ETHNICITY IN MIGRATION.
ROMANIAN IMMIGRANTS AT HOME AND ABROAD

Special Issue. Guest Editors: Irina Culic and Remus Gabriel Anghel

CONTENTS

IRINA CULIC, REMUS GABRIEL ANGHEL, Guest Editors’ Foreword for the Special Issue on “Ethnicity in Migration. Romanian Immigrants at Home and Abroad”........................................3

REMUS GABRIEL ANGHEL, The Migration of Romanian Croats: between Ethnic and Labour Migration .................................................................9

IRINA CULIC, One Hundred Years of Solitude: Romanian Immigrants in Canada ........................................................................................................27

IRINA CIORNEI, The Political Incorporation of Immigrant Associations and Religious Organizations of the Romanian Residents in Spain ........51

GABRIEL TROC, Transnational Migration and Roma Self-Identity: Two Case Studies ..............................................................................................77
CLAUDIA N. CĂMPEANU, Celebrating Crown Day after the 1990s Saxon Migration: Reconfigurations of Ethnicity in a South Transylvanian Village ....................................................................................................................................101

Romanian Sociology Today

MĂLINA VOICU, Religiosity and Nationalism in Post-Communist Societies: a Longitudinal Approach.................................................................................................................................123
ADELA FOFIU, The Romanian Version of the LIWC2001 Dictionary and Its Application for Text Analysis with Yoshikoder.................................................................139

The Authors of this Issue ..................................................................................................................................................................................153
ETHNICITY IN MIGRATION.
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Guest Editors’ Foreword

IRINA CULIC¹ AND REMUS GABRIEL ANGHEL²

The question of ethnicity has been for a long time central to social science scholars researching international migration³. The role of ethnicity in processes of adaptation, integration, and assimilation of immigrants in the United States captured early on the attention of urban sociologists and policy makers (Thomas and Znaniecki, 1984; Gordon, 1964). The formation of hyphenated communities, ethnic political mobilisation, and the emergence of ethnic economies within immigrant societies of the West have been constant topics of scrutiny and extensive research. Initially, the study of immigrant settlement took on the viewpoint of their eventual absorption in destination societies, influenced by notions of exclusive citizenship and political danger represented by foreigners, prevalent at the beginning of the twentieth century. This approach tended to accentuate the importance of ethno-cultural bases of immigrant groups, directing the analysis around the progress of assimilation or the formation of ethnic enclaves.

Present scholarship now looks at both sides of the process, bringing valuable insights into the changes in ethnic, racial, social and gender hierarchies made by immigrant presence and interaction with the local society (Ong, 1996; Jacobson, 1998). The focus on destination societies and the emphasis on ethnicity in immigrants’ incorporation are shifting studies towards events and processes taking place at origin (Brettell, 1986; Brubaker, 1998; Massey, Durand, and Malone, 2002), and towards the social space generated by immigrants, which maintain substantial and sustained relations between their home and settlement societies (Basch, Glick Schiller, and Szanton Blanc, 1994; Ong, 1999; Levitt, 2001). There is also increased interest in state politics of ethnic selection, and phenomena of large-scale ethnic migration (Groenendijk 1997; Münz and Ohliger 2003; Joppke 2005; Tsuda 2009).

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³ Remus Gabriel Anghel received the support of the Romanian National Council for Scientific Research, grant CNCS PN-II-ID-PCE-2011-3-0602, entitled: “Recasting Migrants’ Voices. Local Perspective on Migration, Development and Social Change in Romania”.
Ethnicity is an extensively theorized concept, and a politically contested one (Weber, 1997 [1922]; Barth, 1969; Gellner, 1983; Smith, 1986; Eriksen, 1993; Kymlicka, 1995 and 2011; Balibar, 2004). Various scholars have recently questioned its explanatory power and analytical utility from different disciplinary angles. Sociologist Rogers Brubaker has repeatedly expressed discontent with the concepts of ethnicity and identity (Brubaker, 2004: 7-63). He warned against the error of taking categories of practice as analytical categories, thus assisting in reproducing and reinforcing reification, and against “groupism” - the tendency to take homogeneous and bounded groups as units of analysis of social life, charging academics’ groupism on their own political practice of identity. He concluded that questioning the unit of analysis, the ethnic group, may lead to contesting the domain of analysis, ethnicity itself. From another disciplinary standpoint, Kanchan Chandra (2006) set off to appraise the definitions and uses of ethnic identity in comparative political science. She arrived at the standpoint that ethnicity either did not matter or had not been shown to matter in explaining most outcomes researchers had attributed to it. She also proposed that this concept be replaced by empirically more appropriate ones, such as descent-based identities and identities based on sticky or visible attributes; and that the body of theories and datasets on ethnicity should be discarded and rebuilt anew on different foundations (Chandra, 2006: 422).

Within migration studies, researchers increasingly found that the diverse and multi-faceted social relations immigrants develop at destination localities are often obscured by the “ethnic lens” (Glick Schiller, Çaglar, and Gulbrandsen, 2008). The focus on ethnic groups, ethnic institutions, and ethnic ties conceals the actual mechanisms of immigrant adaptation and incorporation, the construction of the distinction between “insiders” and “outsiders”, the perception of “assimilability,” the local discourse regarding immigrants, and the cultural practices structuring immigrants’ sociality (Baumann, 1996; Glick Schiller, Çaglar, and Gulbrandsen, 2008; Wimmer, 2004). Other factors such as the city scale, and their position with neoliberal processes of rescaling significantly immigrants’ pathways of settlement and transnationalism (Glick Schiller, Çaglar, and Gulbrandsen, 2008).

While the decentering of the ethnic perspective has opened the space for new theorising and empirical research, we maintain that ethnicity continues to be relevant in understanding the context, course, and consequences of international migration. Embeddedness in social relations also takes the specific form of embeddedness in particular collectivities (Calhoun, 2003: 559). Though variable, ethnic belonging does shape immigrant settlement, and it is reconfigured by the relations immigrants build at destination and leave at home. Their continuing reference to the place of origin is crucial to their redefinition of the self. Distinguishing between transnational “ways of being” (actual engagement in everyday social relations and practices across borders) and “ways of belonging” (recognition and emphasis on the transnational elements of who they are), Levitt
and Glick Schiller (2004) propose the possibility of simultaneity of sharing an identity while living outside the physical space of its sociality. Such a perspective requires an ample look on migration processes, which necessarily include the home society, the settlement society, and the social fields encompassing both of them, generated by immigrants’ acts. International migration always causes the rescaling of relations, spaces, and practices, and ethnicity in this context means a reconfiguration along the new territorial and symbolic boundaries (see also Wimmer, 2009).

The following studies share the ample look on migration processes, allowing for the possibility that ethnic belonging appears both natural and necessary (Calhoun 2003: 559) to immigrants adapting to their new life, but also to families, communities, and groups left at home. They investigate the re-making of ethnicity, ethnic identity, and ethnic communities in and through international migration. This special issue is focused on Romanian international migration, one of the largest post-communist migrations in Western Europe.

Remus Gabriel Anghel examines the case of post-communist international migration of Romanian Croats, revealing the different meanings ethnicity took for them. First, through the capitalization of language, ethnicity provided access to job openings and social ties with locals in Serbia. Following the ethnic conflicts between the states of the former Yugoslavia and the new laws on citizenship in Croatia, ethnicity gained value as a social status, enabling access to citizenship, rights and opportunities in Croatia. Finally, as a form of transnational solidarity with co-ethnic minorities in Austria, it gave supplementary forms of social trust, opening economic opportunities on grounds of an “imagined” (Anderson, 1983) ethnic community.

Irina Culic investigates the migration of Romanians to Canada from its beginning at the turn of the twentieth century to the present date. The account of the main historical waves of migration shows how Romanian ethnicity was formed and continuously remade in Canada at different historical junctures and immigration regimes. The distinct temporal reconfigurations of ethnicity now coexist, united by the common reference to Romania as a constitutive though markedly variable identity signifier.

Taking the case of Romanian immigration in Spain, Irina Ciornei shows that the political incorporation of Romanian immigrant organizations in Spain is a stratified process, which unfolds across civic associations, and between these and religious organisations. Official paths of inclusion are paralleled by informal ties and ad-hoc processes. Religious organisations play a central role not only in immigrant adaptation, but also in their political representation at local and regional levels. Transnational religious solidarity between the Catholic and the Neo-Protestant churches, and the new immigrant religious organizations respectively, contribute to their centrality in the context of immigration.
GUEST EDITORS’ FOREWORD

In a comparative analysis of the impact of transnational migration for two considerably different Roma communities in Romania (the Gabors and the Ursari Roma), Gabriel Troc disputes the prevailing argument of Roma traditionalism and modernization failure. Their specific responses to modernizing circumstances are shown to reflect the groups’ particular social histories, their preserved archaic social relations, and their racialization across Europe. Roma traditionalism is thus not an obsolete reminiscence, but an adaptive lifestyle, allowing for economic prosperity, community expansion, and articulation to neoliberal practices.

Claudia Câmpeanu’s paper scrutinizes the reconfigurations of ethnic relations in a Transylvanian village following the migration of most of its Saxon population to Germany, by exploring the meanings performed during the yearly celebration of the Crown Day. She shows how Saxonness continues to play a role in processes of ethnic symbolic realignment, while opening the space for increased dominance of the Romanian population, but also opportunities and obstacles for the transformation of the status of the local Roma.

The articles show the continued relevance of ethnicity when confronted with the situation of migration and its consequences. In the receiving society, ethnic identity is transformed by the local regimes of belonging and hierarchies of ethnicity, race, and class. In the origin society, it undergoes readjustments by the import of immigrants’ experience and acquired resources, or by the new social relations ensuing their departure. In all these situations, ethnicity, as consciousness of difference and subjective commonality of feeling, is fundamental for the emotional, practical, and material redefinition of the people involved.

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GUEST EDITORS’ FOREWORD


THE MIGRATION OF ROMANIAN CROATS: BETWEEN ETHNIC AND LABOUR MIGRATION

REMUS GABRIEL ANGHEL

ABSTRACT. Romanian migration is one of the largest migration movements in Europe. So far, much of the efforts to analyze and theoretically frame this phenomenon have focused mainly on the analysis of labour migration of Romanian citizens, mostly ethnic Romanians. The literature on Romanian migration succeeded in showing how the networks of Romanians functioned, that kinship and the home locality played a determinant role in the building and functioning of migrant networks. Due to the expanding networks, Romanian labour force was involved in enduring transnational migration circuits. Studies also show how migrant networks functioned in different states that employ open or restrictive policies, supporting or hindering migrants’ efforts to adapt to labour markets. On the other hand, the analysis of ethnicity in migration received less consideration. In this paper I attempt to illuminate the ways in which ethnicity influences migration. The analysis is carried out with ethnic Croats from Romania, a small ethnic group whose members first migrated to Serbia, then to Croatia and later to Austria. In these phases of migration, three uses of ethnicity unfold: ethnicity as access to language, providing easier access to job openings and social ties to locals; ethnicity as legal status enabling access to citizenship, rights and opportunities; and ethnicity as a form of transnational solidarity to co-ethnic minorities, providing access to supplementary forms of social trust enabled by minority organizations. In this context, migrant networks functioned as provider of opportunities in a context where ethnicity was a structuring factor of this migration. In the case under study, two cumulating social resources – social capital and migrants’ ethnicity – granted the easiness and success of migration, as well as the economic prosperity of migrants’ households.

Keywords: migration, ethnic migration, Croat ethnicity
Introduction

International migration is a mass phenomenon in the Romanian society. Essentially a post-1989 phenomenon, the topic of migration entered the realm of public debates and scientific research especially in the past 10 years, when Romanian citizens gained the right to travel freely in the European Union. So far, much of the efforts to analyze and theoretically frame this phenomenon have focused mainly on the analysis of labour migration of Romanian citizens (Diminescu, 2003; Sandu, 2006; Anghel and Horváth, 2009; Sandu, 2010), mostly by ethnic Romanians. Studies on the migration of ethnic minorities—Germans, Hungarians, and Jews received less attention (Michalon, 2003; Weber, Nassehi et al., 2003; Gödri and Tóth, 2005; Fox, 2007). In the literature, these migrations are sometimes regarded as cases of ethnic return migration, in which people usually migrate permanently to their mother-states, as members of the titular host nation. They usually enjoy a special status vis-à-vis other migrants groups (Brubaker, 1998; Münz and Ohliger, 2003; Joppke, 2005; Tsuda, 2009). If the literature focuses on the permanent migration of ethnic return migrants, less attention was paid on cases of ethnic migrants involved in temporary migratory practices and circulation between their places of origin and the national homelands, as it is for instance with Transylvanian Hungarians (Fox, 2007). This paper unfolds such a case in which members of a small ethnic group, Romanian Croats, have migrated to work temporarily to three different destinations: Serbia, Croatia and Austria. In this study I first attempt to show how these migrants enjoyed the status of ethnic return migrants to Croatia, who did not settle in Croatia, maintained a continuous relation to their origin community and transnational circuits between their origin community and the neighboring countries where they migrated for work. Their status as ethnic Croats and Croat citizens sustained their migratory practices when they migrated towards Croatia and Austria. I also aim to illuminate on the different uses of ethnicity in migration. Different from some case studies on ethnic return migrants, where the attention focused on migratory patterns and the longer-term relationships between ethnic migrants and the locals (Tsuda, 2009), the goal of the paper is more limited, as it mainly looks at the different roles of ethnicity in migration. In this paper I look at ethnicity in a non-substantialist but relational way, and as a resource that people can mobilize to attain their aims (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000).
Labour and Ethnic Migration. Attempts to Frame the Romanian Migration

Two conceptual attempts – labour migration and ethnic migration – seem to circumscribe the migration of Romanian citizens. In this section I will present these two theoretical perspectives and the ways we may approach the temporary migration of ethnic minorities, such as the Romanian Croats. Labour migration is a widespread phenomenon in all developed countries, intensely analyzed in the recent years in European context. Ethnic return migration, in contrast, is a more specific phenomenon. Ethnic return migration refers to the type of migration where migrants go towards states where they are recognized as members of the titular nations (Brubaker, 1998). Brubaker for instance distinguishes between labour migration (Anghel and Horváth, 2009) and ethnic migration. Ethnic migrations are promoted by destination states. It presupposes there is ethnic affinity between ethnic migrants and the population of destination states. In contexts of growing ethnic diversity and increasing discontent with the arrival of culturally-different peoples, states select, and actively encourage the arrival of co-ethnics. Ethnic return migrations are thus, processes by which co-ethnics are brought to their national homelands, enjoying all rights and obligations of the majority populations. Although there are more reasons why states adopt such selective policies, the purported ethnic and cultural affinity and the aim of migrants’ easy integration are presupposed by the policy. This was the case of ethnic Germans and Jews from the Eastern Europe who emigrated to West Germany and Israel, or of Russians who went to Russia from the former republics of the USSR (Brubaker, 1998). The concept of ethnic migration was then extended by Joppke (2005), who considered that states prefer migrants of certain ethnic background. He tied this phenomenon to the colonial inheritance of Western European states, which at least for a while after WWII favored immigration from their former colonies (Bade, 2003). But Joppke believes that nation-states began to abandon the ethnic selection of new migrants and entered a new process of convergence of migration policies in which liberal principles and institutional practices lead to more procedural immigration policies (Joppke, 1998; 2005; 2007). From his perspective, liberal states are now de-ethnicizing their immigration policies, along with ethnicization of their policies of support for groups of co-ethnics living outside the national borders. These perspectives on ethnic migration help explaining "top-down" institutional approaches. Empirical case studies actually unfold a variety of situations, some of them challenging the assumption of ethnic affinity, and the positive reception of ethnic immigrants by the local population (Tsuda, 2003; Ipsen-Peitzmeier and Kaiser, 2006; Fox, 2007).

The migration of Romanians was intensively analyzed as labour migration. Migration was a combination of supply and demand of jobs (Horváth and Anghel, 2009). The conceptualization of labour migration is realized in this general frame
of supply and demand of jobs (or push and pull factors), while the effective explanation of migration is conducted through the use of the perspectives offered by the new economics of labour migration and the theories of migrant networks and social capital. Motivations for migration are built at the level of communities of origin, where previous migration created motivation for new migration waves, and the process goes on. In this process, social ties and resources determine the extent and duration of migration (Massey, Arango et al., 1993; Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993; Faist, 2000; Horváth and Anghel, 2009). Thus, the literature on Romanian migration succeeded in showing how the networks of Romanians functioned, that kinship and the home locality played a determinant role in the building and functioning of migrant networks (Potot, 2003; Bleahu, 2004; Sandu, Radu et al., 2004; Sandu, 2005; Anghel, 2008; Elrick and Ciobanu 2009). Due to the expanding networks, Romanian labour force was involved in enduring transnational migration circuits. Studies also show how migrant networks functioned in different states that employ open or restrictive policies, supporting or hindering migrants’ efforts to adapt to labour markets (Bauer and Zimmermann, 1997; Vlase, 2004; Düvell, 2005; Cingolani, 2009; Elrick, 2009; Elrick and Ciobanu, 2009).

Romania is a country where minorities made a large share of out-migration (Horváth and Anghel, 2009). Despite the impressive development of Romanian migration in the last decade, little effort has been dedicated to unfold the role played by ethnicity in the migration of ethnic minorities. 2 Although it is less present in the current debates on Romanian migration, ethnic return migration was a central element in the development of Romanian migration to Western Europe, especially in the first years following the fall of communism. A few studies on the history of Romanian migration mention the high propensity of members of ethnic and religious minorities to migrate after 1989 (Sandu, Radu et al., 2004; Baldwin - Edwards, 2007; Horváth and Anghel, 2009), when migration was oriented mainly towards Germany and Hungary, but also towards Italy and Spain (Şerban and Grigoraş, 2000; Stan, 2005). Also, the amount of ethnic minorities’ migration was substantial, largely surpassing the proportion of ethnic minorities in the Romanian population (Horváth and Anghel, 2009). Finally, comparing to the migration of ethnic Romanians, studies on ethnic migration often reveal other mechanisms of migration, social and economic incorporation and transnationalism. In the following section I will analyze the migration of ethnic Croats from the village of Carașova, a small ethnic group in Southwestern Romania. I will analyze this migration by looking at the stages of migration and the ways in which migrants’ ethnicity influenced their migratory practices.

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2 Among the most important studies there are: Michalon (2003), Weber et al. (2003), Fox (2007), and Nacu (2011).
Stages of Romanian Croats’ Migration

When I first reached the village of Carașova in 2008, I talked to locals about the village life, of what it meant to be Croat in Romania, and about their life-plans. I told them I was interested in their migration. At first sight, almost everybody recorded at least a migration experience in the past years. But people were intrigued by my inquiry. They all tended to answer: “What migration? There is no migration here.” In the eyes of the locals, migration was conceived of as something final, a definitive departure from the country, something that Swabians from the area did when they migrated to Germany in the 1980s and 1990s. After some clarification of what I meant by migration, people reacted: “Oh, going for work, this is something else.” For them, this semantics of migration signified that temporary labour migration was conceived of as something normal and normalized, a shared social practice, that the social order of the village and social relations were not radically changed or disrupted when international migration began.

For two decades, Croats of Carașova maintained a model of temporary (or incomplete) migration (Kaczmarczyk and Okólski, 2005), in which the periods of stay abroad were followed by periods of stay in the village. In this pendulum, the destinations of migration were relatively close, up to 600 km, allowing the locals of Carașova to easily return home and keep permanent contact with their community of origin. What made this migration seem normal and easy in the eyes of the locals was that Croat ethnicity provided specific opportunities for migration and labour market incorporation. As I will further show, ethnicity represented the main migration mechanism and selection criterion of migrants. There were three main periods of migration, where ethnicity was differently used: a) after 1990 there was a short migration to Serbia; b) it was followed by migration to Croatia, when people obtained Croatian citizenship; c) in the recent years, migration developed towards the Croat minority in Austria. In all of these stages, ethnicity was a vital resource for migrants. It granted access to labour markets and Croat citizenship, as well as the right to free travel in Europe immediately after 1990. In the following sections I will analyze these stages of migration discussing the role of ethnicity and social capital in each of these phases.

3 The research was carried out in May 2008 and April 2010. Altogether I spent one and a half months in Carașova. I carried out semi-structured interviews and participant observation with migrants, their families and local authorities. I also carried out interviews at the Union of Croats in Romania, at the local council and the school.
The First Stage of Migration: At Work in Serbia

Croats in Romania live in several villages around the town of Reșița, southwest Romania. The ethnic community is small, around 6,800 people (Domaneanț, 2010), located in two communes, Carașova and Lupac. The village of Carașova has about 2,280 inhabitants and it is located at 12 km from Reșița, the largest city in the region. Carașova is the locality where the Union of Croats in Romania and the MP representing the Croat community have their offices.

The local economy in the last years of the communist regime was mixed, and its two main pillars were the industrial plants in Reșița and the subsistence agriculture. The land in the area was not included in socialist collective farms. This type of mixed economy characterized many areas in communist Romania and generated a social and economic stability that people lost right after 1990. As they remember even twenty years after the fall of communism, “5-6 buses left daily for Reșița from Carașova. There were 50 people in each bus. [We were going to work]; people were happy as they had land, animals, [and jobs in the city].” (Martin, 56 years old) Interviews revealed that around 3,000 people from the seven Croat villages worked in Reșița, which led to prosperity in the 1970s and 1980s. After 1990 there was a dramatic change, similar to other mono-industrial areas in Romania, where the fall of heavy industry or mining left much of the local populations jobless (Crăciun, Grecu et al., 2002). With this massive process of de-industrialization, the only jobs left were those in the local administration, in the small local shops, and in a small wood factory.

Migration began to Serbia right after 1989, where few pioneers went to work. The short distance to Belgrade and the knowledge of the Serbian language motivated the first labour migrations. For the locals of Carașova, Serbia was a convenient destination. The transit to the neighboring country was free and they could find better paid jobs than in Reșița. Migration was free of risks. As several migrants note, “we found work there, there was [plenty of job offers]. We earned there in a single month the same money as we could do here in much more time” (Jakob, 40 years old). In this initiation stage, men migrated. They found jobs in agriculture, constructions, small household activities or even in car repair shops. In some cases, they were accompanied by their wives, who worked mostly in agriculture. Migrants found jobs around Belgrade. They were usually helped by acquaintances or friends from Carașova who managed to establish connections with the Serbian population. There were also trade tourists from the neighboring villages who, after getting to know Serbs, mediated labour offers for people from Carașova.

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1 Data was gathered from the local mayor’s office in Carașova.
2 Names in this paper are fictitious in order to assure the anonymity of interviewees.
Migration to Serbia was short. On the one hand, salaries were lower than the salaries in Croatia. On the other hand, and perhaps more important, the outbreak of the war in the former Yugoslavia determined many locals from Carașova to avoid working and traveling through Serbia: “in 1991 I stopped going there because they started fighting the Croats” (Marko, 50 years old). Jakob’s case is revealing. He went to work in Serbia in the beginning of 1990. He recalled that locals from Carașova were regarded by Serbs as poor migrants, having low-paid jobs. Jakob obtained a job in a car repairing shop and started to earn well. He later moved to a transportation company. He worked as mechanic, checking the cars’ technical condition prior to departures. He had to be available at all times in case of spontaneous transports. After a while, an event made him leave the job and return to Romania.

On the 15th of August, I didn’t go to work. [It was Saint Mary’s Day] “Why don’t you want to work?” the owner asked. “We have an important holiday and I can’t work.” It took about three hours until the boss called me in his office. He asked me suspiciously: “Why are you saying you have an important holiday? What is your religion?” “I am Catholic”, I replied. “Catholic? How come you are a Catholic?” He told me I am Catholic because my father was German, but my mother was [Orthodox, as she was] Serbian. I lied. He asked about my mother’s family name. “Her name was Katci,” I lied to him again. “Your mother has a good Serbian name,” he said, “but you are half with us and half with the others.” Afterwards I started having problems with my colleagues. I had to leave the place eventually. (Jakob, 40 years old)

When people from Carașova migrated to Serbia, ethnicity played a role that facilitated migration in its early stage as the access to the language helped accessing jobs and enabling social relations to the Serbian population. But when the interethnic conflict broke out between Serbs and Croats, people from Carașova stopped going to Serbia. Migration to Serbia did not involve many people from Carașova. With the worsening of the economic and political context due to the outbreak of war in the former Yugoslavia, the migration from Carașova to Serbia did not further develop. Another important factor in the reorganization of migration was that people learned about jobs and higher salaries in Croatia. Croatia also offered a more comfortable environment for them. In short time migration to Serbia stopped and people started to migrate to Croatia.

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6 The names of the interviewees are fictitious.
7 The knowledge of Serbian was however not mandatory for obtaining jobs, as Romanians also worked in agriculture. But it facilitated the easy access to different types of jobs and better communication with the local population.
Migration to Croatia: Unrestrained Access and Double Citizenship

In 1991 Croatia declares its independence from the Yugoslav federation. As a follow-up of this major political act within the former Yugoslavia, the new state offered citizenship rights to Croatian communities worldwide: in Serbia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, North America and Europe. The Croatian state opted for an ethnic approach to citizenship (Štiks, 2010). As in other cases, the new Croatian constitution and citizenship laws were built to “facilitate the national construction and ‘ethnic engineering’” (Štiks, 2010). In October 1991, a new citizenship law was adopted, defining Croatia as a state of the Croats inside and outside its borders. It also defined three categories of citizens: the included – Croats living in Croatia; the excluded - such as Serbs or other ethnic groups living in Croatia; and the invited – ethnic Croats from former Yugoslav states or from the Croat diaspora (Štiks, 2010: 1629-1630). In 1991, 1.15 million Croatian citizenships were granted for Croats outside Croatia, most of them from Bosnia-Herzegovina (Štiks, 2010: 1633).

Croats from Carașova were part of the third category of invited citizens who aimed at obtaining Croatian citizenship. They applied for citizenship to the Croatian consulates in Budapest and Bucharest,8 or directly in Zagreb. After a few years, application procedures were carried out in Carașova, where the Croat consul came from Bucharest to receive new citizenship applications. In order to acquire Croat citizenship, locals from Carașova needed a certificate from the Catholic Church and a paper issued by the Romanian state certifying their Croat ethnicity. In the cases I have analyzed, locals acquired the Croat citizenship between 1992 and 1994.

Along with the acquisition of Croat citizenship, ethnic activism developed in Carașova, through the establishment of classes in the Croat language and, from the 13th of April 1991, the establishment of the Union of Croats in Romania (UCR). UCR stood in the 1992 election with its own candidates and gained two seats in the local councils. In 1994, the newspaper of the Croats in Romania, Hrvatska Granica, was printed for the first time. In 1995 the Romanian-Croat high-school was established in Carașova. Artistic groups from Carașova started to participate in annual cultural exchanges with Croats from all over the world, while UCR took part in the Croatian World Congress, gathering Croat communities worldwide (Domaneanț, 2010). UCR also organized several artistic events with art and folk groups from nearby villages. People received support from Croatia: some cultural activities were financed by Croatia, and the youth went to study with scholarships offered by the Croat state. Ethnic activism, Croat citizenship and new social links established during the events with ethnic organizations worldwide would play a decisive role in the development of migration from Carașova in the following years.

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8 The Croatian Embassy in Bucharest opened only on the 3rd of September 1993.
Migration directed towards Croatia. When the Carașoveni obtained Croatian citizenship, they obtained full access to the labour market and the welfare system. This migration took place in a general context in which Croatian institutions supported the immigration of Croat citizens originating in the diaspora. Migrants from Carașova recalled they were well received by authorities, which were very supportive to them, and that they had positive experiences with Croat institutions. In some cases their migration was considered a sign of ethnic solidarity:

Authorities were very supportive to us. When we applied for citizenship, they were amazed and enthusiastic. “These people are coming here and they come from all over the world to help [us].” Some cops stopped me on the street once. I showed my ID. They were astonished and said: “You are one of us, you came here to work.” They asked me how I arrived there; they were really curious to learn something about me. It was a type of [genuine] curiosity [during the war], even solidarity. (Martin, 56 years old)

Beyond ethnic solidarity, migrants encountered ambivalent situations. They were often considered „Romanians,” and could face derogatory attitudes.

Some of my colleagues looked down at me as a Romanian. It didn’t bother me. When some filthy work was required they used to say: “You have to go there and do the work because you are a Romanian.” I never did it, of course. (Jakob, 40 years old)

But migrants recalled that employers made almost no difference between Romanian Croats and Croats from Croatia, and that payments were equal in most cases. Students also recalled they had very good relations with their Croat colleagues. Some of them mentioned they maintained friendships with their colleagues many years after graduation.

Migration towards Croatia had a few clearly defined patterns. It was mostly a men migration where women remained back home to take care of households. When they migrated, women worked especially in agriculture and as caregivers. A second migratory pattern is of young students. In the context of institutional support granted by the Croatian government, a number of young people from Carașova were able to attend Croatian universities. In the following, I will briefly describe these diverse migratory patterns.

Men worked especially in the construction sector. During and after the war with Serbia, there was a need for labour force. As Croat citizens, people from Carașova had full access to labour opportunities. They first received jobs in state companies operating in the sector.

We went over there [to a state company], to look for jobs; there was a bearded guy asking about papers. We replied that we applied for citizenship and in two weeks we will receive the papers. He said: “Ok, we’ll hire you; once you’ll receive
the citizenship we’ll do the papers.” He sent us to the company’s hostel. The following day we did psychological tests and physical examinations... [It was all right]. There was no language barrier between us. There was some difference as we used some Romanian words. But they explained everything to us. After we passed the tests we started to work. The first job was to work for a hotel. (Marko, 50 years old)

In these state companies construction projects were distributed all over Croatia and offered jobs to many people from Carașova. Migrants received salaries, accommodation in company’s hostel and meals at the canteen. The general working conditions were good, but people from Carașova started looking for better-paid offers in the private sector. “Private companies paid better, almost double sometimes, but they also exploited you. If you worked 10 hours a day, you could make 1,000 DM a month. Once we adapted to the market, salaries kept rising.” (Marko, 50 years old) This pattern of labour migration developed over the years. It was sustained by the demand of jobs and the existence of social networks of friends, family members and relatives from Carașova.

They helped each other because they called up friends and relatives to work, that’s how it went. [Migration] was [based on] kinship, friendship, and neighborhood [relations]. Some neighbors would say: “Look, there is an employer who needs two or three more people...” (Marko, 50 years old)

This migration remained temporary. People used to work in Croatia a few months and returned home every two to three months. Migrants used to remain home for a while then returned to work in Croatia, going to Zagreb or to the Dalmatian coast. In this manner, they were able to carry out domestic work and take care of their households, simultaneously maintaining their jobs in Croatia.

Women usually worked in the greeneries next to Zagreb. Maria tells how she went to Zagreb at 17, with her mother who was already working at the greeneries. Her father left first at the beginning of the 1990s to work in construction. After some time Maria’s mother also went to Zagreb to work in greeneries. For Maria, migration was not determined by financial motivation alone, but by the desire to visit Zagreb and Croatia. She worked one month at greeneries together with her mother. After realizing that she had underestimated the work load, she abandoned the job at the greenery, considering it too difficult. For Maria the migration to Croatia was short and she returned to Carașova. Similar to the case of Maria and her mother, some other women worked in greeneries. But they believed that working in the greeneries was poorly paid, around 500-600 DM per month, about half of what men could obtain in constructions. Women also had to work longer hours, generally between 12 to 14 hours a day, including Sundays. Despite the hardships and relatively low payments, earnings were 4 to 5 times higher compared to the salaries in Romania at that time.
On the other hand, in spite of difficulties, greeneries offered a sufficient amount of jobs. When Stana first migrated to Zagreb she found work as a cleaning woman for the building company where her husband was employed. She faced hardships there and decided to change the job. She also started working at greeneries where she worked only six months. As she says, “conditions were terrible, we sometimes worked 16 hours a day. It was really exhausting. All the time we had to carry big bags or flower pots. It was very hot inside, up to 60 degrees Celsius. In the winter it was very cold, in the summer it was hot.” (Stana, 35 years old) Given these conditions, many women preferred to remain at home in Carașova taking care of children and households, while men worked in Croatia to provide remittances for their families.

A second pattern was the students’ migration who received scholarships from the Croatian state. Dragan applied for a scholarship at the University of Zagreb after receiving Croatian citizenship. He first asked some friends from Carașova, already students in Zagreb, about the living conditions and study opportunities. He considered the study program and the scholarship attractive, so he decided to pursue graduate education in Croatia. In addition to the scholarship he obtained, as a student, he also received support from the students’ office at the university in finding additional jobs during holidays. Students were able to expand their circles of friends and acquaintances. Soon, they were able to find jobs for themselves and for other Carașoveni. Furthermore, these students were able to support other people from Carașova with housing, guiding them to authorities or employers needing labourers.

When I was student, I worked [in Zagreb] because I needed some more money. I did not pay for accommodation and meals at the university campus and I had a scholarship. As we were students from diaspora, we had substantial support. In Zagreb there were many students from Carașova and the nearby villages. I could also work during summers. In the beginning I received 3 DM per hour, later on 3.5 and then 4. Whenever I came home, people in Carașova asked me about jobs. I often said: “Yes, there are some who need more people where I work. Some other time I got to know different persons possessing information about jobs.” (Ratko, 37 years old)

Different from other cases of ethnic migration where migrants expressed dissatisfaction with their status (Ipsen-Peitzmeier and Kaiser, 2006; Fox, 2007) the Carașoveni expressed positive feelings towards their stay in Croatia. Indeed, Croatia is exceptional in this respect. It was a country at war and the issue of ethnicity and ethnic belonging was of a paramount political and social relevance. This can provide an explanation for the positive attitude that the Carașoveni encountered during their migration to Croatia.
Two mechanisms stood at the basis of this ethnic migration. Croatian citizenship offered free entry to Croatia and access to jobs on the legal labour market. Secondly, migrant networks from Carașova distributed job offers within the ethnic group. Students in Zagreb, men working in constructions, but also women with temporary jobs distributed job offers to their kin, neighbors and friends. In spite of economic opportunities and migrants’ legal status, the migration to Croatia remained temporary. For more than ten years, from mid 1990s until the mid of 2000s, temporary migration ensured the prosperity of families back home in a general context of economic downturn in Romania.

Migration to Austria. The Feminization of Romanian Croats' Migration

When people from Carașova acquired Croat passports, they gained unrestricted possibility to travel to European countries. Unlike Romanian citizens, whose mobility in Europe was restricted until 2002, Croat citizens could travel freely in Europe after 1990. After 1994, many people in Carașova holding Croat citizenship were able to travel freely within Europe for three uninterrupted months. This change in the status of the locals of Carașova will bear great impact on migration from Carașova in the following years. Migration to Austria emerged already at the beginning of the 1990s, but at that time it was sporadic and often irregular.

Only after 2000 migration will begin a typological diversification, when migration towards Croatia will develop towards Austria. In the context of the emerging Croat ethnic activism in the Croat diaspora following the 1991 declaration of independence, new institutional and social relations were established between locals from Carașova and Croats from nearby countries, including Croats from Burgenland, in Eastern Austria. These links were forged by the Croat state that supported and initiated cultural exchanges with the diaspora. Croats from Carașova started to visit Croats from Burgenland, who in turn visited Carașova. The youth from Carașova was able to visit families in Austria and vice-versa.

After 2000, Croats from Graz, Austria, started to come here, they established pretty good relations with the Union of Romanian Croats. Generally [there were exchanges on] folklore and shows. Guests were housed by several families in Carașova. Later on [several Croat women] started going to work as caretakers for elderly people in Austria. There were only a few in the beginning, but then more could find work there. (Jakob, 40 years old)

The economic perspectives looked more promising in Austria than in Croatia, where jobs already began to be scarce in constructions.

Women holding Croat passports were the first to leave. Until they went to Austria, they went to Serbia and Croatia. But the crisis hit Croatia too. Some of them haven’t been paid and many returned. Therefore, women started to migrate [to Austria]. (Stana, 35 years old)
Migration to Austria includes more women than men. Due to the high demand of domestic labour force, women from Carașova could constantly find jobs through the mediation of Austrian Croats. In the first period of migration work was informal, but formal work relations appeared afterwards. "There are countless jobs for nurses. There are no risks in Austria, women work legally nowadays, so they have no problems." (Stana, 35 years old)

Thanks to the knowledge of Croatian, and the relations with co-ethnics in Austria, women from Carașova started to migrate to the area of Graz and Burgenland, where the Austrian Croat community was concentrated. The access to jobs was first realized through Austrian Croats who offered jobs directly. Afterwards, jobs were distributed by women from Carașova to friends, family members at home, and acquaintances. A telling example is Ana. Her mother worked in Austria since 2005. She didn’t speak German and looked for a job in some Croat villages close to the Hungarian border. After getting to know some employers, she found out about new job offers. She then became involved in intermediating domestic work between Carașova and her Croat acquaintances in Austria. Women’ migratory strategies took different forms, from a practice in which women spent most of their time in Austria, to cases when two-three women worked for the same employer temporarily replacing each other at the workplace. Finally, there are women working on temporary contracts only. The most frequent is the practice of pairs of women working for the same employer.

You stay there for a month or two and then you look for someone trustworthy to replace you. This is an agreement, you can stay for a month or two, depending on your own wish. Nobody forces you to stay longer. [You can work there] two, three months, a month and a half or two months and a half. [Afterwards, someone else replaces you]. (Vera, 36 years old)

This pattern of temporary migration thus developed among the women from Carașova. Women were able to work in Austria and take care of their households in Carașova. The mechanism of migration was tied to kinship relations and job intermediation by acquaintances. This was often conducted by a number of women from Carașova.

If someone in your family would ask, you will of course find a job for her. But you also would try to find job offers if someone from the village would ask. There are women doing only that. They work there, have also acquaintances in Graz. They work for several families, they know people and know very well where to find jobs. (Vera, 36 years old)

The migration of men to Austria was more difficult mainly because there were fewer jobs for them. Men used to work in agriculture, but they took on different small jobs, such as home repairing, small workings in construction, plumbing, or repairing cars and agriculture equipment. They also engaged in farming activities in rural areas. These jobs were often intermediated by wives.
or relatives with access to Austrian or Croat employers. In addition, men and women worked temporarily in vineyards in the region of Burgenland. Employment lasted only a few months a year.

With expanding social relations in Austria and the learning of German, migration extended from Burgenland to the Western regions of Austria. In spite of this regional development, there is a substantial difference between men and women: while women find jobs easily, men face greater challenges. In both cases, nevertheless, the Croat ethnicity and the institutional links between Croat associations in Romania and Austria ensured additional opportunities of employment and migration. Bogdan’s story is revealing on how migration and labour opportunities were created when the ties between Croats in Romania and Austria developed:

I didn’t leave for long periods. I never went to work in Croatia, I was there only on vacation in 2000. I first went to Austria in 1997, [for] three weeks. It was a trip organized with the support of the Croat community in Austria, in Burgenland. We were a group of 40 [children]. We stayed at local families.

My mother was [one of the first who went to work] to Austria. She was there with some other women. After one year, half of the village went to Austria. I first went to work in 2005. A neighbor helped me going. I went as a professional football player, I had in mind to find a football team to play for. After a while I managed only to find something to work. It was a stone and marble company next to Salzburg. The same person who helped me going there offered me this job. He went to Austria in 1990 and had lots of friends there. One of his friends hired me to his company. They legalized my stay. We signed a labour contract after working three months without papers. I earned 1,470 euro a month. I worked 10 hours a day, sometimes even 12 or 14. On Saturdays, I used to work from 8 to noon. There were some other migrants there: one from Albania and one from Bosnia.

In 2008 I went to another region [in Austria] where I found work through my cousin. He already helped my brother with a job. My brother worked at a pig farm, the same place I obtained employment later. For three weeks, it was ok. Each of us earned 38 euros a day, plus accommodation and meals. I went there whenever they needed us. These employers hired only people from Carașova and we all worked legally. We stayed there seven or eight months a year and [then we came home]. (Bogdan, 29 years old)

Compared to the migration to Croatia, where Croat institutions played a major role in facilitating migration, migration to Austria was driven by migrants’ social ties: the ties to Austrian Croats, established through cultural exchanges, and the ties to friends, relatives and acquaintances in Carașova. For women, ethnicity was essential, as it enabled easy communication with Croat employers in Austria and helped them gaining their trust. The men’s migration is not as
intense as women’s. However, this case reveals how besides personal social networks, Croatian citizenship and ethnic belonging (in particular linguistic competence) played an important part in migration. Over the years, migrants from Carașova began learning German, which allowed them to have access to jobs in other parts of Austria and expand their social ties. Most of them, however, remained in the areas populated by ethnic Croats, and maintained practices of seasonal and temporary migrations.

Conclusions

In a casual talk in Carașova, one migrant said: "As long as things go well in Austria, everything is fine for us" (Bogdan, 29 years old). This utterance actually implied that the temporary pattern of migration, with migrants working in Austria but returning home, ensured families’ prosperity with no need to relocate abroad and adapt to new societies. For more than twenty years, Romanian Croats were involved in different forms of temporary migration. Migration enabled local households to avoid the deep economic crisis following the industrial collapse in the region. A large number of studies on Romanian migration reveal the importance of migrant networks for migration and migrants’ social incorporation in the countries of destination. Different from these studies, this paper shows that in certain cases, ethnicity was a major structural factor which enabled migration. Three broad mechanisms of migration, based on ethnicity, are here emphasized. First, linguistic competences conferred by ethnicity favored the migration to Serbia, as far as migrants were able to understand and speak Serbian, thereby setting up social ties to the Serbian population and Serbian employers. On the other hand, though, ethnicity disabled this migration when the war begun in the former Yugoslavia and Serbs started to fight the Croats. In the second stage, migration to Croatia was enabled by ethnicity, as it conferred *jus sanguinis* the status of Croat (invited) citizen. People from Carașova obtained the Croat citizenship, opening up the doors of social and economic incorporation. In Croatia, migrant networks functioned in this broad framework of opportunities and institutional support enabled by the Croat citizenship. Finally, ethnicity also was used as a mechanism of migration when people started to migrate to Austria. Migration was possible because of the ethnic activism of Croat minorities in both Austria and Romania.

These three cases thus cover different meanings to “ethnicity” in migration: ethnicity as access to language, providing easier access to job openings and social ties to locals; ethnicity as legal status enabling access to citizenship, rights and opportunities; and ethnicity as a form of transnational solidarity to co-ethnic minorities, providing access to supplementary forms of social trust enabled by minority organizations. In this context, migrant networks functioned as providers of opportunities in a context where ethnicity was a structuring factor of migration. For the group analyzed in this study, the cumulating of social resources – social
capital as networks and migrants’ ethnicity with its above-mentioned meanings—
granted the ease and success of migration, as well as the economic prosperity 
of migrants’ households.

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ABSTRACT*. This article investigates the migration of Romanians to Canada from its beginning at the turn of the twentieth century to its present dwindling numbers. It gives an account of the main waves of migration, through the lens of ethnicity. It shows how Romanian ethnicity was formed and continuously remade in Canada at different historical junctures and immigration regimes. The relational nature of ethnicity offers the possibility to investigate the work done by migration policies on individual subjectivity and social interaction.

Keywords: Immigration, Romanians, Canada, ethnicity, policy

Introduction
Romanian immigrants arrived for the first time to Canada at the end of the nineteenth century. They had been enticed by the promise of land, through a policy aimed to domesticate the country’s vast lands. Along the twentieth century and into the start of this century, Romanians have continued to come to Canada. Every lot of new immigrants carried the political conditions of their making into their new life, effecting distinct associations, perceptions, and subjectivities. They now form an ethnic population whose members often declare to be fractured, disunited, and suspicious. This article investigates the variable modes of immigrant Romanian ethnicity in Canada, in historical context.

It starts with an outlook of the Romanian ethnicity puzzle in Canada, as viewed from the church. Church exerts a centripetal force on the old and new Romanian Canadians, embodying the awareness of their ethnicity. The edifice of the church is metonymically related to their country of origin. Despite their considerably different experiences in and of Romania, and despite different
regimes of exit and reception, the country of origin, as abstract object, stays central for Romanian Canadians’ ethnic identity - both as a source of commonality, and as a constituting “other”.

The article then continues with the account of the three main waves of migration, unfolded during more than a century. The first wave emerged at the end of the nineteenth century and stalled right after World War One (WWI). The second wave of migration set off with the upheaval brought by World War Two (WWII) and continued during the communist rule in Romania. The present wave of migration is related to the transformations that followed the fall of the communist bloc. The account examines the way immigration conjunctures - where political regimes, migration policies, international commitments, and discourses of human worth interact, shaped Romanian ethnicity in Canada. The article concludes by discussing ethnicity as effected in situations of migration and points to its contingency on distinct state governmentalities and local social relations.

The study is based on empirical work done between 2008-2011 in the cities of Toronto and Windsor in the province of Ontario. It comprised examination of legislation, legal records, white and green papers, official statistics, census data, and mass media reports; immigrant publications, archival documents, literature containing accounts of immigration from Romania and other regions in Central and Eastern Europe, and internet forums of Romanians in Canada; interviewing and participant observation in the Romanian communities of the two cities.

**Group Portrait of Romanian Canadians with Church**

On the Pentecost Sunday, St George’s Romanian Orthodox cathedral in Windsor, Ontario barely contains the people gathered under its austere ceiling, reaching highest turnout of the year. More than two hundred people fill the pews, spilling out to the church’s entrance. About twenty small children attend the Sunday school downstairs. The older children have joined their parents in the nave. Most of them arrived from Romania after the fall of the communist regime in December 1989. They still wear clothes brought from their country. The whole sense of their bearing is marked by tension, grown out of always being on guard as to what the proper ways of doing things are. They are the “new immigrants” to Canada.

Alongside this rather youthful congregation sit a set of persons in their sixties or seventies. Unlike the former, who have recently become landed immigrants or Canadian citizens, they have been Canadians for a long time already. They are successfully integrated, by demeanour, speech, and acquaintance with Canadian institutions. They left Romania in the nineteen seventies or the nineteen eighties, and some have never returned yet. The Romania of today, almost two and a half decades after the fall of the communist regime, has definitively departed from Romania they carry inside, constitutive to what they are. These are the “old new immigrants”.
Among the crowd there are also several men and women of various age who do not speak Romanian and who seem both a bit aloof and a bit involved. They are the descendants of Romanian pioneer immigrants to Canada, the "old immigrants," whose reunion group pictures in sepia adorn church's main hall. Wonderfully foreign to recent Romanian immigrants, they are most familiar to the church. Set up back in 1914, the church's present building was erected with their money. Through them, the long history of Romanian presence in Canada is embodied.

While the church only reaches high attendance on Easter day, the Pentecost, and the Christmas Eve, the congregation joins several times a year in communal lunches held in the social hall, to mark religious dates. On St. Elijah (Sf. Ilie), car owners and drivers park their cars with the front to the church's entry, and open the doors and the hood wide to receive full blessing from the priest. In June, the church hosts the Romanian Village, Romanians' "ethnic" contribution to Windsor's Carousel of Nations, the all-city festival of Canadian multiculturalism. Dressed in standardized folkloric attire, they cook and sell “traditional” food, perform Romanian dances on the stage raised in the park lot in front of the church, exhibit various old artefacts brought to Canada across time, and hang around picking up news and gossips, job hints and well wishes.

The religious service is performed in both Romanian and English, a strange mix made even more so by the priest's linguistic clumsiness and the format of the liturgy. The bilingual arrangement reveals the wish to cater for all immigrants, both the new ones, who can only imagine orthodoxy in Romanian, and the descendants of old Romanian Canadians, who have always known it in English. It also points to the divides among the different types of Romanians gathered in the church. They are temporal divides, exposing the work of different historical contexts and immigration regimes on people. Thus, common words have come to mean different things for immigrants who landed in Canada twenty years apart, or for immigrants of the past fifty years and the Romanian origin Canadian born.

When one of the new immigrants, freshly returned from a visit to Romania, was asked after the service by an elderly lady, an old new immigrant: “How are they, the Romanians, doing?” she answered, clearly annoyed by the question: “How can they be doing? We are Romanians all, just like they are!” And the reply came: “Yes, but we are here now...” The “Romanians” she implied were still marked by the country's post-war misfortunes, by communism, by backwardness. In fact, these immigrants very often depict Romanians and Romania just as they have left it, whether in the nineteen seventies or in the nineteen eighties. Moreover, they mobilize the discursive formations of the time, or, if updated, combined with the present hegemonic anti-communist discourse.2 When they finally get to visit Romania, they are perplexed. Very

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2 For this perspective see Sîrbu and Polgár (2009) and the debates on the platforms criticatac.ro and protokoll.ro.
concretely, in their practical relationality with the people there, and apart of any abstract reflection upon the changes the society went through, they cannot confirm their representations. "I will never bring presents to my friends in Romania again," told me an old new immigrant lady, landed in Canada in 1987, when she returned from her third or fourth visit to Romania in twenty five years. "They have everything, and of much better quality than I can buy here in Canada. I felt ashamed with my gifts, they not needed them..." The phenomenon of city-sprawling, while taken for granted in Canada, has been an object of much debate for the case of Bucharest: "We had to take the car to get to the city centre. Fortunately, our host (who lived in a new villa outside the city limits of Bucharest) had two cars."

But temporal divides among Canadian Romanians are doubled by "temporal" divides within the Romanian Orthodox denomination. The cathedral in Windsor belongs to the Romanian Orthodox Archdiocese in the Americas (ROAA), the missionary diocese of the Church of Romania in North America. This is distinct from the Romanian Orthodox Episcopate of America (ROEA), since 1960 one of the three ethnic dioceses of the Orthodox Church in America (former Russian Orthodox Greek Catholic Church in America).

ROEA was the original episcopate set by the Church of Romania in America in 1929. The ascent of the communist rule after WWII brought increasing interference of the political in Church's affairs. In 1947, the American episcopate rejected the new bishop elected and sent to the United States by the Holy Synod, after the bishop in function had been detained in Romania and prevented to return to his post. A period of struggles and confusion followed, shaped by interpretations, significations, and re-enactments of the old Statutes of the episcopate. In 1950, another body formed in the support of the claimant bishop, and associated as an ecclesiastical corporation in the state of Michigan. However, he continued to assert to represent the original episcopate, not the new one chartered in 1950. At the Congress held in Chicago in July 1951, the delegates elected a bishop co-adjutor to lead the episcopate until the return of its bishop still confined in Romania. The complete schism was achieved with the ordaining of the elected bishop co-adjutor by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the United States, and with the United States Court of Appeals' decision that the episcopate be completely autonomous administratively and canonically from the Romanian Orthodox Patriarchate, and that the bishop sent by the Holy Synod "has not borne the burden of proof in showing that he has been elected or consecrated as bishop of the episcopate" (US Court of Appeals, 205 F.2d 107, 1953, paragraph 34).3

3 The United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit, 205 F.2d 107 of May 29, 1953 and amended on July 3, 1953, paragraph 34. See also the United States District Court N. D. Ohio, E. D., Civ. No. 27916, 20 F.Supp. 183 (1952), of July 8, 1952. For a detailed history of the struggles for the souls of Romanians in North America see Bobango (1979).
The religious landscape of Romanians in Canada is thus marbled by the division within the Romanian Orthodox denomination. Its pattern is however more complicated than that. Due to the Orthodox Church’s protracted response to the requests of the first wave of immigrants for priests ordained in Romania, the first priests sent from the country to serve in the United States and Canada were Uniates (of Eastern rite Greek Catholic Church in Transylvania, dating from 1697). Romanian Uniates in Canada now attend Eastern rite Ukrainian Catholic or Western rite Roman Catholic parishes, as the Uniate Eparchy in North America does not have parishes in Canada. Finally, there are many neo-protestant churches attended by Romanians, some of them on an exclusive basis. A phenomenon manifested of late is that of small tight communities of Romanian immigrants, who decided to bring priests from Romania by themselves.\(^4\) Having experienced high levels of anxiety, hardship, and dislocation, and having lost trust in both the rest of the Romanian “community” and the representatives of the church, they practice a form of integration into the Canadian society through thoroughly controlled in-group solidarity.

Despite these multi-faceted temporal divides, there is no question that all the groups and categories of people portrayed here consider themselves Romanians, and are considered Romanians by all the other. Romanian ethnicity in Canada presents itself in a multitude of forms, but is undergirded by a number of elements: the common place of origin and the memory of it, mythified by the trauma of migration, irrespective of how wanted or expected or anticipated was the move; the constant relevance of language at first generation migrants, as a cultural element that permanently re-makes boundaries, whether from the inside or from the other side; and the patterns of sociality, such as commensality, that re-enacted in Canada become patterns of solidarity.

I use ethnicity as a relational concept, designating a reality that emerges out of human mobility and interaction. Groups become ethnic through contact with others perceived as “culturally” different (Eriksen, 1993: 11-12). The experience of alterity generates re-signification of everyday acts, re-orchestration of relations, and formation of a sense of distinction supported by a subjective commonality of feeling (Eriksen, 1993:12; Weber, 1997[1922]: 18). In this research, an ethnic group is one that has developed a “consciousness of kind” (Weber, 1997[1922]: 17), out of differences created through subjective meaning and practices into which they get embedded.

In both its practical and its symbolic dimensions, ethnicity is political. When ethnicity becomes the organisational principle of states, it manifests in two ways. As identity, it is essentialized and made “cultural”, expressed through language, phenotype, artefacts, symbols, and claim over a territory. As alterity, it

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\(^4\) One should note that the Romanian Patriarchate does not pay wages for its priests overseas. These initiatives belong both to Orthodox Romanians and to Romanians of other denominations.
is used as an instrument of exclusion, marking on, distancing, boundary-making. In situations of migration the relation of ethnicity subsumed by nationhood recasts otherness as *ethnic minority*. There is an asymmetry of power in the relation between nationals and immigrants, predicated through the state, which makes immigrants an object of possible acts of assimilation, integration, accommodation, and positive action. It is not a demographic asymmetry, but one of power relations, as manifested in the position of the *colonial*, the *subaltern*, the *racial*, or the *primitive other*.

The memory of the experience of migration, as accumulative and discursive practice, is constitutive to historical settlements of immigrants. They are also permanently recreated through administrative categories, classifications, regulations, procedures, operations and institutions used by the states to manage the presence of immigrants on their territories. Immigrants are thus made into nominal ethnic groups, for themselves and for the native-born. They all perform ethnicity through enactment of policies that take immigrants and relations with immigrants as their object.

The following sections give a historical account of Romanian immigration to Canada. I show how the interplay of different political regimes, migration policies, and localities of social relations produced specific modes of being ethnic Romanian in Canada.

**The first wave: promised land**

The first immigrants from Romanian lands arrived in Canada in 1898, from the village of Boian in Bukovina. They were Ichim Yurko (Ichim Jurcă) and Elie Raviuk (Iliuță Rauliuc) with his wife and four year old daughter. They were soon joined by other thirty one families from the same village. By January 1901, in the district of Boian, Alberta, named after their origin place, around one hundred Romanian families were settled (Popescu, 1986; Zawadiuk et al., 1998). Small communities of Romanians formed in the surrounding area, about 100 kilometers North-East of Edmonton; in Saskatchewan, North-East and South-West of Regina; and along the Saskatchewan-Manitoba border. Until 1921, about 30,000 Romanians settled in Canada’s prairie (Patterson, 1999). Most of them came from Bukovina, as well as Transylvania and Banat, parts of Austria-Hungary at the time; ten percent came from Bulgaria, Macedonia, Greece; only five percent came from the Kingdom of Romania (Patterson, 1977: 13; Patterson, 1999; Popescu, 1986). Romanians were lured from their homes to Canada by the offer of 160 acres of land in exchange for building a home, breaking thirty acres of land, cultivating crops, and actual residence on the homestead.6

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5 This section follows closely Culic (2012).
6 *Dominion Lands Act*, 1872.
In 1897, Minister of Interior Clifford Sifton visited Bukovina and Galicia in a campaign intended to encourage peasants to come to Canada. Member of the recently formed Liberal government (1896) which had pledged to populate Canada’s West and transform it into the country’s granary, he had a clear depiction of the required immigrants:

> When I speak of quality I have in mind, I think, something that is quite different from what is in the mind of the average writer or speaker upon the question of Immigration. I think a stalwart peasant in a sheep-skin coat, born on the soil, whose forefathers have been farmers for ten generations, with a stout wife and a half-dozen children, is good quality. (Sifton, 1922: 32)

Exactly such were the first immigrants from historical Romanian lands. Before WWI, more than 8,000 Romanians had come to Canada. By 1921, their number increased to almost 30,000 (Patterson, 1999). Most of them came from Bukovina, and together with Transylvania, the two provinces accounted for 85% of Romanian immigration to Canada up until the 1920 (Patterson, 1999). The typical passage of the peasants and their families had them set off in carts to borderland stations, from where they took the train to Hamburg or Bremen. Embarked on passenger steamships or cattle boats, they arrived in Halifax, and then crossed Canada by train to Winnipeg, whose Immigration Hall functioned as the gateway to the West. From there they travelled to their destination by whatever means available: trains, wagons, horses, or by foot.

While national legislation and police regulations generally made it difficult to advertise and recruit immigrants from most continental European countries, booking agents, motivated by the commissions from steamship companies and bonuses from the Canadian government, developed knowledge and skills to evade them (Petryshyn and Dzubak, 1985: 50-3; Petryshyn, 1997). State officials and their private enterprising associates in the origin lands used vigorous advertising, propaganda, and networking to organize groups of families for the passage.7 The Austrian administration helped through liberally issuing one-year temporary passports to young people, while entertaining hopes that the peasants would engage on a round-trip. Bankers deemed subsidizing immigrants more lucrative for the return of their investments through cash flows and remittances, than borrowing money for farm-improvement (Rasporich, 1982: 36). Through its agents operating in many European locations, the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) offered packages of passage over sea, work, and land at relatively low prices. Fellow villagers already landed in Canada were the most efficient device of

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this complex assemblage in convincing peasants to embark in this adventure, whose reward was extensive land of their own.

Their historically specific experience of living in an imperial borderland made peasants from Bukovina, rather than from other regions of what was to become Greater Romania, embark to Canada. The changes in political administration, multiethnic cohabitation, complex class, ethnic, and political relationships, and intense contact between village and town shaped their availability for huge, life-changing projects (Barton, 1975: 1-90; Bobango, 1979: 3-4). The names of the first recorded Romanian immigrants to Canada, mentioned at the beginning of this section, are not Romanian, but Ukrainian. Many of the family names of those first pioneers from Bukovina, whose tombstones rest in the prairie cemeteries, sound Ukrainian: Hlopina, Holovaci, Moscaliuc, Porojnic, Petruniuk, Romanko, Săvâliuc, Seminiuk, Soprovici, Zaharichuk. Yet, their third and fourth generation descendants declare themselves of Romanian origin at present day Canadian census surveys, and work to promote their version of Romanianness through enactments of a collective memory of migration (Popescu, 1986; Asociația Română din Canada, http://www.arcanada.org; Canadian Romanian Society of Alberta, Edmonton-Boian, http://www.canadianromaniansocietyofalberta.org).

Ukrainians were the most numerous ethnic group in Bukovina at the beginning of the twentieth century. At the 1910 census, those who declared themselves Ukrainian represented 38.4 per cent of the population, followed by Romanians with 34.4 per cent, 12 per cent Jews, 9 per cent Germans, and others, including Poles and Hungarians (Livezeanu, 1995: 49). Moved to Bukovina from Galicia in great numbers in the second half of the nineteenth century, the majority of them were peasants, and were not recognized politically. By contrast, Romanians had historically enjoyed representation in the government of the duchy and cultural rights. But those who settled in the same districts and regions of Canada intermarried, whether Romanian or Ukrainian, and used the Romanian language to communicate. They experienced the same tough conditions of grim weather, arduous work in the fields, loneliness, and isolation. The need for cash and food forced them into schemes where the man worked at the CPR or in the cities for several months a year, while the wife lived in the homestead with the children, off a household – garden and sod house – strenuous to manage. (Popescu, 1986; Patterson, 1977). The shortage of Orthodox priests, and the bad quality of the monks sent to Canada by the Metropolitanate of Moldova, in Romania, made Romanians turn to the help of Ukrainians to build their churches and serve in them as priests (Bobango, 1979).

Alongside “Romanian” and “Ukrainians”, other fellow adventurers arrived around the same period from Bukovinian lands. In 1882, a group of Volga Germans, relocated to Bukovina after 1871 for fear of drafting and dwindling privileges, came to work for the CPR and build their farms (Patterson, 1977: 8, 17). A report
to the Parliament of the Dominion of Canada from 1891 (House of Commons Canada, 1891: 97, 98) describing several German colonies in the West, around McLean, north of Balgonie Station, refers to Romanian speaking Germans, and to Russian or Romanian types of dwelling built by these pioneers. A number of Szeklers, a Hungarian people that lives overwhelmingly in three counties of present-day Romania, came from Bukovina to settle in the same areas of the prairie. Bukovinian Ashkenazi Jews have started to migrate to Canada’s West in the 1870s and continued to come, joined by fellow Romanian Jews from Basarabia and the province of Moldova. Many of them spoke Romanian, and Romanian functioned as *lingua franca* in places like the Dysart region in Saskatchewan, where they all settled (Patterson, 1977: 18-19).

The commonality of practices and arrangements entailed by the terms of their cohabitation in Canada, and the commonality of political and economic regimes experienced in the country of origin, partly account for their formation into an ethnic group self-denominated as Romanian. It was initially prompted by their struggles with the Canadian authorities over the allocation of land sections, as they strived to settle in compact areas. The solidarity grown out of cooperation and dependence needed for sheer survival, and the shared language and memory of native land were the matter of the Romanian ethnicity formed on Canadian soil. This becoming as Romanians was also mediated by WWI, as a few men joined the Canadian Forces and celebrated postwar Greater Romania, enlarged with Bukovina, Bessarabia, Transylvania, Partium, and the Romanian Banat, as their homeland (see accounts in Popescu, 1986). The experience of the war and Romanian nationalism ignited through parts of North America by diplomats and Orthodox clerics triggered the transformation of “home”, which for most immigrants meant their street, village, or region, into the “homeland” or “vechea țară” (the Old Country). The narratives of Romanian identity, homeland, and ethnic origin, and the works that edify them, whether internal, such as the building of Romanian Orthodox churches, or external, through state-generated categories of ethnic origin, document Romanian ethnicity in Canada.

Most of the descendants of the first pioneers from Bukovina, while collecting the stories of their parents and grandparents, and while recollecting their own experiences as sons and daughters of tamers of Canada’s West, ground their narrative construction on a foundational error. They claim that the village of

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8 See the ethnic distribution on the quarter sections of the *Dominion Lands Survey*, e.g. in Luciuk & Hryniuk (1991), Popescu (1986), Rasporich (1982). “Galicians” were mentioned most often in discussions concerning the quality of immigrants and the location of their land entries. See for example *House of Commons Canada*, 1900: 10186-7.

9 See the successful political tour of Reverend and President of the “League for the Political Unity of all Romanians” as reflected, for example, in the newspaper *America*, issues of July-September 1917 and March 1918.
Boian, the hearth of the original Romanian immigration to Canada, now in Ukraine, belonged, at the genetic time of their arrival, to Romania. This slip of memory stands as an act of collective baptism. It aligns a specific awareness of cultural distinction historically contoured in a multinational empire, with a national project materialized in a “state of Romanians” - Greater Romania - which would incorporate their land as one of its own historical lands, and with an identity that had to be settled in the new country, to clear the lasting confusion of officials at entry points which had been recording them alternatively as Austrians, Germans, Romanians, Ukrainians, Ruthenians, Hungarians, or Russian (Popescu, 1986; Woodsworth, 1972).

This identity supported the life chances and the sense of self of migrants and their descendants by reflecting their increasingly well-placed position in a hierarchy of racialized ethnicities and nations. Until 1962, Canada practiced various immigration politics of exclusion based on racial, national, and cultural grounds (customs, habits, and modes of life), geographical area of origin, unsuitability with regard to the climate (euphemistic formulation for “race”), potential for assimilation, and others. The Immigration Act of 1906 aimed to prevent “undesirable immigrants” by adding restrictions and expanding categories of the “prohibited”, and by giving the government legal authority to deport immigrants within two years of landing for reasons including disease, becoming a public charge, or “moral turpitude”. The 1910 Immigration Act gave huge discretion to the government to regulate immigration through Orders in Council, and furthermore increased restrictions and grounds of deportation. Immigration fell dramatically during WWI. When in 1923, after the post-war period of economic low, Canada started again to encourage immigration, Romanians, as nationals of non-preferred countries, were admitted only as agriculturalists, farm labourers, domestics, and sponsored family members. From the few accounts of the early migration of Romanians to Canada, no hostility from the locals’ part or from “Canadians” themselves was shown toward them. In contrast, the more numerous histories, memoirs, and studies of the Ukrainian first immigration to Canada (mostly from Galicia and Bukovina) are marked by traumatic reports of negative reception as “non-preferred continentals” - dirty, garlic-smelling, filthy, drunken, penniless, ignorant, holding unintelligent methods of farming (e.g. Czumer, 1981; Woodworth, 1972). Romanians distinguished themselves expanding the boundary of whiteness and locality through hard work, industriousness, and self-improvement. These peasants which were “of exceptionally

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10 The fact that the Greater Romania was a multinational state itself with almost one third of the population belonging to national minorities is effaced by Romanian nationalist ideology and by Romanian becoming unmarked for ethnic Romanians. The proportion of ethnic Romanians at the 1930 Census was 71.9. See Populaţia pe Neamuri, 1930: XXIV.

11 Subsequently three, respectively five years after landing.
fine physique” and “good quality” as fodder for the domestication of the great prairie stayed peasants, and many of their children became farmers, on increasingly larger holdings of land. Other of their children, and almost all of the following generations moved to the cities into liberal professions, business, services, or administration.

The narrative about an earlier Romanian ethnicity in Canada is built on the stories of adversity of the first pioneers.

When my father arrived there [to his allotted land section, in Southern Saskatchewan] there was nothing, nothing. Only the sky and the ground [...] They were all given a square mile for ten dollars. But the weeds were this deep [she shows the length of her arm], the rocks were this big [she shows the height of her thigh], the mothers all went to pick the rocks, put them on the stone boat, and dug the weeds, and plough was two oxen. (Filmed interview from 2005 with Dorothy Nicholson, born in Canada in 1915 to a father who immigrated in 1907)12

During the great depression, and in the following years, hardships multiplied, as various natural disasters stroke parts of the prairie inhabited by Romanians. Storm, dust and wind, Russian thistle, and grasshoppers are mentioned by this interviewee for successive years between 1932 and 1937. Many Romanians from Alberta and Saskatchewan moved to Montréal, Toronto, Hamilton, Kitchener, or Windsor to survive economic bankruptcy and draught. The Canadian government paid relief to those who remained on the land ($32 per month for a family of twelve, and piles of flour and beans). WWII however produced greatest dislocations. Most Romanian men joined the army, while women took employment in factories in the cities. Very few returned to the farms, and when they did, they went back as university graduates, utilizing modern means of agriculture.

The narrative was thus fixed by a final departure from an early experience of farming in the prairie. In the late 1980s and 1990s the third and fourth generation of Romanians have started to collect, talk, write, and perform accounts of a Romanian identity and ethnicity in Canada. While the (otherwise antiquated and dialectal) language was lost to English, and Romanians assimilated to an urban Canadian society, the narrative became separated from their actual ongoing experiences, cemented into a myth, and started an autonomous existence of its own. Memories of Greater Romania, to which Bukovina belonged between the wars, and of communist Romania never visited, grew on a Romanian identity sported on particular occasions, linked mostly

12 Courtesy Cristina Stamate from YMCA/ Immigration services, Windsor, Ontario. See also the tens of accounts collected by Ion Longin Popescu in 1983 from survivors of the first Romanian immigrants to Canada (Popescu, 1986).
with the Canadian state and the policy of multiculturalism. It was activated when now hyphenated Romanian-Canadians went to church, where the service, for convenience, was held in English. It was also activated in lucrative commercial ventures (opening an ethnic restaurant), or social gatherings (balls, social clubs, local events celebrating the Canadian mosaic). The myth and its narrative went hand in hand with the census administrative category of ethnic origin – one of the peculiar pillars of the evolving Canadian multiculturalism policy.\textsuperscript{13} It contributed to preserve the name of "Romanian" relevant in various contexts of identification, and to invest it with the positive impressions of these people's social achievement.

The early Romanian ethnicity in Canada evolved at the junction of Canada and Romania’s state-building projects. Confederation Canada aimed to populate the immense lands it had acquired from CPR with “able-bodied men who are willing to work and can work” (Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier in Parliament, House of Commons Canada, 1900: 10187). This was part of a larger National Policy, whereby agriculture established by farmer immigrants would support and complement industry in the rest of country, helped by the newly completed Atlantic-Pacific railway and the tariffs policy. It consolidated a transcontinental nation, threatened by an ever-expanding United States of America. In Austria-Hungary and Romania, national struggles were shaped by modernisation forces acting in contradictory ways. Many immigrants who left for Canada were not poor and destitute, as the story would tell it, but socially mobile, in possession of land and implements, open to commercial ventures with the city, and holding multiple cultural ties. Their passage was part of larger plans made possible by the transformations in social and economic relations, citizenship regimes, and types of subjectivity. Unable to return due to costs of travel, the start of WWI, and the definitive establishment on Canadian soil through the toils of the first years on their granted land, their relationship with Greater Romania remained mythical and emotional.

The first layer of Romanian ethnicity in Canada, formed out of the original wave of immigration, is now weaved into a larger setting, as illustrated by the Pentecost opening scene. The following waves of Romanian immigration to Canada grafted new objects, practices and meanings onto the original field of Romanian ethnicity. The following two sections present briefly the distinct cultural forms inflected upon Romanian ethnicity in Canada by the second and third waves of immigration.

\textsuperscript{13} For the use and consequences of census ethnic categories, single and hyphenated, see Howard-Hassmann, 1999; Boyd and Norris, 2001. For criticism of Canada’s multiculturalism policy see Bibby, 1990; Bissoondath, 1994. For a critical analysis of Canada’s politics of citizenship, nationhood and multiculturalism see Thobani, 2007.
The second wave: the oppressed, the communists, and the unbearable lightness of being

The Canadian Immigration Act of 1952 allowed large administrative discretion, giving the Governor in Council the power to make regulations that could restrict or limit access based on a multitude of criteria: literacy, non-continuous journey to Canada, ethnicity, nationality, class, occupation, peculiar customs, habits, modes of life or methods of holding property, unsuitability to the climatic, economic, social, industrial, educational, labour, health or other conditions in Canada or country of origin, probable inability to become readily assimilated. "Visible minority" immigrant admissions were very limited or averted altogether, while independent skilled immigrants from non-preferred nationalities (most of the South European, Central and South American countries) were sidelined by limiting access to sponsored relatives. By the end of the 1950s, the immigration officials’ acknowledgment that sustained immigration benefited the economy and society of Canada even through sheer population growth clashed with Department of Labour’s short-term interest in filling the skilled labour needs of a dynamic economy and its worries about the big influx of unskilled persons generated by "family class" sponsorship (Kelley and Trebilcock, 1998: 329; Green and Green, 2004; Hawkins, 1972: 102-6). At the same time, Canada’s self-identification as a progressive liberal democracy embracing the rule of law, and its position within an international normative setting observant of human rights, found its immigration policy increasingly slated for its racial inequality and discrimination (Triadafilopoulos, 2010).

In 1962, Canada abandoned formally all white racist immigration policy, and in 1966 a task force was mandated to devise admission rules governed by the principle of universality, employing standard criteria of selection. The proposed system identified a set of factors determining a person’s capacity to successfully settle in Canada, which were operationally defined and ascribed specific weight through "assessment points". It provided immigration officers an instrument to judge applicants in a consistent way, eliminating racial bias. Missing a permanent place in the whole system and implemented only as a matter of emergency, the admission of refugees reinforced the notion of immigration as a tool for economic policy.

Wary of admission of refugees, Canada reluctantly started to accept them in the years following WWII, on an exceptional basis. Refugees were considered by economic, ethnic, and political criteria, and required to be in good

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health. A sentiment that Canada should approach admission and resettlement of refugees as a permanent commitment and active practice contoured after several successful resettlements of refugees from Hungary (1956-7) and Czechoslovakia (1968-9). On June 4, 1969 Canada acceded to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol. The Immigration Act of 1976 set the system in its present form, organized around three admission categories: independent (or economic) class, dominated by the Federal Skilled Worker category; Family class; and refugees (Protected Persons, and Humanitarian and Compassionate categories). The independent class represents the backbone of the whole system, and it is expected that its economic contribution will offset the costs incurred by the others.

This was the context that allowed most Romanian immigrants to come to Canada during the communist regime. Their arrival was furthermore supported by an interest-free Assisted Passage Loan Scheme (1951), aimed to assist financially immigrants from Europe whose services were urgently needed and who could not afford their own transportation; and by the creation of the designated class of East European Self-Exiled Persons (1979), which facilitated the resettlement to Canada of people who met the assessment criteria. About half of those who came to Canada during this time (see Table 1) enjoyed the status of protected persons (refugees). Almost similar numbers came under the Family class. The other half were admitted under the Federal Skilled Worker and Family classes, in roughly equal parts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Romania</th>
<th>Country of Last Residence</th>
<th>Country of Citizenship</th>
<th>Country of Birth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946-1955</td>
<td>6,049</td>
<td>8,780</td>
<td>13,143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956-1965</td>
<td>926</td>
<td>782</td>
<td>5,546</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-1975</td>
<td>1,128</td>
<td>1,146</td>
<td>4,670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-1985</td>
<td>6,083</td>
<td>3,978</td>
<td>8,360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986-1989</td>
<td>5,865</td>
<td>4,565</td>
<td>6,418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 1946-89</td>
<td>20,051</td>
<td>19,251</td>
<td>38,137</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Canadian official data filed arrivals from an individual country in three of its instances, as country of birth, country of last residence, and country of nationality. For the first decade after the war, 1946-1955, the number of immigrants born in Romania was more than twice the number of immigrants whose country of last residence was Romania, and one and half the number of Romanian nationals. The figures for the next decade, 1956-1965, are sharper. While only 926 persons immigrated to Canada from Romania and even fewer, 782, held Romanian nationality, there were recorded 5,546 landed immigrants born in Romania. Historical records and ethnographic data indicate that the non-resident non-national Romanian born immigrants were denationalized Jews who managed to leave Romania and find shelter in another country or moved to the state of Israel, from where they submitted an immigration application under the regulations of the time; and former Romanian born citizens who lost their citizenship by fleeing the country, were received in detention camps in various states of Europe such as Austria, Germany, or Greece, and were recommended to be admitted as refugees and given protected persons status by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (until 1947), the International Refugee Organization (until 1952), and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Very few Romanian nationals and Romanian residents came in the period of restrictionist, racist, and discriminatory legislation introduced in 1952, equally deterred by the restrictionist exit regime in their home country. They most likely arrived in Canada through the Family Sponsorship program and as privately sponsored refugees.

Figures remained very low in the decade of 1966-1975, with 4,670 immigrants born in Romania, 1,128 with Romania as last residence, and 1,146 Romanian nationals. A significant number of Romanians resettled to Canada under the East European Self-Exiled Persons designated class 1979-1989, doubling the figures of the previous decade. The last four years of the communist regime, 1986-1989, saw an influx of Romanian nationals, Romanian born, and residents of Romania. The majority of the immigrants arrived in the last decade of the communist rule in Romania were granted refugee status and were meticulously cared for by the authorities: they were transported within Canada, given accommodation, helped find jobs, and granted low interest credits. Unlike immigrants of earlier decades, who arrived after long years of liminality in foreign camps or transient in various passage countries, most of them had been embedded in the structures of the communist regime and a few of them had held privileged positions therein. This was a bitter rift to separate two different generations of Romanians, which came to broadly define themselves as “anti-communists resisters” and “communists”. As the social status of both suffered painful deterioration, the fact that one party was forced to emigrate, and had to struggle for themselves in a landscape indifferent to their arrival, while the other chose a convenient exit facilitated exactly by their position within the communist structure and were welcome and supported as political refugees, made all the difference in the (new) world.
The brands of nostalgia traversing these immigrants left different inscriptions on them and contentious claims to authenticity, patriotism, and relation with their mother country. They were forbidden access to Romania during the communist regime and were stripped of Romanian citizenship. This loss justified, on the one hand, a resilience to maintain a purity of their ethnic identity as an objective property of the person, and the injunction to actively promote it in such propitious policy environment. Being Romanian meant to keep one’s sense of distinction - where distinction also borne the honour diacritic. On the other hand, it acted as a permanent push to prove oneself, in order to make sense of a destiny one could no longer control. Being Romanian meant to succeed in the new country. While “resisters” exerted efforts to recreate bits of Romania in Canada reminiscent of the interwar autochtonism practiced by the Legionary Movement, such as the national celebrations associated with the Romanian Camp at Val David, ‘communists’ often maintained their claim to Romanianness by recasting their former power position as a location which had allowed them to influence political decision in a meaningful and good way.

They all integrated within the Canadian labour market, and their children readily assumed the hyphenated identity, becoming “Canadian first, then Romanian”. Their small numbers and subdued arrival, and the dual character of their position at the same time provisional and definitive, made the second wave of Romanians little inclined to associate or cultivate intense interaction, other than very localized. While serving opposed versions of political Romanianness, the authenticity of their ethnicity, in the sense of spontaneous and unquestioned recognition of the commonality of origin, was never doubted and was grounded in the common state of Romania and the common hope for its liberation from dictatorship.

The separation of ethnicity from the politics of nation materialized in yet another category of immigrants that came to Canada in the late 1980s. Petty speculators, failed fleers, unemployed individuals – the system’s “maladjusted” – were beaten up and then ejected by the communist state as political refugees in Canada (see also Patterson, 1985: 496). These immigrants, equally maladjusted in Canada, represented the otherness that all the more thickened the sense of commonality among the second wave Romanian immigrants. The interaction with the newly arrived after 1989, however, will push them back into the institutional and symbolic field of ethnicity.

The third wave: the loneliness of the long-distance immigrant

The two-decade post-communist history of Romania can perhaps be written as a story of mobility. The dislocation of economic and social structures provided massive occasion for people’s movement within reconfiguring social spaces. First, the crumbling of the state-run enterprises generated unprecedented workplace mobility and compelled individuals into private entrepreneurship and redundancy. Second, as various governments negotiated Romania’s integration
into European political structures, Romanians experienced increasingly fortified international migration regimes and tightening rules of exit. Third, with the country’s repositioning into the globalized world, inscriptions of evolving “scapes” made possible a particular imagery and possibility of the West and the larger world (Appadurai, 1996).

Local practices of communist times could be inflected at expanded scale, and international labour migration became the functional equivalent of commuting from village to town for work. One of my subjects, who immigrated to Canada, and then returned to Romania, expressed in striking words this rupture in scale: “We thought in Romania nothing worked. [...] We sold the apartment and left straight to Canada. Our mistake and others’ as well was that we did not think that we could try to find work someplace else in the country. [...] This is the mistake Romanians make: they do not know their country. They go directly to Canada, without knowing that in [city of Romania] there are cinemas, work places, bigger wages. They are called by overseas fantasies.” By mid nineteen nineties immigration to Canada had colonized the imaginary of many Romanians. They started to leave for Canada by thousands.

And Canada wanted them. A special report to Parliament presented by the Minister of Employment and Immigration in 1985 showed that fertility rates had fallen below the population replacement level. It also urged the government to lift the bar for applicants lacking arranged employment and increase the economic class component, though not at the expense of the other two classes. By 1992 Canada committed to stable annual inflows of about one percent of the existing population. In 1993 it increased it to 250,000 despite poor labour market. It thus marked a clear break with the “absorptive capacity” policy that had previously guided immigration levels. The switch from the model of occupation-demand micro-management to a broader “human capital” model materialised in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) of 2002.18 By changing the structure of the assessment points scheme, it aimed to approach in a dynamic way the labour market demands of a knowledge-based economy, by supplying immigrants who have flexible and transferable skills, and are flexible and transferable from job to job.

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18 The Canadian immigration policy went through important changes since 2008. In brief, these are: economic immigration was refocused to short-term needs, by restricting and fast-tracking applications under the Federal Skilled Worker class to persons who have offers of arranged employment in Canada, or work experience in one of only thirty-eight occupations considered in demand; there was created a new fast-track Canadian Experience class to support those who have been legally residing in Canada for at least one year as temporary foreign workers or international students to settle as permanent residents; the Provincial Nominee Program was liberalized and diversified; the Temporary Foreign Worker Program was expanded to expedite employers’ supply of workers for difficult jobs.
This policy suited a certain category of young people - in their late twenties and thirties at landing, highly educated, moved by a deep urge of professional achievement, and a sense of adventure (Culic, 2010). They held a middle-class notion of well-being, accomplishment, and professional propriety, which encountered in the Canadian immigration policy a means to be achieved. If in 1990 the Federal Skilled Worker (FSW) class represented 17% of Romanian immigrants, with the rest distributed in the Refugee and Family classes, its weight rose dramatically in a few years, to reach 84% in 2004. Most of the third wave immigrants to Canada belong to this category of people, men and women, with their families. Those who came in the Family class, representing almost all of the rest of the immigrants, are their parents and spouses.

Getting selected for a FSW visa requires patient waiting. Due to the limited capacity of the Immigration Section of the Embassy of Canada in Bucharest, by mid two thousands the average FSW visa application processing time had raised to forty eight months. But migration starts earlier and lasts longer. From the moment the decision to immigrate is made to the actual landing in Canada, a whole course of transformations unfolds. Preparing the application file occasions a full examination of the self in order to make one’s biography legible by the Canadian bureaucratic rationality. Filling out forms, legalizing papers that document one’s life achievements, applying for security clearances, and assessing one’s financial worth have a perspectival effect. The applicant gets objectified through self-reconstruction as a desirable subject in terms of the Canadian immigration policy.

The indeterminate temporality of the waiting period creates a space of practices that comprises embassies and consulates, interview hotel rooms, cultural institutes and language centres, immigration firms and NGOs, doctors and hospitals, translators, and internet networks through which information and emotions flow. Applicants inscribe dispositions on their bodies and minds. They alter relationships with family, friends, and colleagues. They create themselves as subjects of the new state, through a form of anticipatory socialization with the Canadian space (Culic, 2010). Such remaking of the self effects a specific type of actual immigrant. Post-communist Romanian immigrants to Canada are inclined to refashion themselves as Canadians in all ways. Their children, both those born in Romania, and those born in Canada, speak mostly English. The conversational Romanian the children might eventually pick up, and then forget, is due to grandparents coming periodically from Romania to help with the household.

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19 Figures computed by author from electronic datasets available at the University of Toronto Data Library Service. 2004 is the most recent year for which data broken by country and immigration class are available.
There is a particular *habitus* of post-communist immigrants from Romania, supported by established structures of interaction and rituals of settlement. One of its blatant forms is buying a large house and cultivating a perfect turf in front of it as soon as some economic stability is obtained, even though it usually can’t be afforded or objectively needed. There is a compulsory feeling that this is expected by the more or less imagined community of fellow middle-class minded immigrants. There is also a subjective injunction coming from family and friends at home, for whom the only sense of their departure resides in acquiring displayable prosperity in the shortest time. The trauma of immigration is soothed by a solid sense of achievement, which can only be maintained by freezing their representation of Romania at the moment their departure. Post-communist Romanian immigrants quickly develop a sense of distinction by adjudicating hierarchies of cultural, racial, and ethnic groups. The perplexity and shame derived from initial inept interaction are fended off by way of categorizing, facilitated by Canada’s specific system of ethnic distinction and recognition. Their many encounters with “Canadian-Canadians” and members of “visible minorities”, also “new immigrants”, generate soothing geographies of social worth. To cope with the hardships of immigrant experience and the foreignness of the place, post-communist Romanian immigrants envisage their ethnic species as possessing an extra dimension which “Canadians” lack, and that has to do with the owning of a soul. They like to play the unruly while displaying propriety of behaviour in public, which they demand from the others as much as they impose on themselves. They develop narratives of how the Canadian state and society discipline the newcomers, by giving particular interpretations to work, social welfare, or housing regulations and policies.

In interaction with charter Canadians and new Canadians within the space of Canadian institutions, and in interaction with the many sorts of Romanians in Canada, the ethnicity of post-communist Romanian immigrants is refashioned as unquestionably hyphenated. This new identity bears tensions and ambiguities, and endures constant change, ever sensitive to the changes Romania undergoes. It involves reviewing the motivations to leave in relation to the achievements of their peers who stayed at home, and to the possibilities perceived to have been missing at their departure and are now present.20 It is

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20 These are all the more salient since Romania’s access into the European Union, and the recent changes in the Canadian immigration policy. The inflow of Romanian immigrants, which peaked in 2002 with 5,688, making Romania the top European sending country to Canada, ahead of traditional senders the United Kingdom and France, has started to decrease by 2005 (4,964). The figures for the following years up to date are: 2006 (4,393), 2007 (3,770), 2008 (2,754), 2009 (1,994), 2010 (1,845), 2011 (1,723). Figures collected from Citizenship and Immigration Canada. *Facts and Figures. Immigrant Overview. Permanent and Temporary Residents* (2000-2011).
also related to their own experience in the new country - the suffering, the trials, the loneliness, and the proving they have gone through; and to the life they have built in another place. This identity is marked by the sense of freedom gained through the immigration experience itself, at times hard to bear. At the same time it is imprinted by the sense of captivity surfaced by untold failure and nostalgia.

Conclusion: Ethnicity at scale

The account of historical Romanian immigration to Canada points to the way ethnicity morphs as a relevant aspect of interaction along the process. The individual decision to migrate and the actual act of migration take place in conjunctures that involve political regimes at origin and destination, policies of exit and access, international norms regarding human rights and mobility, global fields of power relations, and maps of labour circulation. Migrants interpret them, enact them, and perform them. Throughout all these, they reflect on themselves and on their relationships with others. They recreate themselves as subjects of policies and states, as categories of classifications, and as members of groups. Ethnicity emerges in processes of migration as the concept that enables understanding individual and collective action.

Ethnicity is the way subjectivity, interaction, and boundary making congeals into embeddedness in specific collectivities (see also Calhoun, 2003b: 559). Ethnicity is produced and produces effects in fields of power relations in which options and needs for solidarities are unequally distributed (Calhoun, 200a3: 537). In order to recognize ethnicity in migration, the analyst has to consider immigrants' transforming subjectivities and patterns of relationships at origin, at destination, and along the way. She has to recognize their need to relate to a group as real and essential, for their sense of reality and of self, and to draw all sorts of boundaries between their group and the rest, again as a function of maintaining their own boundaries as beings.

Romanians in Canada came first as agricultural labour force to break the lands of the prairie. They were admitted as non-preferred nationals when the traditional, desired sources of immigration from Western Europe had started to dry out. The forms of cooperation, solidarity, and sociability determined by the harsh conditions of life on a homestead contoured a new Romanian ethnic identity. It anchored on several elements: a common spoken Romanian language in an area where several foreign languages were being spoken; memories of the homeland sublimated in the image of Greater Romania as external identity reference; solid material achievements, and the recognition for their hard work, making and keeping them "white". The second wave of Romanian immigrants came to Canada as refugees, and maintained a discrete and private Romanian
identity structured along the divides drawn in Romania. The temporal-historical divide between “anti-communist” and “communist” immigrants, based on the context of exit and the relationship with the regime, was compounded by the temporal-confessional divide between the Romanian Orthodox Episcopate declared autonomous from the Romanian Patriarchate, and the missionary archdiocese of the Orthodox Church of Romania, re-set after the ascent to rule of the communist party in Romania. The third wave of Romanian immigrants, arrived to Canada after the fall of the communist regime, belonged in great majority to FSW immigration category. They shared a strong social class component, and were formatted, through the anticipatory socialisation engendered by the process of selection, to fit into the Canadian society. They redefined themselves as hyphenated Canadians, and their children are “First Canadian, then Romanians”, as one of my subjects put it.

Romanian ethnicity articulates at various scales of time and space, an outcome of historical structures, conjunctures, and events. It is recurrently remade through complex social processes and relations: of migration, expanding capitalism, labour relations, administration, or political oppositions; rewritten through a dialectics of remembering and forgetting; performed through complex interactions and ceremonial enactments. This articulated emphasized the social-historical and relational polymorphism of ethnicity, and pointed to the central role played by states. The national politics of a state, even if a state afar, may trigger claims of ethnic belonging and practices of ethnic identification. The existence of Greater Romania as a state, in conjunction with the social solidarity formed in isolation and adversity, and a linguistic practice that made Romanian salient, produced Romanians out of immigrants with multiple social allegiances. The post-war wave of immigrants came inscribed with a clear and strong ethnic identity, which was armed by an acute relation to the origin country and a concern for its fate. Finally, the ethnicity of the new “new” Romanians is shaped by the tensions encountered in Canada, on the one hand, and the tensions internally generated by the fact of not being able reconcile the loss of leaving Romania and its continuous promise.

REFERENCES


THE POLITICAL INCORPORATION OF IMMIGRANT ASSOCIATIONS AND RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS OF THE ROMANIAN RESIDENTS IN SPAIN

IRINA CIORNEI

ABSTRACT. This paper addresses the question of the political incorporation of Romanian immigrant organizations in Spain. By looking at the immigrant associations and the religious organizations, we propose an analytical framework that reveals a better understanding of why some organizations are more successful than others in being visible and gaining policy influence in the receiving context. To that extent, we show how the political opportunity structures in Spain and Romania, the transnational religious solidarity and the organizational resources play out in the process of political incorporation of immigrant organizations.

Keywords: immigrant associations, transnationalism, political incorporation, religious organizations

Introduction

The political incorporation of an ethnic group is a multidimensional concept that refers to the extent to which immigrants participate, are represented and gain policy influence in the political institutions of their countries of residence (Hochshild and Mollenkopf, 2009). Scholars consider that “being incorporated” is on the one hand an attribute of individual immigrants and in this case it denotes their level of naturalization and socio-political integration (Jones-Correa, 2005). On the other hand, it is a characteristic of the migrant group, referring to the degree in which the groups have representatives and policy influence in the decision-making processes. Gaining formal representation in the elected and non-elected bodies of their contexts of residence is the main venue through which immigrants make their voice heard and influence the policy outcome (Browning and Tabb, 1986; Hochschild and Mollenkopf, 2009).

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According to the official data, there is no elected local councilor of Romanian origin after the municipal elections of 2007 (MPT 2009). To that extent, the group level incorporation of the Romanian residents takes place through participating in the immigrant consultative spaces and through the involvement of immigrant representatives in the implementation of integration policies at various levels of government. The consultative spaces have been set up in most of the middle-size and large Spanish localities with important immigrant population, but they are also established at the regional and at the national level. The immigrant groups are represented in these consultative spaces by the voice of their associations. Moreover, the leaders of immigrant organizations also play an important role in the implementation of integration initiatives and policies. As a consequence, the study of the incorporation of immigrant organizations becomes a common concern of policy makers and academia.

Most of the scholarly research compares the processes of incorporation of immigrant organizations across countries (Fennema and Tillie, 1999; Bloemraad, 2005) and between groups in the same context (Jones-Corra, 1998; Maxwell, 2008). While acknowledging the relevance of this literature, we give an account of the various levels of organizational political inclusion of the same immigrant group in one national context. This research design allows us to observe how factors related to home and host country political opportunity structures and organizational resources play out in different incorporation scenarios. The analysis focuses on immigrant organizations of two broad types: civic and religious. While the landscape of immigrant organizations ranges from religious congregations, ethnic business groups, social clubs and ethnic and cultural associations (Bloemraad, 2005: 866), the Romanian associational movement in Spain is largely characterized by immigrant (civic) associations and religious organizations (Pajares, 2008; Sandu et al., 2009). To that extent we analyze the variation in incorporation across the civic immigrant associations and between them and the religious organizations.

On the overall, the paper argues that the mobilization capacity of the associations is one of the factors that accounts for their differentiated incorporation in the formal and informal political processes in Spain. Moreover, the weak associational environment of the Romanian immigration and the social visibility of the religious organizations contribute to the emergence of religious leaders as immigrant representatives in areas that do not concern religious issues. But, as the analysis shows, these incorporation dynamics cannot be fully understood without bringing in the transnational perspective. The sending state governments and political actors as well as the religious organizations in Spain contribute to empower certain organizations over the others. This in turn impacts on their political incorporation in the context of residence.

As of November 2012, there is no official data available regarding the foreign-born local councilors after the Spanish local elections of May 2011.
The argument is based on a qualitative analysis developed in two Spanish autonomous communities with the highest concentration of Romanian immigrants. The author conducted around 30 semi-structured interviews with organization representatives, Spanish and Romanian politicians in several localities from the two regions. The interviews have been complemented with press research from Spain and Romania and quantitative analyses and surveys related to the Romanian immigration in Madrid.

**The political incorporation of ethnic and religious organizations**

Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad (2011) define the incorporation of immigrant organizations as the political presence and weight they manage to have in the local or national arena. The concept of political presence denotes the extent to which the organization is “known” and “visible” for the members of the community and for the relevant political actors (Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad, 2011: 19). However, presence does not necessarily entail the capacity to advance the community’s interests. To that extent the authors consider that a genuine process of political incorporation presupposes the capacity to include migrant’s demands on the policy agenda. From a normative perspective, the influence on the policy process can be attained either through having representatives in the elected bodies of the local and national governments (Pitkin, 1967; Young, 1990), and/or through participatory mechanisms at various level of decision-making (Sousa, 2005).

In the past decade, host countries have designed multiple participatory and consultative spaces in order to meet migrants’ needs and demands and to discuss the policy agenda (Vertovec, 1994 Alexander, 2004; Gsir and Martiniello, 2004; Pennix et al., 2004; Morales and Ramiro, 2011). However, not all the encounters between the immigrant representatives and the political actors in the host country take place in these formal spaces. Informal networks and contacts between the immigrant organization representatives and the politicians in the country of residence are also a common practice (Fennema and Tillie, 2001). These contacts may be a successful way to integrate immigrants’ demands, albeit they are intensified during the electoral periods (Morales and Ramiro, 2011; Permoser et al, 2010). But, as many scholars show, the capacity and success of these organizations to be visible and to have policy influence is stratified across groups, organizations and countries (Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad, 2011; Schrover and Vermeulen, 2005; Maxwell, 2008). Since the paper focuses on the political incorporation of organizations of the same group we will mainly discuss three types of factors that that contribute to empowering certain organizations over the others during this process: the political opportunity structure in the receiving state, the transnational institutional resources (sending states’ politics and religious organizations) and the organizational resources.
In host societies, national and sub-national governments play a central role for the survival and the political incorporation of immigrant organizations. The receiving country political institutions’ role ranges from setting up the rules of formal inclusion till offering or not financial support for immigrant organizations, fact which may be decisive for their organization and functioning (Soysal, 1994; Bloemraad, 2005; Fauser, 2008). Making a more general argument about migrant mobilization in the host societies, Koopmans (2004) considers that the openness of citizenship and integration policies has a positive impact on the political involvement of immigrants and their organizations in the host societies. However, Morales and Ramiro (2011) argue that in spite of the important role played by the political opportunity structure, in new immigration countries like Spain the political inclusion of immigrant organizations actually relies on their social and human capital and on their visibility. The authors explain this finding by the fact that less structured policy processes act on ad-hoc, poorly defined formal rules of inclusion.

Apart from the national and sub-national administrations, non-state actors play an important part in the management of integration. Itçaina and Burchianti (2011) discuss the double role performed by the Catholic Church in relation to the politicization of immigration. On the one hand the Church has developed a repertoire of hospitality that is dedicated to assisting and lobbying for the socio-economic integration of immigrants. On the other hand the Church is a key actor in shaping the relations between the immigrant religious denominations and the state (p. 4). In this sense, the Catholic Church not only offers assistance to the immigrant groups but, at the same time, it competes with their religious organizations in the redefinition and regulation of the new religious pluralism (Itçaina and Burchianti, 2011; Griera Llonch, 2008). The transnational religious solidarity is also manifest in the case of the Evangelical churches. As several authors argue, the Adventist and Pentecostal churches constitute a primary support for the immigrants of respective denominations, as well as for the foundation of immigrant evangelist churches (Garcia, 2010; Pajares, 2008; Tamames et al., 2008).

Another factor that contributes to empower politically certain immigrant organizations over others is related to the transnational politics of the sending states. Contrary to the past, the home country governments maintain the link with emigrant organizations by controlling their activities and/or supporting them (Itzigsohn, 2000; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003; Schrover and Vermeulen, 2005). The sending states have set up various programs and policies through which home country language and cultures are maintained and disseminated among the emigrated communities. The immigrant associations are some of the main actors through which these programs and policies are put into practice. Moreover, religious organizations have played an important role in the preservation of the “ethnic” character of the emigrated communities. It is for example the case
of the Catholic Church and the Polish and Latin American immigration or the Christian Korean churches in the US (Moya, 2005; Min, 1992; Levitt, 2007). Given this tremendous potential of the religious organizations to foster the national language, customs and solidarity among its members, the sending states have constantly sought to maintain the ties and to support their activities. More recent examples from the European context show an enduring link between the Islamic states and the religious organizations in the context of immigration (Kastoryano, 2007). One of the consequences of these relations between the sending states and the immigrant organizations (both civic and religious) is that they contribute to increase their visibility and organizational capacity in the receiving context. This, in turn, may spill over into their positioning and subsequent incorporation in the political arena (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003).

The visibility of immigrant organizations is strongly related to their organizational resources. The mobilization capacity refers both to the effective support in terms of members and to their capacity to promote and represent immigrant interests. Immigrant organizations help immigrants to adjust to their new environments, provide social services and support and function as political channels (Verba et al., 1995; Jones-Correa and Leal, 2001; Levitt, 2007; Bloemraad, 2005). In some contexts, where the associative movement is weak the religious organizations take over various functions that exceed the mere religious character of their activities. For example, the immigrant churches and temples offer fellowship, the maintenance of the native traditions and social services to the newcomers and settled immigrants (Min, 1992; Menjívar, 2003; Cage and Ecklund, 2007). In spite of the growing body of literature that shows the increasing civic and social visibility of immigrant religious organizations, few have actually studied how this impacts on their political visibility and inclusion (Permoser et al., 2010).

**Data and methods**

The paper deals with these theoretical issues by discussing the case of the Romanian immigrants in Spain. In the past years, the Romanians became the most numerous foreign-born residents on the Spanish soil, increasing from 6,343 in 2000 to 702,954 in 2008 (INE 2009). The Romanian migration to Spain is essentially economic and was encouraged on the one hand by the lifting of the visa regime in the home country in 2002. On the other hand, the relative easiness of working without a legal contract in the Spanish construction and domestic work sectors is also an influential variable. This fact is illustrated by the gap between the number of Romanian workers affiliated to the Social Security system and the number of Romanian residents registered in the municipal census. At the end of 2007 there were around 300,000 workers and 700,000 registered residents. Most of the Romanian immigrants live in the Madrid
Autonomous Community (26 per cent of the total number of Romanian residents) and the Valencian Autonomous Community (18 per cent of the total number of Romanian residents), although Andalucia and Castilla y la Mancha also score high in terms of Romanian residents.

The Romanian immigrants do not benefit of a positive image in the Spanish press. Most of the local and regional news related to Romanians deal with prostitution, Roma-locals conflicts, crime and robbery. It is no wonder then that according to a survey from 2010, the Romanians are the “least liked immigrant group” by the Spanish nationals (CIS 2010). Romania’s entry in the EU and the newly acquired status as European citizens did not change this perception, but instead granted Romanians a series of social and political rights, as for example the right to vote in Spanish local elections starting with 2007. In terms of political rights in the country of origin, the Romanians living abroad can vote in the presidential elections and for special representatives in the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies.

The paper looks at the process of political incorporation of the Romanian organizations as part of a fieldwork that took place between 2008-2009. The organizations selected for this study are the civic immigrant associations and the religious congregations in the top two regions with Romanian population: Madrid Autonomous Community and Valencia Autonomous Community. In Madrid we interviewed the two federations of Romanian associations and organizations from various towns from the metropolitan area of Madrid. These towns (Arganda del Rey, Alcala de Henares Coslada) are middle size, with a population between 50,000 and 200,000 inhabitants. They are the towns with the largest percentage of Romanians in the Madrid region (between 12-18%). In the Valencia Autonomous Community we went to Castellon (200,000 inhabitants, 17% Romanians) as it is considered the town outside Romanian with the largest number of Romanians. In these towns we also spoke to local councilors dealing with immigration and representatives of the Popular Party (PP) and the Spanish Workers’ Party (PSOE). We also interviewed representatives from the regional administration that work with immigrant associations. As most of our Spanish interviewees told us that the churches are actually the most prominent organizations of the Romanian community, we went to various churches and interviewed the Orthodox priests and the Adventist and Pentecostal pastors in the selected localities. The fieldwork has been complemented with press research. The author made a search in immigrant newspapers in Spain as “Romani in Lume” and “Noi in Spania” between 2007-2011. As well, various articles related to the Romanian community from the Spanish national press “El Pais” and “El Mundo” have been read and coded for the period 2010-2011. A Romanian online database (www.ziare.ro) compiling most of the national press has also been consulted on topics related to the emigrant community for the period 2008-2011.
In order to assess the organizational capacity of the associations and churches the study uses data from the Romanian Communities in Spain (RCS) survey. The RCS study took place in localities from the Madrid Community in 2008 and maps in detail the social, political and economic situation of the Romanian immigrants as well as their plans for return. The survey is representative for the Madrid Community (more than 800 respondents) with an estimated error of 3.5% for a 95% confidence interval (Sandu et al., 2009).

The Spanish political opportunity structure for the incorporation of immigrant organizations

Following the immigration boom and European recommendations related to the civic integration of immigrants, the Spanish integration policies cluster around the concept of active citizenship and "citizenship in the city" after mid 2000. As the First National Plan on Citizenship and Integration (2007-2010) reminds us, the active involvement of immigrants and of their associations is the first important step for the incorporation in the Spanish society. To this extent the Spanish administrations formed consultative councils at the national, regional and local levels where representatives of immigrant collectives collaborate at the agenda setting, formulation and implementation of the integration policies.

At the national level exists the Forum for the Social Integration of Immigrants dependent on the Ministry of Labour. This forum is composed by representatives of immigrant federations (Latin American, Moroccan, Chinese, Bulgarian and Romanian), delegates of various levels of administration, labour unions and representatives of Spanish NGOs working on the integration of immigrants. The government of Madrid Autonomous Community established the Regional Forum for Immigration, which has a similar composition of the other institutions mentioned above. The Valencian Autonomous community has also set up the Valencian Forum of immigration composed by 17 associations representing various nationalities and administration and third sector representatives. Moreover, various cities and towns established their own Forums of Immigration, which gather representatives of immigrant associations and local political and social actors. All these participatory spaces meet regularly and discuss proposals of the administrations and the other participants regarding immigration related issues. One of the weaknesses signalled by several interviewees is that the presence in these forums does not necessarily imply influence, since many times the initiatives pertain to the administrations, while the role of the associations is mainly to give an opinion.

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3 I am extremely grateful to prof. Dumitru Sandu from Bucharest University and the Soros Foundation Romania for allowing me to analyze the RCS dataset.
The religious organizations do not make part of the immigration consultative forums. Instead, there are several interfaith platforms organized at the local, regional and national levels. The scope of these platforms is to support the dialogue between the various religious denominations and the administrations and, at the same time, to promote the cultural diversity, social cohesion and peace (Griera Llonch, 2008). As members of these platforms the religious representatives do not represent immigrants per se, their role being restricted to religious issues. Instead, the collaborations that arise between the administrations and the churches on areas like the social, cultural and economic integration of immigrants take place in a less formal and symbolic context (Permoser et al., 2010).

Another important point of encounter between the immigrant associations and the Spanish politics is related to the calls for subsidies for the third sector (Fauser, 2008). Some of the associations receive funds as part of wider programmes to support the immigrant organizational sector. The majority competes with non-immigrant associations in calls organized by the regional and the local authorities to finance projects and proposals of the whole associative sector. But, as our interviews show, few associations actually get selected and in this case the wide majority suspend their activity or continue to exist only on paper or organize ad-hoc encounters of the members. In other occasions the local or the regional authorities collaborate with the immigrant associations and religious organizations to implement programme and policies related to the immigrant community. However, once these programmes finish the associations have to find various strategies to survive and to attract public subsidies.

**Romanian Immigrant associations**

The research on the associational life of immigrant groups is many times condemned to work with imprecise data. This is also the case of Spain, where in spite of having a national register of associations, many immigrant organizations lack the necessary resources and personnel, do not perform activities or are almost inactive and absent from the civic and political scene (Aparicio and Tornos, 2010). The official data on the Romanian associations can be found in the Spanish register of associations and on the website of the Romanian embassy in Spain. Although the two data sources do not perfectly coincide, from our own research and triangulating with information from other sources, the Romanian embassy seems to have a more accurate and update register of associations and for that reason it is used as the main source of information for this research.

According to the embassy, in 2012 there are 154 Romanian associations in Spain, distributed unevenly across the autonomous communities. At the aggregate level, the density of associations per 100,000 Romanian immigrants is 19. In a study related to immigrant associations in Spain and concentrated on four
Autonomous communities (Madrid, Valencia, Murcia and Andalucia), Aparicio and Tornos (2010) find that the associational density for 100,000 Romanians is 15, a number comparable to ours. Moreover, the author observes that in comparison to other groups, the Romanians have the lowest associational density. For example, immigrants coming from the Dominican Republic have 63 associations per 100,000 residents, while in 2008-2009 the Peruvians score 43 (Aparicio and Tornos, 2010: 58). The low associational profile is also confirmed by the survey data. According to the RCS survey, 62 per cent of the interviewees in the Madrid area have never participated in the activities of a Romanian association. Only three per cent were members of an association, while other four per cent declared to have participated in its activities without being a member (Mihai, 2009: 89).

Almost half of the associations are in the Madrid Autonomous Community (53 associations) and the Valencia Autonomous Community (27 associations). The two federations of Romanian associations are based in Madrid, FEDROM (Federation of Romanian immigrants in Spain) and FADERE (Federation of Romanian immigrants in Europe). FEDROM is the Romanian organizational structure that is best placed and connected to the Spanish administration at the national and regional level. The federation is a permanent member of the Consultative Forum for the Integration of Immigrants of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and of the Council of Associations of the Madrid Community. FEDROM has also a strong collaboration with the Europe Direct Centre in Coslada, organizing joint events related to the social and economic integration of the Romanian immigrants and their rights as European citizens.

The federation is composed of 26 associations and started its activity in 2002 at the initiative of a Spanish association militating for peace and solidarity (MPDL) who wanted to unite the Romanian associations of that time in a representative entity. Initially the Adventist and Pentecostal associations from the Valencian Coast and Madrid community were the core members of the Romanian Federation, but subsequently newer formed laic organizations from Castellon and Madrid area became the main actors and leaders inside the federation (interview president FEDROM, January 2009, Madrid).

Since 2004, FEDROM performs various activities related to the cultural and linguistic identity of the Romanians, it offers legal consultancy for immigrants and has several local integration initiatives in collaboration with city halls of Madrid Community localities. It lobbies for issues related to Romanians’ rights in Spain, as for example the equivalence of driving licence and recognition of working rights after Romania’s accession to the EU. Related to the political integration, the federation organizes information campaigns for the Romanians to inscribe themselves in the electoral census in order to be able to vote in the local elections in Spain and at the European elections. In collaboration with the Department for the Romanians Abroad, FEDROM organized Romanian language
and civilization classes for the public servants of the Madrid Community government in order to facilitate a better dialogue between these and the Romanian immigrants.

As most of the official statements of immigrant organizations, FEDROM claims to be neutral in terms of partisan preferences. However, the president admits that he is closer to the Spanish Socialist Party and the Workers' Union (UGT) and declares that until 2011 he has not received funding from the regional government (which is ruled by the Popular Party). After 2011 the federation starts to be better integrated in the consultative forums of the regional government of Madrid and to receive funding for projects related to Romanians in situations of social exclusion. The relations with the Romanian administration are "correct but punctual". He "knows" most of the Romanian politicians, but does not have an enduring contact with any of the Romanian political parties.

In comparison to the low profile of FEDROM in relation to the Romanian political scene, FADERE is known to be the protégé of president Băsescu and of the former president of the Madrid Community, E. Aguirre. FADERE was initiated in 2008 after the Congress of the Romanians living abroad whose guest of honour was the Romanian president. Although its target is to reach the Romanian diaspora in Europe and beyond, FADERE's leader acknowledges to have a special relation with the regional government in Madrid, from where he receives most of the funding and who gave the support for the organization of the Congress of the Romanians abroad in 2008 (interview president FADERE, January 2009 Madrid).

The federation is visible in the press and to the public through the figure of its leader, D. Tecu, a former member of the Adventist Church in Madrid. Tecu has various appearances in the Romanian press as being involved in development programmes in African countries, many of them supported by the Provivere Dignum foundation. In 2010 Tecu appeared in an important Romanian newspaper as making a wide campaign among public figures in Romania in order to collect funds and build houses in Haiti (Adevărul, 2010). He also declares to be the initiator of social projects in Romania that offer shelter and food for needy old people and that he received the support of the Madrid government to build a house for the poor people in Bucharest (interview, president FADERE, January 2009, Madrid).

FADERE also has various cultural and social projects directed to the immigrants from the Madrid Community. At the same time, he is one of the main association leaders campaigning for the Popular Party in local elections in Madrid. Discussing its relations with the Spanish political actors, Tecu considers that "the politicians want to see that you are faithful to them. In a way they are right...If they give you money to do this project for the Romanians, it is normal to expect something in return" (interview, president FADERE, January 2009, Madrid).
The dynamics observed between the Romanian federations are also reproduced at the level of associations. In spite of declared neutrality, the association leaders label each other as “left” or “right”, “PP, PSOE, PSD or Băsescu”. All the associations I interviewed in the Madrid community localities and in Castellon organize activities related to Romanian language and culture and offer legal assistance and advice to the immigrants. In general, the associations receive subsidies and funding for projects from the Spanish administrations at the local and at the regional level. It is also the case that those who receive support from the autonomous community have more funds and more capacity to organize.

Most of the leaders are also in contact with the Romanian administration and some have received funds from the Department of the Romanians Abroad in order to organize cultural activities, language classes and seminars on various topics, as gender equality and labour market integration. What the fieldwork revealed is that the world of Romanian association is segregated, although they make part of the same federation, especially due to the political allegiances of their leaders and the funds they receive from various administrations. For example, a very active and visible association in Castellon, the Association of Eastern European immigrants (AIPE) is perceived by the rest of the immigrant community as having received “all the attention and all the funds” from the Valencian Community government (interview, April 2008, Castellon). This fact determined the other prominent leader from the Castellon region, the president of the Romanian Association of Castellon, Valencia and Alicante (ARCVA), to strengthen the connections with the local administrations and with the Romanian government. At the same time, the ARCVA leader is the president of the Romanian Liberal Democratic Party (PDL) in Castellon and has a strong collaboration with the Romanian deputy for the Diaspora, W. Branza. Together with the president of FADERE, the ARCVA president organized several visits of president Băsescu in Spain and coordinated the electoral campaigns of PDL.

Beyond the auto-segregation of associations across financial issues and political preferences of their leaders, there is another divide that most of the interviewees point out: immigrant associations vs. churches. The following section discusses the emergence of the Orthodox and Neo-Protestant (Pentecostal and Adventist) churches in the communities of immigration and shows how the support from the state of origin, the sister congregations in the immigration context and the migration networks are some of the factors that may explain the importance of these institutions for the civic and political incorporation.

**Romanian religious organizations**

According to the Romanian embassy, in 2012 there are 103 churches that serve the Romanian community, distributed among all provinces of Spain.
Of these, the widest majority are Orthodox (76) followed by Pentecostal (9), Greek Catholic (8), Adventist (5), Roman-Catholic (3) and Baptist (1). In the RCS survey, 79 per cent of the respondents declare to be Orthodox, nine per cent Adventist and four per cent Pentecostal. The Roman and Greek Catholics and the other religious denominations comprise eight per cent of the sample (Sandu et al., 2009). As table 1 shows, around 18 per cent of the Orthodox go frequently and very frequently to the church, in comparison to more than 90 per cent of the Adventists and Pentecostals. However, these numbers are only informative, since the numbers of Adventists and Pentecostals in the sample is very low.

Table 1.
Main religious denominations and church attendance. RCS Survey 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency of church attendance</th>
<th>Religion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Orthodox</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>once a year or less</td>
<td>298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on saint days</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>once-three times a month</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>once a week or more</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>657</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Orthodox Church

The Romanian Orthodox church sent its archbishop in Madrid at the end of the 1970s, but it is only after 2000 when smaller Orthodox churches were formed in various Spanish towns and villages at the request of the immigrants. One of the oldest “bottom up” funded church is in Alcala de Henares, where in early 2000 the president of the Association for the Support of the Romanian People (AAPR) and a young Romanian priest lobbied their country of origin administration and church archbishop in order to give the green light for the celebration of the mass in Alcala.

The Orthodox churches provide its believers with important information and support, especially after arrival. At the entrances there are various announcements with jobs and cheap accommodation (Pajares, 2008). At the same time, the priests and the “old” congregation members help the newcomers with important information about the rights and facilities they can find in Spain. Sometimes the churches help the immigrants in need with shelter and other social benefits but only in “special cases”. The Orthodox priest in Arganda explains that the church is not any type of organization in the sense that it does not have an official programme of social assistance. When it is possible,
the members collect money or offer other types of goods in order to help another parishioner. However, this is not a common practice.

The Orthodox Church has been involved in various social projects with the help of the Catholic Church (Dascălu, 2011). As mentioned before, the Catholic Churches developed in the past thirty years a dense network of NGOs (the most prominent being Caritas) that offer social assistance to immigrants in situations of social exclusion, information and legal orientation. Since the onset of the Romanian immigration in Spain, the Catholic Church has been a faithful friend of the Romanian priests and their organizations. In many towns the service is celebrated in Catholic churches and the Spanish priests offer support for the integration of their orthodox counterparts (interview Orthodox Priest, April 2009, Tarragona).

Apart from the Catholic Church, the Romanian state is another key actor that supported the creation and the maintenance of faith among its emigrated communities. The central role of religion as a marker of national identity is stipulated in the Law of the Romanians Abroad (299/2007). According to this law, the state supports the maintenance and affirmation of the Romanian identity through its cultural, linguistic and religious manifestations of the emigrated communities and kin minorities in the neighbouring countries. One example is the lobby pursued by the Romanian embassy in Madrid in order to convince the local and regional authorities in Spain to cede terrains and spaces for the establishment of Romanian churches (interview Madrid 2009). Besides the legislative terrain, the salience of religion related to the migratory phenomenon has gradually increased once more and more Romanians moved across borders. Since the referendum in 2007, president Băsescu came several times to Spain, in order to participate at the Congress of the Romanians abroad and other official visits. In each of these visits he contacted the representatives and local elite of the Romanian community, among which the Orthodox priests and Pentecostal and Adventist pastors. In one of his public statements directed to immigrants, the president declared that:

We want the Orthodox church to be involved in the life of Romanian communities living abroad. The Orthodox Church has always made part of our patriotism, of our faith, so do not hesitate to enter each time you see it because it will always help you. The Orthodox Church is the most efficient way to support the Romanian communities living abroad. Whenever you go and you have dispersed communities, it is the church that unites them at the Sunday service. That is why I want you to understand that it is our politics to support the Orthodox Church to be more and more active in the life of our communities living abroad. (Ziare.ro 2009)
President Băsescu is not the only supporter of the role of churches in the political life of the emigrated Romanians. Both the Senator for the Diaspora, V. Badea, and the former Prime Minister A. Năstase, declared in interviews with the author that the churches abroad should do politics. The main reason is that the churches have the capacity to mobilize many Romanian immigrants and to disseminate the political message. In contrast, the Romanian associations lack the necessary means in order to connect with the immigrants (interview V. Badea, August 2009, Bucharest; interview A. Năstase, August 2009, Bucharest).

President Băsescu and the other political actors are aware that in some Spanish localities the percentages of Pentecostal and Adventist believers are just as important as the Orthodox ones. In these circumstances the official discourses adapt to the religious pluralism of the Diaspora. When in Madrid, at the Congress of Romanians Abroad organized among others by important Adventist migrant elite, the president visited the Pentecostal and Adventist churches, received a bible as a gift and stressed the important role of the pastors as moral guardians of the community. But no official declaration states the role of the Neo-Protestant churches for the cohesion and the integration of immigrant communities. In this case, how did the Adventist and Pentecostals and their elites acquired such a political capital in spite of not being officially supported as the Orthodox Church? The next section explores some of the factors that contributed to the fact that the Neo-protestant churches and their believers become influent in the relations to both home and host country administrations.

**The Adventist and Pentecostal churches**

While the consolidation of the Orthodox organizations in the diaspora owe a great deal to the support of the homeland government, the Adventist and Pentecostal churches became visible and influent due to the national and transnational networks of their believers. The arrival of first Romanians in Spain, more specifically in the provinces of Castellon and Madrid, take place at the beginning of the nineties. Even though there are several myths about these "pioneers", the most plausible is that they were members of the Adventist church (Şerban and Grigoraş, 2000; Diminescu, 2004; Constantinescu, 2003). At the end of the nineties and the beginning of 2000, the Adventists were the majority of the Romanian collective in various Spanish towns in Valencia and

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4 I am extremely grateful to Paloma Crespo from the Autonomous University of Madrid for helping me with the fieldwork related to the Neo-Protestant churches in Madrid and for providing me with rich information from previous fieldworks developed between 2005-2006 in the Madrid region.
Madrid. In a study related to the circular migration from a Romanian village to Spain, Constantinescu (2003) shows that the Adventists were the first to migrate. In few years they took all their family and relatives with them. Moreover, the first Orthodox to migrate from that village were friends and relatives of the Adventists who migrated. This is of course a specific case-study, but we may consider it relevant for the patterns of the Romanian migration to Spain and the intertwining between religion, migration and settlement in this process. What our interviewees consider as decisive in the enforcement of the first Romanian Adventist networks in Madrid is rather transnational in nature. Some think that the US military basis from Torrejon de Ardoz is the missing link from the picture. Thus, at the beginning of the nineties, the civil and military personnel of the basis, most of them members of the US Adventist church, had returned to the United States, leaving behind many warehouses but also an Adventist temple. The pastors of this temple sought to balance the numbers and asked the Romanian Adventist church to recommend their temple to the migrants seeking insertion in the Spanish society. Even if these facts are narrated rather than found in written documents, we may imagine that this is a possible scenario, due to the strong ties Adventists from all over the world maintain between and inside their churches (interview made by P. Crespo with Adventist priests in Coslada 2006). The Spanish Adventists and Pentecostal have also offered help to the first Romanian believers who arrived in Castellon and Coslada (Pajares, 2007; 2008). Thus, in Castellon the one of the churches of Romanian Adventists gather at a space that used to pertain to the Spanish believers. In Madrid the Pentecostals have also opened their spaces and material support to the Romanians.

Just as the Orthodox Church, the Adventists and Pentecostals provide various services for the community, albeit in a much more formalized manner. For many Romanian migrants, both Orthodox and Adventists, the first destination they had when arriving in Spain were the Adventist temples. There they could find temporary accommodation and many times jobs on the black market. In Coslada, some informants talk about a sort of exchange: jobs for membership.

Many Romanians come here as Orthodox and convert themselves afterwards. Because here there are many churches and they can be better integrated... they have a lot of advantages and almost all the Orthodox turn themselves into Adventists.

Interviewer: And your friends are Orthodox?
Yes, well, they will convert themselves, but not yet. (J. and E., 25, Coslada, 2006)

5 The religious diversity of the Romanian communities in Spain is not representative for the home country religious communities. Thus, in Romania, the percentage of Orthodox in 2010 is 86,8%, while the Pentecostals and Adventists are less than 5% (INS 2010).
Most of the members of the Adventist church confirmed us that they receive help from their priests and that the churches from all over the world support the mobility between their members. This kind of support is usually formalized in letters of recommendations that the migrant be well received in the Adventist church from the country she chooses to immigrate. The ties among believers themselves many times provide the necessary access to information and other resources, so we may notice that the support is not given only vertically, from pastors to the faithful, but also horizontally, between the members themselves. Opposed to the Orthodox Church which does not have a practical strategy regarding the socio-economic support of its believers, the Adventist church covers more than the spiritual needs of its members. It organizes several activities in the free time, from talks about morality and family and extra-curricular education till cooperation in order to help a member in deep need. The Adventist church is not only the Saturday service. Is a compound of cultural, religious and socio-economic resources that make its members feel as part of a bigger whole. When the first Adventists arrived in Madrid or Castellon, they set up not only a worship place, but also a matrix of other opportunities: jobs on the black market and eventually on the legal one, mutual help with foes in need and all sort of activities that strengthen the ties between members. The relations between the Pentecostals are strong as well and based on mutual aid, although not as visible and systematized as in the case of the Adventists.

The political incorporation of the Romanian associations and religious organizations

As we specified earlier, the only Romanian entity that is present in the national Immigration forum is FEDROM, while FADERE is a member of the Regional forum of immigration of the Madrid Community. AIPE used to have enduring contacts with the Valencian government, while most of the Romanian associations communicate mainly with the city halls in the localities where they are based. The associations selected participate in the regular meetings of the forums they are members of and in wider consultative processes. For example, FEDROM gave its opinion on the second National Plan on Immigration and Citizenship, while AIPE actively participating at drafting the Valencian Plan on immigration. Most of the associations that are present in the national, regional and local consultative forums are also the ones that obtain funds in the calls for the funding of the third sector. Moreover, some of them are selected to participate in the implementation of municipal or regional policies and programmes directed to the Romanian communities. Apart from these “winners” there are many other associations that have limited resources and that do not manage to maintain their activity. They consider that the competition for the local and
regional subsidies is fierce and they perceive that they do not receive enough support. For this reason these associations do not have a physical space nor members who meet regularly.

But the presence of the Romanian associations on the Spanish political arena does not entail that they are perceived as equal dialogue partners. Only few associations who have contacts with Spanish politicians also manage to have capacity of influence. After the local elections of 2007, the perceptions of the local politicians in the Madrid and Castellon municipalities converge on one idea: the associations do not have much legitimacy and visibility inside the collective. They obtain funding and support from the city hall and many times the mayors participate in the cultural activities the associations organize. However, as the responsible for immigration of the Madrid Socialist Party declares:

The associative movement is very weak in the Romanian community. All the leaders have a political bias. The Romanians do not participate in associations and the link that they have is mainly religious. I think that we should work more with the churches. (interview PSM, January 2009, Madrid)

Although there are some association leaders that are many times present in the local press as the representatives of the Romanians, the local politicians do not consider that this is necessarily a plus of legitimacy. This is the case of the president of the AAPR in Alcalá de Henares. The local newspaper, Diario de Alcalá, interviews him every time there is news related to the Romanian collective. But as a local politician declares, being visible in the press does not translate itself into more cohesion and collaboration among the immigrants. The president of the Romanian-Hispanic Center, (CEPI) an institution dependent on the Madrid Government and responsible with the integration of immigrants thinks that:

We know him well and we collaborate with him [president of AAPR]. Every time there is an accident involving the Romanians in Alcalá he is present. And he gives declarations to the press. But is this important? No, I think it is not... [...]. The Romanians do not trust their association leaders. They are suspicious. If you want to find the Romanians together come to CEPI or go to the church. (Centro Hispano-Rumano president in Alcalá de Henares, January 2009, Madrid)

The Spanish politicians consider that the low civic and political profile of the association leaders is one of the reasons why none of them was proposed as a candidate for the local elections of 2007. Although most of the association leaders had political dreams of becoming an elected local councillor, none of them was nominated. They explain this by stating that the Spanish parties were afraid to lose native votes by including a Romanian on their list. The parties think that the leaders are not entirely predictable and trustworthy and, moreover, they cannot attract too many Romanian voters.
The mobilizing capacity of the Churches is what determines the Spanish politicians to establish a dialogue with them on immigration issues. The religious congregations are the only places where Romanians gather in high numbers and where the message from the top seems to reach the community. For example, the responsible for immigration and integration at the Coslada city hall declares for the local newspaper that the collaboration with the Romanian churches has been very fruitful. Birth control, drug dependency and town cleaning have are some of the projects that have been successfully completed with the help of the churches (Global Henares/Coslada, 15.07.2010).

On the overall, the Spanish representatives of local administrations were surprised by the fact that even if the religious leaders have God and the migrants on their side, they do not make claims outside the religious necessities. The most recurrent demands are more places service or the construction of churches. Only few Adventists and Pentecostals are engaged in social projects and asked Arganda del Rey city hall support for a centre to deal with Alcoholic or homeless Romanians.

Religion and local politics agenda

The civic visibility of the religious leaders and the new modes of religious governance (Griera Llonch, 2008; Itçaina and Burchianti, 2011) contribute to the fact that immigrant religion enters on the local policy agenda. The importance of churches as mediators between the immigrants and the politicians does not only suppose that they start performing a civic role, but also that religion becomes a politicized issue. It thus enters on the agenda of local politics debates and, at the same time, it is considered to be one of the most attractive topics for the immigrant voters.

In Castellón, the Romanians have been promised the building of a church for many years, although this has not materialized until 2012. The Romanian ambassador played an important role in lobbying the Valencian Government for the construction of an Orthodox Church (Las Provincias, 18.11.2006). The official local discourses claim that the money for the future church comes from donations and important business men. However, the associations declare that the popular party ruling the city hall has agreed to cede a land from the public domain for this construction, but they prefer not to make too much publicity to the issue for fear of local population’s reaction. In the mean time, the Catholic Church ceded one of its temples for the Orthodox Church in the summer of 2012, fact which suggests that in Castellón the construction of a separate Orthodox Church is still in its project phase (Servicio de Informacion Catolica 2012).
In Alcalá de Henares the construction of the Orthodox Church was one of the most commented issues in the local press at the beginning of 2007, few months before the local Spanish elections. The opposition and the other migrant groups have criticized more or less openly city hall’s decision to “support the construction of a cult place for a foreign population”, while the migrant leaders from the area have all stressed out their role in lobbying the authorities in this issue. As a consequence, the Orthodox priest has been thanking the mayor at most religious services. In spite of the criticism by some part of the local public opinion, the mayor declared that he likes to take care of his migrant collective. However, his statements are ambiguous.

We have temporarily ceded, for 20 years, a land to the Orthodox parish of Alcalá de Henares so that they may build with their money a temple...which once they will cease to use it...as I believe that the Romanian migrants, as the Poles, will return, the building will be our town’s property. (B. Gonzalez, mayor of Alcalá de Henares, interview for La Sexta Channel, 14th of May 2007)

Although the campaigns for the local elections in 2007 used confusing declarations around the construction of Orthodox churches, 2010 brings a shift in the public political discourse. In a much publicised meeting, the president of the Madrid Community and the Patriarch of the Romanian Orthodox church lift the first stone of the future Orthodox Cathedral in Madrid. This Cathedral will serve for the Romanians in Spain and Portugal and will fulfil several other functions, as the provision of social services and legal advice. As the counsellor for Immigration declared,

The construction of this church is a proof of our common defence of the principles of humanist Christianity. These principles inspire our conception of freedom, dignity and equality that we, all Europeans, share. (Interview with the counsellor for Immigration for ABC, 19th of April 2010)

The other religious denominations, in spite of receiving growing attention from the political actors in Spain and Romania, do not benefit from the construction of churches. Most of the Adventists and Pentecostals in Madrid gather in warehouses that the local municipality or their Spanish counterparts allowed them to use. The Pentecostals in Coslada cooperated with volunteer work and money in order to remodel the warehouse destined to them.

Concluding remarks

This paper has analyzed the different venues and levels of political incorporation of the Romanian immigrant associations and religious organizations in Spain. The analysis reveals that the entrance and the presence of these
organizations on the Spanish political scene vary not only between the civic immigrant associations, but also along the divide civic-religious. Although the Romanian organizations are embedded in complex social and political dynamics, we illustrate how the political opportunity structures in both receiving and the sending states, the transnational resources of religious solidarity and the organizational resources contribute to their stratified incorporation. At the same time, we reveal how and why the religious organizations emerged as representatives of the immigrants on the Spanish political scene.

Similar to other European experiences, the Spanish administrations encourage the inclusion of immigrant associations in the formal decision-making processes. But the presence of immigrant associations on the local political scene does not necessarily entail that they can advance issues on the policy agenda. Their role is mainly consultative, while their visibility and the informal contacts with the local politicians is what help them gain funds and develop projects. Following this logic, the Romanian associations and federations are included in the consultative processes at the various levels of decision-making. Moreover, a few of them manage to win the support of the local administrations and put in practice various projects related to the cultural integration of the Romanians. Notwithstanding, their political presence does not match their public image. The Romanian associations and federations are visible, but their capacity to influence the policy agenda is limited. The local politicians believe that the Romanian associations are weak and non-representative. To that extent they refrain from making electoral promises to association leaders. In this context the Spanish political actors engage in dialogue with the religious organizations.

The emergence of churches as central institutions in the process of immigrant adaptation and integration in the new environments is not a new finding (Min, 1992; Jones-Correa and Leal, 2001; Levitt, 2007; Moya, 2005; Chung, 2005). The internal resources to offer fellowship and socio-economic support for immigrants are stronger in the case of the Neo-Protestant churches than in the case of the Orthodox Church. Notwithstanding, the religious leaders of both Orthodox and Neo-Protestant denominations become representatives of the immigrant collectives in areas that do not concern minority religious issues (see for the case of Austria Permoser et al., 2010). Our case study reveals that the weakness of the immigrant associational sector and the increased civic visibility of churches through their capacity to provide socio-economic support to immigrants also have spill overs in the political field. Moreover, the religious leaders do not only become visible interlocutors but at the same time, the construction of churches and the management of religious diversity enter the local policy agenda.

It is also worth noting the important role played by the transnational religious solidarity for the empowerment of the Romanian immigrant churches. Through its repertoire of hospitality (Itçaina and Burchianti, 2011) the Catholic
Church not only develops various projects in the field of the social and the cultural integration of immigrants. It also positions itself and acts strategically in relation to the new management of religious diversity. The close collaboration and the support it gives to the Orthodox churches and priests may be interpreted in the wider context in which we witness a diversification of the religions and of the religious actors in Spain. To that extent the Catholic Church strengthens the ties with certain actors that are closer to the principles of the "Christian humanism" than others. Although the fieldwork did not reveal conflictive relations with the Neo-protestant churches, we could not find testimonies of collaboration either, as in the case of the Romanian Orthodox Churches. On their part, the Neo-protestant churches receive the support from other sister congregations from Spain and abroad.

Apart from the local and regional Spanish political actors and the transnational solidarity between churches, the Romanian government and political actors prove to be other important stakeholders in the process of political incorporation. Through its promotion of national culture and identity across borders, the sending state supports certain associations to develop projects in the context of residence. Moreover, as the Romanians have the right to vote in the presidential and the parliamentary elections of their country of origin, the electoral politics is another field in which the associations position themselves and gain entrance to certain Romanian politicians. During the electoral campaigns directed to immigrants and due to the transnational contacts and collaborations that the Romanian politicians develop with their Spanish counterparts, the associations become the third interlocutor. They gain visibility in the eyes of the Spanish politicians and therefore future possibilities to establish venues of dialogue. As the case of FADERE and ARCVA show, the transnational relations with homeland political actors constitute another resource that the associations have in gaining visibility and influence on the Spanish political arena.

The sending state government has also supported the establishment of Orthodox churches among the emigrated communities. Moreover, during the electoral campaigns and not only, the Romanian political actors contact the religious leaders from both Orthodox and Neo-Protestant churches in order to make their message heard by the parishioners. These contacts and acquaintances have a similar effect as in the case of the Romanian associations. They empower and make more visible the religious leaders in front of the Spanish political actors.

In sum, the analysis reveals the complex relations that take place between the immigrant organizations, the political and institutional opportunities in the receiving and the sending contexts and the organizational resources they develop. In this sense, their political incorporation is not a linear process, but a stratified one across the civic associations and between these and the religious organizations. In dialogue with the wider literature, the paper shows that the formal rules of inclusion established by the Spanish administrations are paralleled by informal
contacts and ad-hoc processes (Morales and Ramiro, 2011). As a contribution to the literature on the role of religious organizations in being central institutions for the adaptation of newcomers to their new environments (Min, 1992; Menjívar, 2003 Levitt, 2007) we argue that these processes also empower the religious leaders to become representatives of the immigrants on the local and regional political arena. Moreover, transnational religious solidarity between the Catholic and the Neo-Protestant churches respectively and the new immigrant religious organizations also contributes to their establishment in the context of immigration. We have also shown that the long-distance nationalism and the electoral politics of the sending state is another relevant factor that should be taken into account when analysing the political inclusion of immigrant organizations in their contexts of residence.

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Madrid


75

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Orthodox Priest. Interviewed by Paloma Crespo, January 2006 Coslada.
Adventist Pastor. Interviewed by Paloma Crespo, January 2006 Coslada.

Arganda del Rey
Asociación “Dor Roman”. Interviewed January 2009, Arganda del Rey.

Alcala de Henares

Castellon
Agencia AMICS. Interviewed March 2008, Castellon.

The paper also uses excerpts from a fieldwork developed by Paloma Crespo between 2005-2006 in municipalities around Madrid (Coslada and Alcala de Henares) related to the civic and political integration of the Romanians. Around 50 immigrants and religious leaders have been interviewed in relation to various social, cultural, political and religious aspects of their lives.
ABSTRACT. The article challenges the received wisdom that Roma groups, because of their presumed static traditionalism, always fail to integrate in mainstream societies and to follow, like other groups, the steps to modernization and to healthy community development when their lives’ circumstances are pressing for change in these directions. This view, present both in academia and outside of it, which makes Roma an everlasting exceptional case, is based on a particular understanding of Roma ethnicity, that is concentrated in Roma culture, or life-style, which is viewed as unusually conservative and resistant to change. The article deconstructs this perspective through a comparative analysis of two traditional Roma communities from Romania, which, due to the constraints and opportunities associated with transnational migration, are in a rapid process of social change and communities’ adjustments. These transformations are ethnographically documented with the aim of clarifying which are Roma-specific and which are proper to other ethic groups in a similar situation. The defended argument is that Roma may indeed have particular responses to modernizing circumstances; however, these are not determined in the first place by an everlasting cultural specificity which is preserved against all odds (in fact the contrary is true - central values and patterns of social action of the groups are deeply affected in the process), but mostly by the groups’ particular social histories, their preserved archaic social relations, and the particular racially-rooted discrimination against them in Europe. Considering the economic relative success of the researched groups, as well as the changes in their values and ways of living, but also their group-focused image of change, Roma traditionalism is viewed not as an obsolete survival from the past, but as an adaptive life-style, which provides them with a successful community development and an adequate integration in today’s neoliberal societies.

Keywords: Roma self-identity, Gabor Roma, Ursari Roma, transnational migration, traditionalism, Romania

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* This work was done with the financial support of the Sectoral Operational Program for Human Resources Development 2007-2013, co-financed by the European Social Fund, under the project number POSDRU 89/1.5/S/61104, with the title “Social sciences and humanities in the context of global development - development and implementation of postdoctoral research”.

TROC

TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATION AND ROMA SELF-IDENTITY:
TWO CASE STUDIES
Introduction

This article deals with the consequences of transnational migration for two groups of so-called “traditional” Roma from Romania. The themes that I explore here are the results of two stages of fieldwork among these Roma groups, the first taking place in June 2007 among a Gabor Roma extended family from a Transylvanian village, and the second in June-July 2011 in a community of Ursari Roma from the county of Teleorman, in Southern Romania. The focus of the article is laid on revealing the changes in the groups self-perception as result of the direct or mediated experience of transnational mobility and on depicting the cultural innovations these communities are producing due to the new economic opportunities brought by migration.

Against the misconception that Roma traditionalism is an obstacle for their proper integration in contemporary societies, a misconception that is reproduced also within the academic discourse on Roma ethnicity, my research provides evidence that the changes brought by transnational migration, which are modulated by cultural patterns that Roma have preserved from the past, provide them precisely with the qualities and the abilities required by today's neoliberal societies, both at home and in the receiving countries.

I will start by putting in context the perception of the contemporary Roma migration and the ethnic judgments that underlay it. Further on, I will summarize the main views and theories on Roma ethnicity in order to make clear the view that I work with in discussing the selected cases, but also to reveal how variants of academic discourse have provided the image of Roma as profoundly conservative and non-adaptive populations. Lastly, and extensively, I will present the cultural, social and economic data of the investigated communities in order to make understandable the range of changes brought by migration at the level of their collective self-perception and of their life strategies, and to make clear the consequences of these transformations for the social reproduction and the community development of these groups.

Theoretical background

Roma migration from CEE countries in Western Europe after 1990 has been one of the most politicized and debated subjects in the last two decades, both in the sending and the receiving countries. The arrival of some Roma groups in important western cities had most of the time triggered front-page news, generally foreseeing a following “exodus”, “wave” or “mass migration” of the Roma from Eastern Europe. During time, and irrespective of changes in the migration regimes for the CEE countries’ citizens, a dominant image of the Roma migrants took shape: explained by their presumably “natural” nomadism and propensity
for deceiving, the Roma migrants have been generally portrayed as deceitful asylum seekers, vagrants, beggars, and social assistance profiteers. In short, migration has been seen as just another situation in which the Roma miss a modernizing opportunity.

Being grafted onto older prejudices of western Europeans against “Gypsies” (Fraser, 1998), the contemporary prejudices (as well as the ensuing administrative actions) against the Roma migrants from CEE countries are based mostly, if concealed, on ethnic grounds (Braham & Braham, 2000). More precisely, these are based on a particular understanding of Roma ethnicity that concentrates the essence of what their ethnic specific is in their culture, or lifestyle, which is reified through some (mostly “antisocial”) features, while downplaying other ethnic markers, such as origins and descent, language or consanguinity.

What is of interest for the argument of my paper is that the way Roma ethnicity was conceived - both by some non-Roma “experts” from social sciences and by the Roma elite - might well serve the above-mentioned prejudices and actions against the Roma, and at the same time lets unobserved the current transformations of their ethnic self perception and their adaptive behaviour to nowadays societies.

Shortly put, there are three main conceptions about Roma ethnicity. The first conception, built on the way opened in the 18th century by the German thinker Heinrich Grellman, considers that Gypsy ethnicity is defined mostly by the unity of origins (India), and by a sum of particular ancient customs (inherited or acquired during migrations toward Europe) the people have succeeded to preserve during time; claiming also clearproofs for the existence of a proto-European Roma language (Matras, 2002), this direction argues for the existence of a unique Roma people beyond the well-known fragmentations (Tcherenkov & Laederich, 2004). While not denying that at least some groups may have foreign origins, a second conception argues for the emergence, during the turbulences that resulted when the feudal order collapsed, of groups of vagrants and entertainers which considered to have better chances to earn a living if presenting themselves as kin-related. Even if this “indigenous origins” hypothesis was conceived in order to give account for the formation of a particular group, the British Travellers (Okely, 1983), it produced much debates and contestation. And this precisely because it has allowed for a view about a pseudo-ethnicity, featured by a cultural content that is the result of adaptation to the market niches made possible by the capitalist organization of western societies. The third conception, which was produced within the field of social anthropology, let aside the concerns for the primordial origins, focusing instead on particular communities (Williams, 1982 & 1984; Stewart, 1997) and conceiving a Roma ethnicity as being specific to indigenous or allogeneic groups that were historically and structurally marginalized by majority ethnic groups.
and who developed in response reactive identities and culture/cultures. This culture has no strong inner core; it consists of original features, as well as of contents borrowed from the surrounding cultures, which are both assimilated and radically transformed by the Roma so as to provide for the groups the cultural difference and social autonomy that allow them to safely reproduce their constantly endangered (or perceived so) societies.

By and large, the first conception on ethnicity has got the credit of most of the Roma educated elites, who found convenient for their identity politics and ethnic policies in the 20th century to use the grand narrative of nationhood that was provided, explicitly or not, in most scholarly (sympathetic) representations on Roma. Already from the end of the 19th century Gypsy Lore Society has provided both the big picture of a unique people in diaspora and the incentives for the discovery of its internal variations, expressed through a rich cultural content of customs, folklore, dialects, crafts and lifestyles. This combination (one nation, plus internal variation) was particularly important for the Roma in the context of the collapse of state socialism, when claims for the ethnic recognition were addressed (and gained) in Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, where most of the European Roma live. The new (ethnic) status opened the way for a new approach to the Roma integration problem (which was dismissed by the communists as being but a class problem; Stewart, 1997), allowing for the local Roma elite to play with the policies of multiculturalism, which the candidate to EU membership countries were forced to formally integrate. These policies were indeed successful for a tiny stratum of Roma educated people gathered around newly formed NGOs, who got important funding for various social or educational programs, but were irrelevant for the larger Roma population, who had to face the deteriorating economic climate of post-socialism, which hit them particularly hard (Szelenyi and Ladanyi, 2006). To this situation the majority public responded by reframing the old prejudices of the presumed social “un-fittingness” of the Roma: there should be something in the “Gypsy” culture (if not in their “race”) - laziness, propensity for speculating etc. - that made them either the poorest of the poor, or, in the case of some groups of traders, unworthily rich. The latter groups seem to be particularly important for the social construction of a reified Gypsy character: they are seen as the purest incarnation of the essence of what “gypsyness” is: social auto-isolation, refusal of modern life-styles, and traditions that conflict the majorities’ mores and values. Less attention was paid to the fact that (1) their success is due to an intense socialization with the majority, and that they actually play by the (formal or informal) rules at work in contemporary capitalism; (2) in the culturally fragmented societies of today there no longer exists one consensual normative life-style and (3) many of the “traditional” behaviours are recent, and while they conserve an undeniable archaic style, they illustrate also the recent changes in the social and economic situation of these groups.
The same misrepresentation can be found in the context of Roma post-1990 migration, this time forged within the context of a presumed widespread tolerance of the western democracies:

The antipathy towards the Roma has less to do with their skin colour than with their perceived behaviour... ethnic prejudice focuses on a people life-style and its judged "fittingness" within a given social environment... If there is any transnational complaint against the Roma, it is that they are regarded as violating majority custom... Here we touch on the near intractability of the "Roma situation": ...wherever they appear to settle, the Roma are separated from the majority societies by majority - and self-created boundaries of ethnicity, reinforced not only by the majority society's perception, but also by the force of their own social cohesion and firmly held sense of difference.... The marginalization of Roma is not only a consequence of their exclusion by majority societies, but also of their own rejection of such societies (Braham & Braham, 2000: 100).

This view on Roma ethnicity as concentrated in its cultural auto-isolation, which presumably challenges even the generous frame of western multiculturalism, is drawn from the influential scholar Yaron Matras, revealing how a certain essentialist construction may be trafficked from the field of linguistic to academic works on policy papers. The case of the Roma integration thus, both in their home societies and in those where they migrate, would be than one that should be solved in the first place by the Roma themselves, who have to abandon...

... their sense of integrity, their belief in their racial purity, and the importance they attach to their social system", which make them unwilling to integrate in any society at large (Braham & Braham, 2000: 101).

What is at work here is an idealized version on modern society, where culturally homogenous "majority populations" stand as unified counterparts against minority ethnic "foreigners", which refuse to make those cultural changes that would allow them to go over their "traditionalism" and embark on the route to development and modernization. It seems that the case of the Roma migration generates a theoretical amnesia with regard to poststructuralist views on modern society, which allow for fragmentation, cultural diversity, pluralism of values and life-styles etc. and reinforce obsolete organic and evolutionary paradigms - in fact, the old discourse that links development with "civilization", and its supposed neutral standards.

I would involve in the following a different view on values, tradition and development, one that is able both to unravel the range of social and economic changes of the researched Roma and to make clear the sort of social success some Roma acquire through transnational migration. While I engage also the
third conception on ethnicity\(^2\) that was mentioned above, I assume as well that the perspective that I propose could surpass some of its limits (especially its static vision on traditionalism) and could go beyond the reproduction at the level of the analysis of the emic dichotomy "us-them" (Roma-Gadze), which informs many anthropological studies, with the undesired result of reinforcement of a bold (and sometime exotic) cultural difference that makes the Roma an everlasting exceptional case.

Developed by Denis Goulet and Marco Walshok (1971) in an article on values among marginal population, this perspective claims that the pervasive views on development either ignore traditional values or treat them instrumentally. In the latter case traditional values are considered only as means that foster or impede development and they are "measured" against modern values, like industrialization or monetized economies, considered uncritically as good. Consequently, advocates of development most of the time conclude that pre-modern values must disappear in order to make a “healthy” development possible. An alternative perspective on social change considers that development, while dealing with economic, political and cultural mobilization, is not an absolute end, but a means for enriching the quality of human life. Development, thus, has to be judged as good or bad in the light of differing normative values operative in the human groups affected. The alternative perspective understands development "not as a process whose term is predetermined to be economic and social modernization, but as a process which may or may not lead to a higher quality of human life." (Goulet and Walshok, 1971: 453).

Viewed from this angle, altering an informal distributive or welfare system, for example, on the grounds that it is traditional and, therefore, incompatible with a certified development, would certainly be a mistake. On the contrary, looking for ways of improving this system, following a change in the life conditions of a population, and according to its values and preserved customs, should be a task for "a good" development, as long as it does not conflict with the surrounding populations’ interests and goals. What is at stake here is both a different pedagogy in advocating development and a different epistemology in analyzing it. Tradition, in this respect, would not be seen any longer as some sort of a "survival" from the past, but as a disposition for social innovation which is

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\(^2\) There is not enough space to develop here on the differences and similarities between "ethnicity" and "collective self-identity"; however, I would mention that while I consider that "ethnicity" is in the case of Roma a "distant concept", produced mainly within politically-oriented discursive practices that forged an abstract Roma identity, by forcibly containing and neutralizing the huge variations within the Roma populations, I prefer and - later in the article - involve the concept of "collective self-identity", which I consider to be more appropriate for understanding the concrete social practices in which particular Roma group-identities are created.
proper for any population with a commonly preserved cultural repertoire. Accordingly, traditions should not be considered only as raw materials for museums, but as proper modes for entering into a de-standardized modernity, which in its current phase of "late", "hyper-", "post-", or "liquid" modernity has lost or deconstructed anyway most of its "classic", supposedly universalistic, canons.

The situation of the traditional groups of Roma, from this perspective, would be but a case among other cases, with its specific for sure, but not entirely different than other populations with a preserved archaic cultural repertoire, which join modernity in its present phase. Analyzing from these premises the ways Roma responded to modernizing circumstances, as I will exemplify in the following with the case of transnational migration, could provide a way out from the dichotomy "Roma-Non-Roma", which is a constant trope of Romani studies and, springing from there, a factor in the public policies concerning the Roma.

The groups and their social organization

The Gabor Roma

I met the G.L. family in rather odd but favorable circumstances. Looking for a Gabor Roma family in the village of Sântana de Mureș, in the proximity of the city of Târgu Mureș, I was guided towards an address on a street in the center of the village (I was also informed that the five Gabor families from the village live dispersed, unlike two other Roma groups, both poor, which live segregated on two ends of the village). It was not very difficult to spot the family house quite easily. Larger than the surrounding houses, the Roma house stands out for the absence of fences, the emptiness of the yard and for the many children playing around. Together with a woman colleague, we approached the children who alerted the people from inside. It proved that only the women were at home and they were at first very anxious to talk with some strangers with no clear intentions. It was clear from the beginning that dealing with the non-Roma individuals in such circumstances was a man's business, and that the situation of non-Roma visiting their house was in itself a rare happening. However, why it became quickly obvious that our visit is not a regular one, that we don't want to sell them something, convert them to a religious denomination or asking them to pay for a service, they became puzzled by our rather naive statement that we want only to talk with them about their specific way of life. Being taken as a couple, a role we instantly adopted, being clear that this would ease access, we were introduced in the house and scrutinized by the whole group with undisguised curiosity. The result was that for three days, until men
returned home from their work, the "Gabor way" revealed to us only through the lens of women, with their specific concerns, from the mundane activities as cooking or child rearing, to the symbolic practices they reproduce, as respecting the dressing code, obeying to marital arrangements or possessing and exhibiting prestige items. After hours of talking - not without amusement from their part for a man being interested in such things - about skirts, giving birth, period of breast-feeding and the like - we were introduced to the returned men as trustful acquaintances, and even won eventually the suspicions and precautions of the experienced head of the family.

As Ludovic, the head of the G.L. family asserted, the Roma families from the village belong to the community of "the Gabors with Hats" (Gaborii cu pălărie). They represent a subgroup of Transylvanian Roma who is documented as living in the area of Târgu Mureș from the middle of the XIX century (Sala, 2007: 19). They speak a Vlach Romani variant as their mother tongue (Berta, 2007: 32), and for intercultural communication they use both Hungarian and Romanian. The group of the Gabors is divided along the work they practice, most of them being traders, while a minority, which previously belonged to the patrilineages of the coppersmiths (Kăldărari)\(^3\), work today as metalworkers, mainly in tin. Unlike other Roma groups, the Gabors have a hierarchical social organization, with a system of family ranks, and a symbolic center, which is located in the village of Craciunesti, from the Mureș County, where many of the prestigious families of traders reside. While the traders have had an important economic success after 1990, due to their high mobility and to their knowledge to act within the informal markets, the crafters succeeded but to be better off than the majority rural population surrounding them, in the condition of providing types of products specific for a niche that was not entirely occupied by mass production. Because they have fewer resources than the traders, no residential unity and scattered relationships with the traders, the crafter subgroup is less stratified. The Gabors marry endogamously and, dissimilar to other Roma groups, the marital exchange doesn’t involve a bride price, but a dowry, usually paid in money by the girl’s parents to the groom’s father.

**The Ursari Roma**

In the condition in which the access in the Ursari community proved at the beginning of my fieldwork to be difficult, I approach them at first in "my private space", taking individuals or young couples who were hitchhiking in my car, on the road that link Zimnicea and Turnu Magurele, two towns on the

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\(^3\) They recognize two patrilineages within their ethnic subgroup, the Čarar and the Kăldărar, cf. Berta, op. cit. (2007), p. 32
Danube's bank. Later on, and based on these first encounters and informal communication, I made connections with a number of families from the village with one of the highest representation of Ursari from the area, namely Seaca, with whom semi-structured interviews were made4.

Unlike the Gabor traders, the Ursari Roma from Teleorman used to have till recently a very egalitarian social organization. The elder people that I talked with remembered vividly the time when they went en masse during summer times in the plain of Bărăgan, to work collectively on the socialist farms, and how they lived "all the same". They witness a strong consciousness of their group appartenence, making clear distinctions between their kinsmen ("vița") and the many other Roma groups and subgroups that live in Teleorman. The group's history and relative position among other Roma groups are less clear than in the case of the Gabors. The "Ursari" Roma were identified in the literature both as former entertainers, "bear leaders or trainers", and musicians, who didn't speak Romani, and as metalworkers who spoke as their mother tongue the Rîsarja dialect (Tcherenkov and Laedrich, 2004). None of these classifications match the present day Ursari from Teleorman. While they speak a common Vlach dialect with the surrounding groups of "Čurari", "Costorari" and "Lăieți", and have similar cultural practices, it is very likely that they are the descendants of the nomadic groups that were described at the end of the XIX century by Ozanne - when he talks about the wandering groups of "Ursari" blacksmiths - as the most mobile and traditional (culturally autonomous) groups from southern Romania (Ozanne, 1878, apud Crowe, 1994: 121-122).

As they recall, in the 20th century they were only agricultural workers, working both in the villages they reside in, as seasonal workers in the Romanians' gardens, and, as I mentioned, as temporary workers on the large state farms in Bărăgan. Unlike other groups, in the last 40 years of the last century they have lived mostly in rural areas, in villages where their residential patterns, relations with the majority Romanian population and univocal life strategies make them distinct among other Roma from the area. They are seen by the Romanians as fair and reliable workers, as obedient and polite, but also as distant people,

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4 The methodology that I involved in investigating the two groups was similar, being based on fieldwork research that was centred on participant observation and on collecting a wide range of interviews. While the sociological data of the groups was very different, the guides of the interviews were also different, being tuned in accordance with the relevant social experiences of the subjects. Being oriented towards community values, relevant behaviours and identity expressions, the collected data was not quantifiable. The comparison of the two communities, thus, was made within an interpretive framework, which looked after landmarks that expressed the forms, the extent and the amplitude of the social change as result of transnational mobility. For the same reason I considered that the investigations being done in two different periods of time would not impede on the comparative endeavour.
secluded in a world of their own. Their inner social organization was structured, until recent time, along the divisions that are proper to other egalitarian Roma groups, with the extended family being the basic social unit, where a strong gender separation, formalized through dressing code and specific social roles, plays an important structuring function, and where the public sphere is dominated by men, united within a community of brotherhood, where prestige was accumulated by individuals through their performative abilities, and where political actions (like representing the community, judging internal quarrels or finding work contracts for the community) were conducted by older men of certified honor. They also married endogamously, and the marriage contractual arrangement constrained the grooms' family to provide him the "basic means" for setting a family. Reflecting the former precariousness of life, but also the lack of durable goods possession, as land or cattle, the obligation for the bride's family was only to "put something for her on the wedding table".

Transnational mobility

At the time of the research the Gabor G.L. family was going through a series of recent changes. They were triggered by the marriage of Eva, the daughter of the old couple, who has also three sons, all married, living in the same house with their parents, and having children of their own. While all the sons married within the group of the crafters, taking wives from the surrounding villages, the daughter, who was also the younger sibling, married with a trader Gabor man from the town of Huedin. The marriage was four year old at the time, and Ştefan, the son-in-law, was not only well accepted by the family, but became also influential within it. What was under influence was precisely the core of their group identity: the way they have access to resources through their work.

The male members of the G.L. family subgroup were basically metalworkers, working in copper, tin and zinc, and who in the last 30 years have specialized in roof making. Depending on orders, they could produce and install various roof appliances, as copper-made kettles or zinc draining tubes, or could provide the complicated works in zinc that are demanded by different rich Roma groups for the roofs of their recently built "palaces". In the last two decades they have constantly adapted their craft to the market demand. While Ludovic (56 years

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5 These communities are egalitarian with respect to the similar economic and symbolic positions of the extended families, and they could be labelled so because of the central role the extended family plays in structuring the internal social relations. From another perspective they are still hierarchical communities, with a bold hierarchy built along gender lines, and a lesser one based on individual status and age.

6 For a photographic documentation of this phenomenon, see Andreșoiu and Ciocăzanu (2008).
old), the head of the researched family used to make in the past a wide range of metal artefacts, from copper pots to distillery appliances and small agricultural tools, in the later years he, together with his sons, have narrowed down their offer, but have learned also how to install various industrial-made products for roofs. In the process, parts of the crafting abilities were lost: only lanko (33 years old), the older son, has still learned how to make distillery appliances and how to work properly in cooper. They find work especially in the Transylvanian villages and small towns, being most of the time on the road, looking for orders or executing them. Usually they operate following the agreements and transactions available in the Romanian informal economy; however, in order to be able to respond to a wider range of clients, they have lately organized their business in the legal frame of a "Family Association".

Till recently their craft was the only activity that ensured the family incomes. It was also common sense that only men work outside the household, women having only domestic duties. The earnings were erratic, depending on the number of orders, but they were not precarious. The range of incomes for a month could go from 500 to 1,000 Euro for each of the four members of the family team. However, when they have an important order, the incomes could be doubled or even tripled. Considering, as they mentioned, an average of 750 Euro/worker, the total incomes of the family per month has been around 3,000 Euro, which divided to the 14 members of the extended family lead, after subtracting different expenses like the transport, tools etc., to revenues of about 150 Euro per family member. As they said, their family was "an average one among the Gabor crafters" and, as I evaluated, much better situated economically than the common Hungarian and Romanian families.

As good as their position on the market and economic situation seemed to be, they paled in comparison with the opportunities that Stefan, the son in law, claimed as being available to him. At the time of the research he was visiting his wife's family, on a break from his transnational trading travels he was into in the last three or four years. Stefan, who was 24 at the time, was member of an average trader family, well enmeshed into a network of families where hierarchy was instrumental for trade. He claimed to have a very wealthy uncle, whose high position within hierarchy was guaranteed by the possession of one of the prestige items - a silver beaker - by which the Gabors both represent symbolically the hierarchy and limit the number of the higher position within it. Owing to this kin relation and to its symbolic influence, he became part of a selected network of traders, who share information about suppliers, dynamic markets, products in demand and who, most importantly, provide money loans, having the moral guarantee that they will be returned with the requested interests.

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7 For a detailed analysis of the issue of these prestige items see Berta, 2007 and 2009.
Trading transnationally was a rather recent experience for him and his family. During the interviews he recalled that in his childhood, in the 90's, they only used to trade in the country, selling a wide range of cheap replica products, bought with their own money, like watches, clothes, electronic devices, auto spare parts, that were provided to them by richer Roma, from Bulgaria, Serbia, or Turkey. They used to work mostly in the warm seasons, travelling with the whole family to the Black Sea resorts, or to Transylvanian small towns, were they sold the products on the streets, in the flea markets or door to door.

Triggered by the liberty of circulation in the Schengen space, available for Romanian citizens starting with 2002, but also due to the growing capital wealthier Gabor Roma acquired through the 90's, some of them operated lately mostly in the developed European countries. Along this trend, and using mostly borrowed money, Stefan was later reselling replica brand clothes in Germany, or fake Zeppter cooking appliances ("the best fake on the market") in Italy and Croatia. The business was, as he said, flourishing; he was proudly exhibiting his second hand Opel Vectra, registered in Austria, which he bought on his last trip, and was mentioning a house being under construction for his family in Huedin. Contrary to the former work pattern, now he was working year round, living most of the time abroad, and coming to Romania only during summer time to see his relatives and to take care of his home arrangements. He claimed constant earnings of "thousands of euros", and the way he spent certainly make the claim credible; however, it became clear during interviews that while he indeed rolled important money, he was regularly in debt, and in constant need of cash. The marriage with Eva, a rural girl from a less prestigious family, who brought though a significant 10,000 euros dowry, may have responded, back in time, to a need of cash for Stefan's family. Still, being indebted was not a big concern for Stefan; he talked easily about his ability to borrow money at any time, till a rewarding big business would occur, proving thus that he confidently relayed on a good capital of trust within the traders' network.

What is important for my argument is the fact that in the later year the youngest sons of the G.L family, Ludovic (31) and Rupi (29), were joining Stefan abroad for helping him in his businesses. What was seen at first as an incidental event, proved later on as an alternative working strategy to be seriously considered. At the end of Stefan's visit, the decision of the head of the family for the two brothers to join Stefan again was already taken.

The convenience of transnational mobility has affected the Ursari Roma from Teleorman in a different way and at a different scale. Still, like in the case of the Gabor traders, the Ursari have only relocated at transnational level the type of occupation that was specific for them in the past. What started at the end of the '90's as an adventurous initiative of some youngsters to look for agricultural work in western countries have turned after 2000 into
a mass migration. In a ten years time span, they have literally deserted their
home communities and moved to Spain, in the province of Valencia, where
they found work as unskilled agricultural workers in orchards and green houses.
In villages like Seaca, Traian, or Lisa, for example, where they represent about
10 to 15% of the whole population (and the youngest also), communities of
200 to 400 people have shrunken to 20-30 people, mostly the very old, who
are still present in the village as permanent inhabitants8.

Their departure was triggered by the structural changes in the region’s
agriculture at the beginning of the new millennium. Shortly put, the small scale
agriculture that was practiced in the 90s by the Romanian landowners who
got back their land after the socialist farms were shut down, was slowly replaced
by a large scale, market oriented agriculture, dominated by big companies, which
exploited both the state owned land, taken in concession, and the small owners
land, taken in lease. The higher technologies they use eliminated the greatest part
of the 90s agricultural labour force, an important part of this being previously
provided by Roma. While during socialism few Ursari Roma worked in the
local cooperatives, but laboured seasonally in the large socialist farms from
South Eastern Romanian plain, they were not entitled to get land during land
re-privatization, and very few got pensions. And while land given in lease and
pensions remained among the few steady sources of income in the area (Troc,
2012), the Roma were actually pushed to look for work elsewhere.

Their working history and living circumstances as migrant unskilled
workers were not significantly different than those of other ethnic groups from
Eastern Europe or elsewhere. Starting around 1998 as irregular migrants, a
group of (men) pioneers found work and lived at the beginning in very rough
conditions, accepting precarious menial jobs and living as vagrants or in
abandoned houses. Later on, and mostly after 2002, when the mobility constrains
were lifted, larger groups of youngsters, both men and women, went to Spain,
mostly along family networks, and got work in contractual frameworks, which
allowed them to improve both their level of earnings and their living conditions.
The migration of almost all the others in the second half of the latest decade
may let the impression that Ursari migration turned "communitarian". Actually,
while indeed they migrated en masse, they didn't follow the pattern of residence
of other Romanian Roma migrants in UE. Unlike the Roma who live together in
improvised camps at the outskirts of Italian cities (Clough Marinaro, 2009), or
the well publicized Roma migrant communities from Paris, and even of other
non-Roma migrants from Romania, the Ursari live in Valencia rather scattered
in various suburbs. What is actually interesting is precisely a process of social

8 In a different article I analysed in detail the phenomenon of transnational migration of both Roma
and non-Roma populations from this area. See Troc (2012).
fragmentation of the community that was determined by the new form of praxis they were experiencing through migration. If during the late decades of socialism and in the first years of post-socialism they used to work and reside most of the time together, in groups that were defined along the kinship relations and the locality of residence, maintaining a close and continuous contact between its members, the context of migration constrained them for grouping in small teams of few families that worked together on the farms and resided according to the best leasing opportunities they found on the real estate market.

Cornel C. for example, male, 41 years old, went to Spain together with two cousins in 2000. Four years later he established himself in Alzira, Valencia, and brought his nuclear family with him - his wife, a son and three daughters. He worked together with his wife and two adult daughters in a citrus orchard, for 8 to 10 hours a day, in a team of 15 people, some of them being Roma from his community, some being migrants from Northern Africa. The youngest siblings went to school till they reached the age of 16, the legal age for working in Spain, when they joined also the workers' team. They lived together for a while in rented apartments, changing their residence for a number of times, looking for the cheapest rent available. As soon as they got the work permits and reside legally in Spain, they applied for consumption credits, and later on they made a mortgage for a three-bedroom apartment. In the years following 2007 Cornel brought also his older mother, the only member of the family left at home, and the elder daughters married and moved out, living lately in rented apartments shared with other Roma and non-Roma young families.

With respect to the use of the earned money, the Ursari in Spain followed a pattern common to other lower-class migrants (Piore, 1979: 166). Namely, their style of living was oriented towards saving and accumulation for a later significant consumption at home, and therefore towards minimizing the costs of living in the emigrational present. The financial gains were collected within a sole budget at the level of the nuclear family, and all the expenses were collectively decided. What actually happened was that, because of the steadiness and the levels of earnings, as well as of the break in the communitarian social continuum specific for their home life-style, the nuclear family - considered as the unit that existed at the departure point - became economically individualized. This process can be properly understood if related to the back-home context of theirs past living history: when working in the socialist farms or in the Romanians' gardens they were paid mostly in agricultural products. These later goods were easily transferrable within the community and less quantifiable, while eating in common, or giving help to a kin-related family in difficulty during winter times, which would have been paid back through a sort of future service, or helping someone to build a house was commonsensical. If a form of solidarity remained open in the context of migration also, the mediation of money altered the
nature of help, which took the form of the strictly quantifiable money debt. This new social arrangement was possible in the context of the plenitude of jobs offers and of the relatively good earnings. With an average salary of 1,000 Euro/month/worker, the family of Petrișor O. (male, 49) for example, composed of husband and wife, one adult unmarried daughter, two adult sons, their wives and three grandchildren, succeeded to save around 55,000 Euro during a six-year period. Originally from the village of Seaca, they reside in the present in Alzira in two apartments, bought with a 25-year mortgage, and located in the same block of flats. Five members of the family work in a team together with four members of Petrișor brother’s family, Ionel (42), whom also reside in the same district. The two brothers also have three sisters in Valencia, Didina (53), Angela (51), and Sonia (36), who live in other suburbs and work in different teams. While the relations between the siblings were described as very tight when they were at home, they loosen in the migration context, the sister being visited at rare occasions, a situation deplored by the parents left at home, Stoian (73) and Maria (66). They complain that while all the siblings send money to be invested in newly built houses in the home village, they have to administrate them very carefully, and give a precise and individualized account for the expenses of each construction site.

Changing values and life-styles as result of transnational mobility

If we agree, up to a point, with Carol Silverman that Roma culture is not static, but vital and innovative, which exhibits still few signs of decline and assimilation in the context of changing of the life circumstances (Silverman, 1998: 261), then looking to the transnational mobility and migration in their case, with all the dynamic processes implied by it, is an opportunity to understand how a specific collective self-identity could be both preserved and transformed within an accelerated flux of social changes. However, this does not imply that the way they respond to the social forces and the social processes that are common to transnationally migrating groups is Roma-specific all the time. They certainly do what other people in the same circumstances do: they built migration networks, send remittances at home, invest in new houses and status-related goods, develop a culture of migration and so on. The Roma specific responses though come from their particular social position as lowest-status ethnic group, both in the sending and the receiving countries, in the European context, and from their proper systems of norms and values, that were historically produced as a reaction to this position.

Coming back to our cases, I would notice, following Bruneau, that transnationalism refers to the two groups differently. If the Gabor traders are not properly migrants, and their transnationalism is related to a "territory of
movement", located between emigration and immigration countries, the groups of the Ursari Roma can be considered as proper "transnational communities", which consist of labor migrants who established groups in the immigration regions (Bruneau, 2004, apud Faist, 2010: 17). However, if the mobility pattern is different in the two cases, the incentive for change in values and lifestyles are, as we will see, similar, due to the similarity of the economic gains they achieve as result of transnational mobility and the comparable social position within the majority societies they are living in.

If gradual, the influence of Stefan in the Gabor G.L. family seems to be decisive in determining a sharp change in the way they experience and perceive their social reality. With two of its adult male members ready to embark on a different way of getting access to resources, the family is affected, as I mention, at the deepest level of the foundation of their collective identity. Choosing trade against craft was neither an easy decision, being debated within family for years, nor a change to be made without careful reflections on its pros and cons. They valued, as they said, the tranquility and the certainty of the crafters' way of life; they praised the hard working man and the obedient and domestic woman, as well as "looking after your own business" and "paying your debts in time" attitudes. Being themselves in a transitory phase, they were still looking down, from a certain angle, to the traders, using for naming them the pejorative term of "bişnitari" (black marketers), which implied both dishonesty and ostentation, but on the other side they envied their ability to make more money with less effort. Stefan, as an individual from outside the family, but who has been integrated within it, represented a mediator to a different way of life, an easier and more rewarding one, which seemed to be available for them as well. The influence the son in law had on the G.L. family came both from his different position within the Gabor society and from his personal achievements in connecting with the social world at large. Being part of a larger, closely knit community, he has better knowledge about the Gabor's clans and branches than his new relatives, as well as of the relative positions of different families within the community's system of ranks. Being an urban Gabor and an experienced traveller, Stefan has also a greater mobility and a much broader cultural horizon. Above his trading abilities, he is also smart in different practical matters like how to get a driving license in Budapest if one fails numberless times in Romania, or in new forms of "impression management" in dealing with the non-Roma, like changing his style of clothing depending on the profile of the clients (he quits wearing the Gabor hat when trading abroad), or handing a business card to his potential clients. He knows what products are advertised on TV and what brands the commoners look after. Even if he has only one year of formal education, he has learned to write and to read. He even made a personal website, where he presented himself as a regular youngster of his age, with preferences...
and interests, and where only his moustache still evoked his ethnic identity. (In passing I would note that while on Stefan’s website both he and his wife were dressed casually, wearing no “ethnic” outfits, when visiting Eva’s family, they were properly dressed “as Gabors”, and indistinguishable from the others from the group.)

What the G.L. family witnesses and is remotely affected by is the recent transformation, with its crisis, tensions, and adaptive innovations the Gabor community has experienced as result of transnational mobility. The community of Stefan, from Huedin, has benefited strongly, in economical terms, from this opportunity, be that in the form of trade or in other available strategies for temporary migrants. The benefits are easily visible in the city, where a new district of “gypsy palaces”, as the Romanians are calling them, located in the proximity of the main national road, has been raised in the last 15 years. The houses, with their complicated tin roof ornaments, with tens of rooms and expensive furniture represent but the most visible expression of a new repertoire for expressing, within their codified system of reference, the old norms and values of the cohesion of the extended family, of the rank of the family within the community, and of the transformation of the neutral and exogenous value of money into significant expensive goods like luxury cars, electronic devices, jewellery and others. Being understood by the majority population as but an opulent manifestation of a perennial ethnic stylistics, the wealth the rich Gabor Roma exhibit as result of exploiting resources available transnationally expresses mainly a collective response to a crisis of growth, a form of communitarian adaptation to modernizing constrains and a process of rearrangement of the internal hierarchy which in the past had only limited positions of higher status. Viewed form a certain distance, but still from inside of this inner world, the opportunity of social climbing and of all the material and symbolic benefits that come with it appears for the G.L. family members as being both a possibility that is open now for them also, and a pressure for change. They till recently represented, in a certain sense, the incarnation of a Gabor family from the past: identifying itself as an “average, honourable” family, with a sole and unambiguous occupation, oriented towards alliances with families of the same status, and limited in its aspirations to successful marital transactions and to representing their social position through accumulation of gold coins, they slowly became a marginal family. Viewed from this angle, the occupational change they are up to, as well as the changes of the lifestyles that come with it, doesn’t result from the exhaustion of their old way, but from the social pressure for keeping up with how the things are for the Gabors in the present or, otherwise put, from the specific form of modernization this population is going through.
The same pressure for social conformism and the same group-focused image of change (Goulet and Walshok, 1971) can be found in the case of the Ursari Roma. After five or six years of working in Spain, and using the savings they succeeded to make, the heads of the families returned in the hometown villages for the summer and started to build new homes. If at the beginning they built within the segregated areas of their previous settlements, located at the outskirts of the villages, later on they gradually moved towards the central spaces, buying Romanian properties. Modern villas, with two or three stories, much larger and in deep contrast with other houses from the area, aligned to the main road, changed dramatically, in the last five years, the landscape of these rather poor villages. While at start the Ursari planned to build new houses for the nuclear families that worked in Spain, during time, and while the children grew up and some married, the pressure for building a new house for each son, following and older custom, grew. As Cornel C. put it, one or two started to build large houses, "as other Roma groups from Teleorman do, but more in a style that we saw in Spain. Others followed them, trying to build larger and more beautiful houses". At the time of the interview he advanced with the villa he built for himself, and started to build another one for his son, because, as he said, "he didn't want to be reproached that he was not doing what other people were doing". As this view became normative, the number of houses under construction grew rapidly, and because the savings were very soon spent, few constructions were completed. Being in need of cash, and with their incomes reduced after 2009, when the economic crisis hit Spaniard agriculture, some of them have recently started to borrow money from wealthier groups of Roma from Teleorman, have intensified the relations with them and have started to look for other strategies for making money these other groups are practicing (selling used cars, gambling etc.). However, few are yet in this situation, most of the interviewed Ursari imagining their future occupation only as wageworkers in agriculture. The same conservative view is revealed with respect to their future place to live. Similar to the times when they were collectively displaced for working in the socialist farms from Bărăgan, the time they spend in Spain is seen as limited. Working in Spain is perceived as a temporary opportunity, which cannot last for long, and which would end up with the communities' re-unification. Investing the remittances in home improvements, the competition for displaying migration success through durable goods possession, as well as the projection of the future life back home are for sure not something specific for the Roma, but common to numberless other successful temporary migrants (Vertovec, 2009: 121). What seems to be specific for the Ursari is a common view, shared across generations, on a bounded community that is temporarily in a sort of exile, from which it will be resurrected, as community, within a foreseeable future. If migration context determined dramatic
changes of previous social arrangements, including, as I mentioned, the emergence of an internal fragmentation, but also, as I will briefly note, numberless other small changes, imagining a cohesive and all inclusive community, and the definition of the self through community and place of origin has remained stubborn. The case of Iancu (19) is illustrative for this state of affair. He came back to the village of Traian for three weeks during the summer, together with his wife Angela (17), mainly for registering their newborn daughter at the local town hall. Getting the Romanian papers for her was important, as "they would come more often at home now, where they want to built their house". Together with his father, Iancu has started already to look for a place and a team of workers. Both youngsters moved to Spain when they were very young: Iancu was 12 at the time, and Angela 9. They went to school both in Romania and in Spain, being fluent in both languages. Both worked in the last years in citrus orchards and, for the time they had the child, they lived together with another young Roma family in a rented apartment in Alzira. Their parents set their marriage years in advance, an arrangement they perceived as commonsensical, and as logical as of planning a family with at least three of four children. He had a fashionable tattoo on his left arm, and wore a ring in one of his ears. Both were dressed like regular urban youngsters, with sporty garments and, unlike the generation of their parents, when in the village they behaved totally uninhibited with the Romanian villagers (who they evaluated as narrow-minded and rude). As they said, they wear Roma costumes only at important fest, like a wedding or a baptism. Actually, according to them, less and less people wear Roma clothes in Spain, mainly because when they work they have to wear the special clothing provided by the employers. Iancu said they would definitely come back to the village "because here is my homeland [he used the Romanian word "patră", a word with nationalistic connotation, he probably learned in the elementary school, and which would be hardly used today by a Romanian youngster] and because here I can live happily with my brothers and sisters, with the people of my kind. In Spain you are nobody, and no one cares about you." Reflecting their marginal positions, as temporary unskilled workers, tolerated but not integrated within the Spaniard society, the Ursari, like the Gabors in this respect, are bounded to imagine the good life only within the borders of their community and on the land of their origin. This projection and its adjacent material and symbolic counterpart is followed, as always, with a repressive response from the part of the majority: the local council from Seaca, in Teleorman, has recently decided to raise the local property taxes for multi-storied houses, while the mayor of Huedin has opened a public debate about measures to be taken for constraining the Gabors to dismantle the ornamented roofs of their houses, because the city, in his view, is in danger of becoming a "Gypsy city".
Conclusions: re-evaluating the Roma traditionalism and collective self-identity

Against the view, widely spread, and shared by commoners as well as by different policy making specialists, both in the sending and the receiving societies, that the Roma geographically mobile traditional groups have a static culture and that, in order to be integrated, they have to change, the two cases sketched here indicate not only that important changes are underway within their communities, but also that these changes are substantial, affecting central values, lifestyles and social patterns of interactions with majorities. However, if modernizing processes influence them as strongly as in the case of other populations, their response remains collective and communitarian, which allows for a cultural difference to be preserved within the flux of change. This distinction is certainly still not sufficient for grasping their specificity, while other ethnic or occupational groups may also respond in this way. Above of being collective, their response is also rooted in specific social histories of their communities, determined by the preservation up to nowadays of archaic social relations and worldviews (not all of these being though Roma specific, but common to the majority population surrounding them in the past) and, more importantly, catalyzed by the unifying force of distinct mother tongues, and by a unique racially-rooted discrimination against them in Europe.

The issue of Roma traditionalism and self-identity should be reconsidered in this light: if central self-identity features can be replaced, as we saw in the case of the Gabor crafters, and if a whole way of living is slowly transformed, as in the case of the Ursari, what remains as "traditional" is a collective adaptive life-style, which conserves some patterns of social action from the past, modifies others or adopts, integrates and re-signifies new patterns from the surrounding repertoires. Coming again to Silverman's view, we can still agree that Roma culture is dynamic and innovative, but we refute the idea that it proves no "assimilation" or "decline" during time. In fact, terms like "assimilation" and "decline" (which evoke a previous classificatory polemic over the distinction between the "pure" and the "impure" Roma) misleadingly guide us towards a culturalist path in which different cultural contents and behaviours would be evaluated as "more or less" Roma-specific, and would re-direct the analysis towards an essentialist perspective. Going on this path, the phenomenon of the "Gypsy palaces" from Romania, for example, which emerged after 1990 without a known precedent, would be incomprehensible. More generally, the fact that some Roma groups have become more visible in the public sphere as incarnation of conservatism only in the last 15 years (see all the talks about the Roma kings, opulent weddings, famous witches, fortune-tellers and the like)
indicates that attention given to the social and economic context of post-
socialism could provide a better explanatory perspective. With their spatial
mobility and their knowledge to operate within the informal economy, some
Roma groups from the former socialist countries were able to mobilize along
their extended family networks resources and capital and to operate efficiently
on the newly emerging local markets. The transnational openings provide
them with even better opportunities, from which groups as different as those
analyzed here have equally benefitted. In fact, in the context of the ubiquitous
neoliberal model of society, imposed in the East as in the West, which has
dismantled most of the safety nets available in the past, has eroded previous
social arrangements that ensured a large social integration and has replaced
them with calls for flexibility, occupational mobility and constant adjustment
to the market needs, mobile Roma groups have fit sometimes very well. If one
considers only our cases, the Gabors are as adaptive to the market demands as
any other successful capitalist trader, while the Ursari may be considered the
most desired workers on the today’s labour market: they don’t ask for
constant work and payment, are available to work with no fixed schedule or
limited numbers of hours/day, don’t belong or organize themselves in unions
and don’t ask or expect for extra social benefits. Therefore, studies which
conclude that the Roma migrants should change their life-style in order to fit in
the receiving societies, and to be properly integrated, like the one that I mentioned
at the beginning of this article (Braham & Braham: 2004), disregard, firstly,
that these later societies are not integrative societies any longer, and secondly,
that important changes of life-styles within the Roma migrants' communities
do occur. Indeed, their new lifestyles may be contrasting with the majorities,
but - at least for our cases - this is not because they would be stuck in a
mechanical attitude of reversing meanings, as the literature that lifts to the
rank of law the opposition Roma-Gadze assumes, but because the adjustments
required by the changes of their living context preserve or creatively transform
values or behaviours from the past that proved to remain adequate in the
present also. As we saw, two Roma communities with different backgrounds
and different dynamics of internal change have both preserved values and
collective behaviours that are alien to the mainstream society, and in doing so
they were both economically successful. Against the view that Roma respond
to the changes of their life circumstances in a typified "gypsy way", I would
argue for a multitude of "ways", each being produced in a specific historical
context and determined by a unique collective background. Preserving a way,
though, should not be seen only as a passive, inertial response, but also as an
active one, which may provide a healthy communitarian development, if we
understand development, as I proposed above, as a process that may lead to a
higher quality of human life. The people from both groups analyzed here are economically better off, socially better integrated and with a stronger sense of belonging than most of the non-Roma people with same geographical origins, similar educational capital, and similar labouring abilities. Following their "traditions" thus, in the sense that I have specified above, has provided the transnationally mobile Roma, in the context of late modernity's fragmented society, an advantage over other "secularized" communities. Important to notice, still, is that Roma cases are not unique in this respect, other rural non-modernized communities being also successful in community development as result of transnational migration. By accepting this observation we can find a way out from the path that views Roma condition as a perennial exception. The future fate of the Ursari, for that matter, remains as undecided as the fate of other cases of temporarily migrant communities, being highly dependent on many variables, like the availability of jobs in the home region in the future, acculturation of younger generations in the receiving countries, changes on the labour market and so on.

The changes in their collective self-identity are also important, being equally dependent on the rapid transformation of their life contexts. If the collective self-identity in terms of kinship, occupation and ranks remain constant, the two case studies suggest that a generational gap is under formation. The youngsters from both groups seem to develop more ambiguous relations with core identity markers, like the dressing code or the typical patterns of interactions with the non-Roma. The observed behaviour of the Roma young adults let us speculate about a dual sense of the self in their case, which allowed them to better interact both within the community and outside of it. As we saw, Stefan was able to present himself both as a rule-obeying, honourable Gabor when he was interacting with Gabors from a higher generation, and as a regular businessman when trading abroad, or a common person, who posted pictures of himself over the Internet and talks about his leisure preferences. The Ursari youngsters, on their side, have a sharply different self-perception than their parents’ generation, which was naturally developed from their acculturation in a less ethnic discriminatory environment. They define themselves as "Rom", and accepted that they are labelled as "Gypsies" by the Romanians, but they didn't internalize also the pejorative meanings of this term. When interacting with the rural non-Roma from their home village they exhibit a certain superiority, talk down on them and limit the interactions to strictly instrumental business. For both groups, the unifying identity of "one Roma people" - the identity accepted and promoted by the Roma elite activists - is either not known or has no practical importance.
REFERENCES


CELEBRATING CROWN DAY AFTER THE 1990s SAXON MIGRATION: RECONFIGURATIONS OF ETHNICITY IN A SOUTH TRANSylvANIAN VILLAGE

CLAUDIA N. CÂMPEANU

ABSTRACT*. In this paper I discuss reconfigurations of ethnic relations in a village in South Transylvania following the migration of most of its Saxon population to Germany. I use the example of a yearly celebration, the Crown Day, to explore continuities and transformations in ethnic identities and relations between the remaining Saxons, Roma, and Romanians, and in particular transformations in what it means to be Saxon, in the village, in 2011. Using participant observation and formal and informal interviews about past and recent celebrations, I show how Crown Day serves as a site of performing and renegotiating historical legitimacy as well as a continued, albeit transformed, investment in the Saxonness of the village. I argue that the celebration continues to serve as a rehearsal of the local symbolic ethnic order, while mirroring the increasing dominance of the Romanian population as well as recent opportunities and obstacles in the transformation of the status of the local Roma. The symbolic and social space opened by non-Saxon participation in the festivities and their preparations represents an opportunity to confront and mitigate the social and cultural changes following the departure of their Saxon co-villagers. For all in the village, the Crown Days gives a way to discuss, instantiate, and act on the recent transformations in the village.

Keywords: ethnicity, celebration, migration, Saxons, Transylvania

Introduction

Looking through photographs I snapped during Crown Day (Kronenefest) in 2011, in this south Transylvanian village, one catches my attention. It is a photograph of two couples of young dancers, performing in Saxon folk costumes.

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* This work was made possible by the financial support of the Sectoral Operational Programme for Human Resources Development 2007-2013, co-financed by the European Social Fund, under the project number POSDRU/89/1.5/S/61104 with the title “Social sciences and humanities in the context of global development and implementation of postdoctoral research.” The results and the analysis were not influenced in any way by the author’s relationship to the funding organization.
In the background, two rows of spectators standing and watching, some sullen, with their arms crossed, some just serious and interested. Nothing spectacular in itself, but a few ethnographic layers—participant observation and formal and informal interviews—turn it into a snapshot of the complexities of the recent transformations in the village.

Crown Day (Kronenfest) is a traditional Saxon celebration, organized by the Saxon community in the village, the Saxons being, in the living memory of this community, symbolically and practically at the center of these festivities. Two of the dancers in the picture don't identify nor are recognized as Saxons in the village. One boy is three quarters Romanian and one quarter Saxon and was chosen by his peers in the dancing group to execute the most prestigious of the celebration elements: climbing the celebratory pole and retrieving some special objects. His role did not go uncontested—if only through side puzzled conversations on the village streets, concluded by the recognition that there weren't really that many Saxon young men left in the village to choose from, and he's a good boy after all. One of the female dancers was Roma, and this year, she had trouble finding a costume, as the Saxon woman who normally lends her one, simply didn't want to anymore, justifying her reluctance by saying that she doesn't want her costume to be "worn out" and the girl should just find one somewhere else.

The spectators in the back were mostly Roma, living at the south end of the village in conditions of social and physical exclusion. Their presence in the middle of the village would have been normally out of ordinary, questioned and commented on by the rest of the villagers (Romanian, Saxon, and the better off Roma living in the rest of the village). On Crown Day, however, they were present, like everybody else in the village, dressed in their best clothes and spending cash on food and drinks. I remember them having fun during that day, but the photograph captures their bored/sullen/grave faces, a performance and critique of their place in the social order of the celebration and the village community as a whole.

Thus, the photograph (with its ethnographic texture) shows some of the tensions, complexities, and historical continuities and disruptions of the celebration: a symbolic and enacted ethnic order that relies on slippages as well as enduring investments in ethnic identity, and non-Saxons participating in the Saxon celebration in roles that both affirm and disrupt historical ethnic arrangements. In what ways, then, are the photograph and the celebration symptomatic of the transformed social realities in the village of the past twenty years?

In this paper, I use the loose nested indexicality of the photograph and the celebration to talk about the recent transformations in the social reality of the village and about some of its enduring characteristics, especially in terms of ethnicity and ethnic dynamics. If Crown Day is a Saxon celebration in a village
CELEBRATING CROWN DAY AFTER THE 1990 Saxon Migration

still understood as Saxon (despite having a Saxon minority), what does it mean for it to rely on locals, including non-Saxons, instead of building it around the participation of the more numerous Saxon diaspora? What is the relationship between the transformations, tensions, and enduring elements in the celebration, and the transformations, tensions, and enduring social dynamics in the village community as a whole? And, what does continued investment in a Saxonness mean in the context of profoundly transformed community following the Saxon migration of the early 1990s?

Using observations and formal and informal interviews about past and recent celebrations, I show how Crown Day serves as a site of performing and renegotiating historical legitimacy as well as a continued, albeit transformed, investment in the Saxonness of the village. I argue that the celebration continues to serve as a rehearsal of the local symbolic ethnic order, mirroring the increasing and normalized dominance of the Romanian population as well as recent opportunities and obstacles in the transformation of the status of the local Roma. The symbolic and social space opened by non-Saxon participation in the festivities and their preparations represents an opportunity to confront and mitigate the social and cultural changes following the departure of their Saxon co-villagers. For all in the village, Crown Day gives a way to discuss, instantiate, and reflect on the massive migration of a good part of the village population, as well as other recent transformations in the village.

This paper seeks to answer the question of how ethnic identities—and in particular the meaning and social significance of being Saxon—have changed in an area until recently dominated demographically by Saxons but marked by an abrupt and massive migration of this population to Germany in the early 1990s. Its contribution is, first and foremost, substantive, adding to a still scarce body of empirically grounded work on transformations in ethnic dynamics in South Transylvania following the Saxon out-migration. Conceptually, the paper contributes to the theorization of ethnicity as connected to and expressed through dynamics that are first and foremost local. The paper also makes visible the process through which understandings of ethnic categories and their immediate social relevance are transformed and maintained: making room for and resolving ambiguities in ethnic boundaries as well as strategically de-coupling or connecting what would normally count as ethnic markers and ethnic membership.

In the rest of the paper, I will first anchor the discussion theoretically, by offering a framework and a basis for asking my questions and building my argument. Then, I will provide some background information about the community under analysis as well as a description of the festive event, as I witnessed it in 2011. I will end the paper with a more ample analysis and discussion of the social significance of the event in the light of the transformations brought about by the Saxon migration out of this community.
Theoretical framework

I approach the discussion of the social significance of Crown Day in opposition to a facile, yet tempting functionalist explanation (a la Durkheim, Malinowski, Radcliffe-Brown), that is, looking at ritual and festive traditions (even in a modern context) as some kind of expressions of collective consciousness. I see three obvious problems with such an approach: first, it lacks a critical historical dimension, and second, it assumes that “communities” or “groups” are bounded, homogenous and cohesive in their “consciousness,” and third, it assumes that these events themselves are perfectly followed scripts.

Yet, there is a relationship between public, popular festive events and the social reality in which they are produced, and this relationship is worth investigating. Exploring it relies precisely on explicating its historical dimensions and the plural nature of the social forces that shape it. Popular festivals and community celebrations emerge at the complex intersection of forces of social order, resistance and protest, smaller and greater traditions, and commodification, to name just a few (Guss, 2000). Therefore, instead of focusing on discussions of origins and content of the celebrations, these events should be examined as what Nestor Garcia Canclini called “systems of production” (1993, p. 11) echoing Raymond Williams and its concern for cultural forms and their social conditions of production (1977). In other words, we should be paying attention to the social relations and processes through which these events are produced, reproduced, transformed, circulated.

The historical dimension, then, becomes accounting for the longitudinal transformations in the event as well as for locating the ethnographic analysis of the event in its own, historically specific context. Also, any concern with authenticity (in the context of popular culture and festive events) can follow the more productive route of understanding it as part of a system of policing and legitimizing particular forms of continuity and change in the unfolding of these events. There is probably no need to insist on the kinship between the logics of authenticity, tradition, and heritage production, as, to paraphrase Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett (1998: 149), modes of cultural production in the present that have recourse to the past. Moreover, “authenticity and tradition are coconspirators in ensuring that the socially constructed and contingent nature of festive practice will continue to be mis-recognized” (Guss, 2000:15). Discourses of authenticity and tradition, especially in these contexts of public events/festivities offer ways to mediate and mitigate social changes and processes of modernization. For me, then, one concern that remains embedded in my analysis is trying to understand how Crown Day can remain the same, with a recognizable form and enduring social significance—Crown Day, a Saxon celebration—and how it can also change, again, in terms of form and its relationship with the transformed local social reality.
What is the relationship between these public, popular celebrations and the complexity, unboundedness, and the plural nature of the social reality from which they emerge? If the event is, in some ways, about ethnic identity, what is its relationship to current ethnic dynamics? Also, and this is the case for this village, what is the role of diasporic communities in producing and reproducing these events? How do these events relate to other forces and processes which extend beyond the physical confines of the community, such as the state and market forces?

Stanley Brandes suggests that, while providing a break from the constraints and routines of everyday life, community celebrations actually promote order and social control, either directly, through direct power, or indirectly, through what he calls persuasion, "informal pressures and instructive procedures that lead people to conduct their lives with regard to particular standards" (Brandes, 1988: 5). What I take from this is that these public festivities have a didactic and performative function, in that they teach something about the prevailing social order in the community and also its limits. They offer the opportunity to try and test these limits, and also assume, rehearse, and transform social roles and positions.

But, different kinds of people participate in the event from particular, different social locations and in particular, different roles. Therefore, public celebrations like Crown Day offer the opportunity for what Victor Turner called "plural reflexivity, the ways in which a group or a community seeks to portray, understand, and then act on itself" (1979: 94) working within and through the diversity, fractures, and tensions within the community. Different parts of the community (ethnic groups, neighborhoods, social classes, generations, etc.) will bring their own interpretations, expectations, and enactments and will confront and accommodate others'. I can expect, then, such events to have a symptomatic value and help tell the recent history of the community and how its different members choose and are able to act on it.

As the next sections will show, the example of this village is particular, in that it has a sharply defined ethnic structure, a dramatic recent history (massive migration of the Saxon part of the community), and a sizeable diaspora living in Germany that is still invested—through kin relations, residential property, and yearly visits—in its home community.

Expectations built by previous studies on the relationship between community celebrations and migration, in particular in Latin American context, make me imagine that a village celebration such as Crown Day—traditional, central to Saxon identity, and the largest public celebration in the village—would rely heavily on and will be defined by the involvement of the emigrated Saxons. Ethnographic examples have showed that often times migrants (temporary, but also permanent) build their relationships with their home (rural) community around the temporality and social significance of the community fiesta (the
largest religious and community celebration of the village). They return home (or plan/fantasize about their return), spend resources, and renew their allegiance to their kin around these events (Lattanzi, 2011; Levitt, 2001; Striffler, 2007). But, according to the ethnographic evidence I collected, the Saxon diaspora’s involvement and influence in organizing and performing out the Crown Day is not decisive or central to the event, and certainly not compared to the participation of the rest of the community. What does this mean, in terms of the community’s transformation following the migration? What does it mean for the local Saxon community, for Saxon identity, and for local ethnic identities and dynamics more generally?

In answering these questions, I use ethnicity to refer to categories, identifications, and relations that are produced, played out, and gain significance, first and foremost, through local social dynamics. I acknowledge the importance of broader cultural repertoires and social processes that are invoked or become materialized through ethnicity at a local level, but I want to draw attention to the concrete, lived processes and practices through which people sort out matters of ethnic belonging or closeness. Situations that present ambiguities, highlight changes or inconsistencies, that offer several possibilities of interpretation, action, or belonging are particularly suited for such an analysis. They will not reveal the content of an ethnic category, but rather the processes that both shape and challenge its contours, processes that will extend outside that micro-situation. John Hartigan makes a similar case for studying race and racial relations as local matters (1999) and paying attention to both how people learn about and shape ethnicity locally through cultural operations they perform in their everyday lives. Such an ethnographic sensibility will get us away from thinking about ethnicity through the logic of “groupism” (Brubaker, 2004). More concretely, I am paying attention to processes of boundary making, remaking, and questioning, which I consider central to these dynamics (Barth, 1969). Moreover, while in this analysis I privilege the realm of the cultural, that of signification and meaning, I maintain an attention to ethnicity’s material basis, that is, in social relationships connected to historically differentiated access to and control over means of production, in particular land and labor. In that, I draw on the historical and materialist approach present in another study, in a similar Transylvanian context (Verdery, 1983; 2003).

The data for this paper comes from a five-month fieldwork residency in the village, in which I explored social and economic transformations in the village following the migration of the Saxons in the early 1990s, in particular transformations in the local economy and residence patterns. The Crown Day festivities emerged, post-fieldwork, through fieldnotes and fragments of interviews on different topics, as a rich example that refracts the complex local ethnic dynamics. In order to make sense of the event, I had to rely on a detailed understanding of local actors and relationships, recall events and details, sort through notes and photographs.
Context

In this section, I will offer some background information necessary for placing the Crown Day in context and for analyzing it. In other words, what are these social conditions in which the event is produced? If the event has a didactic, reflexive, and performative value, what is it that people learn, reflect on, and enact?

The village I am referring to is situated in South Transylvania, Romania, in an area predominantly Saxon (German) until twenty years ago. Following the massive migration of the Saxons to Germany in the early 1990s, the village became predominantly Romanian. In July 2011, according to a survey I took with the help of four local assistants, there were 510 Romanians, 147 Saxons, 321 Roma, and 15 people of other ethnicities living in the village, as opposed to 501 Romanians, 649 Saxons, 170 Roma, and 27 Hungarians in 1985 (according to the local Agricultural Register). The local economy is based, for the majority of the villagers (Romanians, Saxons, and some Roma) on subsistence agriculture supplemented by cash income from labor migration to Germany, state social assistance, jobs, and occasional agricultural work. Some Roma don’t own land and have to rely instead on social assistance and occasional agricultural work.

The village is remarkable that, unlike most of the villages in the region, it has maintained a lively Saxon presence; Saxons (including young families with children) still live in the village, the Saxon dialect is still spoken locally, and the Saxon diaspora still maintains tight connections to its home community (over 200 return every August and visit their kin and friends). The memory of the Saxon past is still maintained in the present through highly visible and enduring cultural elements and forms: recognizable “Saxon” residential architecture (present in the entire region) and featured in the central and most prestigious part of the village, the centuries old German Evangelical Church, German inscriptions, and public celebrations and customs. Also, it is kept present through the living memory of its residents (remembering the time before the migration), and through processes of heritage production, which have been at the center of various non-governmental and entrepreneurial interventions in the village and the surrounding areas in the post-1989 period (in particular tourism and restoration projects).

At the same time, the village is far less Saxon than seventy years ago. Romanians are the majority, not only due to the Saxon out migration, but also due to massive colonization of Romanians in the area in mid 1940s, the deportations of Saxons to Russia around the same time. The Roma are also more populous than they used to be. The Romanian language has become dominant both in everyday life and official affairs, and the work of the Romanian nationalist state (and the practicalities of state bureaucracy) has left its mark on the way in which villagers (Romanians and Roma in particular) understand historical legitimacy and rights: the village is in Romania, Romanian is the official language, and Romanians form the (political) majority in the country as a whole.
A tension remains thus between understanding the village as Saxon and Romanian, a tension palpable for example in the way people discuss the recent past (post 1945 and pre-Saxon migration) or post-socialist land restitution, but more deeply during particular moments of heightened social energy like community events (celebrations, elections).

The past seventy years have also meant an upsetting of the local symbolic and material ethnic hierarchies. While the ethnic hierarchy was fairly clear in the years before the Second World War (local Saxons controlled most of the wealth and the political power), the political changes of the post-1945 period destabilized both these ethnic arrangements and the strength of the Saxon community, placing political power and control over the village resources (agricultural cooperative and state farm) mostly in the hands of Romanians. In 1945, during the Agrarian Reform, Germans (Saxons) saw their lands taken away and many of them were deported to Russia, and Romanian locals and colonists, as well as local Roma were given their land and houses (Șandru, 2000). After the 1950s, the local Saxon community was able to rebuild itself, to some extent, thanks to the survival of some of their community institutions: the church, the neighborhood associations (for a review, see Schiltz, 2009), and community celebrations. Some Saxons were also able to obtain more prestigious and better paying jobs in the village and the neighboring towns, due to higher education levels. Being Saxon continued to carry prestige until today, partially through the migration opportunities that were attached to being Saxon: before 1989 authorized Saxons were able to emigrate to Germany legally (and over twenty families in the village did), and in the early 1990s, Saxons were free to move to Germany and work, while the rest had to wait until Romania joined the EU. Saxons developed migration networks and helped their kin left in the village though remittances and work opportunities, so being connected to Saxons in the village—as kin, friends, neighbors—also meant the possibility to access these opportunities. While Saxons in the village tend to be better off or have easier lives than the rest, overall, the wealth and the political power in the village have moved to its Romanian residents. Also, although the majority of the village Roma remain marginalized physically, socially, and economically, some of them live lives similar to any of other peasants in the region thanks to owning land, educational opportunities and residential arrangements that brought them into closer relationships with other villagers.

Ethnic boundaries, kept stricter through marriage and socializing preferences as well as clear residential arrangements (exclusively Saxon, Romanian, and Roma neighborhoods) have become more relaxed than in the pre-war years. During socialist times, villagers worked side by side in the agricultural cooperative and the state farm. The departure of so many Saxons translated into ethnically mixed neighborhoods, and also an increase in inter-ethnic socializing as neighbors and acquaintances. While mixed marriages did exist, they have become much more common in the post-1990s years.
Of all the last century’s historical events, the Saxon migration seems to have been the one with the most dramatic effects. Less than one third of the Saxons remained in the village: the neighborhood associations are no longer functional, church attendance has dramatically gone down (about ten people attending the Sunday service compared to a full church before 1989) and the Saxon neighborhoods are now ethnically mixed and balanced. Strangely, and maybe attracted by the rural setting and the promise of a social mission, several Germans moved to the village from Germany (including the current priest and his family).

In this context of profound historical transformations (socialism and its collapse, migration and a participation in a globalized world, the work of Romanian state nationalism, etc.), we can expect people to have to deal—in diverse ways—with questions of how to understand historical change and continuity (what stays the same, what changes), with appropriate visions of the social and social order, and especially with questions of (ethnic) identity (what kind of village is this? what is Saxon/what does Saxon mean in the current context?). As the rest of the paper will show, a community event like Crown Day offers a way to explore and work through these questions.

**Crown Day/Kronenfest**

Crown Day (Kronenfest) is organized—at least ideally—every year in June to celebrate Saints Peter and Paul, the patron saints of the local German Evangelical church. From what I understood, every Saxon village in the area used to have its own Crown Day, for their own patron saints.

In 2011 I heard about the celebration, and asked if I can help in any way. I was on good terms with the women from the Evangelical Church and they explained to me that women are in charge of the flowers and the decorations, so I can help them with that. We all met, the day before the celebration, around 2, downhill from the church, a bit confused about where the celebration was going to be held. The place has changed several times in my interlocutors’ lifetime. The “authentic” place seems to have been on the lawn by the old manor at the top of the hill, until the manor was bought by a British funded NGO and transformed into a luxury guesthouse. Next, the celebration moved to a flat portion of land lower on the hill, by the school, but the construction of a new building (actually the extensive digging) made people decide this year to move it right in the center of the village.

We finally set headquarters in the center, on the main street, right in front of the house of one of the Saxon women present there. She brought out chairs and tables and the women proceeded to separate the flowers into piles according to colors. There was also a special pile, this time on a table, of more
“noble” flowers: roses and some tired lilies (the lack of beautiful lilies worried the women). Nobody explained anything to anybody, and there wasn’t any direction giving, any special planning or managing of all these steps. The fifteen or so women arranged themselves in what looked to me like an assembly line, chatting about things completely unrelated to what they were doing. The only one receiving instructions was me, and only because I must have looked lost in the midst of the conversations in a mix of Romanian, German, and Saxon dialect. Soon, a tractor with a large trailer pulled over, driven by a Saxon man, and a handful of teenage boys unloaded a pile of fresh oak leaves. The man is one of the most important in the village, and one of the teenagers was his son, and the rest were his son’s friends, but also some younger Roma kids I’d seen do odd jobs for his farm. Next, the men brought what I later learned was the crown (hence the name, Crown Day): a large frame, about a meter and a half in diameter, made out of iron, and placed it on four chairs. One of the Saxon women was already making a large bouquet out of the roses set aside, and placed the lilies in the middle. That’s what is supposed to go on top, lilies, to thank God, someone explained to me. The crown itself was a kind of celebration of God, but I wasn’t able to retrieve an explanation more specific than that from anybody. For the next couple of hours, the women tied bunches of flowers and oak leaves to the crown.

There were about fifteen women in total, most Saxon, but also the priest’s wife, who was German, and three Romanians (in addition to me) who were married to Saxon men and had converted to the Evangelical Church. About half way through, a Roma teenager who performs in the Saxon dances group came over, and also helped. There was no questioning of anybody’s presence there, it seemed that all who came knew that they would be accepted. All of them, however, had some kind of Saxon connection, and there were degrees of acceptance and inclusion based on language (those who understood and spoke Saxon were at the center of the action), and standing in the community (the richest woman was the one preparing the lilies at the top of the crown, and the wife of the tractor’s driver, although Romanian, was also right in the center doing the most important work).

As the women were finishing the crown, a group of men—far more diverse ethnically—were preparing the pole on top of which they mounted the crown. After the pole and the crown were up, one of the men climbed it and tied two bags to the top of the crown, then we cleaned up the mess left from all the flowers and went home.

The following day, a Sunday, I attended the church service with a far larger crowd than usual. The church seemed full, I counted over sixty people in attendance, compared to around ten on a regular Sunday. The attendees were not, however, all from the village. Some were older Saxons, bussed in from neighboring villages, and someone pointed out to me a man and his two sons.
who now live in Germany, but used to live in a village nearby. There were also members of a dancing group who came in from a nearby town, lead by a Saxon woman who’s been involved in the village for a few years. At the end of the service, everybody stood for a while in the yard of the church, chatting, shaking hands, and having coffee and cake prepared by the local church women. Although brief, the moment created a space that invoked earlier times, when there were more Saxons in the village, the church was full, and these Sunday noon community chats a more usual occurrence. The space was also specifically Saxon, marked by the use of language and an unconditional friendliness extended to everyone in the yard. I kept asking the woman I was with if she knew who those people were (I just knew they were not from the village), and she said she doesn't know any personally, only that they’re Saxons from the area.

Soon, the church crowd spilled into the center of the village, set up for the celebration. The crown pole was in the middle, and beyond it, to the south, there were two large tents, one sheltering a brass orchestra from a high school in the nearby town. To the north, closer to the church and the main store in the village, there were several vendor stands, selling beer and hot food. There was also a tiny fruit stand, which, to my surprise, was extremely popular with poor and rich people alike. From the discussions preceding the celebration day, I understood that the organizers (the church committee, working with the local administration) were very careful to bring in authorized vendors, since the years before they had some problems with fines and vendors being sent home, to the chagrin on the people in the village. In the place where women prepared the crown the day before, there were two large tables set up, with a giant pot of coffee, water, and sweet bread to be distributed to the people attending the event.

The crowd, by now, was not predominantly Saxon anymore. There were, of course, many Saxons—more came in, by bus, from the neighboring villages—but most of the people around were Roma and some Romanians from the village. They were all—poor and rich, Romanian, Roma, Saxon—dressed up in nice clothes, men in white shirts (many collared shirts), black trousers, and town shoes, and the women in clean, colorful dresses they would not normally wear on a work day.

The actual festivities started with a parade of local Saxons in traditional clothes (only a few pairs), followed by the dancers also dressed in traditional clothes. They marched down on one side of the main street, in the sounds of the brass orchestra playing German music. The two dancing groups (one from the village and one from a nearby town) performed, for a little while, what looked like waltzes and polkas accompanied by the brass German music. During all this time, about ten small children stood close, around the pole. They were all Saxon or German, or Roma raised in foster care in German homes, the boys
dressed in black trousers and white shirts, and the girls in Bavarian folk dresses probably sent by relatives living in Germany, and they were all squealing and fretting in anticipation. On the sides, around the circle of dancers, lots of spectators, mostly non-Saxon. When the dancers stopped and the specially selected boy climbed to the top of the pole, the spectators sent in their children, who invaded the space underneath the crown. The teenager retrieved a stick with colored ribbons, and the two bags at the top, one with his prize, and one full of candy he threw to the children waiting below, who were wildly gathering candy and stuffing it into their mouths and pockets. As the boy descended slowly on the pole, the church choir sang the village song, in the Saxon dialect. For those standing closer to the choir, mostly Saxon, it felt like a special, moving moment—I saw tears and looks full of admiration. On the other side of the circle, some parents were busily helping their kids storing the candy, while others watched, captivated, the teenager sliding down the tall pole. They all clapped, however, once the boy arrived safely on the ground.

For the next half an hour, the dancers performed more waltzes and polkas to an audience divided: on one side Saxons, on the other Roma. I saw less Romanians in attendance than I expected to see, but I met many men later, in the vendors’ area, eating and drinking with their neighbors and friends. After the dance, the orchestra continued to perform, with breaks, some popular songs, while the men and women involved in the preparations started dancing themselves, in the space in-between the pole and the two tables they set up. They served coffee and sweet bread to people in attendance with a mixture of generosity and worry that some—that is, poor Roma children living at the end of the village—might “abuse” their offer and take more than one piece.

After about three hours of the celebration, the bus taking the Saxons back to their villages left, and locals continued to linger for another two hours, talking and drinking beer. The pole was left standing for another couple of months.

The celebration has obviously changed within the lifetime of those participating, and remembering how it used to be—in comparison to today—offered a way to talk about the changes in the village and within the Saxon community. An older Saxon I talked to, otherwise very active in the church and community events, told me she refuses to participate, and, indeed, she didn’t. “It’s not beautiful anymore,” she said. I probed her, trying to understand what she means. “I don’t like it, they sell food, and drinks, it’s not beautiful, how it used to be.” Other people (both Saxons and non-Saxons) told me that they also fear it now resembles more a popular fair than the religious, community celebration it used to be. I suspect this is a comment not only on allowing the market (and strangers) to enter the tight community economy based on reciprocity and pooling common labor, but also on the more pronounced participation of non-Saxons, both during the preparation and the celebration.
In 1991, after the departure of many of the Saxons, Crown Day stopped being organized. "People were confused," a Saxon man in his late 30s told me, "they didn't know what to expect, so they stopped doing all the things they used to do." In 2005, the local German priest, knowing about the celebration from other people's stories, decided to revive it while celebrating 750 years of the village's existence, and the remaining Saxons continued to organize it since. In 2005, it took place in its old location, by the manor, and afterwards was moved by the school building and in 2011 in the center of the village.

Before 1989, I was told, Crow Day used to be a huge celebration that involved the entire Saxon community. I wasn't able to collect any memories or stories from before the war; for everybody, the version that existed during socialism got transformed into the ideal, mythical form, how it was supposed to be. There were precise, gendered roles, and the young Saxons were supposed to take care of all the preparations, hire musicians and feed them with food brought from home, prepare the crown and the place.

Strangely, every person (Saxon, Romanian, Roma) I talked to about how the event used to be before 1989, ended up talking about the place itself: the manor, its lawn, and a large dancing circle surrounded by chestnut trees. There was less nostalgia for the event than for the ability to use the location. The building used to be the local cultural house (căminul cultural), a community space and a tool of the socialist state, a place that was available to all for other community dances, weddings, and other celebrations. The manor is now a guesthouse and the lawn, although not fenced in, is guarded by its caretakers who chase away villagers who might linger there (it's one of the only places with cell phone reception). It is not a community space anymore—it has become a space closed and unintelligible. One Roma woman told me, laughing, that she'd seen the renovated interior on TV once, although she passes by the building every day, on her way to her fields.

For every unsatisfactory comparison to the past, Saxons I talked to offered an interpretation that used the rhetoric of making do. The celebration stays the same, in a way, because it happens every year, and people attend to it in improvised ways, in ways that are made possible by current circumstances. Young women used to make the crown, not older, married women, but someone has to make it; in the same way, there used to be enough young people to dance their own Saxon dances, there was no need to bring in a troupe from another town or rely on a local dancing group in which half of the members were non-Saxon; now, the best young Saxon man is not really Saxon, the church has to be filled with people from other villages, the crown is placed in another location, and even the crown itself had to be remade in 2005, because they couldn't find the old one.
This doesn’t mean that the Saxons involved in organizing the event saw themselves as without choices. There were discussions about whether to have food and drink vendors, and the conclusion was that this is what people—all people in the village—want, a recognition that the public space in which the celebration is held, is, in some ways, a borrowed space, and asserting a right to use it for a Saxon-defined celebration cannot come today without concessions. Also, most Saxon participants—old or young—did not wear their traditional clothes, which would have been unimaginable a few decades back. When a woman in her early 40s went on a mission trying to convince other women to wear their costumes, which they all had in their closets, she was literally laughed at. They all preferred to wear their beautiful modern clothes brought from Germany.

Discussion

For Saxons participating in the Crown Day celebration, authenticity and its attached connotations of continuity remained located in the very existence of the event and its loose form: preparing the crown, a church service, climbing a pole, and dancing. The Saxon’s community insistence to revive and maintain the yearly celebration was an affirmation of its very existence and continuity, with all the concessions, adaptations, and inconsistencies it had to deal with. The work of drawing and negotiating boundaries for inclusions and exclusions during the event, and of dealing with various confusions and tensions was another, more public, version of the cultural work participants do in their every day life.

Thus, Crown Day served, for all in the village and especially for participants, as a way to learn about and reflect on the ethnic relations in the village and their recent dynamics, and in the same time to enact and shape them.

Allowing non-Saxons to be part of the core of the celebration, in various roles, making particular kinds of room for them was a way to reflect on and police the increasingly porous, yet enduring edges of Saxonness and the rights to participate in it. Romanian women married to Saxon men, who had converted to the German Evangelical religion and were committed to raising their children as Saxon were accepted in roles similar to any other Saxon woman (with the qualification that they didn't speak the Saxon dialect). There was quite a stir when they married (all in the 1990s), both among their Romanians and Saxon relatives, but the reluctance to be accepted was soon overcome. The Roma girl who performed in the dancing group was accepted into roles that would have been reserved to Saxon girls, but in the same time she was constantly made to feel how tenuous her position was. She was acceptable not only because of her dedication to education and the dancing group, but also because she was a particular kind of Roma: from an older family, living in the center of the village, and not poor.
the non-Saxon men, acceptance was somewhat more facile: many of the men helping with the preparations were actually not Saxons, but were tied to some of the participating Saxons through kin or work/employment relationships.

These exceptions and enlargements in the rights of participation into what used to be something exclusively Saxon were connected to both an increased understanding of Saxonness as a matter of expressive culture/folklore and village-wide changes in ethnic relations and definitions.

Understanding Saxonness as connected not necessarily to a social reality, but to discrete cultural products (costumes, music, dances, traditions) is a defining phenomenon for modernity and not peculiar to this context. Still, I increasingly witnessed it as part of efforts to preserve or rescue the threatened local Saxon heritage and what we can call cultural entrepreneurship (tourism and cultural events in the region). The dance group in the village and the one in the nearby town are both part of this trend and a tradition of folklore groups in the socialist era when membership in an ethnic group become less important than the idea of representing it in a national context.

Locally, making room for participation into “Saxonness” expressed changes in sociality and accepted forms of interaction and relatedness (especially kin relatedness). Romanians and Roma could now be accepted dating and marriage partners as far as most Saxons are concerned, provided that they proved themselves “worthy,” that is, they were hardworking, modest, and had a history of friendships and relations with other Saxons. Non-Saxon women married to Saxons had to work hard: they were expected to join the German Evangelical church and participate in its activities. Acceptance of non-Saxon men into a Saxon family was less problematic, as children would most likely be raised speaking the Saxon dialect (taught by their mothers) and learn to think of themselves as Saxon.

The celebration itself was restructured in such a way to allow the participation, again, in particular roles and positions, of other non-Saxons. I already mentioned allowing vendors specifically to accommodate non-Saxons who expected the food and the beer, and the candy thrown from the pole was imagined as being a special kind of favor to all children in the village and in particular the poor Roma kids who could normally not afford it.

But, Crown Day was not produced, imagined, enacted only by Saxons and only as a Saxon celebration. To treat it that way—which I have to admit I have done, to some degree, so far—is to ignore its co-constructed nature, to privilege and naturalize a vision that foregrounds continuity and a particular version of the social order. Crown Day was a social act in which all in the village participated and have participated, and its transformation was not just the work of the organizing Saxons or some invisible social historical forces, but also the work of the non-Saxons who chose to participate or not, were excluded or directed into particular roles, refused, accepted or transformed them, and so on.
First, for non-Saxons (Romanians and Roma), Crown Day was not Kronenfest, but “ziua coroanei” (in Romanian), or “la coroană” (meaning “at the crown”, in Romanian). For the poorer Roma living at the south end of the village, the event was a disruption of the quotidien, a repurposing of the everyday space of the street. They were normally excluded from this space; their presence there was expected to have particular kinds of purposes: going to work, to the store, to sell foraged foods to other villagers. That space was not a space for chatting, or lingering, or playing—children especially were callously chased away towards their neighborhood. Being in this space during Crown Day, in a posture that demanded nothing but respect—beautiful Sunday clothes, consuming side by side with others—was a way to disrupt that everyday reality and its expectation, to rehearse possibilities and meanings attached to being a poor Roma in this village. Pushed into particular roles—watching from the sides, not dancing to the German brass music, catching candy—was met, as that photograph I started with revealed, with a critique they performed with their own bodies, standing serious, sullen, and unimpressed. Ignored or pushed aside in the everyday life, they both forced the rest of the village to acknowledge their existence and human dignity, and expressed their desires and visions of personal social mobility or community progress, alongside owning consumer goods, building a house, and having their own prayer house in their part of the village (built with their own resources and labor), which several of them pointed out in interviews.

At the same time, I was particularly struck by how little Romanians participated in the celebration and how marginal they seemed to be, by their own choice. I noticed some of the better off Romanians (also village officials) sitting and eating in the shade, in one of the large tents, some Romanian men sitting along the side of the road and drinking beer, talking to other men, and a few parents bringing their children, possibly for the candy throwing. But, overall, they seemed to have had a more reserved role than both that of the Roma and the Saxons, as if they didn’t need this celebration or didn’t need to be included in it, in the same way they recognized the legitimacy of the Saxon’s presence in the village’s identity but didn’t feel the need to participate in it. There was no open or direct contestation of the event, its legitimacy or significance. I interpret this tolerance as a sign of the political security that comes from being a majority population in the village (and backed by the national state and its practical infrastructure), not feeling threatened by the Saxon history or presence here. I see it as a sign of the certainty that the demographic and political balance has been irreversibly tipped towards Romanians, who have now most of the land in the village (and the most productive), have moved into formerly Saxon neighborhood, and dominate linguistically the physical space of the village. Saxon migration was capable of achieving what decades of Romanian state nationalism had not been able to.
When I tried to discuss the Crown Day with Romanians (asking questions about its anticipation), I wasn't able to get much. People didn't say they would go, but were more than willing to explain to me, in short, what will happen. In other discussions with Romanians, Crown Day was often mentioned as part of the village heritage, in an enumeration that also included the 14th century German Evangelical church and the manor, both tourist attractions. Transforming them all into heritage—village heritage—emptied them of their current ethnic significance and turned them into signs of a disappearing (and in need of salvaging) culture from which the entire village can and should profit.

The lack of direct contestation of the event on the part of the local Romanians was, then, connected to the Saxons' diminished demographic and political dominance of the village (no longer a threat), and to their continued presence being a clear, practical advantage for the village (jobs, investments in tourism, and especially labor migration opportunities).

Crown Day, although officially imagined as a Saxon celebration, was, in some ways, about what it means to be Roma or Romanian in this village and how that has changed or would be possible to change. But, in the same time, the departure of a good portion of the Saxon population forced remaining Saxons to rethink and re-understand Saxon identity not only in relationship to the transformed local realities, but also the departed co-villagers. I expected the village Saxon diaspora to play a more central role in the celebration, to return for the event (and not over a month later), to be involved in policing questions of authenticity, and so on. Instead, I found the remaining Saxons involved in and completely owning the event, with no expectations of any involvement on the part of the diaspora. In some ways, it shouldn't be surprising: the majority of remaining Saxons are unequivocally embedded in the local social reality, they understand themselves as living in and being part of the village. This, and their involvement in maintaining the Crown Day celebration reflects their choice not to leave, not to emigrate, and this is an important part of their identity. Several Saxons even chose to return back to the village after a few years spent in Germany, as they felt they could never feel at home there. Part of the reasons they offered was missing their life and access to making a living independently, as they were used to, but what was most important was their kin and friends who stayed in the village. In talking about those who left, one of the recurrent narrative was how the emigrated Saxons have lost touch with the local reality in the village. One older Saxon woman, whose relatives had moved to Germany, told me how she is convinced that many of the Saxons living in Germany, especially if they don't come to visit every year, think that those who stayed are backward and haven't evolved technologically or as consumers, so they keep sending outdated gadgets that nobody here would want to use. For Saxons in the village, Crown Day was, therefore, not a celebration of the Saxons in general, but of those Saxons who stayed, who accepted and worked through the realities of the present.
Final thoughts

To return more synthetically to the questions I raised in the first part of the paper, Crown Day had to increasingly rely on the explicit participation of non-Saxons in the preparation and unfolding of the festivities, as a public recognition, a performance and a working through of the changed social realities of the village. While being Saxon has retained much of its connotations of privilege, access to possibilities, and symbolic ownership of the village, the inclusion of non-Saxons in an until recently exclusively Saxon event points to the symbolic extension of this realm to people who don’t indentify as Saxons.

Despite all the confusions, tensions, and transformations, Crown Day remained a kind of community ritual that, at least in intention, rehearsed and reaffirmed a common ethos, a commitment to the integrity of the Saxon community and to particular gendered roles within that community. It also affirmed and interpreted the continuity of the local Saxon community as the legitimacy of a particular ethnic order, with Saxons as historically legitimate, as authorized to occupy and use public space, and with Roma as ultimately marginal and tolerated. At the same time, those confusions, tensions, and transformations reflected and offered renewed opportunities for changes in the way that order operates, and possibly in the order itself, by confusing ethnic boundaries and identities and rights of participation. A Roma girl dancing in a Saxon folk costume at a Saxon celebration would have been unimaginable twenty years ago, yet it was possible in 2011, reflecting and giving that girl more space to maneuver her own agency and actions, and reflecting transformations and the increased amplitude in the meaning of Roma and Saxon ethnicity. The meaning of Romanian ethnicity however was less affected: Romanians’ detached attitude towards the celebration was connected to its diminished dependency on the local context, which in turn showed precisely its local power. Not a coincidence, then, and for very different reasons, there are no Romanian or Roma specific celebrations occupying in the same way the common, public space of the village.

What does this say, then, about ethnicity? An ethnographic approach that places at its core particular situations and tries to make sense of them through the lens of the local social logics is an argument for an understanding of ethnicity as locally contingent, with a stability and a potential for change closely connected to local events, situations, and actors and not (just) national politics, imagined communities, or abstract categories. It allows us to see it as a process, in particular one of making sense and ordering the world in ways that are socially and materially consequential, but not set in stone.
REFERENCES


Romanian Sociology Today

Editorial Note:

This is a special section dedicated to research articles from the field of Romanian sociology.
ABSTRACT. The paper focuses on how the effect of nationalism on religiosity varies over time in post-communist countries from Central and Eastern Europe. A religious revival in the area is already documented for the first decade of the post-communist transition, by previous researches. The paper tests two hypotheses: the increasing impact of nationalism on religiosity during the first period of post-communist transformation and the diminishing of impact of nationalism on religiosity during the second decade. The hypotheses were tested on data provided by three different waves of European Values Study / Word Values Survey (1990, 1999 and 2008), using Changing Parameters Model proposed by Firebaugh (1997). The analyses were carried out on 11 countries from Central and Eastern Europe. The results suggest that in the impact of nationalism on religiosity boost in the very beginning of transition period and it was already higher during the first survey. The later evolution was rather a descendant one, even during the first decade of transformation. The data support the second hypothesis for eight out of eleven countries, showing that in the second decade the effect of religiosity on nationalism vanished or significantly decreased.

Keywords: nationalism, religious revival, longitudinal analysis, Central and Eastern Europe

Introduction

The transformations experienced by the post-communist countries from Central and Eastern Europe involved multiple changes, in various domains and areas. 'Transitologiest' talk about multiple transitions: double one, political
and economic (Przeworski, 1996; Stark, Bruszt, 1998; Sandu, 1999) or triple one (Kuzio, 2001), adding redefinition of national identity to the previous dimensions. In all of the post-communist state the state and the national identity needed to be redefined. Moreover, the relinquishment of the atheist policies practiced by the communist regime brought a religious revival in the region (Muller 2004; Pollack 2001, 2003, 2004). This religious revival was not limited only to the first years of transition, but continued to influence the post-communist societies even after two decades. Moreover, in some of these societies the revival is more powerful and religiosity continues to increase even after 20 years the relinquishment of the communist restrictions (Pickel, 2010).

Previous researches explained the religious revival in Central and Easter Europe referring to the lower level of social development, which impede the full secularization of these countries (Pickel, 2009). Other scholars employ supply-side theory and allot the revival to the diversification of religious offer during the post-communist period (Froese, 2004). The current research focuses on the relationship between religiosity and national identity. The main goal of this article is to study the effect of nationalism as a driving force behind the religious revival registered in post-communist countries during last two decades.

The current approach is a longitudinal one, investigating how the effect of nationalist ideology on religiosity changes during the two decades of post-communist transformation. The research uses data coming from three waves of European Values Survey, collected in 10 post-communist societies: Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romanian, Russian Federation, Slovakia, and Ukraine. I have selected only the countries for which data on the interest variables were available in three successive waves of European Values Survey. The method employed for the data analysis is Changing Parameter Model, proposed by Firebaugh (1997). The method allows the determination of time-dependence of individual-level relationships and is appropriated for testing how the impact of national identity on religiosity changes over time.

In the first section I provide a short overview of the existing literature on the relation between religiosity and national identity. The second part introduces the indicators and the strategy used for analysis, while the third comprises the data analysis. The final section is dedicated to the conclusions and to a short discussion.

**Religion and national Identity in Central and Eastern Europe**

Previous researches point out that nationalist ideology can fuel religious life in some specific contexts (Bruce, 2006). The cited author refers to Polish case and to the Irish one. In both situations Catholic religion helped the national identity surviving and threatens directed to the national identity strengthen religiosity. In these two cases religion functions as a shelter for national identity.
When national identity is under threat, the nation tries redefining the ethnic border, to make it stronger and more observable. This process of redefining the national border can conduce to the creation of a new border (Volkan, 1999), because the older one was not enough protective for the ethnic group. According to Barth (1969) the frontiers among different ethnic groups can vary from one moment to the next. While language can be such a relevant border at one moment in time, in other context religion can be a better ethnic marker and the group can change the mechanism of identification from language to religion. Religion itself can be an ethnic boundary at a certain moment in time and could lose its significance later (Mitchell, 2006). Therefore, in some specific contexts religion can play a special role in defining ethnic boarder.

Countries from Central and Eastern Europe need a new border during the post-communist transition for several reasons. The collapse of the communist system brought the collapse of some multinational states, such as former USSR, Yugoslavia or Czechoslovakia. The collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia determined an acute need for redefining national identity (Calhoun, 1997). Therefore, the citizens of the new established state searched for building a new national identity.

On the other hand, post-communist citizens developed a strong religious nationalist ideology as a denial reaction to the communist past (Fox, 2008). The communist ideology was an internationalist and atheist ideology, which tried to eliminate religion and to replace it with scientific atheism (Froese, 2008) and to erase the differences among people and nations. Consequently, after the fall down of the communist regime, the citizens developed a new strong sense of national belonging and new religious beliefs.

Moreover, post-communist transformation brought a lot of social, political and economic changes which generated an increasing in personal insecurity due to unemployment, poverty, inflation or raising rate of criminality. According to Kinnvall (2004), during rapid social transformations, individuals experience feeling of insecurity and sometimes they cope with this by joining social groups which provide them with a new feeling of security and with a new identity and social border. Such groups may be religious groups or ethnic ones.

The question that arises here is: why religion is a relevant boarder in Central and Eastern Europe? First of all, religion is an important component of nationalism that developed in Central and Eastern Europe. Previous studies shown that Eastern and Central Europe foster a different nationalism as compared to one which flourish in Western Europe (Kohn, 1962, 1994; Janmaat, 2006). In Central and Eastern Europe has flourished ethnic nationalism. In this version of nationalism, national identification is assigned based 'natural' factors like language, religion, or common ethnic origins. Western Europe nations, excepting Germany, developed a version of civic nationalism. Here, national identification is
assigned based on individual adherence to a set of political principles and values. While in second case national belonging is more fluid and flexible, in case of ethnic nationalism national belonging is pre-determined and difficult to change as long as depend on factors which are out of individual control. All in all, Central and Eastern Europe has a long history in connecting religion and nationalist ideology that cannot be encountered in Western part of the continent.

On the other hand, religion can be a border between ‘we’ and ‘the others’ (Hoppenbrouers, 2002; Krunovich, 2006; Mitchell, 2006; Rieffer, 2003). It marks the boundary between own group and outsiders. Moreover, it represents an effective facilitator for community life and for group mobilization (Krunovich, 2006; Mitchell, 2004), religious rituals bringing people together and creating the opportunity for common actions.

However, nationalist ideology is not a static phenomenon. Its evolution is strongly influenced by contextual factors which may transform it from ethnic nationalism into civic one and vice versa. According to Kuzio (2002) ethnic nationalism evolves into civic nationalism in certain conditions, such as: domestic democratic consolidation, building of local civic institutions, positive influence of international institutions, and when the core ethnic group is self-confident within its own bounded territory. Such evolutions were registered during the last 20 years in many of the post-communist societies and consequently they generate a detachment of religiosity and nationalist ideology especially during the second decade of post-communist transformation.

Therefore, based on the theoretical framework presented here, I formulate the following hypothesis:

- (H1) The impact of nationalist ideology on religiosity has increased during the first decade of the post-communist period in Central and Eastern Europe.
- (H2) The impact of nationalism on religiosity is not significant during the second decade of post-communist transformation.

Data and method

Data coming from three successive waves of European Values Study/World Values Survey (1990, 1999, and 2008) were employed for testing the research hypotheses. These researches provide relevant information regarding both religiosity and nationalism in countries from Central and Eastern Europe. The items taping both concepts of interest for the current paper are measured in the same way in all three waves and in all countries, allowing longitudinal and cross-sectional comparisons simultaneously. Information regarding relevant socio-demographic variable are provided too.

The analyses were carried out on 10 post-communist countries for which data for three different points in time were available (1990, 1999 and 2008).
countries included in the analyses are: Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romanian, Russian Federation, Slovakia, and Ukraine. All the samples are representative for the adult population of respective country. A table including sample’s dimension by country and survey wave is included in the Appendix (see Table A1). Details about research design and sampling procedure are available on European Values Study website (www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu) and World Values Survey website (www.worldvaluessurvey.org).

I have used Changing Parameter Model to tests the research hypothesis. The method is proposed by Firebaugh (1997) and is meant for analyzing how the effect of explanatory variables changes over time. In the context of the current paper, the method helps to test how the effect of nationalism on religiosity changes between 1990 and 1999 and between 1999 and 2008. The method is based on a linear regression model and allows the investigation of the time-dependence of the relationship between religiosity and nationalism (Haynie, 1998). A Changing Parameter Model uses interaction term to determine the changing impact of nationalism on religiosity by allowing the effect of nationalism on religiosity to be time dependent (Haynie, 1998; Firebaugh, 1997). However, this method does not allow testing for the directionality of the effect and it does not help in finding out the direction of causality.

The first step is to pull the data for each country and survey years together. The analyses were run country by country, because the research hypotheses target the change in effect in each individual country. Moreover, for each country two different set of regression models were run, one to capture the changes occurred between 1990 and 1999 and the other one to capture the change for the second period, 1999 and 2008. For each separate period and for each country I have run the following basic regression model:

$$E(\text{religiosity}) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Year} + \delta_0 \text{Nationalism} + \delta_1 \text{Nationalism*Year}$$  \hspace{1cm} (E1)

In the equation (E1), $\delta_0$ represents the difference in intercepts and indicate the initial effect of nationalism on religiosity, in the beginning of the time interval, and $\delta_1$ represents the difference in slopes and taps the changes over time (Haynie, 1998). For each model $\delta_1$ is the key indicator of how the effect of nationalism on religiosity change between the two points in time.

Thus, for each country I have run the regression model shown in the equation (E1) for the two time intervals and two additional models for each time interval controlling for the relevant social-demographic variables, which have impact on religiosity and see if the effect remains unchanged after thinking into consideration other relevant factors influencing the level of religiosity. In all models, I have employed listwise deletion of missing data.
**Variables in the model.** The dependent variable in all models was: religiosity, tapped by the answers to the questions: *How important is God in your life?*. The answers scale varies from 1 to 10, 1 indicating that God is not important at all in respondent’s life, while 10 indicating that God is very important. The main independent variable is: nationalism tapped by the item *How proud are you to be [country] citizen?*, the answers being measured on the scale from 1 to 4, 1 indicating lower proud, while 4 highest proud. Year is the year in which the data were collected. We have added additional controls for gender, because previous researches have shown that women are more religious then men are (Nelsen, 1981). These differences are captured by a dummy variable called female, which has the value of 1 for female respondents. A second control variable is age, tapped by the respondent’s age when the survey was carried out, because older people tend to have higher level of religious beliefs (Becker and Hofmeister, 2001).

The choice of dependent and main independent variable was conditioned by the availability of the data and by avoiding problems related with measurement invariance in cross-sectional comparisons (Johnson, 1998; Vijver, 1998). Therefore, I have chosen the item that taps religiosity because it loads highly on a general factor of religiosity (Voicu, 2012) and it helps testing the relations between religiosity and other factors and avoiding problems related with measurement invariance that occurs when one is using multi-items indicators. On the other hand, the item tapping nationalism was the only available measure of nationalism in this data set and it was the only possible way to test the relationship.

**Results**

In order to facilitate the understanding of the current result I have included in the main text figures showing the difference in intercepts for each country in 1990 and 2008, which tap the initial effect of nationalism on religiosity. Moreover, I include figures showing the difference in slopes for the two period of interest for the current research (1990-1999 and 1999 – 2008) in each country, which tap the changing in effect on nationalism on religiosity over the investigated period. The results shown in these figures are regression coefficients from full models run country by country, with control for age and gender included. In addition, the tables including all models run by country and periods, with and without control variables, are available in Appendix (see Table A2).

The data regarding the initial effect of nationalism on religiosity for the period 1990 – 1999 show that nationalism had a strong and significant effect on religiosity in most of the countries included in the current analysis (see Table 1). The initial effect is the highest in Croatia Slovenia and Slovakıa, all of them being established as independent countries during the post-communist transition. In addition, in Belarus and Ukraine similar significant effects are registered. All
four countries are new established independent states that have built a new national identity in the beginning of transition period. These generated a need for new boarders and religion was one of them. These results confirm my hypotheses, showing that in countries that need new ethnic border, nationalism boosts religiosity.

Table 1.
Initial effect of nationalism on religiosity 1990
(difference in intercepts)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>difference in intercepts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
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<td>0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>0.057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>0.062</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>0.091</td>
</tr>
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<td>Romania</td>
<td>0.151</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>0.275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>0.380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>0.395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>0.405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>0.472</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Poland and Romania follow a similar pattern, displaying significant effect of nationalism on religiosity in the beginning of the post-communist transition, but none of them is a new established state. On the other hand, on both countries are known for the strong connection between religion and national identity (see Bruce, 2006 for Poland and Voicu and Constantin, 2012 for Romania). On both countries religion was during history very important in building and preserving national identity. In Poland religion was relevant for keeping alive polish identity when the country was divided between different empires of different religion (Orthodox or Protestant). Moreover, it was relevant during communist period too, when it marked the boundary between Christian polish people and international atheist communism. In Romania, orthodox religion was during the history an important component of national identity and supports the development of Romanian identity. Therefore, the strong relationship between religion and nationalism is in line with the historical and cultural context of both countries.

In four countries Hungary, Russia, Czech Republic and Bulgaria nationalism has no effect on religiosity in the beginning transition period. According to previous studies these countries are more secularized as compared to other countries in Central and Eastern Europe (Pickel, 2009b). Czech Republic is a new established
state, but Czech society is among the highest secular society in the world, and probably the results is influenced by lower interest in religion among Czech citizens (Froese, 2005). Secularization means that religiosity has lost its social influence and its guiding role at individual level (Ester, Halman and de Moor, 1993). Therefore, a high degree of secularization has separated religion from national identity and there are no relationships between them in highly secularized countries.

Table 2.
Changes in effect of nationalism on religiosity 1990 – 1999 (differences in slopes)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>differences in slopes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>0,138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0,224</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>0,288</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>0,421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>0,429</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the results shown in Table 2, the effect of nationalism on religiosity has significantly increased during the first decade of the post-communist transition only in Romanian and Croatia. While in Croatia this effect is grounded in the need to build a national identity on a religious base, Romania did not experience a reshaping of the national borders during the post-communist transition. Here the effect is probably originated in the long and difficult economic transition and is connected with the rather lower general level of education (Voicu, 2007). In Slovakša, Belarus, Slovenia and Poland the effect of nationalism on religiosity significantly decreased during the first decade of post-communist transformation. One has to mention that the effect was rather higher in all these countries in the beginning of transition, but the longitudinal trend contradicts my original expectation. Again in Bulgaria, Russia, Czech Republic and Hungary there is no significant change in the effect of nationalism on religiosity between 1990 and 1999. Basically in these four countries there was no connection between nationalism and religiosity in the beginning of transition and the two variables remain disconnected within the next decade.
Table 3.
Changes in effect of nationalism on religiosity 1999 – 2008 (differences in slopes)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>differences in slopes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Belarus</td>
<td>0.058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>0.058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>0.260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>0.325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>0.401</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The trends registered during the second decade of post-communist transformation support the research hypotheses only partial (see Table 3). In Hungary the effect of nationalism on religiosity significantly decreased between 1999 and 2008, while in Bulgaria, Romania, Russia and Ukraine the trend is negative but not significant. The data shows that nationalism lost its influence on religiosity on these countries and is not boosting anymore the religious revival. One should notice that in Hungary, Bulgaria and Russia the effect was weak from the very beginning and the later evolution basically follow the same pattern.

A non-significant effect is registered Czech Republic, Belarus and Croatia, too. Basically, in most of the countries under investigation nationalism lost its significance as determinant of religiosity, which confirm the second hypothesis. The ethnic borders are now quite clearly defined and religion is not needed anymore as a boundary between various groups. Contrary to the original expectation, in Slovakia, Slovenia and Poland the effect of nationalism on religiosity increased between 1999 and 2008 and this fact is probably related with the European Union accession of these countries in 2004. This event probably generated a need for a new border to delineate between the larger European identity and the national – local one.

The results for the models without and with controls, shown in Table A2 from Appendix, point out that there no important difference between the two sets of models and the effect of nationalism on religiosity do not change depending due to the presence on the control variables. The only changes are in the magnitude of the effect, but not related with the direction or with the level of significance.
Conclusions

The paper focuses on how the effect of nationalism on religiosity varies over time in post-communist countries from Central and Eastern Europe. A religious revival in the area is already documented for the first decade of the post-communist transition, by previous researches (Muller 2004; Pollack 2001, 2003, 2004). The redefinition of national borders in the region and the economic difficulties occurred during in the beginning of post-communist transformation stimulated the growth of the nationalist ideologies that have fuelled religious revival. On the other hand, nationalism evolves and changes its impact on religiosity due to the development of democratic institutions and civic society (Kuzio, 2000).

The paper tests two hypotheses: the increasing in impact of nationalism on religiosity during the first period of post-communist transformation and the diminishing of impact of nationalism on religiosity during the second decade. The hypotheses were tested on data provided by three different waves of European Values Study / World Values Survey (1990, 1999 and 2008), using Changing Parameters Model proposed by Firebaugh (1997). The analyses were carried out on 11 countries from Central and Eastern Europe.

The model proposed by Firebaugh allows testing changes in the impact of one variable on the other over time. However, this model does not allow investigation of the relations of causality and basically it was not possible to test whether nationalism precede religiosity or vice versa. Theoretical arguments presented in the section dedicated to theory support the idea that nationalism fuelled religious revival in Central and Eastern Europe, at least in part, but the lack of panel data does not allow to fully testing this assumption. Therefore, future researches, based on panel data should approach this topic and provide stronger evidences.

The data partially confirm the research hypotheses. The results show that the impact of nationalism on religiosity was higher and significant in most of the countries included in current analysis, the highest effect being notice in countries established as independent states after 1990, like Croatia, Slovenia and Slovakia. However, during the first post-communist decade, the effect of nationalism on religiosity increased only in Croatia and Romania and significantly decreased in other four countries (Poland, Slovakia, Belarus, and Slovakia). For the rest of countries, the effect in not significant. The results suggest that in the impact of nationalism on religiosity boost in the very beginning of transition period and it was already higher during the first survey. The later evolution was rather a descendent one, even during the first decade of transformation. The data support the second hypothesis for eight out of eleven countries, showing that in the second decade the effect of religiosity on nationalism vanished or significantly decreased. The exceptions are three countries that have accessed European Union during the second decade of post-communist transformation.
The data suggests that the European Union accession might influence national identity and produce a new religious revival based on nationalism. However, the outcome of the current research is limited to the 11 countries included in the analysis, out of which only five became EU member in 2004 and two in 2007. Further research should look to what happened in the other new European Union members and analyze the trend on the long run. Moreover, the present results are limited regarding the time span, too. The last data were collected in 2008 and further investigation are needed to identify whether the EU membership has an impact on national identity and open the door for a new redefining of national borders based on religion.

REFERENCES


APPENDIX

Table A1. Number of valid cases per country and survey year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
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<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1999</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2008</td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1440</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table A2. Changing parameters model: the variation in the effect of nationalism on religiosity between 1990 and 2008 in Central and Eastern Europe

<table>
<thead>
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<th></th>
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</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Age</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Intercept</td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.025 ***</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
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<td>-----------</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
</tr>
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<td>Intercept</td>
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</tr>
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<td>-.173</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>3.310 ***</td>
<td>.624 ***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>.907 ***</td>
<td>-.332</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nationalism</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Nationalism*Year</td>
<td>.227</td>
<td>.092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>.769 ***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>.054 ***</td>
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<td>Year</td>
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<td>.417</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>6.891 ***</td>
<td>5.696 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>.848 ***</td>
<td>.952 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>.416 ***</td>
<td>.380 ***</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Nationalism*Year</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>.535 ***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
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<td>Slovakia</td>
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<td>.289</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nationalism</td>
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<td>.395 ***</td>
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<td>Nationalism*Year</td>
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<td>-.346 ***</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Female</td>
<td>1.072 ***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.055 ***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>Intercept</td>
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<td>1.835 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>-1.001 **</td>
<td>-.763 +</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nationalism</td>
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<td>.405 ***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nationalism*Year</td>
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<td>-.281 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>.640 ***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.034 ***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ABSTRACT*. The Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count is a content analysis tool that counts words in given texts in psychologically meaningful categories and dimensions. This makes the tool powerful in identifying and exploring psychological – emotional and cognitive – content in textual expressions beyond the literal meaning of words. The current discussion paper presents the translation of the second version of the dictionary, LIWC2001, in Romanian and its potential uses for analysing Romanian texts, particularly with an open source content analysis software, the Yoshikoder. Such a linguistic catalogue, as the LIWC, in Romanian is the first to be made available to researchers and others interested in Romanian verbal expressions, oral or written. A brief illustration of how the Romanian LIWC2001 works with Yoshikoder gives way to discussing the strengths and weaknesses of the Romanian version of the dictionary and its application in Yoshikoder.

Keywords: content analysis, Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count, Romanian LIWC2001, Yoshikoder

Introduction

*The ways that individuals talk and write provide windows into their emotional and cognitive worlds.*
(Pennebaker, Francis and Booth, 2001: 12)

Content analysis has gained in value and importance with the advent of new media, which has facilitated the increase of written expressions. Nevertheless, the large data sets thus generated have been more and more difficult to comprehend and analyse in a coherent and efficient manner. In this sense, the creation of

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* The author wishes to thank Mr. Philip Gagner and the Schloer Consulting Group for their support throughout the translation of LIWC2001 and its development in Romanian.
automated data analysis softwares and linguistic catalogues applicable to texts is an excellent feature of computer sciences and artificial intelligence development. The following paper present a content analysis tool newly available for Romanian texts: the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count, and its usage with an open source content analysis software, the Yoshikoder. After presenting the dictionary, a detailed account on its translation is followed by the illustration of Yoshikoder.

The Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count dictionary

Content analysis on texts has been successfully used in research in order to show that people’s health can be predicted by how they talk or write (Gottschalk and Glaser, 1969; Rosenberg and Tucker, 1978; Stiles, 1992 apud. Pennebaker et al., 2001), and that talking or writing about emotional experiences can improve people’s health (Pennebaker, 1997; Smyth, 1997 apud. Pennebaker et al., 2001).

In order to efficiently study the complex cognitive, emotional, structural and linguistic dimensions of verbal expressions, James Pennebaker and his team have developed the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) dictionary, a valuable result of a lifetime work first developed in an exploratory study on language and disclosure. The dictionary belongs to a group of research techniques, the Psychological Word Count Approaches, which are based on the idea that the use of language and the choice of words can be quantitatively analysed in order to reveal inherent cognitive and affective processes (Hartman and Mahesh, 2008). LIWC is a word count strategy based on the principle that words contain and convey an inherent affective or cognitive information, beyond their literal meaning. In this sense, LIWC proved its relevance and utility in exploring emotional and cognitive verbal expressions. Through the use of LIWC, researchers have shown that online usage of language in forums on depression was similar with the choice of words of depressed people in clinical studies (Ramirez-Esparza, Chung, Kacewicz, and Pennebaker, 2008). Lieberman and Goldstein have shown that women who used anger words in cancer support forums improved their health, compared to women who used anxiety words (2006, in Ramiers-Esparza et al., 2008). Fornaciari and Poesio were able to show how LIWC can be used to detect deceptive statements in court testimonies (2011). Another study relying on LIWC has revealed Twitter’s value as a political tool and shown that just the number of tweets mentioning a party reflects the election result, and that political content on Twitter reflects the offline state of

2 More information is available on the website of the project, at http://www.liwc.net.
3 They include three categories: judge-based thematic content analyses, word pattern analysis, and word count strategies (Hartman and Mahesh, 2008).
politics (Tumasjan, Sprenger, Sandner, and Welpe, 2010). Research has also used LIWC to assess the affective coping of victims of natural disasters, and showed that the victims may not be able to recover from a catastrophic experiences for an extended period of time (Hartman and Mahesh, 2008).

The dictionary is, as follows, a valuable tool for the assessment and interpretation of emotional content in verbal expressions. The tool has evolved through three stages – the experimental LIWC, the second version, LIWC2001, and the third and most complex version, LIWC2007. It has been developed at first in English, but it is also available in various other languages4 to which it has been adapted and tested (the Spanish version in Ramirez-Esparza et al., 2008, the Italian version in Fornaciari and Poesio, 2011, the French version in Piolat, Booth, Chung, Davids, and Pennebaker, 2011). During 2012, LIWC2001 has also been translated and adapted to Romanian, thus becoming the first tool of such complexity available for studying the emotional and cognitive load of Romanian verbal expressions.

In the following sections, I will discuss the challenges posed by the translation of the English LIWC2001 into Romanian.

The Romanian version of LIWC2001

In the elaborate work of translating the LIWC2001 dictionary from English to Romanian, the French translation of LIWC2007 (Piolat et al., 2011) was more than helpful and inspirational. The Latin heritage of the two languages was extremely valuable in making specific decisions that regarded verb tenses and modes, noun cases and number, and adjectival forms according to number and grammatical gender.

LIWC2001 is constructed based on four dimensions that include sixty four variables, all of them built on more than four thousand indicators, or words. The following columns show the parity of the English and Romanian versions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English Dimension</th>
<th>Romanian Dimension</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. 1st person singular</td>
<td>1. Persoana I singular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 1st person plural</td>
<td>2. Persoana I plural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Assents</td>
<td>4. Afirmății</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Articles</td>
<td>5. Articole</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Prepositions</td>
<td>6. Prepoziții</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Numbers</td>
<td>7. Numere</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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4 The Arabic, Chinese, Dutch, French, German, Italian, Russian, Spanish, Turkish can be explored on the website of the project, at http://www.liwc.net.
II. Psychological processes

8. Affective or Emotional Processes

9. Positive Emotions
10. Positive feelings
11. Optimism and energy
12. Negative Emotions
13. Anxiety or fear
14. Anger
15. Sadness or depression
16. Cognitive Processes
17. Causation
18. Insight
19. Discrepancy
20. Inhibition
21. Tentative
22. Certainty
23. Sensory and Perceptual Processes

24. Seeing
25. Hearing
26. Feeling
27. Social Processes
28. Communication
29. Other references to people
30. Friends
31. Family
32. Humans

III. Relativity

33. Time
34. Past tense verb
35. Present tense verb
36. Future tense verb
37. Space
38. Up
39. Down
40. Inclusive
41. Exclusive
42. Motion
IV. Personal concerns

43. Occupation
44. School
45. Job or work
46. Achievement
47. Leisure activity
48. Home
49. Sports
50. Television and movies
51. Music
52. Money and financial issues
53. Metaphysical issues
54. Religion
55. Death and dying
56. Physical states and functions
57. Body states, symptoms
58. Sex and sexuality
59. Eating, drinking, dieting
60. Sleeping, dreaming
61. Grooming

Appendix: experimental dimensions

62. Swear words
63. Nonfluencies
64. Fillers

All these dimensions and variables are, basically, categories of words in their specific forms as verbs, nouns, adjectives, numerals, prepositions, articles. Translating these words from English to Romanian required intensive work on adapting them to the specific grammatical and linguistic particularities of the Romanian language, and the frequent grammatical issues encountered while translating are detailed in the following paragraphs:

**Verbs**

Verbal forms according to tenses and modes in Romanian are almost as diverse as those in French. In English, verb conjugations are extremely simple, even for irregular verbs. In Romanian, though – as for other Latin languages – conjugations generate a wide array of verbal forms that relate to tenses (fourteen...
tenses in Romanian), modes (eight modes in Romanian), grammatical person (three persons in Romanian) and number (two numbers in Romanian). The French translation of LIWC2007 includes four verb tenses: le présent, le futur, l'imparfait, le passé simple (Piolat et al., 2011, p. 153). Based on this, the Romanian version of LIWC2001 comprises the following forms: prezent (present), viitor (future), imperfect (the same form as the French imparfait), perfect compus (as opposed to the French dictionary, the verbal form homologous to the French passé composé was more appropriate, given its wide spread and frequent usage). The dictionary also includes the infinitive, the indicative, the gerund and the participle (four out of eight), given that the other four modal forms are constructed using various combinations of the infinitive form, the present indicative form, the participle and conjunctions. To avoid listing all verbal forms according to person and number – quite rich and diverse in Romanian – the software that can run the dictionary allows the usage of the asterisk (*) which is added to the word stem. As follows, verbal forms of words always indicate, when reading the dictionary, the mode and the tense, and only at times the person and the number – these being suggested by the word root. A particular challenge was the translation of -ing verbs. -ing forms can be translated in Romanian with the infinitive form or the gerund form, and in the end, the gerund proved to be more adequate, especially because gerund verbs in Romanian can obtain an adjectival value in sentences, while infinitive forms can not.

Nouns

There was no particular challenge with translating nouns. The only difference in the Romanian LIWC2001, compared to the English version, was the case/number combination in the noun forms (five noun cases and two numbers in Romanian), which was addressed by including more word stems, while exploiting the asterisk (*).

Adjectives

Similar to translating nouns, when working with adjectives, their variation of grammatical agreement to the noun case, number and gender needed to be considered. The variety of forms that results is considerably challenging in building a coherent dictionary, and once again, the usage of stems and of the asterisk was the most adequate choice.

The use of diacritics

An extremely important aspect when working with texts in Romanian is the use of diacritics. The Romanian alphabet consists of 31 letters. The expansion

5 Please refer to the following sections which detail how the Yoshikoder works.
6 A, a; Ĺ, Ĺ; Å, å; Ţ, ţ; B, b; C, c; D, d; E, e; F, f; G, g; H, h; I, i; Î, î; J, j; K, k; L, l; M, m; N, n; O, o; P, p; Q, q; R, r; S, s; Ţ, ţ; T, t; U, u; V, v; W, w; X, x; Y, y; Z, z
of digital media has emphasized - contrary to the print, one might say - the cultural differences in writing, since typing became accessible to any digital device user, and was no longer a prerogative of the knowledgeable. The technical difficulties of setting the computer keyboard in other keys than English led to an informal alteration of Romanian writing – the custom of giving up diacritics and replacing them with the basic Latin letters has thus emerged. The digital written expression of Romanian digital natives most often does not use diacritics. Online media in particular – as compared to print – disseminates the written Romanian language without diacritics, given that online newspapers publish quite often articles that do not use the diacritics. This is not general, of course, and still needs to be systematically studied, but it still is a vital aspect to consider when collecting press articles to be analysed with the Romanian LIWC2001. The texts should always be inspected and prepared for analysis, through correcting spelling errors and including the diacritics where they are missing.

**Dictionary words in English and Romanian**

The most challenging issues with translating the dictionary words appeared when, in Romanian, there were several possibilities of translation, or when several words in English had the same (one) meaning in Romanian.

In the first instance, deciding which translation was fit for the Romanian LIWC2001 required an algorithm to be used throughout the whole translation process. Apparently, although an index of the most frequent words and expressions in Romanian is highly desired by professional translators, a statistical count of the Romanian modern vocabulary in use has not been elaborated. The solution, as follows, was to confront an English-Romanian dictionary with the Merriam Webster\(^7\) English dictionary. The first step was to obtain a complex list of possible translations into Romanian. The second step was to identify the definition of the English word in the English dictionary, and then, the third step, to match the most frequent definition with the Romanian word from the list which meant the same. This proved to be a very useful strategy when confronting the two resources led the way to refined translations into Romanian.

The second instance resulted in translating several words in English with the same word in Romanian (e.g. certain, sure - sigur) – this decision was made only when the previous algorithm did not turn any results.

There have also been a few drop outs in the Romanian version, which were required by 1) the difficulty of identifying an appropriate translation in Romanian, 2) the fact that in Romanian, they are translated with multiple words, which can not be counted as continuous strings when using the content analysis

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\(^7\) Available online at [http://www.merriam-webster.com/](http://www.merriam-webster.com/)
software, 3) the translation of verb tenses, particularly the present tense, using the verb stem and the asterisk – if in the English version there are two verb forms (the stem and the -s form), in Romanian there is one verb form, the stem, which uses the asterisk, 4) the fact that several words in English, especially adverbs, are translated with only one word in Romanian, given that in Romanian there are not as many nuances, 5) word forms which include the apostrophe in English have no equivalent in Romanian (e.g. 've).

Besides the necessary drop outs, a few words that responded to fixed lexical forms in English, for instance, pronouns, articles and verb auxiliaries, needed to be added to the Romanian version. The Pronouns category includes all lexical forms of pronouns derived from noun cases, grammatical gender and number. This includes also the second person plural, which does not have a specific form in English. In Romanian, there are determined, undetermined and demonstrative articles – to mention the most frequent - all belonging to the Articles category. The English forms would, should, could are translated in Romanian with the equivalent verbs conjugated in the conditional optative mode. Thus, besides the specific verbs – a trebui, a putea – the Romanian LIWC2001 also contains the verb auxiliaries derived from the verb a avea: aș, ai, ar, am, ați. Also, the perfect compus tense in the indicative mode is constructed with an auxiliary and the verb participle, and besides including the participle in the dictionary, the auxiliaries derived from the verb a avea: am, ai, a, ați, au have also been added.

The following section discusses how the Romanian LIWC2001 dictionary can be used with a content analysis software.

**Yoshikoder and the application of the Romanian version of LIWC2001**

Yoshikoder is a content analysis program developed at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, at Harvard University. This software is open source, can be downloaded for free and can be used under the Gnu Public License. The Yoshikoder can be used for multilingual text analysis. Its functional principle is the comparison between strings of characters that the user inserts and defines as dictionary entries, and strings of characters in the text to be analysed. A string of characters is a word or a word-stem that the Yoshikoder is able to recognize and count in a given text. When an asterisk is added to a word-stem, the Yoshikoder counts all words in a text that match the stem, regardless of the following characters (e.g. research* → researcher, researching, researched). As well, if an asterisk is attached to a word or a word-stem at the beginning, Yoshikoder

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8 Yoshikoder, please refer to the following section.
10 More information is available at [http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/](http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/)
will search for strings that match the word or word-stem, regardless of the starting letters (e.g. *direct → redirect, indirect).

To continue, this inherent flexibility of defining codes or string of characters in Yoshikoder facilitated a coherent construction of the Romanian version of LIWC2001, allowing for the translation of the English LIWC2001 into a catalogue that can be easily managed. The translation did not imply, as previously shown, the inclusion of lexical families in their entirety, but the sensible use of the asterisk to teach the Yoshikoder to identify the words of interest.

A short analysis on an article published on realitatea.net illustrates how the Yoshikoder works with the Romanian LIWC2001. The article is entitled “Privatizarea Oltchim, ZI HALUCINANTĂ. Diaconescu a venit cu ŠAPTE SACI de bani la minister”\textsuperscript{11}

Yoshikoder is able to count the frequency of all words in the document:

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Fig_1.png}
\caption{Frequency of each word in document}
\end{figure}

And, as well, it can count all dictionary entries in the document, in this case the entries in the Romanian LIWC2001:

One can run only specific analyses on the documents imported to Yoshikoder, and chose the variables of interest from the Romanian LIWC2001 dictionary. In this case, the Yoshikoder shows the occurrences of words assigned to the Money or financial issues, Certainty, and Job or Employment variables.

**Fig. 2.** Frequency of each dictionary entry (Romanian LIWC2001) in document

**Fig. 3.** Highlights of occurrences of variable words – Money or financial issues, Certainty, Job or work
As well, these occurrences can be analysed in association with their neighbouring words, a technique that allows for discourse analysis to be undertaken:

![Fig.4. Concordances of variable words Money](image)

![Fig.5. Concordances of variable words Certainty](image)
Fig. 6. Concordances of variable words Job or work

The strengths of using the Romanian LIWC2001 with Yoshikoder rests in the automated reading of the written texts, particularly useful when dealing with large data bases. In the previous example, reading the highlighted words in the text gives a clear picture of the topic that is being addressed by that particular article. Yoshikoder can, in this sense, generate a report of the frequency of all words in all documents that are analysed. Furthermore, the feature of making concordances of dictionary words with their neighbouring words facilitates the qualitative discourse analysis that explores the inherent meaning of words and expressions, beyond their literal meaning.

Nevertheless, the dictionary and the software both present weak points that need to be further addressed and refined. As with other translations, the Romanian LIWC2001 is constructed on the English structure – both linguistically and socially – and cross-language biases have high chances of being embedded in the dictionary. The tool needs to be further refined so as to consistently evaluate Romanian verbal expressions. On the other hand, although Yoshikoder is extremely useful in doing text analysis, it is mainly a descriptive tool. More elaborated statistical analyses – such as factor analysis, for instance – need to be done by manually inserting the descriptives generated by Yoshikoder to SPSS or other statistical analysis softwares.
Conclusion

The Romanian version of LIWC2001 is the first tool available for content analysis on Romanian texts. The current discussion paper has presented the procedures of translating the English LIWC2001 and the challenges that had to be managed. The tool is extremely useful in analysing emotional and cognitive expressions inherent in verbal productions (oral or written) and is able to reveal psychological information that is not overt in the literal meaning of words. In this sense, it can be successfully used in analysing political discourses, personal documents, written media content, and it can serve sociologists, psychologists, journalists, ethnographers, historians and students, in executing content analysis on texts both as the main method, or in mixed methods designs.

REFERENCES


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