Identity and Well-Being of Bulgarian and Romanian Youth

Note. The parameters represent standardized coefficients. First parameter on an arrow is the coefficient for the Bulgarian sample the second coefficient refers to the Romanian sample.

RMSEA = .053), still there were substantial problematic issues to be considered. First, the best fitting solution was the unconstrained model, which is the less restrictive and statistically parsimonious compared to measurements weights, structural weights and structural covariances models. Second, coefficient estimates varied greatly among groups, with significant link between the latent variable (composed by national identity and nationalism) and well-being for the Romanian group, whereas such relation was not significant for the Bulgarian group. Third, using the latent variable of national identity and nationalism does not allow testing direct relations between national identity and well-being on one hand, and nationalism and well-being on the other. Lastly, we could not test for the mediation role of identity on the relation between nationalism and well-being in line with our assumption that nationalism activates a sense of national identity, which in turn increases well-being. Therefore, we argue that the model we choose is the most parsimonious representation of our data also in relation to our hypothesis.
Table 3
Fit Indices of National Identity, Nationalism and Well-Being Path Model for Bulgarian and Romanian Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>χ² (df)</th>
<th>∆χ² (Δdf)</th>
<th>AGFI</th>
<th>RMSEA</th>
<th>CFI</th>
<th>∆CFI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Configural invariance</td>
<td>46.63 (36)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.925</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>0.991</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measurement weights</td>
<td>67.34 (44)</td>
<td>20.71 (8)</td>
<td>0.917</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>0.982</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural weights</td>
<td>78.92 (50)</td>
<td>11.58 (6)</td>
<td>0.915</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>0.978</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural residuals</td>
<td>79.26 (51)</td>
<td>0.34 (1)</td>
<td>0.917</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>0.979</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Selected model with a good fit is printed in italics.

Discussion

Whereas most research on national attitudes and national identity has dealt with groups in Western Europe or the US, our primary objective in this study was to examine nationalism, national identity and well-being of youth from two former communist countries in Eastern Europe. In order to understand how nationalism influences outcomes in these two groups, we also examined direct relations between national attitudes and national identity on psychological outcomes.

National attitudes and national identity differed significantly in Bulgarian and Romanian youth. For the Bulgarian participants, national attitudes toward their country and ethnic group are more important than for their Romanian counterparts. The emphasis on national and ethnic belonging may be related to the current Bulgarian situation and attitudes toward minority groups. National attitudes could be moderated by factors that become prominent if comparisons of national culture endorsement across groups in national contexts are made. The much longer history of severe ethnic tensions and policy of assimilation of ethnic minorities in Bulgaria compared to Romania is probably relevant here. As a reaction to these attitudes, Bulgarian youth may be more supportive of their culture and national unity. The long-term interethnic conflicts and negative

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7 We opted for the configural invariance model (assuming the same relationships but different factor loadings for variables across groups) that showed an excellent fit where all more restrictive models showed a poorer fit, as indicated by CFI. Nonetheless, as Table 3 shows, the more restrictive model of measurement weights also showed an adequate fit, although lower than the one of the configural invariance model. According to the measurement weights model there are similarly significant loadings for all well-being indicators to one latent factor in both groups, which implies more similarities than differences among the groups being observed. These results are for exploration in future analysis.
attitudes toward Turkish ethnic minority living in Bulgaria may be related to the
development of strong attitude of nationalism (Kleijnen and Hagendoorn, 1993). On a related note and in line with the national attitude model, the lower
economic development and concern about the future may also be a determinant
of strong national attitudes in Bulgarian compared to Romanian youth. Overall,
these findings suggest that the model may be able to adequately predict national
attitudes and national culture identification among ethnic groups within two
different former communist countries situated in Eastern Europe.

A further issue of interest was the relation between national attitudes,
national identity and well-being outcomes in Bulgarian and Romanian groups,
previously examined by researchers such as Reeskens and Wright (2010) and
Walsh and Tartakovsky (2011). Our findings suggest that both national attitudes
and national identification foster better psychological outcomes differently for
the two analysed groups. In the Romanian rather than in the Bulgarian group,
nationalism and national identity were strongly related and this relationship was
conducive to positive well-being outcomes. This result needs further investigation.
Possible explanations may come from understanding Romanian educational
practices, which might enhance youths' national attitudes, and national campaigns
conducted by government and mass-media to reaffirm the national identity and
ethnic pride. In any case, it seems that national attitudes and identification of
Bulgarian and Romanian youth operate differently with regard to well-being.

Limitations and Prospects for Further Research

Although our findings provide the first comparative perspective on
nationalism, national identity and well-being of Bulgarian and Romanian youth,
there are a number of limitations that provide fruitful ground for future research.
First is the need to verify our results using random, representative, samples of
adolescents in the two countries, also in light of the SES differences among our
samples. Second, we would like these analyses extended to other ethnic minorities.
For example, a replication of this study including minority groups in Bulgaria
(Turkish and Roma) and in Romania (Hungarian and Roma) will increase our
confidence in the current findings. We can envision that for Turkish-Bulgarian
youth, for example, the Turkish but not the national Bulgarian domains of identity
promote better well-being and positive acculturation outcomes (Dimitrova,
Bender, Chasiotis, and van de Vijver, 2012). Contrary, for Roma youth in Bulgaria,
Bulgarian national identity has been found to be positive predictor of well-being
(Dimitrova et al., 2013). It may well be that relations among nationalism, identity
and well-being may vary across minority if compared to mainstream groups in
Bulgaria and Romania, respectively.
Additional limitation involves the affective determinants of national attitudes. Further studies should include direct measures on determinants (concern about the future, attitudes toward ethnic minorities, sense of positive self-identity), which have been shown to motivate individuals to develop extremely positive national attitudes. Further direct observations and data on these factors would greatly increase the insight into the relevance of these contextual conditions. Finally, to fully understand the multifaceted processes that affect national orientations and outcomes, studies including further potential moderating and mediating variables should be conducted. Factors such as perceived threat toward minority groups and experienced interethnic conflict may also be linked to the national identification processes.

**Conclusions**

Although an enormous number of factors contribute to nationalistic attitudes, our research clearly shows that, for the employed data, strong nationalism and identity have a prominent stance primarily among Bulgarian rather than Romanian youth. This finding may not be surprising in light of the significant rise in ethnic nationalism in Bulgaria during the democratic transition leading to alienation and assimilation of national minority “low cultures” into the national “high culture” (Volgyi, 2007). Possibly, governmental campaigns of national pride have the potential to affect youth forming strong national identity and attitudes toward their nation state. Importantly, political-economic realities, elite behaviour, and ideological influences in the society may have direct impact on strong endorsement of nationalism, which in turn contributes to exacerbation of interethnic hostilities.

Another relevant implication of the study regards the impact of nationalism on public satisfaction and contentment with governmental policies. Nationalism may be a powerful tool for national and international politics by providing the basis of collective solidarity. As such, adherence to nationalistic feelings is often used by governmental campaigns to promote national policy of integrity and unity, consolidation of national identities, and preservation of cultural particularities. Yet, strong nationalistic attitudes facilitate the process of gradual interethnic conflict and tensions by providing space for lack of appreciation and tolerance for cultural diversity within the society. On a policy level, efforts to address these collective perceptions of national pride should include media campaigns to promote peaceful co-existence and social norms that place a greater emphasis on inclusiveness and equality at national and broader international policy perspective.
REFERENCES


NATIONAL ATTITUDES OF ETHNIC HUNGARIANS FROM ROMANIA, SLOVAKIA, SERBIA AND UKRAINE: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

VALÉR VERES

ABSTRACT. The article comparatively analyses national identifications of Hungarian minorities living in Romania, Slovakia, Serbia (Voivodina) and Ukraine, their ethnic and national attitudes and intergroup relations, including the ethno-national minority – majority relationship, and attitudes towards Hungary and the Roma community. Of interest is the presence and extent of ingroup-outgroup differentiation, and possible cross-national differences and similarities in national attitudes, identity, and perceived social distance. I examined the following two research hypotheses: (1) The Hungarian community in a given country identifies closer with other Hungarian communities living in the diaspora than with Hungarians in Hungary, or the majoritarian population in their country of citizenship. (2) Members of the Hungarian minorities generally perceive a greater social distance in relation to the majority population of a particular country as compared to Hungary's population, but cross-country differences are likely. The empirical data source of my research is the Karpat Panel survey, first wave (2007), collected on multi-stratified random sample (N=2,915), representing the Hungarian communities in Romania, Slovakia, Serbia and Ukraine, as well as a control sample from Hungary. I used a variety of statistical techniques, including OLS regression and multidimensional scaling – Alscal method based on the average values of social distances towards different ethnic and national communities, as well as other social groups – to analyse the relations of interest.

Keywords: minority, attitudes, national identity, interethnic relations

Introduction

National attitudes are an important part of national identity. People use them for orientation, to place other people in the social space, and they help or hinder us to create “custom made” cognitive assessments during our orientation
in the social space. Our image of national groups is conveyed by culture and national ideologies. These are confronted with everyday experiences which enforce, weaken or modulate our image of national groups.

This paper relies on the concepts of auto and hetero-stereotyping as auxiliary elements of national attitudes to examine national identification of Hungarian minorities living in four countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE): Romania, Slovakia, Serbia (Voivodina) and Ukraine. For each country, I consider intergroup relations – that is, how Hungarian minoritarians view Hungarian minorities in other countries than their own. At the same time, I analyse their perceptions of (a) the majoritarian population, (b) Hungarians in Hungary – the "kin state," and (c) Roma, a minority present in all the included countries.

In CEE, the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918 left a part of the population which identified with Hungarian ethnonationality outside Hungary, to form a national minority in the new countries. According to recent census data, the largest Hungarian minority population is to be found in Romania (1,32 million), followed by Slovakia (458 thousand), Serbia (290 thousand) and Ukraine (151 thousand)² (see also Papp-Veres, 2007).

The Hungarian government, after the political regime change in 1989, has assumed a so-called "National policy," which calls for the Hungarian state to elaborate a strategy for improving the situation of Hungarians living outside Hungary, to help them maintain their Hungarian identity and culture. Along this line, the Hungarian Constitution stipulates: "The Hungarian state feels responsible for Hungarians living outside its borders" (Art 6(3)). This "responsibility" is guided by ethnocultural national ideology, and the so-called "Status Law" (2001) has been adopted in its spirit. This law provided for the issuance of so called "Hungarian card" for foreign citizens who claim Hungarian as mother tongue, or who consider themselves part of the Hungarian cultural community. The "problem" of Hungarians living outside the borders has persisted in Hungary. Right-wing organizations have urged the Hungarian state to offer Hungarian citizenship to all persons living abroad who consider themselves Hungarian even if they do not intend to move to Hungary (i.e. double citizenship). The 2004 referendum on this proposal did not meet validity requirements, due to low voting turnout. Yes and no votes were approximately equally split. The results produced great consternation among Hungarians in the diaspora (Culic 2006:175-200).

² Systematic processings have not been published yet, but the preliminary results of the 2011 census from Romania are accessible on the web-page of the National Institute of Statistics, see www.recensamant.ro [May 2013]. For details related to the Slovakian census see Gyurgyik, 2006, Balogová, B.: Census: Fewer Hungarians, Catholics – and Slovaks, The Slovak Spectator 5 Mar 2012.
These historical processes show that the issue of Hungarian minority in Hungary's neighbouring countries is of great concern in Hungary, generating important policy debates, and sometimes diplomatic tensions between these countries. Thus, the empirical analysis of the Hungarian minority identity and their relationship with Hungary is of real interest.

**Theoretical Considerations and Research Hypotheses**

Gellner (1987) differentiates between two types of nation-building forms proceeding from the relationship between social structure and culture. The first one is the "ethnocultural nation", formed in a stiff, yet complex, extended and well-stratified society based on a farming, autarchic (self-sufficient), and food-producing community. Above them, there is a governing elite, which—in alliance with the ecclesiastical elite—monopolizes communication channels and the institutional instruments of using force; social mobility is not characteristic. The other type of nation is based on citizenship (civic nation), which is formed in a society based on more developed technology than the former one and with a complex and refined division of labour. Social processes are characterized by social mobility (even for those working in agriculture), and general education becomes generalized relatively early (Gellner, 1987). In practice, A. D. Smith also states, these models emerged in combination, but the dominant characteristics of one or the other variant may be traced within the different nation-building processes (Smith, 1991) National identity based on citizenship is primarily characteristic to Western Europe. Ethno-cultural consciousness as defined by Gellner is dominant in Eastern and Central Europe.

I define **national identity** as the stock of knowledge and attitudes composed of affective and cognitive elements and formed collectively, which is the result of the social functioning of national ideology. It represents one of the most important forms of attachment of modern social groups. I analyse the simple form of national identity, so-called "natural national identity" present in the entire society. The "natural national identity" – formulated by Csepeli – is a manifestation of the social communication of the national ideology, when people in their everyday life identify with certain elements of national ideology. In this way, they distinguish the ingroup designated by the national category, they share the symbolic universe created by the national name, fatherland, meanings of national symbols” (Csepeli, 1997:108). National consciousness and national ideology are coexisting phenomena, but not entirely the same; we are dealing with a dual phenomenon in Hobsbawm’s formulation, considering that knowledge of the content of official national ideologies does not supplement the national consciousness of average people in everyday life (Hobsbawm, 1990:10-12).
Stereotyping one’s own group and other reference groups is a dimension of collective identity. Usually, the stereotypical image of one’s group is positive, whereas that of other groups is positive or negative to a variable degree. According to Le Vine and Campbell (1972), national and ethnic groups form a positive picture about themselves based on certain fundamental personal features, and this is called autostereotype. If there is a conflict or some kind of tension between one’s own group and another reference group, the other group is likely to be vested with negative characteristics and antipathy. This is called general heterostereotype, which refers to certain fundamental personal, moral, and motivational features. The affective attitudes towards different reference groups are analysed in this article.

As for the relationship between ethnocultural groups, I do not consider that using hetero-sterotypes is harmful, or that ethnocentrism should eliminate cosmopolitanism. I agree with Calhoun who suggested that “culture and social relationships are as real as individuals, even if they lack bodies”, and criticized the “extreme cosmopolitanism” that promotes the elimination of all loyalties lesser than that of each individual to humanity as a whole (Calhoun, 2003: 531-553).

In this paper I also analyse Hungarian minoritarins’ attitudes towards the Roma. The definitions of Roma minorities were discussed, among others, by Troc (2012) in one of his recent writings, where he differentiates a definition from a “majority” view (Troc, 2012: 79). This approach was prevalent in the ways Hungarians living in all countries defined the Roma. Namely, they focused on particular communities and conceived Roma ethnicity as being specific to indigenous or allogeneic groups that were historically and structurally marginalized by majority ethnic/national groups and who developed in response reactive identities and culture/cultures (Williams, 1984; Stewart, 1997).

In Romania and Slovakia (the countries with the largest share of Roma minority), but also in Serbia and Ukraine, the identity and group dynamics specific to the Roma minority significantly differ from the Hungarian minority not only because of the lack of a determined external “kin state” as Hungary in the case of Hungarians, but also because they can be politically mobilised in a completely different way. Although there are Roma social and political organisations, these are not successful in taking action in a uniform way or in ideologically or politically mobilising the majority of the Roma community. Consequently, the influence of the Roma elite on their own community is also weak and fragmented, as opposed to the Hungarian minority.

The characteristics of the ethnocultural national identity are still predominant in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), and I will analyse how it functions in intergroup attitudes, in Hungarian minority cases. As Brubaker said, in the case of Central and Eastern European national minorities, the ideological field, which shapes national identities, has three main sources: the so-called "kin
states" undertaking cultural protection, the national ideologies of majority states, and the ideological elements formulated by the leading elite of a national minority. These are only valid if there is a well-defined ethnocultural majority in a given state (Brubaker, 1996: 60-69).

In line with Brubaker, I do not interpret nation as a real entity, community or substantial and stable collective, but rather as an imagined community as defined by Anderson (1991). Instead of answering the question „what is nation?”, I am rather searching for an answer to the question „how is the idea of nation institutionalised as political and cultural form within the state and between states, respectively?“

Another question refers to when and due to which factors the manifestations of national identity are transformed into nationalism. According to Brubaker, nationalism is not induced through „nation”, but through particular manifestations of the political sphere (Brubaker, 1996: 13–17). Verdery points out that all this might happen in the cultural or political sphere as well. According to Verdery’s definition, „nationalism is using the symbolic content of nation in an emotionally exalted form for political reasons” (Verdery, 1993: 77–95). Yet, in parallel with this political use, nationalism results in national ideological discourses that also hold an influence on other spheres of life. In as much as these are reflected in the national identity of individuals, we may talk about national identity loaded with nationalistic or ethnocentric elements. Thus, in our research, we investigate why Hungarian minority populations display more ethnocentric elements in their identities and social attitudes.

Ethno-cultural consciousness may transform into civic national consciousness. This was pointed out by Kuzio (2002), listing the conditions which strengthen it: domestic democratic consolidation, building of local civic institutions, positive influence of international institutions, and when the core ethnic group is self-confident within its own bounded territory (Kuzio, 2002). The question is if these function in minority situations and in what ways, which national consciousness is transformed so as to show civic characteristics.

Previous papers on the national identity of Hungarian minorities, especially in the case of the more numerous Hungarian populations from Romania and Slovakia, have shown that the members of these minority groups do not identify themselves, emotionally and symbolically, with the Romanian or Slovakian majority of their respective countries, while being a Hungarian has a strong positive content (pride, symbols, ethnocentrism) (See Culic, 1999; Csepeli-Örkény-Székelyi, 2000; Veres, 2005). In 1999 Culic pointed out that the identity of minority persons presupposes a complex, double sense of belonging: a formal, legal one, which is prescribed by citizenship, and a cultural, emotional bond through which they are attached to another ethno-cultural nation whose formation is linked to another state. This duality entails duality at the level of group loyalties, human relationships, attitudes and opinions as well (Culic, 1999: 37).
Based on H. Tajfel’s studies, we know that a positive social identity has an important role in the survival of a minority community without being culturally assimilated (Tajfel, 1978). My previous research has already confirmed that Hungarians have a positive self-image and the feeling of national pride is high, on average, among Hungarians living in minority, especially in Transylvania (Veres, 2000; 2005; 2010).

In this analysis I will not discuss the entire minority Hungarian identity, but I will highlight and analyse one aspect, using a comparative method. I focus on the functioning – as defined by Barth (1969) – of group identity boundaries specific to Hungarian minority communities from each country and region under the category of ethnoculturally based, transfrontier „imagined” (Anderson, 1991) Hungarian nation and on its social-demographic characteristics.

The question of interest is “how do people belonging to the Hungarian minorities in Romania, Slovakia, Serbia and Ukraine, respectively, relate to and differ from Hungarians in the diaspora and from the majority population of their respective countries when interethnic attitudes that imply social distance are considered?”; Are there any similar patterns? The corresponding research hypotheses are:

First, the Hungarian community in a given country identifies closer with other Hungarian communities living in the diaspora than with Hungarians in Hungary, or the majoritarian population in their country of citizenship. Second, Hungarian minoritarians generally perceive a greater social distance in relation to the majority population in their country of citizenship than to Hungarians in Hungary, but country-differences can be expected due to historical reasons.

Data and Methods

The empirical data source of my research is the project Karpat Panel, wave 2007. In 2007, a multi-stratified random sample composed of 2,930 persons was selected from Hungarian communities living in five countries (valid N = 2,915): 900 cases in Romania (Transylvania region), 585 cases in Slovakia, 380 cases in Serbia (Vojvodina), 350 cases from Ukraine (Transcarpathia region), and 700 cases in Hungary, as a control sample.

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3 The institutions coordinating this research project are the following: Minority Research Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (MTA NKI, Hungary) and the Max Weber Foundation for Social Research, Cluj-Napoca (Romania) Partners: Babes-Bolyai University Cluj, Dept. Sociology (Ro), Forum Institute (Slovakia), T. Lehotczky Institute (Zacarpatija, Ukraine), Research coordinators: Attila Papp, Valér Veres, director: László Szarka. The survey was financed by Hungarian Academy for Sciences and the research was supported by Bolyai János scholarship (2008-2010). The next Karpat Panel wave took place in 2010, but only in Romania.
Respondents were selected if they spoke Hungarian. The questionnaire also had questions on national/ethnic self-identification. We asked respondents to indicate, in order, the communities they felt they belonged to, and we processed the first mentioned answers. The main features of so called "natural national identity" (Csepeli, 1997) of ethnic Hungarians from Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine and Serbia was presented in Veres (2010).

To measure ingroup-outgroup, I use the following questionnaire items:

1. In your opinion, the Hungarians from Hungary have other personal features than the Hungarians from the minority from Romania/Slovakia/Serbia/Ukraine?
2. In your opinion, the majority community (Romanian/Slovakian/Serbian/Ukrainian) have other characteristics than the Hungarian minority (from Romania/Slovakia/Serbia/Ukraine)?

I use a five-level scale of attitudes of like/dislike towards specific groups to capture the distance between the Hungarian minority and other social groups. The question was: How do you see the following groups? Answer-options ranged from 1 to 5, where 1=very agreeable, 2=rather agreeable, 3=neutral (neither agreeable, nor disagreeable), 4=rather disagreeable, and 5=very disagreeable (the largest distance). I examine these attitudes also by respondents’ socio-demographic characteristics: gender, type of settlement, age, educational level, and language of instruction in school.

Interethnic relations (i.e. perceived interethnic conflict and cooperation) were measured by question: How is the relationship between the Hungarian minority and the majority (Romanians etc) in country/local level? The answer-options were the following: 1= conflict, 2=neutral, 3=cooperation. For some of the analyses, I have collapsed these three categories into a dummy variable for conflict, where conflict=1, else=0.

The analysis has involved various statistical techniques, including OLS regression and multidimensional scaling. In the regression analysis, the dependent variable has been the 5-point scale of attitudes towards the majoritarian population. The independent variables has been: age, dummies for gender (men=1), settlement type (urban=1), education (tertiary education and high school=1, lower=0), Hungarian as instruction language (in high school or last level of completed schooling Hungarian =1, else =0) ethnocentrism, perception of conflict relations with the majoritarian population country-wide (conflict=1), interethnic relations on local level (conflict=1), and perceived ethnic discrimination (if respondents experienced ethnic discrimination because of their ethnonationality =1, else =0).

I constructed the measure of ethnocentrism with Principal Component Analysis using the set of items listed below. Respondents were asked whether the following statements are valid for Hungarians, and "yes" answers were coded with "1".
1. There is no other nation which has given so many scientists and artists to the world.

2. It is amazing to see how solidary this nation is in times of danger.

3. This nation suffered a lot during history, yet it was able to maintain its identity.

4. This nation has always been the front-line fighter of civilization in Europe.

Regarding multidimensional scaling, I have used the Alscal method to create two-dimensional models based on the average values of attitudes towards different ethnic and national minorities, as well as other social groups, in order to reveal the differences between attitude structures in the countries analysed.

**Results**

*Perceived ingroup boundaries*

In each of the analysed countries, the majority of respondents consider that members of their Hungarian minority group have different personal characteristics than Hungarians from Hungary, whereas 34.6% of Hungarians from Slovakia, 25.5% of Hungarians from Vojvodina, and 21.9% of Hungarians from Transcarpathia and Transylvania consider that these characteristics are the same. Hence, one can notice that Hungarians in the diaspora represent themselves as a distinct group from Hungarians living in Hungary. For the latter, the reverse holds: 51.1% do not see a difference in terms of personal characteristics between themselves and Hungarians in the diaspora, whereas 41.5% consider that the two groups are different (see Fig. 1).

![Fig. 1. In your opinion, the Hungarians from Hungary have other characteristics than the Hungarians from the minority from Romania/Slovakia/Serbia/Ukraine?](image)

*In the case of Hungary, the question referred to the Transylvanian Hungarians.*
Fig. 2. In your opinion, the majority community (Romanian/Slovakian/Serbian/Ukrainian) have other personal characteristics than the Hungarian minority (from Romania/Slovakia/Serbia/Ukraine)?

The results are similar when members of the Hungarian minority reflect on the personal characteristics of the majoritarian population in their country of citizenship. Generally, the proportion of “yes” answers is greater when the reference is group the majoritarian population, than when it is Hungarians in Hungary. Transylvania is the exception (see Fig. 2).

Social attitudes and social distance

Table 1 reports averages values on a 5-points scale that measures social distance from different groups, including ethnic ones (where 1=smallest distance and 5=greatest distance). For one’s own group, the averages are below 2; for Hungarians from Hungary, averages vary between 2.6 and 2.4, whereas Hungarian minority respondents’ attitudes towards majority groups have averages between 2.5 to 2.7. This indicates a rather neutral stance. Again, when we look at the Transylvania region in Romania, there is basically no difference in how ethnic Hungarians evaluate ethnic Romanians (mean=2.5), and how they evaluate Hungarians from Hungary (mean=2.4). The largest and statistically significant difference occurs in Slovakia, where the mean value for Hungarians from Hungary is 2.0, whereas the mean value for ethnic Slovaks is 2.7.

The case of Slovakia, as compared to Romania, is also noteworthy as it shows a change from earlier studies. Analyses on the 1997 Karpat Research, Csepeli, Örkény and Székely (2000: 45, 78) found the social distance between the Hungarian minority and the majority in Slovakia to be lower than for Romania (Csepeli, Örkény, and Székely 2000: 78).
Table 1. Ethnic Hungarians’ Attitudes towards Different Social and Ethno-national Groups, Mean Values, by Countries

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<tr>
<th>Hungarian community from:</th>
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<th>Romania</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
<th>Slovakia</th>
<th>Serbia</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>2.37</td>
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<td>3.29</td>
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<td>2.95</td>
<td>2.99</td>
<td>2.88</td>
<td>2.91</td>
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<td>2.92</td>
<td>2.88</td>
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<td>3.08</td>
<td>3.14</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: The question was: How do you see the following groups? The answer-options ranged on a scale from 1 to 5, with the following coding: 1=very agreeable, 2=rather agreeable, 3=neutral (neither agreeable, nor disagreeable), 4=rather disagreeable, and 5=very disagreeable (the largest distance).

Table 1 consistently shows that Hungarians in the diaspora feel closest to people like themselves, that is, other Hungarians living outside Hungary. They form a separate group, distinguishable from both Hungarians in Hungary, and from the majoritarian population. A significant part of respondents also declared to be members of the national majority (Veres, 2010). From a social-psychological perspective these results may be interpreted in the sense that Hungarian regional membership has a stronger normative and cohesive power than Hungarian statehood, or citizenship of the country where the Hungarian minority lives.
## Table 2.

Ethnic Hungarians’ Attitudes towards Majoritarian Populations, Hungarians from Hungary, and the Roma: Mean Values by Socio-Demographic Variables and Countries

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Romania</th>
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</table>

**Note:** The question was: How do you see the following groups? The answer-options ranged on a scale from 1 to 5, with the following coding: 1=very agreeable, 2=rather agreeable, 3=neutral (neither agreeable, nor disagreeable), 4=rather disagreeable, and 5=very disagreeable (the largest distance).

* p<0.05, **p<0.01 level significant differences between mean values (t-test).
Continuation of Table 2

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<td>3.46</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>2.37</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: The question was: How do you see the following groups? The answer-options ranged on a scale from 1 to 5, with the following coding: 1=very agreeable, 2=rather agreeable, 3=neutral (neither agreeable, nor disagreeable), 4=rather disagreeable, and 5=very disagreeable (the largest distance).

* p<0.05, **p<0.01 level significant differences between mean values (t-test) For age groups and education level variables I compared the first and last categories.

Table 2 presents, for Hungarians living in Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine and Serbia respectively, mean values of attitudes towards the national majority, Hungarians from Hungary, and the Roma, along selected socio-demographic variables: sex, type of settlement, age group, level of education, and the language of teaching in primary school. The one result that clearly stands out pertains to attitudes toward Roma. For all countries and irrespective of socio-demographic
background, ethnic Hungarians dislike the Roma. There are some nuances, for example by settlement type and age groups in Romania and Slovakia. Mean scores are higher for the youngest respondents, and for urban dwellers.

Interesting are also mean differences by language of instruction for attitudes towards the majoritarian population. Only in Ukraine and Serbia respondents whose language of instruction in secondary school was Hungarian report, on average, higher dislike of the majoritarian population than those taught in the language of the national majority. For Romania and Slovakia, this is not the case. Yet for Romania one can notice a significant difference in mean appraisal of Hungarians from Hungary.

Finally, there are some significant mean differences by education levels: in Romania and in Serbia, ethnic Hungarians with elementary education only have more positive attitudes towards Hungarians from Hungary than university-educated respondents. In the interpretation field created by the ideal of cultural unity, it is possible to imagine that intellectuals are disappointed with the extent to which the Hungarians in Hungary have lived up to the state-proclaimed responsibility towards Hungarians living outside its borders (see Culic, 2006). This relation needs further investigation, especially given that in the other two countries no significant differences have been found.

**Perceptions of Interethnic Conflict and Cooperation**

Table 3 and 4 show how members of the Hungarian minority perceive their group's relation with the majoritarian population nationwide (Table 3), and at the level of their locality of residence (Table 4). On national level, Slovakia is the only country where a majority (55%) describes Slovakian-Hungarian interethnic relations as conflictual. For Serbia, the corresponding value is 38.9% for Romania 36.4% and for Ukraine, 14.6%. At the opposite pole, roughly 35% of ethnic Hungarians in Romania and in Ukraine report interethnic relations of cooperation. In Serbia, this percentage is 21%, and in Slovakia 16.6%.

Contextualising the results for Romania, respondents' answers likely reflect the political nature of the relations between the Hungarian minority and majoritarian population: at the time of the data were collection (2007), the political party representing the Hungarian minority (Uniunea Democrată a Maghiarilor din România - UDMR, the Democratic Union of Hungarians from Romania) was part of the ruling coalition. It is very likely that UDMR's participation in government was related to Hungarians' perceptions of interethnic relations.

In contrast to perceived interethnic relations nationwide, when respondents reflect upon their interactions with the majoritarian population in their places of residence, a more positive picture emerges. The percentage of respondents reporting relations of cooperation with the national majority in their locality is 55% or higher in all countries except Serbia.
Table 3.
Perceived interethnic relations between the Hungarian minority and the national majority on country level (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Interethnic relationship on country level**</th>
<th>N (100%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conflictual</td>
<td>Cooperative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>36.4%</td>
<td>35.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
<td>35.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>55.8%</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>38.9%</td>
<td>21.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>38.1%</td>
<td>28.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Association is significant at p<0.01 level (Chi-square)

Table 4.
Perceived interethnic relations between the Hungarian minority and the national majority in the locality (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Interethnic relationship in the locality**</th>
<th>Total (%)</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conflictual</td>
<td>Cooperative</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>70.1%</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>61.4%</td>
<td>34.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>55.0%</td>
<td>34.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
<td>45.6%</td>
<td>36.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>20.2%</td>
<td>51.1%</td>
<td>28.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Association is significant at p<0.01 level (Chi-square)

Next, I regroup answers to the perception of interethnic relations question into conflictual (1) and non-conflictual (0). I use t-test to assess if there are significant differences between these two groups with regard to mean values of attitudes of liking/disliking toward: (a) the majoritarian population; (b) Hungarians from Hungary; and (c) the Roma. It is worth reminding that the attitude variable ranges from 1 to 5 (see Data and Methods). I do these analyses for perceptions of conflictual interethnic relations at the national (Table 5) and at the local level (available upon request). As expected, those who perceive conflictual relations with the majoritarian population also have greater dislike of it, irrespective of country. Generally this holds for both the national and the local levels. Exception is Slovakia, where at the level of localities the difference in means between groups is not significant.
Table 5.

Ethnic Hungarians’ attitudes (mean values) towards selected reference groups, by perception of conflictual/non-conflictual relations with the majoritarian population nationwide

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitudes towards:</th>
<th>Romania</th>
<th>Slovakia</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
<th>Serbia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hungarian in diaspora</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-conflictual</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>1.93**</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>1.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflictual</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>1.73**</td>
<td>1.84</td>
<td>1.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majoritarian population (Romanian/Slovakian/Ukrainian/Serb)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-conflictual</td>
<td>2.40**</td>
<td>2.64*</td>
<td>2.55**</td>
<td>2.37**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflictual</td>
<td>2.74**</td>
<td>2.78*</td>
<td>2.84**</td>
<td>3.10**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarian from Hungary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-conflictual</td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>2.11*</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>2.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflictual</td>
<td>2.44</td>
<td>1.89*</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>2.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma minority</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-conflictual</td>
<td>3.11*</td>
<td>3.42**</td>
<td>3.44</td>
<td>2.94**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflictual</td>
<td>3.28*</td>
<td>3.65**</td>
<td>3.60</td>
<td>3.47**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** The difference is significant at p<0.01 level (t-test)

The next step in my analyses is OLS regression of the 5-point scale of attitudes toward the majoritarian population (1=very agreeable, 5=very disagreeable) on respondents’ socio-demographic characteristics, their degree of ethnocentrism, perception of conflictual relations with the majoritarian population, and perceived ethnic discrimination. Table 6 reports the standardized coefficients for the analyses performed by country.

Among respondents’ socio-demographic characteristics, age and Hungarian as language of instruction in school matter in three of the four countries. *Ceteris paribus*, increase in age significantly lowers attitudes of dislike in Romania and Slovakia, but works the opposite way in Ukraine. Hungarian language of instruction significantly increases dislike in Slovakia, Ukraine and Serbia, net of other factors. Significant gender effects are present for Slovakia only. Serbia is the only country where the effect of urban dwelling is significant: compared to non-urban, ethnic Hungarians living in cities dislike ethnic Serbs less, other factors controlled for.

Independently of respondents’ socio-demographics, ethnocentrism significantly increases dislike of the majoritarian population in all four countries. Its effect is also strong relative to the other variables. Perceived conflictual relations with the majoritarian population country-wide increases dislike of it in both Romania and Ukraine. In Romania, Slovakia and Serbia, Hungarians who felt discriminated against based on their ethnicity, compared to those who did not, display stronger dislike of the majoritarian population.
Finally, perceptions of conflictual interethnic relations at local level are significant only for Serbia, probably due to Serbian immigrants fleeing from the South because of the Yugoslavian wars. I checked the correlation coefficients between interethnic conflict country-wide and interethnic conflict at local level, and we can see significant (p< 0.01) but weak relations (r = 0.249 for Romania; 0.154 for Slovakia; 0.249 for Ukraine; 0.321 for Serbia).

Table 6. 
OLS regression of ethnic Hungarians’ attitudes toward the majoritarian population on selected independent variables, by countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables:</th>
<th>Romania</th>
<th>Slovakia</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
<th>Serbia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.125***</td>
<td>-0.102*</td>
<td>0.118*</td>
<td>-0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (Men=1)</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.107*</td>
<td>-0.052</td>
<td>-0.075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban (1, else =0)</td>
<td>-0.032</td>
<td>-0.058</td>
<td>-0.082</td>
<td>-0.156***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University or collegea</td>
<td>-0.029</td>
<td>-0.030</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>0.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High schoola</td>
<td>-0.064</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>-0.016</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language of instruction in school(Hungarian =1)</td>
<td>0.062</td>
<td>0.083*</td>
<td>0.139**</td>
<td>0.113**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnocentrism</td>
<td>0.198***</td>
<td>0.181***</td>
<td>0.182**</td>
<td>0.235***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived interethnic relations on country level (conflictual=1, else=0)</td>
<td>0.165***</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.106**</td>
<td>0.131**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived interethnic relations on local level (conflictual=1)</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.010</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>0.257***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived discrimination</td>
<td>0.147***</td>
<td>0.162***</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>0.131***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.112</td>
<td>0.080</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>0.274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>870</td>
<td>517</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>368</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This educational group is contrasted to those with lower level of education
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05

Multidimensional Scaling Model of the attitudes toward social groups

I used Multidimensional Scaling, with Alscal method in SPSS, computing two-dimensional models for the four countries. The social attitudes of Hungarian minorities measure social distances towards the following national, ethnic and other social minority groups: national majorities (Romanians, Slovaks, Serbs, Ukrainians), Hungarian minorities, Hungarians from Hungary, Roma minority, other ethnic groups (Jews, Chinese, Germans, Asylum seekers) non-ethnic social minorities (homosexuals, security guards, entrepreneurs, unemployed, drug addicts, and skinheads). For all models, the S-stress values are less than 0.10: 102
for Romania 0.06, for Slovakia and Ukraine 0.05, and for Serbia, 0.10. (see Table 8). The goodness of fit can be assessed by examining the scatterplots by countries (see Appendix 1).

Table 8.

Multidimensional Scaling Model Summary of Group Attitudes
(Alscal method, bidimensional) by countries, cases and
S-stress significance levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Valid N</th>
<th>S-stress</th>
<th>RSQ value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>0.060</td>
<td>0.980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>0.990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>0.991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>0.953</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a Euclidean Distance used

Analysing the Derived Stimulus Configuration of the two-dimensional MDS model of Hungarians living in Romania (Fig. 3), we may see that the level of agreeability -antipathy towards different groups appears along the vertical dimension. The unemployed and the own group, Hungarians from Transylvania, are placed on the top, while Roma, the new rich and entrepreneurs are at the bottom. The other dimension embodies continuum from social non-ethnic groups (drug addicts, skinheads, homosexuals), that may be characterised by strong rejection to Hungarian ethnic minority groups (Hungarians from Slovakia, Serbia, Ukraine) that are largely accepted. If we interpret these two dimensions together, the „own” group, the unemployed, asylum seekers, and other Hungarian ethnic minorities are situated in the first right upper quarter, which is highly accepted according to both dimensions. Germans, together with Jews, Chinese and security guards are around the neutral field; they represent groups to which our respondents are not specifically connected. Hungarians from Hungary, majority Romanians and Entrepreneurs fall into the right bottom quarter. They are considered less agreeable on the vertical axis, but on the horizontal axis they fall very far from the „other” social groups such as drug addicts or homosexuals. It is worth noticing that the two „majority” reference groups have become very close. Both Hungarians from Hungary and Romanians are „majority” national groups to which Hungarians from Romania are linked through some kind of „dependency” and their representation is that of „minority” in relation to both. Therefore, the respondents perceived a similar distance from their minority ingroup and both to Hungarians from Hungary and to Romanians. This is so even under the conditions in which 80% of Romanian respondents agree that Hungarians from Transylvania are part of the Hungarian nation, and 65% also agree that Hungarians from Romania are part of the Romanian nation (Veres, 2010:146-149). It may be argued that in the first case we have to deal with cultural identification, while in the second case with civic identification (Veres, 2012).
The model of Hungarians from Slovakia is somewhat similar, yet with some noticeable differences (see Fig. 4): Hungarian ethnic minorities are situated in the right upper quarter but there are no other social groups nearby. Hungarians from Hungary and majority Slovakians fall into the right bottom quarter, but in such a way that Hungarians from Hungary are situated close to Hungarian minorities, including the „own“ group. In this model, they are situated farther from majority Slovakians than in the case of the Romanian model. Roma are perceived in a similar way as in the Romanian model, but they are more separated and no other social group is close to them. The new rich are situated at the upper margin of the left bottom quarter and their perception is considerably more positive than in Romania.
The model for Hungarians in Ukraine is different from the Romanian model (Fig. 5). According to this model, Hungarians from Hungary are situated in the right upper quarter of the map and majority Serbians near them. Hungarian ethnic minorities are situated in the right bottom quarter of the map, while entrepreneurs and the unemployed fell near the axis of the model, the „neutral” zone. The Roma and the new rich are situated in the left upper quarter of the model. Although they are far from the own group (Hung_Uk) it is as if the vertical axis has turned around compared to the Romanian and Slovakian models. Otherwise, „majority” national groups, Hungarians from Hungary and Ukrainians are situated close here as well. On the other hand, similarly to the Romanian model too, Hungarian ethnic minorities stand apart quite clearly. Based on attitudes towards drug addicts, skinheads and homosexuals, Hungarians from Ukraine are situated farther, in the direction of negative values.
The model from Serbia is exceptionally different (Fig. 6). Different Hungarian ethnic minorities do not form a cluster. Hungarians from Serbia as „own” group are situated at the right margin of the right upper quarter of the map, while Hungarians from Hungary are situated the closest to them. Hungarians from Slovakia falls farther, vertically upwards and to the left at the same time, while Hungarians from Romania and Ukraine appear distinctly in the left upper quarter of the figure, far from both Slovaks and any other group. The most groups do not fall far from Hungarians from Hungary either, but they are situated in the central part of the right bottom quarter. Roma are on their left, but still in the same quarter while entrepreneurs and security guards are situated between the two. Drug users, skinheads and homosexuals fall very far from the own group only according to the horizontal dimension, although they belong to the other left-bottom quarter, but close to the axis.
The MDS Derived Subject Weights model, with differences between countries (Fig. 7) confirms a peculiar location of Hungarians from Serbia. While the location of national-ethnic groups of Hungarians from Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine is similar (all situated in the right bottom corner), Hungarians from Serbia are situated very far from them (in the left upper corner).
Conclusions

The results of this research point out that Hungarians living in minority in different countries form in-groups, in that they feel significantly closer to other Hungarians in the diaspora than to the majoritarian population in their country of citizenship, Hungarians in Hungary, and the Roma. The majority of respondents perceive members of the majoritarian population (Romanians, Slovaks, Ukrainians and Serbs, respectively), as well as Hungarians in Hungary, as having personal characteristics that are different from their own. However, the idea of belonging to the „unitary” Hungarian nation also exists, and it is shared by a large proportion (70-80%) of every minority community (see Veres, 2012:149). Based on the employed bivariate and multivariate statistical methods, we may conclude that certain socio-demographic factors, such as age and Hungarian as language of instruction, are more relevant for shaping ethnic Hungarians’ attitudes of
liking/dislike towards the majoritarian population than education or gender. Of particular importance is ethnocentrism, which significantly increases attitudes of dislike in all four countries, above and beyond respondents' socio-demographic characteristics. My analysis also shows that variables capturing perceptions of conflictual interethnic relations, and of ethnic discrimination, greatly contribute to understanding variation in ethnic Hungarians' attitudes towards the ethnic majoritarians in their countries.

In accordance with Verdery's (1993) approach, the discrepancy between the explanatory model for Serbia and those for the other countries might be attributed to the "loadedness" of ethnicity following the oppressive ethnic policies of the Milosevich regime, the Yugoslav wars and their consequences for the population of Vojvodina. In Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine state policies were more permissive towards the recognized ethnic minorities, thus ethnicity remained less loaded. Except for this difference, the country-models are quite similar.

Hungarians living in minority in various countries do not include themselves in the same ingroup as Hungarians from Hungary, and they do not feel very close to them. According to MDS Alscal models, our respondents' group identity may be illustrated by concentric circles (see Fig. 3). The first circle delineates the attitudes of Hungarians from Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine as similar: the Hungarian minorities from these countries are the closest to the "self-group". The next concentric circle includes the whole Hungarian nation, especially the Hungarians from Hungary. The third concentric circle opens towards the majority nation (and other ethnic minorities, except for Roma, who are placed farther away). The relationship between the Hungarian minority and the majority is closest in Romania; this pattern is also present in Slovakia and Ukraine. In Serbia a distinct model may be noticed: probably due to the social consequences of the Yugoslav war, Hungarians from Serbia (Vojvodina) perceive Hungarians from Hungary as relatively close.

While this paper provides interesting insights, it also has methodological limitations that stem to a good extent from using cross-sectional data. Research on this topic will greatly benefit from over-time cross-national comparisons of ethnic minorities groups' self-identification, and their relational positioning to relevant reference groups, such as those discussed in this paper. Such approach, which longitudinal data make possible, would allow us to measure change in respondents' characteristics through time, including change in their attitudes. It would also facilitate disentangling possible reciprocal effects, for example between variables like perceptions of interethnic conflict and social distance.
REFERENCES

NATIONAL ATTITUDES OF ETHNIC HUNGARIANS FROM ROMANIA, SLOVAKIA, SERBIA AND UKRAINE


APPENDIX

Fig. A1. Scatterplot of liner fits by countries: MDS model (Alscal), attitudes towards different ethnic, national and other social groups, by countries
Discussion Papers.

Opinion Pieces on Nationalism and Identity in Cross-national Perspective
DID HISTORY END?
DEMOCRACY, CAPITALISM, NATIONALISM, RELIGION,
WAR, AND BOREDOM SINCE 1989

JOHN MUELLER1

ABSTRACT2. In a 1989 essay, Francis Fukuyama suggested that, with the death of Communism, history had come to an end. This formulation has generally been misinterpreted. He did not mean that things would stop happening, but that there had been a profound ideological development: Democracy and market capitalism had triumphed over all other governmental and economic systems or sets of ordering principles, and the potential challenges of destructive forms of nationalism and of fundamentalist religion were unlikely to prevail. Developments over the subsequent quarter century suggest that Fukuyama had it fundamentally right.

Keywords: democracy, capitalism, liberalism

In a 1989 essay, Francis Fukuyama suggested that, with the death of Communism, history had come to an end. This somewhat fanciful, and presumably intentionally provocative, formulation has generally been misinterpreted. He did not mean that things would stop happening, but that there had been a profound ideological development. With the demise of Communism, liberalism—democracy and market capitalism—had triumphed over all other governmental and economic systems or sets of ordering principles. Looking for future challenges to this triumph, he examined the potential rise of destructive forms of nationalism and of fundamentalist religion, but found them unlikely to prevail. Thus, the triumph of liberalism was likely to be permanent.

Developments over the subsequent quarter century suggest that Fukuyama had it fundamentally right.

1 Mershon Center for International Security Studies, Ohio State University, bbbb@osu.edu.
Beginning with the countries of Eastern Europe, democracy continued its progress throughout the world after 1989 with remarkably few setbacks, and old-fashioned forms of tyranny have almost completely vanished. There has been democratic progress in Africa—most spectacularly, of course, in South Africa, and equally impressive is the way the world's most populous Muslim country, Indonesia, successfully navigated its way to democracy after 1997. Popular revolutions waged throughout the Middle East beginning in 2011 suggest further progress—though not without pain.

In addition, capitalism increasingly came to be accepted after the abject and pathetic collapse of command and heavily planned economies in 1989. In practice, all capitalist, or market capitalist, states, may not end up looking a great deal like each other, any more than all democracies do. But, substantially and increasingly, the debate is likely to be more nearly a matter of degree than of fundamental principles. Thus, when the world plunged into widespread economic crisis in the late 1990s and then again after 2007, proposed remedies variously recommended tinkering with the system—not, as in the 1930s, abandoning it. There were no widespread calls for trade protectionism, for the imposition of wage and price controls, or for confiscatory taxes on the rich. And when some enterprises were deemed too big to fail, there were sometimes efforts to subsidize their recovery and to increase regulation, but not to nationalize them.

Experience suggests that democracy as a form of government and capitalism as an economic form are really quite simple, even natural. Unless obstructed by thugs with guns, they can form quite easily and quickly and do not require any special development, prerequisites, or preparation.

In the meantime, violent forms of nationalism that surged in some places in the last decade of the old century scarcely proved, as Fukuyama predicted, to be much of a challenge to these trends, and the same seems likely to hold for violent forms of fundamentalist religion that surged in some places in the first decade of the new one. In fact, the significance of both of these illiberal developments seems to have been much exaggerated.

In the 1990s, many held a rise in nationalism, or ultra-nationalism, to be potential rival to liberalism and therefore a vital challenge to the Fukuyama thesis—or even a devastating refutation of it. However, it appears that the “nationalist” and “ethnic” conflicts of the 1990s were spawned not so much by the convulsive surging of ancient hatreds as by the vicious ministrations of small bands of opportunistic predators either recruited for the purpose by political leaders or else formed from essentially criminal and bandit gangs. It is less a clash of civilizations than a clash of thugs in which ethnicity or nationalism becomes something of an ordering or sorting device that allows people to determine which thugs are more or less on their side and which ones are out to get them. Despite such distortions, however, nationalism could well prove, on balance, to be a
constructive force. It has aided the difficult and painful process of unification in Germany for example, and it probably helped strengthen Poland’s remarkable political and economic development of the 1990s.

In the new century, the isolated, if dramatic, success of a few violent religious terrorists was taken to suggest another major challenge to liberalism and to Fukuyama’s thesis. However, in the years since the September 11, 2001, attacks, terrorists have inflicted little violence in the West, and it is unclear that al-Qaeda central has done much of anything except issue videos filled with empty, self-infatuated, and essentially delusional threats. Indeed, extremist Islamist terrorism—whether associated with al-Qaeda or not—has claimed 200 to 400 lives yearly worldwide outside war zones. That is 200 to 400 too many, of course, but it is about the same number as bathtub drownings every year in the United States. Moreover, far from igniting a global surge of violent religious fundamentalism, al-Qaeda has mainly succeeded in uniting the world, including its huge Muslim population, against its violent jihad, and cooperative efforts by governments have led to important breakthroughs against the group.

Civil war, by far the most common type of war since World War II, reached something of a peak around 1989. However, there has been a notable decline in their number since then. Indeed, following the pattern found with international war in the developed world, civil war may be going out of style. One key may have been in the rise of competent governments which have increasingly been able to police domestic conflicts rather than exacerbating them as frequently happened in previous decades.

Fukuyama’s prediction, however, that the end of history would be characterized by “boredom” has, perhaps unfortunately, proven to be savagely mistaken. Indeed, there may be benefits to the endless and endlessly-successful quest to raise standards and to fabricate new desires to satisfy and new issues to worry about. It keeps the mind active and boredom at bay, and it probably importantly drives economic development as well.

Finally, Fukuyama’s celebration of the “autonomous power of ideas” seems justified. The remarkable rise of liberalism and of war aversion over the last two centuries appears to be substantially the result of efforts by idea entrepreneurs who have actively promoted—or marketed—the concepts around the world. In general, it seems best to see each idea movement as an independent phenomenon rather than contingent on something else or on another idea stream.
THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTEXTS: MULTIPLE UNITS OF ANALYSIS IN CROSS-NATIONAL RESEARCH

ROBERT M. KUNOVICH

ABSTRACT. Although researchers often treat countries as a unit of analysis in multilevel studies of ethnic, racial, and national attitudes, there has been some debate about which is the appropriate unit of analysis in such studies. Rather than limiting ourselves to one unit of analysis, we should systematically examine and compare multiple units of analysis. In this essay I offer two recommendations for improving cross-national research in nationalism, conflict, and identity. First, researchers should measure contextual variables for multiple geographic regions. Second, researchers should consider non-geographic contexts, such as occupations, in multilevel analyses. For each theoretically relevant concept, scholars should ask: For which units of analysis is it possible to measure this concept and what are the strengths and weaknesses of selecting each?

Keywords: cross-national research, geographic data, multiple units of analysis

Cross-national research on nationalism, conflict, and identity has grown considerably over the years. One area of enduring interest is explaining geographic differences in attitudes – for example, explaining why attitudes toward immigrants are more negative in some places compared to others. Much of the research in this area seeks to establish an association between negative attitudes with labor market competition and poor economic conditions (e.g., Quillian, 1995). Other contextual conditions are also associated with people’s attitudes toward immigrants: ethnic heterogeneity and social security benefits expenditure (Coenders et al., 2004); percentage of the extreme right-wing vote (Semyonov et al. 2006, 2008; but see Wilkes, Guppy, and Farris, 2007); restrictionist immigration policies and emphasis on national culture (Hjerm, 2007); and religious diversity and the minority’s acquisition of majority language (Evans and Need, 2002).

Although researchers often treat countries as a unit of analysis in multilevel studies of ethnic, racial, and national attitudes, there has been some debate about which is the appropriate unit of analysis in such studies. Quillian (1995:592) argues

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1 The University of Texas at Arlington, e-mail: kunovich@uta.edu.
that countries are an appropriate unit of analysis compared to cities or smaller regions because comparable data are more readily available for countries, because they are “important cultural, political, and economic units”, and because of their ties to national identity and threat perceptions. Fossett and Kiecolt (1989) argue that metropolitan areas are appropriate because metropolitan areas define people’s space in daily life – including intergroup competition for resources. Oliver and Mendelberg (2000:577), by contrast, argue that regions within metropolitan areas are better because they contain less internal variability, more external variability, and better describe one’s immediate racial context (see also Ha 2010).

There are costs and benefits associated within any of these choices. Rather than limiting ourselves to one unit of analysis, however, we should systematically examine and compare multiple units of analysis. Doing so will allow us to determine the appropriate level of analysis for different variables. Immigration policy and social security benefits expenditures, for example, should probably be measured at the country level. Labor market competition, though, may be better captured at the metropolitan level due to regional variation within countries in factors such as the size of foreign-born groups and economic conditions. Housing market competition may be better measured at the neighborhood level due to variation in desirability within metropolitan areas. This does not mean that we should begin to estimate complex multilevel models with respondents simultaneously nested within three or four geographic regions; such data may not meet the basic assumptions of multilevel modeling. It is possible to proceed in a more cautious way. Meuleman (2011), for example, relies on correlations and scatterplots to examine relationships between group size, economic conditions, and aggregated anti-immigrant attitudes after first establishing measurement equivalence.

It is also surprising that few have questioned whether it might be possible to measure critical concepts, such as labor market competition, in non-geographic contexts (see Kunovich forthcoming; Ortega and Polavieja 2009 for exceptions). One such possibility is occupation. Labor markets are clearly influenced by physical space. There is a distinction, however, between labor markets, which are associated with specific occupations, and labor market areas, which are associated with geographic regions. Focusing only on labor market areas is problematic because the labor markets for occupations are segmented. A variety of factors limit competition between people in different occupations within the same labor market area (e.g., skill requirements, training costs, credentialing, occupational segregation, and internal labor markets within firms). Rather than measuring labor market competition only on geographic regions, we should begin to develop and test models with occupations as units of analysis. There are many sources of occupation level data (e.g., micro census data and bureau’s of labor statistics) and there are many interesting occupation-level variables that could be included (e.g,
the percentage of foreign-born workers, wage inequality between native and foreign-born workers, occupational self-direction, and occupation-specific unemployment). Occupations are not meant to replace geographic regions as units of analysis in contextual studies, but they should be included along with geographic data. Doing so opens up the possibility of exploring interactions between occupation and region characteristics. Perhaps, for example, the presence of a large foreign-born population in a region has a negligible impact on people's attitudes who are working in an occupation with low unemployment.

In sum, I offer two recommendations for improving cross-national research in nationalism, conflict, and identity. First, researchers should measure contextual variables for multiple geographic regions. Second, researchers should consider non-geographic contexts, such as occupations, in multilevel analyses. For each theoretically relevant concept, scholars should ask: For which units of analysis is it possible to measure this concept and what are the strengths and weaknesses of selecting each? By returning to fundamental questions of measurement and design, we have the opportunity to improve our understanding of the sources of nationalism and conflict.

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ABSTRACT. This essay describes some conceptual and methodological challenges for future comparative scholarship on national identity and citizenship. Conceptually, linking individual attributes with emotional/psychological awareness in civic, political, or institutional realms is a challenge and distinguishing between ethnic and civic components is important. Methodologically, we need to capitalize on analytical techniques that allow us to frame our research questions in harmony with our selected analytical technique to maximize variability that exists among individuals, groups, and nations, and that further takes into account the nested structure of these relations. Here, I briefly discuss two techniques that are well-placed for future research on national identity and citizenship: structural equation modeling with latent variables and multi-level or hierarchical linear modeling.

Keywords: national identity, hierarchical linear modeling, confirmatory factor analysis

In an increasingly globalized world, national identity continues to strongly connect individuals, nations, and supranational entities. Variation in these multiple, complex identities is present both within countries and between countries, the study of which is a useful direction for future research. This essay describes some conceptual and methodological challenges for future comparative scholarship on national identity and citizenship.

Although some predicted diminishing importance (Huntington 1990), research on national sentiment has broadened in scope and encountered new challenges. Attitudes expressing love of country, pride, sense of belonging, loyalty, and views toward political authorities, for instance, are no longer restricted to geopolitical boundaries. Linking attributes such as place of birth, cultural markers, religious faith, and citizenship with emotional/psychological awareness in civic,

1 Michigan State University, e-mail: marqua41@msu.edu.
political, or institutional realms is a challenge. Although nationalism, national identity, and patriotism are often considered as interchangeable concepts, modern scholars articulate its many facets (Davidov, 2009; Kunovich, 2009). In addition, delineations between ethnic and civic dimensions is important: Assuming that national attachment means blind acceptance of authorities does not adequately address cultural traditions, religious views, and perceptions of institutions.

Specifying the intersection between national identity and place is also of interest. In this regard, comparative and cross-national research offers significant potential for gains. Cross-national research on national identity suggests regional differences, such as Western and Eastern European differences (Haller and Ressler, 2006; Shulman, 2002). Others argue that variation exists not only across geographic divides, but also within specific national contexts, articulating the importance of group-based differences within geographic boundaries (Zubrzycki, 2001). Stated succinctly, accounting for variation both across and within countries is essential for advancing the field. An emerging line of inquiry investigates how national identity is taking shape in the post-socialist region among mass publics to shed light on how multiple collective identities can emerge simultaneously among different social groups. Both comparative and case study research offer important insights on national identity and citizenship. Comparative studies that build on investigations of individual cases are also fruitful for thinking about how processes of identity formation are similar or different across countries within a geographic region or region sharing an ideological legacy.

Posing a challenge for research is the question of how to reconcile complexities related to identity coupled with a comparative perspective that fundamentally rests on traditional modes of data collection and analytical techniques for data analysis. In short, our point of entry from a data and methods perspective remains the geopolitical boundary of the state. Given this, we need to capitalize on analytical techniques that allow us to frame our research questions in harmony with our selected analytical technique to maximize variability that exists among individuals, groups, and nations, and that further takes into account the nested structure of these relations. Here, I briefly discuss two techniques that are well-placed for future research on national identity and citizenship: structural equation modeling with latent variables and multilevel or hierarchical linear modeling.

Structural equation modeling with latent variables (SEM) is an analytical technique with many advantageous properties for research on national identity and citizenship including its ability to incorporate direct and indirect effects, reciprocal relations, feedback loops, measurement error, and observed and latent variables. In a full SEM with latent variables model, numerous latent exogenous and endogenous variables are constructed and evaluated using confirmatory
factor analysis (CFA). Specifying CFA shifts the investigation to latent levels, which is essential for research on national identity and citizenship as these are abstract, multidimensional constructs that are likely imperfectly measured via survey instruments. CFA is theoretically driven, as the model and the relations between individual measures indicators and the latent construct(s) are detailed in advance, providing a range of fit statistics that enables comprehensive assessment of model fit including values assessing the quality of survey items. CFA thus offers a number of methodological advantages for future research to consider (Bollen, 1989; Kaplan, 2009; Kline 2011). For national identity and citizenship research, SEM provides the tools for creating and assessing multiple, complex measures of identity and citizenship. It also affords the opportunity for including national distinctiveness in a comparative framework through the specification of the error structure and introducing nation or group-specific correlated errors of measurement.

Multilevel or hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) is appropriate when there is nesting of observational units at one level within another level of aggregation (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002; Snijders and Bosker, 2012). These models account for micro-macro linkages through a number of model specifications articulating separate within-group and between-group regressions to empirically link parameter estimates with their respective clusters. Across various multilevel specifications, terminology of within and between groups is essential, as multilevel models allow for estimation of models including fixed and random effects associated with the levels of aggregation articulated as groups. Two are described briefly here: the typical macro-to-micro proposition and a cross-classified model. Briefly, the former proposes that individuals are nested within countries, and human sentiments are embedded within a series of processes at increasingly aggregate scales. The latter proposes complex relations among micro-level variables and variables at other levels of aggregation, which are referred to as imperfect hierarchies where the nesting structure takes into account multiple proposed nesting hierarchies including individuals, groups, communities, nations, and supranational entities. For national identity and citizenship scholarship, HLM provides an appropriate analytical technique that enables researcher to examine variation both within and between nations.

Prospects for future research on national identity and citizenship remain bright, given their continued salience in the world. Future scholars are tasked with describing existing variability in ways that show how to apply analytical techniques like SEM and HLM to pressing social issues. This scholarship remains critical for comparative research in the social sciences.
REFERENCES


Methodological Forum
ELASTIC SURVEY AND ITS FIRST APPLICATIONS IN ROMANIA AND HUNGARY

LÁSZLÓ LETENYEI1, ELIZA BODOR-ERANUS2 AND GÁBOR DÁNIEL NAGY3

ABSTRACT. This paper revives a methodological dispute laid aside in the forties, taking the standard character of surveys into consideration. It stresses that the standard requirement of asking the questions verbatim every time needs to be reconsidered due to three shortcomings: it produces invalid results, it is unimplementable and unethical. We present an alternative method called ‘elastic survey’ and illustrate it with two applications within researches carried out in Romania and Hungary.

Keywords: Elastic survey, standard, validity, fieldwork, omnibus

Introduction

This study reconsiders the main characteristic of standard surveys, namely that questions must be asked verbatim every time during the survey. In the following we briefly present the former and current disputes on the standard character of the survey, then we formulate the criticism of the standard survey from the point of view of the relations between the researcher, the interviewer and the field. Finally, we append a brief summary of the elastic survey design, including some fieldwork experiences.

1 Corvinus University of Budapest, e-mail: llet@uni-corvinus.hu.
2 S.C. Erromed S.R.L., Timișoara, e-mail: eliza.eranus@gmail.com.
3 University of Szeged, e-mail: ngd1@rel.u-szeged.hu.
4 The study was elaborated in the frame of the project entitled The Creation of the Elastic Survey Editor, a project implemented under the Hungary-Romania Cross-Border Co-operation Programme 2007-2013 (www.huro-cbc.eu), being part-financed by the European Union through the European Regional Development Fund, Hungary and Romania.
Where the standard character of surveys is coming from?

The survey technique became widely accepted by the 1930es. The USA president election of 1936 proved that a smaller but representative sample is more efficient compared with a non-random bigger sample. The scientific dispute after the election focused on the questionnaire and the process of surveys. The essence of the dispute of the 1940es was that some researchers believed that the only way to get useful information through questionnaires was by loosely structured in-depth interviews, while others preferred the strict, structured standard survey method (Beatty 1993: 1048). Paul Lazarsfeld started to deal with the differences between the data collection of the two orientations, since a serious dispute evolved in the United States of America between two units of the US Bureau of Intelligence on the application of closed-ended and open-ended questions (Lazarsfeld 1944). Lazarsfeld played an intermediary role between the parties, and found that the quality of the collected data does not differ in the case of surveys using open-ended and closed-ended questions. In this view, the usage of closed questions seemed more appropriate due to their lower expense (Barton and Lazarsfeld 1955/2003; Krosnick 1999: 7).

Jean M. Converse (1987 in Platt 2001:38) states that the dispute was not about the validity of the data but the expenses of data collection. It became certain that the application of open-ended questions did not only raise questions regarding coding, but excluded undereducated interviewers from such surveys. The fact that during national researches, the interviewers were far from each other geographically meant further difficulties, since this way research training and monitoring was hard to achieve.

Anyway, it is certain that Lazarsfeld's statements decided the fate of questionnaires for a long time, since surveys containing closed questions in a standard way became more and more accepted, while the usage of open-ended questions significantly decreased (Krosnick 1999: 7).

In the sixties, the dispute seemed to be settled towards the standardized method. Aaron V. Cicourel (1964) recognizes the problem of misinterpretation of the question on both sides of the interview. He stresses that 'opinions have common-sense features' (Cicourel:93). Contradicting to the standard character of data gathering Cicourel emphasizes that every interview is a unique event, one of a kind, and the setting for 'eliciting data' will not exist again in the same form. As an answer to the misinterpretation, Cicourel recommends that sociological concepts should be "constructed in such a way that the structure of everyday life experience and conduct is reflected in them" (Cicourel 1964:120).

Maynard and Schaffer (2000) cite Cicourel when they criticize the survey technique in general because of neglecting contemporary studies in linguistics and qualitative research about the verbal conditions of the interview situation.
The critique of Pierre Bourdieu is even more fundamental: in his "Public opinion does not exist" (1973), Bourdieu stressed that it cannot be supposed that all respondents have an opinion regarding arbitrarily selected problem areas. He tries to prove with the class pattern of the received answers that the validity of the data produced by public opinion researches is low, and he suggests that the answers of the lower classes seem consequently authentic regarding several topics, because this group does not have the due knowledge to set up alternatives. On the other hand, he suggests that people usually have a specific opinion regarding a question if it affects them, and this may greatly increase the answer rate for certain questions. However, if the respondent does not have a specific opinion regarding a given topic, it is hard to avoid influence during the interview.

Paul Beatty (1995) argues for the opportunity of making a compromise between the unstandardized, loosely structured in-depth interviewing and the more structured, standardized surveys. He reminds us that one of the main aims of interview-standardization was to make the monitoring of interviewers possible during the survey research, and the exclusion of the interviewer as a possible opportunity for error. The dispute was based on the role of the interviewers, who are still the main reason of current errors during the fieldwork. The strict rules of the standardized method did not, and do not make the communication of the exact meanings of the questions possible to the respondents. As a solution attempt, it arose that researchers should not standardize the text of the question, but its meaning, and interviewers should not have a greater role in the execution of the survey researches (Beatty 1995).

Hanneke Houtkoop-Steenstra (2000) devoted an entire volume to the analysis of the survey interview situation. He has concluded with standardized interview errors and countermeasures shall be applied to raise validity and reliability. Schober, Conrad and Fricker (2004) carried out a test of standardized surveys. They made short interviews regarding the labour market in the USA. They assessed that the makers of the standardized researches either do not approve of the interviewer providing any help to the respondents regarding interpretation, of if they approve, it can only be carried out in the form accepted by the researchers and only if the respondents request it. The authors state that the interpretation of the standardized question, especially without help, is only rarely identical to the interpretation of the researcher. In order to test these assertions, they carried out a telephone survey, where some of the interviewers were ordered to read the questions verbatim, while others were allowed to paraphrase the questions. Furthermore, the first group was only allowed to help in the interpretation upon the request of the respondent, the other group could help when they felt that the respondent needed it. The result was that respondents gave more valid answers when they received help in the interpretation of the questions. What the interviewers do after reading the question is fundamental for
the interpretation of the standardized language, this phase has the greatest effect on the respondents to interpret the questions according to the intentions of the questionnaire. On the whole, it can be stated that it helps if researchers allow interviewers to assist in the interpretation of the questions within controlled circumstances, but it gave the best results when interviewers were allowed to freely rephrase the questions in order to facilitate interpretation (Schober, Conrad and Fricker 2004).

Maryse Marpsat (1999) draws our attention to another possible error of standardized surveys. He formulated his criticism against the standardized survey method based on a data collection carried out among homeless people. This was based on the presumably large social distance between the researcher who makes the questions and homeless respondents, which may cause important differences in interpretation. According to the finding of the author, standardized surveys were unable to fulfil their function in these cases. In order to solve the problem, researchers tried to mix qualitative and quantitative methods, and also to continuously test and improve the questionnaires. Those questions brought the most significant improvement, which respondents could not understand at all in their standardized form; these mainly inquired about the social connections of homeless people. Another set of questions was interpreted entirely differently by the homeless respondents: here researchers found the totally different meanings of the words flat, home, and accommodation in the examined group. Researchers made further efforts during the processing of the results for appropriate interpretation, which reveal that after the design and construction of the questionnaire, they spent at least the same amount of time creating the frameworks for the interpretation of the data (Marpsat 1999: 6-10).

Frederic Conrad and Michael Schober (1999) created the method of “conversational interview” as an alternative for the data collection that consists of standardized questions. Here, the meaning of questions is standardized, not the questions themselves. In the framework of the method, the conversation continues until the interviewer is sure that the respondent understands what the researchers meant by the question. The most important criticism of this method is that the interviewer may overly influence the respondent. Regarding the efficiency of the method, Conrad and Schrober (1999: 1-6) stress that the answers of the conversational interviews considerably differed from the answers of the standardized interviews, and the change in the answers was due to the more accurate understanding of the question.

Nowadays, computer aided data collections (CAPI, CATI, CAWI techniques) are more and more widespread. If survey questions are asked online by a machine and not by a person, the survey situation becomes mechanic. On the other hand, new data collection methods create an entirely new situation, a direct linkage
between the researcher and respondents, what could open new perspective for an interactive or elastic surveying.  

**Criticism of the standard surveys**

Present paper stresses that standard requirement (what means questions must be asked verbatim every time), needs to be reconsidered due to three aspects: it produces invalid results, it is hardly implementable and unethical.

*Invalid*

The aim of survey data collection is usually the invalidation of a hypothesis. The technique is excellent for this: if the researcher is aware of the research question, and knows based on what data, and from whom he can expect an answer, then the survey is the most efficient way to collect the result with the appropriate reliability. However, survey method has several problems; among these, we briefly mention three opportunities for errors:

- When the survey is not used for the appropriate aim,
- When it is not written in the appropriate language, and
- When it is supposed that the same question will be interpreted the same way in different cultural environments and in different social groups.

The aim of the survey is to collect clearly circumscribed, factual data as much as possible in the most efficient way. The good questionnaire contains simple, clear and easy to understand questions, for which we expect a definite, preferably quantifiable answer. During the design of the questionnaire, questions should be dealt with thrifty, on the one hand, in order to decrease expenses, on the other hand, so that the respondent would not get tired. The "good" questionnaire contains exactly as many questions as the researchers have the capacity to process. It often causes a problem that the survey technique is applied routinely to answer any arising question. Unfortunately, situation analysis is often carried out using surveys, saying "we do not know anything, let us ask for some basic data." The questionnaire is a "hard" research instrument, it is not suitable for sensitively probe the motivations behind the answers, or to explore a question in details. Explorative questions like "In your opinion, what is the most serious problem of the settlement?" are typically good for interviews or focus-group techniques. A division of labour has to be created between qualitative and quantitative techniques. During the division of labour, surveys should only be used for well specified questions that can be asked without explanation, and which can preferably be measured in a rating scale, or for yes-no questions. The "all knowing", robust questionnaires exhaust the respondent and the interviewer, and thus produce bad results.

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5 Nowadays we are working on the development of ‘elastic survey editor’ software; its first version, the *QoD 1.0 Beta* is already available in Romanian and Hungarian (test version) on elasticSurvey.eu.
The language of questionnaires is often difficult. Difficulties are caused by the approach of the researcher who works far from the field: during the formulation of the questions, many people do not try to create easy-to-understand questions, but try to avoid misleading ones. Due to the demand for questionnaires that cannot be misunderstood, they are written in a specific researcher meta-language instead of the language of everyday life.

The formulation of the question correlates with the validity and reliability of the answer. If the question adapts to the field, that is, it is formulated in the local language, we get valid answers. If we have complex questions with a scientific language, we get answers with a limited validity. We are unable to estimate the rate of errors due to misunderstandings, thus the reliability of the survey weakens.

The third, and from the aspect of this paper, the most important observation questions the comparability of the results of surveys. The methodological writings dealing with the designing of questionnaires put it as a principle that the items of the questionnaire have to be asked in a standard way, that is, always exactly in the same form.

In reality, questions asked in a standard way have different effects in different social environments. Let us look at a simple example. If we want to examine the smoking habits of the population, we may ask the question like this:

"Do you smoke?" (Using the formal "you")

The question supposes the formal relationship between the interviewer and the respondent. A group of young people, who know each other, would ask the questions like this:

"Do you light up?" (using the informal 'you')

Asking "Do you light up?" instead of "Do you smoke?" makes a difference. It may be supposed that answers to the two questions are going to differ. Lighting up may be fashionable at a younger age, they would say yes more easily. Smoking, however, is known to have a harmful effect on health, cause cancer, not mentioning its effect on pregnant women and on the people living around us. On the whole, young people will probably give fewer "yes" answers to "Do you smoke?" than to "Do you light up?". The same question may be valid (one that results in appropriate answers) in one area and may distort reality in another. The more complex, value oriented and less quantifiable questions we ask, the higher is the chance of mishearing. In many cases, it would be more practical to take over the content of the questions rather than copying them verbatim, which would be nearing to a elastic, field-adaptive questionnaire.
Impractical

It is self-beguiling to hope that the questions can be asked in a standard way, if their formulation is far from the locally spoken language. Even the best trained interviewers sometimes modify the difficult questions according to the local language or give a little help and explanation if the respondent is puzzled.

Gostowski (1974) writes about it this way: ‘difficulty is not solved by the training of the interviewers, according to which the question has to be repeated the same way if it is misunderstood. This procedure ... may unfavourably influence the relation of the respondent to the interview, since in normal interpersonal relations, if the respondent does not understand the question, he expects a more understandable repetition. Mechanical repetition irritates the respondent, it gives the impression that the interviewer considers him weak-headed. It leads to random answers in order to stop the interrogation.’ (Gostowski, 1975 [1974]). In practice, the interviewers themselves solve this problem by modifying the primary version of the question to adapt to the reaction of the respondents. If these linguistic operations happen ad hoc, and a large number of interviewers do it according to their own feelings, a negative destandardization of the measurement instrument takes place, which cannot be controlled by the researcher.

The indiscipline of the interviewer, with which it defies the intention of the researcher is in fact a natural field-near expression. The designer of the questionnaire, who is far from the field, may write in his own language on his computer in his office, and may create questions that meet the putative scientific expectations. The interviewer, however, has to adapt to the field, for example he cannot talk formally if he is offered to talk informally. We have to add, that the indiscipline of interviewers and their flexibility often corrects the badly formulated questions of the researchers, thus helping data collection.

In our opinion, the questionnaire that uses standard questions is an illusion; in reality, interviewers do not ask the questions in a standard way. The procedure what we call ‘elastic’ does not wish to change the attitude of the interviewers, we consider it right, however, this method expects the controllability of the differences from the standard. If necessary, this information has to be included in the analysis.

Unethical

Mostly, sociologists do not consider themselves superstitious, but still due to a kind of professional tradition, they believe in certain magic spells. For example, the following is such a magic spell: “responding is anonymous and voluntary, the data is only going to be published in an aggregated form.” Many sociologists believe that the mechanical rattling of this sentence helps creating the trust in the relationship in a survey situation in the field.
In reality, the creation of this trust that is necessary for the survey is mainly up to the interviewer. We do not want to underrate the image of the company doing the survey or the role of the topic of the questionnaire, but we pinpoint that the trust that is necessary for the interview is primarily provided for the research by the personality of the interviewer and his ability to make contacts. The financial and mainly moral appreciation of the interviewers does not reflect this personal added value. In the hierarchy of researchers, those who design the surveys are on top, those organizing the research are in the middle and the interviewers are on the bottom, despite the fact that interviewers are the only ones who put their personality into the joint enterprise. Most of the times, the researcher does not know the field, furthermore, sometimes he does not even know the interviewers in person. This sub/super-ordination is not only morally questionable, but it is as the expense of the validity and reliability of the data, since the researcher does not know about the interferences of the language of the questionnaire or about the improvised question modifications of the interviewers.

The dilemma may be solved if the researcher personally participates in the interview phase of the research, assumes solidarity with the interviewers as it is essential in the practice of the elastic survey.

**Putting theory into practice: requirements and techniques of elastic surveying**

If you work with a survey database, than you certainly know what are the answers. But who knows what the questions were?

Elastic survey method gives a control over the flow of information between the interviewer and the respondent by its usage.

It is well known that during a personal interview, both the interviewer and the respondent’s education, qualities and the relation between them have an important impact on the respondent’s answer to a survey question. Language differences based on the respondents’ position in the social structure have an effect on his or her answers to survey questions. Main strength of the elastic survey approach is that the real communication during the fieldwork is recorded, and it might be involved to the analysis later. Data collection is not set in fixed boundaries via the application of the method, but the constant addition of new answer categories and question versions is a possibility.

Other strength is the validity of the data: interviewers could be sure about what respondents understood, what is their own concept and motivation regarding the question. From the interviewer’s point of view, it is a more flexible job than the standard survey: interviewers are given the free choice to select an adequate language style of phrasal composition in order to get the valid answers.
They are also expected to assure themselves that respondents understood the question and the possible answer choices. In a few words: interviewers are not ‘asking machines’ anymore.

For another argument, elastic survey is a more responsible job than the standard one: interviewers are obligated to record all extra information they give to respondents regarding the survey questions, and also the comments of the respondents. Training about the purpose of the questions in the questionnaire is necessary; it clarifies for the interviewers what the researchers want to ask with the questions, and the possible answer options are also presented to them. In a few words: interviewers become researchers, and respondents become partners because they have understanding and some form of control about the content of the questions. Obviously, interviewers can’t take all the researcher’s tasks (analysis, writing essay etc.).

To strengthen the cooperation among researchers and fieldworkers (interviewers), meetings are recommended where they systematically check every question and alterations made by interviewers on the field – together they are recoding the new question versions, comments, and set a new list of answer choices. By this process, the number of possible question versions and answer choices might grow until the end of the research. It can be expected, that by the usage of this method, most of the required question and answer variants appear for interviewers by the time half of the survey research is finished. At the end of the data collection, ‘elastic’ information might be involved to the analysis, so the validity of the research report might be higher.

The elastic survey is still a quantitative method, with some advantages of qualitative data collection. Elastic Survey might be defined as a strange kind of combination of qualitative and quantitative traditions, not described in the well-known writings of Alain Bryman on the topic (Bryman 1992, 2004, 2006). Elastic Survey method is rather fine-tuned with much less effort and resources for effectiveness, and still much cheaper than the application of a large-scale qualitative research.

The elastic survey concept is used in our two case studies as supplement to the personal or telephone interviews. According to our view, elastic survey method can be applied to online researches too; possible improvements on internet surveying are fairly considerable. In the interactive universe of the World Wide Web, users do expect interactivity on behalf of researches and researchers as well. In this regard, in the case of the online survey, respondents are free to alter the question versions they answer to, according to their understanding, new answer options are free to add by respondents, and comments can freely be posted to question, answers, and to the process as a whole. All alterations might be controlled of the researchers, and can be involved into the analysis. In this regarded, the respondent is not the subject of the research, but rather a partner in it.
Two examples: fieldwork at Fizeșu Gherlii (Ördöngősfűzes), 2005 and BESPO project, 2012-13

The elastic questionnaire can be considered more like a research practice rather than a theoretically founded methodological innovation. We believe that by describing the elastic questionnaire, we recognized an old but poorly acknowledged routine (which has not even tried to achieve acknowledgement) and our role is primarily to present the method.

In the following two examples will be shown:
- the first one is a fieldwork in 2005 in Fizeșu Gherlii, Romania,
- the second one presents the first results of the BESPO project we started to implement in 2012-13 in Budapest, Hungary.

Fieldwork at Fizeșu Gherlii (Ördöngősfűzes)

In the framework of an ERASMUS IPUC project, a summer school and fieldwork took place in 2005 in Fizeșu Gherlii (Ördöngősfűzes), a village close to Cluj-Napoca (Romania, Transylvania historical region). The interdisciplinary project included more than 80 students and 8 trainers from 4 countries, and represented several faculties (sociology, anthropology, psychology, urbanism etc.) from 6 universities. The main goal of the project was to provide broad scientific knowledge and practice to the participants. Among the organizers and participants were the authors of present paper.  

Participants (students and professors) formed research teams, where they developed their own research plan, implementing at least one of the qualitative research methods (interviews, participant observation etc.). Above this, there was a common quantitative research phase of the fieldwork: a questionnaire developed and asked commonly by all participants. The questionnaire was a micro-omnibus, containing some questions from every research team.

The research teams and the field were both multi-ethnic: researchers of Spanish, French Romanian, Hungarian, etc. language, communicated with the Romanian, Roma or Hungarian speaker inhabitants. In this multi-ethnic situation a standard survey technique did not seem to be successful, therefore we oriented ourselves to the elastic survey method. Taking just one example, we would like to present the lessons we learned during this fieldwork.

One of the research groups was interested in the connection between mental illness and religious beliefs. They supposed that religious affiliation will influence the representation about mental illness. In the first phase the group made interviews with the inhabitants, trying to find out how many mentally ill

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6 See more: www.uni-corvinus.hu/antropologia/ordongos
7 The study can be read here: Alibert, Balla, García, Inglés, Király, Laclemence: Mental illness http://web.uni-corvinus.hu/antropologia/ordongos/main.php?file=view_data.php

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people were in the village at that time, and what inhabitants were thinking about mental illness. The perception of the mental illness during the interviews was asked in this form: “Do you believe that mental disease is the punishment of god/comes from the devil/has biological causes?”.

In the second research phase, taking into consideration the language requirements, the research groups tried to avoid as much as possible the scientific terminology, using very clear questions, as much as possible in local dialect. The information gathered to “Do you believe that mental disease is the punishment of god/comes from the devil/has biological causes?” question helped the research group not only to formulate a very clear research question, but to formulate also the popular possible answers to this question for the survey (in Romanian and Hungarian, too):

“What is your opinion, what can we do if somebody is mentally ill?
1. To pray?
2. To have a "White Mass" performed?
3. To provide medical treatment?
4. Go to psychologist or other specialist?
5. To have an exorcism made?
6. To talk about the problems?
7. To help himself/herself?”

Contrary to the standard survey technique, in the elastic survey concept questions can be modified or explained by the interviewer during the data collection. If a respondent did not understand a question (for any reasons: the accent of the interviewer, the complexity of the question or others) the explanation of the question was allowed to the interviewers. However, interviewers were asked to note every comment, explanation or modification. This method helped the research group from our example to introduce an additional question in the survey, helping those respondents who did not understand the “mental illness” term. During the questioning the researchers found out that not everybody understand what “mental illness” means. Than one of the interviewer made an additional question: “Don’t you know anybody who can have mental illness?”. The respondent told that he know somebody who has epilepsy. The respondent wrong (epilepsy is not a mental illness) but interviewer realized that in this way question would became easily understandable. Thanks to the elastic survey, and the interviewer notes, the following supporting question was introduced in the survey:

“Do you know what epilepsy is?
1. The illness comes from God
2. The ill person is bedevilled
3. Biological origin
4. Other cause ”
Since the modifications in questions or language are permitted, the elastic survey method can be considered a process, question variations might arise during fieldwork. On the basis of our experience, not every question has had to be modified. Taking into consideration that previous fieldwork was made, only a few problematic questions had to be redefined in the survey. These modifications were emerged however randomly, also even through the last day. That is why we can state that the final version of the questionnaire was created after the data collection ended.

When the modifications of a question emerged, the consultations in the end of each day helped us to communicate this with the other research groups. The permanent consultations during the data collection were necessary to maintain the coherence of the questionnaire versions. Comments and variations were coded and recoded during these consultations.

Interviewers (students) did not record the answers on the questionnaire, but on a separate page what we called the “code page”. Every participant received only one copy of the questionnaire but as much code pages as many interviews he or she had. (The separate code page is known but not widespread practice in surveys, and it is often criticized. In the beginning the code page was unusual for students, and it slowed down the data collection in the first day, but when they got used with the method it did not cause problems any more.)

Both the answers and the modified questions (or comments) were always documented and coded. In order to help data entry, every question had two columns in the code page, one contained the code of the answer, and the other contained the code of the comment or question variation (if there was any). During the data entry extra precautions were needed, which slowed down a little the data input process. From a technical point of view, the modifications made during the data collection outcome with insignificant data loss. Although the elastic survey technique was something new for the students it was not uncomfortable or time spending.

In conclusion, elastic survey method helped us to clarify questions to the respondents if they needed it, and according to this we could avoid invalid data. The explanations/modifications made by the interviewers, and also the respondents’ comments were noted and registered, therefore the interview situation was controllable, and the answers could be analysed later (if it had relevance). In the case of the mentioned example the elastic survey method helped the interpretation of data, too. Researchers found that while in general they use to call upon traditional medicine (based on local beliefs and superstition) even in the case of mental illness, in a concrete example such as epilepsy, the medication given depends very much on the relation between doctor and patient. Many of the inhabitants didn’t trust the local doctor, they preferred to consult another doctor even if that meant travelling to another locality.
First results of the BESPO project

This case study is based on the first results of the Budapest Elastic Survey Omnibus Pilot (BESPO) implementing by TARKI Social Research Institute and Corvinus University of Budapest. The joint methodological pilot aims to analyse the applicability of the elastic survey (and also the graphical scales) during the omnibus surveys. According to the research design, TÁRKI omnibus survey data has been collected on a large national sample (N=1012) as usual, and the same questions were asked with the elastic survey method on small subsamples (N=55 or 114) in multiple waves. The pilot comprises of six waves; present case study is built on the results of the first two waves.

As a demonstration of the relevance of elastic survey method, we selected to analyse only one question, asking respondents about their self-definition of religiosity (table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q</th>
<th>Measure of Religiosity originally coined by Miklós Tomka in English, Hungarian and Romanian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EN</td>
<td>HU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q</td>
<td>Which of the following statements apply most to you?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A1</td>
<td>I am religious according to the teachings of the church</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A2</td>
<td>I am religious in my own way</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A3</td>
<td>I can’ t decide whether I’m a religious person or not</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A4</td>
<td>I am not religious</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the followings we will only discuss this single question. The question has been formulated first by Miklós Tomka in the seventies and was utilized in the Hungarian version of the European Values Studies. It underwent substantial modernization by its creator since that time, based on scientific measurements and the questions performance in different survey researches (Tomka 1998). The question was also used in Romania by Tomka himself (2005), and other researchers, such as Kiss (2012), Ivan (2012).

The most innovative specificity of this question version is that it offers a category, ”I am religious in my own way”, which became most popular since the widespread use of this measure of religiosity begun. This question is in use by TÁRKI Omnibus in Hungary, asking every month, since years.

---

8 Translated by Kiss, Dénes.
Prima facie

TÁRKI Omnibus results on the Hungarian national sample are almost the same during every waves: the majority of the respondents (about 50-60%) are "religious on his/her own way, there are important 'religious according to the church' and 'not religious' too. BESPO pilot produced similar results:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Standard method</th>
<th>Elastic Survey method</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N=1012</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First wave</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am not religious</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I can't decide whether I'm a religious person or not</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am religious in my own way</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am religious according to the teachings of the church</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't answer</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>System</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Standard method</th>
<th>Elastic Survey method</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N=1012</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second wave</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am not religious</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I can't decide whether I'm a religious person or not</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am religious in my own way</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am religious according to the teachings of the church</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't answer</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>System</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Standard method</th>
<th>Elastic Survey method</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N=55</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First wave</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am not religious</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I can't decide whether I'm a religious person or not</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am religious in my own way</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am religious according to the teachings of the church</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't answer</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>System</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Standard method</th>
<th>Elastic Survey method</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N=55</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second wave</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am not religious</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I can't decide whether I'm a religious person or not</td>
<td>1,8%</td>
<td>1,8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am religious in my own way</td>
<td>16,4%</td>
<td>16,4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am religious according to the teachings of the church</td>
<td>58,2%</td>
<td>58,2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't answer</td>
<td>1,8%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>System</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 1. Religiosity. Results with Standard and Elastic methodology

Comparing the diagrams it can be realized that respondents of the Elastic Survey pilot (N=55, two waves) and the standard Omnibus has given similar answers. Prima facie it seems that we used the same measurement technique, with the same reliability of results.

There were however an important difference between the standard and the elastic methodology. In the Elastic Survey cases, interviewer has been allowed to explain the question (if needed) and they have had the obligation to note both their own explanations (if any) and all comments of the respondents.
Noting all comments during the fieldwork becomes very fruitful: it helps us to get additional information about respondent’s motivation. Why respondents have chosen one or another category? What are their real feelings about their religiosity?

*Secunda facie*

Thanks to the honest work of the interviewers, Elastic Survey pilot got 20 additional categories in the first wave, and 9 in the second.

**Table 2.**

Which of the following statements apply most to you?
The results in the rows are the outcomes of elastic surveying, cross-tabulated with the original categories in the columns.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First wave N=55</th>
<th>I am not religious</th>
<th>I can't decide whether I'm a religious person or not</th>
<th>I am religious in my own way</th>
<th>I am religious according to the teachings of the church</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I have faith, but I am not religious/churchgoing.</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I believe in God but hate the clergy.</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If God exists, why does he allow horrific things to happen?</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I was not brought up religiously, I am not baptised.</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am baptised, but not religious.</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I only go to church on major feasts.</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes I go to church, it gives me comfort.</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am a practicing Catholic.</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have not been to church lately.</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am Christian and I go to church very rarely.</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don’t care about religion, there are more important things in life.</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I keep the laws and teach my children in the same way.</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I do not go to church and do not follow church teachings.</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don’t believe everything written in the Bible.</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I believe in God.</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I believe in the family.</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have taken the first communion, but I don’t go to church.</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is a difference in religious ideologies even between churches.</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I used to pray.</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I do not believe in it.</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
If we analyse the answers received with elastic survey in the second wave, we should see Table 3.

Table 3.
Which of the following statements apply most to you? The results in the rows are the outcomes of elastic surveying, cross-tabulated with the original categories in the columns.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Second wave N=55</th>
<th>I am not religious</th>
<th>I can't decide whether I'm a religious person or not</th>
<th>I am religious in my own way</th>
<th>I am religious according to the teachings of the church</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I believe in a creator force, which controls the Universe.</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I believe in God but I don’t go to church or rarely go to church.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I believe in myself and the family.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I believe, but I am not bigot.</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I believe, I go to church regularly.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am baptised, but I’m not religious.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I only go to church on major feasts.</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have always believed, but it was not advised to go to church some time ago</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I believe, but I hate our priest in the village.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Focusing on the 'religious in my own way' category, two people specified their answer by claiming their belief in 'a creator force'. 18 respondents does 'believe in God' but rarely or never goes to church, three respondents suggested that they rather believed in themselves. There are people who believe, but claim not to be 'bigot'; there are those who are baptised but not religious, and those who only go to church on big feasts.

In some cases, the additional information is not simply completing but contrasting the originally chosen category. (E.g.: there were three people who had choose the 'religious at his/her own way' category, but commented that they are 'baptised, but not religious'.)

In some other cases field notes helps to understand the uncertainty of the respondents. (E.g.: there are many people who goes rarely to the church. In the majority of cases they define themselves as 'religious on his way' but also sometimes '~ according to the church'.)

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The relevance of the results for the sociology of religion

We had a preliminary thought on how the new answer categories might distribute and which new categories might show up, based on the very exhaustive and thorough research of Gereben (1998) on the “religious in my own way” category. Gereben conducted a large series of qualitative interviews to study the background of this specific category in survey researches. New categories discovered by the BESPO pilot research mostly correspond to the categories and background reached by Gereben (1998). This proves the usefulness of elastic surveying, as it led to the same results as a large scale qualitative research, but with the involvement of significantly lower financial and human resources.

The methodological relevance of the results

We can conclude, as a result that Elastic Survey functioned during the pilot in two sides: on one hand, methodology was able to get the standard results, but on the other hand, it helped to identify new, valid categories, as additional information. These categories were added by the respondents on the field, not by the researchers in a “laboratory”.

In both waves, the majority of the respondents (38 and 45 people of the total 55-55 respondents) added some additional information, comment when they have chosen a standard category. Information which would have been lost if we wouldn’t ask the interviewers to note them.

With this method, it was also possible to identify misunderstandings of the standard categories by respondents.

According to the BESPO project’s aims in the future, problems such as the identification and measurement of the interviewer effect during a survey, or the importance of the symmetric communication during the survey fieldwork will also be investigable.

As a summary, according to our view, the elastic survey method raised the validity of our measurement instrument, while its reliability was not changed. Elastic survey might be a more economical and effective way to get valid and reliable data than combining qualitative and quantitative methods e.g. survey with interviews, focus groups etc.

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THE AUTHORS OF THE ISSUE ON NATIONALISM AND IDENTITY IN CROSS-NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

Guest edited by CONSIRT, June 2013

KATARZYNA ANDREJUK, sociologist and lawyer, obtained her PhD in sociology from the University of Warsaw (2012). She currently works as Assistant Professor at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences. Her Research interests include multiculturalism, Europeanization, migrations, and national and ethnic minorities.

CARMEN BUZEA obtained a doctorate in Sociology at the University of Bucharest with a dissertation on work motivation. Currently Carmen is implementing a postdoctoral grant on work motivation and work culture, financed by the Romanian National Authority for Scientific Research. Carmen is an Associate Professor in the Social Sciences and Communication Department of the Transylvania University of Brasov and coordinates the Communication and Social Innovation Research Centre, at the PRO-DD Research and Development Institute. Carmen published two books, one on work motivation and one on staffing, both in Romanian. Carmen is a project manager at a HR consulting company coordinating projects on work motivation assessment, organizational design and organizational development. Carmen’s research interests are focused on human resource development, distributive justice and cross-cultural methodology.

RADOSVETA DIMITROVA received her PhD in Developmental Psychology at Trieste University, Italy with a dissertation on immigrant families, awarded the Best Doctoral Thesis by the Italian Psychological Association in 2009. Currently, Radosveta is completing a project on identity and acculturation of minority youth across Europe (most notably Roma) at Tilburg University in the Netherlands, for a second PhD in Cross-Cultural Psychology in 2013. Her current project received the 2012 Early Career Council Award of the Society for Research in Child Development (SRCD). Radosveta has international mobility experience as a research fellow at the Brent Centre for Young People, London (UK), Brown University (USA) and ongoing collaborations in Europe, Asia, the USA, and Africa. Her areas of expertise regard cross-cultural psychology, immigration, identity and acculturation of ethnic minority groups. She is also editing a book on well-being of immigrant families across Europe, Africa, Asia, North and Central America currently in production at Springer. Additionally, Radosveta is actively involved in international professional service by organizing research activities and collaboration opportunities for young scholars as a representative of the Society for Research on
Adolescence (SRA) Study Group Committee and the Society for the Study of Human Development (SSHD) Emerging Scholars Committee. She is also the secretary of the Early Researchers Union (ERU) of the European Association of Developmental Psychology (EADP), and a newly elected representative to the Ethnic & Racial Issues Committee at the SRCD – one of the leading international associations for developmental scientists.

**JOSHUA KJERULF DUBROW** received his PhD from The Ohio State University and is an Associate Professor at the Polish Academy of Sciences. He is Program Coordinator for *Cross-National Studies: Interdisciplinary Research and Training Program* (CONSIRT) and is Board member of RC 09, the Research Committee on Social Transformations and the Sociology of Development of the International Sociological Association. In his research on nationalism and identity, he co-edited the edited book, with Wlodzomierz Wesolowski and Kazimierz M. Slomczynski, *National and European? Polish Political Elite in Comparative Perspective* (2010). His current research is on political inequality in cross-national perspective.

**SIMONA GUGLIEMI** earned a Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of Milan and a M.A. in Statistics from the University of Milano Bicocca. She is currently a Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Department of Political and Social Studies of the University of Milan. Her main research interests are in the relationship between collective identity, political culture and political system. Her most recent publications focus on conceptualizing and measuring national and European identity and on national and linguistic minorities. Methodological interests include comparative studies and cross-national equivalence. She has expertise in the collection and management of survey data and statistical analysis.

**VENZISLAV JORDANOV** received his PhD in Sports Psychology at the Bulgarian National Sports Academy, Department of Psychology, Pedagogy and Sociology in 2012. Currently he is a lecturer at the University for National and also at the International Economy and the National Sports Academy in Sofia. His main research interests revolve around the psychology of sports, work with developing young basketball players and cross-cultural psychology. In 2009, he joined the research team of Dr. Dimitrova and, since then, he has been actively involved in the study of identity, acculturation and wellbeing of youth and young adults in Bulgaria.

**CAROLYN SMITH KELLER** is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at Keene State College. She received her Ph. D. from The Ohio State University in 2012. Her research and teaching focuses on stratification, political sociology and comparative methods. Her dissertation research analyzed attitudes towards marginalized groups in Europe. Her current research includes analyses of gender differences among political elites in the European Union as well as variation in voter turnout in industrialized countries. She is also working on a project analyzing state variation in marijuana legalization across the United States.
ROBERT M. KUNOVICH, Ph.D. is an Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Texas at Arlington (UTA), Associate Chair of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology, and the Director of the Sociology Program. He conducts research in the areas of comparative race, ethnicity, and nation; political sociology; and social stratification and inequality. His research focuses on the public reception of immigrants as well as changes in social and political attitudes in Eastern Europe. He has published articles in journals, such as *American Sociological Review*, *International Migration Review*, and *Social Forces*. Professor Kunovich teaches undergraduate and graduate courses in research methodology and statistics as well as substantive courses in ethnic conflict and risk. He is the recipient of the 2012 College of Liberal Arts Outstanding Teacher Award and was inducted into UTA’s Academy of Distinguished Teachers in 2013. Professor Kunovich is also an Associate Member of the Cross-national Studies: Interdisciplinary Research and Training Program (The Ohio State University and the Polish Academy of Sciences).

VANJA LJUJIC studied law at the University of Kragujevac (Serbia), from which she graduated in 1999. She received her Master’s degree in international law (with specialization in human rights law) at the University of Utrecht in 2001. From 2002 until 2006 she worked at the Anne Frank House in Amsterdam, as a coordinator of a large educational project in the Balkans. From 2006 until 2011 she has been working on a Ph.D. project entitled *Romaphobia among adolescents: the role of perceived threat, nationalism, and acculturation expectations* at Leiden University. She is a member of the European Academic Network on Romani Studies. Her research interests include prejudice, perceived threat, nationalism, acculturation, political socialization and interethnic relationships.

SANDY MARQUART-PYATT is Associate Professor in Sociology and the Environmental Science and Policy Program at Michigan State University, USA. Her research and teaching areas of expertise are in comparative social change, environmental sociology, political sociology, and quantitative methods. Her current work focuses on identifying cross-national patterns on environmental and political attitudes and behaviors that include general concern for the environment, sustainability, national identity, democratic values, and participation.

hundreds of articles in journals, newspapers and blogs. He has been a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC, the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, and the Norwegian Nobel Institute in Oslo. He has appeared on television on "The Daily Show with Jon Stewart," and "The National" on CBC, and on radio on "Marketplace," and "All Things Considered." He is a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, has been a John Simon Guggenheim Fellow, has received several teaching prizes, and in 2009 received the International Studies Association’s Susan Strange Award that "recognizes a person whose singular intellect, assertiveness, and insight most challenge conventional wisdom and intellectual and organizational complacency in the international studies community."

IRINA TOMESCU-DUBROW received her PhD from The Ohio State University and is Associate Professor at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences (PAN) and Program Manager for Cross-National Studies: Interdisciplinary Research and Training Program – CONSIRT of the Ohio State University and PAN. Her research is on social stratification, structural change, and cross-national methodology.

PAOLO SEGATTI is Full Professor of Political Sociology at the Università degli Studi di Milano (Italy). He is co-founder and President of Itanes (Italian National Election Study). He is also vice-chair of True European Voter Cost action (chair Prof. Hermann Schmitt). He published several books and articles on comparative electoral behavior, political culture and national identity, among them he edited (with Paolo Bellucci) a volume on the Italian electoral change in the last forty years (Votare in Italia, 1968-2008, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2010).

KAZIMIERZ M. SŁOMCZYŃSKI is Director of the Cross-National Studies: Interdisciplinary Research and Training Program (CONSIRT), affiliated with the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology at the Polish Academy of Sciences and the Departments of Sociology and Political Science at The Ohio State University. His English-language publications include Social Structure and Mobility: Poland, Japan, and the United States (Warsaw: IFiS, 1989), Social Structure and Self-Direction: A Comparative Analysis of the United States and Poland (with Melvin Kohn; Cambridge: Blackwell, 1990, and subsequent editions in 1993 and 2007), Mental Adjustment to the Post-Communist System in Poland (with collaborators; Warsaw: IFiS, 1999), and Open for Business: The Persistent Entrepreneurial Class in Poland (with Elizabeth Osborn; Warsaw: IFiS, 2005). In 2010 he co-edited National and European? Polish Political Elite in Comparative Perspective (with Włodzimierz Wesolowski and Joshua K. Dubrow; Warsaw: IFiS; Polish edition, 2012). His recent articles appeared in Party Politics, International Journal of Sociology, Perspectives on European Politics and Societies, and other journals. He also edited three volumes containing analyses of the Polish Panel Survey (POLPAN) data, 1988-2008. Under his direction, the sixth wave of the panel study was conducted in May-June, 2013. Recently he received a grant from the (Polish) National Science Center on Democratic Values and Protest Behavior: Data Harmonization, Measurement Comparability, and Multi-Level Modeling in Cross-National Perspective.
THE AUTHORS OF THIS ISSUE

DOROTA WORONIECKA-KRZYZANOWSKA is PhD student at the Polish Academy of Sciences. In her research, Dorota conducts extensive ethnographic fieldwork and combines anthropology with sociology to examine identity and meaning in daily life in societies marked by long-term conflict. She received her MA from the University of Warsaw; her thesis examined the role of sporting clubs in everyday life in Belfast, Ireland. Her dissertation examines social space and identity in a Palestinian refugee city-camp. Dorota has been a Visiting Study Fellow for the Refugee Studies Center at Oxford University and has received a grant for her PhD work from the Polish National Science Centre.

VALÉR VERES is associate professor, PhD at the Faculty of Sociology and Social Work, Babeş-Bolyai University Cluj-Napoca. He published on national identity and social stratification of Hungarian minorities in Transylvania and in Central and Eastern Europe, demographic evolution of the Hungarian minority population in Romania, youth studies in Romania. His present research was carried out within the Carpathian Panel Study, which investigated Hungarian minority populations and their relations with majoritarians and the Hungarians from Hungary in five CEE countries: Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine and Serbia.

THE AUTHORS OF THE METHODOLOGICAL FORUM

LÁSZLÓ LETENYEI, PhD, Habil., is associate professor at Corvinus University of Budapest, Institute of Sociology. He is working with mental mapping (www.mentalmap.org) social networks (www.socialnetworks.hu) and elastic survey (www.elasticsurvey.eu).

ELIZA BODOR-ERANUS received her PhD at Corvinus University of Budapest in 2013. She made researches related to local governments, social capital, key actors of social networks, information society, and elastic surveys. She is also working at S.C. Erromed S.R.L. as researcher from 2007.

GÁBOR DÁNIEL NAGY received his PhD from the University of Pécs and is assistant professor at the University of Szeged, Department for the Study of Religions. He is also chairperson of DARTKE Association, an NGO active in the field of social research and project planning. His main interests concern the topic of social capital and its intertwining with religion, and social network analysis of religious groups. He is a researcher and proponent of the elastic survey method.
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