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EDITORIAL OFFICE: Hasdeu no. 51, 400015 Cluj-Napoca, ROMANIA
Phone +40 264 405352

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"DAY-TO-DAY POLITICS" IRAQ'S DEVELOPMENT BETWEEN BILATERAL AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Elizabeth Bishop *

Abstract
After the 2003 invasion of Iraq, $6.6 billion in Iraqi petroleum revenues disappeared; during the Second World War, too, Iraq's share of $3 billion was rolled into "development aid" in a program conceptualized in Great Britain. This essay compares the ethics of Iraq's experience with bilateral relations, with the role of various international organizations.
Key words: Coalition Provisional Authority, Development Board, Development Fund, International Monetary Fund, World Bank

Introduction

Great Britain's imperial heritage has been raised as a model for world affairs in the "historic present."[1] Since the United States' 2003 invasion of Iraq, historians and journalists have compared the events of that year with the British forces' 1915-1919 occupation of Mesopotamia; among them, Toby Dodge,[2] Jonathan Glancey,[3] and Rashid Khalidi.[4] The robustness of such parallels (between Britain's Imperial past, and an American Empire) can be tested by addressing one specific aspect of Iraq's current occupation, and compared the U.S. occupation with Great Britain's

* Elizabeth Bishop is a historian of Arab West Asia and North Africa. She holds a Ph.D in the History of the Modern Middle East at the University of Chicago and she is currently Assistant Professor at Texas State University, Department of History.
Contact: eb26@txstate.edu.

1 Walter W. Benjamin, *Selected Writing: 1913-1926*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996, volume 1, p. 395.

2 Toby Dodge, *Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation-Building and a History Denied*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2003.

3 Jonathan Glancey, "Our last occupation: Gas, chemicals, bombs: Britain has used them all before in Iraq," *Guardian*, 19 April 2003.

4 Rashid Khalidi, *Resurrecting Empire: Western Footprints and America's Perilous Path in the Middle East*, Boston: Beacon Press, 2005.

policies (particularly those policies referring to economic development and public "progress") toward that country from a different period, the early Cold War.

The following discussion will compare "ethics" in contemporary economic development practices, with Great Britain's development assistance to Hashemite Iraq during the 1950s.[5] This discussion builds on previous contributions to *Studia Europaea*, as the 2001-2003 Iraq crisis was the center of Ioana Andreea Tiriteu's assessment political divisions in the European Union, employing Kenneth Waltz's structural realist perspective.[6] So, too, do questions of "economic development" occupy Vanentin Cojanu, investigating Romania's regional evolutions on a county-by-county basis.[7] This intervention will take advantage of both insights, in its analysis of government records (as well as those of international organizations), contemporaries' memoirs, press accounts, and transcripts of radio broadcasts which fix contemporary understandings of "progress" in post-war politics.

Development Fund for Iraq

The Development Fund for Iraq was a bilateral organization created during May 2003. It was intended to facilitate payments for currency exchanges, electricity and oil infrastructure, salaries for civil servants, security forces' equipment, and wheat purchases. With a Program Review Board as its executive, its budget arrived in Baghdad in the form of cash (stacked on pallets and shrink-wrapped), loaded onto C-130 Hercules cargo aircraft.[8] Each of 21 loads carried about $2.4 million.[9]

Paul Richter of the *Los Angeles Times* broke the story that a total of $6.6 *billion* had gone missing.[10] As Tucker Reals was careful to distinguish, "It was not, it is crucial to note here, U.S. tax-payer dollars which have gone

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[5] Kathleen Langley, *The Industrialization of Iraq*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967, p. 81.

[6] Ioana Andreea Tiriteu, "'Power as Influence' or "Power as Capabilities'? The EU's Political Division during the Iraq Crisis of 2001-2003 into 'Old' versus 'New' According to American Criteria," *Studia Europaea*, LI, 1, 2006, pp. 61-74.

[7] Valentin Cojanu, "Entrepreneurship and Regional Development in Romania," *Studia Europaea*, LI, 12, 2006, pp. 61-74.

[8] "Iraqi money: biggest theft in US history," *Russia Today*, 13 June 2011.

[9] "Oops! Pentagon Loses Track Of $6.6 Billion," *Judicial Watch*, 13 June 2011.

[10] "Iraqi money: biggest theft in US history," *Russia Today*, 13 June 2011.

missing in Iraq. The money came from a special fund set up by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York with Iraq's own money -- funds which were withheld from the nation during a decade of harsh economic sanctions under Saddam."[11] After the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq during 2003, the United Nations had turned Iraq's oil and gas revenues over to the Coalition Provisional Authority's reconstruction programs.[12]

The *New Yorker* picked up the story, with Amy Davidson's wry observation that it "says a great deal about the financial imprudence of this whole operation that, for years, auditors considered it plausible that the money might just be 'mislaid' somewhere or the other, like a piece of paper on a very messy desk."[13] Stuart Bowen told Eamon Javers of *USA Today* that he hopes the United States has learned some basic financial lessons from its experience in Iraq: "Pouring cash — hundreds of millions in dollars of cash — across a war zone is a foolish thing to do; it will bring out the lesser parts of certain people and lead them to criminal conduct."[14] Alan Grayson, a Florida-based attorney, called the occupation a "free fraud zone;" he explained, "In a 'free fire zone,' you can shoot at anybody you want. In a 'free fraud zone,' you can steal anything you like."[15]

Representative Henry A. Waxman (who chaired a U.S. House of Representatives' Government Reform Committee) voiced the committee's charge, that U.S. officials in Iraq "used virtually no financial controls to account for these enormous cash withdrawals" once they had been unloaded from the airplanes.[16] Bowen (special inspector general for Iraq reconstruction) called this, "the largest theft of funds in national history."[17] Certainly, it was viewed as such in Iraq. That country's chief auditor, Dr. Abdul Basit Turki Saeed threatened to go to court to get the money back.[18]

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[11] Tucker Reals, Report: $6B missing in Iraq may have been stolen," *CBS News*, 14 June 2011.
[12]Dina Al-Shibeeb, "It might be stolen! US continues searching for Iraq's $7 billion oil money," *al Arabiya*, 15 June 2011.
[13]Amy Davidson, "The Baghdad Airport Heist," *New Yorker*, 14 June 2011.
[14] Eamon Javers, U.S. tracks 'millions' of dollars stolen by Iraqi officials," *USA Today*, 29 October 2011.
[15] Callum Macrae and Ali Fadhil, "Iraq was Awash in Cash; We Played Football with Bricks of $100 Bills," *Guardian*, 19 March 2006.
[16] Paul Bentley, "Revealed: How $6.6billion of taxpayers' money sent to Iraq by Bush may have been stolen," *Daily Mail*, 13 June 2011.
[17] "Missing Iraq money may have been stolen, auditors say," *Los Angeles Times*, 13 June 2011.
[18] "6.6 billion dollars for Iraq stolen?" *Press TV*, 13 June 2011.

The Iraqi Parliament's Integrity Committee appealed to the United Nations office in Baghdad, covering their 50-page report with the assertion: "All indications are that the institutions of the United States of America committed financial corruption by stealing the money of the Iraqi people, which was allocated to develop Iraq, (and) that it was about $17 billion."[19] For the members of Iraq's legislature, the multilateral institution promised a "moral high ground" which served as a respite from the abuse the country suffered in the context of bilateral relations.

Keeping a contemporary sensitivity to the ethics of "development," we may now turn to address Great Britain's postwar recovery, and the role that development assistance to Iraq played in it.

The Development Board

The Development Fund for Iraq that followed the 2003 war, can be assessed in the light of a Development Board established after World War II.

Britain's relationship with Iraq had been governed by the terms of a 1930 agreement, designated to remain in force for 25 years. It's helpful to draw attention to this treaty's Article 4 ("in the event of an imminent menace of war, the High Contracting Parties will immediately concert together the necessary measures of defense"), since formation of the United Nations after the war undermined this particular aspect of the agreement, with its general promise to end warfare. The U.N. Charter (particularly its article 51, "nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations") rendered the language of the 1930 treaty obsolete.

The economics of the war years cast a shadow on the 1950s, among both parties to the 1930 accord. F. H. Gamble, of His Majesty's Embassy in Baghdad, documented the war years' inflationary trend in Iraq. British payments for wartime leases (in addition to those for Ceylon, Egypt, India, and Pakistan) were estimated at $3 *billion*.[20] British forces' heavy expenditures, the shortage of imported goods after Victory Day, and the high prices

[19] Dina al-Shibeeb, 'Did I say I was missing $7 billion? Sorry, make that $17 billion.' Did America steal Iraq's American money?" *al Arabiya*, 20 June 2011.

[20] William Henry Chamberlin, "European Recovery: Western Nations are Not out of the Economic Woods," *Wall Street Journal*, 8 June 1953.

obtained from Iraq's barley exports had overheated the economy; with August 1939 fixed at 100, the wholesale price index had ballooned to 691 four years later, when bank deposits and currency in circulation totaled 50 million Iraqi dinars. Baghdad Radio, reporting Gamble's findings, observed: "Precisely the same situation arose as a result of the First World War and it took a number of years to achieve stability; but things [are] much worse this time."[21]

As historian D. K. Fieldhouse explained, "there is no doubt that the Labour government in Britain in and after 1945 was as keen as any of its predecessors to maintain a dominant British position in Iraq, and indeed throughout the Middle East.[22] At the time, Anthony Nutting identified a contradiction at the heart of Britain's struggle to maintain its relevance. If Britain's goal was to maintain a global empire, then the very latest in military technologies were useless; as he put it: "Britain has put her money into a nuclear armory, and atomic weapons are not the best weapons to put down a riot in the vegetable market in Bahrain."[23] Development would play a role in the constitutional politics of a world that would no longer accept unequal treaties such as that Britain had signed with Iraq before the Second World War.

Within the U.K., the Labour Party accepted the Movement for Colonial Freedom as an ally; nonetheless, the M.C.F. articulated a challenge to Labour policies regarding Britain's relations with the rest of the world. By 1955 this would emerge in ethical terms, when Douglas Rogers characterized the colleagues in power as: "practically delirious with self-congratulation because for the first time it devoted a whole session to colonial affairs; it should have felt shame at the years of silence; last year Labour adopted a program that set forth a comprehensive plan for moving the colonies to self-government. Comprehensive—but woolly! Where is the evidence that Labour really means to fight for colonial freedom? Where is the evidence of any serious challenge to the Tories on their colonial policy during the last twelve months?"[24]

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[21] *Baghdad - 1950-01-24*, Politics Cause For Iraqi Economic Slump, Daily Report. Foreign Radio Broadcasts, FBIS-FRB-50-019 *on* 1950-01-27.

[22] D. K. Fieldhouse, *Western Imperialism in the Middle East 1914-1958*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 110.

[23] Anthony Nutting, *I Saw for Myself: the Aftermath of Suez*, London: Hollis & Carter, 1958, p. 69.

[24] Stephen Howe, *Anticolonialism in British Politics: The Left and the End of Empire, 1918-1964*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993, p. 269.

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Iraq's Prime Minister Salih Jabr (the first Shi'i to form a cabinet) was charged with initiating negotiations for an agreement to replace the 1930 treaty. In 1948, a new text (its negotiators were convinced) would meet Iraqi nationalists' needs, as well as the requirements of those in power. This "Portsmouth Accord" specified that British troops would be removed from Iraq, its provisions established a Joint Defense Board to discuss the common interests of the two countries. In effect, the 1948 draft Portsmouth language would have permitted the Royal Air Force to use the Habbaniya and Shuayba bases, "dependent on an invitation from Iraq," for a second 25-year period.

When the text was published, however, Baghdadis responded in a movement subsequently known as *al-Wathba*. Incendiary newspaper reports encouraged citizens to join public demonstrations.[25] This mass insurrection lasted for eleven days,[26] and government repression of the crowds of students and workers left between 200 and 300 citizens dead.[27] Rival political parties demanded the immediate resignation of Jabr and his entire cabinet. The Palace formally repudiated the treaty.[28]

When it became clear that no Iraqi government could ratify the Portsmouth language for a defense treaty, the vocabulary of "development aid" retained currency in the bilateral relationship. Labour politician Ernest Bevin (appointed Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at the end of the war) remained "very enthusiastic" about conceptualizing payments for wartime leases as development assistance. While Bevin committed himself publically to a "partnership of equals," his concept for Iraq's economic future was closely tied to British perceptions of domestic political and economic needs, as closely as the Portsmouth language had been tied to London's strategic priorities.

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[25] Adeed Dawisha, *Iraq, A Political History from Independence to Occupation*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009, p. 131.

[26] Adeed Dawisha, *Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009, p. 158.

[27] Peter Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq: Contriving King and Country, 1914-1932*, London: I.B. Tauris, 2007, p. 213.

[28] Edmund A. Ghareeb, Beth Dougherty, *Historical Dictionary of Iraq*, Latham, Maryland: Scarecrow Press, p. 185.

From 10 Downing Street and the Foreign Office in London (and the U.K. Embassy in Baghdad), an agrarian model retained currency for Iraq's economic progress. In the U.K., an Agricultural Act of 1947 had granted subsidies to farmers, to encourage them to adopt "green revolution" technologies and ensure the island nation's food security. As Britons adopted factory farming, Bevin believed Baghdad to be the capital of "a future food exporter of extraordinary potential, and this was very important as he expected that a rise in living standards in Asia would absorb Australian wheat exports;" in addition he saw Iraq's agricultural development as a way to overcome a "one-sided economic dependence" on oil exports.[29]

Like the British technical advisors appointed to the Iraqi national railroads[30] and the Ministry of the Interior,[31] Bevin's idea of Iraq as a plantation colony was a one-sided concept of "progress." The Labour Premier's "always very practical outlook was shown in his idea of using old bombers planes to import Iraqi poultry" to the *metropole*; the prime minister justified this financially impractical "'poultry-bomber' project" as propaganda for Britain's enterprising spirit."[32] The Head of the British Middle East Office, Sir Arnold Overton, expressed his preference for a bilateral "Development Planning Committee" (which would twin a "Joint Defense Board" that had been penciled into the Portsmouth Treaty).

During the war, Overton had chaired a committee on commercial policy; his proposal for a central and independent planning institution in Iraq reflected a general view among British Keynesians at the time.[33] Overton's concern, "given the frequent changes of government in Iraq," was that any kind of economic planning would be vulnerable to shifts in successive cabinets' political priorities. For that reason (when it was founded

[29] Gerwin Gerke, "The Iraq Development Board and British Policy, 1945-1950," *Middle Eastern Studies*, 27, 1991, p. 235.

[30] *London - 1947-08-06*, Iraq Planning Transport Improvements, Daily Report. Foreign Radio Broadcasts, FBIS-FRB-47-117 *on* 1947-08-07.

[31] Matthew Elliot, *Independent Iraq: British Influence from 1941-1958,* London: I.B. Tauris, p. 45.

[32] Gerwin Gerke, "The Iraq Development Board and British Policy, 1945-1950," *Middle Eastern Studies*, 27, 1991, p. 235.

[33] Draft report of the Overton Committee on Commercial Policy, December 1942 - February 1943, Public Record Office Class T 247 - Papers relating to International Finance and the Chancellor of the Exchequer's Consultative Committee, 1940-1946, Treasury Papers of John Maynard Keynes.

in October 1948) he decreed from London that any local Development Board's "operations should be separated from day-to-day politics;" in effect, strengthening the hand of the U.K. Ambassador in Baghdad.[34]

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Initially, the politics of representation in multilateral organizations restricted Iraq's access to any model of development that would differ from Britain's single-minded obsession with its own security. Iraq was one of the postcolonial countries with a representative who served a two-year term on the International Monetary Fund's government board. This individual was not an Iraqi; the Hashemite kingdom was represented on the IMF's executive board by Egypt's Zaki Bey Saad (who also stood up for the interests of Ethiopia, Iran, Lebanon, Pakistan, the Philippines and Syria).[35] The dilution of Arab representation on the IMF's board (where one Egyptian represented eight nation-states) left the political imaginary of the Britain's Labour Secretary of State unchallenged.

Marginally more fruitful were conversations with the I.M.F.'s parent institution, the United Nations, which Iraq had formally joined in 1949.[36] Even before its formal accession, Awni Khalidi represented his country on the Social Commission. When requested to furnish national experts for global assignments, he protested that Iraq struggled with development issues itself: "I beg to inform you that *no* Iraqi experts in social welfare activities could be loaned for the purposes stated in your above quoted later as none could be spared from government services."[37] Note here that Awni Khalidi's definition of "progress" equated social welfare activities, the various social services provided by a state for the benefit of its citizens, not the increase of agrarian exports.

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[34] Gerwin Gerke, "The Iraq Development Board and British Policy, 1945-1950," *Middle Eastern Studies*, 27, 1991, p. 235.

[35] Michael L. Hoffman, "Ethiopia Gets $7m Loans From World Bank to Build Roads," *New York Times*, 14 September 1950.

[36] United Nations Archives and Records Management Service, S-0475-0020, folder 28, 13 September 1949.

[37] United Nations Archives and Records Management Service, Box S-0441-0076, folder 13, 19 February 1948.

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Disregarding local concepts of "progress" which entailed state services, the UK Embassy in Baghdad continued to press for a Development Board (and its plantation vision of "progress") that would report directly to the Prime Minister of Iraq, in order to "keep the development projects away from political intrigues."[38] While historian Juan Romero remains convinced this would give Nuri es-Said "a degree of independence *vis à vis* his conservative political supporters,"[39] it is more likely that "day-to-day politics" and "political intrigues" referred to the political parties of the Iraqi Opposition and their resistance to Nuri es-Said's politics of representation (recall that even his political client Awni Khalidi had articulated an inclusive concept of "progress" which included the government's social welfare activities).

Under pressure from the British Embassy, Iraq's Finance Minister Abdul Karim al-Uzri drafted a bill that proposed the Prime Minister to serve as president of a Development Board, with the finance minister and six other cabinet members on its executive board. Three of these executive members were required to be technical experts (one in finance and economics, one in irrigation, and a third in a field left to the Cabinet to specify). al-Uzri was successful in steering it through the parliament, where it passed as law no. 23 of 1950.

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While the Development Board's five-year investment program allocated ID 117 million for the purposes of flood control, water storage, irrigation and drainage, its "bricks and mortar" approach to progress remained controversial with the political opposition.[40] Minister of Economics Dr. Dhia Jafar stood up in the Chamber of Deputies to declare, "the government is determined to spare no means to ensure the country's legitimate rights to its oil resources on which it depends for raising the standard of living."[41]

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[38] Gerwin Gerke, "The Iraq Development Board and British Policy, 1945-1950," *Middle Eastern Studies*, 27, 1991, p. 235.

[39] Juan Romero, *The Iraqi Revolution of 1958: A Revolutionary Quest for Unity and Security*, Lanham MD, University Press of America, 2010, p. 9.

[40] Kamil A. Mahdi, *State and Agriculture in Iraq: Modern Development, Stagnation and the Impact of Oil*, Garnet & Ithaca Press, 2000, p. 173.

[41] "Iraq Applies for World Bank Loan," *Christian Science Monitor*, 11 August 1950.

As a substantive gesture toward alleviating some of these concerns, Darwish al-Haydari (as Director General of Agriculture) announced the transfer of state-owned land to small independent holders on condition that they cultivate it. In his opinion, initial settlement of 1200 families in Bigheila "points the way toward a possible solution of the crucial land tenure problem that underlines many of Iraq's political and economic difficulties."[42]

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Within months of formally joining the U.N., Iraq had applied to its Educational, Social, and Cultural Organization for fellowships under the "science in general education" program "to further our social welfare plans."[43] While the Government of Iraq sought funding to send one woman and two men (Dr. Laman Zaki, Mr. Abdul Hamid al-Ani, and Mr. Rashid Salbi) on social welfare fellowships to Switzerland and Italy, that Iraqi application arrived at the UN's temporary offices in Lake Success after the deadline, rolling over to the following year. Rather than sending the three Iraqis to Europe, social welfare expert Glen Leet was dispatched to the region at the host government's request. Eventually, 36 technical experts from the United Nations were consulting in a variety of capacities in Iraq.[44]

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The Bevin vision of Iraq as a plantation was about to transfer from agriculture, to petroleum resources. A new 1950 oil agreement proved "the most important in Iraq's history, in terms of economics," in the wake of new petroleum agreements around the world (as in Saudi Arabia and Venezuela).[45] Nuri es-Said renegotiated the country's petroleum royalties, negotiating terms whereby Iraq witnessed a fourfold increase in oil production between 1951 and 1958 (with a six-fold increase in government revenues). This growth was due, in large part, to the increasing world demand for oil to fuel Europe's postwar reconstruction; "these funds, almost all in foreign exchange [at a time when Iraq was still a member of

[42] *Baghdad - 1951-10-02*, Iraqi Land Plan Boosts Arable Areas, Daily Report. Foreign Radio Broadcasts, FBIS-FRB-51-198 *on* 1951-10-04.
[43] United Nations ARMS, Box S-0441-0083, folder 04; UNESCO, 9 December 1949.
[44] "UN Aide on Iraq Mission," *New York Times*, 7 February 1953.
[45] Albion Ross, "Oil Income Spurs Progress in Iraq," *New York Times*, 6 January 1953.

the sterling zone] made it possible for the state to initiate programs of development without the necessity of going through an austerity period or one of heavy taxation."[46] These new funds were directed toward the "bricks and mortar" development projects, that the Development Board and its backers at the UK Embassy preferred.

These new funds were directed toward the "bricks and mortar" development projects (and outmoded plantation vision) the Development Board and its backers at the U.K. Embassy preferred. Minister of Development, Dr. Dhia Jafar, presented the cabinet with a plan to spend a sum of 416 million pounds sterling over a 5-year period to finance bridges, dams, the modernization of agriculture, railways, *and* social services.[47] A six-fold increase in government revenues did not signify a comparable increase in the quality of life for Iraqis. Ribhi Abu El-Haj notes, charitably, that (of the income from petroleum) the Development Board's "most important contribution to development came indirectly."

Abu El-Haj explained that the country's development after foundation of the Development Board, "suggests that even when there is an ample supply of capital and the government seeks to invest this capital, there are short-run obstacles." Only 49% of the funds allocated for investment by the Development Board were actually spent. While the government "imported highly specialized technicians and personnel, opened technical and medical schools, and sent Iraqis for study and training abroad," most of the royalties from petroleum were invested in agriculture (39.2% of expended funds), with transportation and communications (20.4%) leading expenditures on education and public health (9.9%), and industry (2.5%).[48]

These Development Board funds even impaired the social participation of half the population. Ethnographer Elizabeth Fernea described the "new cement bridge that had recently replaced the pontoon footbridge." The new structure's location, however, had considerably cut down women's social exchanges, as they could no longer slip across the river and return unnoticed: "they could no longer wind through alleys to the back entrance of the bazaar, make a small purchase, and return home discreetly; with the

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[46] Fahim I. Qubain, *The Reconstruction of Iraq: 1950-1957*, London: Stevens Atlantic Books, 1959, p. 30.

[47] Birdwell, *Nuri es-Said*, pp. 237-238.

[48] Ribhi Abu el-Haj, "Oil Industry: A Strategic Factor in the Economic Development of Iraq," Ph.D. thesis, Faculty of Political Science, Columbia University, 1957, pp. 2-3.

coming of the new bridge, each foray across the canal became a major undertaking." As a result of the new bridge, women went out of their homes much less frequently.[49]

To explain widespread resistance to the Development Board among Iraqi citizens, journalist Elizabeth Monroe merely contrasted Arabs with the West, countering that, "Arabs grasp only what they can see." She qualified, "They are, therefore, credulous of stories that seem ridiculous to any Western ear. New schools built to a western architect's specifications became 'Western barracks,' and the great catchments being dug as part of the new Tigris-Euphrates flood-control scheme, which will save southern Iraq from an annual disaster, are 'lakes for seaplanes.'" Her informant told her, of the Development Board's flood control plans, "'Believe me-- the little lake at Habbaniya is for British seaplanes and the big one at Wadi Tharthar is for American seaplanes, which, they tell me, are bigger.'"[50]

Conclusion

On the topic of "ethics," Fadhil Zaky Mohammad (who taught law at the University of Baghdad during the 1950s) clarified: "the horizon of the science of ethics is wider than that of the law; Ethics usually covers man's duties to God, himself, and others; whereas law covers only the duties of man toward the others."[51] This essay compares Iraq's experience with bilateral relations (in the case of the Development Fund, with the United States; and in the case of the Development Board, with Great Britain), to identify ways in which foreign partners profited from these Iraqi government organizations; the US retaining control over income generated from the sale of Iraqi mineral wealth, and Britain seeking to achieve food security. Then, Iraq's experience with bilateral relations is assessed in the light of the country's relations with international organizations. Iraq joined the United Nations in 1949; while the design of the International Monetary Fund, kept the state from a direct relationship with this organization, Iraq was more successful in obtaining assistance for social welfare activities from the Social Commission.

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[49] Elizabeth Warnock Fernea, *Guests of the Sheikh: An Ethnography of an Iraqi Village*, New York: Random House, 2010, p. 50.

[50] Elizabeth Monroe, "'Pink Communism' in the Middle East;" *New York Times*, 7 June 1953.

[51] Fadhil Zaky Mohamed, *Introduction to Law*, Baghdad: Akhbar Press, 1958, p. 27.

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ON RECOGNITION AND EXCLUSION FACES OF OTHERNESS IN EASTERN EUROPE

Ana Pantea*

Abstract

The present paper deals with intersubjective sources of the community construction and the relevant implications of these theories, from an ethical perspective, for the inclusion of some marginalised groups in Eastern Europe. The arguments developed here suggest that interactions of social actors lead to various forms of positive and negative manifestation of intersubjectivity: cooperation and consensus; but imminent dangers as well, like exclusion, conflict or violence. Empathy and recognition are considered in the following the two theoretical frameworks for understanding the phenomenon of inclusion of Eastern European marginalised groups from an ethical perspective. In such extend, I present a case study in order to verify such methodological hypothesis which is focused on the Roma community. Public policies for equalizing opportunities and promoting social inclusion are seldom considering the concepts of empathy and recognition in order to approach concrete measures. In spite of the theoretical weight of the terms involved, such approaches could be prolific in the future for an inclusive approach of excluded groups.

Keywords: Eastern Europe, otherness, political and ethical theory, recognition, social exclusion of the minority groups

"No generation can free the next"
Sophocles, *Antigone*

Introduction

Within the space of the last two decades, we have witnessed important theoretical advances in the field of economical redistribution and political recognition. From a theoretical standpoint, redistribution

* Ana Pantea PhD is teaching assistant at the Department of International Relations and American Studies within the Faculty of European Studies, Babeş-Bolyai University. Her research is focused on the philosophy of international relations.
Contact: apantea@euro.ubbcluj.ro

and recognition are implicit if not explicit nowadays in almost all types of contemporary theories. From a practical standpoint, our everyday social life draws attention on the way we see and manage our interactions in terms of recognition of difference, inclusion of otherness, just distribution of material goods, etc. But in spite of all theoretical efforts, recent social movements in Turkey, Greece or Italy underline the political long term effects of the experience of social or cultural misrecognition or disrespect. We have come to realize today "that the recognition of the dignity of individuals and groups forms a vital part of our concept of justice."[1] In the last two decades as well, Europe has experienced exceptional economic, political and social transformations. The redefinition of the ideological and economical boundaries of Europe has brought advantages for many of its citizens. But the dark site of this phenomenon is the increasing marginalization and pauperization of some groups. Amongst them are the Roma or other socially excluded groups for whom chronic unemployment and poverty has become an ordinary form of being. There are two major consequences of this phenomenon. First, we can notice the rise and spread of violent forms of xenophobe a attitude all over Europe. Second, we are witnessing massive migration of Eastern European excluded groups to other parts of the continent as their last hope for a decent life.

In this respect, the aim of contemporary political actions should be the recognition and the improvement of the life conditions of misrecognised groups in Europe through some transnational structures. Several primary actions are taking place: data on poverty and misrecognition of minority rights are collected, measured and compared in supra-national structures, joint actions are conceived on the European level, etc.[2] All these development seems indicative of the growth of a common space for actions towards social and cultural inclusion – a common space that is less state-centered and allows claims to be framed

[1] Axel Honneth, "Recognition or Redistribution?: Changing Perspectives on the Moral Order of Society", *Theory, Culture & Society*, 18 (2-3), 2001, p. 44.

[2] See United Nations Development Programme, *Avoiding the Dependency Trap*, 2002, [http://web.worldbank.org], March 2013; J. de Laat, Ch. Bodewig, *Roma Inclusion is Smart Economics*, The World Bank: Knowledge Brief, 39, 2011, [http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ECAEXT/0,,contentMDK:22895991~pagePK:146736~piPK:146830~theSitePK:258599,00.html], March 2013.

in terms of European values. In theoretical terms, the "Europeanization" of recognition policies may offer additional avenues for the advocates of social inclusion and minority rights for raising demands about recognition and redistribution. In practical terms, strong national politics maintain the social and economical status of marginalized groups and conserve thus their excluded status.

The present paper seeks to analyse (1) the theoretical background of misrecognition and social exclusion; (2) to present the importance of "empathy" and "recognition" as fruitful ethical and political concepts that could be used for a better understanding of the phenomenon of exclusion. (3) Furthermore, the paper explores the case of Roma, a socially and politically marginalized group that is increasingly conceptualized today as one of the largest transnational minority of Europe. The aim is to analyse the status of this misrecognized social group in Eastern Europe through the conceptual apparatus offered by an ethical theory. While one could expect that the "Europeanization" of minority politics should have a positive effect especially in Eastern Europe, the political actions which takes place for the improvement of life conditions of unrecognised communities reveals a darker picture of this phenomenon.

Intersubjectivity, empathy and recognition

The theoretical framework of intersubjectivity and otherness offers the background for understanding the way in which excluded groups are conceptualised, constituted and perceived by the majority. While from a phenomenological or psychological point of view, intersubjectivity can be briefly defined as an embodied and linguistic co-constitution of distinct subjects, in sociology or social theory the term is used to emphasize two things: 1.) self-consciousness is a result of the relationship with others[3], that is, a socially constituted self-consciousness is a construct that it is settled through multiple interactions with a significant other and/or through multiple encounters during the process of socialization. 2.) the intersubjective process of producing, sharing and

[3] See G. H. Mead, *Mind, Self and Society. From the standpoint of a social behaviourist*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962.

passing down the "stock of knowledge"[4] from one generation to another (socialization), the changes in the stock of knowledge produced by a generation, the emergence of new value systems and new social structures, authorities and new forms of power. In conclusion, from the sociological perspective the "self" and the "other" are outcomes of interactions in a common world, of a common knowledge of the history of their communities and other communities as well.

The conventions through which otherness is sketched in everyday life context have a normative sense[5], due to the fact that one group oppose another one in order to identify itself ("they are so" for being able to say that we are "as us"). The everyday like dichotomy does not stand up to an accurate analysis (being able only to give rise to stereotypes and weak generalizations), although such an everyday like approach of conceiving otherness exist as long as communities exist. Conflict, violence and exclusion– as immanent dangers threatening the equality of intersubjective field – are as well present in our daily lives. Thus, the differences between equality and inequality, fairness of and conflict in interactions are always at stake.

Empathy refers to the most basic capacity of human being to recognize others as minded creatures. Thus, empathy had been considered either an unmediated (direct understanding of the other), or a mediated (context-dependent) process. Following the second standpoint, we assume in everyday life that it is almost impossible to intuitively grasp others as "fellow human beings"[6], without having a previous social cognition of a certain context. We assume as well that the other is constitutively dependent upon a given *Lebenswelt* (the world that we understand and orient our actions toward), a historical-cultural context and group membership. Thus, the fundamental level of understanding and including others as others in a shared world, in a typified manner, is a framework dependent process[7]. So to speak, the experience of the lifeworld is a process of typification. In everyday life context, we have to

[4] See A. Schütz, *Phenomenology of the Social World*, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1967.
[5] See L. McNamara, *Critiques of Everyday Life*, New York and London: Routledge, 2000.
[6] Schütz, *op. cit.*, p. 16.
[7] *Ibidem.*

employ some practical 'know-how'-s in order to understand the world and other human beings. Our way of encountering the world is related to things which stand under some general 'types' of what we are familiar with. Concrete intersubjective encounters take "as granted" that other people are always already available to us as "fellow human beings." Generally speaking, we have to have some minimal knowledge of others as others as having a shared context with them.

Schütz refers to a form of basic empathy that it is the condition of understanding the behaviour of a conscious human being. He emphasizes the basic experience in which "I" become aware of a fellow human being as a person. He distinguishes between "Thou-orientation" and "They-orientation". "Thou-orientation" – which is a pure abstraction – is about direct, immediate experience of the living presence of the other, of a "fellow human being *as a person*"[8], it doesn't involve any awareness of the other's beliefs or experiences. "They-orientation" describes a different kind of intentional directedness to another human, which is guided by the ideal-typical schemes mentioned above[9]. It is within the former that we grasp "a fellow human being", an "other I" and whose experiences are constituted in the same fashion as mine.

The experience and understand others is in accordance to these typical structures and patterns, which have been previously experienced from a subjective standpoint. These structures orient the way one can act in a particular situation. Intersubjectivity plays an important role, due to the fact that the stock of typical assumptions and expectations are socially derived and accepted. The gain of Schütz' account stands in the fact that it explains the "radical differences"[10] as a qualitative term that can be applied to excluded groups like Roma. The advantage of Schütz' account is the fact that it allows "radical differences"[11] between the immediate thou-structure of experience and the they-structure, sometimes characterized by "anonymity." This "radical difference" as a qualitative term can be applied to excluded groups and show how "anonymity" and the influence of "standardized schemes" can suspend basic empathy as

[8] *Ibidem,* p. 164.
[9] See *Ibidem,* pp. 202-204.
[10] *Ibidem.* p. 8.
[11] *Ibidem.*

basic understanding of the other as one of our kind, providing the soil for practices of misrecognition. The "anonymity" described by Schütz can easily turn to humiliation or dehumanisation. The influence of "standardized schemes" in a particular life context can even suspend empathy as basic understanding of the other as one of our kind (the "Thou-orientation"), providing the soil for practices of misrecognition.

Thus, the influence of unconscious "standardized schemes" can transform the Roma in a silent, amorphous, even anonym community which faces social and economical inequalities and institutional humiliation. From a theoretical standpoint, this means the absence of empathy and the disintegration of concrete intersubjective relations. This perspective put the question of dehumanization as an ethical issue. From a social standpoint, such depictions mean exclusion, fragmentation of community and more or less violence and conflict.

If the concept of empathy can work out for a better understanding of social exclusion of the Roma, it is fruitful to add another theoretical dimension: the one of recognition. Consequently, we have to take into account that the reproduction of our lives is governed by mutual recognition, "because one can develop a practical relation to the self only when one has learned to view oneself, from the normative perspective of one's partners in interaction, as their social addressee."[12] The matter of recognition has become prominent in social and political theory over the last two decades under the "patronage" of the Hegelian conception of *Kampf um Anerkennung*. Hegel was one of the first philosophers who argued that subjectivity is something that can only be achieved within a social context, within a community of minds and that it has its ground in an intersubjective process of recognition. In philosophy, "recognition designates an ideal reciprocal relation between subjects in which each sees the other as its equal… one becomes an individual only in virtue of recognizing, and being recognized by, another subject"[13]

[12] A. Honneth, *The Struggle for Recognition. The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts*, trans. J. Anderson, Cambridge MA: Policy, 1995, p. 92.

[13] N. Fraser; A. Honneth, "Introduction", in N. Fraser; A. Honneth (eds.), *Redistibution or Recognition?A Political-Philosophical Exchange*, London: Verso, 2003, p. 10.

The recent development of the "politics of recognition"[14] wants to shed light on the demands made by members of oppressed and marginalized social groups. In this regard, an important step was to bring recognition into view as a unique but neglected human good; as "a vital human need."[15] The most prominent contemporary theorists of recognitions are Charles Taylor, Axel Honneth and Nancy Fraser. In spite of significant differences between them, they are united in the conviction that "contemporary politics have seen a shift away from ideas of class, equality, economy and nation towards those of identity, difference, culture and ethnicity."[16]

For instance, according to Honneth, recognition is seen as a category that conditions subjects' autonomy on intersubjective regards. There are three key factors that shape individuals' capacity to fruitfully engage with others: the sense of a basic (1) self-confidence (which is related to how we were, and are presently, situated within loving relationships), (2) self-respect and (3) self-esteem. The initial love relationship is conceptually and genetically prior to every other form of reciprocal recognition. In this context, Honneth relies on the "object-relations theory" of early childhood experience, which lays emphasis on the fact that the "development of children cannot be abstracted from the interactive relationships in which the process of maturation takes place."[17] When a human beings possesses "self-confidence", (s)he will be able then to acquire self-respect. As Honneth understands it, self-respect has "less to do with whether or not one has a good opinion of oneself than of one's sense of possessing of the universal dignity of persons."[18] Related to this, being accorded rights is also crucial to self-respect. While "self-respect is a matter of viewing oneself as entitled to the same status and treatment as every other person, self-esteem involves a sense of what it is that makes one special, unique."[19] What "distinguishes one from others must be something valuable.

[14] See Ch. Taylor, *Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition"*, Princeton: Princeton University, 1992.
[15] Ch. Taylor, *op. cit.*, 26.
[16] S. Thompson, *The Political Theory of Recognition*, Cambridge: Policy, 2006, p. 3.
[17] J. Anderson, "Translator's Introduction", in A. Honneth, *The Struggle for Recognition. The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts*, trans. J. Anderson, Cambridge MA: Policy, 1995, p. xiii.
[18] J. Anderson, *op. cit.*, p. xiv.
[19] *Ibidem*, p. xvi.

Accordingly, to have the sense that one has nothing of value to offer is to lack any basis for developing a sense of one's own identity."[20]

The underlying premise for both Honneth and Fraser is the fact that distributive injustice has not disappeared in the 21st century. "On the contrary, economic inequalities are growing, as neoliberal forces promote corporate globalization and weaken the governance structures that previously enabled some redistribution within countries."[21] Honneth basically suggests a "normative monism" where recognition is a fundamental moral category and distribution is derivative. On the contrary, Fraser proposes a "perspectival dualist" analysis which mean that the two dimensions are co-fundamental and mutually irreducible dimensions of justice. Fraser's general thesis is "that justice today requires *both* redistribution, *and* recognition. Neither alone is sufficient."[22] The debate between Honneth and Fraser is settled down on three levels: the one of moral philosophy – the priority of "the right" over "the good"; the one of social theory that put in question the relation of economy an culture, and the structure of capitalist society; and last, the level of political analysis which interrogates the relationship between equality and difference, between economic struggles and identity politics, social democracy and multiculturalism.

In the succession of Taylor, Honneth or Fraser, another important theorist, P. Markell[23] has provided an insightful criticism of the politics of recognition that, in his view, has a tendency to divert "attention from the role of the powerful […] focusing on the consequences of suffering misrecognition rather than on the more fundamental question of what it means to commit it."[24] Consequently, he argues instead for what he conceptualizes as an existentially inclined "politics of acknowledgement" which "involves coming to terms with, rather than vainly attempting to overcome, the risk of conflict, hostility, misunderstanding, opacity, and alienation that characterizes life among others."[25] For him, the issue of recognition is about people who "respond to the experience of intersubjective

[20] *Ibidem*.
[21] N. Fraser; A. Honneth, *op. cit.*, p. 2.
[22] *Ibidem*, p. 10.
[23] See P. Markell, *Bound by Recognition*, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University, 2003.
[24] P. Markell, *op. cit.*, p. 18.
[25] *Ibidem*, p. 38.

vulnerability in overly ambitious ways-that is, in ways that do not acknowledge but instead try to overcome some of the basic conditions of human activity-and who thereby find themselves working against their own purposes. But if this story is tragic […] perhaps, for all the blindness in which it implicates us, the desire for recognition and the politics that flows from it-including its injustices-are ineliminable features of human life."[26] Recognition is about giving people what they are due, but a more fundamental issue is the openness to others, the welcoming of others without prior condition, grounded in the appreciation of someone's universality–and this is related to acknowledgement. The openness is closed to the sense offered by Lévinas, and the universality of welcoming is linked to Hannah Arendt and Derrida. In the sense "of accepting the existence of others-as yet unspecified, undetermined others-makes unpredictability and lack of mastery into unavoidable conditions of human agency. […] Is to expose ourselves to surprise appearances and unexpected developments."[27] Markell's insight critique of the politics of recognition is a prolific position for further development on the theoretical level. The reason of such a statement stays in the fact that Markell emphasizes a principle that any person can perform in him/herself through individual decision.

From the perspective of intersubjectiviy-theories, arguing for a politics of "acknowledgement" instead of that of "recognition", would mean to take the ethical dimension of intersubjectivity or empathy as the primary and grounding sphere of social recognition and justice, in the manner of Levinas (and the philosophy of dialogue of Buber, Rosenzweig), or the late Derrida etc. Observing conflicts or sufferance of other living being, we have a natural "attitude" of acknowledging a responsibility for our fellows: "seeing that another suffers is more like recognizing that (*ceteris paribus*) *something ought to be done*. Thus is, […] embodies something like an *ethical demand*."[28]

An alternative way is to follow the proceduralism of Habermas and regard intersubjectivity related to the speech acts, analyzing the

[26] *Ibidem*, p. 177.
[27] *Ibidem*, p. 180.
[28] S. Overgaard, *Wittgenstein and Other Minds*, London & New York: Routledge, 2007, p. 146.

rules by which we understand each other.[29] However, the interference between a purely ethical and a technically procedural way could be grounded in everyday life (in a "depoliticized" and secular way), in which concrete communitarian principles (like "building bridges" within communities, "mutual recognition" between communities) are applied. For this reason, it is fruitful to consider intersubjectivity as a flexible principle for establishing new value systems, imposed through consensus by force of argument.[30] The aim is to make possible the cooperation within society in concrete social projects like social inclusion or recognition. This means that it has to carry on the meaning of the genuine sense of *inter* and not to dislocate it in the field of *intra*-subjectivity[31] – in a field of asymmetrical relationship and domination.

The Case of Eastern European Exclusion

The relatively "Romantic" approach of otherness or strangeness is often referring to Roma in almost all parts of Europe. Academic and legal importance of debating the ethnicity of the Roma cannot shadow the social and political condition of their excluded status, facing economical and social disadvantages today. Scholars are seldom searching for non-ethnic explanations for this inequality giving the fact that the main debate is focused on the particularity of the Roma ethnic identity.

It is well known that the debates on the meaning of "ethnicity" has a long history[32] which, in the 21st century, unfortunately just replaced the analytical gap left by the inappropriate use of the notion of "race" as an explanatory tool for cultural, social and political "differences". Race and ethnicity are used as distinctive forms of categorization for a group without having any objective reality.[33] The acceptance of ethnicity today

[29] See J. Habermas, *Theory of Communicative Action*, trans. Th. McCarthy, Boston: Beacon Press, 1984.

[30] See J. Habermas, *op. cit.*

[31] See S. Overgaard, *op. cit.*, pp. 65-90.

[32] See F. Barth (ed.), *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries - the Social Organisation of Culture Differences*, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1969; B. A. Belton, *Gypsy and Traveller Ethnicity. The Social Generation of an Ethnic Phenomenon*, London: Routledge, 2005.

[33] See B. A. Belton, *op. cit.*, pp. 11-32; K. Malik, *The Meaning of Race*. Basinstoke: Macmilliam, 1996, pp. 95-123.

has proof its vagueness and it "cannot be accurately understood as a hygienic continuity of blood, race, ethnicity or hereditary factors. (…) [S]ocial and economic considerations need to be included in the analysis of Traveller identity in order to produce a more precise analysis of the Gypsy and Traveller population."[34]

In spite of a dominant standpoint related to Romani studies, some researchers consider that "with the exception of educated Gypsy intellectuals who run the Rom[ani] political parties, the Rom[a] do not have an ethnic identity. For them, identity is constructed and constantly remade in the present in relations with significant others, not something inherited from the past."[35] This statement has relatively high significance if we want to move forward from an ethicist approach of the Roma to a sociologically and politically relevant one. From the standpoint of self-identification, the weight of a "significant other" determines the identification of a member of the group as being a Roma. Anyway, the collective self-identifications are not characterized by the degree of cohesiveness and culture-centeredness that national-state paradigm attributed to it. For this reason, the identification of a community cannot be appropriate without the hetero-identification of the community. Kligman[36] noticed in her field researches that, in post-communist Eastern Europe, poverty and spatial segregation are important criteria for someone's hetero- and self-identification as being a Roma. Basically, such criteria of identification work as social stigmas.

Even if we regard Roma as an ethnic group, it has to be mentioned the unusual structure of the group. "The uniqueness of the Gypsies lies in the fact that they are a transnational, non-territorially based people who do not have a 'home state' that can provide a haven or extend protection to them."[37] In such extend, for the Roma every country they settle down for a period is a "country of residence." Comparing with other ethnic groups, like, for instance, the Kurds, the Jews or the Berbers; the Roma don't have a homeland or territory to which they periodically or

[34] B. A. Belton, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

[35] M. Stewart, *The Time of The Gypsies*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1997, p. 28.

[36] See G. Kligman, "On the Social Construction of «Otherness»: Identifying «The Roma» in Post-Socialist Communities," in *Review of Sociology*, 7(2), 2001, pp. 61-78.

[37] Z. D. Barany, *The East European gypsies: regime change, marginality, and ethnopolitics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 2.

symbolically return. "They are unique in their homelessness, a situation that, in important respects, explains their marginality as well as their relationship to the states of Europe and beyond."[38]

If we intend to understand the particularity of Roma exclusion, it has to be mentioned the differences between being poor and being excluded. To be socially excluded is usually defined as an economic phenomenon which also has consequences in the social and symbolic fields. As social exclusion does not necessarily entail poverty, poverty cannot be the only indicator of exclusion. Talking about exclusion, there are two levels of dealing with it. On a theoretical level, social exclusion occurs, according to Amartya Sen[39], when one does not have the freedom to undertake activities that a person would have reason to choose. The process of social exclusion is intrinsically linked to the denial of freedom. Groups or persons may be "actively" excluded from taking advantage of an opportunity because of a deliberate policy or practice in society, or as a result of a complex web of social processes in which there are no deliberate attempts to exclude ("passive exclusion"). Contemporary Roma exclusion is a form of "passive" exclusion as nowadays public policies are not deliberatively exclude the Roma, even if they are excluded as a consequence of social policies.

On a practical level, exclusion means the way in which "our society to keep all groups and individuals within reach of what we expect as a society. It is about the tendency to push vulnerable and difficult individuals into the least popular places, furthest away from our common aspirations. It means that some people feel excluded from the mainstream, as though they do not belong."[40] From this perspective, Roma are not only subjects of social exclusion but the permanent stereotipisation of their status may be the results of the processes of exclusion. It is acknowledged in the field of social sciences that exclusion is not only about poverty, but also about symbolic boundaries, social networks, institutional and interpersonal discrimination, access to services and information, access to infrastructure, possibilities of participating in the

[38] Z. D. Barany, *op. cit.*, 143.

[39] See A. Sen, "Social Exclusion: Concept, Application, And Scrutiny", in *Social Development Paper*, Manila: Asian Development Bank, 1, 2000.

[40] A. Power; W. J. Wilson, *Social Exclusion and the Future of Cities* (research paper 035), [http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/dps/case/cp/CASEpaper35.pdf 2000], January 2013, p. 1.

formal economy, geographical distances from working opportunities, etc.[41] All these factors which produce exclusion might have effect on self-identification (considered here as a pure negativity of opportunities one can have). Thus, self-identification – which is basically the acknowledgment of a complex "status" – can be an uncertain, fluctuant, unimportant dimension of a person. This might even conduct to a lack of self-esteem in the sense analysed by Axel Honneth. For this reason, ethic Roma identification (self and hetero) is relatively confusing and almost impossible to measure with qualitative sociological tools. Several surveys had been made in the last two decades in Central and Eastern Europe in order to estimate the percentage of Roma population (through self-identification or hetero-identification). Of course, the surveys intended to measure the level of "Roma" poverty, education, housing conditions, etc. Reliable dates are still not available in Eastern Europe due to the instability of self-identification and the lack of self-respect of the Roma population.

Speaking about the Roma, the issue of migration is one of the most pressing today, especially after East European states joined the European Union. The main question is whether the migration potential for Roma differs or not from that of other non-Roma citizens in Eastern Europe. Fleck and Rughinas[42] bring evidences that the migration potential of the Romanian Roma is generally higher than that of the non-Roma in Romania. Another pressing topic is related to gender inequality. Paraphrasing in this context S. Benhabib (2004), most of Roma women of Eastern Europe are still "docile bodies" and not "public selves." Women's condition is related to socioeconomic factors and to cultural patterns related birth planning. "The links between frighteningly high infant mortality rates and high fertility rates suggest that expansion of women's reproductive rights is increasingly emerging as a huge challenge and opportunity for women and children's health status."[43] Beside the two issues mentioned above, there are several others: lack of political representation, health care, schooling, etc. – all of them having a strong effect on self-esteem of some embers of the group.

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[41] See G. Fleck; C. Rughinas, *Come Closer. Inclusion and Exclusion of Roma in Present Day Romanian Society*, Bucharest: Human Dynamics, 2008, pp. 20-24.

[42] See G. Fleck; C. Rughinas, *op. cit.*, pp. 31-42.

[43] United Nations Development Programme, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

Fraser's "perspectival dualism", which argues that recognition and redistribution are two co-fundamental and mutually irreducible dimensions of social justice, can be considered a fruitful theoretical position when we are taking into account marginalized groups like Roma. First, due to the fact that Fraser intends to distance herself from "psychologization"[44] which is a transfer and finally a reduction of social and economical issues to a psychological domain. When misrecognition is identified with "internal distortions in the structure of the self-consciousness of the oppressed, it is but a short step to blaming the victim."[45] Furthermore, it is a short step from blaming the victim to xenophobia and violence. It could be argued as well that many persons coming from excluded groups like the Roma experience severe forms of rejection and misrecognition. Some of them are able to get rid of misrecognition and to surpass their initial social status. The so called "positive examples" or "success stories" are well linked to "affirmative strategies" through which inequality can be corrected on lower and higher social level. Second, because Fraser's concern is the "principle of parity of participation" that permits all members of the society to interact with the others as being equal. The aim is to preclude "institutional norms that systematically depreciate some categories of people and the qualities associated with them" (Ibid, p. 36) which means, basically, to exclude xenophobia from decision making. Third, because she reject the priority of "diversity" and "difference" over matters of class inequality and economic exploitation, conferring equal importance to the economical redistribution and cultural recognition. If we regard to the Roma, it is indeed the case. In public sphere, "cultural difference" often replaces the debate over redistribution, engaging a romanticized perspective of the group, which has no relevant effects on political and social level.

Without doubts, the Roma or other marginalised groups are victims of multifaceted misrecognition, but are also agents of social change. Towards ensuring recognition, eliminating prejudices and equal treatment, increasing self-esteem, and affirming political representation, Eastern European states will able to integrate their socially excluded groups and improve their life conditions. There is a need which is often

[44] *Ibidem*, p. 31.
[45] *Ibidem.*

addressed to national and local decision-makers from Eastern Europe to assure the chance to any responsible citizen to participate on decision-making processes and to have access to decision making positions. All responsible citizen advocate for the creation of socio-economic conditions in which the Roma has equal access to goods and services provided by the contemporary societies.

Conclusion

The paper deals with intersubjective sources of social life and the relevant implications of intersubjectivity-theories for the inclusion and recognition of otherness. The arguments developed here suggest that interactions of social actors lead to various forms of positive and negative manifestation of intersubjectivity: cooperation and consensus; but imminent dangers as well, like conflict, violence or exclusion. Empathy (following the work of A. Schütz) and recognition (Honneth, Fraser and Markell) had been considered the two main theoretical structures for understanding the exclusion and the chance for inclusion of Eastern European Roma. Public policies for equalizing opportunities and promoting social inclusion are seldom considering these two concepts in order to approach concrete measures which are basically very closely related to these theories. In spite of the theoretical weight of these concepts, such an approach could be prolific in the future. In this respect, the issue of social inclusion of the Roma communities will not act only on the communities alone, but also on the majority, on all responsible citizens. The strengthening of self-respect and self-esteem among ethnic Roma; together with assuming a redistribution policy; and finally the elimination of discriminatory cultural stereotypes of the majority are not easy tasks to manage. But it is an important ethical task for all of us.

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SUFFERING CIVILIANS IN AFRICA: BETWEEN THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR HUMANITARIAN WAR AND THE ETHICS OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE – ICRC AND MSF PERSPECTIVES –

Laura M. Herţa*

Abstract

The suffering of civilians in African war-torn countries triggered both the attention of scholarly accounts and the reaction of the international community; the latter responded with a double approach: forcible humanitarian intervention (or strong military action dubbed as "humanitarian war") and international relief aid or humanitarian assistance. By presenting two tragic and violent African case studies (the war in Nigeria/Biafra in 1967, and the civil war and humanitarian emergency in Somalia in 1991-1994), the article focuses on pitfalls, shortcomings, and ethical dilemmas resulting from humanitarian crises. The main research questions tackled in this article are: to what extant is the use of force the appropriate means to end civilians' plight? What were the impediments of Cold War geopolitics with respect to relief actions? What are the features of the new wars in Africa that clearly hamper the proper response to humanitarian disasters?

Key words: ethics of IR, humanitarian intervention, relief work, International Committee of Red Cross, Médicines sans Frontières

Introduction

The article focuses on pitfalls, shortcomings, and ethical dilemmas resulting from humanitarian crises and is structured as follows: the first section seeks to present a brief terminological and conceptual overview and to identify correlations between relief activities, forcible humanitarian intervention, humanitarian assistance, and features of violent armed conflicts in Africa.

* Laura Herţa has a PhD in History and is currently Lecturer in International Relations within the Department of International Relations and American Studies (Babes-Bolyai University). She is conducting lectures and seminars on *Introduction to the Study of International Relations, Sociology and Analysis of International Relations* and *Internationalization of Ethnic Conflicts*.
Contact: laura.herta@euro.ubbcluj.ro

The second section is dedicated to the presentation of ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) and its core principles, while the third is centred on Médicines sans Frontières (MSF) and its pivotal tenets.

The following two parts of the text will present two major African crises (namely the war in Nigeria/Biafra from 1967, and the civil war in Somalia in 1991-1994) while at the same time discussing humanitarian assistance and its shortcomings. Due to the centrality of ICRC and MSF relief operations, a broader attention will be given to their activities in the two case studies.

The last section of the paper will problematize the optimal measures meant to protect civilians, to alleviate human suffering, and to secure humanitarian convoys. The main argument will focus on limits in achieving a state of normalcy by employing outside forcible humanitarian intervention relying on firepower, and the pitfalls and features of new war scenarios that transform relief workers from humanitarians into walking targets.

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Intertwining terms and ethical dilemmas: forcible humanitarian intervention, humanitarian assistance, NGOs, relief work, and international humanitarian law

Humanitarian intervention, internal armed conflicts (or "new wars") and international humanitarian law (IHL henceforth) are interrelated key terms in current debates and analyses on international politics, and within the contemporary lexicon of International Relations.

The concept of humanitarian intervention was diversely defined, debated on and revisited in the scholarly milieu. Ever since the Cold War period, R. J. Vincent emphasized a chief feature of the bipolar international order and an adamant restriction in inter-state relations, namely *the rule of non-intervention* in the domestic politics of states (as twin attribute of state sovereignty): "Activity undertaken by a state, a group within a state, a group of states or an international organization which interferes coercively in the

domestic affairs of another state."[1] Therefore, traditionally intervention was regarded as violation of state practice and as a controversial act, and Vincent captured all this in his definition: "[Intervention] is a discrete event having a beginning and an end, and it is aimed at the authority structure of the target state. It is not necessarily lawful or unlawful, but it does break a conventional pattern of international relations."[2] However, the aftermath of the Cold War brought along intra-state turmoil associated with violence, humanitarian catastrophes, suffering civilians and the subsequent destabilizing effects for entire regions. Consequently, scholars like Weiss and Hubert focused on the "the definition of 'humanitarian', as a justification for intervention", since it "is a high threshold of suffering. It refers to the threat or actual occurrence of large scale loss of life (including, of course, genocide), massive forced migrations, and widespread abuses of human rights. Acts that shock the conscience and elicit a basic humanitarian impulse remain politically powerful."[3] J.L. Holzgrefe and Allen Buchanan underlined the act of humanitarian relief and the concern for human rights associated with the humanitarian-driven act of intervening; their definition is specific in stating that "[humanitarian intervention] is the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals others than its own citizens, without the permission of the state within whose territory force is applied."[4] The correlation between the legitimate use of force in order to achieve humanitarian outcomes, on the one hand, and the situations that justify such action, on the other hand, is emphasized by Michael Walzer who claimed that "humanitarian intervention is

[1] R. J. Vincent, *Nonintervention and International Order*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974, p. 13. See also, Tim Dunne, *Inventing International Society. A History of the English School*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998, pp. 161, 164.

[2] Vincent, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

[3] Thomas G. Weiss; Don Hubert, *The Responsibility to Protect: Supplementary Volume to the Report of ICISS*, Ottawa: International Development Research Center, 2001, p. 15.

[4] J. L. Holzgrefe, "The humanitarian intervention debate", in J. L. Holzgrefe; Robert O. Keohane, *Humanitarian Intervention. Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 18; Allen Buchanan, "Reforming the international law of humanitarian intervention", in J. L. Holzgrefe; Robert O. Keohane, *Humanitarian Intervention. Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 130.

justified when it is a response (with reasonable expectations of success) to acts that 'shock the moral conscience of mankind'."[5]

At this point a distinction should be made between 1) the military force employed to end humanitarian emergencies and 2) relief work or humanitarian assistance provided to alleviate human suffering. Nicholas Wheeler and Alex Bellamy distinguished between non-consensual, *forcible humanitarian intervention* and *non-forcible intervention*, explaining that while the former involves coercion and the breach of sovereignty, the latter "emphasizes the pacific activities of states, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations in delivering humanitarian aid and facilitating third party conflict resolution and reconstruction."[6] Furthermore, the authors clarified the difference between *consensual non-forcible intervention* and *non-consensual non-forcible intervention*: the first is illustrative for the activities of different humanitarian agencies or relief organizations and particularly to the International Committee of the Red Cross whose work is correlated with consent of sovereign governments; the second is relevant for relief work of other NGO's, and one example is the activities of Médecins sans Frontières which operates without the consent of host governments.[7]

In ICRC's terms, the notion of humanitarian assistance is a part of humanitarian protection that seeks

> to protect human dignity in conflicts by three primary means: development of international humanitarian law (IHL), detention visits, and assistance, mostly to civilians. This assistance, or relief, includes provision of food, water, clothing, shelter, and health care. It also includes restoring family contacts through the tracing of missing persons, restoration of other family ties, and a variety

[5] Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars. A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*, 4th edition, New York: Basic Books, 2006, p. 107. Walzer adds that "it is not the conscience of political leaders that one refers to in such cases. They have other things to worry about and may well be required to repress their normal feelings of indignation and outrage. The reference is to the moral convictions of ordinary men and women, acquired in the course of their everyday activities."

[6] Nicholas J. Wheeler; Alex J. Bellamy, "Humanitarian intervention and world politics", in Jon Baylis; Steve Smith (eds.), *The Globalization of World Politics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 573-574.

[7] *Ibidem.*

> of other civilian-related tasks such as reintegrating former child soldiers into civil society.[8]

With respect to NGOs, there are, of course, various definitions of non-governmental organizations (broadly comprising "any organization which is *not* a governmental body"); however, in a much narrower sense (and for the purpose of this article) "the term NGO is used to refer to *not for profit organizations*, which have social and political agendas that aim the advancement of a public good."[9] As mentioned in the introduction, this study will focus on the activities, mandate and principles of the International Committee of Red Cross and Médicines sans Frontières.

In what concerns the relation between international humanitarian law and internal armed conflicts, Elisabeth Griffin and Başak Çali show that "historically, the regulation of civil wars (referred to by international lawyers as non-international armed conflicts or internal conflicts) was not seen as being an appropriate topic to be addressed in international relations", because ot states' stricture and reluctance to allow fissure in state sovereignty. Therefore, "states regard dissidents as criminals rather than combatants", but gradually changed their attitude towards the topic, by accepting that "minimum considerations of humanity should apply in internal armed conflicts" (in 1949) and, since 1977, by contributing to an increasing humanization of IHL coupled with the strengthening of the human rights movement."[10]

As the empirical data indicate, the proliferation of armed conflicts in Africa and the resulting human tragedy (posing both a threat to regioanal stability and to international peace and security) rather complicates the attempts of conflict designation; in many cases, what initially appears to be an internal armed stuggle turns out to be an "internationalized non-international armed conflict."[11]

According to Scott Peterson, "Africa has always known violence and war, its soil regularly stained with the blood of its people. But the conflicts

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[8] David P. Forsythe; Barbara Ann J. Rieffer-Flanagan, *The International Committee of the Red Cross. A neutral humanitarian actor*, London and New York: Routledge, 2007, p. 55.

[9] Maghna Abraham, "Non-governmental organizations and international law", in Başak Çali (ed.), *International Law for International Relations*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 143.

[10] Elisabeth Griffin; Başak Çali, "International Humanitarian Law", in Başak Çali, *International Law for International Relations*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 241.

[11] *Ibidem*, p. 242.

of the last ten years of the millennium have been the most vicious, have created the most suffering, and so are most worthy of examination."[12] In fact, ever since the Cold War increased violence, massive refugee flows, and shocking human tragedies were associated with armed conflicts in Africa (Congo in the early 1960s, Nigeria in the late 1960s, Algeria etc.). The withdrawal of superpower support at the end of the Cold War, in some cases, and the removal of a long-time dictator, in other cases, often led to mounting clan/religious/ethnic struggle and the terrorising of civilians as main tactics employed by irregular groups in Africa. In a scenario of lawlessness, emerging anarchy, increasing multiplication of military irregular groups, child-soldiering, looting and banditry, the key provisions of the Geneva Conventions (or International Humanitarian Law) seem to find no place.

ICRC and core principles

The International Committee of the Red Cross represents the most widely known humanitarian symbol and the oldest relief movement; its long history goes back to the 19th century and to the actions and ideas of Jean Henri Dunant.[13] The International Committee of the Red Cross (henceforth ICRC) was established in 1863, and it is at the centre and origin of the Geneva Conventions and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. According to its stated mission, "it is an impartial, neutral and independent organization whose exclusively humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of armed conflict and other situations of violence and to provide them with assistance [and] it directs and coordinates the international activities conducted by the Movement in armed conflicts and other situations of violence."[14] According to its mandate,

[12] Scott Peterson, *Me against my Brother – At War in Somalia, Sudan, and Rwanda,* New York, London: Routledge, 2000, p. xiii.

[13] For a detailed account of the initial phase of the Red Cross Movement see Michael Ignatieff, *The Warrior's Honor. Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience*, New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1997, pp. 109-163.

[14] *The ICRC's Mission Statement*, available at [http://www.icrc.org/eng/who-we-are/mandate/overview-icrc-mandate-mission.htm], accessed April 2013.

> The ICRC is an independent, neutral organization ensuring humanitarian protection and assistance for victims of armed conflict and other situations of violence. It takes action in response to emergencies and at the same time promotes respect for international humanitarian law and its implementation in national law.[15]

According to David Forsythe, the ICRC is based "on two fundamental subjects: the ICRC's core role of humanizing war, and the relevance to the organization of the official seven Red Cross principles", namely *humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, unity, universalism, volunteerism*.[16] The ICRC has played a chief and unique role in the development of International Humanitarian Law[17] and the first Geneva Convention of 1864 was adopted by states due to ICRC's initiatives. In what concerns the legal bases of the actions undertaken by the ICRC, they include

> - The four Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I confer on the ICRC a specific mandate to act in the event of international armed conflict. In particular, the ICRC has the right to visit prisoners of war and civilian internees. The Conventions also give the ICRC a broad right of initiative.
> - In non-international armed conflicts, the ICRC enjoys a right of humanitarian initiative recognized by the international community and enshrined in Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions.
> - In the event of internal disturbances and tensions, and in any other situation that warrants humanitarian action, the ICRC also enjoys a right of initiative, which is recognized in the Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. Thus, wherever international humanitarian law does not apply, the ICRC may offer its services to governments without that offer constituting interference in the internal affairs of the State concerned.[18]

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[15] *The ICRC's mandate and mission*, available at [http://www.icrc.org/eng/who-we-are/mandate/overview-icrc-mandate-mission.htm], accessed April 2013.

[16] David P. Forsythe, *The Humanitarians. The International Committee of the Red Cross*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 157 and pp. 161-190.

[17] David P. Forsythe; Barbara Ann J. Rieffer-Flanagan, *The International Committee of the Red Cross. A neutral humanitarian actor*, London and New York: Routledge, 2007, p. 38.

[18] See *The ICRC's mandate and mission*, available at [http://www.icrc.org/eng/who-we-are/mandate/overview-icrc-mandate-mission.htm], accessed April 2013.

As Forsythe accurately indicated, the main difference between ICRC and other organizations is that the former is a consensual type of humanitarian assistance: "unlike Amnesty International or Doctors Without Borders, the ICRC has long preferred a cooperative rather than an adversarial role *vis-`a-vis* public authorities. Its basic *modus operandi* is a discreet search for cooperation in humanitarian matters, preferably in keeping with IHL."[19]

MSF and core principles

Médecins Sans Frontières/Doctors Without Borders (henceforth MSF) is "one of the world's leading independent humanitarian medical aid organizations, responding to the emergency medical needs of people affected by armed conflict, natural disasters, and such medical catastrophes as malnutrition, malaria, AIDS, tuberculosis (TB), kala-azar, other neglected diseases, and epidemic outbreaks of meningitis and cholera."[20] According to the MSF Charter, it "is a private, international association" which is "made up mainly of doctors and health sector workers and is also open to all other professions which might help in achieving its aims."[21]

The central doctrine is centred on:

1) "assistance to populations in distress, to victims of natural or man-made disasters and to victims of armed conflict. They do so irrespective of race, religion, creed or political convictions; [...]
2) independence from all political, economic or religious powers";
3) volunteerism.[22]

The principles of MSF are *independence*, *impartiality*, *neutrality* ("in the name of universal medical ethics and the right to humanitarian assistance and claim[ing] full and unhindered freedom in the exercise of its functions"),

[19] Forsythe, *op. cit.*, p. 170.
[20] Kevin P. Q. Phelan, "From an Idea to Action: The Evolution of Médecins Sans Frontières", in Chris Stout, *The New Humanitarians. Inspiration, Innovations, and Blueprints for Visionaries*, Vol. 1 - Changing Global Health Inequities, London: Praeger, 2009, p. 1.
[21] *MSF Charter and Principles*, available at [http://www.msf.org/msf-charter-and-principles], accessed April 2013.
[22] *Ibidem.*

medical ethics (respecting "patients' autonomy, patient confidentiality and their right to informed consent"), *bearing witness* (which refers to the right to speak out publicly, when MSF "witnesses extreme acts of violence against individuals or groups" in order to "bring attention to extreme need and unacceptable suffering when access to lifesaving medical care is hindered, when medical facilities come under threat, when crises are neglected, or when the provision of aid is inadequate or abused"), and *accountability* (in the sense of "responsibility of accounting for actions to patients and donors").[23]

However, in contrast to the ICRC's principle of confidentiality (or the so-called "doctrine of silence"), according to MSF statement, "the principles of impartiality and neutrality are not synonymous with silence."[24] Therefore, MSF has tailored its relief profile ever since its inception by assuming the underlining role of exposing human tragedies, mismanagement of humanitarian crises, and disrespect for the rules of war.

Suffering civilians between military troops and humanitarian assistance, and ethical dilemmas

We selected two case studies for analysis (Nigeria/Biafra and Somalia) and the choice was deliberately centred on both the Cold War period and the post-Cold War one in order to capture the different pitfalls and limits regarding humanitarian aid. The humanitarian crisis in Nigeria/Biafra indicates the shortcomings of humanitarian aid in situations whereby warlords manipulate relief workers and use refugees and suffering civilians in order to attract international sympathy, whereas Somalia in the 1990's shows the anarchical conditions in which humanitarian convoys, confronted with massive looting and banditry, tried to reach starving civilians.

Nigeria/Biafra, 1967-1970

The civil war in Nigeria broke out in 1967, after two *coups* in 1966 and subsequent military rule. Several factors led to the fragmentation of the post-colonial fragile country, to the internationalisation of the crisis, and to the shocking humanitarian emergency. The liabilities of the Nigerian state are mostly interlinked with its post-colonial heritage, since "the state of

[23] *Ibidem*.
[24] *Ibidem*.

Nigeria was an artificial British imperial creation", comprising three "major ethnic groups – the Hausa-Fulani of the north, the Yoruba of the west, and the Ibo of the east", each having a population larger "than most individual African states"; moreover, it lacked a "historical basis for the unity" of the three regions "whose interests tended to draw them away from central authority and, once the British had departed, there was intense rivalry as to who should control the centre."[25] Similarly to other African states, "the political structure inherited from the British rapidly broke down over the period 1960–1966", and, as Guy Arnold argued, this was also eased by the fact that "Great Britain fostered strong regional governments and encouraged a sense of regional rivalry, maintaining the balance between the three great regions from the centre."[26] James Mayall discusses the fact that "divide and rule is one of the oldest principles of imperial statecraft"[27] and explains how in most cases "the imperial powers frequently co-opted minorities to help them run the colonial state"; in the case of Nigeria, "Western-educated Ibos spread all over Nigeria and made themselves a target of resentment by the northern, primarily Hausa Fulani, majority prior to the civil war in 1967."[28] In fact, almost two millions Ibos were dispersed in other parts of Nigeria, "many holding jobs in the more conservative Islamic north where they were often resented."[29] The events during the two *coups* precipitated inter-group suspicion and resentment, and finally led to horrid attacks and slaughter of hundreds of people.

> When the coup leader, General Ironsi promulgated a law stating that the federal government had been abolished and that state civil service jobs would henceforth be based on merit, the reaction

[25] Guy Arnold, *Historical Dictionary of Civil Wars in Africa*, second edition, UK: The Scarecrow Press, 2008, p. 262.

[26] *Ibidem.*

[27] James Mayall, "The legacy of colonialism", in Simon Chesterman; Michael Ignatieff; Ramesh Thakur (eds.), *Making states work: State failure and the crisis of governance*, Tokyo, New York, Paris: United Nations University Press, 2005, p. 51. The author argues that this principle used by colonial powers was not always deliberate, since "in some cases it was an unintended consequence of a desire to protect weaker communities from those who had historically preyed on them [whereas] in others, it was a consequence of a reluctance to meddle with established religion."

[28] *Ibidem*, p. 50.

[29] Arnold, *op. cit.*, p. 262.

> was swift. The Igbo became the immediate target because they were Christians and more educated in contrast to the Hausa of the north. The latter were suspicious that the former would take all the lucrative jobs offered by the government. The reaction to the promulgation led to the death of thousands of Igbo living in the north. Once again, a few months later, approximately 30,000 Igbo perished in further massacres.[30]

The violence and subsequent emergency scenario included "anti-Ibo demonstrations [which] took place in the north and between 10,000 and 30,000 Ibos were killed [...] resulting in an exodus of Ibos from the north (where there were one million), the west (400,000), and Lagos (100,000) back to the Eastern Region."[31] Nigeria's eastern region began fighting to break free from the military government (dominated by northern ethnic groups) which represented the federal state of Nigeria. The declaration of independence came on July 6, 1967[32] and the new state was named the Republic of Biafra[33]; according to William Reno "a spokesman justified this decision in terms of 'unworkable colonial boundaries' that denied justice to "people within them who want nothing more than self-determination."[34] What was initially believed to be a secessionist attempt that would be quickly hampered (since "at the beginning of the war the federal government assumed that Biafra would collapse in a matter of weeks"[35]), turned out to be one of the most violent armed conflicts in the late 1960's, a "full scale civil war" which led to the following dramatic results: "Estimated casualties were 100,000 military (on both sides) and between 500,000 and two million civilians, mainly the result of starvation, while 4.6 million Biafrans became refugees. In the end, 900 days of war had not destroyed Africa's largest black state, while Biafra's bid for secession and independence had failed."[36]

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[30] Yacob Tesfai, *Holy Warriors, Infidels, and Peacemakers in Africa*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p. 47.

[31] Arnold, *op. cit.*, pp. 263-264.

[32] Tesfai, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

[33] William Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States*, Boulder London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999, p. 18.

[34] Kenneth Dike, "Biafra Explains its Case," *New York Times*, 28 April 1969, *apud ibidem*.

[35] Arnold, *op. cit.*, p. 264.

[36] *Ibidem*, p. 268.

Similarly to other modern civil wars or "new war" scenarios, the armed conflict in Nigeria/Biafra was an *internal* and *internationalized* one. Cold War geopolitics played a considerable role in rallying states (and subsequent arms provisions) either around the Nigerian federal government (thus resisting secessionism and African post-colonial state fragmentation), or around the Biafran self-declared state and the leader of the rebellion Chukweumeka Odumegwu Ojukwu (thus legitimizing claims of Biafrans, even though for controversial and varied reasons).

As Reno underlines, even though "Biafra's army proved to be almost as militarily capable as Nigeria's", "this was not enough to convince most other governments to recognize Biafra's independence" and therefore the only African countries which "extended diplomatic recognition to Biafra, a flagrant contravention of African norms endorsing old colonial boundaries, [were] Zambia, Tanzania, Gabon, and Côte d'Ivoire."[37] As far as other states were concerned, according to Guy Arnold, Nigeria's oil wealth "ensured a high level of international interest in the war as well as a readiness on the part of outside powers to intervene" especially in the case of Great Britain which had "substantial investments" and whose "two giant oil companies, British Petroleum and Shell, were heavily involved in the exploitation of the country's oil."[38] Just like in the case of Congo, wherein the secession of the province Katanga was hampered after a four-year war and massive UN military intervention, the Biafran war triggered international reaction and support alongside ideological or economic interests; therefore, the internationalization of the war pitted the international community as follows:

> Britain [...] came down firmly on the side of the federal government and was to be its principal source of light arms throughout the war. France, in pursuit of its own geopolitical interests in the region and the hope of increasing its influence generally in western Africa, supported breakaway Biafra which it aided with arms and other assistance through its proxies Côte d'lvoire and Gabon. The USSR [...] was ideologically opposed to the breakup of a federation and Moscow saw providing assistance to Nigeria as a way of obtaining influence in a region in which, up to that time, it had had little impact, and

[37] Reno, *op. cit.*, p. 18.
[38] Arnold, *op. cit.*, p. 265.

> during the course of the war it supplied about 30 percent of the arms imported by the federal side [...]. The United States signalled its intention of remaining outside the conflict [...]. Both Portugal and South Africa, which were facing growing problems justifying white minority rule to an increasingly hostile world, supported breakaway Biafra on the general grounds of prolonging a war (and chaos) in the largest independent black African state, so as to bolster their claims on behalf of white minority rule in the south of the continent.[39]

The violent nature of this armed conflict was caused by a number of factors: first of all, according to Guy Arnold the presence of mercenaries on both sides of the conflict contributed to "unwelcome complications" and the strategy of the Nigerian federal government triggered massive civilian suffering since it aimed "to blockade the shrinking enclave of Biafra and bring about its surrender by starvation."[40] Secondly, the proponents of the secession argued that separation was an existential issue and "that it was in search of security for the Igbo"; the war was based on representations of struggle between "the 'Christian nation' of Biafra and the Muslims of Northern Nigeria who launched a *jihad* against the Igbo."[41] Guy Arnold believes that the war was actually prolonged because of strong "Ibo belief cultivated by its own propaganda that they were fighting for survival and faced genocide."[42] Finally (and of utmost importance for our topic), the suffering and starving Biafrans were not only targeted by the military, but they also became instrumentalized in order to achieve international recognition for Biafra's secessionist effort and international relief aid. According to Guy Arnold the relief workers and relief agencies were caught in a trap because "international charities, aided by mercenary airlifts of supplies, provided relief when otherwise Biafra would have been forced to surrender. The war became a cause for various charities whose propaganda 'to feed the starving Biafrans', however well-intentioned, in fact prolonged the war and the suffering."[43]

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[39] *Ibidem*, p. 265.
[40] *Ibidem*, p. 267.
[41] Tesfai, *op. cit.*, p. 47.
[42] Arnold, *op. cit.*, p. 268.
[43] *Ibidem*.

The ICRC and Nigeria/Biafra

As already indicated, the International Committee of the Red Cross's involvement in the Nigerian conflict was "a precursor to the widespread manipulation of humanitarian issues by fighting parties."[44] Just as ICRC personnel would act later (in Somalia or in Bosnia in the 1990's), in the midst of the Biafran violence the relief workers were trying to find solutions to help starving civilians, while at the same time trying to protect themselves and remain loyal to ICRC's principles, especially the essence of its involvement, namely consent of all warring parties. David Forsythe explains the efforts and subsequent ethical dilemmas confronted by ICRC volunteers, but also the fact that Biafra represented a turning point in ICRC history:

> At times the ICRC proceeded with relief flights into Biafra, 'at its own risk' in the words of Lagos, mixing its planes with flights running weapons to the rebels, and thus contributing indirectly to the rebels' fighting ability. But after one of the planes on loan to it was shot down by Federal fighter aircraft with loss of life, the ICRC reverted to the more cautious position that, according to the principles of humanitarian law, Lagos had the right to supervise relief flights to inspect for contraband.[45]

If relief work's essence is providing help to those who suffer from atrocities of war and if the suffering of thousands of civilians doomed to starvation was conspicuously signalling an international humanitarian emergency, what was ICRC (or other relief organizations) expected to do? Several courses of action are available, but none would actually have been able to stop the suffering immediately: on the one hand, the ICRC could have maintained absolute loyalty to the principle of neutrality and move away (when warned by the Nigerian government) from dying and starving innocents in a violent and gradually shrinking Biafra (due to attacks from Nigerian army, the blockades of roads for humanitarian convoys). This option would be based on close collaboration with authorities in order to have access to the suffering people and presumably best serve the humanitarian

[44] Forsythe, *op. cit.*, p. 63.
[45] *Ibidem*, p. 67.

cause. Another course of action in such situations could be centred on departure from key principles, on expressing public outrage concerning immense human tragedy that shocks the conscience, and on helping those in need in any way possible. In fact, Nigeria/Biafra was a crucial event resulting in the separation of the two mutually exclusive courses of action and on the distinction between what we currently designate as conventional or traditional humanitarians (ICRC), on the one hand, and radical and "new humanitarians" (Amnesty International, Médecins Sans Frontières, Human Rights Watch), on the other.

According to David Forsythe and Rieffer-Flanagan,

> The Nigerian Civil War (1967–70) demonstrated to the world (via media coverage) and even to the ICRC itself, that a number of its policies and procedures needed rethinking. The ICRC entered this war without a well developed strategy and was unable to cope with new challenges, such as intense media coverage, other humanitarian actors working in the country, lack of well trained professional staff, and the political implications of some of its decisions. Following its controversial performance in the Nigerian Civil War, the ICRC agreed, without enthusiasm, to a review of Red Cross activities by a team of international scholars and officials.[46]

The ICRC's involvement in Nigeria was linked to the Biafran "televised disaster"[47], but also it meant the realization of the fact that Biafran leaders manipulated relief issues to attract international, and mostly Western, support for their cause, as Forsythe accurately expressed it:

> One of the best "weapons" they had, in order to draw attention to their secessionist efforts, was the media image of starving children. Biafran leaders would not agree to balanced or Lagos-inspected relief schemes that would cut off that image. They also wanted to use relief shipments to contribute to weapons delivery. Thus Biafran leaders profited from the spectre of mass starvation supposedly caused by the Federal side, and for a time they counted on the reluctance of

[46] David P. Forsythe; Barbara Ann J. Rieffer-Flanagan, *The International Committee of the Red Cross. A neutral humanitarian actor*, London and New York: Routledge, 2007, pp. 22-23.
[47] Ignatieff, *op. cit*., p. 124.

> Lagos to attack the night time weapons flights for fear of hitting Red Cross planes in the process.[48]

On the one hand, the work of ICRC was considerable in the case of Nigeria, because "it had no trouble mobilizing considerable assistance based on the assessments provided by Hoffmann and Lindt" (the ICRC delegates) and "both Western governments and Red Cross societies provided the goods, services, personnel, equipment, and money needed for a major relief effort."[49] Moreover, "the ICRC delivered 120,000 tons of nutritional and medical assistance during the conflict, while operating forty-five medical teams, fifty-three first aid stations, and five hospitals; the total cost to the organization at that time was about 600 million Swiss francs; fourteen persons working for the ICRC paid with their lives."[50] The amount of humanitarian aid came from several other relief agencies, such as Joint Church Aid and Caritas, as well as from certain African countries like Rhodesia (at the time on the verge of becoming independent) and Haiti.[51]

On the other hand, ICRC found itself trapped by both sides to the conflict which saw relief "in political terms", and was "competing particularly with Joint Church Aid for 'market share' in delivering relief", since ICRC was "based in pro-Biafra Europe" (but its entire activities were, ever since its inception and formulation of Dunant's goals, the founding father of the Red Cross, built on the doctrine of silence and on the principle of neutrality) and "Joint Church Aid, a Western faith-based consortium of relief NGOs [...] tended toward solidarity with Biafra, not being much interested in nice notions of Red Cross neutrality"[52]). Additionally, it faced a fragmentation of the Red Cross Movement. The French and the Swedish Red Cross Societies were pro-Biafra and especially the French National Society of Red Cross worked separately from its British, Finnish or even Swiss ones. The involvement in Nigeria/Biafra also indicates internal mismanagement. According to David Forsythe "ICRC headquarters, despite having some knowledgeable persons on the ground in Nigeria (e.g. Georg Hoffmann), never fully understood the various issues in the conflict and never developed a

[48] Forsythe, *op. cit.*, p. 67.
[49] Forsythe; Rieffer-Flanagan, *op. cit.*, p. 63.
[50] Forsythe, *op. cit.*, p. 64.
[51] Arnold, *op. cit.*, p. 266.
[52] Forsythe; Rieffer-Flanagan, *op. cit.*, pp. 63-64.

clear and viable strategic vision for its management" which meant that "ICRC in the late 1960s was still a very amateurish organization."[53]

The ICRC developed its entire doctrine on compliance to international humanitarian law (and proper conduct during armed conflict consistent to provisions of the Geneva Conventions) and assumed the chief role in "civilizing war"[54], namely it gained international recognition for supervising how warring parties or combatants lawfully conduct armed hostilities in a manner that limits human suffering. This role is present in IHL, which

> is the only body of international law that provides a special status and role to an international humanitarian organization. The 1949 Geneva Conventions task the ICRC to play a major role in encouraging compliance with IHL and it is recognized in treaty law as having the authority to visit prisoners, organize relief operations, reunite separated families, and carry out other humanitarian activities during armed conflicts. Many states recognize the international legal personality of the ICRC and accord it privileges and immunities under their domestic laws.[55]

The case of Nigeria/Biafra indicated a debilitating moment for the core activities of ICRC. According to David P. Forsythe and Barbara Ann J. Rieffer-Flanagan, "the ICRC as an organization paid too little attention to IHL and its principles concerning neutral relief" and due to the fact that it was "caught up in competition with Joint Church Aid, it paid too little attention to the norm that belligerents had the right to supervise relief to guarantee its neutrality"; in the end, the authors show, "it tilted toward Biafra, was manipulated by [...] Biafran leaders, and paid too little attention to the efforts at reasonable relief by [...] Federal officials. The ICRC was unwilling to recognize the implications of Red Cross neutrality."[56]

The fact remains that the violence in Nigeria/Biafra raised several questions about the proper response to alleviate human suffering, and about Cold War geopolitics and state attitude with respect to crises implying secessionist attempts.

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[53] Forsythe, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

[54] Ignatieff, *op. cit.*

[55] Elisabeth Griffin; Başak Çali, "International Humanitarian Law", in Başak Çali, *International Law for International Relations*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 242.

[56] Forsythe; Rieffer-Flanagan, *op. cit.*, pp. 64-65.

The MSF and Nigeria/Biafra

Events in Nigeria in the late 1960's also signified a major turning point for the subsequent evolution of Médecins Sans Frontières/Doctors without Borders. Some of the doctors who set up the organization had worked for the French Red Cross in the Biafran brutal conflict. Others had been involved in relief activities in eastern Pakistan (which later became Bangladesh) during the disastrous tidal wave that resulted in astonishing human suffering. Though operating in different types of conditions, both "groups discovered (the first during a war, the second during the aftermath of a natural disaster) the shortcomings of international aid"; therefore, "by forming MSF, this core group intended to change the way humanitarian aid was delivered by providing more medical assistance more rapidly and by being less deterred by national borders during times of crisis."[57] One of the chief MSF founders, Bernard Kouchner, "was an ex-militant from the Communist Students Union" and was "active in left-wing, anticolonial, and activist causes during France's turbulent 1960s."[58] As we shall see, he played a key role in setting the core doctrine of later MSF. The evolution of the MSF is based on previous activities within the French Society of the Red Cross, but also on the understanding that, although "during the early part of the twentieth century, humanitarian emergency aid was provided primarily by the Red Cross movement, [...] the effectiveness of its actions was compromised by slow transport facilities and cumbersome administrative and diplomatic formalities."[59] During the war in Biafra, some of the future founders of MSF departed from ICRC's strict rules in providing assistance, with respect to the personnel's "reserved public attitude toward the events they witness during an assignment"[60]; in addition, since ICRC always operates with the consent of the involved parties (and in the case of Biafra this meant allowance by the Nigerian government),

> Several doctors defied this prohibition by organizing a 'committee against the Biafran genocide' as soon as they were back in France – less to make the public aware of the plight of the Biafran population

[57] Phelan, *op. cit.*, p. 2.
[58] *Ibidem*, p. 2.
[59] Cf. *ibidem.*
[60] *Ibidem.*

> than to denounce the political sources of this conflict, which were too often hidden by the journalistic accounts of the war. By dropping their apolitical stance, though, the French doctors gave legitimacy to the rebels' secessionist cause.[61]

The result was that after the conflict, Bernard Kouchner established Médecins Sans Frontières, and later Doctors of the World, and the pivotal doctrine was fostered by the fact that he and his colleagues were completely dissatisfied with "the limitations imposed by the notion of Red Cross neutrality. He wanted a relief organization that could do well on the ground, but that would also speak out against civilian distress and other violations of human rights and humanitarian norms. He wanted active solidarity with 'victims', not neutrality."[62] Consequently, "the notion of *témoignage,* or speaking out, coupled with appeals to the mass media became an integral part of MSF's concept of modern humanitarian action."[63]

Somalia (1991-1994): between humanitarian intervention and relief aid

Somalia gained independence in 1960, even though the remnants of British Somaliland in the North and Italian Somaliland in the South ("which had been made a Trusteeship Territory of the United Nations in 1945"[64]) have never been properly reconciled or unified; at best, Somalia's cohesiveness as a nation was precarious. Historically speaking, Somalia "has, for centuries, been a land inhabited by itinerant herders", since "the dusty, dry earth did not nurture a settled lifestyle", and "the constant search for water, food, and shade bred instead a loosely connected web of nomads"; consequently, "such a harsh heritage of wanderlust makes Somalis, by nature, fiercely independent."[65] In contrast to other African countries where internal divisions and rivalries range across ethnic lines and corresponding minority-majority conflicts (such as Rwanda, Burundi, and D. R. Congo) or across religious lines (such as the violent conflict in Nigeria), the case of Somalia displays different features: "Though all one ethnic tribe, Somalis

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[61] *Ibidem.*

[62] Forsythe; Rieffer-Flanagan, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

[63] Phelan, *op. cit*., p. 4.

[64] Arnold, *op. cit.*, p. 328.

[65] Cf. April Oliver, "The Somalia Syndrome", in Roderick von Lipsey (ed.) *Breaking the Cycle*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997, pp. 121-122.

are divided by clans, and those cleavages are deep."[66] According to a former senior UN official, Somalia "is a nomadic society with very odd institutions [since] power is spread in peculiar ways, through strongmen, tribal institutions and village elders", and therefore, "it is a very difficult society to penetrate."[67] In the words of Somali historian Said Samatar, "extreme individualism is the political culture, so that it is practically impossible for one Somali to command the allegiance of another Somali; everyone is a king unto himself."[68]

After its independence, Somalia experienced a nine-year calm period, until 1969, when, following a *coup*, strongman Muhammad Siad Barre became president, ruling "as an increasingly dictatorial figure until his overthrow in 1991."[69] Moreover, Siad Barre "tried to forbid clan loyalties (the core of Somali life) and attempted to persuade clan elders in the rural areas to make his ban stick"[70] and his despotic rule gradually created "increasing political and economic disparities between clans, by favouring his own", which in turn augmented Somalis dissatisfaction throughout the country who "felt disenfranchised."[71] Cold War geopolitics and the impact of proxy wars also played a major role in the evolution of Somalia's destiny. Though at the beginning a client state of USSR, Barre's territorial ambitions which triggered the war with Soviet-backed neighbouring Ethiopia in 1977 (over the Ogaden region) resulted in shifting Cold War allegiance towards the USA. Therefore, "over the next ten years, the United States poured nearly $ 250 million in lethal and nonlethal arms into Somalia" so that "the combined stockpiles of Soviet and U.S. weaponry turned Somalia into an arsenal, with more machine guns, automatic rifles, mines, tanks, and mortars than almost any other country in Africa."[72] April Oliver accurately indicated that "much of the weaponry would be used not against a Soviet threat, however, but against the Somali people by their own leader"[73].

[66] *Ibidem*, p. 122.
[67] Cf. Brian Urquhart, quoted in *ibidem.*
[68] Said Samatar, quoted in *ibidem.*
[69] Arnold, *op. cit.*, p. 51.
[70] *Ibidem*, p. 52.
[71] Oliver, *op. cit.*, pp. 122-123.
[72] *Ibidem*, p. 123.
[73] *Ibidem.*

The rule of Siad Barre became increasingly contested and several groups rose against the regime, with two major separatist groups emerging: *The Somali National Movement* and the *Democratic Front for the Salvation of Somalia*. Barre's "poor human rights record steadily alienated international opinion" and "by 1990, he had not only failed to eliminate the Somali clan system, but had produced a situation in which there was escalating fighting both among clans and between clans and the government, so that the country had been reduced to a state of anarchy and Barre was steadily losing control."[74] In the period 1990-1991 the traumatic experience of growing civil war was doubled in disastrous effects by the drought. The Government declared a state of emergency[75] and "according to Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance reports, food prices began to rise sharply in the cities, as much as 1.000 percent; this encouraged hijacking and looting of relief supplies by ruthless profiteers."[76]

The so-called Magadishu Manifesto, signed by 114 Somali politicians and intellectuals, expressed willingness to organize a national reconciliation conference and urged Barre to resign.[77] The country was fragmenting and finally Barre was ousted from power in January 1991; the removal of the autocratic strongman left behind a power vacuum which was not filled in by another political figure (enjoying countrywide legitimacy) thus turning Somalia into an archetypal example of what scholar William Zartman has coined "collapsed state". As April Oliver pointed out, "prominent opposition groups fought, but never formally united against Siad Barre" and even though groups like *Somali National Movement*, *Somali Salvation Democratic Front*, *United Somali Congress*, and the *Somali Patriotic Movement* were "joined by their hatred of Barre, [they] were divided by clan and ideology as well as geography."[78] Another disturbing factor was the presence of local warlords and their increasing control over parts of the Somali territory while institutional capacity was breaking down, lawlessness and looting became an every-day experience and fear turned into an endemic feature of daily life. Scott Peterson, a journalist who witnessed atrocities in Somalia, vividly

[74] Arnold, *op. cit.*, p. 52.
[75] *Ibidem.*
[76] Oliver, *op. cit.*, p. 125.
[77] See details in *ibidem*, p. 125 and Arnold, *op. cit.*, p. 331.
[78] Oliver, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

described the situation wherein humanitarian aid was hijacked or stolen and used as ransom: humanitarian agencies "[...] unloaded [...] tons of relief food, meant to help save the lives of Somalis made miserable by the reign of warlords and militia, by tempestuous gunmen [...]; these were the predators that made Somalis suffer, the militiamen who foraged to survive, abusing and looting at whim."[79]

The dramatic situation in 1991 determined Oliver to state that "Mogadishu was hell on earth" and the appalling crisis and mounting starvation shocked the international community. In April 1992, the United Nations Security Council issued Resolution 751 established UNOSOM I (United Nations Operation in Somalia)[80]; this was a peacekeeping mission, set up because a fragile peace agreement was reached among different military groups and warlords. Also, the UN dispatched a fact-finding mission led by Mohamed Sahnoun (who, in the words of April Oliver, could not have been a better choice). Sahnoun reported the "total disaster" and urged for the provision of "urgently needed humanitarian assistance."[81] According to his testimonial account "more than 3.000 – mostly women, children, and old men – were dying daily from starvation. That was the tragic situation in Somalia at the beginning of 1992".[82] In a report sent to the UN headquarters he warned that "some 4.500.000 people [were] in urgent need for food" and that "an absence of food breeds insecurity which, in turn, causes instability leading to starvation, suffering and disease. Breaking this diabolical and vicious cycle may be the key to resolving the intricate social and political problems in Somalia."[83] Due to increased levels of violence and dangerous conditions, most of the UN relief agencies have left Somalia in 1991[84] and "their absence of nearly one year had created intense

[79] Peterson, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

[80] See full text of UNSC Resolution 751 available at [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/751(1992)], accessed April 2013.

[81] Mohamed Sahnoun, *Somalia: The Missed Opportunities*, Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1994, p. vii.

[82] *Ibidem*, p. 16.

[83] *Ibidem*, p. 18.

[84] The main United Nations organizations operating in Somalia were the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UNICEF, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), World Food Programme (WFP), and the World Health Organization (WHO). More than other 30 NGOs had been present in Somalia working in partnership with the United Nations.

anger among Somali [who] felt abandoned and saw no reason to trust the UN."[85] While Sahnoun's efforts to mount necessary and appropriate measures, showing that there was not only a food crisis, but also a security crisis, were considerable, the UNOSOM troops proved to be completely inefficient in the Hobbesian *status naturalis* that Somalia had regressed into, given their limited peacekeeping mandate. April Oliver emphasized that the US State Department insisted on labelling the situation as a "food problem", and not "a security one" and thus the solution was to deliver more provisions; in fact, "the more food was sent in, the more was stolen. The more that was stolen, the more the warlords' political capital increased. During the final months before the US military intervention, as much as 80% of UN relief may have been looted, or blocked in the warehouses and harbour, while Somalis starved."[86]

With respect to aid agencies in Somalia, Oliver discusses the "fissures in the Relief Community" and shows that

> Perhaps foremost, the crisis deepened in Somalia as a result of a humanitarian community that, for understandable reasons, pulled out when it became too dangerous. [...] *Except for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and a few NGOs, most relief groups fled Somalia during the crucial year of 1991,* after Siad Barre's departure. The UN itself was totally absent during the crucial year of 1991. Those who stayed risked their lives. As conditions deteriorated inside Somalia, so did security for the NGOs. As a result, *the ICRC hired armed protection for the first time in their history.* They hired as many as 20.000 Somalis at some point labelling them (and their armed vehicles) 'technical assistance'[87]. Some 'technicals' turned on the agencies themselves. *Many relief workers lost their lives; others were severely injured trying to deliver or protect supplies*.[88]

[85] Oliver, *op. cit.*, p. 128. See also John Harriss, "Introduction: a time of troubles – problems of international humanitarian assistance in the 1990's", in John Harriss (ed.), *The Politics of Humanitarian Intervention*, London and New York: Pinter, 1995, p. 5.

[86] *Ibidem*, p. 131.

[87] The term "*technicals"* refers to the armed trucks or other vehicles equipped with heavy guns and used for rampage rides or looting (or, in some cases in Somalia, for protection of humanitarian convoys).

[88] *Ibidem*, p. 134. Our emphasis.

Our central point of discussion is centred on the optimal ways for protection of suffering civilians and on the lessons that could be drawn from African case studies. The question is whether in such cases of immense violence an outside heavily military intervention (authorized under Chapter VII and comprising of troops ready to engage in military action) is the adequate response, in order to best restore normalcy, law and order, and further alleviate the suffering; or, whether a less military-centred reaction, and a more relief, humanitarian-centred one is in order, so that the presence of military does not frustrate the warlords thus triggering revenge and elevating the state of violence; besides, in the latter scenario, a combat mission, even though aiming at humanitarian outcomes, might produce "collateral damage", accidentally killing innocent civilians, as we shall see was the case of Somalia.

This dilemma also placed the relief community in two opposing views: on the one hand, some rejected the idea of military intervention, fearing that this might "hinder their work, making them vulnerable pawns in a war" while others believed that intervention could "obstruct the fragile political reconciliation process."[89] The fact remains that in many cases the mere presence of humanitarians in the theatre of conflict is regarded with suspicion[90] and often belligerents do not see "humanitarian agencies as true neutrals, but instead as agents of outside powers."[91] On the other hand, InterAction which reunited eleven relief agencies (among which Oxfam America, CARE, and the International Rescue Committee) held a press conference in Washington in order to attract international protection for their convoys; however, Human Rights Watch, for instance did not want a full-scale nation building operation, but rather "a more minimal strategic intervention – to protect the ports and airports, and protect the truck convoys so food could be distributed"; according to a representative of HRW (in a telephone interview with April Oliver), "we did not want American soldiers involved in all aspects of Somali society. We knew that would have a bad effect."[92]

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[89] *Ibidem*, p. 135.

[90] Shannon Bosch, "Relief workers in African conflict zones: neutrals, targets or unlawful participants?", *African Security Review*, London: Routledge, issue 19:3, 2010, p. 81.

[91] K. Anderson, "Humanitarian inviolability in crisis: the meaning of impartiality and neutrality for UN and NGO agencies following the 2003–2004 Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts", quoted in *ibidem.*

[92] Oliver, *op. cit.*, p. 135.

Finally, in December 1992 the United Nations sanctioned Resolution 794 authorizing UNITAF (United Nations International Task Force), led by the United States, comprising of 28.000 American soldiers and other more than 10.000 troops, with a mandate enabling it to use "all necessary means" in order to solve the humanitarian crisis. While never receiving the formal Chapter VII authorization, UNITAF is regarded as a Chapter-six-and-a-half operation, namely it had the ability to use force in order to achieve its goals. Resolution 794 determined "the magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia, further exacerbated by the obstacles being created to the distribution of humanitarian assistance, constitutes a threat to international peace and security", expressed that the UN is "gravely alarmed by the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Somalia", underlined "the urgent need for the quick delivery of humanitarian assistance in the whole country", and expressed "grave alarm at continuing reports of widespread violations of humanitarian international law occurring in Somalia, including reports of violence [...] against personnel participating lawfully in impartial humanitarian relief activities, deliberate attacks on non-combatants [...] and impeding the delivery of food and medical supplies essential for the survival of the civilian population."[93] Most analysts agree that UNITAF was the most successful attempt to solve the crisis in Somalia.[94] UNITAF had a clear-cut (though limited as far the deep-rooted problems of Somalia's political and social life was concerned) set of goals aiming at securing relief convoys and ending starvation; in tactical terms, US force commander Robert Johnston corresponded the goals of the mission into four "no's": "*no technicals (trucks or other vehicles with crew-serviced weapons such as heavy machine guns); no banditry; no roadblocks; no visible weapon"*.[95] One of the achievements of UNITAF was that it forged a coherent civil-military strategy, namely the Civil/Military Operations Centre (CMCO), which "aimed to provide a workable interface between the NGOs, who coordinated their efforts through

[93] See full text of UNSC Resolution 794, available at [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/794(1992)], accessed April 2013.

[94] See Oliver, *op. cit.*, p. 136; see also Thomas R. Mockaitis, "From Counterinsurgency to Peace Enforcement: New Names for Old Games", in Erwin A. Schmidl (ed.), *Peace Operations between Peace and War: Four Studies*, Vienna: Landesverteidigungnsakademie/Militärwissenshaftliches Büro, Nummer 11, September, 1998, pp. 21-36.

[95] Mockaitis, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

the Humanitarian Operations Centre (HOC), and UNITAF"[96]; by appointing daily meetings the two centres were interconnected and produced a certain level of communication and cooperation, although

> CMOC/HOC did not always work well, and Marine and NGOs perceptions of its success vary widely. Relief workers who had been in the country for a long time resented the Marines' "take charge attitude" and considered the soldiers insensitive to local culture. The Marines in turn believed that the NGOs withheld valuable information on the Somali factions and cooperated with the military only when it suited them.[97]

Since UNITAF had a six month mandate, in May 1993 it handed over the operation to the UN. Therefore, "the mandate of UNOSOM II, as approved by the Security Council in resolution 814 (1993) under Chapter VII of the Charter, covered the whole territory of Somalia and included:

- monitoring that all factions continued to respect the cessation of hostilities and other agreements to which they had consented;
- preventing any resumption of violence and, if necessary, taking appropriate action;
- maintaining control of the heavy weapons of the organized factions which would have been brought under international control;
- seizing the small arms of all unauthorized armed elements;
- securing all ports, airports and lines of communications required for the delivery of humanitarian assistance;
- protecting the personnel, installations and equipment of the United Nations and its agencies, ICRC as well as NGOs;
- continuing mine-clearing, and;
- repatriating refugees and displaced persons within Somalia."[98]

UNOSOM set up a more ambitious role, even though it had so much more modest resources, it targeted one of warlords (Aideed), considered chief part of the Somali problems, it established a ransom for capturing

[96] *Ibidem*, pp. 8-9.
[97] *Ibidem*, p. 29.
[98] See *Somalia - UNOSOM II*, available at [http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosom2b.htm], accessed April 2013.

Aideed and initiated the manhunt[99], thus departing from the strictly humanitarian-oriented mission, and finally it initiated several military actions meant to capture Aideed and then to proceed to full-scale disarmament which produced the death of innocent Somali civilians. Consequently, the UN "was no longer an impartial peacemaker" because "it had taken sides decisively in the conflict"[100]; the more Aideed was hunted, the more the Somali support for the latter grew, and the more the UN was perceived as an intruder. The result was that "beyond strengthening Aideed" the manhunt operation "was a neglect of humanitarian work" and due to this "relief efforts were reduced by half."[101] According to Thomas Mockaitis, UNOSOM II lamentably failed and "it demonstrates the consequences of relying on military force to solve a political and humanitarian problem"; therefore, in trying to achieve a human-suffering alleviating outcome,

> UNITAF had found an appropriate mix of humanitarian aid and the use of force to protect its delivery and had kept in constant touch with the Somali faction leaders. UNOSOM II placed military activity ahead of diplomatic and humanitarian, over-relied on firepower, and concentrated too much on arresting individuals rather than on stabilizing the situation.[102]

The ICRC and Somalia

In Somalia, the ICRS "one of the first organizations to sound the alarm about the plight of the civilian population" and "despite the death of one of its Belgian expatriates, the ICRC stayed in the country to try to deliver humanitarian assistance."[103] Also, it played a major role in attracting international attention to the plight of the Somalis (though in contradiction to its core principles, especially the so-called *doctrine of silence*):

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[99] See UN Security Council Resolution 837, available at [http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/332/32/IMG/N9333232.pdf?OpenElement], accessed April 2013.
[100] Oliver, *op. cit.*, p. 142.
[101] *Ibidem.*
[102] Mockaitis, *op. cit.*, p. 30.
[103] Forsythe; Rieffe, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

> the ICRC, with some reluctance about the ethics involved, paid for journalists to come see the misery at first hand. '[I]n the course of five weeks between August and September [...] 730 journalists were brought from Nairobi into Somalia and transported back to Kenya, briefed and otherwise taken care of by the ICRC.' This effort, along with publicity from other groups, finally produced coverage by the *New York Times*, the *BBC*, *Le Monde*, and other major western media centres.[104]

The ICRC worked with the Somali Red Crescent and established a complex food distribution network, so that

> between February and June 1992 the ICRC brought in a total of 53.900 MT of food into Somalia through twenty different entry points, by sea, by air, and overland across the Kenya–Somalia border. Multiple delivery points at small locations circumvented the extortion network that was centered on Mogadishu [...] The ICRC also handled the distribution of food to several hospitals in various cities [...]. Most of the US food sent to Somalia was handled by the ICRC.[105]

The hiring of local armed men for protection was necessary due to violent conditions (as previously discussed) but in abstract thinking constituted a small contribution to the perpetuation of violence and to the war economy, thus raising ethical dilemmas: should the ICRC have retreated as other UN agencies and stayed loyal to its principles? Or, with the purpose of saving suffering civilians, should it have remained in operation and adjust its relief activities to the "new war scenario" in Somalia?

Throughout its relief humanitarian history, the ICRC refused to be accompanied by armed military transports, but in the case of Somalia another departure from strict ICRC requirements was signalled because

> for the first time in its history, the ICRC took the decision to operate as part of a military mission, because that was the only way, in the view of the top decision-makers of the organization, that widespread starvation could be checked in Somalia [...] the ICRC finally developed a

[104] Forsythe, *op. cit.*, p. 116.
[105] *Ibidem*, p. 117 and Sahnoun, *op. cit.*, pp. 20-21.

> close partnership with an internationally approved military force, although in reality it was overwhelmingly a US militarized supply chain.[106]

According to Forsythe and Rieffe, such tactics were not incorporated by International Humanitarian Law, but it "demonstrated the creativity and pragmatism of the ICRC on behalf of the usual principles of impartial and neutral humanitarianism."[107]

The ethical dilemma is again resurfacing: how to positively assess the activities of humanitarians such as the ICRC in Somalia? Based on positive outcomes, no matter to what extant strategies employed departed from core principles of the organization? Or, based on stricture of basic principles, and thus irrefutable ethical tenure, but with limited humanitarian outcome?

The MSF and Somalia

When the fierce fighting broke out in Mogadishu, when law and order completely vanished, and anarchy prevailed, "MSF was one of the few organizations, along with the ICRC and Save the Children-UK, which managed to maintain a presence in the war-torn city, providing surgical services in highly insecure conditions."[108] If the case of Nigeria/Biafra showed the opposing views of emerging MSF, on the one hand, and the ICRC, the massive humanitarian crisis in Somalia is indicative for the shared strategies by the two relief organizations. First of all, both organizations maintained their relief efforts in highly dangerous conditions, as already mentioned. Secondly, just like the ICRC, anarchical violence in Somalia "compelled MSF [...] to use armed guards, a 'necessary evil' whose costs would become increasingly apparent." Kevin Phelan showed that "in time, MSF teams would have a small militia on hire to protect their travel and work, fuelling the 'war economy'", but he also exposed the clear-cut assessment of MSF activity in Somalia, by stating that "the benefits of MSF's surgical and nutritional programs in this massive crisis overrode

[106] Forsythe; Rieffe, *op. cit.*, pp. 70-71.
[107] *Ibidem*, p. 120.
[108] Phelan, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

these concerns."[109] Thirdly, MSF joined the ICRC and other organizations in the efforts to publicize the Somalis' suffering and the need to end starvation by providing protection to relief aid convoys. Basically, the costs and apparent unethical shortcomings of the relief strategy were definitely outmatched by the lives saved.

Conclusion

Several questions were raised throughout the article and ethical dilemmas were pinpointed. The main research questions tackled here were: to what extant is the use of force the appropriate means to end civilians' plight? What were the impediments of Cold War geopolitics with respect to relief actions? What are the features of the new wars in Africa that clearly hamper the proper response to humanitarian disasters?

In this concluding section of the article we shall try to problematize the solutions advanced by the international community for the protection of suffering civilians and their corresponding ethical dilemmas, and provide answers to the questions posed. It is our contention that the new wars (that saw a multiplication and a full-scale violence in Africa) display certain features that hamper proper humanitarian aid and adequate international action aiming at restoring peace, a state of normalcy, and the reimposition of law and order. The new war scenarios include looting the humanitarian convoys; attacks against civilians; warlord tactics meant to increase individual power (sometimes with no subsequent political goal) and based on the privatization of military irregular troops; and sometimes a regression to a Hobbesian state of nature. In such a violent scenario, the humanitarians become targets, fear becomes endemic and looting and indiscrimate killing turn into daily experience. The case of Somalia this was illustrative in this respect, and as Forsythe showed, although the Security Council "decreed that to interfere with that assistance was a war crime", most "Somali armed groups paid little attention to such legalistic statements emanating from New York. After all, this was a country in which virtually no one with a weapon had heard of the Geneva Conventions."[110] It was also the contention of ICRC that "civilians are no longer fundamentally viewed

[109] *Ibidem*.

[110] Forsythe, *op. cit.*, p. 116.

as extraneous to war itself, nor even used as a 'base' of logistic and political support, but have become stakes in the conflict or even the very reason for it."[111]

The case of Somalia pointed to the ineffectiveness of outside heavily military intervention (authorized under Chapter VII and comprising of troops ready to engage in military action) aiming at capturing warlords in order to restore normalcy and to the fact that a combined military/relief operation with a sensitive eye for local Somali culture and longer timetable might have protected civilians on the long run. The case of Biafra showed that Cold War geopolitics was capabable to produce breaches within the international humanitarian movement, and that (neutral) relief was impossible: The ICRC placed itself at the mercy (and approval) of Nigerian government, and when it did not do so, it suffered the death of its personnel, while the emerging MSF, "haunted by the passivity of the ICRC during World War II when confronted by the Holocaust", conceived the concept of modern humanitarian (centred on *témoignage,* or speaking out), even though, "ironically, until 1977, MSF actually forbade its members to talk about what they had witnessed during their missions, despite an early record of opposition to the ICRC's reserved policy. This silence was intended as a strong symbol of political neutrality as well as a strategic posture to ensure its ability to perform 'border-free' operations."[112]

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ION I. C. BRĂTIANU'S ETHICS AND REALIST PRINCIPLES WITH REGARD TO ROMANIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

Ion Novăcescu*

Abstract

The statesman Ion I. C. Brătianu was among the first and few Romanian politicians who attempted to codify a Romanian foreign policy system before and after World War I. Starting from the rules and compulsory steps of a "good foreign policy," and extending to the ethics and principles underlying the statements and actions of the Romanian state in the field of international relations, Ion I. C. Brătianu tried to outline and emphasize the "general and permanent directives" of Romanian foreign policy, in a conceptualization effort meant to crystallize a national doctrine. He envisaged developing a Romanian Code of foreign policy, which established binding and permanent benchmarks, guidelines, ethics, conduct and principles. It should be noted that Brătianu's approach - just like the author stated in the Parliament of Greater Romania in December 1919 - was inspired and followed a brilliant model of the international political stage: England. Only by following the English model, Brătianu insisted, could Romania engage in great politics.

Keywords: foreign policy, European policy, international relations, democratization, doctrine, ethics, principles, strategy

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Starting from the idea that International Relations Theory is grounded on the contributions of and debates between the Realist and the Idealist schools of thought, our research aims to highlight one of the relevant contributions Romanian politics brought to this field, both before and after World War I. Inspired from and situated within the framework of European political realism, the ethics[1] and principles espoused by the

* Ion Novăcescu has a PhD in history from Babeş-Bolyai University (2010); he is an Associate Faculty member at the Faculty of European Studies, Babeş-Bolyai University.Contact: ion@novacescu.ro.

[1] "The contemporary field of international ethics is preceded of course by a long history of moral and political thought, which explores the many ethical and philosophical issues arising from the attempt to sort out how people should live their lives in a reflective and

statesman Ion I. C. Brătianu[2] with regard to Romania's foreign policy represent the focus of our study. The importance of Brătianu's political thought and management is underscored by the manner in which the Romanian statesman used them in addressing issues of foreign policy during his mandates as Romanian Prime Minister (1910, 1914-1918, 1919, 1922-1926, 1927). At the same time, Brătianu's contribution is one of the few Romanian political attempts to codify and enforce in practice a set of ethical rules and principles of realistic political action in the field of international relations and foreign policy. This is the reason why our approach aims to reveal not only Brătianu's novel theoretical ideas, but also his political attitudes and actions, expressed and carried out in the name and spirit of Romanian political realism, against the particularly intricate and dangerous European background of World War I and the Paris Peace Conference, a period marked by the interests and forceful action undertaken by the *Realpolitik* of the great powers. At the same time, we endeavor to see to what extent Ion I. C. Brătianu's ethics and realistic principles were useful for the national interest and served the diplomacy, foreign policy and the Romanian State in its international relations. Moreover, we intend to point out whether they succeeded in meeting, above all, his own interests in acquiring greater power. The usefulness and relevance of such a scientific research are also ensured by the timeliness and topicality of many of the ideas, principles and attitudes adopted by the Romanian statesman, who thought and acted before and after World War I: these could well be resumed on the contemporary Romanian political scene, in the context of the cyclical evolutions of the European and international society. Our attention focuses on researching and presenting Brătianu's political discourse, which

responsible way. Central to this ongoing argument is recognition of our social embeddedness, the fact that we are inescapably related to others and therefore that our moral beliefs and political decisions impact upon the lives and decisions of others." Patrick Hayden, "Introduction", in Patrick Hayden (ed.), *The Ashgate Research Companion to Ethics and International Relations*, London: Ashgate Publisher, 2009, p. 1.

[2] Ion I. C. Brătianu (born 20 August 1864 - died 24 November 1927) was an engineer, politician and statesman, president of the National Liberal Party (1909-1927), several times a minister and prime minister of the country, as well as an honorary member of the Romanian Academy from 1923 on. As Prime Minister of Great Romania (1918-1919, 1922-1926 and 1927), he advocated and made efforts for the country's western modernization. He introduced key reforms, such as universal suffrage, land reform, the eight-hour working day, Sunday rest, and one of Europe's most modern constitutions, adopted in 1923.

is why our approach can be considered descriptive rather than analytical. This is also due to the limited editorial space in which we can expose the vastness of Ion I. C. Brătianu's realistic political discourse and actions.

Our scientific approach takes into account the fact that in International Relations, political realism represents an analytical tradition that highlights the imperatives the states are facing in the pursuit of power politics, for the fulfillment of the national interest.[3] In the foreign specialized literature, references to the concept of political realism[4] are numerous, whereas in the Romanian studies they are rather few.

Thus, in the foreign specialized literature, highlighting and analyzing the place and purpose of ethics in the foreign policy of a state represented an important concern of the classical realist school, not only in canonical texts such as Thucydides' "Melian Dialogue" and Machiavelli's *The Prince*, but also in works of twentieth-century political scientists, such as Carr, Morgenthau and Niebuhr.[5] According to Morgenthau, ethical considerations must give way to reasons of state. "Realism maintains that universal moral principles cannot be applied to state actions"[6] and "state actions are not determined by moral principles and legal arrangements, but by reasons of interest and power," which represent the main purpose of politics. Similar views were expressed by Max Weber and Nietzsche,[7] and Machiavelli and his Prince - Cesare Borgia - whom Ion I. C. Brătianu admired, speak of the moral right of human interests, which states that "when the safety of the country

[3] Jack Donnely, „Realismul", in Scott Burchill (ed.), *Teorii ale relaţiilor internaţionale*, Iaşi: Institutul European, 2008, p. 43. The same author shows that "political realism, *Realpolitik*, "power politics," is the oldest and most widespread theory in international relations" (*Ibidem*).

[4] As defined by one of its leading theorists, Hans J. Morgenthau, political realism considers that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature. For this theorist, *a good foreign policy is one that minimizes the risks and maximizes the benefits* for the state that promotes it. In his view, the main indicator of political realism is the concept of interest, defined in terms of national power. The procedure for determining the national interest - Morgenthau says - varies according to the cultural and political context in which the foreign policy is made. He also argues why political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a nation with the moral laws that govern the universe (Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Fifth Edition, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978, pp. 4-15.

[5] Jack Donnely, „Realismul", in Scott Burchill (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 64.

[6] *Ibidem*, p. 45.

[7] *Ibidem*, p. 64.

depends entirely on the decision to be taken, no attention should be paid either to justice or to injustice."[8] In fact, many realists explicitly present the pursuit of the national interest and realistic power politics as a matter of ethical obligation. Morgenthau goes so far as to talk about the "moral dignity of the national interest."[9]

The promotion of a realistic Romanian foreign policy before and after World War I is closely related to the name of the Liberal politician Ion I. C. Brătianu. He was a man of state whose political activity was linked to the establishment of the Romanian unitary national state, Greater Romania, in 1918-1919, the introduction of major social reforms (universal suffrage and the agrarian reform), the public and governmental policies of national development inspired by the doctrine of economic nationalism ("*By Ourselves"*) and one of the most appropriate constitutions for the historical moment and the geo-political situation in the country during the third decade of the twentieth century. All of Brătianu's acts and deeds were creations and achievements based on realistic political views and actions (*Realpolitik*), in the name and on the grounds of which this politician managed to dominate the scene of national politics in the period before and after World War I. At the same time, at the level of Romania's foreign policy and external relations, Ion I. C. Brătianu endeavored to define a doctrine of political realism and national selfishness, which he applied throughout his political career, and especially during the period of Romania's neutrality and the Paris Peace Conference (1919).

Brătianu's *Realpolitik* contended that the definition of the political option and the national interests that had to be met depended on the principles and the general and permanent directive, which the nation-state defined at a certain moment.[10] This was specified by Brătianu in the famous *Letter* he sent as the Prime Minister of Romania to Luigi Luzzatti, the Prime Minister of Italy, on 14 March 1914, a document showing that Romania's policy sought to serve primarily its own nation, "*promoting national egoism,*

[8] *Ibidem*, p. 67; see also Oana Albescu, *Etica în Relaţiile Internaţionale sub auspiciile interdependenţei complexe*, "Sfera Politicii", vol. XVIII, No. 10 (152), October 2010, p. 18.

[9] Jack Donnely, *Realismul*, p. 66; some realists adopt a radical nationalist ethics, maintaining that the "state is not to be judged by standards which apply to individuals, but by those which are set for it by its own nature and ultimate aims" (*Ibidem*).

[10] "Dezbaterile Adunării Deputatilor" no. 15, 01.01.1920, p. 166; (hereinafter cited as "D.A.D.")

ensuring its security and providing it with the means to flourish and grow."[11] This fundamental directive - the *policy of national egoism* - was the product of *political realism* of Brătianu's inspiration and may be detected in most of the foreign policy approaches he promoted. This policy and, implicitly, Brătianu's *Realpolitik* were creations of his father and the founder of Romanian Liberalism, Ion C. Brătianu, who had defined in 1876, when he was the Romanian Prime Minister, the essence of political realism through the famous formula (inspired from English): "We have neither sympathies nor antipathies, we have only Romanian sentiments."[12] Accused during the Crown Council of 14 August 1916 that he was a Francophile, Premier Brătianu said that, like his father, he had no feelings of sympathy or antipathy towards any state, but only Romanian sentiments, stating that he was nothing else but Romanian.[13] I. G. Duca even spoke of a "traditional realistic policy" in the Brătianu family heritage, founded by Ion C. Brătianu in 1877, during the negotiations with Tsarist Russia, a policy thereafter applied by Brătianu, who had assumed it as "a real duty to adopt a policy of utilitarianism and not of barren sentimentalism."[14] He was aware that after the tough negotiations he had carried out, in the spirit of his realistic policy, during the period of neutrality, he was considered a blackmailer in the Entente camp.[15]

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[11] Ion I. C. Brătianu, *Discursurile lui Ion I. C. Brătianu.* Published by George Fotino, vol. IV, Bucharest: Cartea Românească, 1940, p. 159; (hereinafter cited as Ion I.C. Brătianu, *Discursuri*).

[12] Ion C. Brătianu, *Discursuri, Scrieri, Acte şi Documente*, vol.II, part I, Bucharest: Imprimeriile Independenţa, 1912, p. 255; At a meeting of the Crown Council from 14 August 1916, Brătianu defended himself against the accusation that he was a Francophile. "He showed that he, like his father, did not adopt this or that policy because they had sentimental preferences for this or that state, but because the interests of the country required them to form alliances with one or the other" (Ion I. C. Brătianu, *op.cit.*, vol. IV, p. 399).

[13] I.G. Duca, *Amintiri politice*, vol. I, München: John Dumitru Verlag, 1981, pp. 280-281.

[14] *Ibidem,* pp. 177-178; It should be noted that the line of realistic policy in the Brătianu family was assumed by his son, Gh. I. Brătianu in the fourth decade of the past century. The fact that Ion I. C. Brătianu was a *Realpolitiker* was noticed by one of the most intelligent and astute diplomats accredited in Bucharest during the period of neutrality. In a letter he sent, on 10 September 1914, to Chancellor L. Berchtold, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to Bucharest, Otokar Czernin stated: "Brătianu's heart is neither with us nor with others, he oscillates hither and thither, the only reason of his policy is fear and he will throw himself unscrupulously at any man that he thinks cannot defend himslef" (*1918 la români. Desăvârşirea unităţii naţional-statale a poporului român. Documente externe. 1916-1918,* vol. I, Bucureşti: Editura Ştiinţifică şi Enciclopedică, 1983, p. 453).

[15] Pamfil Şeicaru, *România în marele război*, Bucharest: Editura Eminescu, 1994, p. 88.

The essence of Ion I. C. Brătianu's political realism was expressed in his famous speech delivered in the Romanian Parliament, at the beginning of the twentieth century, when he said that "a state like ours cannot claim to issue the directives of global policy, but must clearly know the (international, *our note*) situation, taking advantage of various circumstances as far as possible and as well as possible for its own interests."[16] He was a visionary, calculated and responsible man of state, who knew that a people must always watch over its own interests, regardless of their rank, because "the foreign powers will not watch over them in its stead;"[17] and when a Romanian interest is at stake, our decision cannot come from others."[18] These realistic utterances of the Romanian statesman were intended to dispel the unfortunate illusion of many Romanian politicians, from different generations, whereby Europe would watch over and protect the Romanian interests at the mouths of the Danube, since these were also its interests. This deception was planted in the Romanian idealistic political consciousness by the resolution of the Paris Treaty of 1856, when Moldova received Bessarabia so that the freedom of the Danube Delta would be ensured. However, as Nicolae Iorga said, "Europe changes depending on who commands and leads it."[19]

As a politician, Ion I. C. Brătianu was considered a ***Realpolitiker***.[20] He was dubbed as such by one of his political opponents, Alexandru Vaida-Voevod, the leader of the Romanian National Party of Transylvania (RNP) and a former close associate of Prime Minister Brătianu's at the Paris Peace Conference from 1919, as the country's second delegate to the peace talks. Nicolae Iorga also noted the political realism of Ion I. C. Brătianu, adding that the latter "pursued - in accordance with his training as an engineer - a certain path to a given target" and "took all measures of material security, just like for the construction of a bridge across a chasm," so as to attain that political objective and to satisfy that interest.[21] In turn, Brătianu defined himself as a realistic and calculated politician in the

[16] Ion I. C. Brătianu, *Discursuri*, vol. II, Bucureşti, 1933, p. 143.
[17] *Ibidem*, vol. I, Bucureşti, 1933, p. 430.
[18] *Ibidem*, p. 32.
[19] N. Iorga, *Politica externă a regelui Carol I*, Bucureşti: Institutul de Arte Grafice Luceafărul S.A., 1923, p. 303.
[20] Alexandru Vaida-Voevod, *Memorii*. Ed. Alexandru Şerban, vol. II, Cluj Napoca, 1995, p. 76.
[21] Nicolae Iorga, *Supt trei regi. România contemporană de la 1904 la 1930*, Bucharest, 1932, p. 117.

discussion on the *Message of the Throne*, from 20 June 1914, when he said that: "I can be accused by both our opponents and our friends (...) that I have many flaws in my qualities, but I think neither of them have accused me (...) that I am not a man who thinks and that I do not weigh, as much as it is humanly possible, *the effects of the actions I undertake*."[22]

In our opinion, Ion I. C. Brătianu was one of the most important representatives of Romanian political realism, his essence and spirit concentrating the features, strengths and flaws of both Byzantinism and Occidentalism: all these were intertwined in a complex human being, who was prone and committed to realistic political thought and action.[23] To these were added other major causes and influences, which competed - in Brătianu's political personality and skills - to promote a realistic policy and impose *Realpolitik* as a doctrine of the Romanian state, for as long as Ion I. C. Brătianu was active in national politics. Among these causes and influences should be mentioned: his family and the political initiation his father imparted on him, his education and hobbies (he studied engineering in France and history was his main passion and preoccupation), his entourage and the political-economic-cultural environment in which he moved, along with the political models that inspired and influenced him in crystallizing the realistic political conception and management. Here we are referring to, first of all, his father, to the German man of state Otto von Bismarck (the *prince of Realpolitik* in modern Europe), and to Cesare Borgia and Machiavelli, the founders of the Western doctrine of political realism.[24]

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[22] Ion I. C. Brătianu, *Discursuri*, vol. IV, pp. 290-301.

[23] In a speech delivered in the Parliament of Greater Romania on 17 December 1919, Ion I. C. Brătianu defined himself as the "representative of the manly consciousness of a brave and determined people" ("D.A.D.", no. 15, 01.01. 1920, pp. 174 -175).

[24] Constantin Argetoianu testified to the passion that Ion I. C. Brătianu had for studying the realistic conception and political action of Cesare Borgia - Machiavelli's *Prince* - whom he considered a great European statesman. "Ionel Brătianu confessed to his deep admiration for Cesare Borgia and had a genuine cult for this adventurer of the Renaissance - and that surprised me. It would have been easier for me to understand if he had had a cult for Ignatius of Loyola, for throughout his political career he had used the Jesuit *mental reserves* and never resorted to poison and dagger like the desperate son of Pope Alexander VI" (C. Argetoianu, *Memorii pentru cei de mâine. Amintiri din vremea celor de ieri*, vol. VIII, 1927-1932, Bucharest: Editura Machiavelli, 1997, p. 81).

Under the influence of Bismarck and his father - Ion C. Brătianu - he underwent a fundamental transformation from a man of the Revolution and of France at the mouths of the Danube into the Romanian man of state who defined the Romanian *Realpolitik* and promoted a realistic policy to meet Romania's interests.[25]

Another major influence exerted by the German *Realpolitik* may be sensed in Ion I. C. Brătianu's realistic policy of building and consolidating the nation-state as the main actor on the internal and external political stage and as the main instrument of promoting *Realpolitik*. Brătianu's belief in the role and mission of the state came *via* the Bismarckian and Hegelian conception, whereby "there is no higher value than the state, that is the homeland we belong to,"[26] and a politician's foremost goal was that of strengthening the state. Brătianu strongly believed in the conception according to which "the State is the ultimate goal of human activity"[27] and, in his case, of political activity. Bismarck significantly influenced the public speeches of Ion I. C. Brătianu, when he spoke of the Romanian state.[28] In a speech he delivered on 24 June 1909, on the theme of "organization, State and King," Ion I. C. Brătianu showed that "in the modern view, the state is no longer what it used to be: the power that absorbed and all too often destroyed everything. In the modern conception, the State," he said, "is the power that harmonizes forces and renders them fruitful for the individual and for society. The old idea of the state and the new idea of the state may also be drawn from the two historical formulas, one of which was given by the prototypal king of yore, Louis the XIV, who said *The State, It Is I,* while the other was given by Frederick II, King of Prussia, who said, *I am the first servant of the state*. Where one or the other conception may lead has been revealed by history itself."[29]

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[25] Gh. I. Brătianu, *Bismarck şi I. C. Brătianu*, Conference delivered at the University of Berlin, 22 January 1936, extract from *Revista Istorică Română*, Bucharest: Imprimeria Naţională, 1936, p. 17.

[26] Mircea Djuvara, "Principiile şi spiritul ultimelor tratate de pace," in *Politica externă. 19 prelegeri ale Institutului Social Român*, Bucharest: Editura Cultura Naţională, no year, p. 2.

[27] *Ibidem.*

[28] The concept of Greater Romania is also of Bismarckian origin, being inspired by the German concept of "Grossdeutschland."

[29] Ion I. C. Brătianu, *op.cit.*, vol. III, Bucharest, 1939, p. 152.

At the same time, the *Architect of the Romanian nation-state* stated, at the end of January 1923, that the aim of his realistic policy of political and statal construction envisaged a "solid state life, based on broad democratic foundations."[30]

On the other hand, the essence of *Realpolitik* - as Bismarck conceived and imposed it - determined that the duty of a state was to satisfy its interests, developing its own power and action in all respects and regardless of any consideration, "even if population were to be wretched, even if the sacred and vital interests of other states were undermined."[31]

We do not know whether Brătianu studied Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*, but it is clear that he believed in one of the Chinese strategist's principles, which stipulated that a great leader could achieve a victory without removing his sword. As shown by the testimony of a politician from the time of neutrality (1914-1916), Ion I. C. Brătianu wanted to bring Romania national territories without involving the country in World War I. In this regard, a significant testimony is that of Alexandru Marghiloman - the Conservative Party leader - who, following a discussion he had with Brătianu at the end of May 1915, noted in his journal: "the entire conversation we had yesterday gave me the impression that Brătianu would be delighted to have a win without drawing the sword, just like Maiorescu in 1913."[32] To achieve such a political feat, Ion I. C. Brătianu resorted - both in foreign policy and in the negotiations he carried with the Entente and the Central Powers - to lies, deception and hypocrisy, as Machiavelli[33]

[30] *Viitorul*, 3 February 1923.

[31] The conception of *Realpolitik* dominated international life before World War I and strongly manifested itself during the Paris peace negotiations in 1919-20. This conception "led to a policy of force, a policy of cunning for all against all." This is the conception that was cynically defined by the French journalist Rene Pinon, who embraced it. According to it, "treaties are mere provisional notations of a provisional equilibrium of forces," and political action has no other purpose than to grant more power through any legal or illegal means to that state (Mircea Djuvara, *op. cit.*, p. 2).

[32] This refers to the successful foreign policy conducted by the Conservative Government, led by Titu Maiorescu, who obtained the Quadrilater for Romania following the defeat of Bulgaria in the Second Balkan War, without the Romanian army waging a single battle (Al. Marghiloman, *Note politice*, vol. I, Bucharest: Editura Institutului de Arte Grafice Mihai Eminescu, 1927, p. 460.)

[33] Ion I. C. Brătianu had great admiration for Cesare Borgia, whom he considered "the greatest political genius of all time" (C. Argetoianu, *Memorii pentru cei de mâine. Amintiri din vremea celor de ieri*, vol. I-II, 1871-1916, Bucureşti: Editura Machiavelli, 2008, p. 240).

preached or as Sun Tzu recommended in *The Art of War*. Memorable are the moments from the neutrality period when Ion I. C. Brătianu had meetings with the ambassadors of the Central Powers, whom he simply exasperated with his deceit and false statements. From among the dozens of testimonies in this regard, mention should be made of the confession the German Ambassador in Bucharest, von dem Busche, made to Alexandru Marghiloman that Brătianu had just looked him in the eye and assured him that he would not negotiate with Russia, even though he did.[34] Also, in the same respect, we should also point out the statement made by the German General Falkenheim, who cabled his country's ambassador to Bucharest, saying that he was looking forward to the end of the war so he would get to know Brătianu, for he had "never met a man capable of lying like him."[35] Because of this behavior and such attitudes and actions, Brătianu was denounced in Parliament that he allegedly had "links to both warring parties, deceiving them both and always on the prowl for the best opportunity."[36] He resorted to such unethical behavior primarily because he had no other means of national power at hand and also because he literally had a great talent as an actor. We should not forget Kenneth Waltz's argument according to which there is a great difference "between politics conducted in a condition of settled rules and politics conducted in a condition of anarchy."[37] In fact, Brătianu conducted Romania's foreign policy and aimed to meet the national interests in the anarchic conditions of the Great War. It should be emphasized that while in the civilized human society the manifestation of such immoral behavior is unacceptable, for a statesman who managed the interests of a small country - as Romania was between 1914 and 1916, under the conditions of a global war - positioned between two great empires that were engaged in armed conflict, such behavior could be tolerated and was, moreover, necessary, especially since he acted in the service of national interest and by virtue of the Romanian Realpolitik.

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[34] Al. Marghiloman, *op. cit.*, p. 460.
[35] *Ibidem*, p. 143.
[36] Charles and Barbara Jelavich, Formarea statelor naţionale balcanice. 1804-1920, Cluj Napoca: Editura Dacia, 1999, p. 339.
[37] Jack Donnely, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

In order to have an accurate picture of the ethics espoused by the statesman Ion I. C. Brătianu during neutrality, we should mention his honest address to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, Czernin, made on 27 July 1914, one day before the declaration of war of the Dualist Empire against Serbia, when, at the request of the diplomat that Romania should clearly state its position, he adopted, we believe, a flawless ethical attitude as a Romanian statesman. Prime Minister Brătianu informed the ambassador that Romania would conduct a politics of abeyance, but if Bulgaria became involved in the conflict and if significant changes affected the balance of power between the states in South-East Europe, Romania's situation would become "critical." Although he did not doubt that Austria-Hungary would defeat Serbia, Brătianu opposed any changes to the Serbian border. If this were to happen and if Bulgaria were the beneficiary of this situation, Brătianu declared his intention to seek "a corresponding increase of Romania's territory."[38] His attitude as an imperturbable and impenetrable Sphinx, and his Oriental-Talleyrandist attitudes and tactics generated a huge outpouring of hostility and antipathy against him. This attitude, however, was self-imposed, serving as a true shield for this statesman, who had to govern a small and weak country in a Europe that was engaged in war. We should insist that Ion I. C. Brătianu's controversial ethics during neutrality generated particularly tense moods in the sphere of domestic politics, too, as one of the leaders of the Conservative opposition and the movement that supported Romania's joining the war on the Entente's side, Nicolae Filipescu, was on the point of slapping Premier Brătianu and challenging him to a duel for his refusal to declare war on the Central Powers, at the time of the Battle of Lemberg. However, as he had stated since 1914, "what we need, more than ever, if to be the masters of ourselves, so that we can be the masters of our destinies."[39] The fact is that in the two years of neutrality, Ion I. C. Brătianu managed admirably to control his feelings and *act as a realistic statesman and a promoter of national egoism*. Moreover, in a moment of rest, after a grueling day at the time of neutrality, he admitted to his main political collaborator, I. G. Duca, that "so far, thank God, I have led everybody on the way I wanted and, not to brag, I found it an easy game to play." This confession appears to confirm the words of his adversaries and of the foreigners who

[38] Keith Hitchins, *România. 1866-1947*, Bucureşti: Editura Humanitas, 1994, p. 273.
[39] Ion I. C. Brătianu, *op. cit.*, vol. IV, p. 312.

characterized him as the prototype of an Oriental politician, whose words one cannot count on. However, the key lies in the second part of his confession: "If only the pipe didn't choke on me right now! How difficult the country's situation is and how overwhelming our responsibility!"[40] That is why Ion I. C. Brătianu could not afford to engage in "heroics without calculation" in Romania's state policy, especially at a time of war, even though the public pro-Entente or pro-German pressure was huge. The statesman Ion I. C. Brătianu simply exasperated with his composure both his opponents and his friends, the foreign diplomats in Bucharest, as well as the journalists. What is legendary is the episode in which in the dramatic context of the German attack on Verdun, when all the pro-Entente opposition was on fire, fretting and screaming that Europe was collapsing because of the cowardice exhibited by the country's Liberal Prime Minister and of the Romanian Country, Ion I. C. Brătianu peacefully retreated to Florica, where he spent all day studying ancient Byzantine coins with a magnifying glass, which he then ranked in cabinets, while the Entente ambassadors who visited him suffered genuine nervous breakdowns because of this unethical and disrespectful conduct towards the moral and ideal norms in whose name the Entente had waged war against the Central Powers.[41] In fact, Brătianu's behavior represented a smart diplomatic strategy to negotiate with the Allies, who did not accept the two non-negotiable conditions: the signing of the military agreement whereby the Russian-Romanian troops were placed under the command of King Ferdinand and the granting of the entire Banat province to Romania.[42] At the same time, as George F. Kennan shows, the "primary obligation of any government is to the interests of the national society it represents," and therefore moral norms are no longer relevant for it.[43] On the other hand, throughout the period of neutrality, Ion I. C.

[40] I. G. Duca, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 72.

[41] *Ibidem*, pp. 234-235.

[42] "D.A.D.", no. 40, of 29 January 1924, p. 947; the Minister of Agriculture in the Brătianu Government, Al. Constantinescu, revealed in a speech he delivered in Parliament, on 27 December 1923, where he referred to Brătianu's ethics and tactics, that "we kept the treaty unconcluded for six months until we were given Bukovina, with Chernowitz and the whole Banat." (*Ibidem*)

[43] Jack Donnely, *Realismul*, p. 66; Kennan maintains that the priority concern for the national interest is an "unavoidable necessity" and that it consequently "cannot be classified either as *good*, or as *bad*." (*Ibidem*)

Brătianu's main purpose, correctly identified by the experienced Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Bucharest, Ottokar Czernin, was to gain time. Brătianu did everything that was humanly, politically and diplomatically possible to avoid the war, and when the pressures exerted by the Entente were so great and he realized that the step had to be taken, he delayed the inevitable for as long as he could. What is significant, in this regard, is the note of the Austro-Hungarian diplomat who became the Foreign Minister of the Dualist Empire, written on 1 July 1916, in which Ion I. C. Brătianu was characterized as "this wily politician who always wanted to gain time, even if only a few more weeks."[44] Ion I. C. Brătianu's cunning and deceit - mentioned by the British Ambassador to Bucharest, G. Barclay, during the period of neutrality - was also pinpointed by his close collaborator, I. G. Duca, who in July 1914, after Brătianu warmly defended Austria and rebuked Duca and Prince Ştirbey for slandering Vienna, remarked with annoyance: "I am sure that his anger was hypocritical and who knows what combinations he was after then or what impression he wanted to give? In these respects, Brătianu evinced "infinite subtleties," and Duca claimed that Brătianu remained unfathomable to him.[45] The fact is that he had the great quality of a statesman: that of being discreet and impenetrable to his opponents and even to his political friends. Al. Vaida Voevod believed that the "loquacity of the people of Bucharest had taught him to keep silent" and had imposed his reticence towards people.[46]

In addition, he had a real talent as a stage actor, a fact noted by Nicolae Iorga, who mentioned the various roles Brătianu played and his talent for political theater.[47] These qualities necessary in a realistic statesman exasperated him during neutrality and led the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, Ottokar Czernin, to declare, during a visit to Bucharest on 27 February 1918, that Brătianu was "the biggest bastard history has known."[48] Exasperated by Premier Brătianu's negotiations, growing pretenses and frequent pirouettes meant to delay as much as possible Romania's joining

[44] *1918 la români*, vol. I, p. 728.
[45] I.G. Duca, *Amintiri politice*, vol. I, pp. 37-39.
[46] Alexandru Vaida-Voevod, *Scrisori de la Conferința de Pace.* Published by Mircea Vaida Voevod, Editura Multipress, 2003, p. 226.
[47] N. Iorga, *O viață de om așa cum a fost*, ed. Valeriu Râpeanu şi Sanda Râpeanu, Bucureşti, 1984, p. 430.
[48] *1918 la români....*, vol. II, Bucureşti, 1983, pp. 1080-1081.

the war, the French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau wrote in an article he published in his newspaper, *L'Homme Libre*, that "Brătianu is swinging towards the four cardinal points, regretting that there are only four of these."[49] In turn, Mihail Manoilescu, one of his most vehement political opponents, who was arrested, in fact, at Brătianu's order - noted in his *Memoirs* that he had an "exact intuition that statesmen should not be slaves to commonplace morality."[50] Duca also testified to this effect: "the truth is that Brătianu, with all his great qualities, sometimes engaged in petty stubbornness; suddenly, it was as if he was another man."[51] The reference was to Brătianu's error of completely ignoring Take Ionescu in Paris, during the Peace Conference. In this respect, C. Argetoianu recorded in his *Memoirs*, following a discussion with Take Ionescu, who had returned home in the summer of 1919, that he had obtained Pasici and the whole of Torontal from the Allies and that Brătianu's stubbornness and his megalomania "cost us a county."[52] The same "Brătianu sometimes indulged in fireworks of Oriental policy," according to an opinion expressed by his collaborator Duca, who referred to Brătianu's announcement that he would withdraw from the helm of the NLP after the signing of the armistice with the Central Powers.[53] A similar view was conveyed by Al. Vaida Voevod, who spoke in his Memoirs of "Brătianu's Byzantine tactics that have become his second nature."[54]

In December 1919, in an extensive speech he delivered on the Romanian foreign policy in the Parliament of Greater Romania, Ion I. C. Brătianu defined the conditions of good politics in the field of international relations and of Romanian foreign policy.[55] Before the over 450 MPs elected through universal suffrage for the first time in the country's history, he stated that a good foreign policy was subject to compliance with the existence of three essential conditions" "- a precise goal; - a precise knowledge of the

[49] Sterie Diamandi, *Galeria oamenilor politici*, Bucureşti: Editura Gesa, 1991, p. 32

[50] Ion Bitoleanu, *Şefi de partide priviţi cu ochii vremii lor*, Constanţa: Editura ExPonto, 2006, p. 75.

[51] I.G. Duca, *op. cit.*, vol. III, Munchen, 1982, p. 184.

[52] C. Argetoianu, *op. cit*., vol. VI, Bucureşti, 1996, p. 38.

[53] I.G. Duca, *op. cit.*, vol. III, p. 98.

[54] Al. Vaida Voevod, *Scrisori de la Conferinţa de Pace*, p. 70.

[55] "D.A.D." no. 15, 01.01.1920, pp. 165-175; on that occasion, he resumed the definition of an efficient Romanian foreign policy, which he had given in September 1913, amid the deepening Balkan crisis.

conditions in which you are, so that you may realize the ways to implement it; and, once the ways have been determined, decided action to reach (achieve, *our note*) this goal."[56] It should be noted that on 7 September 1913, the day when he made public the *Letter to the National Liberal Party*, Ion I. C. Brătianu stated that the national power of a state was the factor that set the goals of a realistic foreign policy. It was also at that time that he indicated the action directions of Romania's national development strategy, which, in Brătianu's conception, had a direct impact on the country's foreign policy: "Romania," he said, "(...) has the overriding duty to light its paths and to strengthen and develop its social, military and economic organization, in order to ensure the conditions for its existence and prosperity."[57]

In December 1919, the statesman showed that the foreign policy of a country like Romania "must be based on a decisive and permanent directive, which shall imprint its general orientation, and also on the temporary circumstances it must accommodate itself to in order to fulfill its purpose."[58] The essential premise from which Ion I. C. Brătianu started, in his effort of conceptualization and pragmatic action in the field of the international relations of a state, was that like an individual, a nation built its destiny in the world through the energy with which it manifested its qualities.[59] He grounded his undertaking on the evolutionary idea whereby "great people, long-lasting works, are not accomplished only through instantaneous élans,"[60] which is why a national foreign policy strategy could be effective depending on how it capitalized upon the necessary axiological benchmarks: responsibility, professionalism, pragmatism, continuity, perseverance, energetic spirit and inspiration. Ion I. C. Brătianu insisted that in order to eliminate suspicions of amateurism and adventure in promoting the Romanian foreign policy, it was necessary to establish a fundamental political directive, designed to orient the national efforts abroad.[61] The Romanian man of state severely drew our attention, from across time, that "a state must, more than in any other branch of its affairs, have some permanent norms in its relations with

[56] *Ibidem,* p. 166.
[57] Ion I. C. Brătianu, *Discursuri,* vol. IV, pp. 46-47.
[58] "D.A.D.", no. 15, 01.01.1920, p. 166.
[59] Ion I. C. Brătianu, *Cuvintele unui mare român*, Craiova: Editura Ramuri, no year, p. 89.
[60] Idem, *Discursuri,* vol. IV, p. 459.
[61] *Ibidem*, vol. II, p. 631.

the outside world, by which it may guide its policy in the midst of daily fluctuations, so as to not lose the general orientation."[62]

In a Liberal meeting that took place in Timişoara on 12 June 1921, Brătianu told the Banat people who had come to listen to him, that "on this vast and stormy sea of social and international struggles" the Romanian man of state should tie his actions to higher purposes, to the "leading polar stars, which do not move with the time of night and may give him untreacherous directives that may ensure his reaching the desired havens." These polar stars could help the coordinator of foreign policy to find solutions to deadlock situations, especially when the fight had been lost on the international stage or when the man of state was lost in the maze of international relations.[63] In Brătianu's conception, the "polar stars" were what he called *the general and permanent directives of foreign policy* that the Romanian state assumed at a certain time and that it promoted in the long run, for "this is the only way to make great politics."[64] In support of his claims, Brătianu gave, in Parliament in 1919, the example of his favorite state, England, "which must be admired by all, given the constancy of the principles whereby it conducts its foreign policy." England's status and power in the world - he told the elected representatives of the reunited Romanian nation - were due to the admirable consistency with which it had followed the principles and guidelines of its foreign policy.[65] Therefore, on that occasion, the statesman announced that the principles on which he had founded and would found his foreign policy were not mere "inventions or inspirations, produced under the influence of some special circumstances, but indeed represent for us and for those who worked in our sense, before us, throughout time, the permanent principle of Romania's policy."[66] Moreover, for the Romanian statesman, "the general and permanent directives of Romanian politics are so clear that there can be no discussion upon them."[67]

[62] "D.A.D.", no. 15, 01.01.1920, p. 166.
[63] *Viitorul*, 15 June 1921.
[64] "D.A.D.", no. 15, 01.01.1920, p. 166.
[65] *Ibidem.*
[66] See: *Ibidem,* pp. 165-166.
[67] *Ibidem,* p. 166.

Thus, according to Ion I. C. Brătianu, the permanent directions of the Romanian foreign policy were: 'Romania can never be against France and England, nor can it be against Germany. Romania is not a great power, and it cannot interfere in the disputes between the Great Powers."[68]

One of the general and permanent directives of the Romanian foreign policy, which also guided Brătianu's attitude, was that of *national sovereignty*, stemming from Brătianu's principle of national conservation. This was the fundamental principle of foreign policy that was strongly cultivated by the man of state in the Romanian political and civic culture and was used during the Paris Peace Conference, especially once its agenda included the issue of solving the problem of the minorities through the great powers' intervention in and control of the internal affairs of small states like Romania. Apud Ion I. C. Brătianu, all the Romanian state propaganda, including the communist one, fully capitalized on this principle. In the spirit of this principle, on 27 May 1919, in Paris, Brătianu sent a diplomatic note to the French government, in which he stated: "Overall, Romania is ready to receive any directive that all the member states in the League of Nations will admit on their own territories in this matter. Otherwise, Romania will not, under any circumstances, accept foreign government intervention in the enforcement of its domestic laws."[69] Then, in a letter sent to Mihail Pherekyde, the Interim Prime Minister from Bucharest, on 3 June 1919, after reading the provisions for the minorities from the Peace Treaty with Austria, Ion I. C. Brătianu firmly enunciated this principle: "My conviction is that we can in no way accept these conditions. We have inherited an independent country and we cannot sacrifice its independence even for the sake of expanding its boundaries."[70] The doctrinal culmination of this principle came with the act of state Brătianu carried out through his government's resignation, when he stated: "The supreme council of the great powers, which has replaced the Peace Conference of the allied states, took no account of this treaty and decided to impose upon Romania

[68] *Universul*, 28 November 1938; Brătianu presented this foreign policy directive to the Liberal leader Tancred Constantinescu during the refuge from Iaşi.

[69] *1918 la români...*, Bucureşti, 1983, vol. III, p. 387.

[70] *Ibidem*, p. 432; As one can see, he was the author of these official state concepts - such as "autonomy", "political independence", "sovereignty", which later came to be so abused by Ceauşescu's propaganda.

conditions that it cannot accept, because they are incompatible with its dignity, integrity and political interests. Bucharest, 12 September 1919."[71]

The Romanian man of state did not accept the thesis that the great powers could dictate the interests of a state without its taking part in the discussion that interested it directly. He captured this thesis in the famous formula: "One cannot decide about us without us."[72] Hence, he believed, the need for the states "that want to live to be strong enough in manifesting their rights,"[73] which would contribute to developing the sense of national security.[74]

However, in his political career, Ion I. C. Brătianu had to deal with extreme situations, in which the great powers decided Romania's destiny arbitrarily and abusively, after the disaster of the Romanian-Russian front from 1918, when Romania was forced to seek an armistice and, eventually, to sign the abusive peace from Bucharest. In the Crown Council from Iaşi, held on 17 February 1918, Brătianu - who had been informed by King Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary's claims to annex Dobrogea - argued that in a Diktat situation, as that of the claim to cede Dobrogea, "as a prerequisite to be accepted even prior to the negotiations, no other condition that will be imposed will be more painful if the most unacceptable of conditions is accepted. Then," Brătianu advised, "all that would be left to do would be to ask the enemy to impose all possible conditions and accept them without question, showing thus that this is not an agreed and definitive peace, and through this moral protest against the whole of humanity, the [Diktat's] violent character will be shown before the eyes of all, in its true light." "This course of action," he also said, "would be a moral protest that would impress mankind and even the enemy peoples more than if these conditions were accepted in the wake of discussions." In the same council, Brătianu told the king and the assembly of political leaders that "however great the demands on the matter of the Danube, of oil, cereals and so on, they will not surpass the taking of Dobrogea away," or the loss of national territory, that "resistance is necessary as our only strong protest" and that "although eventually defeated, we may save our honor by not caving in

[71] *Patria,* 16 September 1919.
[72] *Viitorul,* 4 December 1921.
[73] Ion I. C. Brătianu, *Discursuri*, vol. II, p. 615.
[74] *Idem*, *Cuvintele,* p. 86.

without bloodshed, when we are demanded to rip off the body of our country and tear out its very lungs."[75] At the same time, Brătianu advised, in the case of a threat coming from a state against Romania, the Romanian statesman "must know the reality and the efficacy of intimidation" so as to distinguish between empty threats and real dangers.[76]

Ion I. C. Brătianu considered that each state had the moral obligation to promote and defend its interests, adopting the perspective that "the independence of all the countries has an identical character, which does not vary with their population numbers and the extent of their territory."[77]

Moreover, he made the successful promotion of a foreign policy strategy conditional upon increasing the responsibilities of the decision makers and institutions handling the destinies of the state.[78] Those responsible, the Liberal politician stated, must take full responsibility for the foreign policy decisions, and in case of failure, they should not attempt, through political maneuvers, to transfer the political responsibility onto their potential associates.[79] In this regard, in the Parliament from Iasi, he said that he would not share his policy with anyone, even in so desperate a situation as that of the refuge from 1916.[80] This view was contradicted by C. Argetoianu, who claimed that "he was always ready to share misfortune and damage with another," referring to Brătianu's political practice of accepting national unity governments only after incurring serious problems, as he also did after Turtucaia, when he co-opted Take Ionescu's conservative faction, partly also in order to disperse political responsibility for the disaster on the front.[81]

Ion I. C. Brătianu paid increasing attention to the Romanian diplomatic offensive abroad, considering that it should be promoted as a long-term strategy.[82] He grounded his strategic plan upon the idea that the historic

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[75] Ion Rusu Abrudeanu, *Păcatele Ardealului față de sufletul Vechiului Regat. Fapte. documente şi facsimile*, Bucharest: Editura Cartea Românească, p. 139.

[76] Ion I. C. Brătianu, *op. cit.*, vol. IV, p. 32.

[77] Ion I. C. Brătianu, *op. cit.*, vol. IV, p. 160; Ion I. C. Brătianu considered that the Romanian statesman's duty to defend and promote the national interests was an important service to humanity, which he defined as the sum total of all the nations of the earth (*Ibidem*, p. 159).

[78] Ion I. C. Brătianu, *Cuvintele...*, p. 104.

[79] Idem, *Discursuri*, vol. IV, p. 409.

[80] Sterie Diamandi, *op.cit.*, p. 44.

[81] C. Argetoianu, *op.cit.*, vol. I-II, p. 297.

[82] *Ibidem*, vol. III, p. 375.

mission of the Romanian people had been to serve as the representative and defender of Western civilization in the Carpathians and at the mouths of the Danube.[83] In order for Romania to carry out this European mission, Ion I. C. Brătianu believed that its foreign policy must be energetic, persistent and consistent in following this goal.[84] In addition, he strongly argued that demagoguery had no place in foreign policy actions.[85] Such political undertakings, he considered, had to have a twofold character: *moderate form* and *energetic substance*.[86] In the answer he offered to the Viennese newspaper *Neue Freie Presse* on 16 October 1912, in response to the questions asked by the newspaper's war correspondent in Bucharest, the one who would become the Bolshevik revolutionary Leon Trotsky, Ion I. C. Brătianu stated that the Romanian foreign policy could meet the national goals only if it was serious and responsible, without engaging in a sense of adventure. He also insisted that it should not suggest the "appearance of passivity", which would not be consistent with Romania's interests, role and national power.[87]

Making the effectiveness of foreign policy actions conditional upon the determination to achieve that goal[88] and upon concentration on issues that were at the order of the day,[89] Brătianu found it inconceivable to use improvisation in support of the diplomatic offensive.[90] On the other hand, just like in the case of domestic politics, Brătianu's tactics established a direct link between the efficiency of the diplomatic offensive and the international context. Moreover, Ion I. C. Brătianu laid down the mandatory rule that *the Romanian man of state must square his action with the global interests, "which for us are the European ones,"* seeing this as a cause for national success.[91] He also contended that a professional foreign policy approach required great self-restraint, discretion, as well as much political and diplomatic skill on the part of the factor responsible for promoting it.[92]

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[83] "D.A.D.",no. 15, 01.01.1920, p. 175; see also: Ion I. C. Brătianu, *op. cit.,* vol. IV, p. 50.
[84] Ion I. C. Brătianu, *op. cit.*, vol. IV, p. 50.
[85] *Ibidem*, vol. III, p. 458.
[86] *Ibidem*, p. 550; see also: "D.A.D." no. 15, 01.01.1920, p. 166.
[87] Ion I. C. Brătianu, *op. cit.*, vol. III, p. 549.
[88] *Ibidem.*, vol. IV, p. 460.
[89] "D.A.D.",no. 15, 01.01.1920, p. 167.
[90] Ion I. C. Brătianu, *op. cit.*, vol. IV, p. 50.
[91] "D.A.D.", no.15, 01.01.1920, p. 166.
[92] Ion I. C. Brătianu, *op. cit.*, vol. IV, p. 459.

In Brătianu's view, there were other fundamental principles that ought to guide the Romanian external policy. Among these, the *principle of national conservation* played an essential role, as long as it did not harm the prestige of the state, but enriched it.[93] At the level of foreign policy, it was possible for "the power of the national will to overcome the inertia of the government," demanding that vigorous initiatives be undertaken to satisfy a major interest.[94] Therefore, he considered, political action in the sphere of foreign policy should be able to "awaken the national preservation instinct," so that a government should not find itself in a position to act following the energetic manifestation of the national instinct.[95] In his opinion, the action of awakening the national consciousness - that would enable it to manifest itself realistically in major foreign policy decisions - had to be made in an organized and responsible manner and not in anarchic and chaotic forms.[96]

One of Brătianu's important foreign policy principles, which the great statesman used consistently in his external action and in positioning Romania in relation to the attitude and demands of the major powers, was the *principle of intransigence*. By virtue of this principle, Ion I. C. Brătianu believed that "in the major issues, in the moral questions that govern the future of a nation and to which its interests of honor and nationality are related, there can be no price haggling and no reasons of expediency, no descending from the high and safe realm of principles. Whatever the vicissitudes of days and years, whatever their duration, the time for reward will come."[97] The essence of Brătianu's notion of intransigence in international relations and in the Romanian foreign policy is perhaps best revealed by the public statement he made before leaving for Paris to disavow his great rival, Take Ionescu, who had just given in on the matter of the claim for the

[93] *Ibidem,* p. 63; In line with this principle, the Romanian statesman sent several clear and trenchant messages to the West. The most significant seems to be the one sent to the Western governments in the famous letter addressed to the Italian Prime Minister Luigi Luzzatti, in which he showed that although the major European interests had supported the independence of the country, "before all and above all, it is the result of the qualities, work and sacrifices of the Romanian people. It is the natural result of our entire national development, and it is up to no one to call this independence into question." (*Ibidem.*, p. 160).

[94] *Ibidem*, p. 46.

[95] *Ibidem*, vol. III, p. 550.

[96] *Ibidem*, p. 551; "The more difficult the circumstances in which we are, the greater is our duty to raise the national consciousness as high as possible" (*Ibidem*, p. 552).

[97] Gh. I. Brătianu, *Intransigenţă şi transacţie în politica externă a României*, Bucharest, 1932, p. 9.

entire Banat, in accordance with the Treaty of Alliance with the Entente from August 1916. "*I will never cede anything* and if I knew that at the Peace Congress they would not give us everything that is written in the treaty, I would refuse to attend the Congress."[98]

Notwithstanding all this, Ion I. C. Brătianu did not take a stand against *transaction* (negotiation, *our note*) and opportunism, considering them to be efficient means and attitudes in promoting and satisfying the national interests.[99] In fact, at the end of the Crown Council of August 1916, when it was decided that Romania should join the war against the allies from the former Central Powers bloc, he stated that at that time he "was not allowed to hesitate and incur the historical responsibility for having missed the most propitious moment offered to the Romanian people, who could achieve their much-desired union, which had been awaited for centuries."[100]

In fact, it was Ion I. C. Brătianu who reached the ultimate heights in the Romanian diplomatic art of negotiation during the period when he negotiated Romania's adherence to the Entente. In a way, Ion I. C. Brătianu's arrogant display of intransigence in Paris was a crafty form of negotiation, which provided a basis and a space for maneuvers to the new Romanian negotiator, Alexandru Vaida Voevod. Moreover, at the Genoa Conference of 1922, Brătianu realized that extreme intransigence was of no use either to the state or the one who promoted it. From the conference summoned for finding solutions to pay the war reparations owed by the defeated powers, on 20 April 1922, Brătianu wrote to his brother Vintilă, who, as the minister of finance, had asked for intransigence on the amount Austria owed as damages: "excessive intransigence leads to nothing"; He also stated that he had agreed with the proposed moratorium on the payment of reparations by the defeated states, urging him to seek other financial solutions, since there was little hope that Romania would obtain money from those compensations.[101]

An important place in the hierarchy of Brătianu's diplomatic action principles was occupied by the *principle of reciprocity*, whereby the Romanian state's acceptance of an obligation entailed the partner state assuming a

[98] C. Xeni, *Take Ionescu*. *1858-1922*, Bucharest, 1933, pp. 395-396.
[99] Gh. I. Brătianu, *File rupte din cartea războiului*, Editura Cultura Naţională, Bucharest, 1934, p. 19.
[100] Ion Rusu Abrudeanu, *op. cit.*, p. 127.
[101] Biblioteca Academiei Romane, MSS, The *Ion I. C. Brătianu Fund*, S1(120)/CCCLXV.

mutual obligation. In his view, any alliance that would require only one party to sacrifice its interests and succumb to the pressure of the other was doomed to failure, "because only a leveling of the debts, benefits and sacrifices may seal a treaty."[102] For him, only the mutual exchange of services represented the true ground for the robustness of bilateral or multilateral state relations.

Another important principle espoused by Brătianu in the domain of Romanian foreign policy referred to the fact that in the disputes occurring between the great powers, *the attitude of a small or middle-sized state could be none other than that of expectation*.[103] Ion I. C. Brătianu showed that Romania could have no other conduct than that dictated by the interests of peace, respect for treaties, non-interference in the disputes between the major powers and in the internal affairs of other states.[104]

To these was added the *principle of not accepting the other states' interference in Romania's internal affairs*, much needed for a harmonious philosophy of policies conducted in the name of national self-interest. He strongly clamored against the thesis whereby external pressures or international solutions might be justified in some circumstances in order to solve matters pertaining to a state's internal politics. He was convinced that "the political or social matters are addressed by each state in a special manner and only the solutions given by the national authorities in full awareness of the situation" can settle them favorably.[105] Last but not least, the hierarchy of Brătianu's principles in matters of foreign policy included honoring Romania's promises and commitments in international relations. "Keeping one's word is fundamental to the life of peoples as well as individuals," he told the newspaper *Le Petit Parisien*, on 28 May 1917, after returning to Iaşi from a visit to Russia. About Romania, Brătianu always stated, hauntingly, that "it will remain faithful to the letter of the Treaty that binds us and comply with its commitments."[106]

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[102] *Viitorul*, 14 July 1921.

[103] This principle is very well reflected in the official statement released by the first Crown Council on 4 August 1914, Ion I. C. Brătianu's creation, in the formula: "Let's wait for the events to unfold. In all likelihood, the war will probably be long. We will have another occasion to speak our minds" (Ion I. C. Brătianu, *op. cit.*, vol. IV, pp. 306-307).

[104] *Viitorul*, 5 February 1924.

[105] Ion I. C. Brătianu, *op. cit.*, vol. IV, p. 160.

[106] *Ibidem*, vol. IV, pp. 443-444.

Brătianu justified the importance attached to these principles in the statement he delivered in the Chamber on 17 December 1919, when he showed that for the Romanian state, "leaving the ground of principles would mean accepting defeat, because only principles may give us, in international life, the necessary compensation before the large powers."[107]

In conclusion, as it could be noticed from the references we have made, Brătianu's *Realpolitik* was not just a state policy (of Romania), but also a party policy (of the National Liberal Party) and a statesman's policy. All these were the expressions, attitudes and political behaviors of several generations in the most important political family of modern and contemporary Romania - the Brătianu family - around which the Romanian elite organized itself as a political party and as a group of economic and financial interests (the oligarchy). This organization and this specific model of policy making - *Realpolitik* - had a definite purpose that satisfied, at the same time, two fundamental interests, both beneficial to Romania. First, it satisfied the private and lucrative interest of the national bourgeoisie, which was on the rise and wanted power in the Romanian society. Second, it satisfied the interests of an important country and nation in Europe, whose national territory had been divided and dominated by three empires. The modern Romanian state was created in 1859 and as we have shown, through one of its founders and promoters of Romanian liberalism, Ion C. Brătianu, it embraced the political realism of Bismarckian inspiration. It is an undeniable historical fact that all the new nation-states of Europe assimilated political realism as a state doctrine because they wanted to have their interests acknowledged as such or to impose them, depending on their geographical location and internal power. This is what Ion I. C. Brătianu, as the man responsible for the national interests, also did, being influenced by the model of the German and English political realism, as well as by American pragmatism.

The promotion of a realistic policy by Ion I. C. Brătianu, on behalf of Romania, was done under difficult circumstances and in dangerous and complicated contexts, requiring a special political and historical sense, much attention and diplomacy, together with the cold calculation and political determination of the Romanian statesman. In fact, Ion I. C. Brătianu was a master of contextualism, as attested by his negotiations in

[107] "D.A.D.", no. 15, 01.01.1920, p. 174.

the national interest with the Entente powers during the period of neutrality. Just like in the human and animal world, the Romanian *Realpolitik* clashed with the realistic policies of the other nation-states or great powers on the international political stage. The results of these confrontations are well known and they can represent - if we refuse to accept the promptings of Ion I. C. Brătianu - the wise and useful advice that history has conveyed to us: that only developed nations with a solid internal organization can successfully accomplish their interests.

The realism of Brătianu's foreign policy and, implicitly, his - perhaps controversial - ethics, along with the principles on which he based his political and diplomatic actions had, nevertheless, remarkable results in terms of satisfying the Romanian interests at the end of World War I. Positioned in the camp of the winners, Romania's surface increased by 128.6% (which meant more than the doubling of its territory). We should mention that the territory of Greece increased by 11.9%, while Serbia, replaced by the new state of Yugoslavia, was by 183.6% larger than Serbia had been in 1914.[108] Our scientific research has hopefully revealed that in promoting a realistic foreign policy and, especially, in meeting the goals and ambitions of a small and weak country on the periphery of Europe - especially the ideal of Romanian unity - the ethics and principles of the Romanian statesman adapted to and served the national goals and interests, as well as his own political interests. At the same time, it is also interesting that despite being a Liberal and a contemporary of Woodrow Wilson's, whose ideas - especially the principle of the peoples' self-determination - assisted him in meeting the national ideal and fulfilling his political goals, Ion I. C. Brătianu was only to a little extent the supporter and promoter of idealism and liberalism in international relations. The Romanian statesman's speeches on democratization and ethics in international relations, peace, cooperation and European progress can be considered to have been liberal and idealistic only after the national ideal was achieved, and especially after Brătianu's *Realpolitik* was crushed, at the Paris Peace Conference, by the political realism of the great powers of the Entente in 1919.

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[108] Peter F. Sugar, *Naţionalismul este-european în secolul al XX-lea*, Bucureşti: Editura Curtea Veche, 2002, p. 20.

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THE EUROPEAN NATION?

Attila Demeter*

Abstract

The paper deals with the issue of European political community and identity: examines the conditions and terms of such an identity and the possibility of creating it. Not in a general manner, but somehow in the form of a more concrete question: can we imagine a European nation, can we hope that a certain – national – type of European political community came into existence? Such a question assumes from start that EU intends to become a nation-state, although such an aspiration is not that clear at all. Nevertheless, there are signs (such as the common European flag, the anthem, and generally other symbols meant to consolidate European identity) which point to the existence of some intention – albeit not always conscious and coherent in practice – to shape the European demos as a national type of community. Another argument for the approach I opted for is the fact that national political identity – regardless of how harmful European nationalism proved to be and of the damages it caused during the last two centuries – turned out a very stable and popular form of community identity, to such extent that today one can hardly find an example of non-national political communities in Europe. The method I selected is a historic analogy whereby I endeavor to see to what extent our historic knowledge acquired about the shaping of the nations and the evolution of the national ideology entitles us to speak of the possibility of shaping a pan-European national community. Briefly, my position is that one has to analyze the process of creating a national political community in certain European states (on a large scale), focusing especially on the beginnings of the process, France and the French Revolution, and one also has to see whether some analogy could be drawn between the evolution or shaping of the national identity and the European identity. In the last segment of my paper I deal with the issue and the possibility of a European political identity, this time in a general manner, taking as a ground the conditions and circumstances under which such an identity could come into existence. The starting point of the whole inquiry

* Attila M. Demeter is assistant professor and the head of Hungarian Department of Philosophy, within Babeş-Bolyai University. He is founder of the philosophical review Kellék, founder and president of Pro Philosophia Foundation from Cluj-Napoca, member in Presidium of Hungarian Society of Philosophy from Transylvania.
Contact: demeter_attila@yahoo.com

is the conviction that any new form of government, any new representative political system (including that of the EU) presupposes "the people" which could serve as basis and could provide legitimacy for that government.
Keywords: European identity, transnational identity, national identity, political community, common political space, communication

For many people, the necessity of establishing the European Union was explained by the increasingly evident inadequacy of nation-states to tackle the challenges posed by globalization, where globalization means the ever more complicate and dense system of interstate relations, here and now. The nation-state, which not so long ago used to be the primary (or even sole) form of political organization of humanity, seems to be more and more inadequate for embarking upon tasks such as regulation of nuclear proliferation, decreasing the deepening global economic and financial instability, subduing the powers of multinational companies and capital, halting massive migration, pacifying the conflict zones, and avoiding the global environmental disaster. Popular views suggest that these issues could only be regulated by regional powers – if at all – as the EU had been envisaged to become by its founders.

Thus, among the many other aspects, the EU could be perceived as a modern alternative of a system of nation-states, an endeavor to overcome the inadequacy of nation-states through a new political form of organization, a new political "body". Indeed, sovereignty transfer in Europe has become more and more visible after World War II, having as direct "beneficiaries" the political institutions of the EU: the Commission, the Council and the Parliament, and as "losers" the nation-states. Albeit the EU initially had not been envisaged to be more than a steel and carbon industry community encompassing a few states only, that is, an economic community with the primary goal of preventing – through economic interdependence – the revival of nationalism that covered the entire Europe in blood twice in the 20th century, by today, the institutionalization of the EU has by far exceeded the initial economic objective.

Otherwise, the functionalistic conception of political integration that practically accompanied the EU institutionalization from start, has proven to be true in terms of its basic assumption: the need for creating – and logically,

controlling – a common economic market indeed lead to the birth of the common European governance institutions. In this regard, the birth of institutions followed the scenario first elaborated in theory: by the acquisition of real and independent power by these institutions, a new center and a new form of power and governance was created in Europe. However, the nature of this new form has become quite intangible, and moreover, the legitimacy of the governing institutions created in the meanwhile has proven to be extremely disputable. The Europe-wide form of governance has not turned out to be as transparent, accountable and accessible – not even visible for the European citizens – as its predecessors, the governing bodies of European nation-states were. Moreover, the more power these institutions acquire, the more evident their democratic deficit becomes.

Similarly, the nature or character of the EU as a political form of organization hasn't turned out unequivocal either. The EU is not merely an international organization as the UN or the NATO, but it isn't a nation-state either. Albeit the motives of power and sovereignty transfer in Europe were mostly geopolitical, the EU has not become an alliance of nations either, as the EU norms are institutionalized through rules and practices all over Europe, deeply penetrating into social life: neither the Delian League, nor the Hanseatic League had such a claim on transforming social life. Perhaps the closest resemblance could be drawn with a federation; yet, the common control and influence instruments of a federal government are missing. The American political scientist Michael Mann is justified in his irony when he says that by creating the EU, the political legacy of the Greek language is finally superseded, and probably the best term for describing the institutional character of the EU is just "euro".[1]

Regardless of what the correct description and classification of the European Union as a state organization is, indisputably, it is a justified question to ask, as in case of every form of political organization and government: whom does it represent? Are there any, and if there are, who are the people who comprise the European nation, the European *demos?* – If today the issue of the European constitution is the primary subject of disputes in Europe, we must take into account that a constitution does not only set out the methods and limits of exercising power (in the future), but also approaches

[1] See Michael Mann, "Has Globalization Ended the Rise of the Nation-State?" in *Review of International Political Economy* no. 3, vol. 4, 1997, p. 487.

the person of the legislator. Creating a constitution must be seen as an act whereby the legislator, that is, the "nation" shapes itself and also submits itself to the power it created. Therefore, creating a constitution does not only assume the existence of a legitimate and limited power, but also that of a "political body", that is, the existence of the people themselves. A political community is created by the "people" submitting themselves to the political power they themselves created.

Thus, the question arises involuntarily: is there a European *demos* which could serve as basis for European governance and constitution? – which is practically the same as asking: is there a pan-European political identity or at least some feeling of togetherness – more vague and intangible – in the European people. Can we justly say today that "we, the people of Europe"?

I believe that the answer to this question – at least for now – is negative. In this regard, it is worth taking a look at the Eurobarometer data: to what extent the inhabitants or citizens of European nation-states stated they were Europeans or rather Europeans than members of a certain nation (around 12%, of which only 4% declared they were Europeans), and what did that actually mean for them?[2] It seems that albeit the political elites of some nation-states tend to see – and accordingly, treat – the EU as an independent and specific political institutional system based on its own law, the citizens of the same nation-states have a completely different view

[2] See also the books penned by Michael Bruter, Neil Fligstein and Heikki Mikkeli (Michael Bruter, *Citizens of Europe? The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005; Neil Fligstein, *Euroclash. The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, especially chapter "Who are the Europeans?", pp. 123-164; Heikki Mikkeli, *Europe as an Idea and an Identity*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998 – the first ones are more useful), and two collections. One of them is edited by Jefrey Checkel (Jefrey T. Checkel; Peter J. Katzenstein (eds.), *European Identity*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.), the other one by Joe Andrew, Malcolm Crook and Michael Waller (Joe Andrew; Malcolm Crook; Michael Waller (eds.), *Why Europe? Problems of Culture and Identity*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000). For the European demos, see the studies by Michael Th. Greven and Claus Offe (Michael Th. Graven, "Can the European Union Finally Become a Democracy", in Michael Th. Graven; Louis W. Pauly (eds.), *Democracy beyond the State*, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2000, pp. 35-62; Claus Offe, "The Democratic Welfare State in an Integrating Europe", in Michael Th. Graven; Louis W. Pauly (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 63-90), and Étienne Balibar's book (Étienne Balibar, *We, the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship*, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004).

on it. Aside from the small, almost insignificant group of Europe fans, even today most citizens identify themselves primarily with their own national community. They see the European governance as part of the international relations of their own national governments, which indeed concerns some of their national interests, but is not by itself a political institutional system based on its own law. The positive approach of most Europeans to the EU, reflected in the Eurobarometer data, is of little significance in this regard. Surveys polling the voters about their approach to the EU essentially differ from elections, when voters are asked to resolve their priorities and undertake issues in order to cast that one vote they have in a coherent way.

The visible difficulty of identification with the EU probably emerges from the "abstractness" of European political goals: as of today, citizens don't consider the problems of taxation and social benefits or normative issues such as abortion or immigration regulation to be within the EU's competence.

Similarly, albeit the official documents and treaties of the EU utilize the concept "European citizen" – moreover, there is even an EU passport –, none of these documents can be said to possess a real operational value. Indeed, ultimately one has to be a citizen of a nation-state in order to get a European passport, and the passport is issued by the competent authorities of the nation-states, just as before. That is, while the governance institutions and organizations of the Union acquired independent and autonomous powers, European citizenship remained merely a derivate of national regulation. The term European citizen creates the false impression that citizens living in the EU acquired a specific and new political status, which is far from reality – it is merely a symbolic status. The only real political substance that could be paired with this status is that European citizens, at least at the local levels of European elections, are entitled to elect or be elected under certain conditions. Yet, the parties operating in certain countries, that usually dominate the process of nomination, rarely nominate foreign national candidates. Thus, if we are to seek some closer form of European identity – able to serve as basis for political community –, the analysis of Eurobarometer data or the examination of the effective, operational value of Union treaties and documents lead to fairly skeptical conclusions.

As for the feeling of togetherness: Europeanism and the sense of belonging to Europe indeed have some historical and cultural roots, yet this sense of togetherness will hardly be sufficient for stimulating – for

instance – a stronger feeling of solidarity that would be necessary for operating the European welfare system (welfare state). (The failure of the French referendum on the draft constitution pointed out this very fact in 2005.) As a matter of fact, discussions on the issue of European cultural identity *per se* – and of the political implications of this cultural legacy – could only bear tangible results if we manage to surpass the usual generalities.

Theoretically, the "common" European cultural tradition has a double root: the Hellenist one and the Judaic-Christian one. Greek tradition produced the most important elements of our democratic political culture, but this "culture" has undergone quite many changes during the transmission process, and our political thinking and practice today is determined much more strongly by the quasi-institutionalized theoretical legacies of Hobbes and Locke or Montesquieu and Rousseau than by the world of Aristotelian ideas. Today, our democracies bear resemblance to the democracies of Greek city-states only in their names.

In principle, Christian tradition does not have such political implications. By referring to the Christian roots of Europe, we mostly think of the fact that Christian values penetrated European culture. At most, we habitually – and incorrectly – consider the democratic principle of equality to be originating in the Christian doctrine of equality of all human beings before God. Nevertheless, there are political philosophers – such as Pierre Manent[3], to name one –, who claim that the typical European form of political community and identity, the *nation*, could not have developed without Christianity, and that it is rooted in Christianity: Christianity spiritualized the political community, and through Reformation, it nationalized it. Thus, it might be worth analyzing the political significance of Christianity from this point of view, in another context.

Thus, we may summarize that the common European identity (today) is by no means an actually existing fact; it is, at best, a desideratum; and the basis for creating it could hardly be given in reminiscences or reminders of the common European cultural tradition. The typical European form of political community and identity has remained until this day the nation, and as they usually say: things that separate European nations are much more numerous than those that unite them. After these, the task for the EU –

[3] See Pierre Manent, "What is a Nation?", in Pierre Manent, *Democracy without Nations? The Fate of Self–Government in Europe*, Wilmington, Delaware: ISI Books, 2007, pp. 87-103.

should it want to validate itself as a specific and independent form of governance – is evidently to create such an identity (a political body), and indeed there are express aspirations within the Union in this regard, primarily relying on the instruments of education and communication.[4]

Yet, if we look beyond these – quite hesitant and often contingent-looking – aspirations of the Union, and also take into account the important theoretical debates that are still taking place in this field, we shall see that the leading political theoreticians themselves push for the creation of a common European political identity – naturally, except for those who do not believe it is possible. (The latter group includes the afore-mentioned Pierre Manent, whose views shall be analyzed later herein.) Beyond doubt, the leading voice is Habermas, who advocated the necessity of a common European constitution and a common European loyalty in several of his books and studies.[5]

After World War II – Habermas points out – the entire Europe witnessed the appearance of a strong demand for a pluralist and tolerant society similar to the United States of America – this hope continues to animate his vision of a "post-national" Europe, but also the gradually institutionalizing political project of the European Union itself. However, he suggests that the "transnational" political community which could act as a sort of a "body" for the post-national Europe could only be created if the cultural differences that divide the groups – even nations – from each other were confined to the social (or, in certain cases, the private) dimension, and if we recognized that particular identity did not bear a public or political significance. The common – political – identity must be built on the universal values of a civil constitution based on the principle of guaranteeing individual rights. The demand for the political validation of particular identity (the so-called *politics of recognition*) cannot compromise the universal basic values of the

[4] See Jonna Johanson, *Learning to Be(come) a Good European. A Critical Analysis of the Official European Discourse on European Identity and Higher Education*, Linköping: Linköping University, 2007.

[5] Jürgen Habermas, "Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe" in *Praxis International*, vol. 20, 1992, pp. 1-19; Jürgen Habermas, "Why Europe needs a Constitution?", in Ralph Rogowski; Charles Turner (eds.), *The Shape of the New Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 25-45; See also: Jürgen Habermas: "The European Nation-State and the Pressures of Globalization" in *New Left Review*, 1999, pp. 46-59.

constitution. Therefore, the hallmarks of Habermas's theory are transnational political community, civic nation, common constitutional values, citizen's loyalty, constitutional patriotism (and its instruments, social publicity and consultative democracy). [6]

As it is not my purpose (nor do I have sufficient space) for discussing Habermas's theory in more detail, I shall confine myself to making two short comments on the problems he raised. One of them is the fact that sovereignty transfer towards the EU undoubtedly erodes the powers of nation-states (albeit not their legitimacy), and as the nation-state is not only a beneficiary of a national type of identity, but also a promoter thereof, we can by all means speak of a gradual erosion of existing national identities, although only in a very limited way. Thus, it is indeed worth considering the possibility of a transnational (or even if not a transnational, but at least post-national) political identity. Nevertheless, the visible erosion of the sovereignty of nation-states does not automatically lead to a similar erosion of national communities and national identity. Such a conclusion would be legitimate – as the well-known researcher into nationalism, John Hutchinson, claims – only if we put the sign of equality between nation-state and nation, which is not really justified either from historical, or from methodological point of view.[7]

My second comment refers to the fact that Habermas – as he himself mentions – considers the American constitution to be exemplary, and envisages a key role of the future European constitution in the development of European constitutional patriotism. Ever since Tocqueville, we indeed have seen the

[6] Obviously, Habermas is not alone with this view. Other representatives of the alternative of transnational identity, albeit not necessarily on the grounds of constitutional patriotism, are Michael Zürn and Edgar Grande with their studies (Michael Zürn, "Democratic Governance beyond the Nation-State", in Michael Th. Graven; Louis W. Pauly (eds.), *op. cit.*, 91-114; Edgar Grande, "Post-National Democracy in Europe", in Michael Th. Graven; Louis W. Pauly (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 115-138), or Peter A. Kraus with his book (Peter A. Kraus, *A Union of Diversity. Language, Identity and Policy-Building in Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). The same position is adopted also by most authors published in the book edited by Richard Bellamy, Dario Castiglione and Jo Shaw, including the three editors (see: Richard Bellamy; Dario Castiglione; Jo Shaw (eds.), *Making European Citizens*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

[7] John Hutchinson, "Enduring Nations and the Illusions of European Integration", in Anna Triandafyllidou; Willfried Spohn (eds.), *Europeanisation, National Identities, and Migration*, London – New York: Routledge, 2003, pp. 36-51.

Americans as being characterized by a particular form of collective political loyalty which he identified as a reflected form of patriotism (that is, not merely one rooted in the hearts) and contrasted it with the French nationalism (which at that time was actually already typical of the entire Europe). Yet, as opposed to the fashionable theory of constitutional patriotism, Tocqueville did not attach a particular significance either to the so-called civil sphere (and social dialogue entertained within it) or to the constitution in the evolution of American patriotism or public spirit. He did mention civil organizations as bastions of culture and as products of civil initiative spirit, but he attributed much more importance to the decentralization of public administration in the evolution of public spirit. Administrative centralization, he suggested, robbed the people who accepted it of their power, because the state's omnipotence weakens public spirit in the citizens; however, decentralization, as it makes people interested in exercising power at the local level, arouses genuine concern and care for the future of the state (and not of the nation!). – I believe, it is a much more tangible proposal to base the possibility of patriotism and love of country on the decentralized forms of power than on a social deliberation and communicative action which is not given as a fact or perhaps not even as a possibility, and which, even so, could only have very slim chances besides the strongly centralized and bureaucratized forms of power.

Nevertheless, Habermas's theory is much more complex than to treat it so unjustly shortly. Yet, it is not the purpose of this study to explore his work, or to even consider the possibility of a transnational European political identity more seriously. Instead, I would like to ask ourselves: can the community of European citizens be envisaged as a national type of community? Or to put it plainly: can something like the European nation ever be created, at least in theory?

Such a question assumes from start that EU intends to become a nation-state, although such an aspiration is not that clear at all. Nevertheless, there are signs (such as the common European flag, the anthem, and generally other symbols meant to consolidate European identity) which point to the existence of some intention – albeit not always conscious and coherent in practice – to shape the European demos as a national type of community. Another argument for the approach I opted for is the fact that national political identity – regardless of how harmful European nationalism

proved to be and of the damages it caused during the last two centuries – turned out to be a very stable and popular form of common identity, to such extent that today one can hardly find an example of non-national political communities in Europe. And many consider this to be more than just a side-effect of historical coincidence. Rather, it shows – and some authors looking into political identity see it this way, too – that the nation has proven to be a form of political community which was the most capable of carrying the achievements of modernity, thus also the most adequate agent of modernity.[8]

There is no other better known and recognized authority in this manner of discussing the issue than Habermas. Albeit several available titles promise an examination of European identity from the perspective of national ideology, in most cases this correlation of European and national identity conceals merely a skeptical and pre-assumed conclusion. That is, those authors most often don't believe in the possibility of a European identity and intend to emphasize the durability and unchallengeable nature of existing national identities, against the common European identity. Thus, for instance, an older volume handling this subject-matter, edited by Brian Jenkins, warns about the increasing presence of nationalism in Europe.[9] At the same time, another one, edited by Mikaelaf Malmborg and Bo Stråth, reveals that the various national discourses associate extremely different ideas with Europe.[10] A similar mindset underlies Anthony Pagden's approach from the perspective of the history of ideas, deducing from the analysis of various historical forms of the Europe idea that the European concept propagated in the various historical periods only served for concealing the European hegemonist aspirations of various states and empires, and nothing changed in case of the EU either, where the Europe ideal is just a camouflage of the German-French desires of hegemony.[11] This issue is approached in a very concrete manner and on a similarly skeptical tone in John Hutchinson's

[8] See, for example: Miklós Bakk, *Politikai közösség és identitás (Political community and identity)*, Cluj-Napoca: Komp-Press Kiadó, 2008. (Especially sub-chapter "A nemzet mint a modernitás egyetlen formája (The nation as the only form of modernity)".)

[9] Brian Jenkins; Spyros A. Sofos (eds.), *Nations and Identity in Europe*, London – New York: Routledge, 1996.

[10] Mikaelaf Malmborg; Bo Stråth (eds.), *The Meaning of Europe. Variety and Contention within and among Nations*, Oxford – New York: Berg, 2002.

[11] Anthony Pagden, *The Idea of Europe. From Antiquity to European Union*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

afore-mentioned study, but also in an older text by Anthony D. Smith, another emblematic figure of studies on nationalism.[12]

The approach I am proposing, albeit its basis in examining the issue of European identity is also served by the national ideology, brings into play another methodology and objective: that is, my intention is not necessarily to emphasize the durability and unchallengeable nature of existing national identities against the common European identity, but to inquire into the possibility – even if confined to the level of an intellectual experiment – of whether a national identity could be extended to the community of European citizens? (I reckon we should not be averse to such theoretical approaches *ab ovo*: let us remember that the birth of American constitution was accompanied by debates on such theoretical issues as the possibility – if any – of a republic of many people covering a large geographical area.) Evidently, my approach should eventually reach some conclusion regarding the possibility of European identity (or at least its certain modalities), but this conclusion does not by all means have to be a skeptical one; or, if it so, the supporting arguments should not be based necessarily on the primate of existing national identities.

The method I selected is a historic analogy whereby I endeavor to see to what extent our historic knowledge acquired about the shaping of the nations and the evolution of the national ideology entitles us to speak of the possibility of shaping a pan-European national community. Briefly, my position is that one has to analyze the process of creating a national political community in certain European states (on a large scale), focusing especially on the beginnings of the process, France and the French Revolution, and one also has to see whether some analogy could be drawn between the evolution or shaping of the national identity and the European identity.

At a first, superficial approach, it will seem that the process of the evolution of national ideology, of the genesis of the nation *does* contain moments which could fuel our hopes, and at least apparently, could entitle us to envisage optimistically the evolution of a common, national type of European identity.

First of all, it is the fact that the nation is always an *idea*. That means, it is an "abstract concept" (as Benjamin Constant said once), and not a "real thing". Unlike family, relatives or tribes, the nation is not a tangible form of

[12] Anthony D. Smith, "National Identity and the Idea of European Unity" in *International Affairs*, no. 1, vol. 68, 1992, pp. 55–76.

community, and national identity – compared to other forms of identity – is a very abstract form of collective community identity to begin with. Therefore, its further extrapolation faces no theoretical hindrances. National identity was "created" – first in France, then elsewhere too, using the French example – by "separating" the individuals from their earlier particular forms of identity – manors, parishes, guilds, provinces –, then the individuals thus "freed" were reunited under the nation as the most comprehensive form of political community. Therefore, there is no theoretical hindrance to separating individuals again from their existing national forms of identity, and reuniting them in the supranational nation encompassing all the citizens of Europe.

However, as this form of identity is based not on direct blood relations and the ties of kindred, but has a predominant *conscious* nature, a nation-building process could only expect success if a clear conscience of this new, comprehensive identity is "implanted" in the minds of people: a nation only "exists" if members of a given group of humans *know* (or recognize) themselves to be part of the same nation. This also entails – and Ernest Renan saw this quite clearly in his notable-notorious essay on the nation – that a preliminary condition to the existence of a national identity is not a common language, as the nation is predominantly or primarily not a linguistic, but a "spiritual" community: "A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle".[13] (Renan's finding remains valid even if he simply *had to say this* in the debate on the French nation he held with German historians because of the separation of Alsace. He couldn't say that the French nation was a linguistic community, considering that most Alsatians were speakers of German.)

Equally, belonging to the same ethnicity is not a precondition of a common national identity, nor is the historic remembrance of a common ethnical origin; but much rather – as Renan suggested – the *forgetting* of a distinct origin is. If the French had faithfully preserved the remembrance of their distinct – Gallic or Frankish – origin, the French nation could have never emerged. Thus, the conscience of national identity arises not from a carefully preserved memory of a common origin, but on the contrary: from collective historical oblivion and amnesia – and that's the only way it could arise.

[13] Ernest Renan, "What Is A Nation?" [http://www.cooper.edu/humanities/core/hss3/e_renan.html], 13 February 2011.

Yet, the success of "nation-building" does not only depend on whether a clear conscience of the new identity can be created in individuals, but also on the ability to awaken in them a *feeling* of belonging to a nation. That is, the creation of a nation-like community is conditioned not only by national identity and its conscience, but also a strong emotional loyalty towards the nation. The fact that the nation is an "idea" or an abstract entity, does not mean that emotions towards the nation and the individual's emotional identification with the nation is not (or could not be) very "real".

For this very reason, the French Revolutionaries, faithfully following Rousseau's proposals on the national religion, attempted to *spiritualize* the national idea, through the mandatory religion of the Supreme Being introduced through Robespierre's decree. That is, they tried – and today we know that they succeeded – to transform the concept of nation into the object of religious or quasi-sacred reverence. Albeit the object of spiritual adoration in Robespierre's state religion was the concept of the Supreme Being, this concept of the Supreme Being – as he himself emphasized in several speeches – was actually expressing the character of the "French people".[14] Rousseau's proposal – which Robespierre quoted literally in the reasoning of the first festival of the Supreme Being, recorded in the decree – reveals even more evidently the final intentions of the state religion: "With liberty, wherever abundance reigns – Rousseau writes – well-being also reigns. Plant a stake crowned with flowers in the middle of a square; gather the people together there, and you will have a festival. Do better yet; let the spectators become an entertainment to themselves; make them actors themselves; do it so that each sees and loves himself in the others so that all will be better united."[15] Thus, at the festival of the nation's religion, each sees and loves

[14] Maximilien Robespierre, "A vallási és erkölcsi eszményekről, kapcsolatukról a köztársasági elvekkel, és a nemzeti ünnepekről" (On Religious and Moral Ideas and Republican Principles, and on National Festivals) (Hungarian translation by Géza Nagy), in: Maximilien Robespierre, *Elveim kifejtése (My Principles)*, Budapest: Gondolat Kiadó, 1988, pp. 443-470.

[15] Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Letter to D'Alembert and Writings for the Theater*, University Press of New England, 2004. About Robespierre's state religion and its relation to nationalism, see: Attila M. Demeter, "Rousseau és a polgári vallás dicsérete" (Rousseau and the Praise of the Civil Religion), in Attila M. Demeter, *Írástudók forradalma (Revolution of the Scholars)*, Miercurea Ciuc: Pro-Print Könyvkiadó, 2004, pp. 123-143; Attila M. Demeter, "A nemzet modern eszményének kialakulása a francia forradalom idején" (Evolution of the Modern Ideal of Nation during the French Revolution), in: Attila M. Demeter, *Republikanizmus, nacionalizmus, nemzeti kisebbségek (Republicanism, Nationalism, National Minorities)*, Cluj Napoca: Pro Philosophia, 2005, pp. 37-72.

himself in the others, so that all will be perfectly united. – Obviously, that doesn't mean that this is the only way to arouse emotional loyalty towards the concept of nation; but indeed it draws attention to the necessity of emotional loyalty towards the nation and towards the significance of symbols (anthems, flags), rites, etc. in shaping the nation-type identity. National identity is unconceivable without the common symbols which awaken this emotional loyalty, and fill the hearts with pride and sentiment.

Accordingly, we can draw the conclusion from the above that the nation is merely an "imagined community", a powerfully *conscious* form of common, collective identity, which does not assume either the historic remembrance of a common origin, or a common language. What it does require is the clear conscience and definite feeling of togetherness. From this perspective, it seems that the creation of a pan-European national identity is not facing any particular theoretical hindrances.

And still: thinking over the possibility of this, I do remain skeptical. And this is for several reasons.

First, because – and perhaps this is the most evident reason of all – the EU has so far obtained very little success in reviving the emotional loyalty of its citizens. This fact is so obvious that it is not worth demonstrating it in more detail.

Secondly, still at the level of emotional and spiritual reasons, also because the boundaries of the "imagined community" of the nation cannot be extended indefinitely, for the above reasons. The nation – Pierre Manent writes – which was actually made possible by the ideas of Christianity and Reformation, served as the first durable solution to the disconcerting dilemma that had preoccupied Europe since the Roman republic. The dilemma referred to what was an adequate framework of the political existence of European humanity: a small, clearly delimited city-state republic, or a monarchist empire, that is a huge, limitless *corpus politicum*. The historic answer to this question was the emergence of European nations, of these large but well delimited political entities which could only be created because Christianity had first spiritualized the political community, or at least persuaded the European humans to accept some sort of a spiritual community which ultimately had some political relevance attached. However, with Reformation, the Christian universe broke to pieces, and a new political form was born: the Christian nation. However, from the perspective of the

nation's birth, it was at least equally important that the Christian king – voluntarily or under constraint, maintaining or losing its function – later surrendered its role to an impersonal, secular or, as Hobbes put it, "abstract" state. Yet, if Europe was formed of political communities of Christians, the sovereign, neutral, abstract state also needed a Christian political community, the Christian nation.

Of the above aspects, what is essential for our purposes is that the nation meant a sort of a "midway" between the strongly limited and the unlimited forms of political existence. However, today we are at the about same position as in the Roman ages, because after the failure of the nationalist and imperialist ideals, we again must tackle the question of what actually European nation means to us. On the one hand, we are attracted by the familiarity of the smaller nation-state framework, even if our nations have already lost a considerable part of their political sovereignty; on the other hand, we experience the imperial urge and wonder whether we should continue to walk on the path that leads to an unlimited European empire based on the universalistic feeling of togetherness. Manent points out that "we are fast losing the middle dimension, with its inseparable physical and spiritual aspects, on which we predicated everything worthy of still being cherished in our several national histories as well as in our common European history."[16] Far from us to say that we, the illuminated Europeans, grew out of the national frameworks. Instead, we rather visibly lost our sense for the fragile balance between the small things and grand things.

Finally, I am skeptical also because – as our historical experiences shows – creating the nation was possible only because the individuals could be separated from the earlier particular forms of identity. In 1789, this process – as we have seen – did not only entice with the hope of liberation, but also contained gradual *individualization,* the liquidation of former social binds: therefore, until this day, nation has been a community of *individuals,* and nationalism and individualism are interdependent. This claim, albeit astounding, is not paradoxical, nor is it unsustainable.

Such a claim appears to be paradoxical today, because after the age of revolutionary nationalism, we have also known the strongly collectivist forms of nationalism that contrasts the aspirations of liberty and is hostile towards the individual, and it seems to us today that this collectivism is

[16] Pierre Manent, *op. cit.*, p. 102.

hostile towards individualism. Nevertheless, as Hannah Arendt demonstrated, as soon as – starting the French Revolution – the individual appeared on stage as a completely independent being with inherent rights and dignity, who does not require any larger order encompassing it, it instantly disappeared and was transformed into one of the people. And, because after the French Revolution, humanity has been pictured as a family of people, indeed it is valid statement until today that the true form of man is not the individual, but the nation.[17]

Thus, the individualism of nationalism and its powerful collectivism were born in the same time; not only that the two are not mutually exclusive, but they actually mutually assume each other. Of all these aspects, here and now the only one that bears importance for us is that the nation is a community of individuals, and this calling into existence of the nation required gradual individualization, the "liberation" of the individual from the social bonds inherited. However, today this would mean that the individuals must be liberated from the inherited bonds of their national existence, and reunited in the European nation as a new, even more comprehensive form of political identity. – And personally, I see very slim chances for this.

Not necessarily because I were in the bonds of my own limited – Hungarian – nationalism. And not even because, like others, I see the nation-state – and the frameworks of national existence, for that matter – as some sort of historical *necessity*, a necessary framework of modernity or something like that. On the contrary: I fully agree with Elie Kedourie,[18] who in his debates with his younger colleague, Ernest Gellner, kept emphasizing that he considered the nation to be nothing more than a simple historical accident. (Another argument for why the nation is not a necessary framework of modernity is the fact that modernity occurred also in political communities which were organized along non-national principles: perhaps the best example is the United States of America. The United States is not a nation-state, its citizens do not form a nation, or at least not in the European sense of nation: nationalism, as we know it over here in Europe, is practically unknown over there.)

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[17] Hannah Arendt, "A törzsi nacionalizmus" (Tribal Nationalism) (Hungarian translation by Magdolna Módos), in Hannah Arendt, *A totalitarizmus gyökerei (The Origins of Totalitarianism)*, Budapest: Európa Könyvkiadó, 1992, p. 278.

[18] Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1993.

Albeit Gellner and Kedourie both were "modernists", that is, they considered the nation to be a modern phenomenon, still one could hardly imagine two theories that propose so distinct concepts about the origins of the nation. Gellner, especially in the works written in his last years[19] was stronger and stronger in the view that the nation was a necessary element of modernity: processes taking place in modernity (such as industrialization) called the nation into existence, and for this very reason, modernity cannot even be conceived without the nation. However, Kedourie argued that albeit the nation was a modern phenomenon, it was nothing more than a historical accident. In its essence, it was nothing more than an "ideological" construction, and responsible for the creation and propagation of the idea of the nation, more precisely, of national *sovereignty*, were philosophers such as Kant, but even more so his follower, Fichte. The explanatory scheme that is typical of sociologists, and characterizes Gellner's books so pronouncedly, tends to present this process in the light of historical necessity, particularly because it seeks the origins of the nation and nation-state in impersonal effect mechanisms (modernization, industrialization, spreading of standardized high culture, etc.). Yet, through the eyes of a historian of ideas, it is obvious that the nation and the nation-state is nothing else but ideology embodied – again: a simple historical accident. (Of course, this doesn't mean that – as Manent's afore-quoted words show – that the appearance of the nation did not have certain given historical conditions to begin with, and that these could not be explained using the regular methods of historical explanation. Demand for social equality, which is perhaps the most essential element of the national ideal, was called into existence by absolutism, as stated already by Tocqueville. The same way, the ideal of a spiritual political community could of course originate somehow in Christian tradition.)

However, I repeat, I am convinced that the nation is nothing else but a historical accident which was brought into existence by certain given conditions and the ideology of national sovereignty. Yet, this certainly does not mean that today we could simply step out from the frameworks of national existence. No matter how an "abstract" idea the nation is and regardless of the fact that it is a historical product of an ideological construction, the idea – once embodied and taken an institutional form and dominating

[19] See Ernest Gellner, *Nationalism*, New York: New York University Press, 1997.

human thoughts – is very hard to cast off. (This is why Isaiah Berlin, the excellent scholar of the history of nationalist ideas, said that the activity of a bookworm scholar of ideas is by no means just a harmless, professor-like occupation: it is better – he suggests – to eradicate dangerous thoughts as early as in the scholar's study room, before they gain an ideological armor.)

Reiterating, I don't see any particular signs that the conscience-shaping effect of the national idea or the intensity of the national feeling diminished considerably. And I also don't see that the visible lessening of the nation-state's power and sovereignty could lead to the erosion of nation itself and the legitimating power of the national idea. On the contrary: together with the afore-mentioned Michael Mann, I too believe that the decline of the nation-state in the era of globalization does not point to the creation of bigger, multinational state constructions, but rather to the disruption of the existing ones: the ethno-politics, which intensifies in parallel with the decline of nation-states, results in nation-states newer, smaller, but seen more authentic.[20] (The most recent example of this is obviously Kosovo.)

Based on the above, it may seem as if I were contrasting the possibility of a European political identity solely with the somber reality of existing nationalism. However, we have another political experience at hand, which inclines me to have at least the same skeptical view. Albeit it is true that the nation is an abstract idea, an "imagined community", there are still a series of *political effect mechanisms* which do not only assume, but also consolidate the conscience of national belonging and national cohesion. Thus, it is worth evoking – and István Bibó never forgot to do so – that nationalism and "democratism" are so-called "blood-brothers", that is, the national ideal's gaining ground in France was accompanied by the introduction of the republican governance; and that the linguistic assimilation was urged also for basically republican considerations in France.[21] That is, if the French Revolutionaries considered – and some of them indeed did it – that the dialects spoken on France's territory at that time (Breton and Basque, but also Italian or German) simply had to be annihilated, then it was not because they were just irritated by linguistic diversity, as are our days' nationalists, but because they considered that the ideal of liberty (the republican ideal) claimed this sacrifice from linguistic minorities.

[20] Michael Mann, *op. cit.*, p. 155.

[21] It should be noted that less than half of France's citizens spoke only French during the time of the French Revolution.

The clearest reasoning of linguistic homogenization during the Revolution was phrased by Barère, who otherwise was convinced that French was "Europe's most beautiful language", called to "mediate the highest thoughts of liberty to the world". In his proposal made on the 8th of pluviôse year II (27 January 1794), he enounced before the National Convention that "it is impossible to destroy federalism which is based on not communicating thoughts".[22] "We revolutionized governance – he said –, the laws, the customs, the morals, the costume, trade and even thinking; let us revolutionize language which is the common means of the latter one. You ordered that the laws be sent to all the villages of the Republic; but this good deed is in vain for the counties which I referred to. The "light", which is delivered to the margins of the country at great cost, vanishes by the time it reaches the destination, as those places don't even understand the laws.[23] Federalism and superstition speak Breton; emigration and hatred of the Republic speak German; the counter-revolution speaks Italian, and fanaticism speaks Basque. Let us smash these harmful and faulty instruments."[24]

That is, linguistic assimilation is warranted by the propagation of the idea of liberty, i.e. constitutionality and the idea of the Republic. Uniformity is justified by universalism; assimilation is vindicated by the urge for freedom: "man", in its own interest, *can be compelled to liberty* – even by smashing his particular, national identity. Thus, the purpose of linguistic homogenization is not cultural, but political, and is related to the necessity of political consultation (and the optimization of central administration). Linguistic homogeneity is not necessary because diverse linguistic and cultural identities are irritating or disruptive *per se* and therefore should be smashed, but because political significance is attached to language and communication in the Republic.

The most effective means serving this goal – as Edmund Burke noticed already during the Revolution – were the Parisian newspapers distributed in the provinces, as promoters of the revolutionary ideals and

[22] In Revolutionary rhetoric, federalism designated separatism.

[23] Barère exaggerates: the justice minister created an office for translating laws and decrees to German, Italian, Catalan, Basque and low Breton as early as December 1792.

[24] József Eötvös, *A XIX. század uralkodó eszméinek befolyása az államra (Influence of the Dominant Ideas of the 19th Century on the State)*, Budapest: Magyar Helikon, 1981, Vol I, Chapter III, p. 126.

the revolutionary language, Parisian French. Yet, these means eventually turned out inadequate, the time available to the Revolutionaries way too brief for achieving the goal, and France's linguistic unity was created solely later, by the educational policy of the Third Republic, with extremely drastic methods. Nevertheless, even if the French Revolution did not eradicate France's linguistic diversity, it indeed terminated the French people's indifference towards the linguistic diversity of their country.[25]

Of course, not even today do all these mean that republican governance is unconceivable without national community, but rather that the French Revolution introduced a form of democratic systems in Europe which equally assumes and reproduces the nation-type political community. It assumes it because, according to Rousseau's logic, it conventionally legitimates itself as a nation-state, based on the principle of "national sovereignty", and is compelled to constantly reproduce because, being a strongly centralized and bureaucratized state structure, it is functional only as long as its citizens as a community speak the same official language which ensures the standard and undisturbed functioning of administration, justice and public education.

However, there are some contemporary authors who deduce a general conclusion from this historic experience – specifically related to the birth of European nation-states –, and take it as truth generally valid for the republican state structure that it cannot function in a multilingual social environment. Thus, Will Kymlicka, perhaps the most well-known contemporary representative of the theory of multiculturalism, argued in his attempt to dissipate the state's ethno-cultural neutrality shared by even some of today's liberals (such as Habermas) that linguistic identity has a particular political importance in republican political systems, considering that language is an instrument of democratic politics.[26]

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[25] A similarly oriented analysis of the genesis of national identity is found in the work of a less known figure of nationalist studies: Chimène Keitnernek, *The Paradoxes of Nationalism. The French Revolution and its Meaning for Contemporary Nation Building*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007.

[26] See e.g. Will Kymlicka, *Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citizenship*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001; Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995; Will Kymlicka; Christine Straehle, "Cosmopolitanism, Nation-States and Minority Nationalism: A Critical Review of Recent Literature" in *European Journal of Philosophy*, no. 1, vol. 7, 1999, pp. 65-88.

Whatever the liberals may think, he says, political institutions cannot be separated from culture or language as it once happened with religion and state alike. And, he adds, this is so because liberalists generally tend to assume an analogy between the situation of ethnic communities or national minorities and the situation of confessions.[27] And as the state's spiritual neutrality was ensured by the separation of state and church, the state's ethnic neutrality should be ensured by the consistent separation of state and ethnicity. As the state does not recognize and support any confession, the same way, it shouldn't recognize any ethnicity and language either. Yet, while the state-church separation was possible through the laicization of state, as secular politics does not necessary need religious legitimacy (Christianity itself supports the separation of faith issues from secular authority), the central element of national identity, language, is also a necessary instrument of democratic politics. The state does not have to support certain confessions (even if it does so in several European states, such as Germany, England, Romania, but also elsewhere); however, when it decides on the language to be used in public offices, education, then it involuntarily confirms the legal and public status of a given language. And if it supports majority culture by making its language the language of public offices and education, it cannot deny official recognition to minority languages by invoking the breach of the principle of state-ethnicity separation.

Of all these, what concerns us, here and now, is not necessarily Kymlicka's conclusion, but the initial premise of his argumentation: the thought that the central element of national identity, language, is also the major instrument of democratic politics. This is so because, he says, democratic politics is a *vernacular* politics. For the average citizen, it is convenient to have the political issues raised in his own language, and democratic decision-making is legitimized only if each citizen of the state participates (or is able to participate) in the public debates preceding the decisions. Thus, the nation-state's demand for a common national language can be construed as a requirement of robust *consultative* democracy.

If we think of Barère's afore-mentioned enouncement, we can say that this thought is not that new: it was evident already for the French Revolutionaries that the requirement of participation in the republican decision-making process assumed linguistic homogeneity. France's linguistic

[27]Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship*, ed. cit., p. 111.

diversity was not unpleasant as long as the "third estate" did not feel the need to participate in governance: it became a bothersome factor only with the introduction of the republican system. Yet, while recognizing the political importance of language led Kymlicka to infer the necessity of multicultural and multinational states which would institutionalize minority languages just as the majority language, Barère pushed for the assimilation of linguistic minorities on the grounds of uniformity, based on the same logic. The premise, the starting point indeed permits both.

And this is why we haven't been able to decide until now which position the most known representative of national liberalism, John Stuart Mill, represented in 1861, in the famous lines of his work on *Representative Government*: "Free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities. Among a people without fellow-feeling, especially if they read and speak different languages, the united public opinion, necessary to the working of representative government, cannot exist. […] For the preceding reasons, it is in general a necessary condition of free institutions that the boundaries of governments should coincide in the main with those of nationalities."[28] Evidently, this may also lead to the conclusion that an independent government must be set up to lead each nationality, but also that smaller nationalities are "civilizationally obliged" to merge into the bigger ones: a sacrifice to be made for the sake of liberty.

In a way or another, the premise remains valid regardless of the conclusions. Albeit Renan could have been right in claiming that the nation was not primarily a linguistic community, but a spiritual one, the daily functioning of a centralized nation-state and representative governance requires that citizens of the nation-state are shaped into a linguistic community. The nation could exist without a common language, but the nation-state could not. The linguistic homogenization policy of the nation-state obeys this very logic when forcing the official language on those who do not speak it.

However, if we interpret these words by Mill not as a call of a vehement nationalist to linguistic assimilation and civilizational rising (albeit it is difficult not to construe them this way, considering the Mill himself, a few lines below, speaks of a Highlander "sulking on his own rocks,

[28] John Stuart Mill, "Considerations on Representative Government", in A. D. Linsday (ed.), *Utilitarianism, Liberty, Representative Government*, London: J. M. Dent, 1954, pp. 361-362.

the half-savage relic of past times" who should, instead of "revolving in his own little mental orbit", become English), then these words convey the sincere concern of the representative government and followers of the republic. They indeed draw attention to the fact that each republic assumes a "mutual sympathy" between citizens to begin with, and national feeling is only one, yet undoubtedly very efficient form of it. Regardless of this, the remark remains valid: each representative government form – whether or not functioning within the frameworks of a nation-state – assumes something common, something that connects citizens with each other, something that creates political cohesion between them, and for which the best term is perhaps "common political space".

Now the question arises: to what extent can we speak of such a common political space within the EU, of "mutual sympathy" between the citizens? To what extent is the EU government system *representative*? – And this question concerns not only the possibility of a European *national* identity in the narrow sense, but *generally* the possibility of European *political* community and representative governance.

If we attempt to see the EU political system not only as a government with pertaining institutions, but as a common – European – political space, "a political body", then we must notice at once that the "political body" of this system or government comprises not only the citizens, but also the members of political and administrative elite. The latter one can be divided into two groups. One consists of the representatives of national governments who sit in various Councils, while the other one includes the "Eurocrats", that is, the politicians and bureaucrats who serve the own institutions of the EU (including the Commission and the European Court mostly, and to lesser extent, the members of the so-called European Parliament).

Members of the first group find themselves in a somewhat paradoxical situation. Albeit they are active in EU institutions too and as such, they could often be in a situation where they should overlook their narrower national interests for the sake of deepening integration, their own co-nationals (and if they are interested at all, the citizens of the other nation-states) still see them as national representatives. The other group, especially members of the Commission, who exercise executive power in effect, are in the opposite position: they are barely known to citizens of nation-states. The work of the European Court, hardly known to others besides the narrow

group of legal and academic experts, and the activity of the European Parliament are practically unknown and unseen for the large masses of citizens.

Citizens of the individual nation-states are not primarily citizens of the Union either – they are that only insofar as they are citizens of the individual nation-states. They are merely subjects of European regulation and norms, without having the slightest possibility to participate effectively in the creation of European laws and norms. Thus, if the EU is a political body, it does not actually have a "body" – it does not have actual citizens.

We see the same situation if we inquire into other dimensions of political bodies and political communities, such as a common political space based on *communication*. The EU communication system, especially its communication regarding various "policies" is evidently very complex – but it is at the same time structured in a very fragmented way. In the truest sense of the word, European communication takes place solely between the members of the political and administrative elite, those who participate directly in European governance or are at least close to it. Another, fairly different, example of European-level communication could be communication within European researches – to which some seem to attach importance in shaping the so-called European "spirituality" or even the European "creed" – and the communicational relations of the different political, cultural and economic dimensions. Indeed, many see this system of communication networks gradually built across Europe – to which an increasing number of national organizations, companies and recently, for the purpose of a better coordination of their activities, social movements and civil organizations connect – as being a gradually developing "civil society" of the EU.

However, I believe this conclusion to be unfounded and hasty. Indeed, as opposed to the common civil societies, very few citizens participate effectively in this one. As there is no common political space above the nations, social movements and groups of voluntaries can rarely exercise their potential to mobilize and act (such as demonstrations, civil disobedience movements, etc.), and they rely on some "internal" professional help from Brussels in order to make an efficient appearance. Thus, albeit trade unions have been trying for long to coordinate negotiations, talks and strikes, they still haven't reached some coordination and integration of their efforts at the European level, and they are quite far from reaching it. Generally, their

strikes could be seen successful if the national media "amplifies" their sound, and if citizens properly resonate with these sounds in their own countries. In other aspects, the most they could count on is some sort of local answer or one from Brussels or Strasbourg.

Of course, based on the above examples of actions, interactions and communication, we could claim even that some common political space has been created in the EU after all. And similarly to every political space, this one is limited and often exclusive. But even if there is such a thing in the EU, this political space (and communication within) is semi-public at best, as opposed to communication taking place in the political space of democratic states.

If we take as example the government itself, it is striking that the main governing body of the EU, the European Council, does not meet, debate and decide publicly as a rule. (The same applies to other Councils consisting of the appropriate ministers of nation-states, operating in the various fields of the political sphere.) Of course, this is a natural consequence of the fact that these are actually intergovernmental bodies. It is therefore a legitimate expectation to see their activities as are seen international talks usually. Yet, as opposed to international talks, the results of the Council's activity are often determinant for European legislation. And while the Councils, as being formed by members of national governments, indeed may have authorization for the governmental activity and therefore exercise it legitimately, they have no authorization whatsoever to act as legislative bodies. As European governing bodies they do have some legitimacy, but none whatsoever as legislative bodies.

Similarly, the system of communication and networking across Europe is only semi-public. In practice, most information is available solely to experts and specialists. Even if the communication channel is fully public, interpretation and processing of information requires expert knowledge and relations: a possibility to access networks and regular contact with European agencies and the local ministry in charge of EU relations. Not to mention that the communication system is structured in a very fragmented way, certain channels only cover partial areas of the political sphere, and for now, there is no sign of an integrated communication network that covers all the partial fields which could organize Europe-wide public speech along some defined political agenda.

Thus, it would be more correct to speak of a fragmented information network manageable only by few, targeting the various fields of the political sphere, that operates on European levels and nation-state levels at the same time, than of a common, European, public, comprehensive political space and communication. Beyond all this, a European political space which could integrate and control all these and that could organize the information networks related to the various fields of politics around a standard political agenda, simply doesn't exist. Europeans who are not members of the elite and have limited access to the semi-public European communication networks, only see European politics and EU through the eyes of the national media. Because something like European media, again, does not exist.

However, one of the main reasons why we cannot speak of a fully public European political space is that social communication is even today of *linguistic* nature primarily. A political community and body is able to maintain a public political space if the "political body" it consists of meets certain linguistic criteria; and a minimum requirement to this is for the language of communication to be comprehensible for everyone. Thus, the question from this perspective is how the EU could tackle the linguistic diversity of its citizens.

Albeit the EU has an official language policy,[29] here too, as in so many other aspects, it is worth taking a look at the actual political practice rather than the enounced principles. The European political elite seemingly bridges this troublesome diversity of European language by either relying on translators (especially in case of documents), or by using some *lingua franca,* an intermediary language; most often, it mixes these two solutions. Indeed, pursuant to the official language policy of the EU, the language of each member state is also an official language of the EU. Therefore, in practice the elite members usually resort to English as an intermediary language, but they translate every document into all of the official languages. The latter one normally takes months, and documents are translated into the smaller languages most often by the time the experts have long lost their interest for the concerned issue. (Public opinion itself rarely follows up European events.)

[29] See: Monica Shelley; Margaret Winck (eds.), *What is Europe? Aspects of European Cultural Diversity*, London – New York: Routledge, 1995.

Albeit using English as an intermediary language largely facilitates communication between the members of the European elite, the same thing does not apply in case of citizens: the constant translation of information and the related difficulties of passing on information pose serious challenges on the path of a full-value democratic participation. Thus, it is indeed questionable whether a representative government – one that effectively makes civil participation possible – could function efficiently in a multilingual social environment.

Those who see this concern to be unfounded usually contrast it with the counter-example of multicultural and multilingual societies such as Belgium, Canada and especially Switzerland – considering that the latter one has four official languages. However, in the case of Switzerland, political communication between the citizens is based on what we could call "passive multilingualism". (Even if this multilingualism only covers three large official languages and most often does not include Rhaeto-Romanic, albeit it possesses an official status as well.) The Swiss educational system indeed guarantees at least the comprehension of the other two languages, besides the native language. Theoretically, the Canadian education system functions according to similar requirements, but it is questionable whether the official position of the Canadian government in this matter could stand the test of practice.

Yet, no matter how successful the political practices and educational models targeting multilingualism are, they cannot serve an example for creating the European political space. For most European citizens, even if benefiting from full support from the domestic educational system, no more than one or two foreign languages could become accessible – including English, of course. Obviously, a solution in this situation could only be provided by recognizing English as an official intermediary language, yet such a decision seems hopelessly utopist against the backdrop of cultural and political realities currently dominating the Union, considering also the intention of further expansion.

Assuming of course that this solution would not prove to be insufficient in itself. Indeed, there is something irresistible in our liberal and progressionist illusions about the power of "communication", an attractive charm which most often prevents us from assessing its power realistically. We so keenly put a sign of equality between communication and political

community, and we keep on quoting Aristotle who, based on the Greek political experiences – called man a "speaking" and a "political" being at the same time. Thus, if one of the oldest and most convincing definitions of man presented man to be someone with a *logos,* capable of articulate speech and therefore of political association, then it is legitimate to expect that the increasing number of various communication channels and the global spreading of communicational desires would bind people closer together and extend the sphere of the known forms of human associations.

Nevertheless, this thesis bears some covert ambiguity. Albeit the relation between human speech and human association is very close, it is not symmetrical: the two terms are not synonymous. It was not speech that created community, but the community created and maintains speech. – I believe that we often attach excessive importance to means of communication, especially to the role of intermediary language in creating the common space. If let's say tomorrow we all spoke English, this would not bring us a single step closer to political unity, in my opinion. Israeli and Palestinian delegations usually speak a very acceptable level of English, not to mention Indian or Pakistani diplomats; and still, the common language visibly fails to help them communicate any better. Mutual understanding indeed assumes that the interlocutors are parts of the same political community, or at least they belong to political communities whose political systems and political experiences resemble. And we, the Europeans, already know that even this prerequisite is so far from being sufficient: how many nations have fought each other in Europe, even if their political systems and experiences were similar?

Thus, the common language is only one condition of creating the common political space. It is of at least the same importance – and perhaps, Switzerland serves the most relevant example – to have a common political culture; the common cultural and political field of meanings in which everybody attaches the same meaning to the same phenomenon, and shares the accepted political practices and symbols, and which is based on common institutions and traditions (common history). – Albeit the European nation-states themselves share to some – a very broad – extent a common cultural and historical tradition, they still hosted so very different "cultures", and what matters most: their political culture largely differs. This cultural diversity resulted in largely differing institutional and justice systems, lead to striking

differences in constitutionality, and concepts of democracy in the first place. Thus, if we take a look around Europe, we see very dissimilar taxation systems, insurance systems, health care services, educational systems and pension systems.

Undoubtedly, the Union, if it wants to create the so very needed common political space, must accept and assert a form of multicultural politics which will be capable of integrating this visible diversity of political cultures, and ensure the common institutional background, as well as the "mutual sympathy" which are indispensable for creating and maintaining the common political space. However, all this time, the EU faces such a troublesome diversity of local and national political cultures and languages that none of the federal systems ever had to tackle.

Albeit our historical experiences show that the *federal* systems were indeed capable of bearing with the wide difference of their internal institutional and justice systems (and thus, the ideal of federation, of United States of Europe could bring some hope for the supporters of Europe), it is possible solely if they also have "something" in common, something that keeps them together as political bodies and creates in them the common political space. Thus, if "we, the Europeans" indeed want a republic, even if a federal one (and, I think, no other order than the political order of the republic is possible or desirable if we want liberty for ourselves and for others), then we must focus on an order which makes actual political cohesion possible, and creates a *real* political community, namely by "connecting our feelings for ourselves and for others effectively".[30] And, Pierre Manent claims, this is possible only where "people in the given political order have something in common, namely the political order, the political body, the republic which is a *public thing*": *res publica*. Thus, it is possible solely where citizens truly see and feel that the political order of the republic is theirs.

I am not saying this is unconceivable in Europe today. But I am indeed certain that if there will be one, the order of the European federal republic, as any other republican order, will be *limited* for emotional and spiritual reasons to being with. We would be able to see and feel that this order is ours only if we clearly see its limits. In other words: we must finally decide who "we, the Europeans" are. We cannot just submit a preferential

[30] Pierre Manent, *Politikai filozófia felnőtteknek (Cours familier de philosophie politique)* (Hungarian translation by Péter Kende), Budapest: Osiris Kiadó, 2003, pp. 330-331.

number of communities with different political cultures under the same government. Besides all other reasons, also because commitment to the common order (formerly known as *patriotism*), this human feeling which Rousseau considered to be "the source of supreme virtues", could only gain durable strength if it is focused on a *particular* human community. If we try to extend this feeling to communities of increasingly large numbers, theoretically we could hope for a much more just order, as nobody would be excluded from the order of the republic and liberty, however, this feeling will also gradually lose its intensity: eventually, it will be so weak that it would be unable to create a fairly just and happy association of humans.

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Patricia Owens, *Between War and Politics: International Relations and the thoughts of Hannah Arendt*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007, 234 p.

Ágnes Berecz *

The contribution of Hannah Arendt to the political and philosophical understanding of human affairs, as well as, the peculiar interrelation of violence, war, power and politics within the in-between realm of speech and action is an undiscovered potentiality in the international field. The author is drawing on conceptual aspects, historical scrutiny, legal origins, (un)masking hypocrisy, critical assessment of major international theories/ practices and on the making of a (global) public. Patricia Owens's *Between War and Politics: International Relations and the thoughts of Hannah Arendt* is seeking to bring together a diverse literature with a confrontational character for a critically filtered final understanding of not Hannah Arendt, but the buts and whys of international relations through the lens of Arendt's contributions.

The book brings about the rethinking of core concepts, whose elucidation may be the key for an encompassing understanding of the world and of the historical interactions in time and space. The conceptual clarification draws on such notions as power, violence, world, imperialism, evil and humanity and introduces such new concepts within the international as plurality, action, agonism, natality, political immortality and making. However, Owens goes even further by challenging and revisiting monopole theories of IR such as realism, liberalism, marxism, constructivism, normative theory and critical theory. Just as Hannah Arendt couldn't be claimed by any "ism", in the same way Owens is applying the strategy of not belonging, but encompassing: the book tries to embrace, select and argue for or against theories and theorists that had major contributions to the field, but avoiding alliance with any of the leading approaches.

* Ágnes Berecz is BA student at the Faculty of European Studies (3nd year), Babeș-Bolyai University, specialization in International relations and European Studies.
Contact: agnes.berecz@yahoo.com

The precise definition and delimitation of power as human common capacity, violence as instrumental, politics as freedom to act in concert and war as the force of compulsion, Owens not only manages to put the Danish public manifest (1943) and the Hungarian uprising (1956) in a new light, but she also presents some irrefutable challenges to the international theories. Not to mention the effort throughout the book for outlining the changing character of war through the lens of Arendt. However, the book identifies a sort of necessity of war in relation to triggering people to create culture and to be part of the human plurality. War has a social dimension, namely, in a macabre way it is considered to be essential for the development of a functional society.

To the question of "who" is revealed in the war, the book suggests that no who is fighting the wars. This *who* can be revealed, the book argues, under the form of commemoration and political community formation. But, otherwise, the unique character of the warriors of the new wars is blurred and unrevealed. When referring to suicide terrorism as to a new type of war, the author holds that it must be condemned because it destroys human plurality, and plurality is a matter of political, and not of ethical judgments. What is positively striking is that finally men and women are not left numb in the face of injustice. The violent resistance reveals the who and establishes a new public space between them, which would not be possible without the constitutive action itself.

A peculiar link between the imperialist tradition and totalitarianism is reflected throughout the book. The transcendence from the imperialist principle of "everything is permitted" (p. 68), to the more radical principle of "everything is possible" (Idem.) can be traced within the analysis. Thinking further the argument, the reader identifies a certain analogous between the Nazi death camps and the U.S. camps at Guantanamo Bay, whose captured beings, could be coined at best as 'detainees' with no legal or classifiable basis. What is even more striking in the argument is that at a certain point of this transcendence even death itself loses its legal and classifiable character. Drawing on Arendt, Owens emphasizes that the concept of murder becomes meaningless when people are "confronted with mass production of corpses". The implication of this idea is what terrified and terrifies both Arendt and Owens: the transformation of "human personality into a mere thing" (p. 69). Therefore the novelty of the argument is its attempt to prove that the Cold War is the continuation of the imperial era. The concept of expansion is replaced with the notion of sphere of influence.

A further revisiting relates to the close ties between imperial foreign policy and the foundations of law. The specificity of the argument consists in the question whether we can consider law as making possible certain forms of war and relations of hierarchy. Owens holds that the perceived compliance with law produces the sort of global order that makes war possible. The author's implication brings more than this; it also shows the limitation of international theories due to their incapacity to explain this relationship and to oversee "what law can do" (p. 74). Law, besides putting constraints on the international order, also contributes to the production of imperial power relations and subjects of laws. Law in itself does not bring about change, but once change is brought law can stabilize it by remaining the mechanism of legitimating and de-legitimating breaches of the laws of war.

Owens discusses not only the chronological understanding and implications of war, but its affinity with technology, which makes the construction of death, as 'accident', possible. Furthermore, the book suggests that the decisive question is not about compliance or increase/decrease of civil casualty, but about the idea that some acts are "beside intention" (p. 88). However, it is our argument that this does not imply the legitimating of "accidental small massacres" (Idem.), even if these have become normalized in the post-9/11 era. Nonetheless, this aspect has a deeper human implication represented through the so-called "imperial philosophy of the bureaucrat" (p. 89). U.S. official(s) claiming that in wars of choice (and not necessity) the predictable death of civilians is not a self-sustained responsibility leaves the impression of a dehumanized functionary whose statement is the product of the administrative machinery. Therefore, the localization of responsibility disappears. Nobody is responsible, still this nobody rules.

Drawing on Arendt, Owens raises yet again another crucial observation related to human rights and hypocrisy: whether we should judge Western wars which evoke human rights hypocritically or rather accept hypocrisy? Owens argues that the exposure of hypocrisy means a greater danger to human rights than hypocrisy itself, because on the one hand, we offer no alternatives after the exposure, and on the other hand, we run the risk of becoming cynical about human rights. But, why the reader should consider the exposure of hypocrisy as being dangerous? Owens suggests that the barbaric hunt for hypocrisy may tear away the mask of the public persona,

which is the source of plurality/politics. Another contribution of the book is its novel understanding of genocide: cruelty is not the greatest sin of genocide, but rather the annihilation of the human made world and the white washing of human history and the immortality of politics.

The degree of moralism of the neoconservatives (e.g. wartimes) implicates a sort of arrogance that the world can be changed if ideologically mandated. Owens argument, in contrast, is that it is exactly ideology that disarms politics. But, what kind of alternative does the book provide? Owens proposes the establishment of a new foundation that enables an authentic political realm. In order to show the distortion of politics by ideology, interestingly, Owens brings about examples from the American Declaration of Independence and the Bush Administration's approach to the Iraq war. Owens shows that certain issues in the international realm need not be addressed; actions and reasons are held as self-evident, as if "certain ideological convictions need not admit of the possibility of a substantial mistake" (p. 125). The reason why such arguments resist is because they give the public something to unquestionably believe in.

In relation to the constitution of a global public, Owens' first questioning sounds like this: how can states legitimately act in the name of a non-existent global public? In arguing on the (un)necessity of a global public sphere, Owens prefers rather Arendt's more complex, but even more modest understanding of cosmopolitarianism, than Jürgen Habermas's ambitious project of a global public sphere crowded with global citizens. The main argument here is that replacing states, as multiple holders of the monopolized legitimate use of violence, with a single-handed owner of monopoly over global violence is leading not only to the impossibility of a global public, but to the death of world politics itself. When quoting Arendt on "every good action for the sake of a bad end actually adds to the world a portion of goodness" (p. 139) Owens tries to reflect that violence (as a source of 'making') is rational for short-term ends. Albeit, world citizenship is rejected, the solidarity of mankind is possible. The only justifiable limitation would be a republic of republics, a word of inter-republics.

Owens managed to formulate ground challenging observations not only to core concepts, but to the international itself. At the same time, in her endeavor to bring together such a vast literature and diverse field, one might feel that at some point there are parallel running explanations without

having one strong key argument. This is not to say, that there is no chronological bond and thought connection between the transitional parts of the vast analysis, but particular aspects have to suffer the consequences. Nevertheless, she is able to innovate in two ways. Firstly, she invited politics, philosophy, history, security studies, and international relations to a round table fostering an interdisciplinary negotiation within the fields. Thus, extracting and complementing arguments from each discipline. Secondly, drawing this whole round table negotiation on the thoughts of Hannah Arendt, the author managed to put the human affairs of the international into a new light, from which not only the scholarship of international relations would benefit, but professors, lecturers and students, as well.

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Darren J. O'Byrne, *The dimensions of Global Citizenship: Political Identity Beyond the Nation-State*, London-Portland: Frank Cass, 2003, 283 p.

Anca Alexandra Baba*

The concept of global citizenship has been widely discussed among theoreticians in the field of applied ethics and international relations. The significance of the concept itself has been changed during time, from a traditional view when citizenship had been associated with the idea of a nation-state delimited by physical barriers, to the contemporary perspective which presents it throughout the mechanisms of globalization and situated it in the international arena.

The volume *The dimensions of Global Citizenship: Political Identity beyond the Nation-State*, written by Darren J. O'Byrne, has as aims to emphasize the process of how was possible the swift from national citizenship, which is protected by the physical barriers of one state, to a global one that is being preserved only by citizens willingness to be part of a shared community. The author argues in the convincing way that a global dimension of citizenship is not a consequence of globalization, but rather it has been there from the very beginning and is an alternative to the national citizenship.

In the first part of the volume, the author introduces the concept of citizenship stating that "citizenship is now a popular word not only in academic circles, but also in political and everyday-life discourse" (p.2). Afterwards, he focuses on the four main components of citizenship - membership, rights, duties and participation – that based on his interpretation, have value only if them are fully respected. In order to achieve it purpose of presenting global citizenship as an alternative, O'Byrne presents the idea of citizenship in the same discussion with the modern state; namely he centers on how modernity has influenced the values of citizenship. In order to cross the rules respected by other authors, he focuses on more than one ideological perspective, such as: the liberal, the communitarian, the republican, the Marxist, the pluralist and the new right.

* Anca Alexandra Baba is BA student at the Faculty of European Studies (3rd year), Babeș-Bolyai University, specialization in International relations and European Studies.
Contact: ancaalexandra9@yahoo.com

Another major approach brought into discussion refers to the changes brought by globalization. According to him globalization did not produce alterations to the concept of citizenship; it just offered to citizens the possibility to involve in debates, organizations and concerns that by their nature cannot be solved within a state boundaries.

However, his major point is revealed throughout two main topics: "Global Citizenship" and "Global Citizenship as Organizational Practice". The author discusses on one hand the idea of membership within a global community and on how the state as a concept should be reshaped due to the impact of globalization. But what is important is the fact that as in nation-state in a global society there are also categories of citizenship. For instance there is the activist, who is endowed with rational strategies for global change. Then there is the global capitalist, which has a "global culture of experience"[1] than makes impossible the belonging to a single place. And on the other hand, it presents those social movements and organizations that have as guideline the fulfillment of global issues as being among the main representatives of global citizenship.

Other main headline shows how an identity based on political aspects can be obtained both in a local community, where one exercised the right of being a national citizen, but also in a global one where the moral principles are the one that guide citizens' actions. The appeal to morality was and remains the major technique through which citizens among the world unite in defending or protecting the goods of the shared community.

Questioning the issue of "Globality and Everyday Life", the author focuses on the concrete impact produced by globalization. It is the one that forced the need to rethink ones political identity: namely citizens have the right to choose where they want to be members. In order to sustain this, he presents some cities such as London, Tokyo and New York can be seen as global cities, largely due to their global finance, political and economical power and multicultural aspect.

The previous part is connected to one of first chapter point of discussion, namely the part that presents the four components of national citizenship, just that the author submits them to the global citizenship and renamed them as being *The Dimensions of Global Citizenship*. As a consequence,

[1] David Falk, *The Making of Global Citizenship*, London: Sage Publications, 1994, p. 134.

the idea of participation is extended from liberal democracy to an information society. The principle of duties appears to be orientated from national interest to the survival of planet. The one of rights is the most extended because it encompasses the rights granted by citizenship and also those granted by humanity as a whole. When referring to membership it has to pass political state's physical borders and to be more inclined towards a multicultural society.

As a last argument, Darren O'Byrne centers his attention on the idea of "active citizenship". For a proper understanding of how this activism works, the author has thought at the modalities though which education for an active global citizen can be done. These forms are: information technology, environmental protection, multicultural research and human rights awareness. All these above mentioned forms are possible in the international arena due to globalization. For instance, they were met in the national sphere as well just that their impact was not so tremendous. In addition to this, the author considers that encompassing these techniques in our daily behavior and acting in such a way that fulfills them are the first more important steps in order to be perceived as global citizens.

We can read the book written by Darren J. O'Byrne as a riposte, as it takes action to demolish David Miller's and other critics, according to which the idea of global citizenship belongs just to the Utopian side. His work is the starting point of a new domain of research regarding global citizenship as it strongly stated that from being a consequence of globalization and modernity, it is rather an old radical alternative to the borders-limited version of citizenship. Its existence is proven with the help of the social movements taken within international organizations or even by individuals themselves. Finally, the fact that actions were largely taken to ensure the conditions of a shared community and its maintenance, shows that citizens are willing to overpass the limitations imposed by a nation-state. To be a global citizen requires just submitting your duties, rights, membership and participation to global purposes as well.

His contribution was embraced by many scholars, like Robbie Robertson, who reflects on the global sphere as a normal extension to the national one, as the modalities one can undertake in order to act as an active citizen have been improved. He also argues that is evolution the one that made possible the birth of such concepts. The new perspective presented in this book catches

more shape and value as the continuators used it as a foundation to their new thesis. From now on global citizenship is being perceived as an alternative model of citizenship. The concept fully value is highly illustrated by the evolutionary changes produced in the arena of technology, environmental protection and multiculturalism.

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