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EU ENLARGEMENT, PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE

Philippe Beke*

**Conference by Ambassador Philippe Beke
Cluj-Napoca, Babeş-Bolyai University
28th of May 2012**

In March this year, the European Union celebrated the 55th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Rome. This Treaty was a start of the European construction which gave a new face to the continent after centuries of conflict.

With 6 founding members, amongst which Belgium, the first steps of the European Economic Community were, as stated in its denomination, exclusively economically oriented. From the outset however, the founding fathers after the first years of settling the organisation, understood that deepening and widening the construction was the only answer for Europe to strengthen its objectives and be taken seriously by third countries. This political awareness was gradually boosted by the will to create a European environment within which the economic platform would be consolidated and the four freedoms would prevail, thereby eventually putting the quality of life of the population at the heart of its policies and placing social and global relations high on the agenda. It is therefore not by chance that, more than 50 years after the EU's inception, art. 3 of the Lisbon Treaty pronounces: 'The Union's aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples'. The attraction of the EU towards other European countries is today not limited to economic matters.

In the Lisbon Treaty, article 49 is the basis for European states to apply for membership. This article states that 'Any European State which respects the values referred to in article 2, this is human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights and is committed to promoting them, may apply to become a member of the

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Union'. With the accession of Denmark, Ireland and UK in 1973, the European construction was still very economically oriented. With the accession of Greece, Spain and Portugal, member states understood that a larger Europe had a political vocation and also requested a better institutional framework. The answer to this important dimension was expected to be given by the Maastricht Treaty, signed in 1992. However, the deepening in the Maastricht Treaty did not give entire satisfaction, certainly not in view of the preceding negotiations with Sweden, Norway, Finland and Austria, leading to the accession in 1995 of three out of four candidates, leaving Norway out because of a negative referendum.

The changes that occurred in 1989 in Central Europe had an even greater impact on the future of the EU, since their looming accession presented different and more complex challenges. In this respect the Danish Presidency of 1993 played an important role. Before 1993 the accession process was oriented towards Western European states and was merely driven on the basis of the so-called *acquis* requirements. In view of the expected outreach to Central European states, the EU had to devise a clear set of criteria in order to determine who would get a candidate status. That is how in June 1993 the Copenhagen criteria were adopted, specifying political criteria, criteria of fully functioning market economy and criteria assuring the capacity to put EU legislation in place and implement. In 1995 in Madrid the criterion of having a solid administrative capacity in place was added.

When the Danish Presidency organized a major conference with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Western and Eastern European countries in April 1993, it was not yet clear what countries would get a negotiation ticket. Germany, as a promoter of enlargement, was initially only keen to seek accession for the so-called Visegrad countries, namely Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia being in these days still Czechoslovakia. In 1995, after having joined the EU, Sweden and Finland insisted on taking the Baltic countries on board, while Austria, also a new member, supported the candidacy of Slovenia. From that moment onwards until the European Council of Luxemburg in December 1997, a lot of political pressure emerged to consider all Central European countries plus Malta, pushed forward by Italy and Cyprus supported by Greece, as candidate countries. In 1997 however only six countries, the so-called Luxemburg countries, got a negotiation ticket: Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary,

Poland, Slovenia and Czech Republic. Two years later, at the Helsinki summit in December 1999, another six countries, being Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania and Slovakia also obtained the candidate status with Bulgaria and Romania heavily supported by France which marked the importance to strike the right balance between northern and southern Europe. The decision to start negotiations with 12 candidates in the beginning of 2000 will be remembered in the history of the European Union as the largest and most complex enlargement which ever took place. The 13th country that received candidate status in Helsinki, namely Turkey, was considered to not be ready yet for opening negotiations.

As regards the timing for the new member states to enter the EU, it was decided and repeated at the 2000 Nice summit that the fifth enlargement negotiations would start on the basis of the regatta principle, meaning that the country which was first ready could also first enter without setting a timeline. The final approach turned out to be different. With a big bang approach, promoted by Enlargement Commissioner Günther Verheugen, 10 new member states entered on the first of May 2004 followed by the accession of Romania and Bulgaria on the first of January 2007.

1. How the complexity of the 5th enlargement negotiations is to be explained?

First of all, the complexity of the institutional issues was in many respect a real concern. Since the Maastricht Treaty did not provide the requested guarantees, new negotiations were initiated in 1995 in Messina, ending in 1997 with the signing of the Amsterdam Treaty, which entered into force in 1999. Again, too many issues remained unanswered so that new negotiations became unavoidable. After the Nice Treaty in 2000 failed to convince for the same reasons, under the Belgian Presidency, the Declaration of Laken in December 2001 was the start for an Intergovernmental Conference which had the ambitious goal to draft a European Constitutional Treaty, under the auspices of former French President Valéry Giscard D'Estaing. For the first time in EU history, candidate countries were allowed to participate. The ratification process failed however, as the Treaty was refuted in the 2005 referenda in France and the Netherlands. After a period of institutional meandering, the

ratification process finally picked up steam again leading to the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty on the first of December 2009.

Secondly there were the enormous differences in economic development between the Western and the Central European countries. This income gap was far more important than the income gap recorded in 1986 when Spain and Portugal joined. As a comparative example on the strength of the economies in 2000, it could be observed that the Benelux GDP was larger than the total GDP of all 12 acceding countries together. Lessons learned from the Spanish and Portuguese accession, indicated the importance of supporting the reform of the economy, both in legal and financial terms. This is why pre-accession funds were foreseen for agriculture (SAPARD) and for general economic development and infrastructure (PHARE and ISPA). The pre-accession funds proved to be a tool to cope with the needed restructuring of the economies, notwithstanding the reality of misuse and abuse which gave the institutional anti-corruption body OLAF, quite some work. Foreign direct investment was also promoted in the pre-accession period but did not bring the expected results in taking over brown field investments, ie existing plants. The widespread concern in several EU member states that this process would give rise to massive delocalization and unemployment, however did not materialize.

A third complication was related to the different reading of what had to be understood by the rule of law, more in particular in relation to the internal market and justice and home affairs (JHA). It is therefore no surprise that in the accession treaties, special safeguard clauses were introduced in these areas.

A fourth element which could be underlined in this respect is the fact that the *acquis communautaire* had considerably increased in the nineties because of new legislation on matters related amongst others to the introduction of the internal market. At the start of the negotiations in 2000, the legal basis reached some 90,000 pages which had to be adopted and implemented by the candidate countries.

2. We may today in 2012, eight years after the initial 10 countries acceded to the EU, followed by Romania and Bulgaria two years later, look back on what was basically done right and what could be seen as misjudged in the negotiations. This is how I read it.

2.1. We were right in taking the necessary time for in-depth discussions on the adoption and implementation of the acquis, including if necessary, the formatting of transition periods. Although there has never been a slow down in the high rhythm of the negotiations in the years 2000 until 2004, candidate countries at several occasions, had to be reminded that there was not shortcut in the accession process, and that one could not put the NATO and EU accession negotiations on an equal footing. EU negotiations, with the transposition of Directives and Regulations, were indeed essentially technical in nature, whereas NATO negotiations essentially remained political. Some of the candidate countries wanting to have a faster pace in the negotiations, did not hesitate to state that because of the perceived enlargement fatigue and political unwillingness, it took too much time to finalize the negotiations. Let me be clear, there was never any enlargement fatigue. Time was needed to implement seriousness into negotiations. The only country that could claim on the basis of the regatta principle that it had the right to finish off negotiations well before all the others, was Slovenia. Negotiator and current EU Commissioner Janes Potocnik was wise enough not to insist on an early entry, thus waiting for the big bang batch to stand ready for signing the Treaty on Athens' Acropolis in April 2003. Still today, it is difficult to make a final judgment on the option of a big bang rather than of a regatta, but as a former negotiator on enlargement I tend to consider it was a good decision whilst maybe having a slight preference for the accession in three groups rather than two. In this light I believe it would be wise to reflect on the option for a big bang regarding the upcoming accession of the remaining Balkan countries.

We were right not to put minority and property issues into the negotiations as such. Still today these issues are very delicate. It concerns notably the Benes decrees in Czech Republic and Slovakia, related to property rights claimed by German and Austrian citizens in post World War II nationalization. It concerns Slovenia, where only Austria had claims, since Italy had settled property issues with Yugoslavia in 1975 by signing the Osimo Treaty. Minority issues were mainly related to Hungarian

minorities in Slovakia and Romania. All these matters were put into bilateral negotiation frameworks. The only issue which was not tackled in this context, however, was the issue of the integration of the Roma population. Belgium in this respect had made a proposal in May 2000, which was rejected by the Commission, with the argument that there was not enough *acquis* in place for claiming a Roma policy towards the candidate countries. The Belgian side claimed in vain that the Council of Europe conventions were good enough to provide a solid basis. Encouraged by new *acquis*, the negotiations with Croatia later on, included Roma matters.

We were right to set up pre-accession formats in order to smoothen the adoption and implementation of the *acquis*, using association agreements and as already indicated using pre-accession funds as main tools. EU involvement in restructuring the steel sector in several Central European countries, is an example of difficult and time consuming reforms that were tackled in pre-accession formats. A satisfactory functioning of the internal market after accession would depend largely on reforms in place well before accession, as well as availability of tools and modalities to combat market distortion or non respect of the protection of intellectual property. In this respect, Poland was particularly seen as a difficult environment. But today we can say that on the contrary, the accession Poland can be seen as a real success. Generally speaking, one can observe that, thanks to pre-accession investment in terms of commitments and financing, the internal market issue has not turned into a problematic issue in the new members states.

2.2. What might be considered to be a misjudgment?

One can question whether the big bang approach was the best approach. Time will tell. One can also question if all political commitments were fulfilled upon accession. In the case of Cyprus this reflection is certainly relevant since it had been agreed from the beginning that the unification issue of the island had to be finalized before accession, with the United Nations being the guarantor. By the end of the technical negotiations with Cyprus a broad consensus was reached under what was called the Annan III plan. Since the adoption and the implementation of this plan was not mandatory, questions were raised on the *bona fide*

intentions, in particular with a referendum consulting the population on biased grounds. Finally Cyprus entered the EU as a divided country, with all its consequences and most notably within the country itself and in the EU relations with Turkey.

We also misjudged the forecasts on the acceleration of economic growth. Growth was the creed for creating internal wealth in Central-Europe, but also for preserving competitiveness for Western European companies, already visibly under pressure of the BRIC countries. Analysts like Goldman Sachs forecasted double digit growth for at least one decade in the new member states, but as it stands, growth has been rather moderate and in some countries not really in line with the expectations. The financial crisis of 2008 was certainly not helpful but in comparison with Western Europe there is still a lot of room for catching up. As long as growth remains slow, the purchasing power will remain low, leading to brain drain and social dumping. Lack of business leadership in both entrepreneurship and the organization of business, next to limited administrative capacity at the level of the public sector, in addition to limited import substitution and moderate FDI figures, are major factors explaining moderate economic performance. Taking into consideration the overall Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) figures for Central-Europe over the last 20 years, there is no doubt that Germany and Austria, and to a lesser extent also Italy, are the genuine member states that most profited from FDI.

We surely made a misjudgment on the administrative capacity of some new member states, especially Romania and Bulgaria. To make good use of European funds, in particular of structural and cohesion funds, it is indeed absolutely mandatory to boast of a well-functioning administration. Taking into consideration the fairly good absorption of agricultural funds, it might have been useful to impose more responsibility on the candidate country in other pre-accession funds or to organize a better monitoring system well before accession with compulsory reforms in the administrative decision making structure.

We also made a misjudgment on the implementation of the rule of law in some of the new member states. Indications that after accession the rule of law is not well understood, may be observed in the Court, but not only there. Petty corruption is still to be found well after accession in control bodies of the state, e.g. fiscal units, customs, police and even

education or public health where under table payments were common. In order to strengthen the rule of law, next to the use of PHARE funds, it might have been useful to create a specific pre-accession instrument aiming to reform the judiciary and surely introducing a track record, there where constantly misuse or abuse was recorded. By all means, closing chapter 24 (JHA) too soon, as was the case for Romania and Bulgaria, was proven to be a mistake. Taking into consideration these examples of weak results in the implementation of the rule of law, it is therefore no surprise to find out that the 2011 EU decision to monitor right from the start of future negotiations the chapters justice and home affairs with the obligation to close these chapters at the very end of future negotiations. This is a much better approach than the use of warning letters and Cooperation and verification Mechanism (CVM) which was favored under the 5th enlargement, since it can pinpoint the sore points right from the start. In the negotiation logic, several of the objective obstacles could have been avoided if candidate countries would have negotiated more in-house to convince their administrations that EU was serious about its positions rather than taking the easier track of outbound positions which merely sustained the internal non-performance.

The enigma of early accession with quite a number of transition periods versus readiness upon accession dominated the regatta principle. When in 2001 the big bang theory was gaining momentum, the political fear for staying behind vanished and was replaced by the ambition to swiftly mark the accession date for the first group of acceding countries. The option of a combined big bang in 2004 and 2007 objectively resulted in a pace which was too slow for Slovenia, but most likely too fast for Romania and Bulgaria. But in the end it is fair to say that the *acquis communautaire* had always been respected in the negotiations.

3. The present situation on enlargement is characterised by four policy lines:

- 3.1. The accession of Croatia, following the finalization of the negotiations in June 2011 with the signing of the Treaty in December 2011, will be a fact on the 1st of July 2013. Negotiations were fair and even if at a certain point in time, the pace slowed down because of the Gotovina case, one can never speak of enlargement fatigue. The condition to hand over war

criminals to the The Hague Court is rather an indication of seriousness than a maneuver to slow down negotiations. Seriousness in the monitoring of the results is still on the agenda for Croatia. In this respect, the Commission will continue to focus on 1. independent justice 2. track record of corruption 3. integration of Roma population and 4. structural reform of economy.

- 3.2. Accession and negotiations with Turkey and Iceland.
- 3.2.1. Iceland is a member of the European Economic Space (EES) and also of Schengen. As a member of the EES, Iceland contributes to the European funds and is involved in many EU programs. The negotiations started end of 2010. Meanwhile 15 chapters have been opened and one chapter has been closed. The most difficult chapters are environment, fisheries, agriculture and regional policy. Another delicate issue is the ICESAVE case in which UK and Dutch banks made claims towards Iceland. During his last visit to the country on 24th and 25th of May 2012, Commissioner Stefan Füle had the opportunity to measure the progress.
- 3.2.2. Turkey: the negotiations are more or less frozen. Turkey received the candidate status in 1999 and started negotiations in 2005. As we speak, 13 chapters have been opened and 1 chapter has been closed, while 18 chapters have been suspended. Because of the non-respect of the Ankara protocol on the internal market, 8 chapters have been suspended. Some chapters cannot be dealt with, because of country-specific policies, meaning 1) Greece blocking the chapter on energy 2) Cyprus blocking 5 chapters and 3) France blocking another 5 chapters. In order to unblock the situation, the EU launched on the 17th of May 2012, a renewed positive agenda on the Turkey – EU relations.
- 3.3. The third policy line concerns the countries with a candidate status. In March 2012 Serbia received the status of candidate country, while fy Republic of Macedonia and Montenegro already obtained the status in 2005 and 2010 respectively. Let me mention in the margin of this indent, the special position of Switzerland,

which has signed seven key agreements with EU and is also a member of Schengen, as is Norway. Both could easily become candidate countries but face considerable opposition from a part of their population.

- 3.4. A fourth important aspect to be mentioned in the enlargement debate is the enforced roadmap of the EU neighbourhood policy. What started in 2000 as a UK idea on 'wider Europe' is today a combination of association agreements, visa liberalization and deep, comprehensive Free Trade Agreements with all countries neighboring the EU, except those that have already obtained a candidate status. There are two sidelines to be mentioned in this regard. Firstly, in June 2003 the heads of states and governments agreed that ultimately all Balkan countries have the vocation to enter the EU one day. Annual evaluation of their readiness to attain the candidate status are well on track. Secondly, as agreed in September 2011 during the Eastern partnership Summit in Warsaw, the six countries concerned will benefit from closer EU relations, without having the option to become full fledged member.

4. The future of enlargement will entail the finalization of the negotiations with Iceland and the management of accession of the Balkan countries. For the latter, the implementation of the EU enlargement strategy document from November 9, 2010, thereby taking into account further lessons learned from the accession of the three Balkan countries, Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia, form the basis. At a certain point of time reflection need to be started on defining the borders of the EU, and this in relation with further reflection on the EU neighbourhood policy. Translated into political terms these reflections will imply discussions on allocating the "anything but institutions" status to some countries.

- 4.1. The negotiations with Iceland are progressing well, meaning that readiness for accession will be a fact in the short run. The main question which will follow this readiness, will be the acceptance of EU membership by the majority of the Icelandic population.

- 4.2. The most important risk factor towards future enlargement of EU is the Balkan accession. It is commonly said that the Balkans need to get into the EU and not the EU getting into the Balkans. This would require an important mentality change of the population living in South-Eastern Europe, as was proven with the accession of Bulgaria and Romania, but also would require a well balanced regional policy approach. Regional policy matters will include a comprehensive solution for Kosovo which is not recognized today by 5 EU members, political engineering to establish the right equations in the ethnical patchwork of amongst others issues related to Sandjak, Preshovo and the Republica Serbska, deter the establishment of a greater Albania and achieve a consolidated solution in the relations between Athens and Skopje. Timewise, an ideal solution would be the accession of all the countries concerned in a big bang by 2020.
- 4.3. By 2015 the EU will have to decide what direction its negotiations with Turkey will take. Today it is an open-ended process with no guarantee for accession. Member states are divided. Since Turkey has proven to be a strong regional political and economic player, decisions can not be taken overnight. The way forward shall be marked either by a new roadmap on accession, or be reoriented towards relations in a different light with several possible formats, ranging from an enhanced partnership to a format with all accession facilities, except the institutional facility.
- 4.4. Future enlargements will also imply a further deepening of EU relations with the neighboring countries, some of which might in this perspective eventually join the four freedoms, Schengen or be involved in other EU programs in the field of energy and transport, environment and climatic change, or regional development programs. The Eastern partnership document of 15th of May 2012 has already given a preview of this deepening of the neighbourhood policy for the years to come.

Conclusions:

Within the timeline of the European construction, deepening and widening have permanently been on the agenda of the heads of state and

governments meetings for the last 40 years. After the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, and in the midst of growing Eurozone concerns, institutional aspects have been overruled by economic governance and management of Schengen issues. Membership meetings have grown from six partners to 27 and soon 28 around the table. Europe has grown as a construction but also as an economic space, accompanied by the assertion of political weight in the international arena.

Still, Europe has a vocation to grow. Future accession negotiations will follow the guidelines agreed upon and reap the benefits of the lessons learned from previous enlargement rounds. Since new *acquis* will come up and new European standards will have to be truly implemented, the pre-accession process will need to come under even more scrutiny than in the past. The ideal approach to support new member states is to provide them with the best preparation possible well before accession. It will be most likely necessary to introduce more benchmarks monitoring, scoreboards and verification mechanisms through which mechanism member states will be better monitored and monitored on equal footing.

It is hard to predict today what the European construction will look like 55 years from now. No doubt new members will have joined, but the shape of new relations will also have been re-designed. Thus, the EU will be likely to have intensified relations with its neighbours, taking the form of the Swiss “anything but institutions” format, or being part of the wider European economic zone, enabling the enjoyment of the four freedoms and coming close to what the founding fathers initially intended under the definition of economic cooperation. At that point, the European Union and the Wider Europe region will have to share by all means the same values and goals, thereby upholding the rule of law and ensuring the quality of life for its citizens.

FROM EUROPEANIZATION TO RE-NATIONALIZATION: CONTEXTUAL PARAMETERS OF CHANGE IN TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY*

Şevket Ovalı**

Abstract

The aim of this essay is to examine the contextual parameters that culminated in Turkey's retreat from Europeanization and subsequent move towards re-nationalization in terms of its foreign policy. The paper is organized into three sections. The first section examines the analytical tools that may provide explanations for the transformations in Turkey's foreign policy domain, while the second section discusses the early effects of European integration after 1999, with the aim of decoding Europeanization in terms of changes in the foreign policy domain. The third section scrutinizes the contextual parameters of change, which resulted in Turkey's disenchantment with the EU integration in relation to certain topics on Turkey's foreign policy agenda. The empirical parts of the essay focus on Turkey's relations with Greece, Cyprus and Armenia since the shifts in Turkey's policy preferences are more profound and observable in these areas.

Keywords: Europeanization, nationalization, conditionality, socialization

Introduction

Ever since Turkey was given candidacy status at the Helsinki Summit in 1999, Europeanization has been a fashionable term, frequently used as an analytical tool by researchers aiming to examine the drastic transformations that the country has undergone. With its new principles, policy

* An earlier draft of this research is presented at the conference on "Comparing and Contrasting Europeanization: Concepts and Experiences" organized by the Institute of International Economic Relations, in Athens 13-16 May 2012.

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formulations, decision-making processes and means for achieving its objectives, Turkish foreign policy has become one of the areas in which the impacts of European integration have been most profound.

The effects of European integration on Turkish foreign policy did not only bring about structural changes, such as the civilianization of decision-making processes, but also required the internalization and implementation of peaceful means for handling the issues on Turkey's foreign policy agenda. Early achievements of European integration in the foreign policy domain include Ankara's retreats from its traditional stance on Cyprus problem, the normalization of its relations with Greece, and its initiation of a dialogue process with Armenia.

However, due to a series of developments taking place in both the domestic and international environs, within a couple of years, Turkish foreign policy gradually became disenchanted with European integration. Recently, the country came to the brink of an armed conflict with Israel, and problems with Cyprus, Armenia and Greece remain unresolved.

Taking the context dependent nature of foreign policy into consideration, the aim of this essay is to examine the contextual parameters that culminated in Turkey's retreat from Europeanization and subsequent move towards re-nationalization in terms of its foreign policy. In this regard, I will take Europeanization as the dependent variable to identify the changes in the foreign policy domain as an outcome of European integration. In this regard, I suggest the term "contextual parameters" for the independent variables, which refer to indicators that seem to structure Turkey's foreign policy preferences in the course of European integration. While the Turkish government's national role conceptions, its domestic political concerns and identity related factors are assumed to be influential domestic parameters, the attitude of the EU in certain foreign policy issues and simultaneous developments taking place in Turkey's surrounding regions are taken as external parameters.

The paper is organized into three sections. The first section examines the analytical tools that may provide explanations for the transformations in Turkey's foreign policy domain, while the second section discusses the early effects of European integration after 1999, with the aim of decoding Europeanization in terms of changes in the foreign policy domain. The third section scrutinizes the contextual parameters of change, which

resulted in Turkey's disenchantment with the EU integration in relation to certain topics on Turkey's foreign policy agenda. The empirical parts of the essay focus on Turkey's relations with Greece, Cyprus and Armenia since the shifts in Turkey's policy preferences are more profound and observable in these areas.

Analytical tools

Considering Turkey's candidacy status, I suggest that a working definition of Europeanization should be based on a top-down approach. In this respect, I prefer to define Europeanization as the domestic changes that take place under the adaptation pressures imposed by the EU or because of elite socialization. The main rationale behind this assumption is that, whereas EU member states have opportunities to influence the institutions, politics and policies of the EU, such an opportunity does not exist for candidate countries. Since each candidate country gradually becomes a simple EU policy 'downloader' or a "passive recipient"¹ during accession talks, this process may even be said to take the form of EU-ization.²

In this regard, Europeanization as an outcome leads to two pertinent questions that need answering. First, through which mechanisms is the observable change in certain policy domains taking place? Second, what are the expected consequences of European integration in the foreign policy domain of the candidate countries? The answers to these questions could provide researchers with the analytical tools to grasp the underlying dynamics of shifts in the foreign policy behaviors of candidate countries.

Regarding the first question, the rationalist approach argues that Europeanization deepens in the course of integration through the carrots and sticks of EU conditionality. From the constructivist point of view,³ however, Europeanization can be interpreted as a socialization process in which national actors learn the expectations of the EU and gradually internalize them.

¹ Scott James, "Europeanization as 'Projection': Understanding the Changing Face of EU Policy Making within the Core Executive", *Political Perspectives*, No 2 (3), 2007, p. 8.

² Heather Grabbe, *The EU's Transformative Power, Europeanization Through Conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe*, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006, p. 4.

³ See Jeffrey T. Checkel, "Social Construction and Integration", *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol 6, No 4, Special Issue, 1999, pp. 545-560.

When foreign policy is considered, though the EU lacks supranational power, it is still capable of imposing adaptation pressures on Turkey to encourage structural and ideational transformations in the latter's foreign policy domain. The adaptation pressures regarding Turkey's handling of issues like Cyprus and Greece, as well as democratization of decision making, exemplify the carrots and sticks approach of the EU.⁴

On the other hand, the conceptualization of Europeanization as an outcome of state interaction, socialization and learning is also applicable to the Turkish case. According to this argument, national actors learn the norms, values and appropriate types of behaviors generated by the EU, and even internalize them in dealing with issues on Turkey's foreign policy agenda. For instance, even though the EU has not actually required policy shifts in foreign policy issues other than Cyprus and the territorial conflicts with Greece, Turkey's endeavors to normalize its relations with its neighbors, most notably with Armenia, can be interpreted as the outcome of a learning process. That is, this process not only changed the way of doing things in the Turkish foreign policy domain, but also weakened traditional stereotypes about those states previously considered as enemies.

Regarding the second question, the consequences of European integration in the foreign policy domain deserve scrutiny. For Djordjevic, over the course of the European integration of candidate countries, the "EU becomes the only norm maker, generating a stimuli and imposing considerable pressure on the candidates, to adopt certain types of institutional and policy changes".⁵ This uni-dimensional, top-down European integration may produce a dual pattern of state behavior on the part of candidate countries. It may either facilitate change, or produce Europeanization, in the candidate's institutional structures and policy preferences or it may provoke national reactionary attitudes which may even reverse the course of change, from Europeanization to re-

⁴ Mustafa Aydın, Sinem Açıkmese, "Europeanization through EU Conditionality: Understanding the new era in Turkish foreign policy", *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, Vol 9, No 3, December 2007, p. 267.

⁵ Olivera Djordjevic, "The Limits of Europeanization 'From Without': Is there an EU Driven Democratization Process in Serbia?", *UNISCI Discussion Papers*, No 18, October 2008, p. 83.

nationalization.⁶ Re-nationalization becomes particularly visible if the candidate country's foreign policy elite and public opinion reach the point that they believe their nation is not being treated fairly during accession talks, or if they believe that such a process will override national interests.

What makes Turkish foreign policy an eligible case for the application of Europeanization theory to foreign policy analysis are the noticeable shifts in the foreign policy domain, which clearly demonstrate the dual consequences of European integration. Taking stock of the changes that have taken place in Turkish foreign policy, the next section aims to reveal the content and extent of Europeanization as an outcome, with special reference to institutional changes in foreign policy making, attitudinal changes in certain issue areas, and changes in the politics of foreign policy.

Europeanization as an outcome in Turkish foreign policy

Due to the concrete and identifiable characteristics of "institutional changes"⁷, explaining Europeanization in institutional terms is a good point of departure. Mustafa Aydın and Sinem Açıkmeşe argue that the institutional change, which appeared in Turkey with the civilianization of its foreign policy making process, took place because of EU conditionality.⁸ For example, they argue that the replacement of military elites with civilian bureaucrats in the National Security Council (NSC) was the result of European integration through conditionality, since the EU had required such a reform as a pre-condition for democratization in the 2001 Accession Partnership Document.⁹ Thus, Europeanization as a change in institutional terms first occurred in the reforms to Turkey's foreign policy decision-making process.

The establishment of the Secretariat General for EU Affairs on June 4, 2000 and the civilianization of foreign policy making were early effects of European integration in institutional terms. The duties and competences of the Secretariat were defined as "providing internal coordination and

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ For a comprehensive analysis on the impacts of Europeanization in terms of foreign policy institutions and bureaucracy, see Michael E. Smith, "Conforming to Europe: Domestic Impact of EU Foreign Policy Co-operation", *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol 7, No 4, October 2000, pp. 619-624.

⁸ Mustafa Aydın, Sinem Açıkmeşe, "Europeanization Through EU Conditionality...", p. 269.

⁹ *Ibid.*

harmonization between public institutions, with a purpose to prepare Turkey to EU membership".¹⁰ After the elections held on June 12, 2011, the Ministry replaced the Secretariat for EU Affairs, with Egemen Bağış being appointed as the first minister of the new institution.

In the meantime, efforts to civilianize foreign policy making processes were proceeding. The gradual replacement of military elites with civilian experts in the NSC, and the diminishing role of generals in the foreign policy making process both exemplify this. The NSC had been established by the 1961 constitution as an advisory body with a civilian majority. However, after the 1980 military coup d'état, it was transformed into a powerful platform for the military elites to meddle in politics. The NSC, by this stage having a military majority, was also influential in foreign policy making, since many issues in the foreign policy domain were also considered as matters of national security, thereby extending the NSC's scope and power.¹¹

After Turkey was given candidacy status in the Helsinki Summit of 1999, the coalition government made its first attempt at structural reform on October 3, 2001. The Turkish Parliament approved the government's proposal for an amendment of Article 118 of the constitution, regulating the status of the NSC, which led to the first NSC meeting with a civilian majority being held on October 30, 2001.¹²

On July 23, 2003, the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi AKP) government took further steps to civilianize the NSC. A reform package submitted to the parliament included amendments to the status of the NSC in that "the consultative nature of [the] NSC was more greatly emphasized" in the new law.¹³ On August 18, 2004, a senior

¹⁰ Republic of Turkey, Ministry for EU Affairs, *General Information*, 2010, [<http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=44&l=2>], 16 April 2012.

¹¹ For the privileged status and influential roles of military elites in foreign policy making process, see Gencer Özcan, "The Changing Role of Turkey's Military in Foreign Policy Making", *UNISCI Discussion Papers*, No 23, May 2010, pp. 23-46.

¹² *Yeni Şafak* (Turkish Daily), "İlk Sivil MGK Toplantısı yapıldı". 31 October 2011.

¹³ Ali Resul Usul, *Democracy in Turkey, the Impact of EU Political Conditionality*, New York: Routledge, 2011, p. 132. These amendments reduced the number of regular NSC meetings from once a month to once every two months, changed the appointment procedures of the NSC Secretary General by increasing the government's role in this process, and redefined NSC roles, duties and areas of competence. For details, see *the Law of NSC and Secretariat*

diplomat, Yiğit Alpogan, was appointed as the first civilian Secretary General of NSC. Recently, the civilianization process was finalized by a new seating order in the Council that had great symbolic significance domestically. In the new order, “civilian and military members of the council sat on both sides of the table in accordance with the order required by state protocol as opposed to previous years in which military members sat in a bloc on one side of the table”.¹⁴

Second, due to certain attitudinal changes, Europeanization became proponent in Turkey’s handling of foreign policy issues. This claim is based on the preferential shifts in the means of foreign policy and discursive/policy related shifts in Turkey’s adherence to a rigid stance against any unilateral and multilateral initiative aiming to resolve problematic issues on its foreign policy agenda. Specifically, the normalization of previously thorny Turkish-Greek relations, and a remarkable moderation of Turkey’s hawkish stance on Cyprus issue provided significant evidence of a change in Turkey’s general approach towards issues that had previously been securitized.

Considering the change in Turkey’s approach to Cyprus and Greece, it is plausible to argue that EU conditionality is more likely to have caused the above-mentioned changes. Müftüler Bac and Rumelili argue similarly that, the carrot and stick instruments of the EU have come to the fore in Turkish-EU relations, especially since 1999.¹⁵ In Paragraphs 4 and 9 (b) of the Presidency Conclusions of the Helsinki European Council, in which Turkey was given candidacy status, the conditionality regarding the Cyprus issue and Turkish-Greek relations was explicitly indicated.¹⁶

Ifantis claims that, with the decision of the Helsinki Summit, “Greece managed to confine both the Cyprus and the Aegean disputes within an

General, 2003, [<http://www.mgk.gov.tr/Turkce/kanun.html>], Available only in Turkish, 15 April 2012.

¹⁴ *Today’s Zaman*, (Turkish Daily), “New seating order in place at Turkey’s top security council”, 18 August 2011.

¹⁵ See Meltem Müftüler Baç, “The Impact of the European Union on Turkish Politics,” *East European Quarterly*, Vol 34, No 2, June 2000, p. 159-179 and Bahar Rumelili, The European Union’s Impact on the Greek-Turkish Conflict, *Working Paper Series in EU Border Conflict Studies*, No 6, January 2004, p. 9.

¹⁶ For the full text of Presidency Conclusions, see Helsinki European Council: Presidency Conclusions, 10-11 December 1999, Press Release, Brussels, No 00300/99.

EU context and to closely link them with Turkey's accession path".¹⁷ Due to pressure from the EU, the AKP government has had to alter Turkey's previously uncompromising attitude on Cyprus and Greece. In the aftermath of the Helsinki Summit, Turkey has intensified its efforts to improve its relations with Greece. Minister of Foreign Affairs Ismail Cem and his Greek counterpart Yorgos Papandreou made every effort to improve relations between the two countries. In 2000, this rapprochement manifested itself with an agreement on confidence building measures, including prior notification of military exercises, and through the conduct of workshops and seminars on potential areas of cooperation.

In February 2002, the "foreign ministers of both countries decided to launch exploratory contacts"¹⁸ with an aim to resolve the conflicts concerning the Aegean Sea, and this process still continues. The normalization of relations between two countries also proceeded through mutual high-level visits of Greek PM Karamanlis on January 23, 2008 and Turkish PM Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on October 22, 2010. Thus, Turkish-Greek rapprochement can be considered as an achievement created by the respective efforts of Ankara and Athens together with the transformative impact of Europe, and EU conditionality.

The remarkable shift in Turkey's approach towards Cyprus is another case worth scrutinizing in relation to conditionality. Prior to 1999, Cyprus was considered as a national security issue that created its own policy imperatives. After 2002, however, Turkey's previously unconditional support of Rauf Denktaş, and its uncompromising attitude on the resolution of the conflict, was swiftly reversed. The AKP's departure from the position of previous governments can thus be interpreted as being due to the party echelons' noticing of a causal link between EU membership and the resolution of the Cyprus problem. Thereafter, Turkey conducted a

¹⁷ Kostas Ifantis, "Conditionality, Impact and Prejudice in EU-Turkey Relations: A View From Greece", in Nathalie Tocci (ed.), *Conditionality, Impact and Prejudice in EU-Turkey Relations*, Roma: IAI-TEPAV Report, Quaderni-IAI, Istituto Affari Internazionali, July 2007, p. 61.

¹⁸ Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Maritime Issues*, 2010, [<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/maritime-issues---aegean-sea---background-note-on-aegean-disputes.en.mfa>], 16 April 2012.

constructive policy to resolve the conflict along the lines of Annan Plan.¹⁹ Unfortunately, however, neither the Turkish Cypriots' approval of the Annan Plan with 65% of the votes, nor Turkey's support for Rauf Denktaş's main rival Mehmet Ali Talat in the 2005 elections, caused any significant shifts in the EU's general approach to the Cyprus problem.

Considering the change in Turkey's handling of foreign policy issues, Turkish-Armenian relations and Turkey's activism in the Middle East also deserve attention. At this point, however, it is important to note that attributing the transformation of Turkish foreign policy solely to Europeanization, particularly in policy areas where conditionality has been non-existent, risks overestimating the concept, since Europeanization is not an all-explaining factor for all foreign policy shifts in member or candidate countries. Instead, it would be more sound to argue that the Turkish foreign policy elites learned the appropriate and expected patterns of behavior to be a member of the EU club.

Consequently, Turkish foreign policy's guiding principles, as well as the means used to achieve foreign policy objectives, were brought into conformity with EU norms and values, even in areas where EU conditionality is lacking. Müftüler Bac and Gürsoy argue that EU norms in terms of foreign policy making "act as boundaries that shape and constrain member state preferences", and this argument is particularly relevant as far as attitudinal change in Turkish foreign policy towards Armenia is considered.²⁰

Turkey's approach to Armenia drastically changed after 1999, when EU norms requiring peaceful settlement of disputes, together with the use of soft-power instruments rather than military power, became more influential in Turkey. Following the official invitation of Armenian President Serzh Sarkisian, Turkish President Abdullah Gül made the first-ever high-level visit to Armenia in June 2008. On October 10, 2009, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu and his Armenian counterpart Edward Nalbandian signed two protocols to establish diplomatic relations and

¹⁹ Kıvanç Ulusoy, "The Europeanization of Turkey and Its Impact on Cyprus Problem", *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, Vol 10, No 3, December 2008, p. 317.

²⁰ Meltem Müftüler Baç, Yaprak Gürsoy, "Is There a Europeanization of Turkish Foreign Policy? An Addendum to the Literature on EU Candidates", *Turkish Studies*, Vol 11, No 3, September 2010, p. 408.

open the common border. According to Şebnem Arsu, the main motivation behind Turkey's endeavors to normalize its relations with Armenia was the expectation that "better relations with Armenia could improve its chances" of EU membership.²¹

Evidence of Europeanization as an outcome also became visible in the politics of foreign policy. The elevation of foreign policy issues to public debates,²² and the inclusion of civil society in foreign policy making in the post-1999 period exemplify this. In Turkey, foreign policy making has mostly been seen as an elite business, although public debates on the central themes of foreign policy agenda have taken place since the 1960s. However, such debates were largely ignored by the foreign policy elites. In contrast, in the post-Helsinki period, Turkish civil society has appeared to become much more influential in foreign policy making.

The role of public opinion in foreign policy making became particularly apparent during the US' invasion of Iraq. On March 1, 2003, the Turkish Grand National Assembly refused to authorize the deployment of US troops in Turkish territory, from where the Americans had been expecting to be able to mobilize for a ground operation into Northern Iraq. At the time, the most stunning aspect of this development was the pressure on the parliament imposed by Turkish public opinion. In Robbins' words,

What is beyond doubt is that a decisive majority of the population of the country opposed band-wagoning the US in Iraq. It has to be admitted that even in a super elite-oriented country like Turkey, public opinion can count for something, even in the arena of foreign policy-making.²³

Similarly, Özcan argues that, compared with the policies of previous governments, particularly on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the pressure of

²¹ Şebnem Arsu, "Turkey and Armenia to Establish Diplomatic Ties", *New York Times*, 31 August 2009.

²² Ziya Öniş, "Recent Foreign Policy Attitudes in Turkey. How to Reverse the Gradual Shift Away from Europeanization?" Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) Brief, November 2008, [www.diis.dk], 23 April 2012.

²³ Philip Robbins, "Between the EU and the Middle East: Turkish Foreign Policy under the JDP Government, 2002-2007", *ISPI (Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale) Working Paper - 11*, 2007, [www.ispionline.it]. 24 April 2012.

Turkish public opinion has been “much more reflected on the policies of Ecevit (1999-2002) and Erdoğan (2003-...) governments”.²⁴

Europeanization of the politics of foreign policy has also empowered various actors. Not only organizations such as TOBB (Union of Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey), TUSIAD (Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association), and MUSIAD (Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen), which were already experienced in lobbying activities, but also think tanks such as SETA (The Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research), TESEV (Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation) and USAK (International Strategic Research Organization) have become more influential in certain foreign policy issues that fall within their areas of expertise.²⁵

According to Öniş and Yılmaz, the period between 2002 and 2005 can be described as the “Golden Age of Europeanization” in Turkey.²⁶ Later, however, due to a number of interrelated structural and domestic factors, this process lost its momentum, not only in the field of foreign policy but in nearly all areas where the transformative impacts of European integration had been obvious. Considering the dependent nature of foreign policy, an analysis of this retreat or deviation in Turkish foreign policy necessitates undertaking a comprehensive analysis of the contextual parameters that paved the way for Turkey’s gradual disenchantment with the EU in terms of foreign policy.

²⁴ Mesut Özcan, *Harmonizing Foreign Policy: Turkey, the EU and the Middle East*, Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing, 2008, p. 167.

²⁵ For the roles of civil society in Turkish Foreign Policy, see Özlem Terzi, “Is a Europeanized Turkish Foreign Policy Possible? The Role of the Contested EU Perspective in Bringing About A Transformation in Turkish Foreign Policy”, *IES Conference on The European Union in International Affairs*, 2008, [http://www.ies.be/files/repo/conference2008/EUinIA_V_2_Terzi.pdf], 23 April 2012, p 16-18. See also Paula Sandrin, “The European Union as a Vincolo Esterno and the Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy”, *Paper presented at ECPR Graduate Conference, Dublin 2010*, [<http://www.ecprnet.eu/databases/conferences/papers/924.pdf>], 23 April 2012.

²⁶ Ziya Öniş, Şuhnaz Yılmaz, “Between Europeanization and Euro-Asianism: Foreign Policy Activism in Turkey during the AKP Era”, *Turkish Studies*, Vol 10, No 1, March 2009, p. 13.

Contextual parameters and the re-nationalization of Turkish foreign policy

The AKP's retreat from its pro-EU approach is the first parameter, and the causes of this shift are debatable. Firstly, it can be argued that the AKP's Islamist interpretation of democracy required the elimination of Turkey's secular elites through the implementation of EU reforms, so European integration lost its momentum once the AKP had successfully diminished the role of the secular military and civilian elites in decision-making. Alternatively, it can be argued that the country's impressive economic performance emboldened the AKP with a greater sense of self-confidence, empowering its decision makers to formulate and pursue an independent foreign policy from the EU. The term "independent" has a significant meaning here regarding the course of Turkey-EU relations, since it is not only an expression of Turkey's disenchantment from the EU's adaptation pressures but also portrays EU membership as just "one subject among many" for Turkey's foreign policy.²⁷

The second parameter is the EU's stance on Cyprus issue. Even though Greek Cypriots overwhelmingly rejected the Annan Plan, this preference did not prevent the EU from granting a still divided Cyprus EU membership. Furthermore, after Cyprus' accession to the EU, Turkey was asked to sign and implement the Additional Protocol to Customs Union Agreement, which meant that Turkey had to recognize all new members of the EU and open its airports and harbors to Greek Cypriot ships and aircraft. Due to the pressure generated by the EU, Turkey signed the Additional Protocol in July 2005, but with the reservation, that signing would not imply that Turkey had granted diplomatic recognition to the Republic of Cyprus. In response, on November 29, 2006 the Commission recommended the suspension of accession talks on eight of the thirty-five chapters, over Ankara's refusal to implement the policy requirements of the Additional Protocol. The EU's failure to deal with the Cyprus issue has been interpreted by Turkey and Turkish Cypriots as evidence that the EU,

²⁷ Hasan Kanbolat, "Davutoğlu is not very interested or concerned by the EU process". Crisis Group interview, Ankara, 10 February 2010, cited in International Crisis Group, "Turkey and the Middle East: Ambitions and Constraints", *Europe Report*, No 203, 7 April 2010, p. 7.

despite their co-operative attitude towards the Annan Plan has punished them.²⁸

Until 2011, negotiations between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities proceeded, although this dialogue did not produce the expected outcomes for either party. Consequently, Turkish foreign policy deviated from its earlier constructive stance on the issue, moving towards a return to nationalization. The following excerpt from a speech by Turkish PM Tayyip Erdoğan is testament to the re-nationalization of Turkish foreign policy on the intractable Cyprus problem, and demonstrates Turkey's retreat from Europeanization;

During its [Greek Cypriot] presidency, we will never meet them. Relations with the EU will freeze. There will not be any relation between Turkey and the EU for six months...We don't care what the EU would think about it. The EU should have thought about it while accepting them [Greek Cypriots] into the EU.²⁹

The re-nationalization of Turkish foreign policy is not limited to the spontaneous and aggressive reactions of the foreign policy elites. Strained relations between Turkey and Cyprus escalated into a crisis in September 2011, when a U.S energy firm, Nobel Energy, was granted the right to exploratory drilling by the government of Cyprus for oil and gas in areas that it claims as its territorial waters, but which are considered as disputed areas by Turkey. In response, Turkey sent warships to the Aegean and increased its tone of criticism.³⁰ It is estimated that the Cyprus Presidency of the European Council, beginning in July 2012, may further hamper Turkey-EU relations and paralyze the Europeanization process in every policy domain.

²⁸ Öniş, "Recent Foreign Policy Attitudes...", p. 3.

²⁹ *Hürriyet Daily News* (Turkish Daily), "Turkish PM Slams EU, Threatens to Freeze Ties", Ankara, 19 July 2011, [<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=turkish-pm-slams-eu-threatens-to-freeze-ties-2011-07-19>], 22 April 2012.

³⁰ *Today's Zaman*, (Turkish Daily), "Turkish warships head towards Cyprus in oil exploration dispute", 21 September 2011, [http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=257526], 16 April 2012.

The EU's stance on Cyprus has also had repercussions for Turkish-Greek relations. While major problems concerning disputed islands and territorial waters remained untouched, the promising atmosphere of the post-Helsinki period is likely to deteriorate. Though Turkish-Greek rapprochement means the risk of an armed clash still remains unlikely, the two neighbors have not reached any breakthrough on major political issues. Greek PM Papandreou's complaints about alleged Turkish violations of Greek airspace³¹ can be considered as an early sign of this deterioration in relations.

The third parameter is the uncertainty generating by the accession talks. The rise of right-wing governments in several EU member states since 2004, and the unprecedented financial crisis that has had a devastating impact on the national economies of a number of EU countries have together increased the EU's reluctance to engage in further enlargement. Considering Turkey's membership bid in particular, objections that had previously been merely expressed in a discursive manner became concrete with the EU's suspension of talks on eight chapters of the Acquis in 2006.

France took the lead in opposing Turkish EU membership, particularly after Sarkozy's electoral victory in 2007. Subsequently, a significant number of conservative and right wing politicians, exploiting the fears of their electorates about illegal immigration, joined Sarkozy's reiterated opposition to Turkey's membership bid during election campaigns for the European Parliament in 2009. Since the end of 2004, these growing objections in the EU towards Turkey have created a corresponding growing discontent in Turkey that has stirred a nationalistic reaction. For example, according to the annual surveys issued by the German Marshall Fund (GMF), there has been an important change in Turkish people's views on the EU. The survey found that the proportion of Turkish citizens with a positive opinion of the EU fell drastically from 73 per cent in 2004 to 38 per cent in 2010.³² Recently, in conjunction with these

³¹ *Athens News Agency*, "PM details bilateral problems, prospects in high-profile address to Turkish diplomatic corps", Issue No 3689, 8 January 2011.

[<http://www.hri.org/news/greek/ana/2011/11-01-08.ana.html#03>], 26 April 2012.

³² German Marshall Fund, *Transatlantic Trends, Key findings*, 2004,

changes in public opinion, the ruling elite of AKP seemed to adopt a belligerent stance and rhetoric towards the EU,³³ creating inevitable repercussions in the foreign policy domain, which had previously been subject to Europeanization.

In addition, Turkey's retreat from Europeanization did not only result in Turkey's return to a muscular diplomacy concerning the aforementioned Cyprus and Greece issues, but it also hindered progress in the promising diplomatic moves between Ankara and Yerevan. The French Parliament's decision to make denial of the Armenian genocide a crime, increased anti-EU sentiment in Turkey more than ever, prompting further strengthening of an already existing widespread belief that French support for formally acknowledging the Armenian genocide "is another sign of the Christian Club mobilizing to keep a large Muslim country out".³⁴

On April 22, 2010, Armenian President Serz Sarkishian declared that Armenia would suspend discussion of the protocols, to establish diplomatic relations and to open the common border, in the National Assembly, and this change in Armenia's policy towards Turkey has been also reflected in Turkey's more negative handling of the issue since 2010. Armenia's decision to freeze the ratification process, intense diaspora activities in third countries to promote recognition of the Armenian genocide, in addition to the French parliamentary bill, have all impelled Turkish decision makers to reconsider their policies towards Armenia. This has resulted in a clear attitudinal and discursive retreat from Europeanization in the Turkish stance, such that a more nationalistic and hawkish posture on Armenian issue recently gained prominence when Prime Minister Erdoğan, in an interview with BBC on March 17, 2010 threatened to expel 100,000 supposedly illegal Armenian migrants from Turkey.³⁵

[http://trends.gmfus.org/doc/2004_turkish_key.pdf], p. 16, 22 April 2012, *Transatlantic Trends, Key findings*, 2010,

[http://trends.gmfus.org/doc/2010_English_Key.pdf], p. 6, 22 April 2012.

³³ Sami Kohen, "AB'ye Karşı Söylenmek", *Milliyet* (Turkish Daily), 9 December 2011.

³⁴ Chris Morris, "Turkey: Angry Man of Europe", 2 February 2001, [<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1150522.stm>], *BBC News*, 20 April 2012.

³⁵ *BBC News*, "Turkey Threatens to expel 100,000 Armenians", 17 March 2010, [<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8572934.stm>], 28 April 2012.

The fourth parameter arises from developments in the Middle East. The AKP's tenure in Turkish foreign policy has mostly been identified with Turkey's re-engagement in Middle Eastern affairs. Turkey's eagerness to speak on behalf of other Muslims vis-à-vis Israel and Ankara's activism in the region have created opportunities, not only for politicians motivated by neo-Ottomanist intentions, but also for Turkish businesspersons seeking profits.

Compared with the turbulent nature of Turkey-EU relations, the Middle East stands as a region where the economic benefits and opportunities for political influence are deceptively alluring for Turkey. As Öniş convincingly argues, especially after the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2008, "the West, especially the EU, turned out to be a less attractive destination in terms of purely economic benefits while the rising "East" or "South" appeared to be increasingly more attractive in terms of future trade and investment".³⁶ This does not mean that the Middle East or other regions will replace the economic benefits of European integration any time soon, but it is obvious that economic opportunities in the Middle East are gradually undermining the privileged position of the EU as the center of attraction in the minds of Turks.

Conclusion and future prospects

Following the EU's Helsinki Summit in 1999, there have been remarkable changes in Turkish foreign policy, which can be explained through the lens of Europeanization. The integration process has had profound affects in the foreign policy domain since it has facilitated the transformation of Turkey's foreign policy making structure from a military dominated to a civilianized one. In addition, this process has also led to some fluctuations in Turkey's foreign policy behaviors. Specifically, concerning relations with Cyprus, Greece and Armenia, Turkey's abandonment, after 1999, of its ingrained traditional mentality, which was followed by its return to a nationalistic stance in 2005, is clear evidence of such fluctuations.

The contextual parameters of Turkey's domestic and international environment have inevitably affected Turkey's handling of several

³⁶ Ziya Öniş, Multiple Faces of the New Turkish Foreign Policy: Underlying Dynamics and a Critique", *Insight Turkey*, Vol 13, No 1, 2011, p. 55.

problematic foreign policy issues. Despite the normalization process in Turkish-Greek relations, tensions, such as the conflict over airspace, delimitation of the territorial waters and the status of disputed islets, still remain unresolved. In other words, Turkish-Greek rapprochement is still far from producing a peaceful settlement of existing major problems.

Concerning the Cyprus issue, any further significant shift in Turkey's stance on the settlement of the dispute is not expected. Recently, the fifth meeting of the trilateral Cyprus Summit, which took place with the participation of UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon on January 23-24, 2012, only generated further pessimism about settlement of the dispute. Currently, Turkey is still threatening to freeze relations with the EU well into 2013 if Cyprus takes over the EU Presidency as scheduled.

Similarly, the current course of Turkish-Armenian relations is not promising. Even though President Abdullah Gül indicated that, "Turkish-Armenian Relations are neither suspended nor frozen",³⁷ the negative consequences of the French Genocide Bill have gradually become evident. By reviving the Armenian issue in Turkish society, French actions not only hampered the ongoing dialogue between Turkey and Armenia but also created a political crisis with France that is expected to undermine Turkey's enthusiasm for EU membership.

To date, the contextual parameters have influenced Turkish foreign policy in a manner that is likely to produce further negative outcomes. Despite this, however, Turkey's retreat from Europeanization, and its gradual move towards re-nationalization, should not be interpreted as a shift of axis because none of the three examples of re-nationalization discussed here are likely to lead to such a radical change. At the same time though, it is doubtful whether European integration will be able to effectively influence Turkish foreign policy for the near future at least.

³⁷ Hasan Cemal, "Gül: Artık her şeyin konuşulduğu bir ülkeyiz", *Milliyet Cadde*, (Turkish Daily), 22 January 2012.

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**INTEGRATION ET PREVENTION DES CONFLITS DANS L' ESPACE
OUEST-AFRICAIN : LA CEDEAO FACE A LA CRISE
SOCIOPOLITIQUE AU TOGO**

**INTEGRATION AND PREVENTION OF CONFLICTS IN THE
WESTERN AFRICAIN AREA. THE ECOWAS AND THE SOCIAL
POLITICAL CRISIS IN TOGO**

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Résumé

La CEDEAO, dans sa dynamique d'intégration, est passée d'une organisation à vocation économique à une sécurité collective de proximité. C'est ainsi qu'elle ne cesse de mettre en place des mécanismes juridico-politiques pour faire face aux problèmes sécuritaires de son espace géographique. Ces mécanismes lui permettent d'intervenir dans ses Etats membres confrontés à des conflits ou des crises. Son intervention dans la crise togolaise est diversement appréciée par les acteurs de la vie sociopolitique du pays. On note cependant une constante dans les discours : l'incapacité de cette institution à régler les problèmes politiques complexes en toute impartialité.

Mots-clés: Crise, CEDEAO, intégration, intervention, Togo

Abstract

The ECOWAS in its integration process has evolved from an organisation with economic mission to a local collective security. It is in this perspective that in order to solve the security issues in its geographical space, it continues to set and develop legal and political mechanisms. These mechanisms allow the institution to intervene in member states facing conflicts or crises. The intervention of ECOWAS in the crisis of Togo is valued differently by the stakeholders. We have to notice

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however a constant in the the socio-political speeches: the incapacity of the institution to resolve impartially the complex political issues.

Keywords: crisis, ECOWAS, integration, intervention, Togo

Introduction

Les dirigeants ouest-africains ont pris conscience, après les indépendances, que seul le regroupement de leurs micro-Etats en un espace politique plus élargi constitue la voie la plus indiquée pour un développement harmonieux et soutenu. C'est dans cette perspective que la Communauté Economique des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEDEAO) a été créée en 1975. Vouée au départ à une intégration économique, cette organisation s'est transformée, sous la pression des menaces sécuritaires, en une organisation chargée de trouver des solutions aux conflits armés et aux crises politiques.

Son intervention dans la crise togolaise s'explique donc par ce contexte sécuritaire dans la sous-région. On se rappelle que cette crise a connu, à un moment donné, un glissement xénophobe dont ont été ou risquaient d'être victimes les ressortissants de la sous-région immigrés au Togo¹. Cette intervention a structuré à des degrés divers les mentalités des Togolais et chacun en retient quelques images propres.

Cette étude s'inscrit dans la perspective d'une analyse critique des stratégies de la CEDEAO en matière de prévention et de résolution des crises en l'occurrence celle du Togo. Pour mener cette recherche, nous avons procédé à une analyse de contenu des écrits et documents pertinents relatifs à la crise togolaise et à l'intervention de la CEDEAO dans les crises africaines. Aussi avons-nous organisé des entretiens avec une trentaine de personnes ayant accès à l'espace public pour saisir les représentations qu'elles ont de cette intervention. Il s'agit des responsables politiques, des journalistes et des activistes des droits humains. Les données de ces entretiens ont été complétées par des interviews que certains leaders politiques ont accordé à des organes de presse.

¹ ONU, *Rapport de la Mission d'Etablissement des faits de chargée de faire la lumière sur les violences et les allégations de violations des droits de l'homme survenues au Togo avant, pendant et après l'élection présidentielle du 24 avril 2005*, 29 Août 2005, [http://www.letogolais.com/pdf/Rapport_UNU_Togo.pdf], 25.06.2011.

I. Position du problème et cadre théorique de référence

Dans le cadre des processus d'intégration, le Togo a signé et ratifié plusieurs traités et conventions internationaux dont le traité fondateur de la CEDEAO et d'autres documents juridico-politiques en découlant. Depuis 1969, le Togo, à travers une diplomatie offensive, s'est imposé dans le champ de résolution et de règlement de plusieurs crises politico-militaires interétatiques ou intra-étatiques².

Le Togo est lui-même confronté depuis 1990 à une crise sociopolitique à rebondissement. Cette crise a mobilisé des volontés tant nationales qu'internationales pour sa résolution dont la CEDEAO.

Face à la crise togolaise cette institution a entrepris des actions diplomatiques en dépêchant des missions d'information, d'observation électorale, et en nommant des représentants spéciaux et des médiateurs.

Quels sont les enjeux et les défis de cette intervention? Quels en sont les fondements juridico-politiques? Quelles sont les perceptions des Togolais vis-à-vis des initiatives de cette institution?

Nous analysons cette réalité sociale dans l'espace ouest-africain sous le prisme de la théorie néofonctionnaliste de l'intégration. La thèse est représentée par Ernst Haas. Pour ce dernier, l'intégration se définit comme un « *processus par lequel des acteurs politiques de nationalité différente sont amenés à transférer leurs allégeances, attentes, et activités politiques vers un centre nouveau dont les institutions ont, ou cherchent à avoir, compétence sur les États nationaux pré-existants* »³.

Ce théoricien voit dans l'intégration économique la première étape vers une intégration politique. Le néofonctionnalisme se fonde sur trois traits distinctifs à savoir: 1) l'intérêt libéral partagé par les acteurs; 2) l'intégration est conduite de manière technicienne par des élites politiques, administratives, syndicales ou industrielles convaincues de sa nécessité; 3) l'intégration est conduite fonction par fonction, de manière pragmatique et élargie plus tard, au gré des opportunités, à des domaines nouveaux par un

² Les crises du Biafra au Nigéria, du Libéria, de la Guinée-Bissau, du Tchad, de la République Démocratique du Congo, de la Sierra Léone, de la Côte d'Ivoire etc.

³ Haas, cité par Dario Battistella, *Théories des relations internationales*, Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2009, p. 409.

effet d'engrenage ou débordement (*spill-over effect*)⁴. A terme, ce débordement pourrait conduire à une intégration sectorielle, régionale ou globale⁵. L'émergence et l'évolution de la CEDEAO s'apparente, à ce schéma néofonctionnaliste.

En effet, dès 1975, les Etats ouest-africains ont décidé d'aller à l'intégration sous-régionale par voie économique. Mais, chemin faisant, ils vont se rendre compte que le développement économique ne peut se réaliser sans une réelle stabilité sous-régionale. L'intégration étant un processus dynamique, la CEDEAO a transcendé depuis les années 1980 sa mission économique en s'impliquant dans la prévention, la gestion et le règlement des crises et conflits. C'est ainsi que l'organisation sous régionale a procédé à la révision de son traité en 1993 et s'est dotée d'instruments juridico-politiques additionnels⁶. Ces instruments lui permettent d'influencer les développements politiques et sécuritaires de ses Etats membres⁷.

Son intervention dans la crise togolaise s'inscrit dans cette dynamique. Il est clair que cette crise a suscité des préoccupations régionales. Et la mobilisation de la communauté sous-régionale à son sujet sur la base d'une alliance autour des valeurs et normes communes mises en œuvre dans le cadre des institutions techniques communes appelées à y faire face au nom des Etats, s'inscrit dans les conclusions de la thèse néofonctionnaliste.

⁴ Jean-Jacques Roche, *Théories des relations internationales*, Paris, Montchrestien: Lextenso éditions, 2010.

⁵ Ernst Hass, *Beyond the Nation State*, Stanford: University Press, 1964.

⁶ Ces instruments sont entre autres le Protocole relatif au Mécanisme de prévention, de gestion, de règlement de conflits, de maintien de la paix et de la sécurité (1999), le Protocole sur la Démocratie et la Bonne gouvernance additionnel au Protocole relatif au Mécanisme de prévention, de gestion, de règlement des conflits, de maintien de la paix et de la sécurité (2001), la Convention sur les armes légères et de petits calibres, leur munition et autres matériels connexes (2006) et le Document Cadre de Prévention des Conflits (2008).

⁷ Gilles Olakounlé Yabi, *Rôle de la CEDEAO dans la Gestion des Crises Politiques et des conflits : Cas de la Guinée et de la Guinée Bissau*, Abuja : Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2010, p. 13.

II. La crise togolaise et sa dynamique régionale

II.1 Panorama de la crise togolaise

La vie politique du Togo depuis l'indépendance est émaillée de crises. La première crise post-indépendance est liée à l'assassinat le 13 janvier 1963 de Sylvanus Olympio, le premier président de la République. Ce coup de force militaire se justifierait par la gestion autocratique, clientéliste et clanique du pouvoir⁸. On devrait alors s'attendre que la mort de Sylvanus Olympio constitue une *felix culpa* pour l'émergence d'un Etat-nation viable et paisible. Cependant, on se rend compte que cet assassinat constitue un traumatisme historique qui « continue de peser sur la destinée du Togo »⁹.

En effet, le Gouvernement bicéphale mis en place après le putsch et dirigé par Nicolas Grunitzky (sudiste) et Antoine Méatchi (nordiste) n'a pas réussi à rétablir le « fil brisé ». Ce type de gouvernement répondrait à la nécessité de réconcilier le Nord et le Sud en vue d'un « vivre collectif togolais » plus assumé. Le constat est que les deux hommes se sont plutôt lancés dans une guerre de leadership et d'usure. Cette guéguerre a conduit à l'éviction le 14 décembre 1966 de Méatchi de son poste de vice-président par le biais d'une révision constitutionnelle. Le motif serait que ce dernier a soutenu activement une tentative de prise de pouvoir à travers la rue par les partisans d'Olympio. L'armée ayant maté ce soulèvement s'est vue dès lors confirmée dans son rôle de rempart des institutions de la République. Elle décida alors de gérer par elle-même le pouvoir¹⁰.

C'est ainsi qu'après la prise du pouvoir par les militaires en 1967, il a été institué un système de parti unique autour duquel devrait s'édifier la nation togolaise. Mais ce système de parti unique n'a pas tenu ses promesses. Le Togo donnait certes l'apparence d'un pays paisible et stable mais en réalité c'est un pays divisé au sein duquel couvaient des

⁸ Tètè Tete, *Démocratie à la togolaise*, Paris: L'Harmattan, 1998, p. 126.

⁹ Atsutsè Kokouvi Agbobli, *Sylvanus Olympio. Le Père de l'indépendance togolaise*, Lomé: Graines de Pensées, 2007, p. 24.

¹⁰ Roger Tamasse Danioué, *Le Général et le Diplomate. Essai de sociologie historique des relations extérieures du Togo sous Eyadema*, Ouagadougou: Presses Universitaires de Ouagadougou, 2010, p. 68.

frustrations et des ressentiments qui sont apparus au grand jour en octobre 1990.

La deuxième période référentielle de crise au Togo correspond donc au mouvement social de 1990. Face aux souffrances physiques, psychologiques, affectives et matérielles qu'engendrait le système monolithique, un soulèvement populaire s'est enclenché le 05 octobre 1990 dont l'objectif est la réouverture démocratique. Depuis lors, le Togo est plongé dans une crise sociopolitique à rebondissement caractérisée par des violences politiques. Retenons que, depuis le déclenchement de la crise, les protagonistes se sont inscrits dans *un agir stratégique à la hobbesienne* avec, en toile de fond, la conservation ou la conquête du pouvoir.

L'opposition se prévalant de sa position dominante des premières heures du processus de démocratisation a tenté de précipiter la mort politique du Président Eyadema et de son parti, le Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT). Elle n'a pas hésité, à travers les actes de la Conférence Nationale Souveraine¹¹, à dépouiller ce dernier de la presque totalité de ses pouvoirs et à les confier au Premier Ministre de la transition. De plus, un décret du 26 septembre mettait en position de non activité le Général d'armée Gnassingbé Eyadema. A cela s'ajoutent la très faible représentation du RPT dans les institutions de transition et la tentative de dissolution de ce parti.

Le président Eyadema et son parti, ayant frôlé la « descente aux enfers », ont développé une stratégie de survie politique, de reconquête du pouvoir et d'épuisement de l'adversaire politique. Cette stratégie est caractérisée par des répressions militaires, la manipulation des institutions étatiques, des élections frauduleuses et la signatures des accords politiques sans lendemain.¹²

En analysant la vie politique du Togo, on peut retenir un troisième grand moment dans le répertoire de la crise togolaise, celui lié à la mort du Président Eyadema et la tentative militaro-dynastique de prise de pouvoir de Faure Gnassingbé suivies des violences électorales.

¹¹ La Conférence nationale souveraine s'est tenue du 10 juillet au 28 août 1991.

¹² Tètè Tete, *Démocratie à la togolaise*, Paris: L'Harmattan, 1998; Roger Tamasse Danioué, *Le Général et le Diplomate. Essai de sociologie historique des relations extérieures du Togo sous Eyadema*, Ouagadougou : Presses Universitaires de Ouagadougou, 2010, p. 152; Amnesty Internationale, *Rapport 2002*, Editions francophones, 2002, pp. 402-403.

A l'annonce officielle de la disparition du Président de la République le 05 février 2005 et contre toute attente et en violation des dispositions constitutionnelles¹³, le Chef d'Etat-major de l'armée, le Général Zakari Nandja et certains officiers de l'armée togolaise confièrent le pouvoir à Faure Gnassingbé, l'un des fils du défunt président. Une nouvelle crise, caractérisée par des tensions sociales et des violences politiques s'ouvre. Suite aux pressions nationales et internationales, Faure Gnassingbé démissionna. L'élection présidentielle fut alors organisée le 24 avril 2005. Elle fut la plus meurtrière de l'histoire politique du Togo. Le bilan des violences lors de cette élection est très lourd¹⁴. C'est ainsi que le paysage politique se trouve durablement marqué par l'insécurité et la banalisation de la violence.

La crise togolaise dans son évolution a connu des dimensions régionales qui méritent d'être analysées.

II.2 Implications régionales de la crise togolaise

La crise qui secoue le Togo a de sérieuses répercussions sur les pays de la sous-région au plan économique, social voire politique. Sur le plan économique, le port de Lomé constitue un atout majeur au développement économique des pays enclavés comme le Burkina Faso, le Niger et le Mali. Ces pays sahéliens trouvent au Togo l'accès maritime le moins long et le moins onéreux¹⁵. Il convient de rappeler ici qu'au nom de l'intégration économique sous-régionale, le Togo a ouvert ses frontières à tous les Etats du sahel avec lesquels il développe une action baptisée « solidarité sur le sahel », dont ces pays tirent grandement profit. C'est donc, en toute

¹³ Selon l'article 65 de la Constitution Togolaise, l'intérim de la Présidence est assurée provisoirement par le président de l'Assemblée nationale en cas de vacance du pouvoir. L'élection du nouveau président de la République est organisée dans les 60 jours qui suivent la vacance du pouvoir.

¹⁴ Pour la Commission Nationale Spéciale d'Enquête Indépendante (CNSEI), le bilan est de 154 morts et 654 blessés. La Mission d'Etablissement des faits de l'ONU parle de 400 à 500 morts, 10 000 blessés et 30 000 réfugiés.

¹⁵ Maurice Mahounon, *La CEDEAO dans les crises et conflits ouest africains*, Cornell University, Sans papier, 2009, p. 35 ; Roger Tamasse Danioué, *Le Général et le Diplomate. Essai de sociologie historique des relations extérieures du Togo sous Eyadema*, Ouagadougou : Presses Universitaires de Ouagadougou, 2010, p. 160

logique, que l'instabilité politique au Togo provoque un manque à gagner pour l'économie de ces pays.

Par ailleurs, les coups d'Etat et les tentatives de coups d'Etat ainsi que la longue crise ont mis à rude épreuve les relations diplomatiques entre le Togo et ses voisins immédiats. Le Bénin a été accusé d'avoir hébergé les instigateurs des tentatives de coup d'Etat du 12 mai 1969 et du 10 août 1970. Il lui a été également reproché d'avoir accueilli les opposants au régime du Général Eyadema et de les avoir laissé former un gouvernement togolais en exil suite au hold-up électoral de 1993. Le Ghana a été, de son côté, indexé d'avoir servi de base d'attaque et des replis aux assaillants du 23 septembre 1986, du 25 mars 1993 et du 5 janvier 1994. Il faut rappeler que depuis 1958 le Togo et le Ghana ont servi tour à tour ou simultanément de lieu de refuge aux opposants des pouvoirs en place¹⁶.

Un des phénomènes majeurs de la crise togolaise est le flux massif des réfugiés vers les pays de la sous-région.¹⁷ L'accueil des réfugiés constitue généralement un défi pour le pays. Ainsi, même si les réfugiés togolais ont été bien accueillis au Ghana et au Bénin, en raison des liens culturels existant entre ces peuples, la cohabitation a mis à rude épreuve les relations fraternelles qui les liaient. La présence quasi permanente de ces réfugiés a fini par lasser les populations hôtes qui se trouvent obligées de supporter une surcharge démographique, facteur de déséquilibre économique et de tensions sociales. Des incidents ont souvent marqué les relations entre les réfugiés et leurs hôtes et ont parfois dégénéré en conflit¹⁸.

¹⁶ Roger Tamasse Danioué, *Le Général et le Diplomate. Essai de sociologie historique des relations extérieures du Togo sous Eyadema*, Ouagadougou : Presses Universitaires de Ouagadougou, 2010, p. 149.

¹⁷ Selon les rapports de la FIDH et de l'ONU relatifs aux événements de 2005, le nombre de réfugiés togolais est estimé entre 15 000 et 16 000 au Ghana et entre 22 000 et 25 000 au Bénin (FIDH, *TOGO Retour sur la crise togolaise: l'exigence de justice demeure*, Rapport N°433, novembre 2005; ONU, *Rapport de la Mission d'Etablissement des faits de chargée de faire la lumière sur les violences et les allégations de violations des droits de l'homme survenues au Togo avant, pendant et après l'élection présidentielle du 24 avril 2005*, 29 Août 2005, [http://www.letogolais.com/pdf/Rapport_ONU_Togo.pdf], 25 juin 2011.)

¹⁸ ONU, *Rapport de la Mission d'Etablissement des faits de chargée de faire la lumière sur les violences et les allégations de violations des droits de l'homme survenues au Togo avant, pendant et après l'élection présidentielle du 24 avril 2005*, 29 Août 2005, p. 39 [http://www.letogolais.com/pdf/Rapport_ONU_Togo.pdf], 25 juin 2011.

Une autre dimension de la crise togolaise qu'on ne doit pas occulter de l'analyse est celle liée aux velléités de xénophobie dans la ville de Lomé. Même si les Togolais sont reconnus pour leur hospitalité légendaire, il s'est avéré que celle-ci aurait été écornée pendant la période électorale de 2005 où des dérives xénophobes à l'endroit de certains ressortissants de l'Afrique de l'ouest ont été constatées. Ces comportements se justifieraient par le soutien qu'auraient apporté les gouvernements d'origine de ces victimes aux autorités togolaises ; en témoignent les propos d'un Nigérien, rapportés par Hofnung :

Les jeunes nous avaient prévenus qu'ils allaient nous tuer si Faure Gnassingbé l'emportait. Après la proclamation des résultats, 200 personnes ont assiégé notre domicile et jeté des pierres. Avec des voisins étrangers, nous nous sommes regroupés dans une maison, avant de tenter une sortie vers la gendarmerie la plus proche. Nous nous sommes mis à courir, mais un de nos frères s'est trompé de chemin, la foule l'a attrapé et achevé.¹⁹

La crise togolaise est, par ailleurs, caractérisé par le développement des réseaux illicites. On note une augmentation exponentielle des actes de banditisme et des trafics d'armes et de drogues vers le Togo mais aussi à partir du Togo vers les pays voisins. Le Togo constitue, de ce fait, un pôle d'insécurité dont les ramifications pourraient s'étendre à la sous-région. D'où la nécessité d'une prise en compte, au plan régional, de la crise.

III. Interventions de la CEDEAO dans la crise togolaise

III.1 Analyse de l'appareillage juridico-politique d'intervention de la CEDEAO

Après les indépendances, les Etats de l'espace ouest-africain sont « à la recherche d'un système de sécurité collective qui répondrait mieux à leurs

¹⁹ Thomas Hofnung, «Les étrangers boucs émissaires de la crise togolaise», in *Libération* du 30 avril 2005, [<http://www.liberation.fr/monde/0101527555-les-etrangeurs-boucs-emissaires-de-la-crise-togolaise>], 25 avril 2012.

réalités sociopolitiques et géostratégiques»²⁰. Après s'être rendus compte que la sécurité par la grande puissance²¹ n'arrivait pas à assurer la stabilité politique et le développement économique et social, les dirigeants ouest-africains ont opté pour une sécurité collective de proximité endossée à d'importants instruments juridico-politiques.

Dans la perspective de trouver des approches de solution aux crises sécuritaires dont fait l'objet la sous-région, Abidjan et Freetown ont accueilli, respectivement le 09 juin 1977 et le 29 mai 1981, deux grandes rencontres des chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement dont l'aboutissement fut la signature de l'ANAD (Accord de Non-agression et d'Assistance en matière de Défense) et le PAM (Protocole d'Assistance Mutuelle en matière de défense). La CEDEAO, tentait par les présents instruments, de réduire ou mieux d'anticiper les vellités conflictuelles entre ses Etats membres. Il est cependant à contater que ces deux instruments limitaient l'intervention de la CEDEAO à des menaces externes. Mais les conflits qui ont cours en Afrique de l'Ouest sont plutôt d'ordre interne. Le conflit libérien a révélé les insuffisances de ces instruments. La CEDEAO n'a pas réussi à définir les contours de ce conflit afin de lui apporter légalement son soutien²². C'est pour combler ce vide que le Protocole relatif au Mécanisme de prévention, de gestion, de règlement des conflits et maintien de la paix et de la sécurité a été initié et ratifié à Lomé en 1999. Mais les objectifs de sécurité et de paix ne peuvent être atteints que si les principes organisateurs de la vie démocratique sont prescrits et défendus collectivement. Les représentants de la CEDEAO vont réussir à faire le lien entre la stabilité transnationale et l'équilibre interne des Etats, lequel est souvent menacé par un déficit démocratique, une violation des droits humains et la non transparence des élections. Ils adoptèrent alors en 2001 le Protocole sur la Démocratie et la Bonne gouvernance.

²⁰ Kokou Folly Lolowou Hetcheli; Solenko Gnenda, « Sécurité collective dans l'espace ouest-africain: de l'intergouvernementalisme statocentré à l'interaction des forces politiques et sociales » in *Annales de l'Université de Lomé*, Tome XXX-2, 2010, p. 3.

²¹ La sécurité par la grande puissance fait référence à la sécurité des Etats africains basée sur les accords militaires que ces derniers ont signé avec leurs partenaires occidentaux et dont l'une des caractéristiques est l'installation des bases militaires dans certains Etats. Ce terme est employé pour la première fois par l'historien Owayé.

²² Maurice Mahounon, *La CEDEAO dans les crises et conflits ouest africains*, Cornell University, Sans papier, 2009, p. 35.

Aussi la démocratie ne peut-elle se construire efficacement sans une paix minimum. S'inscrivant dans une dynamique d'anticipation, le Document Cadre de Prévention des Conflits de la CEDEAO (DCPC), signé en 2008 à Ouagadougou va servir de cadre opérationnel à la prévention des conflits en mettant un accent tout particulier sur la consolidation de la paix. Dans la même logique et s'inscrivant dans un courant idéologique selon lequel la forclusion de la violence passe par un désarmement général, la CEDEAO adopta auparavant la Convention sur les armes légères et de petits calibres, leurs munitions et autres matériels connexes en 2006 à Abuja. Au regard de ce qui précède, on peut noter avec Yabi²³, une évolution de la culture de la sécurité dans l'espace communautaire ouest-africain. Ces textes juridico-politiques viennent ainsi élargir le champ d'action de la CEDEAO, comme pour s'inscrire dans la perspective néofonctionnaliste qui postule qu'« *une fois lancé, le processus d'intégration est élargi, au gré des opportunités, à des domaines nouveaux par un effet d'engrenage (spill-over effect)* »²⁴.

Retenons, pour le besoin de notre analyse, que la CEDEAO est amenée à intervenir et à se prononcer sur la qualité des processus électoraux dans un certain nombre de pays membres ainsi que sur les modes anticonstitutionnels d'accession au pouvoir à l'instar de la situation du Togo au lendemain du décès du président Gnassingbé Eyadema.

III.2 La CEDEAO et la crise togolaise

L'intervention de la CEDEAO dans la crise togolaise s'exprime aussi bien dans les textes normatifs de la communauté que dans la praxis. Cette intervention a été plus visible lors de la crise sociopolitique consécutive au décès du président Eyadema le 05 février 2005.

Après la mort du président suivie de la prise militaro-dynastique du pouvoir, plusieurs initiatives ont été entreprises par l'institution sous-régionale pour convaincre Faure Gnassingbé et les responsables militaires à respecter les dispositions constitutionnelles relatives à la vacance du pouvoir. Face aux réticences des nouvelles autorités à s'exécuter, la CEDEAO a mis en exécution sa menace de sanction le 19 février 2005. Les

²³ Gilles Olakounlé Yabi, *Rôle de la CEDEAO dans la Gestion des Crises Politiques et des conflits : Cas de la Guinée et de la Guinée Bissau*, Abuja : Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2010.

²⁴ Jean-Jacques Roche, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

dirigeants togolais sont alors interdits de voyager dans l'espace ouest-africain, un embargo sur les armes a été décrété, les ambassadeurs ouest-africains accrédités à Lomé ont été rappelés et le Togo est suspendu de la CEDEAO. L'Union Africaine (UA) et l'Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) lui ont emboîté le pas en suspendant le pays de leur organisation.

Ces sanctions de la CEDEAO et les pressions nationales et internationales ont contraint Faure Gnassingbé à opérer *un retrait stratégique*²⁵ du pouvoir le 25 février 2005. C'est ainsi que le vice-président de l'Assemblée nationale, Abass Bonfo devient de fait le président de la République par intérim, en lieu et place du président de l'Assemblée nationale, Fambaré Ouattara Natchaba.

Suite à ce respect partiel de la constitution, la CEDEAO a levé le 26 février 2005 ses sanctions. De plus, une délégation s'est rendue le 28 février 2005 pour rencontrer les différents acteurs de la vie sociopolitique du pays. Cette rencontre a abouti à un accord entre le gouvernement et l'opposition sur l'organisation de l'élection présidentielle. Il faut cependant admettre que c'est dans un climat de vive tension que les préparatifs du scrutin présidentiel ont commencé avec la caution implicite de la CEDEAO. Cette élection a été la plus meurtrière jamais connue au Togo (*supra*).

Pour décrier la vie sociopolitique, un dialogue inter-togolais a été initié. Il a débuté le 21 avril 2006 à Lomé. Mais ce dialogue étant rentré dans l'impasse quelques jours après, des contacts diplomatiques de la CEDEAO et de la communauté internationale ont abouti à la désignation de Blaise Compaoré, Président du Burkina Faso, comme médiateur. Ce dialogue s'est déroulé sous l'œil vigilant de la CEDEAO qui a exercé beaucoup de pressions sur les parties prenantes²⁶. Cette médiation de Compaoré a abouti le 20 août 2006 à un accord politique dit Accord Politique Global (APG).

L'évolution de la vie politique montre que l'APG n'a pas résolu la crise mais l'a plutôt gelée. Même si les élections législatives de 2007 et les présidentielles de 2010 se sont déroulées sans violences majeures, ce résultat ne saurait être mis exclusivement à l'actif de l'APG. Une étude

²⁵ Ce retrait est intervenu après qu'il ait eu les garanties qu'il sera le candidat du parti au pouvoir à l'élection présidentielle à venir, laquelle il a remportée dans des conditions démocratiquement peu enviables.

²⁶ Maurice Mahounon, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

menée par Adjarba révèle que s'il n'y a pas eu de manifestations violentes lors des législatives 2007, cela est dû au fait que les traumatismes des repressions de 2005 sont restés en cette période encore vivaces dans les esprits des potentiels contestataires²⁷.

Fort de ce constat, la CEDEAO a continué à accompagner le Togo après l'APG. C'est ainsi que conformément aux articles 15, 16 et 17 du protocole sur la Démocratie et la Bonne gouvernance, elle a déployé en 2007 et en 2010 des observateurs civils et militaires pour suivre les opérations préélectorales et électorales et se prononcer sur son déroulement.

Une étude effectuée par Amengonu en 2011 indique cependant que la présence des observateurs lors des élections au Togo ne saurait garantir sa crédibilité et sa fiabilité. Ceci s'expliquerait par l'insuffisance notoire des observateurs par rapport aux bureaux de vote et aussi le temps relativement court que ceux-ci passent sur le territoire. Il serait donc difficile dans telles conditions que des fraudes qui se font en amont et en aval soient décelées. Aussi les déclarations et rapports contradictoires des missions d'observations auxquels on assiste sont-ils la résultante le manque de coordination entre elles.²⁸

En somme, l'intervention de la CEDEAO dans la crise togolaise s'inscrit dans la démarche proactive de prévention de conflit violent et généralisé ainsi que son extension dans la sous-région. Mais cette intervention est diversement appréciée par les acteurs togolais.

IV. Perceptions de l'intervention de la CEDEAO dans la crise togolaise

Les opinions, attitudes et comportements des Togolais vis-à-vis de l'intervention de la CEDEAO sont connus ici sous le vocable de représentations sociales que Jean-Marie Séca définit comme un système de savoirs pratiques générés en partie dans des contextes d'interactions individuelles ou/et intergroupe²⁹. Elles sont, selon Jodelet, nos manières d'interpréter et de penser la réalité et qui émanent de toutes sortes

²⁷ Atchabana Adjarba, *Les facteurs explicatifs des élections sans violence au Togo : Cas des législatives d'octobre 2007*, Mémoire de maîtrise de sociologie politique, Lomé : Université de Lomé, 2009, p. 90.

²⁸ Kwamé Wolako Amengonu, *Les Missions d'observation électorale face à la problématique des élections contestées en Afrique: Cas du Togo*, Mémoire de Maîtrise de sociologie, Lomé: Université de Lomé, 2011.

²⁹ Séca, Jean-Marie, *Les représentations sociales*, Paris: Armand Colin, 2001, p. 11.

d'expériences et d'informations, reçues et transmises par l'éducation et la communication sociale.³⁰

Pour la clarté de l'analyse, retenons que la crise dont l'intervention de la CEDEAO a plus marqué les esprits et structuré les mentalités, est celle de 2005 (*supra*). Cette expérience avec la CEDEAO demeure encore vivace dans l'esprit des interviewés. On peut dès lors aisément comprendre que dans un contexte sociopolitique caractérisé par des tensions sociales et des violences de tout genre, les attentes des acteurs politiques et des populations vis-à-vis de la CEDEAO se situent à des altitudes diverses.

C'est ainsi qu'un leader d'opinion, tout en louant les efforts que déploie la CEDEAO dans les tentatives de résolution des crises dans la sous-région en la comparant aux autres organisations sous-régionales africaines, dénonce la nonchalance dont elle a fait preuve dans la résolution de la crise togolaise de 2005. Il s'est indigné en ces termes :

« Compte tenu des accointances entre bon nombre de chefs d'Etat ouest-africains avec le régime Eyadema et surtout de l'importance géostratégique du Togo dans la sous-région, il était pratiquement impossible d'imposer une alternance démocratique au Togo. Certains Chefs d'Etat ont plutôt souhaité la continuité du régime de Lomé pour des raisons économiques. »

L'analyse d'un politologue confirme les propos de cet enquêté :

« L'attitude de la CEDEAO dans la crise togolaise doit s'appréhender sous le prisme du réalisme politique. La CEDEAO a choisi l'option la moins risquée à l'époque, au regard du charisme et du poids politique du défunt Président qui ne cessent de hanter les esprits de nombre de chefs d'Etat, du soutien de hiérarchie militaire au parti au pouvoir, des incohérences des partis de l'opposition et des pressions occultes de certains pays occidentaux. »

Ce « choix stratégique » de la CEDEAO a, en revanche, trouvé un écho favorable auprès de la mouvance présidentielle.

Un membre très influent du parti au pouvoir laisse entendre :

³⁰ Denise Jodelet, « Représentations sociales: phénomènes, concepts et théories », in Serge Moscovici, (ed.) *Psychologie sociale*, Paris, PUF, 1984, p. 357.

« Je trouve les différentes interventions de la CEDEAO très crédibles et salutaires car elles nous ont permis de sauver le Togo de toutes les tentatives de déstabilisation et de trouver des solutions idoines aux crises institutionnelles et constitutionnelles. »

Un autre militant du même parti renchérit :

« Concernant l'action de la CEDEAO au Togo, il y a lieu de signaler que depuis 1990, elle a fourni des efforts louables dans l'assistance politique, même si quelques défis minent encore ses mécanismes. Il faut tout de même avoir à l'esprit que c'est grâce à elle que le Togo a pu échapper à l'impasse de 2005 après la mort du Général Eyadema. »

Toute proportion gardée, ces propos reflètent la tendance générale des militants et sympathisants du parti au pouvoir.

Contrairement à la mouvance présidentielle, les responsables et les militants des partis de l'opposition ont une autre lecture des actions de la CEDEAO.

Dans un mémorandum datant du 1^{er} août 2005, le deuxième vice-président de l'Union des Forces du Changement (UFC) fustigeait l'intervention de la CEDEAO en ces termes :

Notre défiance à l'égard de la CEDEAO et de ces institutions africaines est ancienne. Car, du vivant de Gnassingbé 1er, elles sont restées silencieuses, voire complices. [...] La médiation de la CEDEAO, après le décès de Gnassingbé s'est imposée aux Togolais. Elle fut l'instrument d'un complot contre notre peuple » (UFC, 2005: 1).

Pour le Président du Comité d'Action pour le Renouveau (CAR), la CEDEAO a fait preuve de partialité dans la crise togolaise. Dans une interview qu'il a accordée à la PANA le 1^{er} juillet 2005, il déclare ce qui suit :

« [...] la responsabilité de la CEDEAO est totale et très grande dans la situation au Togo. [...] La situation ne dépend pas uniquement des seuls responsables locaux qui essayent autant que possible de proposer des solutions de sortie de crise, mais les influences extérieures sont extrêmement déterminantes dans la crise que connaît le pays. »

Au-delà de ces allégations de responsables politiques qu'on peut considérer à tort ou à raison de politiciennes, il est cependant à reconnaître que « ce réalisme politique » de la CEDEAO dans la gestion de la crise de 2005 l'a davantage discréditée aux yeux de nombre d'enquêtés. L'analyse d'un candidat malheureux aux élections présidentielles depuis les années 1990 est ici convoquée :

« Le bilan de l'implication de la CEDEAO dans la crise togolaise de 2005 comporte un aspect positif qui s'explique par le fait d'avoir obtenu de Faure et de l'armée le retour à l'ordre constitutionnel. Mais les échecs enregistrés par l'institution dans ce dossier sont réels et l'empotent sur ses succès. »

Ces échecs seraient liés, selon un journaliste de Tribune d'Afrique, à la partialité avec laquelle le dossier togolais a été traité. Il se fait explicite :

« La CEDEAO a montré ses limites quant à la promotion réelle de la démocratie [...]. En tout état de cause, l'intervention de la CEDEAO dans la crise togolaise en 2005 n'a d'autre but que de rendre un hommage au feu Eyadema, en imposant son fils Faure Gnassingbé au pouvoir. Sinon comment comprendre le zèle peu ordinaire de Tandja qui dirigeait cette institution à soutenir par tous les moyens le nouveau pouvoir togolais dans son obstination à organiser l'élection présidentielle malgré les irrégularités constatées. »

Allant dans le même sens, un sociologue togolais postule :

« La mission de la CEDEAO a plutôt consisté à légitimer une succession monarchique au Togo. Toutes les actions entreprises par l'instance sous régionale relèvent plus de la mise en scène et du dilatoire que d'une volonté réelle de faire triompher la démocratie. »

Un agent de l'administration à la retraite fustige le rôle trouble que les responsables de la CEDEAO ont eu à jouer dans la crise de succession au Togo :

« Ces périodes de crise dans le pays de la sous-région sont des occasions pour ces dirigeants d'organisations internationales pour s'enrichir vu les

innombrables valises diplomatiques que les dignitaires du régime de Lomé ont dû faire sortir en guise de pots de vin pour s'assurer de leur soutien.»

Pour un directeur de publication, l'échec de la CEDEAO dans le dossier togolais serait d'autant plus évident que, conscient du caractère frauduleux de son élection, Faure aurait cherché à légitimer son pouvoir en « *recourant à des négociations avec son opposition pour aboutir à un accord politique dit global.* »

Au total, les perceptions des Togolais vis-à-vis de l'intervention de la CEDEAO sont diverses et contrastées. Mais il y a néanmoins une constante dans les discours: l'échec de l'institution à faire triompher les principes de la démocratie. Malgré ces critiques à l'endroit de la CEDEAO, tous les enquêtés sont unanimes à souhaiter l'implication de celle-ci dans les élections législatives prochaines. Cela signifie que l'affirmissement de l'intégration sous-régionale demeure une nécessité.

Conclusion

Toute œuvre d'intégration s'inscrit généralement dans une perspective iréniste. Les pères fondateurs de la CEDEAO ont compris que la sous-région ouest-africaine ne peut faire face à ses problèmes de développement économique et social que dans un cadre communautaire intégré. L'intégration étant un projet toujours en construction, la CEDEAO, en épousant les contours du «*spill-over effect*» de la théorie néofonctionnaliste, s'adapte progressivement aux exigences nouvelles de la vie communautaire. Cette adaptation se manifeste par la mise en place des mécanismes juridico-politiques de résolution et de gestion des conflits. C'est dans ce cadre qu'elle s'est investie dans la crise togolaise. En intervenant dans celle-ci, la CEDEAO a fait preuve de «*partialité positive*»³¹ qui lui a permis, à l'analyse, de géler la crise et non de la résoudre. La crise n'étant pas vidée de son contenu, on assiste aujourd'hui à des incivilités politiques qui fragilisent le processus d'affermissement de la démocratie.

Toute réflexion faite, la CEDEAO pour forcer l'adhésion des populations ouest-africaines doit dépasser sa stratégie de «*partialité*

³¹ La partialité positive se traduit, selon Alexandre Chouala (2005), par l'appui et/ou la protection des victoires fractionnaires.

positive » en adoptant des stratégies holistique et proactive d'édification de la paix.

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PEACEKEEPING AND (MIS)MANAGEMENT OF ETHNIC DISPUTES. THE CYPRUS CASE

Laura Maria Herța*

Abstract

The article explores the dynamics of the Cyprus conflict and aims at proving that the failure of resolution stems from the physical and mental segregation of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. The main purpose of this article is to identify the weaknesses of long term peacekeeping operations, using the example of UNFICYP, and to prove that in the case of Cyprus, monitoring the separation of military forces has also led to the preservation of ethnic division. We argue that, despite its efforts to reach a peaceful solution to the conflict, the United Nations, through the presence of UNFICYP and its subsidiary tasks, actually contributed to the preservation of internal borders.

Keywords: Cyprus, frozen conflicts, intercommunal dispute, peacekeeping, ethnic separation

Introduction

We chose to discuss the Cyprus case due to certain reasons: on the one hand, we are interested in showing how traditional peacekeeping may result in a stalemate in conflict resolution, thus proving flawed for deeply divided societies; on the other hand, it is our believe that Cyprus presents a most controversial case study: the Republic of Cyprus (represented by the Greek Cypriot community from the Mediterranean island) is a member of the European Union from 2004, even though it still has two foreign military bases (Akrotiri and Dhekelia, which are British sovereign territory¹), international peacekeeping troops along the “green line” are still present (ever since 1964), separating ethnically the capital city of Nicosia and physically the Greek Cypriots from the Turkish Cypriots, and even though one third of the island’s territory is still under the control of Turkish

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¹ Since 1960 when the Treaty of Establishment created the independent Republic of Cyprus.

military troops. In fact, since 1983, when the TRNC (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus) was unilaterally declared, two Cypriot entities have been coexisting. All of the above compel certain authors to assert that “at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Cyprus conflict remains one of the great puzzles in international conflict resolution.”²

Writing about the UN peacekeeping operation in Cyprus, James Stegenga was already anticipating in 1970 that UNFICYP (United Nations Force in Cyprus) may have been successful in “calming the tension and reducing the violence”, but the unintended consequence might prove to be reducing also “the sense of urgency about seeking solutions”. Therefore, “it can, in fact, be argued that UNFICYP, with all its admittedly salutary effects and humanitarian contributions, may actually have helped to accentuate and prolong the division, consolidate the unhappy stalemate, and inhibit the honourable and *lasting* settlement.”³

The aim of this article is to emphasize the shortcomings of the whole peace making process in Cyprus, by focusing mostly on the negative impact of the UN peacekeeping operation. We will argue that the peacekeeping efforts led to the preservation of ethnic separation between the two communities.

The “Cyprus dispute”: approaches and interpretations

The Cyprus case represented the object of scientific attraction for many analysts. The literature on the nature and dynamics of the Cyprus conflict is abundant. Certain authors are preoccupied with the conceptual issue of mediation of international conflicts, the ways in which the process of mediation may break down stereotypes or images that adversaries hold to each other, and therefore integrate the Cyprus dispute in their analyses and case studies.⁴ Others are exploring the dynamics of (non)communication in the cases of protracted ethno-nationalist conflicts. For instance, Harry Anastasiou has studied the process of communication

² Susanne Baier-Allen, “The Failure of Power-Sharing in Cyprus. Causes and Consequences”, in Ulrich Schneckener, Stefan Wolff (eds.), *Managing and Settling Ethnic Conflicts*, London: Hurst & Company, 2004, p. 77.

³ James A. Stegenga, “UN Peace-Keeping: The Cyprus Venture”, *Journal of Peace Research*, 7:1, Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, 1970, pp. 1-14.

⁴ See, *inter alia*, William R. Ayres, “Mediating International Conflicts: Is Image Change Necessary?”, *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 34, no. 3, 1997, pp. 431-438.

between the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot communities and his study “discloses that the interpretative mental frameworks by which the meaning of words, facts, events, behaviours, and phenomena have been perceived, recalled, understood, and transferred have become culturally and institutionally so configured over the years as to often [...] dismantle the very conditions by which intercommunal communication becomes possible.”⁵

Ronald J. Fisher assesses the results of mediation in the Cyprus case and argues that “the Cyprus conflict is an intractable, identity-based conflict”; the author emphasizes the failure of formal mediation and shows how an identity-based conflict escalated to an “adversarial impasse”. According to Fisher’s interpretation, the whole UN mediation process was based on a traditional framework of negotiation and mediation which proved completely inadequate to the Cyprus dispute: the solutions advanced by mediators centred on “positional bargaining” which “was based in a realist, power-coercive philosophy of interparty relations” and which “has dominated the interaction”, thus completely failing to address “the deep fears and basic needs of the parties.”⁶ Proving that the Cyprus conflict is an identity-based one, Fisher’s argumentation goes on by pinpointing that in such cases, “identities and related needs have been expressed, frustrated and threatened, leading to escalation and framework”. As far as Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots are concerned, evidence indicates that “the parties have become stuck in the first phase of adversarial framing and have not moved to the later phases of dialogue and reconciliation.”⁷

A thorough examination of the nature of the Conflict dispute and extended analysis on the whole international attempts at peacemaking may be found in Farid Mirbagheri’s seminal work.⁸ The author is explaining the failure to bring about a settlement by identifying the internal factors (the

⁵ Harry Anastasiou, “Communication across Conflict Lines: The Case of Ethnically Divided Cyprus”, *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 39, no. 5, September, 2002, pp. 581-596.

⁶ Ronald J. Fisher, “Cyprus: The Failure of Mediation and the Escalation of an Identity-Based Conflict to an Adversarial Impasse”, *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 38, no. 3, May, 2001, pp. 307-308 and 322.

⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 321.

⁸ Mirbagheri, *Cyprus and International Peacemaking*, London: Hurst and Company, 1998.

perpetual intercommunal mistrust), as well as external factors: The UN (due to lack of coordination between the Security Council and the General assembly, insufficient pressure exerted from key UN members, and the “divergence of goals between the United Nations and outside powers”) and the mother countries – Greece and Turkey, Great Britain in its capacity of former colonial authority, The USA and the Soviet Union as key actors during the Cold War period, all of them treated as the outside powers that hampered resolution in Cyprus.⁹

Maria Hadjipavlou is also interested in emphasizing the influential role that “both external and internal factors, both psychological and contextual” have played in the “creation and perpetuation of the conflict.”¹⁰ Trying to highlight the complexity of intractable conflicts, Hadjipavlou examines the beliefs about the root causes, as well as social attitudes or future solutions by conducting a survey in the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot communities. Thus, the sociological research is based on interviews and polls in both communities with the purpose of exploring the beliefs and perceptions about the causes of the Cyprus conflict: macro-level causes (historical, outside interventions, economic, and institutional factors) and micro-level ones (social-psychological, societal, structural, and contextual).¹¹

Other analysts or military historians are more preoccupied with the UN involvement in the Cyprus case study and emphasize the very issues we are preoccupied with: the vulnerabilities of the United Nations’ force in Cyprus with respect to settlement of the dispute on the long run and the contribution of the peacekeeping operation to the stalemate of negotiations.¹²

⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 156-161.

¹⁰ Maria Hadjipavlou, “The Cyprus Conflict: Root Causes and Implications for Peacebuilding”, *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 44, no. 3, May, 2007, p. 349.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, pp. 350-362.

¹² See David M. Last, “Peacekeeping Doctrine and Conflict Resolution Techniques”, *Armed Forces & Society*, vol. 22, no. 2, Winter, 1995, pp. 187-210 and Ronald P. Barston, “Problems in International Peace-Keeping: The Case of Cyprus”, *International Relations*, 3:928, Sage Publications, 1971, pp. 928-940.

The conflict in Cyprus: brief historical overview

Throughout its history, the small island in the Eastern Mediterranean was always pivotal attraction to outsiders, due to its “strategic location at the crossroads of Europe, Asia and Africa”¹³ and its *locus* of confrontation between East and West. The Greek culture from the island is stemming from the first period of colonization (namely the ancient Greeks). From the Mycenaean Greeks arriving on the island as merchants (13th century BC), throughout the period when Cyprus was included in the empire of Alexander the Great (4th century BC) and then up to the Ptolemaic period (325-30 BC), the island of Cyprus was a constant object of conquest for almost every ruling empire in the region. Afterwards, Cyprus became a province of the Roman Empire (30 BC- AD 330) up to the moment of the transfer of a great part of the Roman Empire to the Byzantium, so that in between 330-1191 Cyprus was under the control of the Orthodoxy. The history of the island is then marked by the conquest of Richard the Lionheart, who sold Cyprus to the Lusignans, but later also the Venetians held sway over the island until 1571, when it was taken over by the Ottoman Empire.¹⁴

Under the Ottoman rule, Cyprus experienced the introduction of “a new ethnic element to the mixed but mainly Greek populations – that of the Turks”¹⁵, so that by the end of the of the 18th century “the indigenous population of predominantly Greek Cypriots grew to include almost 20% Turkish Cypriots, descendants of soldiers, settlers, and others of Islamic, Turkish origin.”¹⁶ During the Ottoman period, the two communities lived more or less separately, since the *millet* system institutionalized the division of Ottoman subjects along religious lines. Therefore, the Orthodox Church of Cyprus had considerable control over the affairs of Greek Cypriots, but “any moves to gain greater independence or alignment with Greece were quashed.”¹⁷ According to certain authors, the Greek and the Turkish

¹³ Fisher, *op. cit.*, p. 309.

¹⁴ See more historical details in Katia Hadjimetriou, *Istoria Ciprului (History of Cyprus)*, București: Editura Meronia, 2004, pp. 60-178; Oliver P. Richmond, *Mediating in Cyprus: The Cypriot Communities and the United Nations*, Great Britain: Bookcraft Ltd., 1998, pp. 67-68.

¹⁵ Richmond, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

¹⁶ Fisher, *op. cit.*, p. 309.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, *loc. cit.*

communities from Cyprus lived peacefully and “despite the historical enmity of Greeks and Turks, often combining against the excesses of the Ottoman rule [...]”¹⁸ Since the hierarchy of millets in the Ottoman Empire was based on the placement of the Muslim millet on top and the submission of the others, the opportunity (or, better, yet, the incentive) to change millets was open in Cyprus, whether this was realized by religious conversion or social mobility; according to Costas Constantinou, the “transfer of loyalty from the Christian to the Muslim leaders” was not always achieved via religious conversion, since there was “a variety of other social tactics and legal statuses [...] employed to mitigate the effects of imperial policies and as a means of social mobility, e.g. practices such as *kepin* or contractual concubinage, or adoption of the dress and customs of the rulers, and so on.”¹⁹

In 1878 Cyprus came under British administration and in 1914 Great Britain annexed the island, a *fait accompli* which was formalized by the Treaty of Lausanne (1923); this meant that the sovereignty of Cyprus passed from Turkey to Britain.²⁰ Until 1960, when independence was granted to Cyprus, the population on the island was estimated at approximately 670,000 Greek Cypriots living mostly in the south and around 190,000 Turkish Cypriots located mainly in the north.²¹

The British period highly reflected the core of the *divide et impera* principle: the attitude of British authorities towards the Greek Cypriot community was hostile, due to the increasingly manifest desire to create a union with Greece. Thus, Greek Cypriot claims aimed at taking over public local positions or greater participation in the administration was regarded with suspicion, while Turkish Cypriots were overrepresented in local administration and within police forces. Basically, the British strategy focused on fuelling animosity between the two communities, favouring the minority group with the sole purpose of counterbalancing the claims of the other and of discouraging the tendencies towards emancipation and

¹⁸ Richmond, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

¹⁹ Costas M. Constantinou, “Aporias of Identity: Bicomunalism, Hybridity and the ‘Cyprus Problem’”, *Cooperation and Conflict*, Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association, vol. 42(3), 2007, p. 254.

²⁰ See Fisher, *op. cit.*, p. 309 and Hadjidemetriou, *op. cit.*, pp. 179-220.

²¹ Along the Greek and Turkish Cypriots lived a small number of Armenians, Latins and Maronites; see Fisher, *op. cit.*

democratization of the larger group, namely Greek Cypriots, who were more and more supportive of the idea of *enosis* (unification with Greece).²² According to Constantinou, the British rule “changed the identity card” as well, since the “colonial authorities sought to ‘modernize’ rather than abolish the millet system. They retained the religious divisions of the Ottoman administration, and progressively recharged them as ethnic divisions on the basis of which modern governmentality could be exercised.”²³ A local Legislative Council was established which echoed the separation of the two communities (by keeping two separate electoral rolls and the decision that 9 representatives were elected by “Greeks”/Christians and 3 by “Turks”/Muslims)²⁴; the British rule also kept the divided school system, comprising of separate schools for each community.²⁵ Even though social relations between the two groups “were generally harmonious and mutually beneficial” (though mixed marriages were hampered or discouraged by strong religious lines),²⁶ the period prior to the independence indicates acute separation between the two identity groups. According to Constantinou, the British rule fortified it, because “the colonial mentality propagated the perception of a deeply divided society comprising two antagonistic groups, a division running down to all minute aspects of public life and decision-making.”²⁷

Up to the moment of independence, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots “formed only a limited sense of being Cypriot, with a much stronger identity attached to their ethnic groups”²⁸; in fact, the period of British rule was not marked by joint efforts to create or construct a *Cypriot nation*, since the two communities were much more connected to the two outside supportive nations, Greece and Turkey. The argument of Constantinou is strong in this respect: “the British colonial policy institutionalized bicomunalism ... [while] homogeneity was used to support the bi-ethnic model of governance, and heterogeneity was

²² Hadjidemetriou, *op. cit.*, pp. 230-231.

²³ Constantinou, *op. cit.*, p. 256.

²⁴ *Ibidem*, pp. 256-257.

²⁵ Hadjidemetriou, *op. cit.*, pp. 237-240.

²⁶ Fisher, *op. cit.*, p. 309.

²⁷ Constantinou, *op. cit.*, p. 257.

²⁸ Fisher, *op. cit.*, p. 309.

employed to undermine nationalist claims and aspirations.”²⁹ It is the author’s belief that

British colonialism approached the whole question of ethno-religious hybridity and heterogeneity through a strategy that was on the whole ambivalent. On the one hand, it officially ignored the hybrid and in-between; on the other hand, when ethnic communities increasingly put forward nationalistic claims the British authorities responded by proposing that Cypriots were a highly heterogeneous group, a melange culture. Thus British policy on the matter was not monolithic but shifted according to historical circumstances.³⁰

The 1950’s are characterized by an active campaign for independence. The Greek Cypriots turned *enosis* from expressed nationalist aspiration into guerrilla warfare, whose main military actor was EOKA (*Ethniki Organosis Kypriou Agoniston/National Organization of Cypriot Fighters*). The Greek Cypriot campaign “alienated the Turkish Cypriots, who counterfought EOKA with their TMT (*Turkish Defense Organization*) and countered *enosis* with a call for partition into separate communities (*taksim*) each associated with its motherlands.”³¹ A ceasefire was finally brokered in 1958 and in 1959, following a conference organized by the prime-ministers of Greece and Turkey to discuss the independence of Cyprus, the British government together with the leaders of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities decided upon the organization of the future independent Cyprus. The 1960 Constitution “was a complex power-sharing arrangement”³² and was based on the “rigid terms of the London-Zürich agreements.”³³ Basically, the constitution, far from being “a symbol of unification”, led to subsequent impasses, because it legalized differences between the two communities, since “in all governmental departments, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots were not acknowledged as citizens of Cyprus, but as members of their respective communities and it was in this

²⁹ Constantinou, *op. cit.*, p. 259.

³⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 258.

³¹ Fisher, *op. cit.*, p. 310.

³² *Ibidem*, *loc. cit.*

³³ Hadjidemetriou, *op. cit.*, p. 262.

quality that they were granted political and constitutional rights.”³⁴ Clearly, the 1960 Constitution “was not constructed in a way that would instill a common Cypriot identity”³⁵ and was based on the Treaty of Guarantee, the Treaty of Alliance (among Great Britain, Greece and Turkey) and the Treaty of Establishment, which “provided for military intervention by Britain, Turkey or Greece to guarantee the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus.”³⁶ Therefore, Cyprus’s independence was dependent on outside powers and was instantiated in its internal bi-communal character. In fact, the two communities in Cyprus shaped and strengthened their respective *communal identities* even prior to independence and the power-sharing arrangement from 1960 (with its ratio system and power allocation of 7:3) incremented ethnic identities, but did not construct loyalties to a wider or more abstract state identity.

There is no surprise, then, that the Republic of Cyprus was functional only for three years, between 1960 and 1963, and even these years “were marked by an uneasy power-sharing between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities.”³⁷ The result was inter-communal strife and bloody encounters between members of the two groups which erupted in 1963, marking the constitutional breakdown and leading to displacement of hundreds of Greek Cypriots and the creation of Turkish Cypriots enclaves. The increasing level of violence led to the deployment of United Nations peacekeeping troops on the island (UNFICYP/the United Nations Force in Cyprus).

Oddly enough, as Oliver P. Richmond emphasized, the UN force was often overwhelmed in the period 1964 to 1974 in its actions among the mixed population and the image of impartiality was jeopardized by the perceptions and different views regarding its objectives. After the events of 1974, “the situation ironically eased somewhat, as the force was now simply to patrol the demarcation line between the two sides and concentrate on its humanitarian role.”³⁸ According to the author, “since the 1960’s, there has been much concern that UNFICYP, while fulfilling its

³⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 263.

³⁵ Baier-Allen, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

³⁶ Fisher, *op. cit.*, p. 310.

³⁷ Baier-Allen, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

³⁸ Richmond, *op. cit.*, p. xxiii.

mandate of preventing violence and providing suitable conditions for negotiations to take place, has also created a 'comfortable stalemate' and provided one or both parties with a lessened incentive to settle the problem."³⁹

The historical timeline included the subsequent events: in 1974, the military *junta* in Athens organized a *coup d'état* in Cyprus, followed by the immediate Turkish intervention (in July-August 1974) and invasion of northern Cyprus; in 1975 the Turkish Cypriot community declared itself as the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (after establishing a separate administration after the constitutional deadlock from 1963); in 1983, following a unilateral declaration of independence the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was proclaimed.⁴⁰

From 1955 to 2004, the Cyprus dispute was the focus of numerous mediation efforts:

- The Eden Plan (1955)
- The Zürich Accords (1959)
- The London Conference (1964)
- The Acheson Plan (1964)
- The Galo Plaza Report (1965)
- The Intercommunal Talks (1968-1971)
- The Intercommunal Talks (1972-1974)
- The Geneva Talks (1974)
- The Makarios-Denktash High-Level Agreement (1977)
- The Vienna Talks (1977)
- The American-British-Canadian Initiative (1978)
- The Kyprianou-Denktash High-Level Agreement (1979)
- The Intercommunal Talks (1979-1983)
- The Proximity Talks (1984-1986)
- The UN mediation (1988-1990)
- The Set of Ideas (1991-1992)
- The Confidence Building Measures (1993-1995)
- The UN mediation (1997)
- The UN Proximity Talks (1999-2000)

³⁹ *Ibidem*, p. xxiv.

⁴⁰ See details in Mirbagheri, *Cyprus and International Peacemaking*, pp. 87-150; Hadjidemetriou, *op. cit.*, pp. 266-278; Fisher, *op. cit.*, pp. 311-312; Richmond, *op. cit.*, pp. 77-81.

- The Annan Plan (2002-2004)⁴¹

All proposals were unable to achieve the conflict resolution: in part rejected, in part inconclusive, in part simply failed, the numerous attempts to solve the Cyprus dispute were in vain.

Traditional peacekeeping: core features and relevance for the Cyprus case

Any attempt to define *peacekeeping* is complicated by the fact there are several definitions of the term. According to Dennis C. Jett, “nowhere in the 111 articles of the Charter of the United Nations is the word used. It has been applied by journalists, diplomats, academics, and others to a wide variety of situations. Clearly, monitoring the separation of military forces in Cyprus is a very different task from nation-building in Namibia or trying to prevent ethnic cleansing in Bosnia.”⁴² For the purpose of this article, we will select certain definitions of peacekeeping operations and we will show that UNFICYP has become the paradigm of traditional peacekeeping. The latter is then used to underline the achievements of the UN peacekeeping operation in Cyprus, on the one hand, and to emphasize its shortcomings in bringing about a settlement to the conflict, on the other.

According to Roderick von Lipsey, traditional peacekeeping indicates the use of personal trained in the maintenance of law and order and

in its most narrow interpretation, *peacekeeping* is the use of neutral forces between, and with the consent of, previously warring parties for the maintenance of an existing cease-fire or cessation of hostilities. Peacekeeping, [...] is mitigative in nature, it provides a stable environment in which the resolution of conflict may be achieved. It may involve the interposition of neutral forces to maintain law and order. Preferably, contending forces have been disarmed or physically separated prior to the deployment of peacekeeping operation. Peace keeping activities are normally

⁴¹ See Fisher, *op. cit.*, pp. 311-312 and for a detailed account of all mediation efforts and reactions/attitudes of the two communities see Mirbagheri, *Cyprus and International Peacemaking*, pp. 87-161.

⁴² Dennis C. Jett, *Why Peacekeeping Fails*, New York: Palgrave, 1999, p. 13.

associated with those actions authorized under Chapter VI of the UN Charter.⁴³

According to the International Peace Academy, the chief role of peacekeeping operations is “the prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between or within states, through the medium of a peaceful third-party intervention organized and directed internationally, using a multinational force of soldiers, police, and civilians to restore and maintain peace.”⁴⁴ All of the aforementioned definitions try to capture the essentials of traditional peacekeeping, namely the main traits envisaged for the PKO’s (peacekeeping operations) during the Cold War period.

In 1992, Boutros Boutros-Ghali (Secretary-General of UN at the time), in his *Agenda for Peace*, defined peacekeeping in terms of “deployment of a UN presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all parties concerned, normally involving UN military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well.”⁴⁵

In the post-Cold War era the core aspects of peacekeeping were constantly redefined⁴⁶, since the intrastate new wars’ scenarios proved more complex than the traditional interposition of neutral third party whose task was to monitor an already achieved ceasefire.

For the purpose of this article we will only focus on traditional peacekeeping, especially since UNFICYP has become the archetype example for PKO’s. Because UNFICYP has been successful in de-escalating the dispute from violence to separation/segregation and since it retained the essentials of neutral third party authorized to maintain and safeguard the already agreed upon ceasefire, the UN force in Cyprus is considered emblematic for traditional peacekeeping.

Farid Mirbagheri argues that “in Cyprus UNFICYP [...] has suffered casualties and in 1974 proved unable to prevent a recurrence of fighting

⁴³ Roderick von Lipsey, *Breaking the Cycle*, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997, pp. 9, 15.

⁴⁴ *Apud* Jett, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

⁴⁵ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992 [http://www.jku.at/intlaw/content/e70367/e70433/e70452/e70455/files70456/AnAgendaforPeace_ger.htm], retrieved June 2012.

⁴⁶ See Paul Taylor, “The United Nations and International Order”, in Jon Baylis, Steve Smith (eds.), *The Globalization of World Politics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 347-350.

between the two sides. But by no means has that made it a failure. In fact UN troops in Cyprus are viewed as one of the best examples of traditional peacekeeping. By the same token peacemaking has so far, by and large, been unsuccessful in Cyprus as it has failed to bring about a settlement of the problem."⁴⁷ It is our understanding that peacekeeping and peacemaking should be complementary; in fact, in the case of Cyprus, *keeping the peace* proved to be successful as far as the essentials of PKO's are concerned, but it also un-deliberately weakened the efforts for *making the peace*, namely achieving conflict resolution.

UNFICYP and its role in Cyprus: from peacekeeping to preservation of ethnic separation

By the Security Council Resolution of 4th of March 1964, UNFICYP (United Nations Peace Keeping Mission) and a UN mediator were set up. UNFICYP was established with the consent of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus. Initially, UNFICYP stationed for three months, but later this was expanded to six month periods and renewed with the consent of the same Government of Cyprus.

According to the mandate of the mission⁴⁸, the main functions of UNFICYP, integrated within the incentives reclaiming preservation of international peace and security, were as follows:

- preventing a recurrence of fighting, that is maintaining the ceasefire;
- contributing to the maintenance and restoration of law and order as necessary;
- contributing to a return to normal conditions;
- humanitarian functions (such as measures taken for the relief and welfare of the refugees and assistance given to the enclave individuals in the occupied areas).⁴⁹

⁴⁷ Farid Mirbagheri, "Peacekeeping and Peacemaking: the example of Cyprus", *Contemporary Review*, no. 1680, April, 2006, p. 38.

⁴⁸ UNFICYP Mandate

[http://www.unficy.org/nqcontent.cfm?a_id=1577&tt=graphic&lang=11], retrieved June 2012. See also Barston, *op. cit.*, pp. 936-937.

⁴⁹ *Ibidem*.

After the hostilities of 1974, the Security Council adopted a series of resolutions expanding UNFICYP's mandate. The changes included "supervising the *de facto* ceasefire that came into effect on 16 August 1974, and maintaining a buffer zone between the lines of the Cyprus National Guard and of the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot forces."⁵⁰

The positive experience of UNFICYP was primarily determined by the fact that its pivotal deterrent and imposed role was its very presence. The instrument involved in keeping the situation under control was *the use of persuasion*, thus managing to prevent the killings and attacks that might have occurred.

This was corroborated to the other equally important message that the UNFICYP presence on the island conveyed to the warring parties, namely events could now be verified and supported by the personnel testimonies and later included in the official reports. Therefore, the emergence of distorted, biased versions of events, formulated by either of the two communities was highly unlikely, or at least this was the induced perception of this neutral 'third eye' or third party presence. In this context, the UN force represented a counterweight for potential extreme reactions generated by the mental borders separating the two identity groups. Our argument refers to the immediate task of UN intervention as far as possible re-escalation or recurrence of violence is concerned.

On the other hand, within the framework of peacemaking efforts, both Turkish- and Greek-Cypriots perceived the UN force presence as favouring the other party. In respect to the role of the UN throughout the Cyprus peacemaking efforts, we would like to stress the relevance of its actions and its potential to bring about a peaceful settlement to the Cyprus problem. As Farid Mirbagheri also emphasizes in his *Cyprus and International Peacemaking*, the good offices of the Secretary-General were employed to this goal and all the high level talks and agreements were conducted under UN auspices. Therefore, from an overall perspective we believe the UN did its best within the parameters set by the international community for a peaceful settlement and we attribute the lack of progress in peacemaking to the attitudes of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots and the elusive aspect of the settlement to the inter-communal mistrust.

⁵⁰ *Ibidem*.

We argue that, despite its efforts to reach a peaceful solution to the conflict, the United Nations, through the presence of UNFICYP and its subsidiary tasks, actually contributed to the preservation of internal borders.

According to Anastasiou, “observers of the Cyprus phenomenon have noted that while the separation of people by natural barriers [...] is understandable, the separation that occurs along artificial lines of hostility is horrifying” and therefore one could easily conclude that the borders are not just geographic, but they are sometimes the very enemies of communication and interaction.⁵¹ From a retrospective point of view, we may say that even though in an absolutely non-deliberate manner, the UNFICYP supported the ethnic division, when it carried out its assistance tasks to the enclave persons. Although unintentionally, it accommodated old mental borders by acknowledging the ethnic separation. The UNFICYP maintained the *status quo* which consisted of existing internal borderlines.

On the other hand, the United Nations provided the context and a permanent offer to stabilize the situation, but the solution, necessarily based on the political will, was expected to come from the disputants, namely from the authorities of the two communities. The UN provided the de-escalation instruments, as enhanced in its values and goals, but not the conflict resolution ones.

We also strongly support the idea that the stabilization, immediately achieved in Cyprus, in many respects froze the conflict, allowing disputants to lose devotion in the mediation process and to replace a positive attitude with one characterized by mistrust both towards the other party and the UN interference.

Therefore, The UN force was not perceived as a challenge to tear down the walls separating the communities. On the contrary, since it secured the pathways and checkpoints, the peacekeeping personnel were perceived as gate-keepers which also contributed to a stalemate in Cyprus.

According to Harry Anastasiou, “the so-called Green Line, which ethnically divides the capital city of Nicosia, is not so much in itself an obstacle to communication as it is a symbol of a communication problem that goes far deeper than the physical barriers of sandbags and barbed

⁵¹ Anastasiou, *op. cit.*, p. 582.

wire.”⁵² What we may identify here is a normative dilemma: in trying to safeguard and assist the internally displaced persons the UN force also helped strengthen the ethnic separation. As already stated, the purpose of this article was to identify the weaknesses of long term operations, using the example of UNFICYP, and to prove that in the case of Cyprus, monitoring the separation of military forces has also led to the preservation of ethnic division.

The flawed aspect of the peace-keeping force derives from these colliding issues: successfully *keeping the peace* but separating the two parties from each other and from the *making of peace* which means settling the problem on the long run. In other words, the initial attempts to stop the violence and stabilize the situation later evolved towards keeping peace on a divided island and re-contextualizing the old mental borders.

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A POLITICAL-JURIDICAL APPROACH TO THE POST-LISBON AGENDA IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

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Abstract

The effects of the Lisbon Treaty at the Central and East-European level have revealed a set of significant patterns, germane to the political and juridical changes that characterise the post-Lisbon agenda in this geographical area. Thus, each member state of the European Union from this ex-communist space has been able to play a role, for the first time in history, in the juridical modelling of the new institutional configuration at the Community level. This article presents some of the most prominent implications of this participation.

Keywords: Lisbon Treaty, ratification process, Central and Eastern Europe, institutional configuration

Our analysis regarding the importance of the Lisbon Treaty in East-Central Europe is based on various dimensions, including the historical, cultural, institutional and, most importantly, political-juridical areas. Nevertheless, it has to be stated from the very beginning that there are many more viable possibilities to approach this analysis of the Lisbon Treaty, such as the ones focusing on the perspective of EU citizens, the EU within the globalised world, the values it promotes, the concept of multilevel governance and so on.

As far as the historical dimension is concerned, it is without a doubt the area that has been the least widely exploited in the specialised literature, although there are certain prominent names having undergone

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research on this topic.¹ However, it is our view that the Treaty should be credited with the important accomplishment of bringing an end to transition in Central and Eastern Europe, a process that has been particularly long-lasting and extremely abundant in terms of institutional, political and juridical formulas. The fact that a large number of countries from the abovementioned area joined the European Union in two waves, namely 2004 and 2007, has enabled them to stand out as righteous actors on the stage of European affairs for the first time in their history, as decision makers directly involved in the creation of a much needed European Treaty.

Along with this achievement comes the completion of a historic process of European reunification, one that has brought us one step closer to witnessing the rebirth of *Europa Magna*, a dream which has been constantly cited and assumed during the history of the European continent. In fact, it is interesting to pinpoint a remarkable turn of events brought forth by the approval of the Treaty: while it undoubtedly aims to endow the EU with new momentum, so as to strengthen it by means of a reinforced integration endeavour, it also configures a number of intuitively shaped zones that uncover similar affinities and begin to act in a uniform manner, in order to gain more prominent decision making positions within the EU's institutional concert.

This so-called zoning may well question the fact that there has been a single major historical achievement in European construction to date, namely the Franco-German partnership, given that the southern flank of the EU has indeed become quite strong, as has the northern one, to which one may boldly add this *New Europe*. Its evolution sprang from a mere politico-journalistic formula utilised during the War in Iraq, only to become a regional identity which does not aim to raise additional obstacles within the European Union, although it has managed to find a plethora of elements that define it and have enabled it to take certain concrete positions in the thorny debate regarding the Treaty of Lisbon.

The entire historical debate on the Treaty is truly fascinating and it is certain that historians will exploit this spectacular accomplishment of the

¹ For example, in the French speciality literature, we have encountered important contributions by Armel Pécheul, Étienne de Poncins, Stefan Griller, Jacques Ziller, Jean-Claude Piris and Jean-Luc Sauron.

European Union, namely the peaceful reunification of the continent. Equally impressive is the new juridical perspective offered by EU 27, one that fosters much more than a debate on the need to take reform one step further, as it also comprises values, institutional performance and the conferral of new competences. Let it not be forgotten that this Treaty is the first fundamental one dating from decade number one of the new millennium, whereas the last ten years of the 20th century were characterised, from an institutional perspective, by no fewer than three Treaties: Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice, the latter being mostly oriented towards enlargement.²

The task of the scholar is quite difficult. Should he or she interpret the Treaty solely from a historical perspective? Present it from the point of view of the institutional and administrative reform? Or from that of restarting the engines of the EU (see the new competences assigned to institutions etc.)? What about the perspective of the EU in a globalised world? Should one follow the exact debate on the Treaty and its achievements or novelties, perhaps by outlining the role of Central and East-European countries? Should one shed light on what has happened after Lisbon in a Union that has been ever more obliged to react to the global agenda - an increasingly challenging one - and emphasize the contributions of Central and Eastern Europe to the management of this agenda? Or ought one to opt for a mix of ideas, meant to demonstrate that the Treaty represents a new beginning for the EU and that Central and Eastern Europe has been granted for the first time not simply the rights of some states that are being assisted on their way to integration, but the position of pieces of a juridical statement linked to the creation of new European policies?

Prior to actually exhibiting, in a less extended manner, the modelling of the debate and the course of action taken by the ratification process of the Treaty in Central and Eastern Europe, we would like to point out the fact that the abovementioned regional leadership has in fact succeeded in finding a powerful core, which is not something that has necessarily taken us by surprise. This nucleus encompasses firstly Poland

² See Martin Bond, Kim Feus, *The Treaty of Nice Explained*, Federal Trust for Education and Research, 2001.

and then the Czech Republic, Slovakia and, to a lesser extent, Hungary.³ This proves beyond a doubt that it is the Vişegrad group that has emerged as the champion of the painstaking transition process, while striving to come ever closer to embracing a European identity.

These countries have almost invariably opted for further emphasis on identity and wider sovereignty and have subsequently attempted to find a viable solution, by means of the Treaty, to their problems germane to national minorities. Hence, without explicitly altering the territorial *status quo*, they have turned to methods pertaining to institutional restructuring endeavours, by examining the reformist approach of the EU through the lens which are specific of that particular area. This is chiefly noticeable in issues concerning the debate on the number of Commissioners, the Common Foreign and Security Policy⁴, the Agencies or even the Charter of Fundamental Rights.⁵ In so doing, these nations have managed to bring to Brussels' attention (and to that of the European leadership in general) a true Central-European agenda, which overlaps with the general one of the EU in a significant number of areas, such as the matter of the Agencies, energy, free movement, neighbourhood policy etc.

Furthermore, the abovementioned countries have equally succeeded in determining earlier EU decision makers to abandon a potentially inconvenient debate on a multi-speed Europe. In return, they have suggested formulas that preserve the key role of smaller member states, as well as an integration pattern rejecting concentric circles.⁶

Once set in motion, the current European agenda has been credited with conducting substantial lobbying activities in order to foster the enlargement towards the West Balkans. Therefore, it has been capable of introducing a Neighbourhood Policy into the Lisbon Treaty.⁷ Moreover, East-Europeans have once more proven to be quite industrious with regard

³ Armel Pécheul, *Le Traité de Lisbonne - La Constitution malgré nous?*, Paris: Éditions Cujas, 2008, pp. 101-102.

⁴ Christophe Degryse, *Dictionnaire de l'Union européenne*, 3^e édition, Bruxelles: Édition De Boeck, 2007, pp. 84-85.

⁵ Mads Andenas; Anthony Usher John, *The Treaty of Nice and Beyond: Enlargement and Constitutional Reform*, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003, p. 399.

⁶ Jean-Luc Sauron, *Comprendre le Traité de Lisbonne*, Paris: Gualino éditeur, 2008, p. 45.

⁷ *Foreign Policy Aspects of the Lisbon Treaty*, Great Britain Parliament: The House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, 2008, p. 49.

to the development of governance, by actively participating in many policy areas, concerning the environment, resources, energy, the regional dimension, cross-border cooperation and even enhanced management of human resources, so as to effectively take part in decision-making at the highest possible level.

The most significant aspect, in our view, is the furtherance of the process of modernisation and Europeanization in the area that interests us, one that every now and again shows signs of worrying fatigue (as in the case of Romania, where one may notice problems concerning the pace, consistence and even politico-institutional will). It is certain that citizens wish to be made part of this process, along with various other actors, so as to endow it with more *Europe* (an allusion to the former slogan of a Spanish European Council, under Prime-Minister Aznar)⁸ and to lead to a fundamental change of paradigm from the perspective of networking, workgroups, cross-border cooperation and partnerships, firstly on an area level and then, why not, in the implementation of the very generous concept of *European Studies across Borders*.

As a constant element, we may notice the concrete involvement of each and every one of the states from Central and Eastern Europe in the responsible juridical debate on the Treaty, one that has engendered a bounty of ideas, whether they dealt with reform, multi-level governance, intergovernmentalism or the relation between national and supranational. This involvement has effectively contributed to the modelling of New Europe, one that has spread its branches within the European Union, in its quest for a new beginning from a global perspective.

On the other hand, the ties among the member states from Central and Eastern Europe remain somewhat weak, as each of them has so far attempted - and in some cases succeeded - to position itself as conspicuously as possible in the relationship with the institutions from Brussels, or within certain networking projects with Western Europe. It is therefore necessary to initiate a learning process by these states, aiming to foster teamwork, partnerships and even common positions, because, first and foremost, they are intertwined by a rich - and often intricate - cultural

⁸ *Aznar pushes for "more Europe" as Spain prepares to take the EU helm*, [<http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/aznar-pushes-for-more-europe-as-spain-prepares-to-take-the-eu-helm/43857.aspx>], date consulted: 13.12.2001.

and historical inheritance. And this can only be managed by the common assumption of the problems that arise, an act that ultimately builds mutual confidence (take for example the joint Government meetings between Bucharest and Budapest or high level contacts between leaders from the two countries). Henceforth, Central and East-European states should exhibit more initiative in their attempt to reposition the EU with regard to the West Balkans, the Republic of Moldova, the Caucasus or, better yet, the ex-Soviet space, by flexibly managing this concept of neighbourhood policy, whose first fundamental inclusion within a Treaty came along with Lisbon.

The question that arises now is 'why the Lisbon Treaty?'

Despite severe criticism and rather pessimistic views, it is a fact that the new Treaty has managed to keep the most important provisions of the Constitutional one.⁹ Thus, it not only reaffirms the values on which the Union is built, but also endows it with more effective response mechanisms, enabling it to address the current global challenges. For instance, we could refer to climate change, energy security, international terrorism, cross-border organised crime, immigration and enlargement. With this in mind, it is safe to say that the Reform Treaty, also referred to as the Lisbon Treaty, has overcome the standstill caused by the failure to ratify the so-called Constitution for Europe.

Nevertheless, there are still a significant number of dossiers that remain unsolved and fester amid the omnipresent Euroscepticism, which refer, for example, to the future of the Union in light of the lack of a powerful voice representing it on an international scale - an area that imposes juridical changes within the European Union's internal framework. Other issues include the need to further democratise this institutional system of the Union, one that has constantly been marred by accusations claiming the existence of a democratic deficit.¹⁰ This means that the institutional mechanisms are too intricate and seem too remote in the eyes of the citizens, often too detached from their daily concerns, too favourable of the executive side to the detriment of the legislative one and too ignorant towards local and regional communities, trade unions and

⁹ Sebastian Kurpas, *The Treaty of Lisbon – How much Constitution is left?* in CEPS Policy Brief, no. 147, December 2007.

¹⁰ Cristophe Degryse, *op. cit.*, pp. 252-253.

associations. At least, these ideas are so often encountered in the testimonies of European citizens and scholars, who claim that the EU suffers from more than just a democratic deficit, as its problems spread to the area of communication as well. This is partly due to the fact that the EU relies on two types of legitimacy: one that is awarded by the member states and another that emanates directly from its citizens.

Therefore, the need for a new Treaty was further emphasised by the existence of an artificial wall separating the EU's political stage from the national one, whose results can be traced back to communication failures between decisions taken at the Union's level and those pertaining to the national political spectrum. Another reason advocating for the need to elaborate a new Treaty resided in the shortage of coherence and clarity in the EU's governance process. Confusions were consequently noticeable in the case of the separation of competences, as well as the difficulty in regrouping member states around solid common objectives and, respectively, citizens around European institutions. Further challenges referred to the potential reshaping of EU policies by integrating new members into it, the development of a Union sharing a global vision, the need to overcome institutional setbacks, the redefinition of European values, rights and identities - in other words, a set of concrete measures were required so as to ready the Union for a new beginning and provide it with more impetus, in order for it to tackle problems on a global scale.

In conclusion, it is the merit of Central and East-European countries to have spotted, felt and seized this historic moment. By not missing it, they have now integrated into the global architecture of a process aiming to reinterpret European realities in a more pragmatic, effective and powerful manner. It is thus of interest to present, as a future research endeavour, by means of brief case studies, the way that every state from this area has tailored its participation in this new process, one that provides the Union with the chance to start over, while restating European values on a global scale.

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PATTERNS OF MIGRATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHERN DANUBE MICRO-REGION*

Gabriel Troc**

Abstract

Being theoretically located within the debate regarding the positive or negative consequences of the migrant's remittances for local development, the paper is the result of field research in the rural area of Southern Danube Micro-region, from Teleorman County, Romania. The main contribution of the paper resides in challenging the general assumption that transnational migration from rural Eastern Europe is always caused by underdevelopment, and in proving instead that the local process of development itself, in its particular post-socialist-cum-neoliberal form, may determine and enhance migration. As the argument goes, the paper gives an assessment of the extent and the general causes of transnational migration from this region to Spain, and reveals the formation of different patterns of migration along the generational, confessional and ethnic lines. The statements of the paper are illustrated ethnographically with instances from the village with the highest rate of migration. Among the important findings of the research are that the emergence of entrepreneurial behavior, as result of migration, tends to be linked with the minority group of the Adventists, and that the mass migration of the Ursari Roma has resulted in a geographical and a social repositioning of this ethnic group within the villages.

Keywords: post-socialism; transnational migration; rural development; minority group entrepreneurship; Roma migration

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Introduction

The studies on post-1990 for-work migration from Eastern Europe countries generally assume that the obvious and the main cause for migration has been the lack of economic development of these countries. Shortly put, people migrate because of the shortage of jobs, because of the lack of a good business environment, the lack of clear legal regulation, of capital and of major investments. This certainly was the case in the first decade after the collapse of socialism, a period of huge economic turmoil, when so many eastern Europeans were deprived of work and used migration as the sole strategy for coping in the new situation. The assumption of the economic underdevelopment was common both to the actor-centered and the system-centered analyses, and represented an important (explicit or hidden) feature of the frames of reference of these studies. The main theoretical argument of this paper is that this assumption cannot be taken for granted in the research accounts of transnational migration in the second decade after 1990. Even more, the data that I present here suggests that migration, as a social relevant phenomena, is not specific any longer only for areas with poor economies, but for economically developed areas also, and precisely because of the specific form the economic development has taken there¹.

While my case study is based on a Romanian case, I should add that the common local view (both in the academia and outside of it) is that if some urban areas are economically dynamic, being successful in “the transition to the market economy”, with a correspondent elevation of the living standards of their inhabitants, the rural Romania remains instead largely underdeveloped, with poor agriculture and industry, due mainly to land property fragmentation and the absence of important investments (S. Potot: 2008; A. M. Oteanu: 2007; D. Diminescu: 1999)². While this may be

¹ The focus of the paper is on economic development (which is indicated by the economic growth), not on a more comprehensive concept of development, which I understand, following Seers (1979) through criteria as: the capacity to buy/command access to necessities as food and healthcare; continuous access to employment; relatively equal income distribution; adequate educational levels and active participation in politics. My argument goes precisely in the direction of contesting the assumption that the economic development within an area conduces necessarily to a comprehensive development of that area.

² Because of this shared “commonsensical” view the explanations for rural migration (which is prevalent in Romania) based on “economic backwardness” came naturally. Accordingly,

indeed the case in some regions, others, as I will document in the followings, have been the scenes of intense economic development, but one that has remained largely hidden, mainly because the standards of living have not grown accordingly.

The paper is theoretically located also within the debate upon the positive or negative implications of the migrant's remittances for local development. I found the discussion to be best illustrated by Charles B. Keely; Bao Nga Tran (1989), who, based on a cross-countries quantitative analysis of the use of remittances (using the IMF data base on balance of payments), tilted the conclusion of this discussion on the positive view, which claims that "remittances represents an effective response to market forces, providing a transition to an otherwise unsustainable development. They improve income distribution and quality of life beyond what other available development approaches could deliver"³. The negative view, which they refute, claims that remittances increase dependency, contribute to economic and political instability and development distortion, and lead to economic decline that overshadows a temporary advantage for a fortunate few. With the case study that I present here I try to see if a qualitative, in-depth, research confirms or challenges their conclusion.

The third theoretical contribution of this paper aim at clarifying, through an ethnographically documented analysis of the case, the patterns of migration that resulted from the specific social and economical transformations of the researched area in the last two decades. In addition, the paper points at how variables as religion and ethnicity influence migration, what are the main causes for migration, and which are the consequences of migration for the future course of life of the investigated communities.

The case study presented here gives account of the phenomenon of transnational migration from a limited rural area of southern Romania, comprising eight villages located along the Danube River between the cities

on a supposed economically deserted land, the remittances sent by the migrants were seen as the most important resource for economic development, and the successful migrant turned into entrepreneur as its main actor. See as an example of this sort of analysis Ana Maria Oteanu, "International circulatory migration as a local developing factor: The Romanian example", *Anthropological Notebooks*, 13 (1)/2007.

³ Charles B. Keely; Bao Nga Tran, "Remittances From Labor Migration: Evaluations, Performance and Implications", *International Migration Review*, XXIII (3)/1989, pp. 500-525.

Turnu-Măgurele and Zimnicea, and integrated in the “Southern Danube Micro-region”⁴. Among the reasons for choosing this area the following were the most important: the region (but also Teleorman County as a whole) has been poorly investigated ethnographically with respect to migration⁵. Secondly, the villages share a common set of features, in regard with culture, economic activities, history and social composition. Thirdly, people themselves express the commonality of these villages, while they recently have integrated their communities within the above-mentioned larger unit (the Southern Danube Micro-region), with the purpose of a cohesive development through accessing different funds, with a focus on EU funds. Lastly, the newly erected large houses that can be seen in some of these villages, and which are in deep contrast with the old housing types dominant in the area, suggests a brisk process of local development, and make one wonder about its causes and its financial resources.

Methodologically the research is mostly qualitative, ethnographically oriented, and is based on short visits in the area during the summers of 2009 and 2010 and on six-week intensive fieldwork carried in June and July 2011. The documentation at the level of region was covered through informal and semi-structured interviews with local officials, as well as through archival research in the town halls, while the intensive work on the migrant population and on the local social and economical environment was done in the village of Seaca, which is the most representative with respect to migration, where over 40 semi-structured and in-depth interviews were taken. The study assumes the limitations of researching migration only at the departure point, interviewing migrants who happened to be in the villages at the time of the research.

⁴ The Micro-region was settled in 2006 as a free association of 8 villages with the declared aim of taking advantage of the finances provided through the Axis 4 of EU Rural Development Policy for 2007-2013, LEADER (local development in rural areas). See [<http://www.dunareadesud.ro>], 03.17.2012.

⁵ See Monica Serban; Vlad Grigoras (2001), *Migrația circulatorie externă pentru muncă - un răspuns la problemele sociale ale României în tranziție?*, available online at: [<http://www.iccv.ro/oldiccv/romana/studii/teme/2001/perceptii/6.pdf>], 03.15. 2012. Also, Dumitru Sandu, "Migrația circulatorie ca strategie de viață", in *Sociologie Românească*, 2/2000 and Monica Serban, in "Le <Dogènes> de Dobrotești a l'étranger. Étude sur la circulation migratoire en Espagne", in D. Diminescu (ed.), *Visibles mais peu nombreux*, EMSH, 2003.

In order to make clear the focus of the research, as well as the research questions that are answered in the article, I will start with an historical and social overview of the area, an account of the local demography and social mobility and a presentation of the available data regarding migration.

General overview of migration from Southern Danube Micro-region

International migration from rural areas of Southern Romania, and especially from the counties along the river Danube, is more recent than from any other region of Romania. As Dumitru Sandu had shown, the counties from extreme Southern Romania were still counted in 2002 under the head of "low intensity migration", with a rate of migration below 10%⁶. The migration started to become relevant only after 2002, the year when Romanians were allowed to travel without a visa within the Schengen space, and grew steadily up to 2008. Still, up to the present, the rate of international migration from this area has remained far behind other regions from Romania and, with the exception of some specific communities and groups, which make the object of this paper, has not reach the level of a mass phenomenon.

The villages situated in the Danube valley make no exception. The "pioneers" of migration started here to go abroad in 1997, mostly in Italy and Spain, and larger groups followed them only after 2000.

The population structure of these villages, as well as the geographical position, and its socialist past, may partially explain the low migration rate. Their profiles fit well in the scheme of "sedentary" villages, as it comes out from Sandu's model of migration from rural Romania: the communities with low incidence of migration are the communities with low stock of human capital, low rate of youth unemployment, lower ethnic

⁶ Dumitru Sandu, "Circulația migratorie în străinătate pe tipuri culturale de sate", personal communication at Goethe Institute, Bucharest, March, 2004. For a longer-run perspective see Ionel Muntele, "Migrations internationales dans la Roumanie moderne et contemporaine", in Dana Diminescu (ed.), *op. cit.*

heterogeneity and no location in regional points of intense communication.⁷ The story of these villages is mainly a story of an aging population due mainly to the opportunities available for the youngsters during the last three decades of socialism in both the capital city Bucharest, and in the industrialized cities from the near-by: Turnu-Magurele, Zimnicea, and Alexandria. Most of those who went to study in Bucharest settle down there. Also, many of the workers who used to commute to the nearby cities succeeded during time to move entirely in those townships. The villages have remained populated mostly by older people and by people with a lower human capital, who were employed in the local socialist farms. The fact is proven by the instance that today almost all of the positions that require a higher education - teachers, town halls' clerks, farms' specialists - are occupied by people who commute daily from the near-by towns.

A good example for the evolution of population in this area in the 20th century is the village of Viisoara. Taking as a starting point the year 1912, when the village was inhabited by 2605 people, we can observe that the population was recorded in the censuses as continuously growing until 1956 (1930: 3273; 1941: 3855; 1956: 4042⁸), and began to steadily decrease from the next decade till nowadays (1966: 3862; 1977: 3128; 1986: 2711; 1992: 2503; 2002: 2310⁹; 2011: 2200). We find the same figures for other villages, which tell the same story: the high productivity of the Danube's marshland (crops, fish, vineyards) was rewarding for the people in the pre-WWII market economy and determined an increase in population. The trend continued under the communist regime until the beginning of collectivization and the subsequent modernization of agriculture. There was still an important need for labor force during the process of draining the swamps of the Danube's valley that was done during the 60's, but after the land was transformed mostly in arable lots, cultivated intensively with newer technologies, this need decreased constantly. Important to notice, due to the draining, the new land remained in the property of the state after 1989, which, and in the context of land re-privatization, allowed for different political-mediated arrangements to be made (distribution of

⁷ Dumitru Sandu, "Emerging Transnational Migration from Romanian Villages", *Romanian Sociology*, 3-4/2000.

⁸ ***, "Localitățile Județului Teleorman 1741-2006", *Repere administrative*, 2006.

⁹ *Ibidem*.

parcels to political clients and concessions accorded to the newly-emerged local "barons") and determined the sort of agriculture that was implemented in the area. The need for labor force was temporarily revived in the middle of the 1980's when a plan for building a hydroelectric plant on Danube brought hundreds of workers in the vicinity of Seaca village, where a colony was raised on Danube's strand. However, while some of the locals worked there, most of the workers came from outside the area, and the whole project was abandoned after few years, without important changes for the area's population structure.

The age structure of the population of the village of Piatra gives an example about these aging villages and provides an insight on the segment of the population available for migration: in 2002, 14% were below 15 years old, 47% were in the group of 15-59 and 39% were above 60 years old. From all the town halls visited during the research I received the similar complaint about the imbalanced ratio between the births and deaths: "*we had 55 deaths last year and no birth*" (O.T. town hall secretary; Traian); "*there were 70 deaths and 11 births*" (town hall clerk; Viisoara), "*last year we recorded 50 deaths and 5-6 new born*" (C. L. mayor of Seaca).

How many migrants?

However small are the figures of migration from this region compared to other rural areas from Romania, migration became here also, in the last decade, a life strategy for some groups and individuals (and a relevant phenomenon at the European level, being known that Romania is at the present one of the most important sending country of migrant workers in EU¹⁰). Their number and other information regarding migration cannot be found through public sources, no institution being systematically involved in this assessment. The data can be collected only at the level of town halls, mainly by interpreting the electoral rolls (which provide the partial information of the inhabitants over 18 years old who were not in the village at the previous elections), and based on the knowledge of the clerks who keep up the agricultural books and who periodically update the

¹⁰ For an overview on Romanian migration see István Horváth, "Country Profile: Romania" in *Focus Migration*, no. 9/ September 2007, available online at [<http://www.focus-migration.de>], 03.25. 2012.

information regarding households. Coupled with information regarding children born abroad, and with data on children not enrolled in school, I put together (mainly through interviews with local specialist from each village) the following estimation of the people from the region who were abroad in 2011:

Township	Total population (2011)	Migrants
Seaca	2860	400
Piatra	3510	30
Viisoara	2200	10
Lisa	2420	400
Suhaia	2463	50
Traian	1970	160
Fîntînele	1986	100
Ciuperceni	1685	90

The estimation, reflecting the views of the locals that “migrant” is someone who is abroad for a long period of time, disregards a whole category of migrants, namely those who migrate for a short period of time (for 3-4 months), constantly departing and returning at least once a year, and whose counting, according to my assessment, would double the figures.

Who migrates?

What is easy to be observed from these figures is an important difference between the villages in regard with the number of people who practice long-term migration, which cannot be justified only as proportions from the total population of each village. From the interviews it comes out clearly that the main group who practice long-term migration is the group of Roma, followed by the group of Adventist. Indeed the data on ethnic and religious structure of these villages plainly confirm this information.

Township	Total population (2011)	Roma population	Adventists	Migrants (Estimation)
Seaca	2860	372	70	400
Piatra	3510	50(hetero-identification)	51	30
Viisoara	2200	--	3	10
Lisa	2420	307	32	400
Suhaia	2463	--	13	50
Traian	1970	130	89	160
Fîntînele	1986	60	24	100
Ciuperceni	1685	55	14	90

We can see from this table that the number of migrants is in direct correlation with the number of Roma and Adventists from each village, and that the smaller are these groups the less important is the figure of estimated migration¹¹.

Adding to these numbers the figures of the estimated Roma migration from each village we can observe that this group displaced itself almost entirely from the villages, and that they represents by far the most important group that practiced the long-time migration.

Township	Total population (2011)	Roma population	Roma migrants (Estimation)	Total migrants (Estimation)
Seaca	2860	372	320	400
Piatra	3510	50(hetero-identification)	--	30
Viisoara	2200	--	--	10

¹¹ The case of Piatra seems to make a break in this pattern. However, as will see in the followings, the Roma counted here don't belong to the group of people who auto-define themselves as Roma, and they have a different position within the area's social space.

Lisa	2420	307	300	400
Suhaia	2463	--	--	50
Traian	1970	130	130	160
Fîntînele	1986	60	45	100
Ciuperceni	1685	55	45	90

Summing up, we have three dominant groups that practice migration in this region: 1) the group of Roma, who migrates en masse, being at present almost entirely displaced from the home place; 2) the group of Romanian Adventists, who is more prone to practice migration than the majority Romanian population, and 3) the group of Romanian Orthodox inhabitants, whose practice of temporary work abroad is hardly considered as “real” migration by the local officials and the general population. This grouping outlines two main patterns of migration: a long-term regular migration, specific to the Roma and the Adventists, and a short-term incidental migration, specific to a part of the Romanian Orthodox inhabitants.

Starting from these established grounds I will try in the followings to give answers, mostly by qualitative data, to a number of key questions that emerged during the research. Namely: What differences exist between the groups in regard with migration behaviors and what are their causes? What are the reasons that determine the Roma to migrate en masse and why the Adventists are more prone to migrate than the other Romanians? What are the social and economic consequences of migration for these villages? What is the outcome of migration in respect with the development of the area? What contribution this case study could have to the more general discussion regarding the balance between positive or negative implication of migration for the development of a rural area?

I will develop the analysis starting with a condensed social and economic profile of each group (I); I will continue with an account of the economic changes of the area after 1990 as context for migration (II); I will present and explain afterwards the migration processes and the migration behavior of each group (III); I will deal further on with the causes of migration, as they reveal from the area's economic changes and the migration behaviors (IV); in the last section (V) I will make clear what are the consequences of migration for each group and for the area as a whole.

In the conclusions I will provide a refined view of the migration patterns, as they emerge from the analysis, and I will explain the specific of the development type the area is subjected to.

I. The groups involved in migration

I.1. The Roma

There are many different groups of Roma in the researched segment of the Danube's valley. The variation is higher in the two cities that border this segment (Zimnicea and Turnu-Măgurele), and lower in the rural area. In cities dwell communities from the groups of "Ciurari", "Costorari", "Lăieși" and „Ursari”, while in the villages the „Ursari” prevail. There are two other important groups, which are not classified as Roma or as “properly” Roma by the majority population, but considered in a similar way in different contexts, namely the “Rudari”, most of them living in a large community in Zimnicea, and “the Romanized Roma”, a larger category of people who are considered as with probable Roma roots, but who are at the present assimilated to the majority population, due to mix marriages, to their residence among Romanians, or to their adherence to the dominant life-style.

The most Roma people who live in the villages of Southern Danube Micro-region belong to the “Ursari” Roma group, and they are also the people who are counted as Roma based on their auto-identified ethnicity on public censuses. While “Romanized Roma” are also present in smaller proportion in all the villages, only in one village, Piatra, the officials identify them as being Roma (the criterion here being mostly their poverty and their unity of residence, which is not specific to this category in other villages).

What is specific to the “Ursari” Roma is a strong consciousness of their group identity, as well as their communitarian way of life.

“We are from the kinsman of Bear Trainers (“suntem viță de Ursari”) and we are scattered in this part of the Danube valley, in some of these villages and in Turnu [Măgurele]. We know everybody of our kind, but we have also relations with other groups, like the Costorari and the Ciurari” (G.M., male, 20, Seaca).

They share with other traditional Roma from Romania a strong sense of family, broad kinship relations, relative endogamy and a bold gender difference. Family relations are the first that come into discussion when they are asked to explain their difference: *“To the Ursari children never leave their parents...the youngest boy has to live with the parents and to take care of them...nobody ends up unmarried; in our group everyone gets a spouse and make children”* (C.C., male, 41, Seaca).

They speak a Romany language variant that is, with small dialectal differences, commonly shared – as they say - by the Romany speaking Roma from Southern Romania. Professionally, they recall themselves as being most of the time agricultural workers. Few of them were also smiths in the (still remembered) past, producing minor agricultural tools, while up to nowadays few of them are also musicians, playing in small bands at the rural feasts and weddings. Due to the limited range of the economic activities they could perform, their society was in the recent past rather equalitarian. The group has a relative autonomy that is certified by the independence of some central practices, like setting a marriage, or administrating justice. *“Few of us legalize our marriages... we never marry in church... (S.A., female, 18, Traian); we have a Gypsy assembly for setting our quarrels...”* (G.M., male, 20, Traian).

Even if they are strictly dependent to land and its cultivation, they represent also the only “proles”, being the sole group from these villages which does not possess land, and which, very likely, was all the time entirely dependent on the working needs in agriculture that were available in different historical moments. While a longer-time history of their group is hard to be traced through interviews, they recall vividly the socialist times, when most of the adult members of the community went to work seasonally to the socialist farms from Bărăgan: *“We worked all the time in agriculture; some worked in cooperatives, but most of our elders used to go to Bărăgan, from where they came with money, corn and grains for the whole year”* (C.C. male, 41, Seaca). If this form of engagement seemed to be profitable at the time, being employed on a daily-basis contract, they were excluded from some of the social benefits other agricultural workers get in the present, especially from the right to get a pension, or, also important, the right to get land during the re-privatization that took place in the first half of the '90's. *“We have hardly any land, most of us have only the land around the*

house... few got one or two acres for their work in the cooperative” (C.C. male, 41).

I.2. The Adventists

Representing the second-largest religious community in Teleorman after the Orthodox Christians¹², and having the higher number of members within a Romanian county¹³, the Adventists groups are also present in the Southern Danube Micro-region. They have churches in both of the bordering cities, Zimnicea and Turnu-Magurele, and in five of the region’s villages: in Seaca, Piatra, Lisa, Suhaia and Traian. Being more dynamic than the contrasting dominant but stagnant Orthodox church, the Adventist church succeeded to recruit more followers in the last two decades, both from the Romanian majority population and from the “Romanized Roma”. It is thus a growing community, but also a younger one, if compared to the general population, due to its higher demographic rate, and to the lower incidence of internal rural-urban migration, both during socialism and post-socialism. Like all the other neo-protestant communities, the Adventists were under a constant state officials’ harassment before 1990, which limited their mobility, and constrain most of the young and educated people to stay in the villages and, while they were not welcomed as employees in the state’s institutions, to position themselves mostly towards crafts. Also important is their strong communitarian way of life, with strong family ties and a conviction-based system of brotherhood/sisterhood that crosses over the kinship relations. In respect to land property, they have less land than the majority population, making plausible the supposition that, in the past, the relatively poor were those attracted to the church, especially because of the system of communitarian redistribution of the revenues resulted from the practice of tithing (the rule to donate to the church 10% of the family’s annual income).

¹² Cf. 2002 national census.

¹³ [www.adventist.ro], 04.02.2012.

I.3. The majority Romanian Orthodox

With an average of 1.5-3 hectares of land, the majority population can be defined as a group of landowners. They got back the land during the re-privatization process, according to the properties they (or their forefathers) had before collectivization, or to the amount they were entitled to get due to their former employment in the socialist farms¹⁴. The larger share of this land is represented by arable plots, situated at a longer distance from the village, in the Danube's valley or on the related uplands. A more reduced share is represented by a half to one hectare of vineyards or orchards, located closer to the village. A third share is represented by the small gardens, generally located in the house backyard or in the house proximity, which are cultivated with vegetables. Due to their former employment in the socialist farms and in the near-by factories or construction sites, most of the elderly people, but also some middle-aged persons, get pensions. The case of the village of Seaca can be a good example of the number of people in this situation. Therefore, in a village with 2,860 inhabitants there are around 1,400 retired people who get pensions. Among them, around 400 worked in agriculture, and get pensions that varied from 300 lei/70 euros to 500 lei/116 euros. Around 1,000 were employed in other sectors and get state pensions that varied between 400 lei/93 euros to 800 lei/186 euros. If we add to these 20 pensions based on medical conditions, 40 pensions for persons with disabilities and around 80 social aid allowances, we have the picture of a village where most likely in all the 1,087 households there is at least one financial income that comes monthly from the state or the local council, as a benefit for a past activity or as a help for a special situation in the present¹⁵.

The social life of the villages seems to be limited mostly to relations built around kinship and close vicinity. The "mind your own business" attitude is otherwise the rule. While the inhabitants are Orthodox Christians, the Orthodox community is not tight, and the religious life of the individuals is marked mostly by participation to rituals with the occasion of important feasts. The priest from Seaca complains that he "*hardly gathers fifty people for the Sunday service*", making responsible for this

¹⁴ According to the Romanian Law on Land Property no. 18/1991, articles 11; 19.1.

¹⁵ Information provided by Seaca's vice-mayor and the village's mailman.

attitude *“the legacy of the reds, who are still in power in this area”*, alluding to the dominance of the Social Democratic Party (PSD) in most of the elected seats of the county.

II. The economy of the region as context for migration

Like other former socialist countries Romania followed after 1990 the old dogma of developmentalism updated and reshaped by the neoliberal discourses and practices within the new paradigm of “globalization”. No longer seen as the main agent for economic development, the state becomes also less responsible for its citizens well being. The people's welfare should be viewed by now, according to the new ideology of globalization, as a by-product of a new social arrangement, which - through borderless exchanges among a unified mankind - was supposed to provide a common prosperity, democracy and civil society on a world scale (Don Kalb: 2004). “Globalization” - together with the End of History theme - has expressed in fact, up to beginning of the new millennium, the hopes for a newer capitalism, more productive than ever, finally tamed and put in the service of the people on a global scale. However, these expectations have not been achieved in many places, not even - as I will show in the followings - in the cases of those living in rapidly developing areas.

The economy of rural Teleorman followed during the '90's the common Romanian trend of returning to small-scale, subsistence agriculture, which represented a temporary solution both for the ex-socialist farms' employees and for the commuting workers, who were among the first to lose their jobs from the near-by factories (Horvath: 2012). While in some Romanian areas (especially from mountain regions) this re-organization of agriculture proves to be resilient up to nowadays, providing the stagnant economic context which determines massive transnational for-work migration, agriculture transformations in Teleorman (but also its economy in general) has followed a different path, and has produced a different migration dynamic. In short, all the economic ideas that were readily accepted in the '90's (and strengthened even more at the beginning of the 21st century), as the only way to make the economy viable (the need for privatization, free market, foreign and local capital investment etc.), were implemented here, so as that today in the near-by

cities some new factories, privately owned, were built, in the rural area competitive agriculture is made on large shares of land (again by privately owned companies) and jobs are created according to the production needs of these businesses. While the economy of the area seems to be indeed viable, one can hardly say that it also brings benefits for the most people. In fact, most of the locals get access to resources due to their former employment during socialism, due to the state's system of social assistance, due to the resources they get by working outside the area, or due to the subsistence agriculture they practice on the small lots around the house, *and not to the present economic activities of the enterprises from the area.*

Agriculture is by far the most important economic activity, being dominated by the large exploitations of a few big companies. Interagro SA, a company with a mixed Romanian-British capital, and owned by Ioan Nicolae, one of the most well-known post-socialists Eastern Europe "new capitalists", cultivates most of the state-owned land that was taken in concession. The lands are cultivated mostly with corn using high productivity technologies. The productivity the company has succeeded to reach (up to 800 kilos per hectare) has raised the standards to a level where few can compete. As a result, above the state-owned land, the company takes in lease and cultivates large parts of the inhabitant's own land. On this model, other companies were created, from large companies that operate at the level of the county (owned or managed by people with political connections), to smaller ones, which fight to take in lease the land properties of the people of two or three villages. On an even lower level there are also some local entrepreneurs who lease private owned land for more specialized crops. The results of this development is that almost all the inhabitants are constrained to give their land in lease, both because they don't have the technologies that would enable them to compete, and because the agricultural subventions (of 125 euros/hectare in 2011) are given only to those who exploit the land on large surfaces and with high productivity. The leasing contract entitle the inhabitants to get a pre-defined benefit, accorded to them generally in farming products (mostly corn), which for 3 hectares given in lease represented the equivalent of 2.100 lei/488 euros in 2010 (to give a benchmark for this amount: the heating expenses during winter for a household revolve around 3000-4000 lei/700-930 euros). If they preferred the money instead, they receive about

$\frac{3}{4}$ of this amount, within a period of time that is not clearly defined (very often the payments are delayed from one year to another). *“The part of the profit they got is ridiculous”*, as the clerk from the agricultural office of one of the town halls put it. According to the leasing contract, the owner is constrained to give the land for a five-year period. If the owner claims back the land before the term, he/she is not given back his/her lot, but a different one, located at the geographical limit of the exploitation (in other words, the owner may lose his/her own piece of land).

Few inhabitants resist to this development, and those who do resist customarily give the land to a local tenant (generally a younger men working with his family), who provides the machineries and the work, but who asks the owner to contribute to the production expenses (for work, seeds, fertilizers, transport to the market), and thus assuming his/her own risk for an uncertain better profit.

As expected, the intensive, highly technologized exploitation of the land doesn't require much labor force. The only local company from Seaca¹⁶, for example, which exploits the largest share of the villagers' arable land, has a total of 13 employees, among whom three providing the management and the office work, one being employed as mechanic, and nine as workers on the agricultural equipment and as guards. The workers are paid with the minimum wage, under the assumption that they also steal from the fields. The minimum wage for the medium qualified workers is, in fact, widespread (while the specialists and the lower management are paid three to four time the minimum wage), not only in the case of farms, but also in the newly-built workshops, factories and stores: at the textile workshops in Turnu-Magurele, at the plastic factory in Suhaia, at the InterAgro mill in Zimnicea, at the Donau Chemical plant in Turnu, and in most of the rural shops and stores. Simplifying, in the new economic capitalist environment of the area, the small owners of the lands get very little from their land exploitation, the majority of the workers are paid with minimum wage or a little higher (just above the level of the average pensions), the few specialist and lower management employees are paid with a more decent salary, and a very small minority of business owners and their close employees, often with political connections, get the largest share.

¹⁶ Societatea Agricolă Seaca.

III. Migration processes

III.1. Departures

The economic changes from the area hit particularly hard the Roma group. Having no land, almost no social benefits and very few openings on the labor market, they were literally pushed out of the area. In the late 1990s small groups of younger men ventured abroad, looking for work in agriculture. In 2000-2001 a larger group has established in Spain, in the province of Valencia. Soon after 2002 they brought their families, so that around 2004 the elders were the only people who were left at home (many of those were also taken in Spain in the ensuing years).

"We went abroad for work, at the beginning only the youngsters. If you are 50 or 60 you cannot venture into the unknown... We settle-down in Alzira, in 2000, and we work there ever since..." (C.C. 41, Roma male, Seaca).

While Roma ended-up with en masse migration, the Adventist stays on the pattern of migration of the younger and the middle aged people. It should also be mentioned that while migration was a necessity for the Roma, it was more like an opportunity for the Adventists. *"The Adventist aren't poor... they are qualified crafters, especially as carpenters, masons and plumbers"* (C.L. mayor of Seaca). In their case there is no clear-cut moment of departure, the migration of their "pioneers" being situated, compared to the Roma's, earlier in time, and even before 1990. While most of their group's migrants went also abroad after 2002, they had already well settled anchorpersons there, which made the process smoother. They went also to Spain, in the area of Madrid, many of them in the city of Coslada.

"I went in 1998 in Coslada and after one year I brought my wife and the two kids with me. My brother in law who was there from the '80's helped me. I had only to get a visa... I bought a visa for France with 3000 dollars" (I.I., Adventist male, 47, Seaca).

"My family started to go in Spain, in Madrid, in 1999, at first one of my brother, and then, one by one, all the others [8 brothers and 4 sisters]. Our relatives, who were already there, helped us to get and settled there" (S.V., Adventist female, 29, Seaca).

The dominant pattern of migration of the third group, the Romanian Orthodox majority, was to go abroad with a contract, mediated by a state agency (AJOFM Alexandria), for doing mostly seasonal works in agriculture in Spain, France, Greece and Italy. The contracts were made for a limited period of time (2-6 month). Generally the workers went abroad once a year, and repeated the travel yearly, within a cycle of three to four years. In the village of Seaca, the officials evaluated the number of these workers at about 100 people. They started these travels in 2002 and reached the peak in 2008. The group is represented by people between 30 and 50 years old, medium or low educated, both men and women, who have their own nuclear families and who lost or quit poorly paid jobs.

In contrast with this pattern, people in their 20's, regardless to their level of education, may also chose to migrate, taking their chance abroad, with few or no anchors at the destination, and without thinking to come back home.

"My older son went to France in 2004 when he was 22; he works in Paris, in constructions. He met his wife there, and he has now two children. He came back home to visit us only five years after the departure. My younger son is in Greece; he left in 2007 when he was 21; he also married abroad. He lives in Athens..., and works in constructions, while his wife, who is there with her family, is a nurse." (F.V. female, 52, Seaca)

III.2. Work and live abroad

According to their witness, the labor of the Ursari Roma in Spain has almost no variation during time, filling into a marginal labor niche within the local segmented market (Piore: 1976). They stick with working in agriculture, both in open fields, collecting fruits in citrus orchards, and in greenhouses, nurturing vegetables. They got work permits and signed contracts with the Spanish administrators of the farms. Men and women do the same work and the youngsters leave also school for work as soon as they reach the age of 16.

"In the orange orchards we work in teams of 12 to15 people, each team having its own truck. We work to achieve a daily norm, and we are paid daily or, in the last years, with this crisis, weakly. We work 8-9 hours a day during winter, when the day is shorter, and 10 to 12 in the other seasons" (C.C. 41, Roma male, Seaca).

"We work at vegetables in greenhouses, at very high temperature, sometime even at 40 °C. We work as much as it should, sometime even 12 hours a day" (G.M. Roma male, 20, Seaca).

Before the economic crisis hit Spain's agriculture, in 2009, they earned regularly about 1000 euros/month, and they found work easily. In the last three years the earnings have decreased to 6-700 euros/month and there are 3-4 months per year when they don't work.

At the beginning they lived in rented apartments, *"everybody where they find a good place"*, paying generally 150 euros/bedroom. While the money earned by the members of the family were administrated in common, they decided during time to buy their own apartments and to pay for mortgage approximately the same amount they paid for rent. The family of one of the male informants (C.C., 41), composed by husband, his wife, his son, his daughter in law and his mother, used to live together in a three-bedroom apartment for which they paid 470 euros. In 2007 they decided to buy their own apartment; they applied for a credit and bought a three-bedroom apartment, with a mortgage of 550 euros/month, for the next 25 years.

When the apartments became too crowded and new families were formed, the youngsters might move and stayed with rent together with other young immigrant families, sharing a larger apartment or a house. *"We stayed with our parents and grandparents for a while, but after our child was born, we moved in a different apartment, in the proximity of our parents', living together with other three young families of Romanians"* (G.S. male, 20, Traian).

The Adventists followed pretty much the same pattern with regard to housing. I.I. for example, from Seaca, bought in 2003 a three-bedroom apartment in Alcala de Henares, with a 120.000 euros credit for 25 years. Some of them ended-up so well as for buying more expensive apartments: S.T. and her husband bought in 2007 a four-bedroom apartment in Coslada with a credit of 270.000 euros, for which they have to pay 960 euros/month. In regard to work they fit into the model that is by now a trademark for Romanians: men in construction, women in domestic labor. However, compared to other Romanians, the Adventists rarely had to sell their labor in the "Romanian Park" from Madrid, being helped instead by their community internal network: *"I had been to the Romanian Park only to buy*

*some things, otherwise I got all I needed in church*¹⁷. We gather in our church each Friday evening and Saturday... we have a nice church there, the town hall gave us the land to built it; we have also school and kindergarten; at church we help ourselves very much: if one doesn't have a room to stay, we find him a room, if he doesn't have work, we find him work. If somebody new is coming from home, we present him in church, and tell what he can do..." (I.I., Adventist male, 47, Seaca). The common working route for a hard working man is to start as a "peon" (journeyman), climbing up to the status of "profesional", which means he gets qualification in a certain craft, ready to work within a team that accomplish a specialized task, and moves toward the status of self-employed, when he finds himself work, or even to the status of employer, when he organize a team and provides the work for the whole group. Within these positions the incomes varied between 1000 and 4000 euros/month. The working route for women, on the other side, is to move up from the situation when she replaces for a couple of hours per week another domestic worker, who cannot work temporarily or is exceeded by the workload, toward the situation when she gets her place within somebody's else network of household up-keeping jobs, being still paid by hour, up to the situation when she builds her own network of jobs (when she reaches that level of confidence of the households' owners as to be recommended to others), which allows her to have steady work and constant incomes. Within these range of positions a woman may earn between 400 and 1200 euros/month.

III.3. Savings, investments, remittances

It seems that both groups that practice the long-time migration passed through similar phases regarding the balance between savings and important expenditures. Both the Roma and the Adventists save hardly in the first years of working abroad and when they feel financially confident they assume the risk of a long-time credit and they invest in long-term use goods. However, above the similar behavior of taking advantage of the

¹⁷ A totally different, exploitative experience, of visiting the "Romanian Park" from Madrid is described by Monica Serban in her study on circular migration from Dobrotesti, Teleorman, in op cit., p. 187.

opportunity to make a mortgage abroad, the understanding of what worth to be invested in differs sharply.

Within the Roma community the spending behavior on long-term use goods is standardized. After a number of years of working and saving, with a long period of not coming back home, they return yearly for three to four months and build new houses in the home villages.

"At the beginning we didn't come home for 5-6 years, and then, when we had 40.000 euros, we came back in the summer, we bought the land and built the main structure of the house. I start to built my house in 2006 and for that time I come back every summer for doing something to the house" (C.C. 41, Roma male, Seaca).

This behavior is widespread within the community, being the most visible landmark of a status competition made possible by migration. The newly built houses, which, with few exceptions, are at the moment of the research still under constructions, are in sharp contrast with the houses of the majority population. However, if they are disproportionately bigger than the average houses, they don't follow the models common to other Roma groups from Teleorman or elsewhere (the so called "Gypsy palaces", best represented in Teleorman by the houses from the village Buzescu), but more a sort of villas that can be found in many other Romanian villages where an important influx of money flowed in in a short period of time. If the customization of this behavior is seen in retrospect as the result of hazard (*"one or two happened to built large houses and others followed them"*), during time it becomes a constraining norm that everybody has to obey: *"you have to build houses for your children, so that they could not blame you that others did it and you didn't"* (C.C). This behavior actually is only a graft new custom onto older one, namely the custom to provide a decent situation for the sons when they get married, to ensure a patrimony that would enable them to take care of a family (while the obligation for the daughters is only *"to give them something on the wedding table"*). Adapted to their new economic situation, the norm requires a couple with children to provide a new house for each of the sons, but also a new house for the couple itself, who will transfer it eventually to their younger son. Very interesting is the history of this phenomenon, which, as I mention, has transformed an internal norm into a competition arena. This competition has in focus not only the number of houses built by a family, their dimensions and utilities,

but also their location. While the Roma, as they said, *“had even before, decent houses”* (which means two-room houses with a veranda, made out of bricks or adobe, on the model of *“the old houses”* of the area), they were located at the outskirts of the villages. The first Roma who built new houses, in 2002-2003, bought in the first instance abandoned Romanian houses, located all over the villages, turn them down and start the new buildings. Many of them were not finalized and were abandoned, while the latter-generation buildings, started in 2006-2007, aimed to be as close to the center of the village as possible (or at least along the county road), which made poorer Romanians to sell their central located lots or even their houses to the Roma. As a result, in the villages populated by an important number of Roma (Seaca, Traian, Lisa) the Roma houses dominate over the central spaces. Consequently, even if the Roma are absent from the villages for years, the Romanian inhabitants have a strong sense of their presence and belonging to the villages, and see their absence as temporarily (*“there are at least 200 Roma children missing from school”*, opined the Seaca’s school principal, ignoring that many of these children have never lived in Seaca). In the Roma’s present view the houses represent also an expression of a circumstance that would not last forever: *“we had the lack of earning these money... we will come back... why would we have built these houses otherwise?”* They also cannot imagine their future in other terms than as employees: *“I would come back immediately if I would be paid here with 400-500 euros/months”* (G.G., male, 54, Traian). The youngsters, even those who have left the village at a very early age, have internalized at their turn the idea of preparing their place for returning: *“I’ve come back to registered my new-born daughter, but also to look after a good lot for building a house... of course I will come back, here is my country; here I want to live with my brothers and my parents”* (F.G. male, 19, Traian). Above houses, the Roma spend also large amount of money on expensive cars, furniture, house decoration and jewelry, producing the contrast effect with the home environment that was put into light for long time by studies on transnational migration (e.g. Harold J. McArthur: 1979).

If nobody from the Roma community has came back to stay yet, in the Adventist community there are some who have already taken this decision. At a first impression the community seems to be divided along this resolution. However, due to their tight kinship and community

relations all the relocating possibilities between the two countries remain open within a transnational space (Pries: 2001; Portes: 2010) they created, which allows for taking decisions regarding staying in Romania or returning to Spain at any point in time. Their life strategies are built accordingly, with the aim of minimizing the effects of the economic downturns (especially after some were hit by the crisis of the construction sector in 2009). Thus, those who came back rebuild their old houses, build new houses for themselves and also houses for close relatives from Spain (often in the same yard). In contrast with the Roma, they build houses that would provide them the comfort they need, with no concerns for status representation. They also look after possible business they may open and the available opportunities to finance them. They are also concerned for their health and wellbeing, looking after a more peaceful life (they talk about the "exhaustion" they got in Spain during time), but also for a more convenient future for their children. I.I, for example (male, 47, Seaca), has returned home in 2006 after eight years of working in Spain. He sold with 180.000 euros the apartment he bought there for 120.000 euros three years before. Back home he used a part of his savings for buying land, for building a house for his family and for opening a company in construction. His wife found work as a freelancer, in professional photography. Recently the family bought hives and applied for a European financing program. They have the conviction that they have to help themselves: *"I cannot stay to wait for somebody to give something to me. I have to find myself something to work, I cannot go to the town hall to ask for social assistance"*. In their view the future of their two children could be better here, if they get a good education. *"If we stayed in Spain, they would have been just another workers there. ...We brought them back before the high school, before they would have made strong ties there. Now they are both in school in Bucharest, where I bought them an apartment. I have good hopes for their future here."*

Younger people have returned also. S. V. (female, 29, Seaca) has returned in 2009, together with her husband and two brothers, after 12 years in Spain. The family rebuilt the old house, and built three new houses in close proximity. They bought also land in the near-by and have opened a small farm where they produce vegetables, both outdoors and in greenhouse. In addition, they bought 30 hives and with the help of a 25.000 euros non-reimbursable European credit they have reached in two years

the level of 220 hives, having all their production contracted by a specialized company. They collaborate with their people from Spain who send them, for a negotiated interest, cheap second-hand agricultural machineries. The case of S.V.'s family is particularly interesting while their decision to return home was not easy, due to the apartment they bought in Spain in 2007 (with a credit of 300.000 euros, and a mortgage of over 1000 euros/month), and whose value dropped dramatically and cannot be sold any longer. Theirs only thought now is to get rid of it, providing through renting (for 700 euros/month), and additional costs supported by them, the money for mortgage till 2018, when the bank would get back its interests and will take the apartment too.

As expected from the members of a neo-protestant community, and in contrast with the Ursari Roma, the Adventist don't invest in visible status goods and luxury products.

Above the investments the Roma and the returned Adventist made, the remittances sent home by the Adventists to their relatives left home, as well as the money brought home by the temporary workers, were largely converted in small improvements of the households. *"Nobody got rich, but you can see the households where somebody worked abroad: they have newer fences, the houses are newly painted, they made an indoor bathroom or built an extra room"* (S.G., mailman of Seaca).

IV. Causes of migration

Within the rational choice theory migration from this region could be seen through the lens of the decisions taken by the individuals in order to get advantage of the opportunity opened in 2002 by the liberty of circulation for the Romanians within the Schengen space. However, the coincidence of most of the departures with the moment of getting this liberty is rather accidental: as it is very well known, searching for work abroad was not a problem for many other Romanians even before this opportunity was available. The structural changes within the local economy might explain the phenomenon better: at the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century the intended capitalist changes within the area were well on their way. The transformation of agriculture towards an intensive, highly mechanized exploitation, practiced by big companies

on large surfaces of land, made the competition impossible for the small landowners and eliminated the need for unqualified labor force. At their turn, the old industries from the area diminished, and the newly built workshop and plants required few labor force, and provided poor salaries. Accordingly, within all the mobile groups of the area (the Ursari Roma, the Adventists, the more ambitious middle aged workers and the young adults without a working past) a number of people were forced to find work somewhere else. Therefore, the people migrated from this region *not because the economy was not working, but precisely because it did work*. Certainly, it did not work for them, and therefore they were objectively constrained to look after work somewhere else. On the other side, looking at the phenomenon from a higher point, we may observe that the present migration is just another logical step on the process of modernization of this rural area. If socialist modernization pushed an important number of people to the industrial cities, the agriculture of that time still relied on important local labor force. The newer capitalist wave of modernization does not need it any longer; it needs only the land of the elderly small owners, who very likely will be deprived of it on a longer term (considering the low profit they get out of its cultivation they are in fact deprived already). The whole process can be seen as part of a patented model of development imposed by the West everywhere, which involved, in Massey words, a group of displaced people, who “constitute the source for the massive population movements that inevitably accompany development. Most become internal migrants... but some always migrate internationally” (Massey: 1998: 10). Within the structural perspective that we preferred, the push-pull model is also helpful. Being forced to look for work outside the area, the migrants were also attracted by the chances offered by Spain’s labor market; in this regard the free circulation within Schengen space might have a role: while it didn’t cause the migration, it eased up the process.

V. Consequences of migration

The most visible consequences are related to the Roma communities from these villages, with respect to their social position, geographical location and cultural transformations. Moving towards the central spaces of the villages they alter the customary geographical division of these

localities, where Roma used to be located at the outskirts. They started to be seen as successful people, with a certain ambiguity still, which allows for both admiration, for their ability to earn good money, and contempt, for what is seen as conspicuous consumption. Being absent from the villages, the Romanians took only the advantages of the Roma new status: they got important earnings from selling them land for their new houses; locals got work on building the houses; providers of construction material had good clients, and after the Roma left the villages the need for social assistance decreased strongly. On the other side, their departure has deprived the locals of a cheap labor force they need seasonally for working their gardens, and has emptied the local schools, which have made the organization of education on years of study difficult. Within the Roma communities the consequences are also important: the previous rather equalitarian communities have been transformed into hierarchical ones, dominated by an internal competition, which has a functional role in the marital arrangements, and thus in preserving or incrementing wealth. The constrain for deploying a higher economic status leads in some cases to money borrowing from other Roma groups, with a high interest, which leads to conflicts they didn't have before. Other consequences are foreseeable: if the economic situation in Spain get worse, it is very likely that the Roma will come back, and many of the Roma who will return will not be the Roma the local inhabitants were accustomed with. They already have to deal with people who went to Spain at an early age and were acculturated to a different environment: be cause of living in big cities they are strongly urbanized, they lost the former humility of their parents, they don't care about the customary ethic divisions; in short, they have a totally different life experience, and thus they have different expectations and goals. Being dependent on the availability of jobs, their returning might become a hard burden for these villages in the absence of a sustainable development.

While still not many, the returned Adventists stand out in the villages' social landscape for theirs entrepreneurial impetus. However, in the context in which they have to compete on an economic environment already populated by other, stronger investors, it is very likely that their business will not grow, but will remain stuck to the level of the extended families and their small communities.

With respect to consequences of the third group's migration, the temporary workers abroad, they are limited, as we notice, to the level of household improvements. While the group that practices this form of migration is aging, important evolutions in their case are not foreseeable. If their children perceive their migration as a success, and if they will not have other opportunities in the region and the country, it is very likely that they will use their parents experience for definitive migration, as is already the case with some youngsters in their 20's.

The two groups that practice long-time migration have modified also the social space of these villages. They have produced a gap between people and communities who are stuck within the local or the regional, whose cultural horizon and life strategies are limited to the national repertoire, and people who live within a transnational space, having residences in two countries, speaking at least two languages, having a multiple sense of belonging, and taking advantage of a wider range of economic opportunities. The migrants have changed also the previous hierarchy of these villages, with the Roma and the Adventist moving upward, while older landmarks for social position - as ownership of land or education - have become obsolete. Still, this new social arrangement does not produce a stronger connection between the communities, on the contrary: while the Roma are not dependent any longer on the Romanians' land, they tend to become closer to other Roma wealthier groups, from the near-by cities. This separation is proven by the fact that, even if their economic success is recognized, and thus could have been an example to follow, no Romanian has joined their group in Spain, on the basis of their previous or newer relations within the home villages.

Conclusions

The analyzed data let us conclude that there are four clear patterns of migration in Southern Danube Micro-region:

1. Long-time transnational en masse migration, with dual residence, with a fragmented transnational space, of a rural-urban type, with no age limitation and with a probability of return for the elders - which is specific for the Roma group;

2. Long-time transnational migration, with dual residence, of a rural-urban type, with an age limitation and with a probability of temporary return – which is specific for the Adventist group;
3. Short-time international, circular migration, with one (unchanged) residence, of a rural-rural type, with an age limitation – which is specific for the Orthodox Romanians between 30-50 years old;
4. Non-return migration, with residence change, with age limitation, of the rural-urban type, diaspora – which is specific for the Orthodox Romanians in their twenties.

Trying to answer the question we start with, what is the balance between the positive and the negative implication of migration for the region's development, and if and how migration determines the development, we can answer now that there is indeed a development of the region. But this development has nothing to do with migration. It follows instead the logic of the big capital whose interests are related mainly to the intensive exploitation of local resources, be that land, lakes, forests, or others. This exploitation requires few labor force and while this is still abundant, it can be bought cheaply. In fact the locals can rely no longer even on these poor paid jobs: it is notorious in the area that when InterAgro management needed more workers in Zimnicea, they didn't paid better the local workers, preferring to bring workers from Bulgaria and even from China. Therefore, while the non-migrant Romanians remained trapped in the local, the sense of the local itself changed, being now part of the multinational landscape where the big capital operates, with all the support of the local politicians. Thus the newly built houses of the Roma, the small businesses of the Adventists, the renovated houses of the temporary workers abroad may represent contextual gains for the migrants and their families. They remain still houses with no value on the real estate market, on the edges of dusty roads, and small businesses that cannot compete in a longer run, and which don't create more jobs.

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EMINESCU AND THE PATTERN OF ROMANIAN ANTISEMITISM

LUCIAN T. BUTARU*

Abstract

After the Congress of Berlin (1878), the international pressure to eliminate from the Constitution the exclusions based on religious criteria produced an ideological battle, which raised the Romanian antisemitism to a new level. Of the representatives of the Romanian antisemites, Mihai Eminescu is the figure that has the widest public recognition. We can find in Eminescu's writings a pattern of discourse which it was used later (without any nuances) in the Romanian antisemitic discourse. Eminescu contributed to the development of a specific Romanian antisemitic understanding of the Jewishness, as a cultural product – a function of religion, of economic interest and of ethnicity.

Keywords: antisemitism, citizenship, Jewish identity, racism, ideology production

The making of the Romania was intertwined with the 'making' of the Romanians, as the invention of institutions was intertwined with the development of the national ideology. Tradition, religion and many prejudices constituted a part of the framework of this complex process – the international relations constituted the other part of the frame. Politicians and enthusiastic ideologists, working in this framework, produced a specific pattern of antisemitism. We may say that the 'Jewish question' followed like a shadow the birth and the development of the Romanian State from the perspective of the relationship with the European powers and that of the territories and populations which could constitute Romania as a national State. The various peace treaties, which guaranteed Romania's different forms of existence, implied that Romanian rulers should take into account *the entire* population. Due to the persuasive Jewish lobby,

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Romanian politicians were able to see (or were forced to see) a kind of inappropriate intervention behind European universalism.

Retrospectively (from the perspective of inter-war discourse), we could notice that the events accompanying the birth and the international recognition of Romania as a State generated a number of discussions and solutions regarding the Jewish question; and the way in which these problems were perceived and resolved constituted a pattern for the following developments of the question. One could notice that, regarding both the antisemite understanding of Jewishness (either as a religious problem, or an ethnic one, based on the language criterion) and the antisemite political measures (focused on the citizenship issue), the inter-war discourse owes a lot to this period.

The citizenship issue and the Jewish question took its form in the second half of the XIXth century. Marta Petreu offers a general presentation¹ in a study dedicated mainly to the relationship between the citizenship issue and the xenophobic discourse characteristic for that period. Marta Petreu draws essential distinctions from the discussions regarding the 'Jewish question' in the *Junimea* literary circle, by giving a scale of the tolerance/intolerance descending from P. P. Carp to Titu Maiorescu, Mihai Eminescu and Vasile Conta. In this comparative presentation, one could notice that, on the one hand, these thinkers are absorbed by the European general discourse of the time, and, on the other hand, the local nuances were produced through a continuous dialog between intellectuals such as P. P. Carp and Vasile Conta. Therefore, the making of Romanian xenophobic discourse included, as a hardcore, the common field of these discussions: the Conservative critique of the *forms without substance*, and the importance given to the socio-economic aspect of the question.

The involvement of these intellectuals in the political issue of citizenship produced a 'cultural aura' around the old and the new European antisemitic folklore and, therefore, antisemitism became a

¹ Marta Petreu, "'Chestiunea evreiască' la Junimea", in Ladislau Gyémánt, Maria Ghitta (eds.), *Dilemele conviețuirii. Evrei și neevrei in Europa Central-Răsăriteană*, Institutul Cultural Român, Centrul de studii transilvane, Cluj-Napoca, 2006, p. 71-90.

respectable trend in approaching the national ideology.² Referring to the instant popular success of these intellectuals, we could mention Vasile Alecsandri's play, *Lipitorile satului* (*Village Leeches*) which created a popular stereotype of the Jew – sometimes used by some politicians, like Mihail Kogălniceanu, as being the image of reality³ – or philosopher Vasile Conta's political discourse, *Chestiunea evreiasca* (*The Jewish Question*) which produced a 'scientific aura'. Vasile Conta introduced a scientific framework, by using concepts like "the race sympathy"⁴, and introduced new conservative patterns of understanding of the democratic regime. According to Conta, this regime could achieve progress only through uniformity⁵; and the cultural uniformity, or the ideological consensus, is linked to family life – the institution responsible with education.

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From the voices of that time, we chose the discourse of Eminescu, not for his few personal innovations, but for his style that could make the analysis less boring, and for his posthumous celebrity. For example, I rediscovered at Eminescu the ideas of Vasile Conta, excepting one subtlety, which I mentioned. Nevertheless, from a scientific point of view, Eminescu's antisemitism is the most interesting because his literary fame endorsed his political perspective on the Romanian social reality. It is also a difficult issue because of its ambivalence. For almost every violent antisemitic statement from one article, another less violent one, which reevaluates and even contradicts the former, can be found in another article or, sometimes, in the same article. We could say that Eminescu is very consistent in his inconsistency. In this respect, Eminescu sees himself as a balanced and lucid patriot, not as a Jew-hater, nor as a Philo-Semite, only as one who loves his nation and is a friend of true patriots – and patriotism "does not include the use of the sticks or the brawl of different

² Leon Volovici, *Ideologia naționalistă și 'problema evreiască' în România anilor '30*, Ed. Humanitas, București, 1995, p. 31.

³ *Ibidem*, p. 31.

⁴ Vasile Conta, "Chestiunea evreiască" (September 4-5, 1879), in Vasile Conta, *Opere complete*, "Librăria școalelor", București, 1914, p. 642.

⁵ *Ibidem*, pp. 643-645.

individuals”⁶. Eminescu often sees the violence of language as a form of freedom: “Every time the Israelite matter is discussed, the Romanian writer is afraid to see his words interpreted as race hatred, as national or religious prejudice.”⁷ This affirmation also reveals the fact that, at the time, there was a significant, internal or external, trend, which disrupted the antisemitic current.

It is very possible that, apart from the Jews being the most numerous religious minority, Eminescu’s xenophobia took the shape of antisemitism precisely because of the international mobilization of the Jews and intellectuals with conceptions consistently democratic against antisemitism. Maybe it is not true that “the Israelite Alliance... made us aware of the danger which threatens us and awoke the instinct of national preservation in us”⁸, as Vasile Alecsandri says, but it is extremely plausible that the Israelite Alliance made the xenophobic monologue more interesting and more complex. Any writer who has a minimal respect for his image would avoid repeating himself regarding a matter, in the case when he does not have any novelties or nuances to add, or at least an imaginary partner who occasions the repetition.

‘The Universal Israelite Alliance’ created previously (in 1860) through the interventionist policy of its president, Adolphe Crémieux (1867-1880),⁹ became a good monologue partner for Eminescu. Hence, the difference in the approach of the Jewish question compared to the moments when Eminescu was preoccupied only with the “Greek money lender monster”¹⁰. The Jewish question, unlike other ethnic issues, gave the opportunity of an endless ‘general discussion’. In addition, the international aspect of the issue encouraged Eminescu to look for similarities regarding the legal or spontaneous maltreatment of the Jews from Prussia, Austria-Hungary, and Russia etc.

I would recommend considering Eminescu mainly as a conservative politician, at least from the perspective of his writings published in the

⁶ Mihai Eminescu, *Chestiunea evreiască*, Ed. Vestala, 1998, p. 199.

⁷ ***, “București, 31 Octobrie 1881”, *Timpul*, V no. 238, Novembre 1, 1881, p. 1.

⁸ Vasile Alecsandri, apud Volovici, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

⁹ Carol Iancu, *Bleichroeder și Crémieux. Lupta pentru emanciparea evreilor din România la Congresul de la Berlin. Corespondență inedită*, Ed. Hasefer, București, 2006, p. 17.

¹⁰ Eminescu, *op. cit.*, p. 129.

journal *Timpul* (*The Time*). In this context, Eminescu's xenophobia can be understood, at least partially, as political activity over-fuelled with strong metaphors. The Jewish question, from Eminescu's point of view, represented *a matter of Romanian Liberalism*, from the outlook of Eminescu's complex loyalty to the Conservative movement.

On the one hand, Eminescu was afraid of a liberal domination in a political system that favored the rich, because, according to stereotypes, Jews are rich and "Jews from all countries are Liberals, Ultraliberals, Republicans etc."¹¹ Nevertheless, we must say that, at least at a manifest level, both liberals and conservatives, both friends and enemies of Eminescu were not at all philosemites. One can notice in this kind of consensus and controversies that the 'fighters' from the journalism's arena mutually control themselves. And this mutual control of the vigilance and authenticity, which operated with accusations of philosemitism, illustrates the fact that the 23,584 electors from the 1st to the 3rd Constituency and the 12,657¹² representatives with franchise for the 4th Constituency were already educated to negatively sanction the attitudes that could seem reasonable to the Jews. In other words, it already existed something that Eminescu called, in another context, "the capital of hatred"¹³ – and the parties must to take into account when they made their political offer.

[...] our main accusation for the reds is not that they were and still are friends of the Jews; in the end, everyone is the master of his thoughts and of his will. But they do not have any right to mislead the people and to present themselves sometimes as opponents of the Jews.¹⁴

On the other hand, Eminescu was concerned about the rhythm of the political reforms. It was too fast according to a conservative point of view. Liberals, or others under their pressure, introduced something that was called *forms without substance*. So, Eminescu's concern focused on the 'young country', which was unprepared for the fluid reality proposed by Liberalism in order to meet the new standards of European civilization,

¹¹ ***, "București 30 Aprilie/12 Maiu", *Timpul*, IV nr. 94, 1 mai 1879, p. 2.

¹² Keith Hitchins, *România. 1866-1947*, Ed. Humanitas, București, 2003, p. 34.

¹³ Eminescu, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

¹⁴ ***, "București 30 Aprilie/12 Maiu", *loc. cit.*, p. 2.

because of its educational system, and because of the slow accumulation of capital and skills. Therefore, "the danger of revising the 7th article does not consist in the Israelite matter itself, but rather in the condition we were in when this issue was raised."¹⁵

This application of the theory of *forms without substance* to the 'Jewish question' produced a kind of Trojan horse effect, which weakened the fortress of the critical spirit in the case of a great number of valuable intellectuals from the inter-war period. Playing the score of Eminescu, both Emil Cioran and Mircea Eliade agreed with the notorious antisemite A. C. Cuza on 'the critical thinking seen as a luxury for the developing nations'. Eminescu showed that the intellectual could leave his ivory tower decorated with humanism and critical thinking to descend in the "muck of the time"¹⁶ together with the common agitators, on condition that this descent be motivated by love for the nation and care for the future.

However, Eminescu was not a reactionary, as few of his reactionary successors saw him, but a Conservative who understood all the changes, good or bad, on condition that these changes would be internalized by the tradition or at least irremediable: "The church from Curtea de Argeş cost also too much, but this is not a reason to pull it down and to build another one, cheaper."¹⁷ After the event or the situation passed (we speak about time related to the number of generations), there are enough elements to double the melancholy with pragmatic elements: "No matter how bad was the administration of those unfortunate landowners, it had an *asset* valuable for every agrarian, poor in other words, country: it was cheap, as cheap as possible."¹⁸

In exchange, the new administration, full of public servants, was expensive, without soul and did not offer any compensation for the transformations that the contemporaries had to experience. We may say that Eminescu only wanted 'to put a soul' in things; the only limitation being the fact that he couldn't imagine that soul as a product of the present. And it was the problem of an entire century that moved too fast, suffocated

¹⁵ Eminescu, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

¹⁶ Eminescu, apud George Călinescu, *Viața lui Mihai Eminescu*, Ed. Litera, Chișinău, 1997, p. 216.

¹⁷ ***, "București 21 Fevruarie/5 Martie", *Timpul*, IV nr. 41, 22 februarie 1879, p. 2.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 2.

by memory and assaulted by the transformations generated by the new means of production. Eminescu seems to join the movement that contaminated (with the efforts of John Ruskin, for example) inclusively a part of the England, the engine of the new world.

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Selecting only the unambiguous writings of Eminescu, we can say that Eminescu's antisemitism is a product of his violence of language, in the moments when the writer's verve does not fit into regular words:

[...] one should abandon the role of the writer and assert the role of the executioner"¹⁹. "We know too well that three days will be enough to regulate so definitively the Israelite question that the 'Alliance' wouldn't have for whom to intervene anymore. We know the nation. Apparently, it is so gentle and manageable, but its gentleness has a limit that is dangerous to cross."²⁰

In his antisemitic articles there are, punctually, almost all the 'original' ideas and the analysis directions or the pattern of conception used by A. C. Cuza; and through this, the pattern of the radical Romanian antisemitism.

(1) The most interesting aspect is the general framework which Eminescu proposed for the approach of the problem, eliminating from the theoretical portfolio of antisemitism the perspectives which appeared to him too complicated – the question of race, monotheism and other fashionable explanations of Jewishness. The exotic perspectives on antisemitism "would not help us advance, socially and economically."²¹

(2) From this cultural perspective, the conception of Jewishness and of the difference between Romanians and Jews as a religious problem, or as an ethnic problem, is based on the language criterion. From this point of view, "there is no Romanian of Israelite religion, since there are no

¹⁹ Eminescu, *op. cit.*, p. 210.

²⁰ ***, "București, 12 Noembrie 1881", *Timpul*, VI nr. 248, 13 noiembrie 1881, p. 2.

²¹ ***, "București, 29 Octobrie 1881", *Timpul*, VI no. 236, Octobrie 30, 1881, p. 1.

Israelites who speak Romanian within their families.”²² These affirmations are not valuable so much for their truth value but for their capacity *to generate truth*; this capacity was proven by the fact that, throughout the following century, within the cultural frame, antisemites such as A. C. Cuza continued to see Jews different from Romanians, for example considering Jews unable to write correctly in Romanian.

(3) Similarly, an idea pervades, one which could be seen as part of the solution for the Jewish question from 1879, and according to which the Jews “are not – cannot be”²³ and should not become Romanians. The difference exists and must exist:

[...] it could happen that a human being, totally Romanian through its feelings and thoughts, to found in that article an obstacle against its participation to the life of the State. They could be baptized – some would argue. But, as far as it concerns us, we wouldn't be glad exactly for the naturalization of those who, easily and unscrupulously, would convert without a profound change of their religious beliefs.”²⁴

“The Jews do not have to be denationalized, because we don't care if an entire consuming and unproductive race would speak or not Romanian; they have to be forced, through a strict economical organization, to work, to physical work, to production. Then, they will denationalize by themselves or they will immigrate.”²⁵

However, Eminescu does not clearly state the difference anywhere, leaving the issue unsettled. Sometimes, he uses concepts such as *the people* or even (with a certain amount of irony) “the most remarkable people [...] God's chosen people”²⁶. On other occasions, he considers the religious difference, but he prefers not to approach the matter from this perspective and he does not see an obstacle in this difference.

²² Eminescu, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

²³ Eminescu, *op. cit.*, p. 135.

²⁴ *Ibidem*, 121.

²⁵ ***, “București, 19 Octombrie 1881” *Timpul* VI nr. 228, 20 octombrie 1881, p. 1.

²⁶ Eminescu, *op. cit.*, p. 195.

(4) Nevertheless, there are moments when Eminescu ignores these cultural elements, using, for lack of something else, the concept of 'race'; still, this concept is used rarely and inadequately.

The true antagonism is not the Mosaism as an antithesis, but the modern nation with its working classes as an antithesis of the ancient, dissolvent and egoist race, which has no concern for the public welfare.²⁷

Eminescu does not understand "race" as a type of biological conditioning which makes a group exist and behave in a specific manner. He seems to understand it generally, in the same way as Vasile Conta: "race" is the unseen face of social solidarity, and the Jewish race is a kind of "theocratic social organization"²⁸, an informal economic organization "bound together through race solidarity, interests and religion."²⁹

(5) Eminescu revealed few of the instruments which could facilitate the application of the 'diabolical' objectives so that "the Romanian [became] the servant of the Jew"³⁰. Beside Liberalism, already discussed, other poisons are also taken into account. A vaguer (and less discussed) poison was the Jewish spirit, "because everywhere in Europe, the emancipated Jews, interfering with the culture of the country, falsified and corrupted it"³¹. Nevertheless, this poison was not considered dangerous during the time, especially because Romania was presented as having a "semi-culture so corrupted and radical through all its tendencies that another drop of poison would not change it"³².

(6) The proper poison was alcohol – and what it was thought to contain (vitriol) in order to be an effective poison, with an improved power to kill. That is why "the equal distribution of 600.000 leeches and street vendors is... a matter of life and death, and I think that our people would

²⁷ ***, "București, 12 Octombrie 1881", *Timpul*, VI nr. 223, 13 octombrie 1881, p. 1.

²⁸ Conta, *op. cit.*, p. 645.

²⁹ ***, "București, 12 Octombrie 1881", *loc. cit.*, p. 1.

³⁰ Eminescu, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

³¹ *Ibidem*, p. 77.

³² *Ibidem*, p. 77.

prefer to quickly perish by the sword rather than slowly die by *vitriol*"³³. Vitriol became an antisemite leitmotiv, used by all the patriots. A. C. Cuza and N. C. Paulescu dedicated one of their most delicious writings to vitriol.

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These six elements became a kind of 'canon' in the following approach of Romanian antisemitism. One could say that similar problems produce similar solutions; but I believe that *the stock of solutions and methods* produces or reproduces the problems, in the way they are lived. Thus, from the general perspective on the Jewish question, disregarding collateral problems with little significance, the doctrinaire descendants of Eminescu the politician – who either cited him, or forgot to state the source – did not try to improve the discourse, only to copy it, sometimes meeting the same problems. Therefore, these descendants do not even try to solve the inconsistencies regarding the use of such terms as 'race', but they usually limited themselves to awkwardly varying the themes and the motives proposed by Eminescu. In this way, these themes and motives became classic. The re-editions of Eminescu's journalistic works, especially those edited by A. C. Cuza, diminished the contradictory complexity of Eminescu's political discourse through the position stated in their introductions. The antisemite quotations left only the caricature, which nourished from the poet's reputation. Transposed into another era, Eminescu's unscrupulous ethnic and political concerns lost their content because the presumed 'Jewish political domination' did not make any sense *outside the census vote system*. We could say that Eminescu generated epigones in areas in which he probably would not have expected it.

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³³ *Ibidem*, p. 139.

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SÜDOSTEUROPA ALS MIGRATIONSRAUM AM BEISPIEL DER SERBISCHEN BESIEDLUNG DES HABSBURGERREICHS BIS ZUM 18. JAHRHUNDERT*

SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE AS AN AREA OF MIGRATION: THE SERBIAN COLONIZATION OF THE HABSBURG EMPIRE UNTIL THE 18TH CENTURY

Philipp Hochbaum**

Abstract

South-Eastern Europe's ethnic shape was highly influenced by migration throughout its history, which can be defined as a "migration history". Probably the most important of them is the Serbian immigration to Southern Hungary, which was later to become Ottoman territory and – as a result of the Ottomans being defeated by Austria – part of the Habsburg Monarchy thereafter. Of outstanding importance is the Serbian Migration organized by patriarch Arsenije III. Černojević from 1690, also known as „The Great Migration“ (Velika Seoba). With the Serbs also settling in Banat, this multiethnic region became an object of retroactive, ethnicity-based claims in modern Serbian and Romanian historiography. They both reproject ethnic differences and identities upon a population that was ethnically diverse, but not yet nationally differentiated according to contemporary criteria.

Keywords: migration, multiethnic societies, religion, modern national identities, re-projection of national identity

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1. Die Bedeutung von Migrationsprozessen für Südosteuropa

Die südosteuropäischen Wanderungs- und Siedlungsprozesse als eine der fundamentalen Entstehungsbedingungen des neuzeitlichen heterogenen ethnischen Gefüges vollzogen sich nicht losgelöst und isoliert voneinander, sondern innerhalb eines breit gefächerten Kontextes. Dieser besteht bis in die Gegenwart aus einem Spannungs- und Wirkungsfeld verschiedener Faktoren, wobei jeder Umsiedlungsprozess auf spezifische Ursachen beruht. Diese reichen von Handelsmigration und Transhumanz über Flucht bis hin zu Landesausbau und Kolonisation, wobei diese Motive mitunter korrelieren und sich daher nur schwer voneinander separieren lassen. Unterdessen verbieten nicht nur die jeweils spezifischen Faktoren der Migrationsbewegungen, sondern auch ihre jeweils singulären Folgeerscheinungen ihre Standardisierung und Gleichsetzung untereinander. Insbesondere der Transfer spezifischer „Inhalte“ in ein neues Lebensumfeld demonstriert deren individuellen Charakter: Durch sie gelangen neue Gesellschafts- und Geschichtsbilder in eine andere, zunächst fremde Umwelt. Besonders greifbar sind Unterschiede sprachlicher, konfessioneller oder kultureller Art; deren wechselseitige Perzeption vergegenwärtigt anfänglich die Trennlinien zwischen Migranten und neuem Lebensraum. Sollen diese daraufhin ihre spezifischen Merkmale, die sie von ihrem neuen Lebensumfeld unterscheiden, bewahren oder sich diesem anpassen? Diese Wahlmöglichkeit begleitet nicht nur rezente, sondern auch frühere Migrationsprozesse; dabei oblag die Entscheidungsgewalt meist jedoch oft nicht den Betroffenen selbst. Unabhängig vom Zeitpunkt ihres Geschehens prägten *alle* Siedlungsvorgänge das neue Lebensumfeld nachhaltig; gleichzeitig beeinflusst die neue Umwelt die weitere Entwicklung des neuen Bevölkerungselements. Das Ausmaß ihrer Interaktion bestimmt, ob die Trennlinien zwischen ihnen durchlässig oder langfristig gar überwunden werden.

Die Vielschichtigkeit von Siedlungs- und Migrationsbewegungen formierte die Gestalt des neuzeitlichen ethnischen Gefüges Südosteuropas; die zahlreichen Bevölkerungsverschiebungen und daraus resultierende Übergangs- und Entwicklungsprozesse liegen der Ausdifferenzierung seiner komplexen Gestalt zugrunde: Insbesondere die sich oft verschiebenden Grenzen der polyethnischen Großreiche verliehen der

Region einen fluiden Übergangscharakter; deren Auseinandersetzungen untereinander waren für die Herauskristallisierung eines vergleichsweise heterogenen ethnischen Gefüges verantwortlich und modifizierten in der Folge stets dessen Entwicklungsgrundlagen. Südosteuropa bildete indessen nicht nur einen Übergangsraum zwischen den dort interagierenden Imperien, sondern auch in seinem Inneren. Die multiethnischen Vielvölkerreiche waren intern – bedingt durch territoriale und daraus resultierende demographische Umschichtungen – nicht entlang klar erkennbarer ethnischer Trennlinien strukturiert. Für den Zugang der Bevölkerung zu gesellschaftlichen Ressourcen war deren jeweilige ethnische Zugehörigkeit ohnehin nicht ausschlaggebend, sondern das Ausmaß ihrer Partizipation wurde zunächst von Größen wie Standeszugehörigkeit und Konfession bestimmt. Die gewachsene, interne ethnische Verwobenheit sorgte beim Erscheinen neuzeitlicher „nationaler“ Kriterien für jene Umbruchs- und Konfliktsituationen, die den Zerfallsprozess der in Südosteuropa aufeinandertreffenden Großreiche kennzeichneten. Die neuzeitliche Idee der Nation als schichtenübergreifend und die Einheit ihrer Mitglieder propagierendes,¹ konstruiertes Modell bildet das diametrale Gegenstück zur bisher praktizierten Unterteilung der Einwohner multiethnischer Imperien; für deren Einwohner wurde die jeweils eigene, durch ihre Eliten propagierte „Nationalität“² Hauptadressat ihrer Loyalität,³ während etwa Schichten- oder Konfessionsgebundenheit in den Hintergrund traten.

¹ Siehe dazu Anthony Smith' Beschreibung des modernen Nationalismus als „an ideological movement that seeks to attain and maintain the autonomy, unity and identity of a human population, some of whose members deem it to constitute an actual or potential 'nation'“, in: Anthony Smith, *Nationalism. Theory, Ideology, History*, Cambridge: Polity Press 2001, S. 25.

² Eric Hobsbawm beschreibt die Etablierung neuzeitlichen nationalen Bewusstseins als elitäre „Erfindung von Traditionen“, die angesichts gesellschaftlicher Umbruchssituationen sowohl neue Loyalitäten als auch ein Mobilisierungspotential bereitstellen sollen. Der Hauptbezugspunkt jener erfundenen Traditionen seien dabei die erfundene Nation mitsamt ihrer Gemeinsamkeit suggerierenden Symbole. Siehe dazu: Eric Hobsbawm, *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999, S. 13f.

³ Zur analytischen Dimension des Loyalitätsbegriffes und dessen Kategorisierung als soziales Phänomen: Peter Haslinger; Joachim von Putkamer, „Staatsmacht, Minderheit, Loyalität – konzeptionelle Grundlagen am Beispiel Ostmittel- und Südosteuropas in der

Den Nährboden für die ethnische Verwobenheit Südosteuropas bilden unter anderem die frühneuzeitlichen Migrationsprozesse; angesichts ihrer Vielschichtigkeit und ihres verschiedenartigen Auftretens sind sie ein zentraler Entwicklungsfaktor für die sich kontinuierlich fortentwickelnde Gestalt der Region, die sie daher als Migrationsraum *per se* erscheinen lassen. Ihre Tragweite demonstriert insbesondere die serbische Besiedlung Südungarns bis zum 18. Jahrhundert.

Auch diese vollzog sich kontextual und aus verschiedenen Beweggründen. So charakterisierte zunächst die mittelalterliche Handelsmigration den kommerziellen, über bestehende Grenzen stattfindenden Austausch. Ein weitaus signifikanterer Zusammenhang ist indessen die sukzessive Expansion des Osmanischen Reiches: Die sich über Jahrhunderte erstreckende serbische Migration war auch in diesem Kontext eine meist gelenkte, organisierte Siedlungsbewegung. Demnach verfügten die Osmanen angesichts einer anfänglich attraktiven materiellen Lage auch über serbische Militärangehörige,⁴ während sich bedeutende serbische Siedlungsaktivitäten auch auf ein vitales osmanisches Interesse an Kolonisation und Neuorganisation der hinzugewonnenen ungarischen Gebiete zurückführen lassen.⁵ Die serbische Migration setzte sich unter geänderten Vorzeichen angesichts der Eroberungen durch die Habsburgermonarchie fort. Die Ansiedlung von Serben auf den von ihr gewonnenen Territorien geschah zur Stärkung der militärischen Abwehr der Osmanen, zur Neubesiedlung bevölkerungsarmer Landstriche, oder zur Existenzsicherung durch organisierte Flucht jener Bevölkerungsteile, die sich offen gegen das Osmanische Reich wandten und nach dessen Wiedererstarben die Konsequenzen ihrer Parteinahme fürchteten.

Die alleinige Fokussierung auf die osmanische Expansion als Hauptmotiv für die serbische Migration führt zu Simplifizierung und Schaffung vereinfachender Deutungsmuster;⁶ dies wird nicht dem

Zwischenkriegszeit“, in: DIES. [Hrsg.], *Staat, Loyalität und Minderheiten in Ostmittel- und Südosteuropa 1918 – 1941*, München 2007, S. 1 – 16.

⁴ Vgl. Dušan Popović, *Srbi u Vojvodini. Knjiga prva. Od najstarijih vremena do Karlovačkog mira 1699*, Novi Sad: Matica Srpska, 1957, S. 167.

⁵ Vgl. D. Popović, 1957, S. 104f.

⁶ Vgl. Boris Đ. Krstić; Vasa Lupupović, *Sokolovac. Monografija*, Timișoara: Savez Srba u Rumuniji, 1999, S. 13, sowie Stepanov, Ljubomir, *Statistički podaci o Srbima u Rumuniji*, Timișoara: Savez Srba u Rumuniji, 2005, S. 6. In beiden Werken gilt die – de facto

Anspruch gerecht, den Siedlungsbewegungen als komplexe Prozesse an eine ernsthafte und objektive Untersuchung stellen.⁷

„Schuldzuweisungen“ und „Opferrollen“ vor dem Hintergrund sich wandelnder politischer und gesellschaftlicher Hintergründe konterkarieren die Bemühungen um eine sachliche Analyse. So wenig, wie sich die Osmanen in eine Rolle als „Täter“ drängen lassen, können auch die betreffenden Serben nicht pauschalisierend als „Opfer“ charakterisiert werden. Nicht nur neuzeitliches Raumdenken, sondern auch eine bei späterer, unreflektierter Beschreibung des serbischen Migrationsprozesses anzutreffende vermeintliche Selbstaufopferung bilden konzeptionelles Hindernisse.⁸

unentschiedene – Schlacht auf dem Amselfeld (serb.: Kosovo polje) von 1389 zwischen einer antiosmanischen Allianz unter serbischer Führung und dem Osmanischen Reich als Hauptauslöser der serbischen Migrationsbewegung, die sich nordwärts bis über die Donau erstreckte.

⁷ So wenden sich Toma Popović, Radovan Samardžić und Rajko L. Veselinović in ihrer „Istorija Srpskog Naroda“ explizit gegen eine Verklärung und Simplifizierung der Emigration serbischer Bevölkerungsteile aus ihrem bisherigen Lebensumfeld. So habe kein vermeintlicher Wunsch, statt in einem islamisch dominierten „in einem christlichen Land zu leben“ zur deren Auswanderung geführt; diese sei stattdessen nur im äußersten Extremfall und als letzter Schritt zur Sicherstellung der eigenen Existenz erfolgt. Siehe dazu: Toma Popović, Radovan Samardžić, Rajko L. Veselinović, *Istorija Srpskog Naroda. Treća knjiga. Prvi tom. Srbi pod tuđinskom vlašću 1537 – 1699*, Beograd: Srpska književna zadruga, 1993, S. 90f.

⁸ Insbesondere Slavko Gavrilović begibt sich bei seiner Beschreibung des „aufopferungsvollen Kampfes der Serben“ gegen das vordringende Osmanische Reich auf eine eindeutig normative Ebene: Nach dem Scheitern der Verteidigung ihres Staates (sic) hätten „[...] die Serben als orthodoxe Christen das katholisch-protestantische Europa vor dem Islam verteidigt, der die transdanubischen und pannonischen Regionen erobert habe und bis an die Mauern Wiens gelangt sei [...]“, in: DERS., *Iz istorije Srba u Hrvatskoj, Slavoniji i Ugarskoj (XV – XIX vek)*, Beograd: Filip Višnjić, 1993, S. 11. (im serbischen Original: „[...] Srbi su, kao pravoslavni hrišćani, branili katoličko-protestantsku Evropu od islama koji je osvajao podunavske i panonske oblasti i stigao pod zidine Beča [...].“) Seine undifferenzierte Heranziehung des Begriffes „Staat“ (im serbischen Original: „država“) zur Beschreibung des mittelalterlichen Königreiches demonstriert zudem das Bestreben des Autors, eine Kontinuität zum neuzeitlichen serbischen Staat herzustellen, um dessen vermeintliche Historizität zu belegen. Die Unreflektiertheit findet in der Beschreibung der Übergesiedelten ihre Fortsetzung, die sich laut Gavrilović als neue „Mitbürger“ (sic) der ungarischen Könige, der siebenbürgischen sowie der walachischen Fürsten zudem der Verteidigung der südlichen Grenzen verschrieben hätten, „[...] während sie an den Sieg des Kreuzes über den Halbmond glaubten.“, in: S. Gavrilović, 1993, S. 11. (im serbischen Original: „[...] verujući u pobedu krsta nad polumesecom.“)

2. Die serbische Besiedlung Südungarns ab dem 15. Jahrhundert

Die auf spätmittelalterliche Handelsmigration zurückzuführende serbische Präsenz in Ungarn⁹ wurde durch die organisierte serbische Ansiedlung insbesondere im Süden des Landes ab dem 15. Jahrhundert erweitert. Dort erhielten die sich im ungarisch-osmanischen Spannungsfeld befindlichen serbischen Despoten während der Herrschaften Sigismunds von Luxemburg und Matthias Corvinus' umfangreiche Ländereien, was als Versuch verstärkter Einflussnahme und Anbindung zu deuten ist. Das Beharren insbesondere in der serbischen Fachliteratur auf einem aus heutiger Sicht nicht mehr nachweisbaren zahlenmäßigen Umfang der Neusiedler geschieht jedoch auf Kosten einer objektiven Analyse der serbischen Migrationsprozesse und repräsentiert stattdessen eine „numerische Rechtfertigung“ der Präsenz einer Ethnie und birgt ein erhebliches Konfliktpotential gegenüber retrospektiven Ansprüchen anderer Nationen. So werden „mehrere Hundert serbische Familien“ genannt, die der serbische Despot Stevan, Sohn des 1389 während der Schlacht auf dem Amselfeld gefallenen Fürsten Lazar, ab 1411 im heutigen Banat im heutigen Banat Torontál angesiedelt habe.¹⁰ 1464 hätten sich des weiteren unter den Adligen Stevan und Dimitar Jakšić „ungefähr 1.200 serbische Familien“ in den benachbarten Komitaten Temes und Arad niedergelassen.¹¹ Den Höhepunkt bilden jedoch jene „circa 50.000 Serben aus der Gegend um Kruševac“, die 1481 unter Knez Pavle Branković im heutigen Banat angesiedelt worden seien, um sich dafür im Gegenzug unter Mathias Corvinus gegen die weitere osmansche Expansion zu stellen.¹² Derartige Zahlenangaben, auf die in der zeitgenössischen Literatur zurückgegriffen wird, sind jedoch vor dem Hintergrund des Zeitpunktes ihrer Eruiierung nicht als empirische, sondern als symbolische Werte zu interpretieren; zudem ist unklar, wie diese vermeintliche Anzahl der Migranten festgestellt wurde. Dem Spätmittelalter war eine objektive Geschichtsschreibung nicht bekannt,

⁹ Vgl. Popović; Samardžić; Veselinović, 1993, S. 21f.

¹⁰ Ljubomir Stepanov, *Iz povesti Kefelja*, Timișoara: Demokratski savez Srba i Karaševaka u Rumuniji, 1994, S. 22.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ljubomir Stepanov, *Srbi u Knezu*, Timișoara: Savez Srba u Rumuniji, 2001, S. 20.

weshalb auch die entsprechenden Quellen nicht um eine empirische Genauigkeit nach heutigen Maßstäben bemüht waren. Vielmehr drücken derartige Angaben das zeitgenössische Empfinden angesichts einer vergleichsweise umfangreichen Einwanderung und Ansiedlung aus. In Anbetracht ihrer ungesicherten Herkunft und Erhebung halten sie keiner ernsthaften Überprüfung stand und liefern somit keinen stichhaltigen Beitrag zur Untersuchung der serbischen Migrationsprozesse. Im Gegensatz zur Dauerhaftigkeit und Fortentwicklung des serbischen Bevölkerungsteils in seinem neuen Umfeld ist dessen numerischer Umfang daher nur von äußerst untergeordneter Relevanz.

Dennoch ist festzuhalten: Bereits vor der osmanischen Eroberung Südungarns erfolgte eine organisierte Ansiedlung serbischer Bevölkerungsteile; dieses verhältnismäßig neue und zunächst der Osmanenabwehr dienende Bevölkerungselement war indessen umfangreich genug, um bis zur Einverleibung in das Osmanische Reich ab 1541 – das Banat stand erst ab 1552 unter osmanischer Herrschaft – und darüber hinaus einen festen Bestandteil des regionalen ethnischen Gefüges zu bilden.¹³ Die osmanischen Gebietsverluste an die Habsburgermonarchie war eine Zäsur für die serbische Migration, die unter der Ägide der neuen Autoritäten fortgesetzt wurde.

3. Der „Große Serbenzug“ von 1690 unter Arsenije III. Čarnojević

Das im Osmanischen Reich angewandte *millet*-System, das die nichtmuslimischen Untertanen entlang konfessioneller Grenzen separierte und ihnen auf lokaler Ebene einen hohen Grad an Selbstverwaltung zugestand, sorgte zwar nicht für eine religiöse Gleichberechtigung nach modernem Verständnis, doch es vermochte, einen gewissen Grad an religiöser Koexistenz zu garantieren.¹⁴ Ungeachtet der erhöhten

¹³ Vgl. Aleksa Ivić, *Istoriija Srba u Vojvodini. Od najstarijih vremena do osnivanja Potiskopomoriške granice (1703)*, Novi Sad: Matica Srpska, 1929, S. 256; des weiteren: Miodrag Milin, *Interferențe culturale între poporul român și popoarele din spațiul Iugoslav între secolele al XVIII-lea și începutul secolului al XX-lea. Perspectiva politică-culturală în secolul al XIX-lea*, Cluj-Napoca; Timișoara: Eigenverlag, 1988, S. 1: „Deja în vremea bătăliei de la Mohács în valea Mureșului e semnalată prezența acestui element sîrbesc [...]”

¹⁴ Vgl. Barbara Jelavich, *History of the Balkans. Eighteenth and Nineteenth centuries, Vol. 1*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, S. 129.

Steuerlasten betrachtete es die Christen als Schutzbefohlene des Reiches; die sie umfassende millet-Struktur bildete die bis dato einzig gängige Unterteilungspraxis der Einwohner des Imperiums, die in Abwesenheit anderer Kategorien entlang konfessioneller Trennlinien vorgenommen wurde. Diese Struktur bildete die Keimzelle für eine spätere Transformation von konfessionellen in ethnische Identitäten, die sich jedoch erst unter dem Einfluss der sich in der Moderne entwickelnden politischen Prinzipien vollziehen konnte. Trotz der Bevorteilung des Islam war die Situation nicht mit der offenen konfessionellen Konkurrenz vergleichbar, die die anderen europäischen Regionen der Frühen Neuzeit prägte. Das in der nationalistischen Geschichtsschreibung des 19. Jahrhunderts entstandene Bild des „Türkenjochs“ muss daher differenziert betrachtet werden: Zwar fielen die dynastischen Eliten der eroberten mittelalterlichen Reiche dem osmanischen Machtanspruch zum Opfer, doch allein aus fiskalischen Gründen bestand kein Interesse an einer systematischen Verfolgung anderer Konfessionen und einer forcierten Islamisierung. Das Christentum war gegenüber dem Islam institutionell benachteiligt, doch insbesondere der hohe Grad an lokaler Selbstverwaltung innerhalb des eigenen millets war in diesem Ausmaß in anderen europäischen Regionen kaum anzutreffen. Andererseits verdankt auch das Patriarchat von Konstantinopel seine wirtschaftlich und machtpolitisch exponierte Stellung der im Osmanischen Reich praktizierten Selbstverwaltung auf konfessioneller Basis, die wiederum die administrativen Strukturen des Imperiums bedeutend entlasteten.

Die Erfahrung relativer religiöser Koexistenz fand Eingang in das kollektive Gedächtnis der Angehörigen nichtmuslimischer Konfessionen, und sie wurde mit der Emigration in ein neues Umfeld transferiert. Dies erklärt das Beharren auf konfessionellen Freiheiten und Privilegien der orthodoxen serbischen Übersiedler nach ihrer Ankunft auf dem Gebiet der römisch-katholisch dominierten Habsburgermonarchie. Erst unter dem Einfluss neuzeitlicher ethnonationaler Identitäten wandelte sich dieses administrativ-religiöse Kollektiv schließlich zum Nährboden ethnisch-nationalistischer Interpretationen. Die Einteilung der abgabepflichtigen Untertanen – der *reaya* – anhand ethnischer Kriterien war den Osmanen unbekannt; stattdessen bildete die Konfession die entscheidende,

administrative Größe.¹⁵ Angesichts der ethnischen Heterogenität dieses Vielvölkerreiches war dies der effizienteste Ansatz, zu dem seinerzeit jedoch keine Alternative bestand: Die Heranziehung von Ethnizität oder gar Nationalität als Konstrukte der Moderne war zu Zeiten des vormodernen millet-Systems noch unbekannt, weshalb die konfessionell-institutionelle Repräsentation im Vordergrund stand, und nicht die Herkunft der sie ausübenden Kleriker. Demnach handelt es sich bei dem millet-System keinesfalls um einen „osmanischen Entwurf“ oder eine Präformation von Ethnizität und nationalem Bewusstsein, sondern um ein auf eine heterogene Bevölkerung angewandtes Kriterium zur effizienten Kategorisierung.

Infolge dieser Separation bekleidete der Klerus zunehmend eine Führungsrolle. Neben den spirituell-geistlichen Agenden – also der Sorge um das Jenseits sowie eine darauf vorbereitende diesseitige Ethik – übernahm dieser auch repräsentative Funktionen, sowohl innerhalb der eigenen Gemeinschaft als auch gegenüber den osmanischen, imperialen Autoritäten, deren administrativer Einfluss auf lokaler Ebene nur begrenzten Ausmaßes war. Dieses Rollenverständnis behielt sich die Kirche auch im Falle der übersiedelnden Serben auf das Territorium des Habsburgerreiches vor. In diesem neuen Umfeld war sie jene Institution, die sich der Wahrung einer eigenen Identität verschrieb, indem sie sich auf den Mythos vergangener Größe stützte, wobei sie insbesondere auf das Gedenken an die kanonisierten mittelalterlichen Herrscher des früheren serbischen Reiches zurückgriff.¹⁶ Diese Erinnerung diente einer Kohäsion des Gemeinsamkeitsempfindens gegenüber den „Fremdherrschern“ und den „Anderen“, verdeckten jedoch den Blick auf die Tatsache, dass die osmanische Herrschaft nicht weniger soziale und „nationale“ Freiheiten bot als die christlichen, feudalen Königreiche des Mittelalters mit ihren weitgehend undurchlässigen Gesellschaftsstrukturen. Mit diesen sahen sich zunächst auch die infolge des „Großen Serbenzuges“ vornehmlich im Süden Ungarns siedelnden Serben konfrontiert; deren Klerus verschrieb sich gemäß seinem Selbstverständnis infolge ihrer Übersiedlung ins

¹⁵ *Der hohe Stellenwert von Konfession als Unterscheidungsmerkmal im millet-System wird dadurch verdeutlicht, als dass millet im Deutschen sowohl mit Religionsgemeinschaft als auch mit Nation und Volk wiedergegeben wird.*

¹⁶ Vgl. M. Milin, 1988, S. 2.

Habsburgerreich einer Sicherstellung der Privilegien und Sonderrechte zum Erhalt der Gemeinschaft. Dies beruhte auf dem Gewohnheitsrecht der serbischen Orthodoxie: Bereits unter den Osmanen war die alleinige Repräsentation eines ihrer zentralen Anliegen, welches auch nach der Übersiedlung unter Patriarch Arsenije III. Čarnojević auf Habsburger Territorium weiterverfolgt wurde. Mit ihm begab sich eine gesamte Institution samt ihrem Selbstverständnis als Repräsentant des früheren millets unter eine neue Oberherrschaft, wo sie infolge dieser *translatio* um die fortwährende Sicherstellung ihrer Position und ihrer Rechte bemüht war. Dieser Anspruch erstreckte sich wie zuvor im Osmanischen Reich auch hier nicht exklusiv auf die Serben, sondern auch auf andere orthodoxe Einwohner der Habsburgermonarchie.

Der Übersiedlung ging eine offene Parteinahme der serbischen Kirchenhierarchen im Zuge des sogenannten fünften bzw. „Großen Türkenkrieges“ (1683 – 1699) der Donaumonarchie gegen das Osmanische Reich voraus. Angesichts einer osmanischen Gegenoffensive ist ein von Czoernig detailliert beschriebener Aufruf Kaiser Leopolds I. vom 6. April 1690 „an die gesammten Völker Albanien's, Servien's, Bulgarien's, Silistrien's, Illyrien's, Macedonien's und Rascien's etc.“¹⁷ von Bedeutung, der sie aufforderte, „den günstigen Augenblick zu benützen, das türkische Joch abzuschütteln, und zur Beförderung ihres Heiles, ihrer Freiheit und der christlichen Religion auf seine Seite herüberzutreten, gegen die Türken die Waffen zu ergreifen, und sich den kaiserlichen Feldherren anzuschließen“.¹⁸ Dabei muss die zukünftige Forschung versuchen zu ermitteln, warum das Habsburgerreich um die Heranziehung außerordentlich breit gefächerter, zumeist orthodoxer Bevölkerungsgruppen bemüht war und darüber hinaus in ihre bestehenden konfessionellen Strukturen – sie unterstanden dem Patriarchat von Peć – einzugreifen versuchte. Ein belastbarer Ansatz ist die versuchte Entwicklung neuer Loyalitäten der orthodoxen Bevölkerung unter osmanischer Herrschaft, aber auch einsetzende Zentralisierungsbemühungen des Habsburgerreiches: Die Neusiedler als neues Element seines komplexen ethnischen Gefüges erhielten ein konfessionelles

¹⁷ Karl Freiherr von Czoernig, *Ethnographie der Oesterreichischen Monarchie. II. Band*, Wien: Kaiserlich-koenigliche Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1857, S. 157.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

Kohäsionszentrum innerhalb der Reichsgrenzen. Čarnojević als dessen Exponent erhielt im Gegenzug die durch den Hof gebilligte Vorherrschaft über die Gläubigen der genannten Landesteile – ein Übertreten der ihm Unterstehenden unter gleichzeitiger Zubilligung von Privilegien war demnach in beiderseitigem Interesse.¹⁹

Dieser Aufruf und die spätere formale Ernennung Čarnojevićs zum geistlichen Oberhaupt *aller* dort genannten Provinzen per Privileg am 21. August 1690²⁰ verweist primär auf die prekäre Situation des Habsburgerreiches, sich zur eigenen Konsolidierung auf eine überwiegend nichtkatholische Bevölkerung außerhalb des eigenen Territoriums stützen zu müssen; dies demonstrieren die umfangreichen Zugeständnisse, die den Adressaten eines „Aufrufes an die Christen“ in einem kaiserlichen Patent vom 31. Mai 1690 zgedacht waren: freie Religionsausübung, die freie Wahl eines Vojevoden und die Abschaffung der unter osmanischer Herrschaft eingeführten Abgaben und Steuern.²¹ Erlassen zu einem Zeitpunkt *vor* der serbischen Übersiedlung in das Habsburgerreich, legte Leopold I. das Fundament für jene kaiserlichen Privilegien, deren Einhaltung und Bestätigung ihre Adressaten nach erfolgter Emigration fortan größte Priorität einräumten. Die konzipierte Beseitigung der osmanischen Oberherrschaft unter angestrebter Mitwirkung der dazu Aufgerufenen hatte jedoch nicht die Prämisse ihrer tatsächlichen Befreiung; stattdessen sollten sie nach einem erfolgreichen Abschluss des Krieges der ungarischen Krone unterstehen.²² Das Scheitern einer Offensive der Habsburgermonarchie und der mit ihnen verbündeten Serben zog eine fluchtartige Rückzugsbewegung nach Norden in Richtung des noch von der Habsburgermonarchie kontrollierten Belgrad nach sich. Eine serbische

¹⁹ Die Tendenz machtpolitischer Einflussnahme auf die Entwicklung konfessioneller Strukturen zeitigte sich auch anhand der Schaffung der griechisch-katholischen Kirche in Siebenbürgen. Mit Rückendeckung durch den Wiener Hof und in Interessenkongruenz mit den dortigen Ständen sollte die Position des Katholizismus eine Stärkung erfahren. Dies belegt eindeutig, dass das spätere Zugeständnis von Privilegien an die orthodoxen Übersiedler in Südungarn unter der Führung des hohen serbischen Klerus keine generell positive Haltung des Habsburgerreiches gegenüber der Orthodoxie repräsentiert, sondern eine dezidiert fallspezifische, interessenorientierte Macht- und Konfessionspolitik.

²⁰ Vgl. K.F. v. Czoernig, Bd. II, 1857, S. 158.

²¹ Vgl. K.F. v. Czoernig, Bd. II, 1857, S. 157.

²² *Ibid.*

Niederlassung in den von der Habsburgermonarchie gehaltenen Territorien war indessen im Interesse des Wiener Hofkriegsrates: Im Falle künftiger Konfrontationen mit dem Osmanischen Reich repräsentierten die Neusiedler ein enormes militärisches Potential.

Dem ist die Position der Kirche gegenüberzustellen: Die personellen und institutionellen Konsequenzen des Überlaufens Čarnojevićs für das Pećer Patriarchat waren noch nicht absehbar, ebenso wie Gestalt und Dauer seines künftigen Aufenthalts auf dem Gebiet des Habsburgerreiches. Es ist anzunehmen, dass dieser Schritt zumindest aus kirchlicher Sicht als vorübergehend empfunden wurde, bis eine Besserung der militärischen Lage die Rückkehr erlaubte.

Die Führungsrolle Čarnojevićs manifestierte sich unterdessen in einem ab Juni 1690 in Belgrad tagenden *sabor* (i.e. Rat) unter der Ägide des Patriarchen, welcher den Bischof von Jenopolje²³, Isaja Đaković, zu Verhandlungen an den Wiener Hof entsandte, um nach deren Abschluss den Fliehenden im Falle ihres Übertritts auf Habsburger Territorium den Fortbestand der bereits zugestandenen Privilegien zu garantieren.²⁴ Die Delegation eines ranghohen Klerikers durch einen vom Patriarchen einberufenen Rat belegt das administrativ-politische Rollenverständnis der Kirche sowie ihre repräsentative Funktion als Interessenvertreterin der Fliehenden. Dessen erfolgreiche Umsetzung belegt die Bestätigung der ihnen bereits zugestandenen Privilegien nach Abschluss der Verhandlungen Đakovićs in Wien am 21. August 1690.²⁵

Angesichts des sich abzeichnenden Falles von Belgrad erfolgte am 8. Oktober 1690 unter Anführung des Patriarchen Čarnojević der Übertritt auf das Territorium der Habsburgermonarchie; vorübergehende Ziele waren angesichts des unklaren Ausgangs der militärischen Auseinandersetzung mit den Osmanen die Niederungen zwischen Theiß²⁶ und Mieresch²⁷, die

²³ Seltener: Janopol; rum.: Ineu; durch die frühere Zugehörigkeit zum Königreich Ungarn auch als ungar. Jenő bekannt.

²⁴ Vgl. Vasa Lupulović, *Viața bisericească a sârbilor din Banat între anii 1865 – 1918*, Cluj-Napoca: Presa Universitară Clujeană, 2009, S. 70.

²⁵ Vgl. D. Popović, 1957, S. 326f.

²⁶ Rum.: Tisa; ungar.: Tisza; serb.: Tisa. Unter dem Gebot konzeptueller Neutralität wird, sofern vorhanden, auf die deutschen Orts- und Landschaftsbezeichnungen zurückgegriffen. Bei erstmaliger Nennung erfolgt der Verweis auf die jeweiligen landessprachlichen Orts- und Landschaftsnamen. Dies entfällt indessen bei überregional bekannten deutschsprachigen Bezeichnungen (z. B. „Donau“).

Baranya, sowie Ofen²⁸ und weiter nördlich gelegene Landesteile Ungarns,²⁹ während sich einzelne Gruppen nach Nordosten wandten und in Großwardein³⁰ und Sathmar³¹ niederließen.³² Zum ersten Mittelpunkt der serbischen Neusiedler und Sitz des Patriarchen Čarnojević entwickelte sich indessen St. Andrä³³ nördlich von Ofen, wo nach früheren Übersiedlungen bereits eine serbische Gemeinschaft bestand.³⁴

Bereit 1686 und 1687 wichen zahlreiche Banater Serben vor den Kampfhandlungen über die Theiß in die Batschka³⁵ und die Baranya aus, sowohl organisiert als auch in Eigeninitiative.³⁶ Hinzu kam eine Übersiedlung aus dem umkämpften Serbien sowie aus Bosnien nach Syrmien³⁷ und Slawonien in die von den Osmanen aufgegebenen Landstriche.³⁸ Während die Frage ihrer eventuellen Rückkehr der Geflohenen wurde durch den Frieden von Karlowitz 1699 obsolet wurde, kristallisierten sich in der Folgezeit insbesondere die grenznahen Regionen Jenopolje, die Batschka und Syrmien als Zentren serbischer Besiedlung heraus.³⁹

Bereits der „Zweite Serbenzug“ unter dem serbischen Patriarchen Arsenije IV. Šakabenta⁴⁰ 1739 trug neben einer Festigung der bereits unter Čarnojević transferierten Institutionen zu einer Stärkung des Anteils an serbischer Bevölkerung in den sogenannten *Neoacquistica*, den vom Osmanischen Reich eroberten Gebieten Südungarns, bei. Infolge ihrer Parteinahme für die Habsburgermonarchie während des erneuten Krieges mit dem Osmanischen Reich von 1737 bis 1739 und der sich abzeichnenden

²⁷ Rum.: Mureş.

²⁸ Ungar.: Buda.

²⁹ Vgl. K.F. v. Czoernig, Bd. II, 1857, S. 158.

³⁰ Rum.: Oradea.

³¹ Rum.: Satu Mare.

³² Vgl. D. Popović, 1957, S. 318.

³³ Ungar.: Szentendre.

³⁴ Vgl. M. Milin, 1988, S. 3.

³⁵ Serb.: Bačka.

³⁶ Vgl. A. Ivić, 1929, S. 289.

³⁷ Serb.: Srem.

³⁸ Jovan Savković, „Borba Srba Vojvođana za svoju teritorijalnu i političku samostalnost“, in *Zbornik Matice Srpske* Jg. 3, 1952, S. 21 – 51, hier S. 23.

³⁹ Vgl. K.F. v. Czoernig, Bd. II, 1857, S. 161.

⁴⁰ Auch: Šakabent.

österreichischen Niederlage siedelten wiederum zahlreiche Serben auf Habsburger Territorium über, insbesondere in das Banat, nach Syrmien sowie in die Batschka.⁴¹ Auch Patriarch Šakabenta, der fortan in Karlowitz residierte und 1741 durch Maria Theresia in seinem Amt bestätigt wurde, wirkte in seinem Selbstverständnis als alleiniger geistlicher *und* weltlicher Repräsentant der Serben für die Einhaltung und Sicherstellung ihrer Privilegien. Diese kontinuierlichen, an den Wiener Hof adressierten Forderungen sowie der sich verschärfende Gegensatz zu den ungarischen Ständen prägte die serbische Präsenz im Habsburgerreich; die Forderung eines eigenen, „nationalen“ Territoriums auf dem Kongress von Temeschwar⁴² 1790 ist dabei nur eine von mehreren Zäsuren, und sie war zugleich der Ausgangspunkt eines weiteren Interessenkonfliktes: Insbesondere für die Rumänen stellte sich die Frage nach einer eigenen Repräsentation – außerhalb des Fürstentums Siebenbürgen zunächst losgelöst von der Karlowitzer Metropole zunächst auf kirchlicher, später vor dem Hintergrund gesamtnationaler Bestrebungen auch auf politischer und territorialer Ebene. Diese Forderungen sind letztendlich auch eine Folge der die ethnische Heterogenität begründenden Migrationsprozesse; insbesondere im Falle des Banats werden ihre Verläufe und Ergebnisse rumänischer- und serbischerseits höchst unterschiedlich gewertet.

4. Das serbisch-rumänische Bevölkerungsverhältnis im Banat als Resultat der Migrationsbewegungen und als neuzeitlicher Diskursgegenstand

Als Region der Grenze und des Austausches unterlag das Banat einem kontinuierlichen strukturellen Wandel; bedingt durch seine Situation als peripheres Grenzland aus Perspektive der jeweiligen Machtzentren besaß es stets einen Übergangscharakter, was eine später vorgenommene Aufteilung entlang ethnischer, konfessioneller oder sprachlicher Trennlinien erschwerte. Seine ethnische Vielschichtigkeit bietet Freiraum für differierende Deutungsmuster; der angestrebte Nachweis einer „Autochthonie des Ersteren“ ist insbesondere vor dem

⁴¹ Vgl. Slavko Gavrilović, *Iz istorije Srba u Hrvatskoj, Slavoniji i Ugarskoj (XV – XIX vek)*, Beograd: Filip Višnjić, 1993, S. 140.

⁴² Rum.: Timișoara.

Hintergrund moderner Ethno-Nationalismen, die bis heute die historische Forschung in Südosteuropa dominieren, sowie als Ausdruck eines neuzeitlichen, territorialen Anspruchsdenkens zu verstehen.

Die Inkorporierung durch das Habsburgerreich bedingte eine Intensivierung der Bevölkerungsdichte: Die serbische Abwanderung nach Auflösung der benachbarten Theiß-Mieresch-Militärgrenze, die Verstärkung des rumänischen Bevölkerungselements durch eine größtenteils unorganisierte Einwanderung ab dem 18. Jahrhundert sowie die erneute serbische Immigration während des „Zweiten Serbenzuges“ 1739 unter Patriarch Šakabenta prägten die ethnische Struktur des Banats nachhaltig. Die Etablierung der Banater Militärgrenze ab 1764 bildet schließlich den vorläufigen Höhepunkt ihrer weiteren, organisierten Modifizierung während des 18. Jahrhunderts.

Die neuzeitliche rumänische Literatur, die sich in großem Umfang der Historiographie unter dezidiert nationalistischen Vorzeichen widmet, verweist die Annahme eines entvölkerten Banates in die „Geschichtsschreibung des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts“⁴³ und besteht dabei auf einer Authochthonie der Banater Rumänen;⁴⁴ die Region sei zudem „Teil des originären Lebensraumes der Rumänen“⁴⁵ und „Raum ihrer Traditionswahrung“⁴⁶. Dies suggeriert einen territorialen Exklusivitätsanspruch und repräsentiert einen unreflektierten Nationalismus unter konsequenter Nichtbeachtung historischer Forschungstraditionen.⁴⁷

Die Konstatierung einer hohen Bevölkerungsdichte des Banats anhand einer hohen Anzahl der dortigen Siedlungen ist prinzipiell ein

⁴³ Aurel Țintă, „Situția Banatului la cucerirea lui de către Habsburgi“ in *Studii de istorie a Banatului* Jg. 1, 1969, S. 83 – 114, hier S. 85.

⁴⁴ Vgl. A. Țintă, 1969, S. 107.

⁴⁵ Vgl. Theodor Trăpcea, „Aspecte privind starea economică, socială și politică a Pașalikului de la Timișoara“ in *Studii de istorie a Banatului* Jg. 4, 1976, S. 3 – 23, hier S. 3.

⁴⁶ Călin Felezeu, „Autonomia Românilor din Banat în epoca dominației otomane 1552 – 1718“ in: *Actele Simpoziului „Banatul iugoslav. Trecut istoric și cultural“*, Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike i nastavna sredstva 1997, S. 89 – 96, hier S. 95f.

⁴⁷ Elie Kedourie formuliert treffend: „Nationalists make use of the past in order to subvert the present.“; in: E. Kedourie, *Nationalism*, Cambridge; Oxford: Blackwell 1993, S. 70. Der reine Nachweis rumänischer – wie auch anderer – Bevölkerungsteile im Banat erlaubt keinesfalls die Konstruktion vermeintlich historisch begründeter Kontinuitäten, um gegenwärtige Ansprüche in Auseinandersetzung mit anderen Nationen zu begründen.

stichhaltiger Ansatz,⁴⁸ doch bei den Erfassungen infolge der Eroberungen durch das Habsburgerreich handelt es sich nicht um eine Volkszählung im neuzeitlichen Sinne, sondern um eine Erfassung der Abgabepflichtigen; dies ließ ethnische gegenüber fiskalischen Kriterien in den Hintergrund treten. Die neuzeitliche, retrospektive Bezeichnung der Banater Siedlungen als dezidiert „ethnisch rumänisch“ oder „ethnisch serbisch“ setzt enge, rückprojizierende Grenzen, die seinerzeit unbekannt waren und sich erst durch das spätere Einwirken moderner nationaler Identitäten auch im Banat herauskristallisierten. Während zudem eine rumänische Besiedlungsmehrheit in dieser Region mit Ausnahme der überwiegend vermeintlich serbisch besiedelten Distrikte Pantschowa⁴⁹ und Werschetz⁵⁰ anhand linguistischer Merkmale zunächst plausibel erscheint,⁵¹ erlaubt der Name einer bestimmten Siedlung dennoch keine konkreten Rückschlüsse auf ihre Besiedlung durch eine bestimmte Ethnie. Im Rumänischen wie im Serbischen wurden bei verschiedener Schreibweise oftmals dieselben Ortsnamen verwendet, während beide Sprachen erst ab der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts kodifiziert wurden. Erst dieser Schritt erlaubte bei einsetzender Verwendung linguistisch standardisierter Ortsbezeichnungen eine fassbare Differenzierung. Zudem wurde eine Beschreibung der Banater Siedlungen oft durch auswärtige Repräsentanten der Verwaltung vorgenommen; angesichts einer fehlenden Kodifizierung der dort jeweils verwendeten Sprachen wurde auf die in der lokalen Bevölkerung übliche Aussprache ein und desselben Ortsnamens zurückgegriffen, und das meist unabhängig von ihrer ethnischen Struktur. Die Toponyme geben daher nur sehr begrenzt Aufschluss über die tatsächlichen Besiedlungsverhältnisse und verbieten daher eine retrospektive ethnonationale Grenzziehung.

Positionen, die die serbische Präsenz im Banat auf einen Zeitpunkt *nach* der Zerschlagung des mittelalterlichen serbischen Königreiches verweisen, sind mit jenen Positionen unvereinbar, die es als originär serbischen Siedlungsraum betrachten und dessen Besiedlung durch ein rumänisches Bevölkerungselement auf die Zeit *nach* dem Auftreten einer

⁴⁸ Vgl. Paul Binder, „Lista localităților din Banat de la sfârșitul secolului al XVII-lea“ in *Studii de istorie a Banatului* Jg. 2, 1970, S. 61 – 68, hier S. 62.

⁴⁹ Serb.: Pančevo.

⁵⁰ Serb.: Vršac.

⁵¹ Vgl. P. Binder, 1970, S. 62.

serbischen Bevölkerung datieren. So hätten insbesondere im nicht von Rumänen bewohnten, westlichen Banat „aus Siebenbürgen einwandernde Rumänen“ die zuvor serbischen Siedlungen „übernommen“.⁵²

Ein weiteres Motiv neben der retrospektiven Beanspruchung des gesamten Banats bildet dessen Unterteilung in einen westlichen und einen östlichen Teil von jeweils unterschiedlicher ethnischer Gewichtung.⁵³ Als vorgeblich konzeptionell sinnvoller Ansatz versucht er jedoch, die „andere“ Ethnie in der jeweiligen Teilregion wenn nicht zu delegitimieren, sie doch als „Fremdkörper“ zu definieren. In diesem Verständnis sind die geschilderten rumänischen „Zuwanderungsprozesse“ aus den weiter östlich gelegenen Bergregionen in die Banater Ebene zu verstehen, wo sie als Hinzugezogene auf ein bereits vorhandenes serbisches Bevölkerungselement getroffen seien.⁵⁴ Wird andererseits der östliche Gebietsteil allein einem kompakten ethnisch-homogenen rumänischen Bevölkerungselement zugesprochen,⁵⁵ beschreibt dies wiederum die serbische Präsenz als sekundäres Element und vernachlässigt ebenfalls die Rolle des Banats als einen durch interne Migrationsprozesse geprägten Übergangsraum, dem Grenzen entlang ethnischer Scheidelinien seinerzeit unbekannt waren und daher nicht rekonstruiert werden können. Selbst wenn für das 14. Jahrhundert ein rumänischer Bevölkerungsanteil im Banat nachgewiesen werden kann,⁵⁶ so macht es die mangelhafte Quellensituation während der osmanischen Herrschaft unmöglich, eine gesicherte ethnische Kontinuität bis in die Frühe Neuzeit herzustellen. Dies gilt nicht nur für die Rumänen, sondern für sämtliche als „autochthon“ beschriebene Banater Ethnien.⁵⁷

Nicht nur die jeweiligen politischen und administrativen Zentren, die auf dieses Grenzland einwirkten, sondern das Banat bildete darüber hinaus eine periphere Nahtstelle und Randzone. Die Nähe seiner einzelnen Regionen zu einem Epizentrum neuzeitlicher ethnonationaler Bewegungen

⁵² Popović, D., *Srbi u Vojvodini. Knjiga druga. Od Karlovačkog mira 1699 do Temišvarskog sabora 1790*, Novi Sad: Matica Srpska, 1959, S. 36.

⁵³ Vgl. D. Popović, 1957, S. 103f.

⁵⁴ Vgl. J. Erdeljanović, 1992, 7.

⁵⁵ Vgl. D. Ţeicu, *Die ekklesiastische Geographie des mittelalterlichen Banats*, Bukarest: Editura Academiei Române, 2007, S. 11.

⁵⁶ Vgl. Maluckov, M., *Rumuni u Banatu*, Novi Sad: Budućnost, 1985, S. 29.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

erlauben in der Tat Rückschlüsse auf die Gewichtung einer Ethnie in der Moderne. Während seine retrospektive Unterteilung anhand ethnonationaler Gesichtspunkte erwiesenermaßen und trotz des Bestrebens nationalistisch geprägter Fachliteratur unmöglich ist, erlaubt in der Neuzeit der fluide Übergang zwischen ethnischen Schwerpunktregionen weder einseitige Beanspruchungen noch klare territoriale Aufteilungen anhand ethnonationaler Kriterien, weder in einer versuchten Apologie des vermeintlich „eigenen“ Lebensraumes durch die nationalistisch geprägte Literatur, noch bei der Gründung neuzeitlicher Nationalstaaten. Wird dieser Versuch dennoch unternommen, entstehen durch diese neu gezogenen Grenzlinien Minderheiten, die sich nicht als solche verstehen, und die ihre Loyalität statt auf „ihren“ neuen Staat zum empfundenen „Heimatland“ jenseits der etablierten Grenzen richten.⁵⁸

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⁵⁸ Rogers Brubaker definiert den externen Loyalitätsadressaten neuzeitlicher nationaler Minderheiten als „external national, homeland“. Nach erfolgter Grenzziehung entsteht insbesondere dann ein „externes Heimatland“, wenn dieses die Aufsichtsgewalt über die vermeintlich ihm zugehörige Minderheit beansprucht. Über die neu etablierte, teilende Grenze hinweg entfaltet sich demnach eine zweigestaltige Beziehung: Die Minderheit sieht in ihrem „Mutterland“ nicht ihr eigentliches Heimatland, sondern eine Schutzmacht, der sie sich zugehörig fühlt. Diese wiederum reklamiert gegenüber dem die Minderheit vereinnahmenden Staat eine Schutzfunktion der ihr zugehörigen Minderheit. Siehe dazu: Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism reframed. Nationhood and the national question in the New Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, S. 57ff.

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L'ESPRIT FAUSTIEN OCCIDENTAL ET LA CRISE ECOLOGIQUE

THE FAUSTIAN WESTERN SPIRIT AND THE ECOLOGICAL CRISIS

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Abstract

The ecologic crisis is undeniably the product of the Western civilisation, particularly of the modern ameliorative task, now projected on a planetary scale. Is it, however triggered by a more profound determinism, which finds its roots in the original religious vision of Christianity? More precisely, in the biblical mandate God has given men to multiply and dominate the Earth as a king over his dominion? There are, actually, some ecologist "prosecutors" who are making exactly this point. Christianity is, on the long term, to be held as ultimate responsible for the heavy mass of this "eco-cide" civilisation. Evaluating such spiritual roots of the disaster, we discovered however, in the "epileptically" advancing Western history a fundamental differentiation between this royal status given to man in the Bible over the Earth, and the "psychosis" of modern Faustian project. Given the fact that, from a theological standpoint, such a divine mandate implied however a divine surveillance and correction, the neurotic progressivism of the Faustian principle was not completely released, until the proclamation of the Death of God. It is in this way only that man could become his own master. He was now able to freely dispose of the great cosmic reservoir without accounting in front of any instance higher than himself. It is, in conclusion, not in the least the contemplative Christianity to be hold responsible for the ecological crisis, but, indeed, the Faustian modernity.

Keywords: Faustian spirit, Western civilization, Christianity, Modernity, Ecologist movement

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Die Tat ist überall entscheidend
(Goethe)

La crise écologique doit visiblement être imputée, dans le grand dialogue des civilisations, au *projet occidental moderne*. D'aucuns, néanmoins, ont essayé d'approfondir la recherche des ressorts spirituels d'une telle explosion techno-civilisationnelle dévastatrice. L'épicentre spirituel qui aurait travaillé de façon cryptique au surgissement de cette crise serait le christianisme. Pour vérifier cette accusation proférée par des procureurs écologistes, on va essayer de retracer les convulsions spirituelles qui ont tourmenté l'histoire jusqu'à l'aboutissement de la crise mondiale des écosystèmes.

La planétarisation du mode moderne de l'Occident développe une phénoménologie ambivalente. Le rapport typiquement occidental au *cosmos* tire la substance de sa vision de la théologie de l'Occident et de ses adaptations historiques. Les crises de la vision du monde et les ruptures produites autour de la dispute qui visait le rapport entre la *vita contemplativa* et la *vita activa* sont cruciales pour observer le travail secret du principe faustien, qui dans la modernité, a surgi à la surface de l'histoire. La particularité du principe faustien est la médiation du positif par le négatif, de l'idéal par la destruction.

1. *Metron* archaïque et *hybris* moderne

1.1. *L'homme microcosmique*.

Assumer l'équilibre entre l'homme et la nature dans l'horizon de l'existence archaïque signifiait le repli de l'homme dans une temporalité cyclique et dans le sentiment quasi-panthéiste de son intégration cosmique. Les ontologies archaïques élevaient le monde au rang éminent d'une présence presque immédiate de l'esprit, qui serait toujours présent dans le monde. Pour lui, la soumission devant la sagesse archaïque équivalait l'acceptation de la stabilité du monde¹. L'homme sentait de façon *holistique* son appartenance à la vastitude cosmique en vertu d'une corrélation mystique entre *le microcosme* qu'il était d'un côté et *le macrocosme* de l'autre.

¹ Mircea Eliade, *Le mythe de l'éternel retour*, Gallimard, Paris, 1969.

Le caractère microcosmique de l'homme définissait son statut d'expression concentrée de la totalité cosmique, d'être un véritable hologramme ontologique du cosmos² : un être qui contient *in micro* la totalité des constituants cosmiques, mais qui est en même temps contenu et enfermé en lui. Contenu dans le cosmos, il était uniquement cela, donc un précipité et un moment dans les pulsations du grand Tout cosmique (y compris de celui subtil pour aller plus loin de son écorce newtonienne). L'homme est une *imago mundi*, existant ainsi sous les lois et les structures du monde. L'homme primitif (pré-moderne) vivait harmonisé avec le cosmos, puisque, pour paraphraser une expression husserlienne, il se sentait une *partie*, et non un *corrélat* cosmique³. Il a subordonné constamment sa propre culture et civilisation aux grands phénomènes cosmiques, avec lesquels il vivait dans un *modus vivendi* fondé de manière ambivalente tant sur la fertilité maternelle, protectrice du cosmos que sur sa terreur latente. Le rapport animiste, polythéiste, autant que les formes du panthéisme cosmique (mais non du panthéisme acosmique), sont tout autant des *cosmo-phanies* qui localisaient le sacré dans le cosmos et inondaient le mondain avec de la sacralité. Dans l'ère mythologique de l'humanité, c'est *l'homme qui est contenu dans le cosmos, et nullement le cosmos dans l'homme*.

1.2. L'homme micro-théotique

Un rapport d'adversité avec un cosmos qui par tous ces modes élémentaires était porteur de sacralité était impossible pour des raisons religieuses. C'est pourquoi la technique est restée embryonnaire en Asie et dans les autres aires extra-européennes. Dans le contexte judaïque, propagé et universalisé par la frontière chrétienne, en raison de l'accent décisif posé

² Mircea Eliade, *Traité d'histoire des religions*, Payot, Paris, 1964, Le *Traité* peut être considéré comme une vision synoptique du rapport archaïque général aux hiérophanies cosmiques.

³ Edmund Husserl, *Méditations cartésiennes*, Vrin, Paris, 1996, p. 154 : « Dans l'attitude transcendante, et dans l'abstraction constitutive dont nous venons de parler, mon ego, l'ego du sujet méditant, ne se confond pas, dans son être transcendante propre avec le moi humain habituel; il ne se confond pas avec le moi, réduit à un simple phénomène, à l'intérieure du phénomène du monde. Il s'agit, bien au contraire, d'une structure essentielle de la constitution universelle que présente la vie de l'ego transcendental, en tant que constituant le monde objectif ».

sur le « rapport négatif » (*negatives Verhältnis*)⁴ du cosmos à Dieu, des choses changent. C'est l'apophasme qui refuse le statut divin à toute entité cosmique, dans le sens radical de saint Paul. Le cosmos entier devient profane, dé-substantialisé et sécularisé, rendu ainsi compatible avec le développement de la science moderne. Les théologies astrales, zoomorphes, végétales, telluriques sont pulvérisées comme tout autant d'idoles, de *créatures* à qui l'homme mythologique rend un culte à la place de son *Créateur*. Les correspondances cryptiques, magiques, astrales, sont suspendues. Le grand cosmo-morphisme tombe sur le jugement théologique de son manque de fondement ultime, de son manque d'auto-causalité⁵. L'homme n'est pas seulement microcosme. L'homme a en lui du *cosmos*, mais il est beaucoup plus que cela. Il est esprit : porteur de supra-cosmos, il a de l'intellect, conscience formelle de soi-même et créativité qui ne s'alimentent pas exclusivement de la *mimesis* de la nature, mais aussi de l'inspiration et d'affectation supra-cosmique. L'homme compose la grande musique, philosophie et poésie, par lesquelles il dépasse de loin les structures strictement cosmiques. Ainsi, bien qu'il soit subordonné aux structures cosmiques et inclus comme moment dans le grand cosmo-morphisme universel, il est en lui Esprit qui transcende toute affectation de type cosmique et naturel. Il est image divine qui n'écoute pas la nécessité aveugle du cosmos. C'est là le siège de la liberté humaine. L'homme n'est pas une simple *partie* empirique de la totalité cosmique, mais un *corrélat* du cosmos, comme dirait à juste titre Husserl. *Le cosmos est inclut dans l'homme, et non l'homme dans le cosmos.*

1.3. L'homme auto-morphique

Dans cette affirmation, est évidente la continuité de l'ontologie moderne anthropique avec l'ontologie théandrique médiévale. Les dates émancipatrices anti-cosmiques étaient déjà formulées et ce fut besoin seulement de la révolte prométhéenne anti-théologique, où la libération du destin cosmique était doublée de la libération du destin supra-cosmique. La

⁴ G.W.F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik*, I, Werke in zwanzig Banden, 13, Frankfurt am Main, p. 468.

⁵ Ainsi pour le roi Salomon, la sagesse n'est ni dans le monde ni dans l'homme. Tout au contraire, le commencement de la sagesse est « la crainte du Seigneur ».

source la plus puissante de la révolte anti-théiste a été la théologie impitoyable de la *coulpe*, qui raréfiait subtilement les effets les plus grandioses de la christologie : la *théandricité*, la *liberté* et la *dignité de l'homme*. La démolition du toit théologique du monde a déchaîné la déflagration supra-humaniste de la tentation totalisatrice faustienne. L'homme auto-morphique imprime universellement l'image de son idéalité.

L'effort de Bacon en vue de la redéfinition du rapport de l'homme avec la nature est symptomatique comme idéal émancipateur de la modernité (ensemble avec les autres libérations sociales, religieuses et politiques)⁶. Cela participe de la sécularisation du cosmos, par la Révélation. La dissociation est cependant plus marquante, puisque désormais l'homme et le cosmos se confrontent en dehors de tout arbitrage divin possible. La fracture édénique a déjà mis l'homme en face de la nature : voilà la préfiguration de la rupture moderne qui sépare le sujet de l'objet. Toutes les autres civilisations, plongées dans le sentiment de l'identité universelle des étants nous laissent l'impression d'une vision édénique, d'un sublime anachronisme devant les déchirures sanglantes qui ont séparé l'idéal utopique du réel topique.

La connaissance repose en stricte équation directe avec le pouvoir (*Knowledge is power*) : « La connaissance humaine et le pouvoir humain marchent du même pas ; car là où la cause n'est point connue, l'effet ne peut être produit. On commande à la nature en lui obéissant.(...) L'homme peut autant qu'il sait »⁷. Il faut « arracher » à la nature opaque ses secrets, ses lois de fonctionnement afin de lui dominer les énergies. Voilà un véritable projet luministe, violemment héroïque, d'appropriation des *stoikheion* cosmiques. L'homme a répliqué aux typhons par la puissance stabilisatrice de la mathématique, essence intelligible de la technique, qui n'est que de la mathématique incarnée dans l'outil (*Zeug*). Il n'y a pas de technique sans mathématique et la mathématique est l'expression intelligible de l'esprit. L'aveugle nature déchaînée a été remise dans les fers par la transparence géométrique de l'esprit. Prométhée a renchaîné la nature, avant que le *metron* olympien anti-faustien ne pose une borne à

⁶ Francis Bacon, *Novum Organon*, lib.I, 3, „La science et la puissance humaine se correspondent en tous points et vont au même but”.

⁷ Francis Bacon, *Novum Organon*, lib.I, aph. 1.

l'infini mauvais de l'*hybris* prométhéen. La finitude de l'être humain est doublée de sa dislocation infinitiste (intérieure en contemplation, extérieure en action). L'affirmation infinitiste extérieure est de manière inhérente catastrophique, voire doublement catastrophique, étant donné les deux termes de la collision homme-cosmos. Il y a donc un *metron* cosmique et un *hybris* anthropique : les pulsations ordonnées et les cohérences des structures cosmiques d'un côté, et l'expansion sans saturation de l'« insistante demande de livraison (*bestellen*)» (Heidegger), desservie par le forceps technologique, de l'autre. Il existe aussi un *hybris* cosmique (cataclysmes, catastrophes, calamités comme tout autant de dérégulations et déviations), par rapport auxquels la technique se comporte comme un garant d'un *metron* anthropique.

2. La révolte anti-cosmique occidentale

Si ce fut « l'esprit du judaïsme »⁸ qui a ouvert le « rapport négatif » du cosmos en rapport à l'homme, ce fut à l'« esprit chrétien »⁹ d'unir de manière restauratrice la transcendance avec ce qu'auparavant avait été destitué comme idolâtre. Le monde et les hommes sont sauvés et est révélé leur filiation divine. L'Homme devient pour la première fois non seulement « image et ressemblance » divines, mais est aussi anobli par l'Incarnation de Dieu en lui, et dans aucune autre forme cosmique¹⁰.

La réduction moderne (crypto-protestante) des médiateurs, initialement christique, a débordé par inertie sa limite, ainsi que fut réduit même le Christ, celui qui avait proclamé le déclin des *médiations* dans l'âge de l'Incarnation. Ce qui a été uni *en Lui* et *par Lui*, fut à nouveau démembré : l'unité du fini avec l'Infini, de Dieu avec le cosmos. Le nouveau protestantisme (libéral radical, historiciste, quasi-arien, qui contemplait la scission entre la grâce et une nature sévèrement corrompue donc presque complètement disloqué du projet divin) et le déisme ravivent l'esprit de la transcendance négative, vétérotestamentaire, et donnent à l'Homme une solution en opposition avec le cosmos. La philosophie écologiste veut, dans un sens exactement inverse à un anthropocentrisme

⁸ G.W.F. Hegel, *L'Esprit du christianisme et son destin*, Paris: PUF, 1992, pp. 49-68.

⁹ G.W.F. Hegel, *op. cit.* pp. 70-152.

¹⁰ Pico de la Mirandola, *De dignitate hominis*.

anti-cosmique, dissoudre l'Homme dans un *cosmo-centrisme anti-anthropique*. Ces déséquilibres symétriques ne sont que des unilatéralités dissociatives non-christiques, qui tranchent toutes les deux là où le Christ a uni et a réconcilié (*Versöhnung*).

Cette fracturation métaphysique de l'équilibre cosmos / Homme fait de l'Homme une instance royale, un corégent cosmique. Le cosmo-centrisme mythologique est substitué par l'anthropocentrisme moderne. Tout ce qui est modernité est déductible de ce « rapport négatif » du cosmos à Dieu : la révolution scientifique (Galilée)¹¹ qui sécularise le sensible sidéral, donc une forme d'idolâtrie rémanente plus subtile. Le désenchantement protestant du monde réactualise « la dé-divinisation du monde » (Hegel)¹². Le cosmo-morphisme mythologique est converti dans un « univers mécanique », dévitalisé (Descartes)¹³, « rationalisé » (Weber)¹⁴ et enfin « démythifié » (Bultmann)¹⁵. Quant au reste, il fut une simple « situation disponible soumise à une insistante demande de livraison » (Heidegger)¹⁶. La Nature devint du don, un simple donné, facilement assimilable à un géant réservoir potentiellement infini destiné à l'entrepreneur capitaliste dépourvu de tout scrupule « panthéiste » envers la nature.

C'est le destin de la civilisation occidentale qui actualise l'archétype vétérotestamentaire de la sécularisation décisive du cosmos. D'ici vient le privilège technologique de l'Occident, ainsi que la neutralisation « prométhéenne » de la nature. On déplore la nature aliénée de la

¹¹ M. Clavelin, *La philosophie naturelle de Galilée*, Albin Michel, Paris, 1998.

¹² G.W.F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik*, I, *Op. cit.* : « Die entgötterte endliche Welt: zum erstenmal deshalb liegt jetzt die Natur und die Menschengestalt entgöttert und prosaisch vor uns da" (...) „das bestehen jedoch des Endlichen ist substanzlos, und gegen Gott gehalten ist, ist die Kreatur das Verschwindende und Ohnmächtige", *op. cit.*, p. 482, 479.

¹³ Edmund Husserl, *Méditations métaphysiques*, V, *op. cit.*

¹⁴ Max Weber, *Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus*, Tübingen, 1920.

¹⁵ Rudolf Bultmann décrit l'« image mythologique du monde » comme étant saturé de « puissances surnaturelles », des correspondances magiques, et imprégnée animiste d'« énergies » : *Humanisme et christianisme*, traduit en *Rudolf Bultmann et la Mort de Dieu*, André Malot, Cerf, Paris, 1968, p. 114-117. Cf. aussi Jésus. *Mythologie et Démythologisation*, Éditions du Seuil, Paris, 1968, p. 187-195.

¹⁶ Martin Heidegger, *Vorträge und Aufsätze I*, *Die Frage nach der Technik*, Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart. (cf. Martin Heidegger, *Originea opere de artă*, (tr.roumain par Thomas Kleininger et Gabriel Liiceanu), Ed. Humanitas, bucharest, 1995, p. 129-173).

technique. Cependant, l'homme était déjà *aliéné* avant la nature même (par le péché, la *chute* étant l'aliénation originale), déjà disloqué de sa contemplation (*théoria*) édenique, et contraint dans l'histoire à un minimum de « faustisme de survie » (*praxis*).

« Le savant antique contemple, comme la divinité d'Aristote, le savant arabe cherche, comme alchimiste, à découvrir le moyen magique, la pierre philosophale, avec laquelle on se met sans peine en possession des trésors de la nature ; le savant occidental veut *diriger* le monde selon sa volonté. L'invention et la découverte faustiennes sont quelque chose d'unique. Le faustien a une puissance élémentaire de volonté, une réflexion pratique d'une énergie d'acier, qui doivent paraître effrayantes et inintelligibles à quiconque les regarde d'une culture étrangère, mais que nous avons tous dans le sang. Notre culture tout entière a l'âme des découvertes. Découvrir ce qu'on ne voit pas, l'attirer dans le monde lumineux de l'œil intérieur pour s'en parer, c'était depuis le premier jour sa passion la plus tenace. Toutes ses grandes inventions ont lentement mûri dans la profondeur, ont été annoncées par des esprits prophétiques et essayés par eux avant de surgir enfin avec une nécessité de destin. Toutes étaient déjà très proches des spéculations bienheureuses des premiers moines gothiques. C'est là où jamais que se révèle l'origine religieuse de toute pensée technique. Ces fervents inventeurs qui, dans les cellules de leurs couvents, disputaient son secret à Dieu par la prière et le jeûne, sentaient dans cette lutte un service divin. Ici même est né le personnage du Faust, grand symbole d'une culture d'inventeurs. La *scientia experimentalis*, première définition qu'a donné Roger Bacon des sciences de la nature, cette interrogation violente de la nature au moyen de ressorts et de vis, a commencé ce qui, dans nos plaines d'aujourd'hui, recouvertes de cheminées d'usine et de tours d'extraction se présente à nos yeux comme résultat »¹⁷.

C'est toujours l'Homme qui aliène aussi la technique de sa finalité de déconditionnement (la technique militaire, instrument de la mort, et non de la vie). Ce n'est pas la technique, mais l'Homme qui pêche dans le rapport intentionnel qu'il investit dans sa manipulation. Étant donné qu'il était déjà aliéné, il a recouru à la technique. L'aliénation par la technique est seulement un cas d'aliénation, qui resterait à se manifester même en

¹⁷ O. Spengler, *Le Déclin de l'Occident*, Paris: Gallimard, 1948, p. 461.

absence de la technique. Celle-ci ne fait que donner de l'efficacité à tout Prométhée humain. La technique est donc tout au plus une *causa occasionalis* dans l'approfondissement de l'aliénation inhérente de la dislocation *ek-statique* de l'être humain dans l'histoire. Sous le rapport historique, la technique est émancipatrice et sa seule critique non hypocrite serait un homme qui ne serait plus *faber* ; donc si on accepte les démarcations de Bergson¹⁸, seuls les animaux et les anges seraient des critiques possibles de la technique (peut-être aussi alors les « anges dans un corps » qui sont les saints). La technique est l'expression de notre ouverture faustienne infiniment potentielle. Elle est l'instrument par excellence de la pulsion faustienne. Le dédoublement de la réalité cosmique par une réalité artéfact manifeste le retour démiurgique du régent cosmique trahi par son royaume après sa « chute adamique ». La technique manifeste sa souveraineté : il peut devenir tyran, mais la technique impersonnelle ne supporte pas de culpabilité. La technique manifeste la puissance et la limite de l'homme, sa puissance par rapport à la « nature » et sa limite par rapport à « Dieu » : de par sa nature, l'homme est seulement démiurge, et non créateur. La technique, matière mathématisée (Descartes) est la servante de la royauté de l'Homme sur la nature.

Toutes ces considérations peuvent sembler trop « générales » et éloignées des problèmes concrets de l'humanité présente, tel qu'ils se retrouvent dans un manuel d'écologisme. Mais toutes ces questions concrètes et courantes ne seraient jamais survenues sans les problèmes graves qui nous préoccupent ici. Il y a une antériorité déterminante de l'esprit, sur des vastes projections *éoniques* dans l'histoire. Nous vivons les paradigmes imposés dans l'espace intelligible il y a des siècles, qui nous affectent même si nous en restons inconscients, et dont les virtualités, nous ne faisons que les actualiser et les expérimenter.

Si le traitement de la mondialisation écologique appelle les statistiques qui exemplifient la dégradation du *cosmos*, elles se retrouvent partout. Mais une généalogie plus profonde de la crise écologique capable de lui découvrir les sources dans les mutations survenues au niveau des principes métaphysiques à travers l'histoire n'existe pas encore à proprement parler, et il est temps qu'elle soit faite.

¹⁸ Cf. Henri Bergson, *L'évolution créatrice*, F. Alcan, Paris, 1921.

3. Techno-sphère *versus* biosphère

Le régime historique et le régime cosmique définissent, par leur rapport, l'époque pré-moderne et moderne. L'urbanisation édifiera sur la surface de la *biosphère* (la totalité des écosystèmes planétaires ou l'écosphère) des couches épaisses de béton, verre et acier, extraira les hommes des micro-communautés rurales, de leur intimité très étroite avec la nature, pour les déposer dans des mégalopolis, emmagasinés dans des vraies réservations de béton, qui sont les villes surpeuplées, des niches artificielles sur la surface de la nature. L'industrialisation concentrera des millions de tonnes d'outillages, calamitant de manière irréversible la zone où est implantée une entreprise. Des réseaux toujours plus denses d'instruments et de produits technologiques deviendront un vrai superstrat de la planète. Leur totalité forme la *techno-sphère*. Celle-ci est apposée sur et contre la biosphère. L'essence de la crise écologique est la rupture grave de l'équilibre entre l'Histoire (comme produit et processus humain) et *cosmos* (comme cadre de soutien de l'homme et de l'histoire). L'humanité, dans son existence toujours plus expansive, plus agressive et plus dévastatrice est entrée en collision avec le support même de sa vie.

L'écologisme (auto-défini comme éco-centrique et son expression d'action, le mouvement vert) se révèle – après la chute du bloc communiste – le plus puissant mouvement anti-systémique. Pour exprimer de manière plus précise et prégnante l'antithèse qui oppose le capitalisme à l'écologisme, on peut dire qu'il est dans l'essence du capitalisme (l'esprit entrepreneurial) de concevoir la nature comme étant *infinie en ressources*, alors qu'il est dans l'essence de l'écologisme de concevoir la nature comme *finie dans ses ressources*. Celui-ci met en garde sur le caractère non-recyclable à l'infini des énergies combustibles exposées à la sur-consumation dans un système fermé, subordonné aux lois de la thermodynamique, surtout à la loi de l'entropie, qui pose l'indisponibilité progressive d'un corps à effectuer un travail. Tout corps qui effectue un travail dépense de l'énergie et, ce faisant, l'entropie croît vers le maximum.

Comme nous l'avons montré, une sacralisation du cosmos, en tant que porteuse virtuelle de tous les types de hiérophanies, depuis celles aquatiques à celles astrales, était incompatible avec l'émergence d'une conception anthropomorphique d'un cosmos purement instrumental. La

sacralité cosmique non seulement se manifestait, mais aussi se présentifiait ; ce qui exprime une relation de participation plus intense, où le cosmos était un milieu saturé de sacralité, même milieu transparent à la divinité dans les panthéismes les plus radicales.

Dans le rapport ONU *Only One Earth*, on peut discerner une très puissante nuance écologiste, signe évident que déjà l'écologisme a pénétré les grandes institutions de la mondialisation et agissent comme un facteur équilibrant en rapport avec le capitalisme mondial. Si on peut dire de *l'universalisme capitaliste qu'il exprime la mondialité de la technostructure, l'universalisme écologiste, réactif anti-vectoriel, exprime la mondialité de la biosphère*. Ainsi toutes les deux détiennent et promeuvent des projets alternatifs irréconciliables concernant la nature définitive du système mondial.

4. Christianisme, modernisme, écologisme

Lynn White accuse le christianisme que, par l'idée d'un Dieu transcendant, il a créé le contexte d'une justification de l'insensibilité par rapport à la nature. Il résume ainsi son argument :

« Tant notre science actuelle, que la technologie, sont tellement pleines de l'arrogance spécifiquement chrétienne envers la nature, que nous ne pouvons pas attendre aucune solution d'elles pour notre crise écologique. Étant donné que les racines des malheurs sont en grande mesure religieuses, le remède doit être, lui aussi, de manière essentiellement religieuse, que l'on lui dit ainsi ou non. Il nous faut repenser et réinterpréter notre essence et notre destin »¹⁹

D'autres patriarches de la doctrine écologiste proposent la solution de la ré-composition d'une sensibilité religieuse d'essence panthéiste, opposée à la radicalité vétérotestamentaire d'un apophatisme qui destitue axiologiquement le *cosmos*. On laisse comprendre que si on pouvait ressusciter les cultes de la fertilité, le culte de la Mère Gaia, de la Mère Terre, et l'esprit d'adoration de la nature, à l'échelle d'une adhésion planétaire, toutes celle-ci pourraient nous déterminer à cesser l'agression écologique. On observe les instances archétypales féminines, d'où cette alliance a reçu le nom d'éco-féminisme, qui enrichit le registre étiologique

¹⁹ Lynn White, *Historical Roots of the ecological Crisis, Science*, vol.155, 10 mars 1967.

d'une nouvelle tête d'accusation : le patriarcat d'archétype abrahamique. Tous ces discours écologistes ont une audience transnationale, puisqu'ils répondent à des défis transnationaux. Les critiques les plus radicales, enfin, incriminent plus concrètement le « mandat biblique » vétérotestamentaire : « soyez féconds, multipliés, remplissez la Terre et dominez-la ; et dominez sur les poissons de la mer, sur les oiseaux du ciel, et sur tout animal qui se meut sur la terre » (Gn. 1, 28). C'est ce commandement qui aurait déclenché l'impulsion anti-cosmique de l'humanité suprématiste, qui se sentait ainsi déléguée par un ordre divin. Mais :

1. On n'explique pas ainsi pourquoi, pour 1700 d'années, depuis l'institutionnalisation du christianisme, rien de la nature d'une agression sur la nature ne s'est produit, et ensuite ne s'explique par quoi précisément aurait déclenché précisément l'irruption *récente* du problème écologique.

2. Même étant donné « le mandat biblique » concernant la multiplication de l'espèce humaine et sa domination royale sur la nature, celui-ci ne contient pas en lui *analytiquement* la crise écologique. Cette crise s'est ajoutée *synthétiquement* et peut être tout au plus acceptée sous la forme d'une « interprétation extensive » qui a « ajouté » à ce mandat : les entreprises polluantes, la déforestation, la dévastation d'écosystèmes, l'asphyxie de la planète, le surpeuplement etc.

Si on veut vraiment identifier un point décisif d'émergence du rapport *instrumental* du cosmos à l'homme, il suffit d'arrêter le déroulement filmique des déterminismes sur Francis Bacon, qui exprime clairement de manière inaugurale la conception de la modernité sur ce problème, aussi que ses aspirations ouvertes sur l'avenir.

« La supériorité de l'homme réside donc dans la connaissance. Aujourd'hui nous dominons la nature uniquement dans notre imagination, alors qu'en réalité nous sommes soumis à elle. Mais si nous nous laissons conduire par elle dans la création, on parviendra *dans la pratique* de lui commander, nous à elle ! »²⁰.

Il faut donc rendre évident ce point de tournant dans lequel la modernité, virtuellement émanée du modèle ontologique chrétien, fut transmutée fondamentalement par la séparation et son autonomisation historique parricide.

²⁰ Francis Bacon, *Novum Organon*, lib.I, 4.

La fracturation de l'équilibre histoire-cosmos, leur mise en non-équation par le christianisme, fut aggravée au-delà de tout seuil critique de tolérance sous l'impulsion de l'esprit moderne : la logique secrète de l'histoire qui se déroule de manière *finalisante vers l'Eschaton* fut retranscrite dans une logique visible, explicite et prédéterminée, d'un processus historique dénommé *progrès* et détaillé de manière diverse selon les diverses utopies possibles. À l'architecture providentielle de l'histoire s'est substituée ainsi toute une série d'immanentismes auto-providentialistes qui ont forcé de manière eschatologique le futur par des projections intra-historiques de la cité céleste de Jérusalem (les totalitarismes), qui surenchérisaient énergiquement la nature afin d'alimenter les mégalithes de la civilisation. Le vecteur de l'histoire sacrée fut conservé certes, mais sous des formes sécularisées. Les idéologies du progrès ont accéléré la crise épileptique de l'histoire, qui est devenue toujours plus démembrant et plus agressive. La grande civilisation moderne, « mammouthique », mais grandiose, est celle qui dévaste l'écosystème. La rate d'exploitation énergétique nécessaire à l'alimentation de l'appareil de civilisation le plus complexe ayant jamais existé – mais aussi le plus coûteux – excède de loi la rate de récupération et auto-régularisation de la nature. « La raison instrumentale » de la modernité a édifié une vraie *techno-sphère* (comme totalité d'artéfacts déterminés par leur caractère utilitaire dans le rapport homme-nature). Celui-ci est l'expression d'un superstrat (*techné*) déposé sur le corps réceptaculaire de la nature (*physis*), sur ce qui est déterminé en tant que biosphère, comme couche originaire.

Ainsi la mondialisation porte-t-elle le projet anti-écologique de la modernité vers les limites de résistance de la nature, au-delà desquelles commencent à ressurgir des défections irrémédiables (l'extinction d'espèces entières, ainsi que de ressources). L'hyper-capitalisme sous-tendu par la philosophie productiviste de la « croissance économique » (avec pour présupposé l'idée du progrès illimité), tire justification pour la « guerre d'épuisement des ressources » de l'idéal du bien-être (*welfare*) global de l'humanité. Mais tant que seuls certains bénéficient de celui-ci (le monde industrialisé), les autres ne feront seulement que supporter les effets des catastrophes écologiques corrélés avec la nature extractive de la civilisation « lourde » (les périphéries orbitales du système). Cependant, le capitalisme n'est pas un créateur du bien-être, mais tout au plus un démiurge du bien-

être, puisqu'il entretient un rapport parasitaire avec la nature, qu'il exploite seulement, sans aucune compensation restauratrice. La technologie globale n'est pas seulement superposée à la biosphère. Elle lui est superposée de manière opposée. Le capitalisme et un système artificiel, puisque ses lois sont tout autres que les lois de la nature.

Il nous est maintenant possible de distinguer plus clairement entre le *christianisme* et la *modernité faustienne*, outre la simple et confortable démarcation entre théocentrisme et anthropocentrisme. Il s'agit d'une mutation du *transcendant* vers le *transcendantal* (puisque l'anthropocentrisme peut être conçu de manière psychologique ou même naturaliste). Le grand enjeu en vue de différencier une généalogie chrétienne de la crise écologique de sa génération moderne est la réinterprétation de la Providence. L'éclipse lente de la transcendance projette une nouvelle instance solaire du système cosmique : l'homme. La Providence, en tant que « dirigisme » divin de l'histoire était conçue sous l'angle chrétien sous la forme d'une synergie symphonique entre la sur-nécessité de la liberté divine et la liberté humaine disloquée de manière délibérative sur la surface de l'indétermination projective. L'espace d'élection resté à l'homme marquait la différence de la Providence d'un fatalisme simple et homogène.

L'amputation moderne de la dimension transcendante de cette synergie théandrique a octroyé l'histoire aux puissances architectoniques de l'homme « orphalisé » sous rapport métaphysique. Voici la genèse du faustisme en tant que forme de rapport négatif à la précarité de l'histoire humaine, dé-constructive et re-constructive, auto-sotériologique²¹. Mais tous les grands édifices faustiens de la modernité ont dû être alimentés des « entrailles de la grande Mère tellurique ». La fertilité organique du *cosmos* a été sur-sollicitée et sur-utilisée par un grand appareil de formes instrumentales d'extraction. La massivité sans précédent de la civilisation humaine (l'agrégat des artéfacts de béton, verre et acier) réclame une

²¹ Le faustisme est une alternative au christianisme qui n'est pas gnostique. Elle donne une chance à la vie sur la terre, et aussi à la création : celle d'être sauvée par la main de l'homme. Pour les gnostiques, la solution était le repli dans l'intériorité, la sortie de la putréfaction de l'avorton cosmique, alors que le faustien veut guérir cet enfant innocent. Pour le christianisme, le monde n'était pas identique avec le mal, mais il ne saurait pas non plus recevoir une solution exclusivement humaine.

alimentation énergétique permanente, qui a ouvert le cycle terrifiant de l'épuisement autodestructif des ressources cosmiques vitales. Soumise à ce permanent curetage, la vieille Gaïa se décompose lentement sous les rythmes d'exploitation affamée. Ce qu'ont accumulé les grandes ères géologiques se voit dans un processus d'épuisement sous l'urgence extractive maniaque de ces quelques siècles de modernité historique.

Aux écologistes qui réduisent toute cette évolution complexe au mandat biblique de domination de la Terre, sans nullement différencier le christianisme contemplatif de la modernité faustienne, on pourrait répliquer qu'il s'agit seulement d'une utilisation extensive de ce « mandat », équivalente avec la différence entre « domination » et « tyrannie », entre usage et abus. Autrement dit, il est impossible d'expliquer pourquoi le désastre s'est déclenché seulement dans la modernité, une fois avec l'amputation du terme divin de la synergie providentielle de l'histoire, et avec l'éruption du capitalisme commercial et industriel, en tant qu'effet de la « libération » de l'homme de la sur-instance transcendante, ayant comme terme « l'horizontalisation » de son intentionnalité destinale.

Encore faut-il rappeler que le christianisme oriental fait exception de la sécularisation vétérotestamentaire du cosmos, avec ses variantes « cosmiques » sud-est européennes, et « théo-cosmiques » russes. À toutes les deux, on peut appliquer l'évaluation de Špidlik, comme faisant partie d'un phénomène de « *re-mythologisation de la Révélation* »²². L'idée de Feodorov, représentative pour tout le *sophianisme cosmique* russe, concernant le caractère inséparable de l'anthropologie par rapport à la cosmologie, peut certainement être acceptée. L'image la plus expressive de cet attachement de l'âme russe au cosmos est probablement celle d'Aliocha Karamazov embrassant la terre. Toujours Dostoïevski évoque « les forces du sol natal »²³. Il n'en reste pas moins que la critique russe concernant un rapport détestable, d'opposition, entre le sujet et l'objet, d'extériorité entre la personne et le *cosmos* dans la métaphysique occidentale est – de même que la critique de Fritjof Capra – erronée par simplification et amputation²⁴.

²² Th. Spidlik, *L'idée russe. Une autre vision de l'homme*, Éditions Fates, Troyes, 1994.

²³ Dostoïevski, *Discours sur Pouchkine*, dans *Ceuvres*, éd. Moeller v.d.Bruck, t. XII, p. 95, apud. Spidlik.

²⁴ Fritjof Capra, *The Physics of the Tao*; Idem, *The Turning Point*, Fontana, London, 1983.

En réalité, la métaphysique occidentale classique est encore plus subtile et précise que cela. Chez Kant, l'homme est extérieur de manière *transcendantale* et constitutive pour le *cosmos*, mais simultanément interne au *cosmos* sous rapport *phénoménal*²⁵. Ce qui est ainsi rigide opposition sujet-objet revient seulement au positivisme et à l'empirisme, expressions d'un démembrement du paradigme occidental, qui ne sont même pas représentatives, et d'autant plus exhaustives.

L'une des plus décisives méditations sur le destin de la nature et de l'homme est celle de Hans Jonas. Il met en relation *l'impératif technico-économique* et *l'humanisme* (la modernité)²⁶. La foi humaniste dans la modificabilité de la condition humaine, et l'idéal humaniste de l'émancipation illimitée de l'humanité, dans la suppression de tous les conditionnements, exprime la nostalgie d'une négation foncière de la finitude humaine. Il y a une continuité idéale entre l'impulsion humaniste de la suppression de toutes les barrières spirituelles (religieuses, métaphysiques, éthiques) et l'impulsion techno-scientiste de la suppression de toutes les barrières naturelles. L'utopisme technique et le nihilisme entrent en convergence nécessaire puisqu'ils contestent les valeurs en elles-mêmes, ou les limites de principe, convertissant l'homme dans une réalité biopsychique manipulable, d'ordre de la nature. L'idée de la science contemporaine que la mort ne serait qu'un événement accidentel, et non l'un constitutif à l'être humain, périclite selon Jonas, l'essence même de l'être humain, qui est d'être *Sein-zum-Tode*, à savoir être conscient de sa finitude. La crise écologique périclite, en revanche, seulement l'existence de l'être humain.

Il y a chez Jonas une alliance entre humanisme et écologisme. Plus précisément, un humanisme médié écologiquement. Il faut dire que la dissociation entre la mort et l'être (envisagé par le rêve technologique de la technique) humain a l'enjeu d'une la dissociation de ce dernier de la finitude pour rendre l'homme immortel. Cependant, même si la mortalité de l'être humain pouvait être artificiellement supprimée, ce ne serait qu'une *mauvaise infinitisation*, pour paraphraser Hegel (*schlechte Unendlichkeit*). Cela ne modifierait que la *quantité* de la vie humaine et

²⁵ Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Transcendentalen Analytic, Köln, 1995.

²⁶ Hans Jonas, *Le principe Responsabilité. Une éthique pour la civilisation technologique*, Cerf, Paris, 1990.

nullement sa *qualité*. La vraie infinité présuppose les attributs forts de l'autarchie, de l'ubiquité, de la plénitude. L'être humain est qualitativement fini, non seulement quantitativement. La mortalité relève ainsi de son essence même.

La conscience écologique actuelle de la planète a été provoquée et activée par la mondialisation de cette interaction à profil agressif entre l'homme et la nature. L'écologisme comme doctrine, et non les réponses pragmatiques, locales – trouvera l'unité de réaction par un discours de subversion des bases métaphysiques de la crise écologique. Quiconque a l'impression que cette crise écologique se laisse réduire à des paramètres quantitatifs, a déjà manqué l'accès aux surfaces causales d'une plus grande amplitude historique et doit voir quels sont les termes philosophiques dans lesquels pensent les doctrinaires écologistes eux-mêmes la crise planétaire. Ils contestent en principe la centralité anthropique et son expression collatérale, « l'arrogance humaniste » (David Ehrenfeld). Ils dénoncent simultanément tant le christianisme que la modernité, puisqu'ils voient à juste titre leur *continuité*, sans plus s'apercevoir de leur *discontinuité* (inversement aux conservateurs, qui voient seulement leur *discontinuité*, sans voir leur *continuité*!). Ils militent (par inspiration *upanishadique* lue dans une grille occidentale) pour le *principe de l'égalité bio-centrique* qui conteste les hiérarchies à l'intérieur du règne naturel. Tous les organismes et les entités de l'écosphère auraient une valeur et des droits égaux, comme expression de leur coappartenance à la même totalité cosmique, connectée dans la biosphère. On a pourtant facilement repéré l'humanisme résiduel inhérent à cet égalitarisme total, puisque les catégories « valeur », « droit », « obligation », restent foncièrement anthropologiques. La nature n'a pas de loi, et elle est infra-morale. On ne saurait doter les animaux de droits, étant donné qu'ils sont en principes incapables d'honorer les devoirs corrélatifs à tout droit (A propos de cette idée de droit de la nature et des animaux, l'auteur peut-il lire Michel Serres, *Le contrat naturel* et *Biogée ?* Ces livres discutent cette idée de l'impossibilité du droit de la terre et des animaux).

Le **principe de la morale éco-centrique** a été ainsi résumé par Aldo Léopold : « *Une chose est juste lorsqu'elle tend à préserver l'intégrité de la communauté biotique. Elle est mauvaise lorsqu'elle tend vers autre chose* »²⁷.

²⁷ Andrew Heywood, *Political ideologies. An Introduction*, MacMillan Press, New York, 1998, p. 281.

L'expression la plus radicale de la doctrine écologiste est celle qui confère une dimension spirituelle à la nouvelle conscience écologique, où l'autoréalisation de l'individu devient coïncidente avec la profonde identification avec les autres, jusqu'à contester l'idée de personne, toujours manifestée comme un sujet rapporté de manière oppositive au cosmos²⁸. Le multiple personnel, inévitablement celui culturel aussi, sont noyés dans l'universel cosmique divinisé. D'où l'incompatibilité de l'écologisme radical à la fois avec le libéralisme pro-systémique et le nationalisme anti-systémique.

Nous considérons que, sous le rapport des revendications éthiques, l'écologisme peut être assimilé à un « socialisme diachronique », étant donné que sa dénonciation organise chronologiquement, et non synchroniquement, les rapports inégalitaires dans la société. Il explique le bien-être présent comme étant un phénomène d'accumulation primitive au compte du « présent bourgeois », aux dépens du « prolétariat de l'avenir ». Même s'il est presque impossible de déterminer combien convient-il d'accorder, de la totalité patrimoniale cosmique, aux générations présentes et combien revient-il aux générations futures...

En mettant ce problème dans les termes du triangle Dieu, Homme, Cosmos, on peut exprimer en essence les positions qui se trouvent en confrontation, sous la forme des hiérarchies axiologiques que chacune affirme :

CHRISTIANISME	MODERNISME	ÉCOLOGISME
Dieu > Homme > Cosmos	Homme > Cosmos	Cosmos = Dieu > Homme
Théocentrisme anthropique	Anthropocentrisme	Cosmo-centrisme

²⁸ Fox Warwick, *Towards a Transpersonal Ecology*, Shambhala Publications, Boston-London, 1990.

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THE POLITICAL USES OF SPATIALITY: TEMPORALITY, TELOS, LEGITIMACY

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Abstract

This paper aims to present several of the most important aspects concerning political spatiality and its various dimensions, such as the physical, symbolic and charismatized aspects. This analysis will serve a two-fold purpose: 1) depicting the main types of spatiality, while concentrating more on the difficulty in defining and categorising sacred space; 2) how the use of spatiality can aid in the creation of ideological hegemony, of social homogeneity and, ultimately, of a distinct teleological narrative which may legitimize communities, as well as modern ideocratic regimes.

Keywords: spatiality, hegemony, regime, charismatization, legitimacy

This paper aims to systematically depict the main types of spatiality, as well as analysing how the use of spatiality can aid in the creation of ideological hegemony, of social homogeneity and, ultimately, of a distinct teleological narrative which may legitimize communities as well as modern ideocratic regimes. Spaces, landscapes and their political dimensions may be interpreted in three broad ways. Firstly, they are physical reminders of a regime's power and permanence as well as its ability to discipline, to organize its subjects towards common goals. Secondly, they are temporal indices of recreated pasts and desired futures. Finally, they are symbolic expressions of different notions, ranging from community, sacrifice, liberty or apotheosis. The typologies of spatiality can fluctuate according to the objectives of the regime in question and according to the traditions typical of the dominant culture or of its political elite. Thus, a festival meant to promote openness or internationalist sentiments, such as World Youth Day or Labour Day will, at least in certain aspects, be performed and interpreted very differently in a liberal

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democracy in comparison to a totalist¹ state, even though they will likely maintain common means of representation and aesthetics. In asserting that the state possesses a “simultaneously invisible and omnipresent conceptual location”, Adam T. Smith describes a feature which “provides an effective mask for political practices precisely because it obscures the inherently spatial operations of power ‘as an apparatus of domination’ and legitimacy ‘as a representation of that apparatus’”.² To this could be added that spatiality, in its representation of power, authority and of common endeavour, is one of the fundamental aspects in any authority-system which we may call ideocratic regimes. Indeed, it is among the crucial bindings that hold a political edifice together, regardless if its features are centralized, multicentric or extremely decentralized.

For instance, Assyria was one of the earliest polities recorded to create a systematic ideocracy, a complex endeavour which encouraged subjugated elites to become more Assyrian in nature and be part of the Assyrian symbolic universe³. Its chief god, Aššur, was connected to the capital itself, to the name Assyria and also to the entirety of an empire

¹ I prefer the use of *totalism* instead of *totalitarianism* since the latter term is inherently associated with the industrial interwar authoritarian states as well the “war societies” of the era, not to mention the latter word’s suggestion of brutal coercion, something which need not automatically be the case in a totalist system. I use the term *totalism*, to define all-encompassing ideologies – these can be secular, religious or mixed - which seek to reshape all levels of public and private life, including individual worldviews, in accordance with their claims to a Sole-Truth, and which do not accept the validity of other truth-claims. For instance, the Islamic state created by the Sudanese Mahdi in the late 19th century was *totalist* in message, content as well as the implementation of its Sole-Truth claims.

² Adam T. Smith, *The Political Landscape: Constellations of Authority in Early Complex Polities*, London, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003, p. 79. Smith’s work is a very good starting point regarding the debates shaping the field, as well as concerning relevant literature.

³ See: Steven H. Holloway, *Assur is King! Assur is King! Religion in the Exercise of Power in the Neo-Assyrian Empire*, Köln-Boston-Leiden: Brill, 2002; Ian Morris & Walter Schneidel (eds.), *The Dynamics of Ancient Empires. State Power from Assyria to Byzantium*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009; Michael Mann, *The sources of social power I: A history of power from the beginning to a.d. 1760*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986. Naturally we should distinguish between the different Assyrian polities which existed throughout millennia. Thus, whenever I speak about Assyria, it will concern the New Empire (934 BC–609 BC).

whose ruler was his “high priest”⁴. The Assyrians built an empire on the destruction or reconstruction of space. The imposition of Assyrian dominance could mean the complete destruction of enemy temples, their careful patronage or, controversially, their conversion through the installation of the so called “weapon of Aššur”⁵. In all cases, it ultimately meant the symbolic integration in the Assyrian worldview, with its centre in the religious capital and the unique temple of Aššur. Even when serving a multicentric polity like the Achaemenid Empire, the political use of spatiality was crucial for the highly ritualised nature of a peripatetic court and as symbol of the Great King’s qualities. Just to take a single example, the particularity of the royal paradises only goes further in demonstrating the different messages conveyed by and through the use of space:

- *The spectacular nature of an exquisite “oasis” in the middle of a barren land*
- *The coercive message depicting the permanence of authority – a statement of the Great King’s ingenuity and resourcefulness*
- *The paradise as microcosm of the realm – his control over the land also means his care for the people as Gardener*

Whether a regime is traditional-hierarchical, rational-bureaucratic or a complex mixture of factors, spatiality is of even greater importance in the existence of a modern nation state. The territorialisation of a community can be built on the attachment its members feel for specific places, or *ethnoscapes*⁶, political-cultural landscapes and spaces which aid them in constructing a certain worldview and dividing the *We* from the *Otherness*. Another important element for the interpretation of political

⁴ See Stefan Maul, *Der assyrische König - Hüter der Weltordnung*, in: K. Watanabe (ed.), *Priests and Officials in the Ancient Near East*, Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1999.

⁵ Whether or not it really meant the enforcing of a local worship of Aššur, it was clearly a means to exact allegiance and symbolise the Assyrian dominance. See: S. W. Holloway, “The *Giš-Kakki Assur* and Neo-Assyrian Loyalty Oaths,” in Steinkeller, P. Machinist, J. Huehnergard, P.-A. Beaulieu, I. T. Abusch, and Carol Noyes(eds.): *Historiography in the Cuneiform World, Part 1: Proceedings of the XLVe Rencontre Assyriologique Internationale*, Bethesda, MD: CDL Press, 2001.

⁶ Anthony D. Smith, *The Cultural Foundations of Nations. Hierarchy, Covenant and Republic*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2008, p. 35.

spaces lies in charismatization⁷ of spatiality and its potential in legitimising and enhancing the position of a regime.⁸ Indeed, if precursors are to be found in the Persian Royal Paradises, the Delphic Oracle, the Abrahamic Jerusalem⁹, Timur's Samarkand, the Escorial, the Versailles or the Bastille, the importance of the charismatized political landscape only increases with the advent of modernity and the Romantic cult of nature as symbol of the *people*.¹⁰ The importance of spatiality and political space for the rise, expansion and sustenance of regimes and their own creeds can be decisive, even fundamental in character. Even though these are by no means the only interpretations possible, spaces may thus be ideally divided into three major parts:

- a) Physical
 - Exhibitive spaces
 - Coercive spaces (permanence and omnipresence of authority)
- b) Temporal
 - Locative spaces dealing with a common past, uniting a community
 - Utopian spaces depicting a common future and a great destiny
- c) Symbolic
 - Sacralized spaces

⁷ The literature on charisma is extremely vast, contentious and unnecessary to detail here. Suffice to say, that I base my views on charismatization partially on the Sohm-Weber framework (see: Rudolf Sohm, *Kirchenrecht*, Bd. 1: *Die geschichtlichen Grundlagen*. Berlin: Duncker, 1970) and partially on the synergistic charisma encountered in Schweitzer and the dissipative theorem adapted by Spence Smith (See: Arthur Schweitzer, *The Age of Charisma*, Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1984; Thomas Spence Smith, *Strong Interaction*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).

⁸ For a brief account on the different potentials of charismatized landscapes, see: Kees Terlouw, *Charisma and Space*, in: *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*: Vol. 10, No. 3, 2010, pp. 335–348.

⁹ See Maria Leppäkari, *Apocalyptic Representations of Jerusalem*, Leiden-Boston: Brill 2006; Oded Peri, *Christianity under Islam in Jerusalem. The Question of the Holy Sites in Early Ottoman Time*, Brill: London-Boston-Köln, 2001.

¹⁰ See Thomas M. Lekan, *Imagining the Nation in Nature. Landscape Preservation and German Identity 1885-1945*, Cambridge-Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2004; David Blackbourn, *The Conquest of Nature. Water, Landscape and the Making of Modern Germany*, New York-London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006.

Exhibiting Grandeur

The use of spatiality as a symbol of architectural, technological or even cultural wonder can be used to outline the achievement of a political elite, of a regime or of an entire nation. Whether we are talking about ancient hierarchical, covenantal or bureaucratic polities as well as modern nation-states, charismatized political spaces have been used in order to create a sense of grandeur, a sense of achievement which targets legitimacy, prestige, political theatricality, self-confidence and, ultimately, identity. Especially since the late 19th century onwards, the grand exhibitions of Western powers “offered the objects and activities of mass education and entertainment, providing the public culture necessary for the participatory remaking of history, memory, and identities.”¹¹ If the Crystal Palace, the British Museum and their exhibitions were part of the wide-scale reworking of identities, the latter also functioned as a trophy room of sorts, wherein all the “plunder” of the Empire could be stored, interpreted and displayed.

Spectacular architecture has served regimes ever since the earliest polities managed to acquire the appropriate knowledge, resources and manpower. Whether it is the Pyramids, the Ishtar Gate, the Coliseum, Napoleon III’s Paris, late 19th century Vienna or Hitler’s imagined Berlin, architectural grandeur was often the basis upon which other interconnected aspects – such as authority and destiny – were built. Thus, if Phillip II’s Escorial, with its biblical overtures¹² symbolized the role of a messianic Spanish Empire as a centre of the Christian universe, late 18th century Mexico City’s hegemonic construction of space under the Bourbon dynasty was meant to exhibit the reforms and the new face of a modernizing state.¹³ Even though they were often following older patterns, modern regimes – including totalist ideocracies – made an increased use of architectural and structural displays in order to further their agenda. Whether it was a secular or an ostensibly sacred display of a regime’s

¹¹ Peter H. Hoffenberg, *An Empire on Display. English, Indian and Australian Exhibitions from the Crystal Palace to the Great War*, London: University of California Press 2001, p. 273.

¹² Philip II designed the Escorial together with his chief-architect as a monument to Spain’s role as a centre of the Christian world, possibly based on the plan of the Solomonic Temple.

¹³ See Sharon Bailey Glasco, *Constructing Mexico City: Colonial Conflicts over Culture, Space, and Authority*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

political theatricality¹⁴ such as fascist Italy, the Romanian National-Legionary State or their Soviet enemy, temporary or durable spatiality was employed through the massive use of architects, artists and planners. In exhibiting the grandeur and the power which stood at the heart of the regimes they often built upon charismatic symbols or rituals originating in the beginning of the movement.¹⁵ The Italian fascists did not modify the urban landscape in Rome simply due to architectural or social concerns¹⁶. By a relentless process of clearing away old buildings the regime freed up spaces around imperial sites, such as the Theatre of Marcellus¹⁷ and in so doing, they displayed the full force of the New Rome and its fascist interpretation of past, present and future.

The Permanence and Presence of Authority

The relation between authority and spatiality can, at times, be shaped by alterations and transformations to which landscapes are subjected. As the European wars subsided after the grand Napoleonic adventure, domination by force of arms was partly replaced by domination by force of law and by manipulation of the political landscape. Thus, the conquest of peace in the Belle Époque was also the prerequisite for a massive attempt at conquering nature. Armies of workers, under the state's mild or severe direction, dug tunnels, cleared forests, drained marshes and transformed the waterways, at times consciously connecting the orderly remaking of nature to the orderly and ideal remaking of society¹⁸. The "old" and "new" spaces quickly became symbols of national identity, such as the Rhine and the Vistula in the German case, or the Danube in the Romanian one.

¹⁴ Emilio Gentile, *The Struggle for Modernity, Nationalism, Futurism and Fascism*, Westport-Connecticut-London: Praeger, 2003, p. 115.

¹⁵ Relevant examples are the mystical-religious rituals of the Legion of the Archangel Michael, which welded together nativism, Orthodoxy, anti-Semitism, anti-Communism and ethnocentric tendencies into a high-eschatological scenario dealing with death, conflict and resurrection.

¹⁶ For instance, urban restructuring meant that members of the left-leaning working-class were moved to the periphery of the city, where they could be better isolated and watched.

¹⁷ Borden W. Painter, Jr., *Mussolini's Rome. Rebuilding the Eternal City*, New York-Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p. 3.

¹⁸ Blackburn, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

Adam T. Smith has argued that authority as a concept has been neglected in the study of societies – both ancient and modern – due to the influence posed by Hannah Arendt’s authority theory¹⁹, which he sees as wrongly promoting the concept of authority as an “entity to be possessed”.²⁰ Smith’s somewhat questionable comments on the West-Soviet division aside, he is right in pointing to situational and ideal counterarguments to Arendt’s view, thus echoing Bruce Lincoln’s own views on authority, which is not seen as an *entity* but as an *effect* “operative within strongly asymmetric relations between speaker and audience”.²¹ In following this line of thought, if authority cannot function as a separate entity, but as an effect, then it must always be dependent on perception, interpretation and the relation between the power emitter and the receiving public. Symbols, language, visual depictions, iconographies as well as landscapes which are either *pure* or *conquered* are reworked within the internal logic of regimes so as to coerce, legitimize and ultimately enable an authoritative act. A regime, regardless of its ideological leaning, will seek to depict its authority – the fabled arm of the state – as omnipotent, and, crucially, omnipresent, evenly spread out throughout the territory. Often, regimes – but political movements as well - seek to impose a visible local presence on landscapes and on cities, thereby proving the universality of their dominion. Nowhere was this more apparent than in the Roman Empire, with the *Imago* of the Emperor being worshipped and ritualistically paid respect to in every province of the Imperium. Thus, the fragmentary and “constellatory nature”²² of regimes can – at least partially – be overcome through the construction of a universalistic vision meant to be applied to the entirety of the *oikoumene*.

Origins and Memory

Heritage, ancestry and common blood have been often encountered in traditions going back to Antiquity, and have only increased in

¹⁹ See: Hannah Arendt, *Originile Totalitarismului (The Origins of Totalitarianism)*, București: Humanitas, 2006.

²⁰ T. Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

²¹ Bruce Lincoln, *Authority: Construction and Corrosion*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994, p. 116.

²² T. Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

importance from the Early Modern era to the contemporary period. They were partially responsible for the resilience of an ethnos, at times for its resistance in front of physical extermination or cultural assimilation. When landscape functions as a historicizing influence on a community, that community itself may end up seeing and feeling to be part of a certain environment itself. This is a complex process which often stands at a crossroads between attachment to one's homeland and the sacralization of landscapes. Once again, it is, in this case, less important to determine to which degree traditions were (re)invented, constructed by an elite or drawn out of an existing base at the societal level. The important aspect is to establish the influence such traditions of attachment possessed in the make-up of modern states. For this reason, the importance of territorialisation cannot be overstated, especially when imported in the creation of a modern systemic sacralization of politics. For a regime – especially so if highly ideocratic in nature – the territorialisation of memories can function as a crucial piece in the making of ethnosapes, a fusion between nature, ethnos and common origins which come to play a part in a coherent system of myths, rituals and historical vision. Romanticism came to regard landscapes and territory as the embodiment of the nation, a community which is born and thrives within its perceived natural borders. This concept of inherited cultural patrimony stands at the heart of the debate which, on a very general level sets the “constructivists” against the “primordialists”. Needless to say, we can find the truth somewhere in the middle, as the nationalists both invented and used pre-existing traditions, which made for an effective message for their audience. Whether it was a genuine tradition or a (re)invented one, they could not be completely new and alien in nature. In order to be most effective, modern nationalists could not present something the masses could not relate to, hence, the more extreme exceptions aside, historical traditions and pasts were often only half-invented. Virtually all the ideocratic experiments of the 20th century – regardless of their revolutionary tendencies – synthesized ancient and familiar terms within a new and dynamic ideological vocabulary, which sought to highlight the link between precursors and the present.

When Mussolini became prime minister he set out to promote the vision he had for a new Rome, due to its overwhelming historical

significance and the effects it could have on fascism through a successful physical, ideological and symbolic integration of the city within the emerging fascist system. For the ambitious rulers of Italy, the decayed metropolis, home to poverty and social parasites was to give way to the new – and at the same time old – Rome, a Rome fully connected to its imperial past.²³ Monuments, streets, public buildings and sacred sites were restored and integrated in a way which, at the same time, displayed and defined the fascist state and its coming empire. This did not mean that the entirety of the Roman legacy was considered equally important for the development of fascism. Indeed, it was the Augustan era, with its strong emphasis on *romanità* that was most similar to the fascist ideal in Mussolini's view, rather than the period of a united Italy under the House of Savoy, which the fascists saw as a decadent organism which had failed in achieving the aims of the Risorgimento.²⁴ Even as it paid proper tribute to the other periods of Italian history, the monuments and buildings connected to the Baroque, Medieval or Renaissance times were, at times, torn down so as to make way for the old empire or exhibit the new. Other similar examples are found in virtually all European states, with an ever increasing intensity from the 19th century onwards, even though the meaning and importance of spaces shifted and transformed themselves according to their times. In some cases, like the Serbian use of the Kosovo heartland and historical battlefield, the cultural-political meaning remained more or less unchanged, whereas in others, such as the Napoleonic Triumphal Arch or the Prussian-German Brandenburg Gate²⁵, the intensity and symbolism of such landscapes have tended toward a multitude of interpretations.²⁶

Temporality and Telos

Since Antiquity, two great traditions have been shaped and conceptualized by the many different Eurasian civilizations, the *cyclical*

²³ See Benito Mussolini, *Opera Omnia di Benito Mussolini*. 36 vols., Edoardo and Dulio Susmel (eds.), Florence: La Fenice, 1951-63.

²⁴ Painter, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

²⁵ See Stuart Taberner and Frank Finlay (eds.), *Recasting German Identity. Culture, Politics and Literature in the Berlin Republic*, New York-Suffolk: Camden House, 2002.

²⁶ See Lisa Findley, *Building Change. Architecture, Politics and Cultural Agency*, London-New York: Routledge, 2005.

temporality and the *teleological temporality*.²⁷ The first tradition envisioned historical time as a circle and was common to the overwhelming majority of ancient societies, from Greece to India, in no small part due to the importance given to astronomy and to the cycles of the celestial bodies which, it was supposed, mirrored the movements on earth and conveyed the will of the gods. The second tradition organizes history as a straight flux running from a point of origin to an end purpose, a distinct telos. Although both models managed to coexist and even to adopt features from one another, the underlying tension between the two traditions remained important. Even though one could argue differently with references to Judaism, the first truly teleological conception of history was shaped and refined by Christianity.²⁸ At the time of the Fourth Crusade the residents of Constantinople destroyed a lifelike bronze statue of Athena, whose hand seemed to beckon the Latin besiegers into their city.²⁹ The reliefs on the columns of Theodosius and Arcadius also fed the fears of the mob, since the past Roman victories, with their images of conquered cities, triumph and death were rumoured to predict the future doom of their empire.³⁰ In this fascinating case, landmarks which had always been part of the city's past were also seen as mirroring the course of its future. While the way in which future was uncovered differs in modernity from the medieval mind, the basics remained more or less unchanged, with charismatized political landscapes being integrated within a complex system which united origins, struggle, sacrifice, renewal and destiny of a people. The strong sense of mission which starts to permeate the European space with the advent of the Roman Imperium was strengthened by the establishment of Christianity,

²⁷ See Ralph M. Rosen (ed.), *Time and Temporality in the Ancient World*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology, 2004; Andrea Brady and Emily Butterworth (eds.), *Uses of the future in the Early Modern World*, New York-London: Routledge 2010.

²⁸ Here again we must distinguish between Augustinian Christianity, with its atemporal look on history and telos, and Joachimist Christianity, which introduced, for the first time, a system containing the final telos within history itself, rather than outside of it.

²⁹ See R. J. Jenkins, "Further Evidence Regarding the Bronze Athena at Byzantium", *Annual of the British School at Athens* 46 (1951): 72-74.

³⁰ See Donald E. Queller and Thomas F. Madden, *The Fourth Crusade: The Conquest of Constantinople*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 1997, p.138.

reaffirmed during the Enlightenment and brought to new heights in the 19th century and the 20th century.

It was at this time when nationality and the pre-genetic concept of “race” were united in the build-up to an exclusionary version of the nation, whose primacy was to be established either over a homeland beset by foreigners or through conquest over spaces which it deemed rightfully part of its patrimony. Through the advent of modernity, within the public culture set of by authoritarian regimes but also at the heart of the Western liberal-democracies, one can identify a fundamental transformation. The individual hero is increasingly meant to symbolize the collective sacrifice or even completely replaced by the masses, which further bolstered the intensity of ideocratic tendencies. This importance of the collective over the individual is directly linked to the decline of monarchical rule, the rise of the citizen armies and the utopian claims to equality, regeneration and mastery over the adversities of man and nature through a common effort. Political landscapes and charismatized spaces would play their own part in the mythology of the regimes which sought not only to conquer nature but also to shape it to their will, just as they sought to shape man. Sacrifice, prosperity, security and, last but not least, destiny were among the reasons for the way in which regimes treated spaces as harbingers or as stepping-stones to a brighter future. During the Enlightenment almost all voices were united in praising man’s endeavour to claim his right. If the 19th century brought limitless moral progress to the forefront, the 20th finally combined mastery over the elements with that over nature’s chaos, mixing technological certainty with ideological and in some cases racial primacy.³¹ For instance, the wilderness of the Pripet Marshes could be imagined before and during National-Socialism as the *Urheimat* of the passive and “feminine” Slav race, a land filled with disorder which stood in stark contrast with the ancient dynamic and “masculine”³² Germanic order³³, which cleared, drained and urbanized in the name of future generations.

This sense of mission is, of course, not limited to the Abrahamic world, nor is it always dependent on religion or even religiosity. Still, the teleological narrative of history, the special destiny which elevates one

³¹ Blackbourn, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

³² *Ibidem*, p. 254.

³³ *Ibidem*, p. 252.

country over others may easily mix purely secular aspects such as military power and wealth with chiliastic overtones implying a universal moral salvation and redemption by the fulfilment of the nation's calling. Through the use of charismatized spaces which linked past histories and sacrifices and entrusting the community with a sense of mission, regimes could often translate teleological philosophies of history in a fulfilment of their own utopian-eschatological narrative, such as the domination and civilization of others, the primacy of a race, the final victory of the proletariat, the rebirth of a long-dormant people or uniting the world into a single community of the faithful.

Sacred Spaces

There are several approaches to the sacralization of space. The *substantive* view³⁴ represents spaces which are deemed sacred due to their being inhabited by an almost physical presence, a sacral irruption into profane space. This is countered by what we may call a *situational-constructivist* view which seeks to demonstrate the situational nature of the sacred, a product of human action, rather the supposedly inherent indwelling defended by the substantive view. This means that sacred spaces are, first and furthest, created and shaped by social action, which takes into account spatial organization, the integration of sacred space within economic structures and the power relations affecting the role of the participants. Sacredness, like charisma, is not a monolith, it is fluid and determined by social construction, by patterns as well as the actor itself. Spaces are usually sacralized through ritualization, construction or contestation³⁵, all of which are ultimately situational. Sacred spaces may also be divided between what Jonathan Z. Smith has called *locative* and *utopian*³⁶ a distinction which can be useful when addressing regimes and

³⁴ See Mircea Eliade, *The Sacred and the Profane. The Nature of Religion*, New York: Harcourt, 1987.

³⁵ David Chidester and Edward T. Linenthal (eds.), *American Sacred Space*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995, p.15; In a Foucaultian vein (plus Bourdieu's habitus), they go on to discuss space as an exercise of power, establishing that "sacred space is inevitably contested space, a site of negotiated contests over the legitimate ownership of sacred symbols."

³⁶ *Locative* space can be defined as limited and with precise local boundaries, whereas *utopian* space is not attached to a specific location and is universal and transcendental in its

movements which possess or mix eschatological or nationalistic features. Partially reconciling and supplementing the substantive and situational perspectives, there is the “third space”³⁷ approach, or uniting “space-in-being” to “imagined space” into one which is, at the same time real and imagined by the believers. This view is close to the Byzantine conception of transcendent space³⁸, as well as to hierotopy³⁹, another somewhat similar, if controversial, term put forward by Alexei Lidov, who sees sacralization as a dynamic process taking place between existing space and that of the *image-paradigms*⁴⁰ influencing the participants. Within such spaces, participants (believers) are not simply passive participants but rather active contributors.

Thus, despite the situational nature of sacred spaces, it would be a mistake to reduce sacralization to social or power relations when the believer himself will perceive sacred space as a hierophany and “act” accordingly.⁴¹ Naturally, believers are not prone to analyse the many details which hold together a sacred scenario and its connection between the material-profane and the ideal-sacred world. In other words, it matters less if spaces are sacralized due to social action, as opposed to the “effect” of fascination or awe before the Numinous, and the psychological and

aspirations. See: Jonathan Z. Smith, *Map is Not Territory: Studies in the History of Religions*, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1978; Jonathan Z. Smith, *Drudgery Divine: On the Comparison of Early Christianities and the Religions of Late Antiquity*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990, pp. 21-42.

³⁷ See Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith, Oxford: Blackwell, 1991; Edward Soja: *Postmodern Geographies. Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory*, New York: Verso, 1989; E. Soja, *Thirdspace: Journeys to Los Angeles and Other Real-and-imagined Places*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1996. The concept of Thirdspace appears to have been directly influenced by Lefebvre as well as Foucault’s concept of *heterotopia*.

³⁸ See: Jelena Bogdanovic, *Canopies. The framing of space in the Byzantine Sacred Tradition*, Princeton: Princeton University 2008

³⁹ See Alexei Lidov, *Hierotopy, Studies in the Making of Sacred Spaces*, ed. A. Lidov, Moscow 2004.

⁴⁰ See A. Lidov, “Image-Paradigms’ as a Notion of Mediterranean Visual Culture: a Hierotopic Approach to Art History”, In: *Crossing Cultures. Papers of the International Congress of Art History*. CIHA-2008. Melbourne, 2009, pp. 177-183. For Lidov, image-paradigms essentially function as spatial images associated with sacred spaces in the minds of the believers.

⁴¹ See Jeanne Halgren Kilde, *Sacred Power, Sacred Space. An introduction to Christian Architecture and Worship*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 7.

spiritual empowerment of the believer. The sense of fulfilment, of belonging, and lastly, of empowerment which “believers” could experience within the charismatized space of a regime-sanctioned apotheosis (not to mention genuinely spontaneous manifestations), be it a nationalistic festival, a triumphal procession or even a party rally should not be so easily dismissed as coerced or mimicked euphoria and enthusiasm. For our purposes it will suffice to say that spatial charismatization – or the setting apart of special spaces from other “regular” ones – anticipates sacralization itself, which is ultimately more of a fulfilment of the charismatization process rather than a variant. In any case, whether we deal with the spiritual, social or personal dimensions of such charismatized sacred spaces, they all worked together in establishing a distinct narrative within nationalism as well as modern ideocracies.

Sacred space is by definition exclusionary, a place which is usually opened to the believers only, whereas the presence of outsiders is strictly regulated or completely forbidden. In many ways, the sacredness of spaces is not only determined by those willing to die in their defence, but also by those ready to kill in their name. We encounter this in the case of Jerusalem, the holy city of the Abrahamic world, uniting all three faiths. Due to its character as a decisive influence in the doctrine of Christianity, Judaism and Islam as well as the many battles waged for its physical possession, the city has often transcended the more immediate political concerns and manifested itself on a symbolic plane.⁴² The Ummayyad Caliph Abd al-Malik used the holy nature of the city by raising the Dome of the Rock on the Temple Mount as well as probably restoring the Al-Aqsa Mosque, thus seeking the participation of the Faithful in the shifting sands of a sacred scenario which had begun with Abraham himself. Yet, even as Jerusalem declined in economic and political importance it retained its spiritual power. If Jerusalem possessed a good deal of religious significance for Muslims and a much greater one for Christians, it stood then, as it does today, as one of the core fundamentals of Judaism.⁴³ Through rituals and

⁴² See Suzanne M. Yeager, *Jerusalem in Medieval Narrative*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008; Roberto Mazza, *Jerusalem from the Ottomans to the British*, London-New York: I.B Tauris Publishers, 2009.

⁴³ See Simone Ricca, *Reinventing Jerusalem. Israel's Reconstruction of the Jewish Quarter after 1967*, London-New York: I. B. Taurus, 2007.

remembrance days, the Jewish communities constantly relived their expulsion from the city and the destruction of the Temple. Even as the city became a sublime construct which was closer to an ideal than to the physical space, the latter would return in full strength during the modern era when it was and continues to be at the forefront of the battle between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.⁴⁴ Thus, sacred spaces act out in two powerful ways for the believers. They pose a question of identity, in showing who they are as an ethnos, as members of a faith, or a modern nation. Secondly – mostly in the Jewish, Christian and Shi'a traditions - they pose the question of either the part in an eschatological narrative, or in a Grand Plan for which they have been "chosen", a plan in which the locative nature of the space is of vital importance.

A sanctified and charismatized space, whether it is a large territory, a landscape, a city or an architectural complex, is ever useful in the reconstruction of a sacred homeland, through their direct link to the (oft-mythical) founder of a faith, of an ethnos or of a nation. This direct link means, at the same time the separation of the charismatized space from other normal spaces also allowing it to function within a complex system of self-reinforcing elements. Traditionally, sacred space can be, first of all, connected to geographic features, such as holy rivers or mountains. For this reason, even as the Holy Land encompassed all of ancient Judea, several places naturally outdid others in importance, such as Bethlehem, the river Jordan, mount Tabor or Jerusalem. Ultimately, a sacred dimension need not be linked only to major landscapes or overtly religious architectural complexes, but may also be conferred upon battlefields⁴⁵, buildings with a covenantal role⁴⁶ or sepulchres⁴⁷. If well-being and the life of the people and

⁴⁴ See Yitzhak Reiter, *Jerusalem and Its Role in Islamic Solidarity*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

⁴⁵ Defeats are sometimes even more important than victories in the creation of an enduring myth, as is the case of Sevastopol. See: Serhii Plokhy, "The City of Glory: Sevastopol in Russian Historical Mythology", *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 35, No. 3, 2000, pp. 369-383. Of an almost equal importance are battlefields where victory was still achieved at a tremendous sacrifice. See: Lisa. A Kirschenbaum, *The Legacy of the Siege of Leningrad, 1941-1944. Myth, Memories and Monuments*, Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

⁴⁶ This includes such spaces as the famous Oath of the Tennis Court in the French Revolution, the Hôtel de Ville, with its Balcony, which saw a number of coups and – most importantly - republics of the people, being proclaimed.

of the territory they inhabited were interconnected on the most intimate of levels, the supreme fascination was often found in its opposites: sacrifice and death. They are encountered in the most varied of places, whether it was the death-cult present in the Italian fascist squadristi, the almost Christian terminology⁴⁸ which permeates an anti-Christian National-Socialism or the mystical notions of blood, sacrifice and martyrdom which gave the Legion of the Archangel Michael its unique aura among European nationalist movements. In raising these concepts above all else in their pursuit of moral and national regeneration, the architects and propagandists of varied regimes were paying tribute to their – mythical or reinvented – ancestors as well as imagining distinctly utopian futures. Indeed, all modern totalist systems possessed their own versions of sacred political-ideological temples and shrines, the building blocks of what their adherents saw as new moral movements. Nevertheless, I am sceptical with regard to the functionality and validity of the concept of a *political religion*, despite the often brilliant scholarship which has grown around it. Ultimately, I see it as an altogether crude depiction of the intricate layers and processes leading to the creation of authority systems, which were, essentially, *totalist ideocracies*.

Conclusion

The socio-cultural stage of spatiality has had a rich and diverse past. During premodern times, it was created mostly for the consumption of elites, with a lesser, if still important, emphasis on the ruled masses. Thus, while the origins of modern totalist ideocracies is doubtlessly found in ancient, medieval and early modern polities, it is only during the late 1700's that they started to approach the forms found in contemporary regimes. As politics underwent a shift in focus, at least nominally, from the realm of the elite to that of the citizen, so too were rituals increasingly public, unitary and universal in role. The coming of mass politics, with their ever important festivals, parades, rites and rallies would signal a strengthening of political theatricality, or performative politics, which enter "directly onto

⁴⁷ See: George L. Mosse, *Fallen soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars*, Oxford University Press 1990.

⁴⁸ See George L. Mosse, "Fascism and the French Revolution", *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 24, No. 1, 1989, pp. 5-26.

the stage".⁴⁹ The use of spatiality as a means of legitimizing the state was most important in fascist, national-socialist, communist and other regimes which owned higher despotic power and a relatively lower legalistic power, yet theirs was only the most visible ideocratic manifestation. Even in the present European configuration, with its inconsistent mission and its lack of true founding myths and heroes, the importance of spatiality in the creation of a political liturgy cannot be ignored. In the pursuit of a common identity and greater legitimacy, the use and presentation of spatiality is crucial to the new European project. It is for this reason that European spaces and landscapes should be presented, at the same time, as symbols and physical reminders of a common past, a unitary present and a uniquely European future.

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⁴⁹ Gentile, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

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DE VICHY A LA RESISTANCE :
LE CAS DU DIPLOMATE JACQUES TRUELLE

FROM VICHY TO RESISTANCE: THE CASE OF DIPLOMAT
JACQUES TRUELLE

Adriana Bichiș*

Abstract

The aim of the current article is to analyze the actions of the French diplomat Jacques Truelle who from his early position as a Vichy diplomat later rallied himself to General de Gaulle in June 1943. Firstly, our aim is to evaluate the difficulties he encountered into joining the Resistance movement, and those regarding the acceptance of de Gaulle's persona as the leader of Free France. Furthermore, we seek to outline his "double game" policy and the role he played regarding the fate of Jews he encountered in the turmoil of the Second World War.

Keywords: diplomacy, ambassador, Vichy, Resistance, Truelle, Second World War.

« Un homme condamné à servir Vichy ou, du moins, à faire semblant de le servir-doit être continuellement tenaillé par l'humiliation ou la révolte. Se taire, c'est s'exposer à passer pour un lâche ou pour un aveugle; parler, c'est risquer de compromettre non seulement son intérêt personnel, mais encore et surtout le patient travail que l'on a pu entreprendre dans l'ombre en vue d'un avenir meilleur¹ ».

René de Weck

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¹ René de Weck, *Journal de guerre (1939-1945). Un diplomate suisse à Bucarest*, Genève: SHSR et la Libération, 2001, p. 275.

Historiographie et méthode d'approche

L'extrait ci-dessus de « *Journal de guerre* » de René de Weck, l'ambassadeur de Suisse à Bucarest pendant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale nous permet de nous poser la suivante question: *est-ce qu'on peut parler dans des certains cas « d'une politique de double-jeu » en ce qui concerne les fonctionnaires de Vichy?* Et si la réponse est affirmative dans quel contexte est né cette politique ? Au nom de quoi ? et pour servir à quoi ?

Pendant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, les Français ont été séparés par deux options fondamentales²: celle de l'État français et celle de la France libre. À Vichy, on a choisit la reconnaissance de la victoire allemande, la « collaboration », l'inscription de la France dans « l'ordre européen » dirigé de Berlin. À Londres, et puis à Alger on a choisit de ne pas accepter la défaite et l'armistice, de continuer la guerre avec les Alliés, de restaurer l'indépendance de la France et son rôle de grande puissance mondiale. Mais, on a eu des cas quand des Français qui servaient le régime du Vichy ont décidé de collaborer avec la France libre. C'est aussi le cas du diplomate Jacques Truelle.

Caractérisé dans les années 1930 par le diplomate Armand Bérard comme « homme loyal si jamais il en fut », et « d'une parfaite droiture de caractère » par le diplomate François Charles-Roux³, Truelle fait parti des

² Jean-Claude Allain, Françoise Autrand, Lucien Bély, Philippe Contamine, Pierre Guilen, Thierry Lentz, Georges Henri Soutou, Laurent Theis, Maurice Vaisse, *Histoire de la diplomatie française*, Paris : Perrin, 2005, p. 796.

³ François Charles-Roux est né le 19 novembre 1879, licencié en droit et ès-lettres, diplôme d'études supérieures d'histoire et géographie, diplôme de l'École des sciences politiques, il entre dans la carrière en 1902. Il débute, avant-guerre, par les postes de Saint-Petersbourg, Constantinople et Le Caire puis Londres. Cité à l'Ordre de l'état-major du Corps expéditionnaire d'Orient en 1915, il est nommé secrétaire à Rome puis, en 1924, inspecteur des postes, et, l'année suivante, délégué à la Commission européenne et à la Commission internationale du Danube. En octobre 1926, il est ministre à Prague, le 6 mai 1932, ambassadeur à Saint-Siège à Rome. La Deuxième Guerre Mondiale le trouve à Rome, où il est bientôt remplacé par François-Poncet. Secrétaire général du Ministère des Affaires étrangères le 18 mai 1940, il donna sa démission le 24 octobre et se retire dans la vie privée. La poursuite de sa carrière après-guerre ne nous intéresse pas ici. Source *Annuaire diplomatique et consulaire de la République Française pour 1939*. Nouvelle série, tome. I, Paris: Imprimerie Nationale p. 248-249 ; François Charles-Roux, *Cinq mois tragiques aux Affaires étrangères (21mai- 1^{er} novembre 1940)*, Paris: Plon, 1949.

diplomates qui, après avoir servi le régime de Vichy, se rallia à la « dissidence » gaulliste en juin 1943.

Avant de passer à l'analyse de l'action du diplomate Truelle, on considère qu'il est important de donner une définition du gaullisme et on a choisi celle donnée par Robert Belot qui le définit comme : « un phénomène politique étrange doté d'une triple originalité: il naît brutalement de la guerre du jour au lendemain, hors de toute tradition; il procède d'un homme seul sans passé politique; il se définit surtout, au début de l'occupation, par ceux qui le rejettent⁴ ».

Pour pouvoir reconstruire l'ensemble des dispositifs permettant de comprendre la trajectoire en question, il a fallu se limiter à un aspect du problème représenté par la dimension politique de l'action du diplomate Truelle. En partant de la théorie de Catherine Nicault selon laquelle « tout ministère des Affaires Étrangères, ou toute institution en tenant lieu, est d'abord un dispositif voué à la collecte et à l'analyse de l'information, on conviendra que les diplomates constituent au sein des classes dirigeantes des pays en guerre, l'un des principaux groupes de professionnels de l'information⁵ ». Donc, une source importante dans l'élaboration de cette étude a été l'interprétation des documents d'archives. La correspondance de Truelle avec le gouvernement de Vichy constitue aussi un instrument indispensable de travail, à laquelle on ajoute les mémoires des diplomates en postes pendant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale (celles de Jean Mouton, René de Weck, André Godin, Gerhard Stelzer). L'analyse sociologique a nécessité la reconstitution de la trajectoire individuelle de Jacques Truelle. Le dépouillement des Annuaires diplomatiques a permis de connaître l'éducation et la carrière du diplomate Jacques Truelle.

L'ambition qui est à l'origine de cette étude n'a pas été de faire une histoire sur l'action diplomatique de Jacques Truelle, mais d'analyser la difficulté qu'il a eu à s'unir avec les résistants, à s'ouvrir au gaullisme, à accepter la tutelle du chef de la France libre, voir dans quelles conditions il a pu accéder au gaullisme, dans quel contexte il est passé, sans oublier de faire référence à la Deuxième Guerre mondiale et aux événements qui ont influencé son cours. *Pourquoi a-t-il tant attendu? Comment devient-on*

⁴ Robert Belot, *La Résistance sans de Gaulle*, Paris : Fayard, 2006, p. 646.

⁵ Catherine Nicault, « Que savaient les diplomates de Vichy? » in *Les Cahiers de la Shoah*, Université Paris 1, Paris: Édition Liana Levi, 1996, pp. 88-89.

gaulliste? Quel est le contexte dans lequel Truelle décide de passer au gaullisme? Dans quelles conditions est-il finalement passé au gaullisme? Telles sont les questions auxquelles cette étude se propose de répondre.

La volonté de consacrer une étude à ce sujet s'inscrit donc dans ce débat et essaie de donner une réponse.

L'évolution du diplomate Jacques Truelle

Jacques-Marie Truelle est né le 20 septembre 1881 dans une bonne famille bourgeoise parisienne⁶. Il fait des études de droit et il est diplômé de l'École des sciences politiques. De 1919 à juin 1940, Jacques Truelle⁷ a été un diplomate de bonne réputation⁸. Il fait ses débuts comme attaché autorisé à Rome (mai 1918- avril 1919), puis il est nommé attaché d'ambassade le 15 août 1919; chargé des fonctions à Rome le 1^{er} mai 1920, il devient secrétaire de 3^e classe le 22 décembre 1920 puis secrétaire de 2^e classe le 28 mai 1924. Il est nommé rédacteur à la direction politique et commerciale le 31 décembre 1924. Il est nommé chevalier de la Légion d'honneur le 31 janvier 1926. En septembre 1926, il est délégué du Ministère des Affaires étrangères à la Convention de l'American Légion de Philadelphie. Le 14 avril 1928, il devient secrétaire de 1^e classe. De janvier 1928 à juillet 1933, il a été en poste à Londres, puis il est nommé conseiller d'Ambassade au Saint-Siège à Rome lorsque François Charles-Roux y est nommé ambassadeur de juillet 1933 à octobre 1936. Il devient officier de la Légion d'honneur le 10 janvier 1936. Entre le 22 octobre 1936 et janvier 1938, il est en poste à la sous-direction de l'Europe. À partir de juillet 1938 il est en poste à Washington jusqu'en 1940, quand il est nommé par Vichy « envoyé extraordinaire et ministre plénipotentiaire à Bucarest ». Sa nomination a été motivée avec les mots suivants: « il est indispensable que notre Légation à Bucarest ne reste pas sans titulaire et que

⁶ Idem, « De Pétain à de Gaulle: la trajectoire tourmentée du diplomate Jacques Truelle », in *Terres Promises, Mélanges offerts à André Kaspi*, Paris: Publication de la Sorbonne, 2008, p.350.

⁷ Pour la carrière diplomatique de Jacques-Marie Truelle voir *Annuaire diplomatique et consulaire de la République Française pour 1939*. Nouvelle série, tome. I, Paris: Imprimerie Nationale; Catherine, Nicault, *op. cit.*, p. 353-354; Ana-Maria Stan, *La France de Vichy et la Roumanie (1940-1944)*, Cluj-Napoca: Académie Roumaine, Centre d'Études Transylvaines, 2007, p. 76-83, p.381.

⁸ Catherine Nicault, *op. cit.*, p. 353.

M. Truelle se mette en route pour rejoindre son nouveau poste dès que l'agrément lui aura été accordé⁹ ».

Pourquoi cette décision de Vichy de nommer Truelle comme ministre en Roumanie?

Entre juillet et novembre 1940, les dirigeants français procédèrent à des mutations diplomatiques qui leur permirent de placer des hommes politiques qui leur étaient dévoués à des postes où ils comptaient faire prévaloir des vues nouvelles: pendant cette période, le sénateur de Seine-et-Oise, Henry-Haye, « mieux en cour à Vichy », remplaça à Washington le comte de Saint-Quentin¹⁰, Caoulonde a été appelé de Suisse, W. d'Ormesson du Vatican, M. Massigli d'Ankara, La Baume de Madrid et Adrien Thierry de Roumanie « pour éviter que les Allemands sollicitent son départ¹¹ ». Depuis le départ de Roumanie de l'ambassadeur Adrien Thierry le 7 août 1940¹², l'Ambassade et puis la Légation de la France en Roumanie a été dirigée par le chargé d'affaire Henry Spitzmuller¹³. On sait par un télégramme signé de Paul Baudouin¹⁴ le 9 juillet 1940¹⁵ que Vichy a

⁹ Télégramme envoyé de Vichy à l'Ambassade de France à Washington, le 25 septembre 1940, signé Baudouin, AMEF, Vichy, Z-Europe, Roumanie, doss. 675, f. 51.

¹⁰ Jean Baillou, *Les affaires étrangères et le corps diplomatique français*, t. II: 1870-1980, Paris: Édition du CNRS, 1980, p. 554.

¹¹ François Charles-Roux, *op. cit.*, pp. 319-320.

¹² Télégramme envoyé de Vichy, le 7 août 1940, AMEF, Vichy, C-État Français, doss.35.

¹³ Spitzmuller (Raymond, Armand, Édouard, Henry), né le 17 mars 1900, licencié en lettres et en droit, diplômé de l'École des sciences politiques; cité à l'ordre du 23^e régiment de dragons, 16 juillet 1918; attaché d'ambassade, 20 novembre 1925; à Bruxelles, 31 décembre 1925; chargé des fonctions de troisième secrétaire, 13 décembre 1926; secrétaire d'ambassade de 3^e classe, 14 avril 1928; chargé de fonctions de 2^e secrétaire à la Haye, 1^{er} juillet 1930; rédacteur au service français de la Société des Nations, 20 février 1933; membre de la délégation française à la Conférence du désarmement, 3 juillet 1933; chargé de fonctions de 2^e secrétaire à Varsovie (non installé) 19 octobre 1935; secrétaire de 2^e classe, 16 novembre 1935, chargé de fonctions de consul-adjoint à Genève, 22 janvier 1936; chargé de l'intérim de fonctions de 1^{er} secrétaire à Bucarest, 29 janvier-1^{er} mai 1936; chargé de fonctions de 1^{er} secrétaire à Bucarest; 1^{er} avril 1938, secrétaire d'ambassade de 1^e classe, 10 août 1939; conseiller d'ambassade de 2^e classe, 26 août 1940; conseiller d'ambassade de 1^e classe, 1^{er} avril 1945; ministre plénipotentiaire de 2^e classe, 4 mars 1946; officier de la Légion d'honneur 12 avril 1947. Source *Annuaire diplomatique et consulaire de la République française pour 1947*. Nouvelle série, tome LI, Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1947, pp. 569-570.

¹⁴ Paul Baudouin est nommé par Paul Reynaud sous-secrétaire d'État à la présidence du Conseil le 21 mars 1940, puis aux Affaires étrangères le 5 juin. Partisan de l'armistice, il est nommé le 16 juin ministre des Affaires étrangères dans le cabinet Pétain pour en exclure

demandé l'agrément au gouvernement roumain pour que M. Emile Charvériat¹⁶ soit nommé comme successeur de Thierry et qu'il l'a reçu¹⁷. On ne sait pas pourquoi, mais Vichy a décidé de changer cette nomination par la personne de Jacques Truelle.

Donc, dans le contexte de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale un poste difficile comme était celui de la Roumanie avait besoin d'un chef expérimenté¹⁸.

Truelle semblait être la personne indiquée grâce à ses qualités qu'on peut connaître à travers les descriptions faites par ses amis et les autres diplomates ou hommes politiques. Un portrait de Truelle a été réalisé le 7 septembre 1940 par Saint-Quentin, ministre de France à Washington entre janvier 1938 et juin 1940: « Formé à la meilleure école, dans les grandes Ambassades et au Département, M. Truelle possède à fond le métier diplomatique. Sa culture historique, littéraire et artistique très étendue le porte plutôt vers la politique que vers l'économie. Son sens très élevé du devoir, son dévouement à ses fonctions, la pondération de son jugement, la confiance qu'il inspire à tous ceux qui sont en relation avec lui, en ont fait un Conseiller accompli, dont j'ai hautement apprécié la collaboration. Il est tout à fait en mesure de diriger une Légation importante¹⁹ ».

Pierre Laval. Le 28 octobre il est nommé ministre secrétaire à la présidence du Conseil et doit laisser les Affaires étrangères à Pierre Laval. Devenu collaborateur direct de Pierre-Étienne Flandin, il quitte la vie politique en même temps que Flandin, au début de l'année 1941. Il devient directeur général de la Banque d'Indochine. Arrêté en septembre 1944, il est condamné en mars à cinq ans de travaux forcés par la Haute Cour de justice. Libéré sous conditions en janvier 1948, il reprend le cycle de ses activités financières, voir *Dictionnaire historique de la France sous l'Occupation*, sous la direction de Michèle et Jean-Paul Cointet, Paris : Tallandier, 2000, p. 64 ; Paul Baudouin, *Neuf mois au gouvernement*, Paris : La Table Ronde, 1948.

¹⁵ Télégramme envoyé de Vichy le 9 juillet 1940, signé Baudouin AMEF, Vichy, Z-Europe, Roumanie, doss. 675., f. 6.

¹⁶ Diplomate nommé ambassadeur de la France en Roumanie après Thierry, mais jamais installé en poste. Il est né le 9 février 1889 ; licencié es lettres et en droit ; diplômé d'études supérieures d'histoire et de géographie ; ministre plénipotentiaire de 1^{ère} classe depuis 17 mars 1939 ; il est mis en disponibilité le 27 septembre 1940. Pour la carrière du Charvériat voir *Annuaire diplomatique et consulaire de la République Française pour 1947*. Nouvelle série, tome. I, Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, pp. 398-399.

¹⁷ Télégramme envoyé à Vichy le 21 juillet 1940, signé Thierry, *Ibidem*, f. 14.

¹⁸ Ana-Maria Stan, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

¹⁹ AMEF, Personnel 3 nominative, dossier personnel Jacques Truelle, doss. 277.

Comment devient-t-on Résistant?

Au début de l'Occupation, la légitimité de régime du Pétain est très rarement mise en doute et en cause. Écrasés par « la défaite », les Français sont plutôt enclins à penser que le vieux Maréchal se sacrifie sur l'autel de la patrie et qu'il est un rempart²⁰. La légalité du gouvernement de Vichy était peu discutable au début car il y avait eu un vote de l'Assemblée Nationale²¹ et presque tous les États avaient reconnu ce gouvernement. On ne doit pas oublier le contexte de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale et le drame de Mers el-Kébir²², le 3 juillet 1940, qui a eu un effet négatif sur l'image de général de Gaulle.

C'est aussi le cas de l'Ambassade de France aux États-Unis où Truelle était en poste au moment de l'armistice. Dans ce cas, on a les témoignages des deux diplomates qui peuvent être pris en compte.

Henry-Haye, qui a remplacé en été 1940 le comte de Saint-Quentin comme ambassadeur de Vichy aux États-Unis, affirme qu'il a été reçu à Washington « dans une atmosphère sans chaleur » et que dans son premier contact avec le personnel diplomatique français « il a senti une hostilité sourde chez les « diplomates de carrière », peu enclins à accepter sans réserve les conséquences d'une défaite dont ils connaissaient mal les causes²³ ». De son côté, Raoul Aglion²⁴, le représentant de la France libre aux États-Unis, a déclaré que « le personnel diplomatique et consulaire était farouchement loyal à Vichy et aucun n'avait démissionné pour se rallier à la France libre²⁵ ». Il raconte toujours sa discussion avec M. Garreau-Dombasle, le délégué de la France libre à Washington, qui lui fait une courte description sur l'ancien ambassadeur, le comte de Saint-Quentin

²⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 35.

²¹ Pour cet aspect, voir Philippe Burrimi, *La France à l'heure allemande, 1940-1944*, Paris: Édition du Seuil, 1995, pp. 20-24; Robert Aron, *Histoire de Vichy*, Paris: Fayard, 1954, pp. 61-155.

²² Les Anglais ouvrent le feu contre les navires de guerre français qui refusent d'obtempérer à un ultimatum et tuent 1300 marins.

²³ G. Henry-Haye, *La Grande Éclipse franco-américaine*, Paris : Plon, 1972, pp. 160-161.

²⁴ Il s'est rallié au général de Gaulle dès 1940, envoyé en mission aux États-Unis, y fut délégué de la France Libre, chargé des relations avec les personnalités politiques américaines et la colonie française de New York. Après la création du Gouvernement provisoire d'Alger, il fut nommé conseiller juridique à l'ambassade de France à Washington et participa aux grandes conférences internationales d'après-guerre.

²⁵ Raoul Aglion, *De Gaulle et Roosevelt*, Paris: Plon, 1984, p. 13.

« qui ne pouvait prendre une attitude de rebelle et rallier une poignée de Français à Londres²⁶ », en lui décrivant aussi la difficile mission qu'ils auront aux États-Unis parce que « le personnel diplomatique et consulaire, et les missions rattachées n'ont pas rallié la Résistance, parce que les Américains ne comprennent pas ce qui se passe en Europe et parce que le nouvel ambassadeur de France Henry-Haye, loyal à Vichy fait une propagande anti-anglaise, neutraliste et encourage les isolationnistes²⁷ ».

Donc, on n'a aucun indice pour supposer que pendant l'été de 1940, le diplomate Truelle avait des sympathies pour la France libre. La situation semble changer pendant son voyage de Washington à Bucarest via Vichy. Nous avons une note confidentielle du camp gaulliste de 31 octobre 1940 qui mentionne que la nomination de Truelle à la tête de la Légation de Bucarest aurait été due « à ses sympathies manifestées pour l'Angleterre et la France libre²⁸ ». Il semble que déjà en automne 1940 les gaullistes considéraient « qu'il serait de grand intérêt de prendre contact avec Truelle, mais il faudrait le faire sans risquer de le compromettre²⁹ ». Ana-Maria Stan, dans l'œuvre citée, suppose que les premiers contacts entre les gaullistes et Truelle ont eu lieu pendant ce voyage³⁰.

Dans quel contexte allait s'effectuer l'arrivée de Truelle en Roumanie?

Le contexte dans lequel a eu lieu la nomination de Truelle coïncide avec la décision du gouvernement de Vichy de rétrograder l'Ambassade de France en Roumanie au rang de Légation comme réponse aux mesures prises par Ion Antonescu le 11 septembre 1940 « de ramener au rang de Légation ses Ambassades à l'étranger³¹ », décision qui montre un pas en arrière dans les relations diplomatiques franco-roumaines. Bien qu'il ait été nommé le 22 septembre 1940 pour occuper le poste de ministre

²⁶ *Ibidem*, 14.

²⁷ *Ibidem*, pp. 14-15.

²⁸ AMEF, Londres-Alger, Londres-CNF, Fonds Guerre 1939-1945, série Londres (Conseil Nation Français juin 1940-juillet 1943), doss. 274, f. 24.

²⁹ *Ibidem*.

³⁰ Ana-Maria Stan, *op. cit.*, p. 154.

³¹ Télégramme n° 146 de Vichy adressé au chargé d'affaire à Bucarest, le 23 septembre 1940, AMEF, Vichy, Z-Europe, Roumanie, doss. 675, f. 49.

plénipotentiaire de la France en Roumanie, il n'y arrivera que quelques mois plus tard³². Le motif de son retard semble être une maladie.

Dans le difficile contexte de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, Truelle est arrivé en Europe au début de l'année 1941. En février 1941, il rencontre Pétain et il semble comprendre toute la tragédie qui vivait le Chef d'État français: « cet homme qui possède tous les pouvoirs et qui n'en exerce aucun³³ ». Truelle quitte Vichy le 26 février 1941³⁴ pour prendre ses fonctions en Roumanie, y arrive au début de mois de mars et « a pris possession de son poste les 4 mars 1941³⁵ ».

Le contexte roumain semble avoir contribué à son passage au gaullisme. Dans l'un des premiers rapports qu'il a rédigés pour le général de Gaulle et ses collaborateurs, après son arrivée en Turquie, Truelle a affirmé que l'atmosphère de Roumanie a pleinement contribué à la réussite de sa tentative de rallier le mouvement de Résistance³⁶. En Roumanie, il a trouvé le paradoxe exprimé dès la mi-août 1940 par Henry Spitzmuller qui soutenait que : « l'opinion roumaine, à la différence du Gouvernement, est restée francophile au sens le plus large de ce mot »³⁷. Ce paradoxe est confirmé aussi par un télégramme de 9 juillet 1940 envoyé à Vichy par l'ambassadeur Thierry qui demandait la nomination d'un nouveau titulaire motivé comme: « une réserve et un avertissement au gouvernement roumain auquel l'opinion de ce pays, qui nous reste fidèle en sa majorité, ne serait pas insensible³⁸ ».

Dans la Roumanie des élites francophiles, il a renoué³⁹ ses relations avec les princesses Bibescu, Brâncoveanu, il s'est lié d'amitié avec René de Weck, Jean Mouton⁴⁰, les membres de la Légation française, et il a été reçu

³² Pour les motifs de retard de Truelle en Roumanie voir Ana-Maria Stan, *op. cit.*, pp. 76-78.

³³ Apud Jean Mouton, *Journal de Roumanie : 29 août 1939-13 mars 1946 : la deuxième guerre mondiale vue de l'Est*, Lausanne: Édition L'Age d'Homme, 1991, p. 42.

³⁴ Télégramme envoyé de Vichy le 26 février, Fond cit., f. 73.

³⁵ Télégramme reçu le 5 mars 1941, AMEF, Vichy, C-État Français, doss. 42, f. 42.

³⁶ AMEF, Londres-Alger, Londres-CNF, Fonds Guerre 1939-1945, série Londres (Conseil Nation Français juin 1940-juillet 1943), doss 274.

³⁷ André Godin, *Une passion roumaine. Histoire de l'Institut Français de Hautes Études en Roumanie (1924-1948)*, Paris: Harmattan, 1998, p. 128.

³⁸ Télégramme envoyé à Vichy le 9 juillet 1940, signé Thierry, AMEF, Vichy, Z-Europe, Roumanie, doss. 675, f. 8.

³⁹ Il les connaissait du temps où il était ami avec l'écrivain Marcel Proust.

⁴⁰ Directeur de l'Institut français à Bucarest de 1938 à 1946.

au palais royal. Après la présentation des lettres de créance, le roi Mihai et la reine Elena ont invité Truelle, l'attaché français de l'air, le colonel de Sevin et leurs femmes à un déjeuner intime. Truelle informe Vichy « qu'aucun de Ministres accrédités en Roumanie depuis la chute de roi Carol n'avait été l'objet d'une invitation semblable qui [...] a été faite sur le désir exprimé par la reine⁴¹ ». Pendant le déjeuner, la reine a exprimé à diverses occasions ses sympathies pour la France et sa satisfaction de voir la France représentée à Bucarest⁴².

En fait, le comportement de Truelle et ses réflexions sur « l'attitude duplice » vis-à-vis de l'État français correspondaient à ceux de la majorité de la colonie française de Roumanie⁴³, en commençant par Spitzmuller, l'attaché commercial Rogert Sarret et Jean Mouton, dont son journal de ces années sombres ne laisse planer aucun doute sur ses sentiments. La ligne de conduite adoptée dans les activités intellectuelles, dans les relations publiques avec l'État légionnaire et avec les autorités de Vichy « fut de montrer beaucoup de fermeté mêlée à beaucoup de prudence⁴⁴ ». André Godin décrit Truelle avec les mots suivants : « ancien conseiller d'ambassade à Washington, ce grand patriote amputé de la jambe en août 1914⁴⁵, maréchaliste sans illusion, évolua très rapidement vers le gaullisme ». Il semble que la sympathie de la légation française pour le mouvement gaulliste était bien connu même par les officiers allemands et on a comme témoignage celui de Gerhard Stelzer, conseiller à la Légation allemande de Bucarest qui dans ses Mémoires a affirmé que les membres de la légation de la France en Roumanie, mais surtout le chargé d'affaire Spitzmuller, soutenaient le mouvement de la Résistance, et une preuve en est le départ de Roumanie du ministre Truelle⁴⁶.

Robert Belot soutient que le contexte politique du printemps 1942 a pu être très favorable au progrès du gaullisme. Le retour au pouvoir de Pierre Laval a marqué le tournant collaborateur de Vichy et a brisé le

⁴¹ Télégramme envoyé par Truelle le 3 avril 1941, Fond cit., doss. 686, f. 171.

⁴² *Ibidem*.

⁴³ André Godin, *op. cit.*, p. 129.

⁴⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 129.

⁴⁵ Le 7 octobre 1914, Truelle est touché à Notre-Dame de Lorette par un éclat d'obus; on l'ampute la nuit même de la jambe gauche.

⁴⁶ *Diplomați germani la București 1937-1944. Din memoriile dr. Rolf Gerhard atașat de legație și Gerhard Stelzer consilier de legație*, București: All Educațional, 2001, p. 154.

mythe Pétain, au moment où la géopolitique générale de la guerre montrait que l'Allemagne pouvait être vaincue⁴⁷. Cette théorie se confirme aussi dans le cas de Truelle, si on prend comme source les témoignages de René de Weck qui raconte dans son Journal les discussions qu'il a eues avec le diplomate français en avril 1942. Selon le diplomate suisse, le 4 avril 1942, Truelle lui aurait dit: « personne en France à part quelques vendus ne croit plus au mythe sinistre de la collaboration. Le gouvernement de Vichy lui-même commence à faire machine arrière⁴⁸ ». Inquiété par la politique de Laval le 22 avril 1942, il confiait à de Weck que si on lui demandait de prêter serment de fidélité à cette crapule (il parle de Laval) il ne pourrait que démissionner⁴⁹.

L'évolution de la situation internationale dans la première moitié de l'année 1943, l'érosion du pouvoir du régime de Vichy, la constitution du Comité Français de la Libération Nationale et du Conseil National de la Résistance a représenté pour beaucoup de fonctionnaires de Vichy le signal qu'ils attendaient pour rejoindre la Résistance. Tel fut aussi le cas de Truelle. Dès le printemps de 1943, Truelle avait manifesté son désir de rallier la Résistance. On sait, grâce aux télégrammes envoyés par Spitzmuller⁵⁰ que la Légation de France collaborait avec René Massigli⁵¹, le commissaire des Affaires Étrangères de la France Libre, via Ankara « notre agent d'Ankara avec lequel j'entretiens des rapports régulières m'a transmis votre aimable souvenir », et Beyrouth « vous pouvez nous faire tenir des instructions plus précises, plus détaillées et plus secrètes par l'État

⁴⁷ Robert Belot, *op. cit.*, p. 311.

⁴⁸ René de Weck, *op. cit.*, pp. 272-273.

⁴⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 278.

⁵⁰ Spitzmuller écrivait à Massigli sur le pseudonyme de « Dr. Goudéa », AMEF, Fonds Guerre 1939-1945- Londres-Alger, série Papiers Massigli, doss. 1484, f. 151-176.

⁵¹ René Massigli (1888-1988), diplomate français, en 1938 il fut nommé ambassadeur à Ankara jusqu'en 1940 quand il a été rappelé ; pendant l'été de 1942 le général de Gaulle lui demande de venir à Londres et occuper la fonction de commissaire aux Affaires étrangères de la France Libre. Il rejoint clandestinement Londres en janvier 1943 et accepte le poste de commissaire dans le Comité National Français. Il conserve ce poste lorsque le C.N.F se transporte à Alger et devient en juin 1943 le Comité français de la Libération nationale ; il le conserve jusqu'à la Libération et au retour du Gouvernement de général de Gaulle à Paris en septembre 1944. Source Raphaële Ulrich-Pier, *René Massigli (1888-1988). Une vie de diplomate*, Tome I, Direction des Archives de Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Bruxelles : Presses Interuniversitaires Européennes, 2006, pp. 1-3.

– majeur du général Catroux à Beyrouth, avec lequel je suis en communication régulière encore que limitée⁵²».

Au mois de mars 1943, Truelle a adressé un message à René Massigli dans lequel il parle sur son départ de Roumanie, mais celui-ci lui conseille de rester en poste⁵³. Une note du camp gaulliste sur la situation de la Légation de France à Bucarest datée fin de mars 1943 précise que : « toute la Légation sans exception groupée autour de son chef est décidée à servir. Le 9 novembre 1942, Truelle a réuni ses collaborateurs pour examiner les possibilités de départ. L'hypothèse de constituer un gouvernement français provisoire auquel la Légation aurait pu se rallier officiellement en bloc et duquel elle aurait pu se réclamer auprès du gouvernement roumain ne s'étant pu réalisée, seuls des départs individuels étaient possibles⁵⁴ ».

L'attitude de René Massigli semble changer au mois de mai 1943 quand il envoie un télégramme à Truelle et Spitzmuller via Beyrouth, dans lequel il donne son accord pour le départ de Roumanie de ces deux diplomates : « [...] nous ne voyons pas d'avantages à ce que vous prolongiez plus longtemps votre séjour à Bucarest ; vos services nous seront plus utiles ailleurs. Ne vous mettez, toutefois, en route que si toutes précautions ont été prises pour réduire au minimum les risques de l'opération. Les services de Beyrouth doivent se mettre à la disposition de Truelle et Spitzmuller pour faciliter leur départ⁵⁵ ».

On n'a pas une source pour voir si Massigli a envoyé un nouveau message à Truelle concernant son départ qui se produit le 19 juin 1943, mais on sait que Spitzmuller reste en poste à Bucarest.

Jean Mouton parle dans son Journal sur le départ d'ambassadeur Truelle avec les mots suivants : « Juin 1943- Jacques Truelle m'a demandé de venir à l'ambassade pour me parler d'une question concernant notre

⁵² Télégrammes de Spitzmuller à Massigli, du printemps 1943, AMEF, fond cit., f. 164.

⁵³ Note envoyée par le Lieutenant Mella, Chef de la Section „R” à Monsieur le Lieutenant – Colonel Chef du B.C.R.A, le 15 mars 1943 Londres, AMEF, Personnel 3 nominative, dossier personnel Jacques Truelle, doss. 277.

⁵⁴ Note sur la situation de la Légation de France à Bucarest, fin mars 1943, AMEF, Londres-Alger, Londres-CNF, Fonds Guerre 1939-1945, série Londres (Conseil Nation Français juin 1940-juillet 1943), doss 274.

⁵⁵ Télégramme de Comité National Français à l'État - Major Beyrouth, le 6 mai 1943, AMEF, Fonds Guerre 1939-1945- Londres-Alger, série Papiers Massigli, doss. 1484, f. 97.

lycée. Puis, au bout d'un moment, il me dit avec une brusquerie douce: je vous quitte demain. Je suis désolé de vous laisser seuls. Je dois rejoindre (le mouvement d') Alger. Dans quelques temps, vous verrez arriver mon remplaçant-ce sera Paul Morand. C'est un homme charmant mais ne l'écoutez pas⁵⁶ ». Il semble que Truelle et Morand se connaissaient bien avant⁵⁷. Paul Morand cite Truelle à plusieurs reprises dans son Journal entre août et novembre 1917, en allant plusieurs fois dîner avec lui et l'écrivain Marcel Proust.

Truelle est parti pour Ankara « par le train de wagons-lits; il n'avait emporté aucun bagage sauf une mallette qui contenait sa jambe artificielle. Le prétexte du voyage était de faire réparer cette jambe à Constantinople. Les autorités roumaines ont fermé les yeux sur ce départ; elles en ont été un peu complices. Killinger, ambassadeur du III^e Reich, ne sera informé que huit jours après; il entrera dans une violente colère⁵⁸ ».

Le 26 juin 1943, Pierre Laval a décrété la révocation de Truelle du Ministère français des Affaires Étrangères⁵⁹. Truelle part d'Istanbul à Beyrouth (le 7 juillet), puis à Alger (21 juillet). En octobre 1943, il est chargé par Massigli et le général de Gaulle d'être le successeur du colonel Malaise à la tête de la Mission de la France combattante à Madrid. Il meurt le 30 mai 1945 à Madrid à cause « d'une angine de poitrine⁶⁰ ».

Donc, à quel moment Truelle est-il passé au gaullisme ?

On ne sait pas exactement le moment où Truelle est passé au mouvement gaulliste mais on peut affirmer que son poste de Roumanie y a contribué. On est ici enclin d'accepter la thèse de Robert Belot selon laquelle « la Résistance a été une réaction morale et individuelle contre une situation particulière (la défaite, l'occupation, Vichy), puis s'est transformée en une volonté de penser l'avenir et d'imaginer une autre société pour devenir une ambition politique et collective⁶¹ ». La singularité de cet

⁵⁶ Jean Mouton, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

⁵⁷ Morand le décrit très familier dans son Journal: « Truelle très Chardin dans sa robe de chambre rouge avec ses grosses lunettes d'écaille, ses béquilles, sautillant sur sa jambe coupée », Paul Morand, *Journal d'un attaché d'ambassade, 1916-1917*, Paris: Édition Gallimard, 1996, p. 314.

⁵⁸ Jean Mouton, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

⁵⁹ AMEF, Personnel 3 nominative, dossier personnel Jacques Truelle, doss. 277.

⁶⁰ Télégramme signé par Renaud Sivan à Georges Bidault, le 1^{er} juin 1945, *Ibidem*.

⁶¹ Robert Belot, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

événement est liée à sa complexité même: ce fut à la fois (mais pas toujours de manière synchrone) une réaction patriotique, un acte de guerre et la défense d'une certaine idée de l'Homme ; ce fut en même temps un refus, un rejet et un projet de société. C'est pourquoi il est difficile de se rendre compte de quand il a pris naissance.

Dans le cas du diplomate Truelle, on peut affirmer qu'il est passé au gaullisme en juin 1943, mais on ne peut pas savoir quand a eu lieu le ralliement « physique⁶² » dont Catherine Nicault parle et que nous ne devons pas négliger.

La correspondance de Truelle concernant les Juifs

Est-ce qu'on peut supposer que l'antisémitisme du gouvernement de Vichy a contribué dans la décision de Truelle de se rallier à la France libre ?

Dans une étude publiée dans les Cahiers de la Shoah, Catherine Nicault en reprenant le titre d'un ouvrage dirigé par Stéphane Courtois et Adam Rayski, « *Qui savait quoi ?* » essaie de répondre à la question « *Que savaient les diplomates de Vichy ?* » sur l'extermination des Juifs dans les pays où ils étaient accrédités. Dans ce contexte, elle a fait référence aussi à Jacques Truelle. On pense que c'est un bon argument d'ouvrir ce sujet pour essayer de montrer que Truelle n'a pas été le disciple du régime de Vichy et que son attitude a été le signe clair d'une distance prise avec ce régime.

Dans le dossier des Archives du Ministère de Affaires Étrangères n°685, Fond Guerre-Vichy- 1939-1945, série Z Europe-Roumanie, concernant les Israélites, on a pu trouver dix-sept courriers adressés par Truelle à Vichy sur ce sujet.

Dans un télégramme de 1^{er} avril 1941, Truelle informait le gouvernement de Vichy des nouvelles mesures antisémites⁶³ prises par le gouvernement roumain. Le 13 mai, Truelle signalait d'autres nouvelles mesures antisémites prises par le gouvernement roumain. Il s'agit d'un décret-

⁶² Catherine Nicault, « De Pétain à de Gaulle: la trajectoire... », p. 363.

⁶³ Le décret-loi du 23 mars 1941 qui a modifié l'article 44 de la loi des Cultes du 22 avril 1928 relatif au régime des conversions religieuses (les personnes appartenant à la religion israélite ne pouvaient plus bénéficier de la possibilité de se convertir à une autre religion); le décret-loi du 24 mars 1941 qui a annulé tous les contrats d'apprentissage liant les apprentis Juifs à des patrons Chrétiens ou Juifs; le décret-loi du 28 mars 1941 concernant l'expropriation des propriétés rurales appartenant à des Juifs.

loi du 3 mai qui avait fait entrer les propriétés rurales des Juifs dans le patrimoine de l'État⁶⁴. Dans plusieurs télégrammes, il a informé Vichy sur les mesures prises par les autorités roumaines contre les Juifs pendant l'été 1941 : « on m'a indiqué de diverses sources que les mesures draconiennes prises contre les Juifs se poursuivaient en Moldavie et dans les régions proches du front⁶⁵ ».

Ses courriers du 9 septembre et du 18 octobre 1941 dans lesquels il plaide pour n'avoir pas à appliquer une directive de Darlan du 20 juin 1941 sur la délivrance de « *certificats ethniques* » aux citoyens français se trouvant à l'étranger⁶⁶ sont d'une réelle importance. Il souligne qu'il y aurait « un réel danger » à faire une discrimination entre citoyens français dans la Roumanie de 1941. Il a réussi à ce que l'administration roumaine ne fasse aucune discrimination entre Français : « des instructions formelles ont été données aux autorités roumaines afin que, sous condition de réciprocité et dans le cadre des accords en vigueur, aucune discrimination basée sur l'origine ethnique ne soit faite dans l'application des lois aux ressortissants étrangers⁶⁷ ».

Il informe Vichy aussi sur les déportations des Juifs dans son rapport du 10 novembre 1941 : « la persécution a repris avec un véritable acharnement depuis quelques semaines⁶⁸ ». Il relate les déportations au-delà du Bug des Israélites établies en Bessarabie et Bucovine. Il précise que ses sources ont été des témoignages des Roumains revenant de ces régions et des témoignages parvenus à Bucarest dans des lettres expédiées par les exilés. Il cite les deux lettres envoyées par le docteur Filderman, le président de l'Union des Communautés Juives de Roumanie, au Maréchal Antonescu dans lesquelles il « l'implorait en faisant appel à ses sentiments d'humanité pour cesser ce pogrom » et puis la réponse de Maréchal Antonescu publiée le 27 octobre dans la presse. Le courrier du 22 juin 1942 dévoile toujours les déportations en Transnistrie de Juifs de l'Europe Occidentale et de Roumanie.

⁶⁴ Télégramme envoyé à Vichy le 13 mai 1941, Fond cit., doss. 685, f. 22-23.

⁶⁵ Télégramme envoyé à Vichy le 7 juillet 1941, *Ibidem*, f. 24.

⁶⁶ Télégrammes envoyés à Vichy le 9 septembre et 18 octobre 1941, *Ibidem*, f. 28-30, 35-36.

⁶⁷ Note Verbale n°75213, Bucarest le 13 octobre 1941, Ministère Royal des Affaires Étrangères.

⁶⁸ Télégramme envoyé à Vichy le 10 novembre 1941, *Ibidem*, f. 39-42 (il y a des feuilles qui ne sont pas numérotées).

On voit chez ce diplomate une lucidité remarquable et une attitude surprenante⁶⁹, surtout parce qu'il est un agent de Vichy, fonctionnaire d'un gouvernement qui depuis l'automne 1940 pratique lui-même l'antisémitisme d'État.

Donc, dans le cas du diplomate Truelle, on ne peut pas parler d'un disciple de Vichy, comme on témoigne son attitude vis-à-vis des Juifs. Il adopte une attitude de protection de ses compatriotes et aux mesures discriminatoires auxquelles ils sont soumis.

Quelles sont les conclusions que nous pouvons tirer?

Premièrement, le parcours de Truelle nous confirme l'analyse de Robert Belot sur l'obstacle qu'a constitué la culture de la haute fonction publique pour le ralliement au gaullisme, l'ambassadeur reste au poste jusqu'au juin 1943.

Deuxièmement, dans son cas se confirme la « *politique de double jeu* » qui a fait le débat⁷⁰ entre les historiens qui ont étudié le régime de Vichy et les fonctionnaires qui l'ont servi. Dans le cas du Truelle qui a été le représentant de Vichy en Roumanie, la collaboration avec la France libre est évidente.

Troisièmement, sa réaction devant la législation roumaine antisémite, et surtout son refus d'appliquer la directive d'amiral Darlan sur la délivrance de « *certificats ethniques* » aux citoyens français qui étaient à l'étranger, nous montrer qu'il a joué aussi un rôle politique, qu'il a été un acteur actif dans cette région de l'Europe et que dans ces temps obscurs de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale il a réussi à grader ses convictions et agir en conséquences.

Mais, ce qu'on trouve digne chez Truelle sont son rationalisme et son humanisme. On considère essentiel son télégramme du 15 février 1943, adressé à Massigli et dans lequel il décrit sa position : « [...] pendant tout le temps que je viens de passer dans cette ville (Bucarest), j'ai mis tous mes soins à garder une position aussi indépendante que possible, ce qui me permet aujourd'hui, soit aux yeux de mes compatriotes, soit à ceux des

⁶⁹ Catherine Nicault, « Vichy et la question juive. La lucidité d'un diplomate » in Sophie de Sivry et Emmanuel Waresquiel (éd.), *Mémoires du Monde. Cinq siècles d'histoires inédites et secrètes au Quai d'Orsay*, Paris : L'iconoclaste, 2001, p. 288.

⁷⁰ Voir Robert Aron, *Histoire de Vichy*, Paris: Fayard, 1954 et Robert O. Paxton, *La France de Vichy, 1940- 1944*, Paris: Édition du Seuil, 1997.

indigènes, de n'être pas considéré comme un représentant de la ville d'eaux (Vichy), mais d'intérêts généraux qui restent constants quels que soient les régimes ⁷¹».

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⁷¹ Télégramme de Truelle à Massigli, le 15 février 1943, AMEF, Fonds Guerre 1939-1945- Londres-Alger, série Papiers Massigli, doss. 1484, f. 93.

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THE *OSSIAN* PATTERN IN THE MATTER OF IDENTITY ROMANIAN CONSTRUCTION

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Abstract

James Macpherson, the young rhapsode (etymologically speaking) with poetic aspirations who is stimulated or even "obligated" to prove the existence of other founding traditions in the European culture besides the Greek and Latin ones, "invents" Ossianic epic poems by resorting to oral and popular literature. Elements of the Ossianic model were identified in the Romanian culture during the construction of the national state and identity. By "inventing traditions", to use Hobsbawm's terminology, the Romanian modernity was built on the concept of rurality, term that was later applied to the entire Romanian culture.

Keywords: pattern Ossian, tradition, construction, identity, modernity

Les épopées ossianiques

En 1758, le jeune Macpherson, le fils d'un fermier écossais, entre comme précepteur à une famille d'Edinburgh. Très tôt, il attire l'attention des lettrés d'Aberdeen, par l'intermédiaire de quelques poésies écrites à l'âge de 22 ans. Un des lettrés écossais demande au jeune de traduire quelques légendes du dialecte gaélique. Ces fragments produisent de l'intérêt et Macpherson est stimulé de continuer. Dirigé par le professeur de rhétorique Hugh Blair, le jeune commence à travailler, le matériel étant publié en 1760, à Edinburgh, sous le titre *Fragments of Ancient Poetry, collected in the Highlands of Scotland and translated from gaelic or erase language by James Macperson (Fragments de poesie ancienne, recueillis dans Hautes Terres d'Ecosse et traduits de la langue gaélique ou disparue par James Macperson)*. Une fois le projet accompli, Macpherson aurait désiré de revenir à sa propre

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création, mais ses protecteurs ne lui permettent pas.¹ On confie au jeune Macpherson la mission de «coudre ensemble»² les chansons populaires et les confier à son professeur. Initialement il refuse, compte tenu que le matériel est beaucoup trop lacunaire³, et comme réponse à ce problème, il est envoyé dans les régions où l'on croyait que la tradition pourrait être mieux gardée: dans les îles et les montagnes du nord-ouest.⁴ Macpherson accepte ou est obligé d'accepter. Faisant appel aux prêtres, aux nobles et aux gens d'église, il obtient des anciens manuscrits, capables de lui fournir le matériel nécessaire. À la fin de l'année 1761 apparaît *Fingal, an Ancient Epic Poem, in 6 books, together with several other Poems, composed by Ossian the son of Fingal, translated from the gaelic language by James Macpherson* (*Fingal, un poème ancien en 6 livres, avec quelques autres poèmes, composés par Ossian, le fils de Fingal, traduits de la langue gaélique par James Macpherson*). Cette *Iliade*, telle qu'elle est dénommée par Blair, devrait être suivie assurément par une *Odyssée*: ainsi, en 1763, Macpherson produit la seconde: *Temora*.⁵ Le but principal de «l'invention des épopées écossaises étant celui de la fondation des monuments culturels autres que ceux grecs et latins.⁶ Leur création est la preuve incontestable qu'il y a aussi d'autres traditions fondatrices des cultures européennes.⁷ La modernité étant ainsi légitimée par une source antique. Macpherson affirmait avoir reconstitué ces épopées à partir de chants recueillis auprès des paysans des Highlands. Ces épopées posaient les prémices d'une nouvelle esthétique et permettaient de briser

¹ Paul Désiré Van Thieghhe, *Ossian en France*, Paris: Rieder, 1917, p. 10, *apud.* Anne-Marie Thiesse, *La création des identités nationales, Europe XVIIIe – XXe siècle*, Paris: Editions du Seuil, 2001, pp. 17-18.

² Anne-Marie Thiesse, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

³ *Ibidem.*, p. 18.

⁴ *Ibidem.*

⁵ *Ibidem.*, p. 19.

⁶ Il est intéressant que jusqu'à la mort de Macpherson, 1796, rien n'est publié en ce qui concerne les matériels originaux qui prouve l'authenticité des enquêtes. La commission d'experts, désignée par la Société d'Édimbourg, vingt ans plus tard, c'est-à-dire approximativement cinquante ans depuis la publication de *Fingal* et de *Temora*, confirme le fait que le défunt collecteur est intervenu sur le matériel originaire, mais secondairement, tout en épurant certains fragments trop vulgaires. En 1998, l'historien écossais X apprécie que Macpherson a travaillé commençant même par les sources celtiques authentiques, tout en les combinant.

⁷ *Ibidem.*, p. 21.

l'hégémonie culturelle du clacissisme français fondé sur la référence à l'Antiquité classique. Des cercles s'étaient formés un peu partout, dans la jeune génération européenne du second XVIIIème siècle, qui cherchaient fiévreusement les origines barbares de leur peuple et les fondements authentiques de sa culture.⁸

La perspective d'approche du thème

Le modèle ossianique présenté ci-dessus nous fait nous poser quelques questions: *pouvons-nous trouver des éléments similaires aussi au sein de la construction de l'identité roumaine? Le but de la création des épopées écossaises est-il le même avec celui de la mythisation du paysan roumain? Le recours à la tradition, et implicitement au folklore, dans le processus d'affirmation de l'identité roumaine, peut-il être encadré dans ce qu'on appelle constructivisme national?*

La méthode principale de travail est la méthode comparative: nationalisme européen/ nationalisme roumain; « tradition inventée »/ tradition valorisée; ossianisme et épopées écossaises/ éléments du modèle ossianique au sein de la culture roumaine. Nous suivrons l'affirmation de l'identité nationale roumaine commençant non pas par la négation du passé, mais par sa reconstruction graduelle par l'intermédiaire des traditions. La notion de « tradition inventée » d'Hobsbawm sera utilisée par comparaison avec celle de « tradition valorisée » proposée par cette étude. La méthode de travail de Macpherson/de « l'intellectualité d'Edinburg », dans la construction des valeurs fondamentales autres que les valeurs grecques et latines, peut être appliquée aussi au sein de notre modernisation en tant que peuple. Mais à la différence du modèle ossianique qui supposait un autre type de focalisation dans l'approche du passé, la culture roumaine, une culture considérée mineure, a été incitée à un double effort: *a.* de récupérer le décalage envers les progrès ou les soi-disant progrès de l'Europe occidentale et *b.* d'accentuer son individualité, mobilisant les forces autour des identités nationales. Le recours au peuple, c'est-à-dire au paysan roumain et sa mythification représente la voie d'accès vers la modernité. Paysannerie devenant, donc, synonyme avec la Roumanité.

⁸ *Ibidem.*, p. 12.

Définitions des termes

Le mot tradition vient du latin *traditio*, dérivé du verbe *tradere* (*trado, -ere, -didi, ditum*), qui signifiait « continuer », « transmettre ». Les Romains ont utilisé ce terme tout en lui fournissant une signification concrète du point de vue matériel: passer à quelqu'un, confier à celui qui te confie un objet que tu as gardé, donner sa fille comme épouse à quelqu'un. Mais le bien transmis peut ne pas être d'ordre matériel.⁹ L'anglais a repris le mot latin *trado* du verbe *trade* – acheter ou vendre des biens ou des services. Du nom français *tradition*, le roumain a formé *tradițiune* et le mot s'est imposé au fil du temps sous la forme courte de *tradiție*, de laquelle on a presque perdu l'acception commerciale et juridique.¹⁰

Les traditions inventées

Les « traditions inventées » désignent un ensemble de pratiques de nature rituelle et symbolique qui sont normalement gouvernées par des règles ouvertement ou tacitement acceptées et qui cherchent à inculquer certaines valeurs et normes de comportement par la répétition, ce qui implique automatiquement une continuité avec le passé.¹¹ Distinctes des coutumes, qui définissent les sociétés traditionnelles, elles sont étroitement liées aux transformations rapides des sociétés modernes. Et toutefois, même lorsqu'il existe une telle référence à un passé historique, la particularité des traditions « inventées » tient au fait que leur continuité avec ce passé est largement fictive. L'invention des traditions est essentiellement un processus de formalisation et de ritualisation caractérisé par la référence au passé, ne serait-ce que par le biais d'une répétition imposée.¹²

Le Peuple, dans la première phase de la construction identitaire, tient surtout le rôle de fossile vivant garant de la reconstitution des grands ancêtres. Les coutumes paysannes, initialement jugées dignes d'intérêt simplement comme vestige de la culture ancestrale, deviennent aussi

⁹ Jean Cuisenier, *Tradiția populară* [La tradition populaire], Cluj-Napoca: Casa Cărții de Știință, 2005, p. 6.

¹⁰ Ion Filipiciuc, *Semne și minuni în tradiția românească*, [Signes et merveilles dans la tradition roumaine] Cîmpulung Bucovina: Biblioteca „Miorița”, 2009, p. 5.

¹¹ Erich Hobsbawm, «Inventer des traditions» dans *Usages de la tradition*, numéro 2, 1995, p. 2 [<http://enquete.revues.org/sommaire292.html>], le 3 Fevr, 2012.

¹² *Ibidem*, p. 5.

symboles de la patrie et référents éthiques. La paysannerie sert désormais à prouver qu'un dépit de tout changements observables la nation reste immuable.¹³

L'invention de traditions, dès lors qu'elle améliore le patrimoine et s'effectue sous inspiration du génie de la nation, leur semble parfaitement licite. Elles contribuent à l'établissement de la cohésion sociale, à la légitimation des institutions ou de l'autorité mais aussi à la socialisation des croyances ou des systèmes de valeurs. En utilisant, jusqu'à un certain point, des matériaux issus du passé, elles jouent un rôle prééminent dans la constitution de cette innovation relativement récente qu'est la nation.¹⁴

« Tradition inventées » vs coutume

« Tradition inventées », en ce sens, doit être clairement distinguée de la « coutume » qui domine les sociétés dites « traditionnelles ». L'objet et la caractéristique des « traditions », y compris des traditions inventées, c'est l'invariabilité. Le passé, réel ou fictif, auquel elles se réfèrent, implique des pratiques stables, formalisées de manière normative, se prêtant à la répétition. Dans les sociétés traditionnelles, la « coutume » a la double fonction du moteur et du volant. Elle n'exclut pas, jusqu'à un certain point, l'innovation et le changement, quoique de toute évidence l'exigence d'un changement qui soit en apparence compatible avec ce qui le précède, voire identique à lui, lui impose des limites substantielles. Elle donne donc à tout changement désiré (ou à toute résistance à l'innovation) la sanction d'un précédent, d'une continuité sociale et d'une loi naturelle telle qu'elle s'exprime dans l'histoire.¹⁵

Comme on a vu, Erich Hobsbawm comprend par les « traditions inventées », des traditions relativement récentes, apparue dans l'époque industrielle/postindustrielle, qui sont considérées immémoriales, mais qui en fait ont une histoire relativement brève. Le concept de tradition que nous utilisons à ce moment se réfère à ces valeurs trouvées pour une longue période de temps en état latent au sein des masses populaires, auxquelles on fait appel par l'utilisation et la revalorisation à un moment

¹³ *Ibidem*, p. 3.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*.

donné - dans la construction de la nation moderne - et à un certain but - celui de servir à l'intérêt national.

Le culte des ancêtres

« Une nation est une âme, un principe spirituel. Deux choses qui, à vrai dire, n'en font qu'une, constituent cette âme, ce principe spirituel. L'une est dans le passé, l'autre dans le présent. L'une est la possession en commun d'un riche legs de souvenirs ; l'autre est le consentement actuel, le désir de vivre ensemble, la volonté de continuer à faire valoir l'héritage qu'on a reçu indivis. (...) Le culte des ancêtres est de tous le plus légitime ; les ancêtres nous ont faits ce que nous sommes. Un passé héroïque, des grands hommes, de la gloire (j'entends de la véritable), voilà le capital social sur lequel on assied une idée nationale. »¹⁶ Le socle de la nation, c'est un héritage collectif. Paradoxe apparent de la nation moderne : elle est fondée sur la rupture avec un ordre ancien, celui de l'Ancien Régime. Mais la nation moderne va en fait se construire et se stabiliser non pas sur l'éradication du passé mais sur sa réfection, sur la production d'un nouveau passé qui permette le mimétisme du présent. Le XIX^{ème} siècle pratique simultanément la religion du progrès et le culte frénétique du passé. Pour que tout change, sans risque de dislocation, il faut sans doute croire que rien ne change. La voie nationale vers l'avenir, au XIX^{ème} siècle, est représentée comme retour aux sources, aux vraies origines.¹⁷ Le passé a vocation à donner des leçons. Sa principale fonction est pédagogique : montrer à tous comment lire le présent et à chacun comment régler son action et son vouloir. L'enseignement du passé national deviendra donc logiquement une des matières fondamentales de l'enseignement de masse. Mais si la connaissance du passé national devient un devoir pour tous, il faut, exigence de la modernité intellectuelle, des spécialistes pour l'établir. La mise au point du passé est une affaire de discipline, à tous les sens du terme, et, très vite, d'institutions spécifiques. Le passé que construit le XIX^{ème} siècle répond donc aux impératifs de la modernisation.¹⁸

¹⁶ Ernest Renan, "Qu'est-ce qu'une nation ?" dans *Qu'est-ce qu'une Nation ?*, Paris : Agora, 1992, p. 54, *apud.*, Anne-Marie Thiesse, *La modernisation du passé au XIX^{ème} siècle*, Paris : Austin, 2005, p. 2.

¹⁷ Anne-Marie Thiesse, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 4.

La grande opération d'éducation au passé national, en effet, a été menée avec succès. L'école n'en a pas été le dispositif unique, ni sans doute principal. Les supports modernes de la communication et de la représentation-périodiques, gravures, photographies, cartes postales, textes romanesques et brochures en tous genres-ont permis d'opérer massivement cette conversion de la perception qui accorde désormais une haute valeur à d'incommodes vieilleries.¹⁹ On ne saurait trop souligner l'intensité de l'éducation esthétique et patriotique accomplie par les romanciers, poètes et peintres du XIX^e siècle qui, mettant en représentation des bâtiments ont appris au public sous quel angle, sous quel éclairage les contempler, précisant même souvent quel sentiment et quel savoir mobiliser, quelle admiration exprimer. ²⁰ Forme sociale moderne, l'association libre d'individus réunis par une même passion pour des occupations non professionnelles, a pris aussi une grande part à la formation et la connaissance du patrimoine national. L'amour du passé est progressivement devenu passion collective. On se rappelle le pamphlet hugolien : « Guerre aux démolisseurs ! ». Mais pour constituer un patrimoine de monuments historiques, il ne faut pas seulement empêcher des destructions. Moderniser le passé, c'est aussi combattre la mise au goût du jour, que pratiquent spontanément, depuis longtemps, les propriétaires pour embellir leurs biens. ²¹

Le modèle ossianique et la culture roumaine

Les premières survies de la culture primitive ont été les « traditions et les antiquités ». L'orientation envers le peuple a commencée à partir de la période des lumières, à laquelle on a ajouté un intérêt croissant pour la culture des peuples primitifs (intérêt apparu suite aux grandes découvertes géographiques). L'institutionnalisation par la création d'associations, de musées, de sociétés, de publications, apporte aussi une terminologie propre à ce domaine d'étude. Le critère de la valeur qui s'impose est: l'ancienneté des faits évalués. Mais cette ancienneté obtient des contours spéciaux d'une époque à l'autre: aux primitifs – le culte des

¹⁹ *Ibidem.*, p. 8.

²⁰ *Ibidem.*

²¹ *Ibidem.*

ancêtres, aux Grecs antiques – l'époque d'or, en tant que représentation idyllique du passé perdu dans la légende, dans le classicisme – l'antiquité, aux romantiques – le primitivisme. Celle qui a pris contour a été la conception romantique du primitivisme, générant deux directions: celle de l'enthousiasme romantique, qui crée le concept de « poésie populaire » et celle de l'attitude explicative envers la poésie populaire et le folklore en général. La figure centrale sur laquelle s'est basé l'entier courant romantique, est celle de Johann Gottfried Herder. Les recueils publiés entre les années 1779-1779, *Volkslieder* et *Stimmen der Völker in Liedern*, promeuvent un intérêt culturel envers la littérature populaire et sa valorisation au niveau de la création académique, le folklore étant donc conçu comme un document de reconstitution du passé historique national et comme base de la culture nationale moderne.

On peut parler d'un modèle ossianique dans la culture roumaine en nous concentrant seulement sur quelques éléments de convergence. Nous ne pouvons pas parler d'une superposition parfaite de ce modèle. Le contexte sociopolitique, ainsi que le but de l'appel à la tradition, dans la création du sentiment identitaire roumain, est différent de celui écossais.

Dans la culture roumaine, la génération 1848 est celle qui promeut l'attitude romantique, mais qui inclut certaines motivations internes, spécifiques à une culture considérée au moment respectif comme mineure: l'émancipation sociale et nationale par le fondement de la conception démocratique sur le rôle du peuple dans la création de l'histoire et de la culture nationale. Sentant l'immense disparité entre les deux cultures, celle populaire et celle cosmopolite de la bourgeoisie, Alecu Russo propose une solution unique: celle de la régénération de la culture roumaine moderne sur des bases folkloriques « *la littérature populaire doit être à la base de la nouvelle littérature roumaine, la langue de celle-ci doit se développer naturellement de la langue de la poésie populaire* »²² L'attitude romantique envers le folklore a des racines profondes dans l'époque illuministe et a le mérite de donner une signification culturelle majeure au terme de poésie populaire. La première étape, qui marque le passage d'une culture traditionnelle orale à une culture moderne, est représentée par les recueils de poésie populaire (aussi contesté que soit leur caractère scientifique). À cet effet, il est

²² Alecu Russo, Russo, *Poezia populară*, [La poésie populaire], București: Literatură și cunoaștere, 1975, p. 21.

impérieusement nécessaire de rappeler les recueils de poésie populaire de Vasile Alecsandri.

Mihail Kogălniceanu, en « Dacia literară » (« Dacie littéraire ») milite pour la promotion d'une littérature originelle, par l'indication des sources d'inspiration conformément au spécifique national et à l'esthétique roumaine: « Notre histoire a suffisans faits héroïques, nos beaux pays sont suffisamment grands, nos coutumes sont suffisamment pittoresques et poétiques, pour pouvoir trouver chez nous aussi des sujets d'écriture, sans devoir en emprunter d'autres nations. »²³ On fait appel au folklore, de manière ossianique, mais à d'autres mises, celui qui peut donner une légitimité à cette démarche et peut créer les base de la conscience nationale-identitaire. Dans l'étude *Poezia populară* (« Poésie populaire »), Alecu Russo définit le folklore comme un miroir réaliste de la vie du peuple et comme une source non-asséchée d'inspiration pour la littérature culte. Il aidera Alecsandri de composer le premier recueil de *Poezii populare ale românilor* (*Poésies populaires des Roumains*) (1852), suivi par *Balade (Cîntice bătrînești)* (*Ballades (Chansons des vieux)*).

Le paradigme junimiste suppose un détachement de l'histoire.²⁴ Les représentants de la Société culturelle *Junimea* (au siège à Iași 1863-1864, en 1867, apparaît la revue *Convorbiri literare* (*Conversations littéraires*), déplacée en 1885 à Bucarest) « ne sentent pas le besoin de se rapporter au passé, ni pour soutenir leurs privilèges, comme les anciens conservateurs, ni pour changer radicalement la société roumaine par l'invocation de certains modèles historiques fictifs, comme les libéraux. Ils regardent la passé - et implicitement les traditions (ma mention) - avec détachement, et cela est en soi un changement très important de paradigme, inédite dans le contexte roumaine du XIX^{ème} siècle! Cela a été jusqu'au présent le seul essai significatif dans la culture roumaine de détacher le présent du passé, de mettre en discussion les problèmes actuels sans le rapport obsédant aux précédents historiques réels ou imaginaires. »²⁵

Celui qui soulève pour la première fois le problème du caractère de la modernité et de son rapport avec la tradition, dans la culture roumaine,

²³ Mihail Kogălniceanu, „Introducție”, dans *Dacia literară*, Iași, 30 ianuarie 1840, p. 3.

²⁴ Lucian Boia, *Istorie și mit în conștiința românească*, [Histoire et mythe dans la conscience roumaine], Bucarest : Humanitas, 1997, p. 45.

²⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 46.

est Eugen Lovinescu. L'aspiration vers la modernisation ou de synchronisation culturelle est présente de beaucoup de temps dans la culture roumaine. Dans *Istoria civilizației române moderne 1924-1925* (Histoire de la civilisation roumaine moderne 1924-1925), la critique d'Eugen Lovinescu se déroule autour du concept de *saeculum* ou *esprit du temps*, idée d'une inévitable et nécessaire synchronisation des phénomènes de civilisation et culture européenne, fondées (selon le sociologue français Gabriel Tarde) sur la loi de l'imitation. Dans la littérature et l'art, entre les deux guerres mondiales, cette aspiration de la synchronisation ne s'est pas manifestée d'une manière destructive et nihiliste, mais en collaboration avec la tradition.²⁶

« Paysanneté » = « roumanité »

La construction nationale et le nationalisme roumain sont des phénomènes modernes. L'identité nationale et la nation roumaine se sont cristallisées en étapes, au début de la modernité. La naissance du sentiment national et le réveil de la conscience nationale ont été des étapes qualitatives, pas nécessairement chronologiques, dans l'affirmation de la propre identité des Roumains.²⁷

Les mouvements d'unité et d'indépendance nationale apparaissent en Roumanie tout au début du XIX^e siècle. Ils sont simultanés et consubstantiels avec la formation de la culture roumaine « moderne ». Mais certains pays, comme c'est le cas de la Roumanie, n'a pas eu une modernité elle-même. Donc elle devait construire l'une à partir de la culture moderne,²⁸ elle devait « l'inventer ». « *La vie de l'humanité suit le modèle de celle de l'individu, de la jeunesse à la vieillesse. Il s'ensuit que les « Anciens » vivaient comme une enfance de la culture et de l'esprit et que ce sont les « Modernes » qui, par la connaissance et l'expérience acquises, peuvent en réalité prétendre à la maturité et à la sagesse. La modernité, pour se définir, se pare d'une nouvelle dimension et empruntant à la science le concept de progrès, fondé sur le pouvoir de*

²⁶ Dan Ratiu, *La Querelle des modernes et des postmodernes: qu'en est-il la Roumanie ?*, dans Maria Delaperrière (ed.), *(Post)modernism en Europe Centrale, La crise des idéologies*, Paris: L'Harmattan, 1999, p. 97.

²⁷ Dinu Bălan, *Le nationalisme roumain pendant la période 1831-1866*, [http://atlas.usv.ro/www/codru_net/CC13/10_balan_dinu.pdf], 20 Avril 2012.

²⁸ Vintilă Mihăilescu, « Nationalité et nationalisme en Roumanie », dans *Terrain*, no. 17, 1991, p. 1, [<http://terrain.revues.org/document3015.html>], 3 Avril 2012

la raison, et en l'appliquant à la littérature et à l'art. »²⁹ La culture est une construction symbolique qui fonde une appartenance et qui est porteuse d'une identité. La culture d'un pays est donc constitutive de son identité symbolique, identité qu'il va s'attacher à défendre et à promouvoir. La culture a été (et est encore) le domaine de prédilection où se joue l'aventure de la modernité roumaine, le fer de lance par lequel l'idéologie moderne pouvait et devait faire irruption dans la société roumaine.³⁰ « *Le moderne ne peut s'opposer à un ancien qui a été d'actualité lui aussi, il va dialoguer avec lui. Au sens esthétique, „moderne,, n'est plus pour nous le contraire de vieux ou de passe, mais celui de „classique,, d'une beauté éternelle qui échappe au temps.* »³¹ Mais en Roumanie pour pouvoir parler d'une culture moderne il fallait, tout simplement, obtenir l'indépendance et l'unité nationale pour, ensuite, pouvoir réaliser des réformes sociales et économiques radicale.³²

« *Le moderne est autosuffisant: chaque fois qu'il apparaît, il fonde sa propre tradition* »³³, « *Mais une tradition de la rupture n'est-elle pas nécessairement à la fois une négation de la tradition et une négation de la rupture ?* »³⁴

Le développement du projet de la « modernité » roumaine a eu des effets surtout au niveau culturel, enrichissant et diversifiant l'identité commune. Il n'en fut pas de même au niveau des réalités sociales. L'identité nationale suppose un filtre subjectif, avec des mécanismes propres, par lesquels sont construites les images de soi-même et les hétéro-images. L'identité ne peut pas être comprise sans altérité.³⁵ Les thèmes, les représentations, les images, les stéréotypes prennent forme par le jeu des altérités, par la dialectique entre l'évolution historique et les manifestations idéologiques. Le rôle du concept de génération dans la définition de l'identité de la génération de 1848 s'élargit sur une entière époque de l'histoire des Roumains, fait qui implique la reconnaissance du rôle séparé

²⁹ Alexis Nouss, *La modernité*, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1995, p. 10.

³⁰ Vintilă Mihăilescu, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

³¹ Alexis Nouss, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

³² Situation qui n'est pas spécifique ou limitée à la nation roumaine. Elle se retrouve, toutes proportions gardées, à travers toute l'Europe centrale et occidentale, Vintilă Mihăilescu, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

³³ Octavio Paz, *Point de convergence. Du romantisme à l'avant-garde*, Gallimard, 1976, apud. Alexis Nouss, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

³⁴ Antoine Compagnon, *Les cinq paradoxes de la modernité*, Seuil, 1990, apud., *ibidem*.

³⁵ *Ibidem*.

dans la régénération nationale et l'imposition du principe des nationalités. Déterminée d'une certaine séquence chrono-topique, la génération de 1848 a fait du temps et de l'espace un outil et a prouvé un messianisme explicable par le fait d'assumer la paradigme nationale. Les attitudes et les comportements, les références au paysan, comme essence de la spiritualité et de l'identité roumaine, le rapport social et national, l'identité idéologique sont des moyens pour comprendre la perception de soi-même des Roumains.

Très importante a été la transition des solidarités traditionnelles et de l'ethnie vers une nation moderne. La vision organiciste sur la nation de la génération de 1848 a été exprimée clairement à l'époque, même si les procédés discursifs la peuvent nuancer. Alecu Russo a exprimé son essence: « [...] *Pas à pas les gens du pays se transforment dans un peuple ou nation* »³⁶. «La double révolution», culturelle et politique, de la génération de 1848³⁷ a justifié une perspective ample et compréhensive de l'intelligentsia roumaine sur la nation et a favorisé la lutte pour la construction de l'Etat national.

L'analyse du sentiment national, c'est-à-dire d'une liaison affective avec "le pays" et de la sensibilité nationale, relève quelques aspects intéressants. Le nationalisme roumain pendant la période 1831-1866. L'oscillation entre fierté et lamentation, l'exaltation du peuple, l'attitude réservée et hostilité vers les étrangers, les psychoses collectives ne sont pas seulement les réactions d'une population qui montre des tendances ethnocentriques, mais, dans la même mesure, l'expression de la conscience de soi-même des Roumains animés par le sentiment national.³⁸ Au-delà des solutions proposées pour remédier la situation défavorable des Roumains, la génération de 1848 a essayé de répondre au problème de la marginalisation d'une manière nuancée. Le destin infortuné des gens du pays, le sort défavorable, la fatalité, l'histoire implacable, ont joué dans l'imaginaire des hommes de la période un rôle essentiel dans la création de l'image de soi-même, ont été de mythes compensatoires qui ont retardé

³⁶ Alecu Russo, *Cântarea României [Cantique de la Roumanie]*, București : Minerva, 1985, p. 105.

³⁷ Paul Cornea, *Oamenii începutului de drum. Studii și cercetări asupra epocii pasoptiste [Les hommes du début de chemin. Etudes et recherches sur l'époque de 1848]*, București : Cartea Românească, 1974, pp. 31-32.

³⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 31.

plusieurs fois une analyse lucide, raisonnable de la situation réelle de la société roumaine.³⁹ Mais la reconnaissance des réalités désagréables existantes a signifié aussi un pas important en avant, qui a influencé positivement l'évolution ultérieure de la société et de la nation roumaine. Une continuité structurale entre le sentiment national et la conscience nationale va de soi.⁴⁰ Sans se superposer et sans comprendre par la conscience nationale une simple développement du sentiment national, on doit saisir l'incorporation et la transformation de certains aspects du côté affectif au cours de la conscientisation nationale.⁴¹ Structurée sur une double dimension, ethnique culturelle et politique, la conscience nationale comprend deux plans d'évolution: l'un des sentiments, des réactions émotives; l'autre, celui abstrait, de la conceptualisation doctrinaire. Entendue comme "la conscience de nous-mêmes", elle contenait un set de références, explicites et implicites, qui tracent le contour de son essence.⁴²

« La « roumanité », comme identité nationale, s'est forgée à partir d'un mélange stratégique de « ruralité » et de « latinité », selon une recette romantique *sui generis*. »⁴³

D'autre part, par la structure même de son discours, la culture roumaine « moderne » s'appliqua à donner à la société rurale l'image d'identité nationale. En retour, cette image finira par s'appliquer à la société roumaine tout entière, la plaçant dans une identité ruraliste par excellence.⁴⁴

Pendant ce temps, le paysan va son chemin, s'adaptant aux changements de la société. C'est seulement sa « paysanneté » – production intellectuelle de marque – qui refuse de changer et finit par devenir synonyme de « roumanité » ; on se retrouve figés dans une identité « qu'on se donne pour se sauver, donc se perdre ». La « paysanneté » devient critère de réalité et de valeur.⁴⁵ L'individu de la société rurale roumaine est solidairement lié à sa communauté ; son individualité est plutôt un « nous »

³⁹ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*.

⁴¹ *Ibidem*.

⁴² Dinu Bălan, *op. cit.*, p. 162.

⁴³ Vintilă Mihăilescu, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

⁴⁴ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁵ *Ibidem*.

qu'un « moi ». ⁴⁶ C'est pour cela que Noica affirme que dans le monde villageois roumain « la catégorie de la personnalité n'existe pas ». ⁴⁷

Mais au fil du XIX^{ème} siècle l'hypothèse «cœlacanthe» fait long feu. De passé antique retrouvé, le temps folklorique est réaménagé en temps suspendu. Il devient le temps de l'ancien temps historiquement indéterminé, encore tout proche mais sur le point de disparaître à jamais. Le sauvetage de ses reliques, costumes et coutumes, relève du plan d'urgence_: mais, comme pour les monuments historiques, l'inventaire est en expansion et les objets à sauver toujours plus nombreux. „L'invention” de traditions y pourvoit amplement. Et la représentation historique aide à mettre en forme et en beauté le passé folklorique, qu'il s'agisse de fêtes ou de costumes. Les musées d'ethnographie, à vocation patriotique, qui ouvrent à la fin du siècle 'inspirent, pour leur présentation, de la scénographie théâtrale. ⁴⁸ Les premières observations portées sur les vêtements paysans sont dans la perspective du musée vivant. La nécessité pour les Roumains de fournir récurremment les preuves d'une continuité ininterrompue avec les grands ancêtres explique sans doute que Mircea Eliade, en 1943 encore, affirme la similitude entre l'habit contemporain des paysans du « réduit national » et celui des Daces.

« Géo-Daces étaient de taille moyenne, blonds. Ils laissaient pousser leur barbe et leurs cheveux. Les nobles portaient une sorte de bonnet et les autres allaient nu-tête. Leurs traits physiques ainsi que les caractéristiques vestimentaires – chemise longue jusqu'aux genoux (...). Ces mêmes caractéristiques peuvent être remarquées chez les paysans roumains d'aujourd'hui, particulièrement chez les habitants des régions roumaines carpatiques de la Transylvanie. Pendant près de deux mille ans, les Daces ont eu des profondes racines dans le sol de la patrie sans jamais émigrer : on pourrait dire qu'ils sont le produit de ce sol qui les nourrissait et que, pour sa défense, ils étaient toujours prêts à sacrifier leur vie. » ⁴⁹

⁴⁶ *Ibidem.*, p. 2.

⁴⁷ Constantin Noica, 1986, *Scrisori despre logica lui Hermes* (Lettres sur la logique d'Hermès), Bucarest : Cartea Românească, *apud.*, Vintilă Mihăilescu, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

⁴⁸ Anne-Marie Thiesse, *La création des identités nationales, Europe XVIIIe – XXe siècle*, p. 38.

⁴⁹ Mircea Eliade, *Les Roumains, précis historique*, Bucarest : Roza Vînturilor, 1992, pp. 6-7.

Par conséquent, le discours culturel, en Roumanie, sera tenté – sinon contraint –, par sa nature même, de revenir éternellement à ses propres fondements afin d'y chercher une solution à son conflit constitutif. C'est le début de l'« obsession des origines » – et aussi de la culture roumaine « moderne ». ⁵⁰ Et voilà, comment le projet de la culture roumaine « moderne » a trouvé son fondement (il aurait dû, sinon, l'inventer pour pouvoir exister)!

Conclusion

Les réactions de la postérité envers les épopées ossianiques nous offre deux conclusions possibles avec application directe dans la culture roumaine: d'une part les contestataires de la méthode de travail de Macpherson nous font arriver à une conclusion choquante, envers laquelle on reste réservé: nous avons employé des traditions, parfois nous les avons inventées, au sens d'Hobsbawm ou nous les avons manipulées à une fin nationale, et d'autre part en joignant les partisans: nous avons été forcé par le contexte politico-culturel à une affirmation identitaire, possible seulement par une revalorisation des éléments symboliques autochtones. Cela avec les exagérations inévitables, mais assumées, nous offrait la possibilité du raccordement à la modernité européenne.

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