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**FROM POST-REVOLUTIONARY TO EUROPEANIZED LENINISM:
INTERSYSTEMIC REVERBERATIONS OF DE-STALINIZATION.
THE CASE OF THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION**

Emanuel Copilaș*

Abstract

For the Soviet Union, the Hungarian revolution from the fall of 1956 represented probably the most important challenge it had to face since the Nazi invasion during the Second World War. The “popular democracies” were also threatened by it to a great extent; even independent Yugoslavia, a true model for the Magyar insurgents, agreed with Khrushchev’s plan of sending Soviet troops to Budapest and forcefully reinstating communism in Hungary. This study approaches the Hungarian crisis as a consequence of the Soviet ideological metamorphosis that led from what I called post-revolutionary Leninism to Europeanized Leninism. Afterwards, Hungarian and the Suez crises are briefly compared from an international relations’ systemic perspective.

Key words: de-Stalinization, social tensions, foreign policy, ‘socialist camp’, Soviet reactions

From Lenin to Khrushchev: Varieties of Soviet Leninism

In today’s world, as it did at the beginning of the 20th century, Leninism has many meanings. An understandable outcome, if one takes into account its overwhelming ideological, political, social or economical influence over the last hundred of years. However, an ideological pattern common for all “Leninist regimes”¹, to use Kenneth Jowitt’s syntagm, can

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¹ Kenneth Jowitt, *New world disorder. The Leninist extinction*, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1993. The documentation for this article was partially facilitated by an AMPOSDRU scholarship, obtained through the following grant: Investeste în oameni! FONDUL SOCIAL EUROPEAN, Programul Operațional Sectorial pentru Dezvoltarea Resurselor Umane 2007-2013, proiectul „STUDIILE DOCTORALE FACTOR

still be identified. Leninism is a distortion of Marxism, arguing for extreme political means to put in practice the first of all social revolution that Marx had in mind.² Unlike Marxism, it is totally reluctant to empirical realities. In fact, Leninism wears a permanent fight against “bourgeois” reality, aiming to overcome it and install in its place an aggressive egalitarian utopia. Therefore, Leninism and Leninist regimes in general always derive their legitimacy from the future; the past is always reimagined by the “vanguard of the proletarian class”, the communist party, in order to serve the present and ultimately the post-“imperialist” future that only the party is entitled to lead the way to.³

In order to efficiently launch its never ending assault on “bourgeois” reality, Leninism needs, beside the communist party, a strong “internationalist” center, which happened to be the decaying Tsarist Empire. From there, it tried relentlessly to expand itself and to bring about the world revolution. However, during this process, Leninism suffered setbacks and also metamorphoses; “imperialism” turned out to be a much more worthy adversary than the Bolsheviki expected.

I propose viewing Soviet Leninism from Lenin himself to Khrushchev as undergoing three distinct phases: *revolutionary Leninism*, *post-revolutionary Leninism* and *Europeanized Leninism*. By revolutionary Leninism I understand the teachings and actions of Lenin himself, not the enormous mystifications that his image and his books became subject to right after his death. From the Bolshevik-Menshevik split (1903) to the October Revolution and (partially) to Lenin’s death, Leninism was, truistic as it may sound, a powerful, revolutionary movement. It was hugely emancipatory: for workers, who saluted it as an end to tsarist oppression and a promise of a better life, for peasants, who were promised the object of their all-time dream, land, and received it for several years, only to be confiscated by the state starting with 1928, when Stalin launched the

MAJOR DE DEZVOLTARE AL CERCETĂRILOR SOCIO-UMANE ȘI UMANISTE. Parts of this paper were published in a larger study entitled ‘Facing the “counterrevolution”’: Romanian responses to the Hungarian crisis of 1956’, *Political Studies Forum*, nr. 2, 2010, pp. 67-136.

² Robert Tucker, *The Marxian revolutionary idea*, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1969, pp. 10-11.

³ Emanuel Copilaș, “Implozia leninismului. O reevaluare a conflictului sino-sovietic din perspectivă ideologică” in *Sfera Politicii*, nr. 141, 2009, pp. 89-94; see also Neil Harding, *Leninism*, Durham N.C.: Duke University Press, 1996.

collectivization process. But it was Lenin who argued in the first place that the land must be collectivized because peasants engaged in free trade activities are actively supporting capitalism and undermining the revolution. Other social categories who benefited from the revolution were artists and women. Cultural activities were experiencing a blooming effervescence once the tsarist censorship was abolished, while women, led especially by the famous Bolshevik lady Alexandra Kollontai, were ostentatiously affirming their newly found emancipated identity consisting of civil rights and social-political equality with men.⁴ Furthermore, one of the main advantages of revolutionary Leninism was that it successfully presented itself as the single alternative to capitalism and its incessantly economical-political domination that overlapped the unfolding of the modern age.⁵ On short, these were the main tenets of revolutionary Leninism, which, ironically, turned out to be the shortest phase of Soviet Leninism.

Post-revolutionary Leninism covers what in Soviet history is usually known as Stalinism. Stalinism is often understood as an extreme bureaucratization of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and a total loss of revolutionary ferment. The most frequent argument sustaining this hypothesis is Stalin's "socialism in one country," an ideological innovation aimed to stabilize and consolidate the young Soviet regime. If Lenin believed and struggled for a simultaneous revolution in the most developed European countries as a condition for the survival of the Russian revolution and the victory of the global one, after his death this kind of wishful thinking made room for harsher political realities. Stalin did not renounce the aim of achieving global communist revolution, but argued that this must be done progressively, taking into account the unequal contradictions which undermine capitalism – and giving priority to the revolutionary center, namely the Soviet Union.⁶ Furthermore, Stalin developed an irrational approach towards his own party, traceable to its ever growing paranoia. Going against classical Marxism, he argued that, in the process of 'building socialism', the 'class struggle' intensifies rather than disappears. The ideological assault of 'bourgeoisie', which penetrated

⁴ Orlando Figes, *A peoples' tragedy: The Russian Revolution, 1891-1924*, New York: Penguin Books, 1998.

⁵ Claude Lefort, *Complicația asupra comunismului*, București: Univers, 2002.

⁶ Stalin, *Problemele leninismului*, București: Editura Pentru Literatură Politică, 1952, p. 146.

even into the top echelons of the Bolshevik party, was held responsible for this outcome.⁷

Important voices in the field of Soviet studies have convincingly argued that Stalinism is a departure from classical Leninism, rather a continuation of it. Stalin destroyed the old Bolshevik guard in order to impose its own rule, they argue. Furthermore, one cannot adequately comprehend the major ideological changes that affected the Soviet Union after Stalin's death if it does not distinguish between Leninism and Stalinism.⁸ Although I strongly agree with these arguments, they do not prove the discontinuity between revolutionary and post-revolutionary Leninism. The stake of the problem, in my opinion, is not to homogenize Bolshevism and Stalinism as "a single undifferentiated tradition", but to recognize a filiation between them through the ideological matrix of Leninism. As Milovan Djilas writes, "Stalin did not destroy the party, but transformed, 'purged' it and made it a tool of possible". He paid the price of institutionally and politically saving Leninism by voluntarily renouncing its revolutionary surplus: "the comradely spirit from the party and the egalitarian society".⁹

Was therefore the revolutionary impetus really absent from Stalinism? No, and that is why I prefer to call it post-revolutionary Leninism. One must not forget the social dynamics of industrialization, which mobilized and even animated large categories of Soviet population.¹⁰ The Third (Communist) International itself represents the proof that revolutionary Leninism survived, even though in a stabilizing social structure that was becoming more and more unfit for it. Despite the fact it was considered international, the Komintern was actually an instrument through which the Moscow centre undisputedly ruled over all other revolutionary movements that proclaimed Leninist ascendancy.

Post-revolutionary Leninism is very important for the stake of this paper, for several reasons. First of all, for the young 'popular democracies'

⁷ Stalin, *Opere*, vol. 13, București: Editura Partidului Muncitoresc Român, 1952, pp. 366-384.

⁸ Robert Tucker, *The Soviet political mind*, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1971, pp. 55-56, 133-134; Robert Tucker, *Political culture and leadership in Soviet Russia*, New York, London: Norton & Company, 1987, pp. 51-71; Stephen F. Cohen, "Bolshevism and Stalinism", in Robert C. Tucker (ed.) *Stalinism. Essays in historical interpretation*, New York: Norton & Company, 1977, pp. 3-29.

⁹ Milovan Djilas, *Întâlniri cu Stalin*, Craiova: Europa, 1991, p. 139.

¹⁰ Claude Lefort, *op. cit.*, pp. 95-99.

that emerged after the end of the Second World War, it represented the first (and for some, the only) form of Leninism that they had access to. All the formative experiences of the East European communist rulers were shaped by Stalin's Leninism and working methods. By then, revolutionary Leninism was dead and buried for a long time.¹¹ Second, I intend to prove that the Hungarian revolution and the 'Polish October' can be understood as a dephasing between the post-revolutionary Leninism of Soviet satellites and the emerging Soviet *Europeanized Leninism*. While the 'Moscow centre' was undergoing a process of ideological reinvention by invoking revolutionary Leninism, the (un)'popular democracies', with their still weak and unstable political regimes and with their lack of revolutionary Leninist experience, were understandably worried.

Starting with the CPSU's 20th Congress, the Soviet Union and the whole communist world went through major changes. So did Leninism. De-Stalinization, "peaceful coexistence", "state of all people", all these new ideological concepts advanced by Nikita Khrushchev reflected a "de-radicalization" of Leninism, to use a concept developed by Robert Tucker.¹² The new Soviet leader was truly committed to Leninism and tried to restore what he believed to be its original essence, eliminating in the process the Stalinist perversion of Leninism.¹³ Showing (sometimes) a certain degree of political responsibility, Khrushchev understood that a violent confrontation between Socialism and Capitalism (as Lenin theorized) within the new, nuclear international context, would be catastrophic, endangering the idea of communism itself. This did not mean a renunciation of the ideological confrontation between the two "camps" of the Cold War, but rather the extrapolation of the struggle from the political and military field to that of economical, social and cultural competition. Khrushchev, a convinced Leninist, really believed that odds were on his side. Although retrospectively proved wrong, his legacy of *Europeanized Leninism* played a major role within the internal economy of the ideocratic concept.

Relaxing the international ideological tension, inclining toward Western political values like negotiations and compromise, taking the European Common Market as a model while nevertheless competing with

¹¹ As Dan Cătănuș observes in „The Romanian communists under the impact of destalinization 1956-1951”, in *Arhivele Totalitarismului*, nr. 1-2, 2002, p. 185.

¹² Robert Tucker, *The Marxian...*, pp. 187-188.

¹³ Edward Crankshaw, *Khrushchev remembers*, London: André Deutsch Limited, 1971, pp. 3-9.

it, trying to restore “legalist socialism”, freeing from Gulags or rehabilitating some 20 million people and diminishing control over East European satellite regimes¹⁴, renouncing thus the “intrasystemic” perspective for the “intersystemic” one¹⁵ – are reason enough for naming Khrushchevite Leninism “Europeanized Leninism.”¹⁶

Between Stalin’s death (1953) and the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU, held in February 1956), Soviet Leninism experienced an intermediary phase that can be referred to as *pre-Europeanized Leninism*. Also known as the ‘new course’, a period of ideological, political, social and economical relaxation, pre-Europeanized Leninism paved the way for Europeanized Leninism, without necessarily overlapping it. In other words, I argue against perceiving the ‘new course’ as a part of de-Stalinization, although it nevertheless anticipated it. Between 1953 and 1956, none of the Soviet leaders dared to blame Stalin directly for the shortcomings of the Soviet system: Lavrenti Beria and Victor Abakumov, the leaders of the secret police were held responsibly instead.¹⁷

Next, I will focus upon the Hungarian ‘new course’, which gradually led the way to political conflicts, social protests and, eventually, revolution. ‘Popular democracies’ did not experience pre-Europeanized Leninism (Soviet style ‘new course’) because they were not truly prepared to advance towards Europeanized Leninism – at least not in that particular moment although, of course, they still payed lip service to it. Nevertheless, ‘popular democracies’ experienced or ‘simulated’ – to use Michael’s Shafir concept¹⁸ – ‘new courses’ of their own. Some had cohesive political elites and therefore relatively strong parties which enabled them to counteract

¹⁴ William Taubman, *Khrushchev. The man, his era*, London: Free Press, 2005.

¹⁵ Michael Shafir, “Eastern Europe”, in Martin McCauley (ed.), *Khrushchev and Khrushchevism*, London: School of Slavonic and East European Studies, 1987, pp. 156-158.

¹⁶ I tried to offer a relatively detailed typology of all forms of Soviet and post-Soviet Leninism in “Counter-idea of the 20th century: varieties of Leninism in Soviet and post-Soviet Russia”, manuscript under review at *Theory and Society Journal*.

¹⁷ Emanuel Copilaș, “În colimatorul Uniunii Sovietice: România și Europa de Est între sfârșitul celui de al Doilea Război Mondial și dezorientarea post-stalinistă (1945-1955) (IV)”, forthcoming in *Sfera Politicii*.

¹⁸ For a detailed analysis of ‘simulated change’, see Michael Shafir, *Romania. Politics, economics and society. Political stagnation and simulated change*, London: Frances Pinter, 1985.

more efficiently the “Moscow centre’s”¹⁹ new tendencies. Other political elites, like the Hungarian one, were less united and therefore less able to resist reform orientated Soviet pressures. Furthermore, the Hungarian political elite did not lack members that welcomed reforms in order to overcome the Stalin’s era stagnation. However, the reformers themselves – Imre Nagy being the most well known figure among them – were more or less confined to a post-revolutionary Leninist *Weltanschauung*.

Hungary after Stalin. Political debates over the ‘new course’

Stalin’s death has resulted in substantial changes in the Hungarian political elite, directly proportional to the crystallization process of the new leadership in Moscow. The Secretary General of the Hungarian Workers’ Party (HWP), who, as customary during Stalin’s era, was also the prime minister, was nicknamed, a defining aspect for his political and ideological orientation, “Stalin’s favorite pupil”. Mátyás Rákosi had subjected Hungary to an irrational massive program of rapid industrialization, whose economic effects were felt in full at the social level. Consequently, HWP’s popularity and of communism in general were at minimum levels.

In June 1953, Rákosi is forced, pressured by the Soviets, to stop leading the government in favor of Imre Nagy. Known as a moderate and reformist communist, who made his “apprenticeship” in the Comintern, he had been removed in 1948 from his position as Minister of Agriculture, as a consequence of Rákosi’s direct machinations. This undoubtedly rebound for the HWP’s Secretary General’s political career has not continued, as was likely, by minimizing his role also at the party level. Conversely, highly able and adaptable (incidentally, he knew eight languages), the tireless Rákosi waited for the right time, to which he facilitated its emergence by numerous backstage maneuvering, only to regain in 1955 the presidency of the government. However, one year after this success, as we will see, his political career will end abruptly, just months before the outbreak of protests in Budapest. Rákosi will become one of the “victims” of the de-Stalinization policy, being undesirable both for the Hungarian society and for the new leadership in Moscow.²⁰

¹⁹ The syntagm was borrowed from Kenneth Jowitt, *op. cit.*, pp. 159-219.

²⁰ Patrick Brogan, *Eastern Europe, 1939-1989. The fifty years war*, London: Bloomsbury, 1990, pp. 122-123; János Rainer, “A progress of ideas: the Hungarian revolution from 1956”, in Dan Cătănuș, Vasile Buga (coord.), *Putere și societate. Lagărul communist sub impactul*

Imre Nagy strongly launched towards the implementation of the new economic course, initiated by Moscow in 1953. The amounts invested in agriculture, domestic and food industry were increased, while reducing hyper-centralized management of the economy and increasing the importance and decisional weight of local institutions. However, the party apparatus was dissatisfied with the new economic orientation. The former prime minister, after a formal approval of the new course principles and of the collective leadership, began to issue veiled criticism about the increasing number and activities of “kulaks” (wealthy or very wealthy peasants, responsible in Marxist view for promoting capitalism in villages); another criticism aimed at reducing “revolutionary vigilance” among the proletariat.²¹

But Nagy was determined to carry out the economic and social reforms. Denouncing the “Stalinist monopoly on Marxist-Leninist science”, he attributed it with “serious theoretical errors, which had repercussions on the global social development and on the fight between the two systems, and finally on the fate of socialism itself”. The new process did not represent a deviation from Marxism-Leninism, as it had been accused, but its continuation and development. Highly important, the new course, Nagy claimed, did not propose “new strategic tasks” for the HWP; these, “the shaping of the economic foundations of socialism and building socialism in Hungary”, and, in general, the communist world were unchangeable. A step towards “building socialism”, the new course was still very important and “had to be met unconditionally”. What did it consist of? In “the establishment of ever closer relations in the exchange of goods between towns and the countryside, between socialist industry and the system of small farms producing for the market, easing the transition towards a socialist system of farms producing at a large scale”. In Hungary, the implementation prerequisites of the new course were from afar inconsistent; however, its need for the ideological finality of the regime and

destalinizării, 1956, București: Institutul Național pentru Studiul Totalitarismului, 2006, pp. 292-293.

²¹ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The soviet bloc. Unity and conflict*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971, pp. 215-216.

for earning the people's confidence in this process was, at least for Nagy, obvious.²²

The route of the new Hungarian course will be stopped in 1955, with replacing Nagy by András Hegedüs, a close friend of Rákosi's. This would not have been possible without some changes in the leading structure of the Soviet Union itself. Therefore, the Soviet Prime Minister Gheorghii Malenkov, the new course initiator and, consequently, Nagy's supporter, was replaced by Nikolai Bulganin, a close friend of CPSU First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev. Unlike Malenkov, Nagy does perform self-criticism, not recognizing the major economic errors attributed to him by the MDP first secretary, and thus gaining an impressive image capital. However, he will not become a "Hungarian Gomulka"; he will have the chance but, for various reasons, as we will see, he will miss it.²³

Meanwhile, Rákosi's exhilaration will be short-lived. Besides being a very unpopular public figure, the political opposition against him grew in a threatening rhythm. The 20th Congress of the CPSU will have a destabilizing effect on the HWP leadership. Popular dissatisfaction, combined with that of intellectuals, grew, undermining more and more Rákosi's and the Stalinists' position, still in leading positions. The Polish workers' revolt consumed in June 1956 in Poznan had been triggered because of conditions existing in full also in the Hungarian society, which was a warning to the Soviet leadership, fueled by the obstinacy with which the MDP First Secretary exhaustively eluded the application of economic and political reliefs, even in a as moderate version as possible. For these reasons, Rákosi will be replaced by Ernő Gerő.²⁴ The choice was at least unfortunate, because Gerő was also formed at the Comintern school, thus being a convinced Stalinist.

Szabad Nép, HWP's newspaper, announced on July 19 that, for health reasons, Matyas Rákosi had been suspended, "at his request, from the membership of the Political Bureau and the position of First Secretary

²² Imre Nagy, "Reform communism", in Gale Stokes (ed.), *From Stalinism to pluralism. A documentary history of Eastern Europe since 1945*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1991, pp. 82-87.

²³ J.R. Crampton, *Europa răsăriteană în secolul XX... și după*, București: Curtea Veche, 2002, p. 322.

²⁴ János Rainer, "A progress of ideas: the Hungarian revolution from 1956", in Dan Cătănuș, Vasile Buga (coord.), *op. cit.*, pp. 293-294.

of the Central Committee". The letter through which he made public his resignation, "Stalin's favorite pupil" said that, reaching the age of 65 and after two years of suffering from hypertension, his performance as first secretary of the party was deeply affected. "Furthermore", he continues, "the mistakes I have committed in the personality cult and that of socialist legality burdens the task of leading the Party to focus our Party in the broadest possible manner on tasks that are before us".

Self-criticism, however, was not sufficient, because, the new management of the HWP believed, the gaps drawn by the former first secretary on the party and the process of "building socialism" were very numerous and serious. Thus, Rákosi was forced to make a further statement about his resignation, in which to broadly detail how he endangered the regime and the responsibility incumbent in this regard.²⁵

Further, the HWP wanted to be connected to the de-Stalinization process through three major reforms. The first one was "raising the living standards of workers", followed by "increasing the productive security of the working peasantry", and, finally, "improving the social and cultural circumstances of working people".²⁶ Regarding the last point, things will progressively turn to a disturbing twist.

Thus, the Petöfi circle which, similar to the Fourfold Circle Club in Poland, had extended throughout the country, favored with aplomb Imre Nagy and the reformist measures that he had initiated. Students, dissatisfied intellectuals and workers began to make common cause against the Stalinist elite in the Hungarian leadership.²⁷ Just before the protests in Poznan, the circle members initiated a large-scale protest against Rakosi and Nagy's resettlement to power. The HWP First Secretary renounced to arrest Nagy and some hundreds of his important supporters only following direct Soviet pressures.²⁸ Laszlo Rajk's rehabilitation in March and a series of amnesties and limited administrative decentralizations failed to develop into an outlet for the society's grievances. Instead, Rajk's reburial – a

²⁵ Paul Zinner, *National communism and popular revolt in Eastern Europe. A selection of documents on events in Poland and Hungary*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1956, pp. 338-342.

²⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 348.

²⁷ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *op. cit.*, p. 222.

²⁸ Erik Durschmied, *Unsung heroes. The twentieth century's forgotten history makers*, London: Hodder & Stoughton, 2003, p. 380; André Fontaine, *Istoria războiului rece. De la criza alianțelor la războiul din Coreea, 1950-1967*, vol. III, București: Editura militară, 1993, p. 304.

Stalinist no better than Rakosi, executed in 1949 after a Stalinist trial that centrally aimed Tito's compromise – turned into a major public event, bringing together tens of thousands of people (François Fejtö advances the figure of 300,000 participants) in a silent, but very expressive, protest against the leaders in Budapest.²⁹

Rakosi's replacement by Ernő Gerö had no effect; on the contrary, by substituting a Stalinist with another, the population requirements for authentic "political reforms" had not been satisfied, but rather mocked at. Moreover, it seemed that the Soviet Union itself was offering its endorsement for the reform of Hungarian communism. Eventually accepting Gomulka as leader of the PUWP and Poland, which the Hungarian press considered having a "historic importance", Moscow seemed not to be opposed to the de-Stalinization of "popular democracies". Actually, it prudently encouraged it, while assuming the satellites' fidelity towards the Soviet Union would remain unshakable. Amnesties decreed in the spring of 1956 by Rákosi had an unexpected effect: they had contributed, by the return of many party members abusively imprisoned in previous years, to demoralize the HWP. Last but not least, confusion increasingly pushed through the army, a comprehensive aspect for the easiness with which it took the insurgents' side during the revolution. "Gradually, officers and military cadets identified themselves with anxious intellectuals, going down to take part in clubs' discussions", writes Zbigniew Brzezinski.³⁰

Even intellectuals convinced of the correctness of (Soviet) Marxism, as György Lukács, acknowledged that, for Hungarian citizens, it was more unpopular than ever. Welcoming the 20th Congress of the CPSU, before whom "no debate was possible", the Hungarian philosopher advocated for the democratization of the political and intellectual life with the help of constructive polemics. The return to Leninism, he warned still, must be made by Leninist methodology, as "Lenin can be transformed as much as Stalin into a citing and dogmatism figure". Unfortunately, Lukács noted, "there are forces ready to impress this direction to the Twentieth Congress (sic!), and it is the duty of every communist – his debt to the socialist revolution, his debt in honor of Marxism, which unites us as Marxist

²⁹ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *op. cit.*, p. 223; François Fejtö, *Histoire des démocraties populaires*, vol. II, Paris: Éditions de Seuil, 1979, p. 120.

³⁰ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *op. cit.*, pp. 225-227.

philosophers and intellectuals – to take a stand against it at the first outset”.³¹ The Hungarian revolution will, however, exceed the ideological stand proposed by Lukács. He will be deported together with Imre Nagy in Romania, because he actively supported him in the tempestuous days during late October and early November. He will return a year later in Hungary, where he will make his self-criticism, remaining loyal to the regime until the end of his life.

To sum up, the Hungarian ‘new course’ was the result of two major opposing but also hard to delimit tendencies: a conservative, post-revolutionary Leninist one and, respectively, a reformist one. In 1955, its abrupt end signaled the return to post-revolutionary Leninism. In the mean time, however, the Soviet Union was gradually advancing towards Europeanized Leninism. Thus, the centre-periphery tensions were amplifying. Another major factor that has to be taken into account in this regard is the hostility of Hungarian society towards the ruling party in general and the Stalinist political elite in particular. As we are about to see, the spark that ignited the revolution came from outside, not from within the party. Soviet pressures for reform entailed centrifugal tendencies over the HWP which in turn translated into higher pressures from the Hungarian society for more and more freedoms and eventually ‘bourgeois’ democracy.

From social protests to political revolution

Students, intellectuals, workers, party members, military personnel: the social picture was thus complete. In mid-October, in Szeged, an independent student association had been established, which fought for a democratization of social, political, economic and intellectual life, increasingly less compatible with the existence of the Hungarian communist regime. The news of Władysław Gomułka’s confirmation, who symbolized for Poles what Nagy meant for the hopes of reform in Hungary, in the position of Polish United Workers Party (PUWP)’s Prime Secretary arrives in Hungary a day after the date it became official: October 21. Encouraged, the students propose a list of demands and a demonstration march through the streets of Budapest, which will start on

³¹ Gyorgy Lukács, “Contemporary problems of Marxist philosophy”, in Gale Stokes, (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 88-93.

October 23 and will be, by the strong support given by workers, the moment of the Hungarian Revolution outbreak.³²

Among the students' requirements, fourteen in total, which had now been assumed by the remaining protesters, were: the HWP's leadership renewal, "Government reshuffle and inclusion of comrade Imre Nagy among its members", respecting national sovereignty and the principle of not interfering in internal affairs, the Red Army's withdrawal from Hungarian territory, substantial economic restructuring, public trials for Rákosi and his main collaborator, former Defense Minister Mihály Farkas, modifications to the military uniforms and the return to the national emblem from the "Kossuth era", "Total freedom of opinion and press freedom", removing Stalin's statue, "the symbol of tyranny and oppression", from Budapest, and, finally, "Complete solidarity of Hungarians".³³

The government will learn about the students' plan to take to the streets. Confused, the members of the HWP's Political bureau – who has just returned from Yugoslavia, where they tried to convince Tito of the good faith of the new Hungarian leadership, Rákosi being considered by the latter as one of the greatest personal enemies and also one of the East European leaders most hostile to the Yugoslav version of socialism – will prohibit the manifestation.³⁴ In vain. Gathering around the statue of Jozef Bem, the Polish general who played a critical role during the Hungarian revolution of 1848, the demonstrators then headed towards the Parliament square, chanting anti-communist slogans and demanding that Nagy speak to them. Their numbers increase as more and more workers and even soldiers guarding public buildings joined them, reaching approximately 200-250,000. On the way, part of the demonstrators will go to Stalin square to destroy the statue erected in his honor five years earlier, while another part headed to the radio broadcasting building, wanting to disseminate the 14 points on the air to the whole country.³⁵ The conflictogenous potential

³² János Rainer, "A progress of ideas: the Hungarian revolution from 1956", in Dan Cătănuș, Vasile Buga (coord.), *op. cit.*, pp. 298-299; Adrian Pop, *Tentația tranziției. O istorie a prăbușirii comunismului în Europa de Est*, București: Corint, 2002, p. 77; Michael Korda, *Journey to a revolution. A personal memoir and history of the Hungarian revolution from 1956*, New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2006, p. 92.

³³ Tibor Meray, *Budapesta 1956. Atunci și după 44 de ani*, București: Compania, 2000, pp. 43-44.

³⁴ François Fejtő, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

³⁵ Adrian Pop, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

was fully fueled by Gerö himself, in whose name, in that same evening, the Radio Broadcasting will transmit a defiant and offensive release concerning the demonstrators and the objectives that they sought.³⁶

For the crowd's morale, this gesture was imprudent, if not even unconscious. Next, Gerö recognized that some problems had made their place in the relationship between the party and the society, and announced, as soon as possible, a HWP Central Committee plenary session meant to debate them and to find a solution. Until then, however, "a particularly vigilance is necessary to prevent hostile elements to obstruct the efforts of our Party, of the working class and working people, and to clarify the situation (sic!)." Calling for the unity and cohesiveness of the party (not only for ideological reasons, but probably because of the awareness of its organizational weakness and the danger of disintegration that threaten it), Gerö declared himself strongly in favor of "socialist democracy", rhetorically warning against the catastrophic eventuality of the restoration of capitalism in Hungary.³⁷

In those moments of confusion, members of the Hungarian security guarding the building opened fire on the crowd, instigated after the HWP leader's uninspired speech that ended with the disappointing message "The Party Unity for Socialist Democracy". Progressively armed by the soldiers who had changed sides, the insurgents responded in the same manner. The Radio building was captured after an uninterrupted siege. The new troops that were supposed to defend it either changes sides or refused to fight for the detested security service members. On the other hand, an issue that facilitated the occupation of the building by the revolutionary was that the power representatives' messages began to be sent from elsewhere ("Lakihegy locality"); therefore, the strategic importance of this objective was greatly diminished, especially because, after the intervention of Soviet tanks, it could be regained at any time and with minimal loss.³⁸ The Hungarian Revolution had become irreversible.³⁹

³⁶ Paul Zinner, *op. cit.*, p. 403.

³⁷ *Ibidem*, pp. 406-407.

³⁸ Tibor Meray, *op. cit.*, pp. 159-166.

³⁹ Johanna Granville, "From the archives of Warsaw and Budapest: a comparison of the events of 1956", in *East European Politics and Society*, nr. 2 (16), pp. 536-537; Michael Korda, *op. cit.*, pp. 194-195; Tibor Meray, *op. cit.*, p. 111; Adrian Pop, *op. cit.*, pp. 78-79.

On the issue of arming revolutionaries, observations made by historian Adrian Pop are interesting. He considers the ease with which protesters gained, in different circumstances, access to firearms “suspicious”, reaching the conclusion that the KGB, “in collaboration with its Hungarian pendant, ÁVÓ”, acted “on the express orders of Khrushchev’s Stalinist opponents, interested in producing a situation of chaos in Hungary” to demonstrate the limits and drawbacks of de-Stalinization and compromise, namely of the political neutralization of CPSU First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev.⁴⁰ Such a hypothesis, however attractive and plausible it might seem at first glance, has not so far been validated by credible documentary sources. Consequently, its adoption as one of the premises of escalation of the Hungarian revolution seems to be at least improper.

Meanwhile, Nagy, who had just returned from a vacation, fully placed himself under the party power, to which he had been readmitted a few days back.⁴¹ He will eventually be called at the party headquarters, where Gerö, with an evident dissatisfaction, asked him to address the crowd in the Parliament square to temper it and to prevent a violent outcome. Something the former prime minister will not hesitate to do. Emerging from the main balcony of the building that was headquarters of the legislature, Nagy, after finally being recognized and allowed to speak, will start his speech a terminological inertia that thwarted and annoyed the huge rally. “Comrades!”, he called them, with the unpleasant surprise of being booed intensely. “The stirred crowd, sensitized by events, rather tired, still oscillating between fear and hope, expected, no doubt, that he addressed it with “Friends” or “Hungarians”, words that would have met the true state of mind”.⁴² After settling clamor, Nagy urged for calm and the peaceful return of demonstrators to their homes. In vain. His modest display, contrasting greatly with the dynamic speeches, presence of mind and self-mastery that Gomulka had demonstrated in similar circumstances – did not convince the crowd. Clashes with security forces continued until morning.

The next day, Nagy was reinstated as prime minister. Simultaneously, following the hail that Gerö made the previous day, Soviet

⁴⁰ Adrian Pop, *op. cit.*, pp. 79-80.

⁴¹ Tibor Meray, *op. cit.*, p. 114; Paul Zinner, *op. cit.*, pp. 388-389.

⁴² Tibor Meray, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

troops stationed in Hungary initiated the first action against the insurgents. Demonstrating the HWP leadership's inability to correctly assess the seriousness of the situation and the increasing drift of the party itself, Gerö will make public the Hungarian government request for military assistance from the Soviet troops.⁴³

Trying to limit the magnitude of armed violence and devastation that began to spread throughout the country, Nagy will address during the same day a "proclamation to the Hungarian nation", which, besides the call to end armed violence, advocated for the "deep democratization of Hungarian public life", for "the achievement of a Hungarian way corresponding to our national characteristics in building socialism" and, above all, for a "radical improvement of living conditions of workers".⁴⁴ One can observe the attention with which the Prime Minister chooses the words by which he addressed the revolutionaries: "people of Budapest", or "Friends, Hungarians!". The detested "comrades" almost disappears, being strategically framed by terms with a familiar sounding, non-ideological: "Hungarians, comrades, friends!"⁴⁵ Also Nagy insists on the national dimension of the message he sends, in the less feasible attempt to overcome the destructive chaos that had installed itself on the Hungarian capital streets.

Proving, in the eyes of the Soviet leadership, his inability to properly manage the situation, Gerö is replaced by Janos Kadar. By then one of the secretaries of the Central Committee of the HWP, he is known for his moderate political-ideological orientation. Demonstrating empathy, to a certain extent, towards the demonstrators, Kadar said that "The demonstration of a section of the youth that began peacefully and in which most participants had honest goals degenerated in several hours into an armed attack against state power and the People's Democracy in accordance with the intentions of the anti-popular and counterrevolutionary elements which have interfered in the mean time".⁴⁶ Consequently, the armed forces' response was thus more than justified.

The intervention of Soviet troops on October 24 "was, strictly in military terms, less effective". Without a fitting support from the infantry,

⁴³ Paul Zinner, *op. cit.*, p. 409.

⁴⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 410.

⁴⁵ *Ibidem*, pp. 409-411.

⁴⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 415.

Soviet tanks were relatively easy targets for mainly young demonstrators, "armed with grenades and Molotov cocktails". Then, Soviet soldiers were not familiarized with the operations theater, and most maps they had received were at least ten years old, a period within which many street names were changed. It can be argued that the presence of the Red Army on the streets of Budapest had the opposite effect of the one predicted by HWP's leadership: it potentiated the demonstrators "strong anti-Russian and anti-Soviet feelings", also provoking new large scale protests.⁴⁷

Concerning the Soviet intervention, Nagy showed an ambivalent behavior, even Stalinist at times. He advised, which is understandable, the Hungarian troops not to oppose in any form the Soviet "peacekeepers", and did not protest when Gerö appealed to leadership in Moscow in this respect. Moreover, on October 25, he even spoke in favor of increasing the number of Soviet effectives that acted in Budapest.⁴⁸ The central figure actions of the Hungarian revolution misled many protagonists and, later, researchers of the event, thus giving him qualities he did not possess. We must not forget that, between 1930 and 1944, Nagy was politically active in Moscow. As a member of Cominform, acting under the conspiratorial name of "Volodya", he provided information about almost two hundred people, among which Hungarians, Bulgarians, Russians, Poles, Germans or Austrians. Fifteen of them died in prison or before a firing squad. Also, in 1951, when Janos Kadar, in turn, was imprisoned and subjected to extreme torture (his testicles were crushed), Nagy approved in writing the arrest and implicitly the punitive measures to which his party colleague had been subjected to. It is not excluded that Nagy, once he fell into disgrace in 1948, has been shielded from the fate of Rajk, Kostov, or, to a lesser extent, Gomulka, due to the protection given by persons belonging to Stalin's entourage himself.⁴⁹ Thus, once more, if necessary, the inconsistency of the dichotomies "native communists" or patriots, moderate and reforms oriented, and "Moscow communists", foreigners and responsible for the use of Stalinist methods is demonstrated.

⁴⁷ Adrian Pop, *op. cit.*, pp. 82-83.

⁴⁸ Johanna Granville, "Imre Nagy, hesitant revolutionary", in *Cold War International History Project*, nr. 5, (28), 1995, p. 23; R.J. Crampton, *op. cit.*, p. 328.

⁴⁹ Johanna Granville, "Imre Nagy, aka «Volodya» - a dent in the martyr's halo?", in *Cold War International History Project*, nr. 5, (28), 1995, pp. 34-35; Johanna Granville, "From the archives of Warsaw and Budapest", p. 544.

Another important figure of the Hungarian revolution, this time less known, is that of Colonel Pál Maléter. In the last days of October, after being instructed by Kadar to suppress “counterrevolutionary” actions, he changes sides to the insurgents’, putting into practice an organized and, as much as possible, coordinated defense against Soviet troops. With five tanks, but having the advantage of knowing the arms’ deposits both of the army and of the security forces, the colonel has made a major contribution, if not to an impossible win against the Soviets, who temporarily withdrew the troops at the end of the month, then at least to the euphoric mood of those memorable days. “In him”, writes Erik Durschmied, “the movement found its military leader”. But soon the situation will take a dramatic turn. After the restoration of the multiparty and declaring Hungary’s neutrality, a delegation led by Maléter met with Soviet representatives to negotiate a new form of relations between the two sides. Not suspecting the trap that had been set for them, all delegation members were arrested. Until the summer of 1958, nobody heard anything about its leader, when his execution was briefly announced, together with that of Imre Nagy.⁵⁰

On the streets of Budapest the fighting continued despite permanent appeals from the authorities to restore peace and the resumption of daily activities, without which the city was literally paralyzed. However, not all inhabitants of the Hungarian capital were taking part in the hostilities. There were endless lines in front of bakeries, and being part of such a group required no less courage than when engaging in combat activities. The risks of those who waited to buy bread to turn into collateral casualties were very high. In such cases, which were not rare at all, the victim was simply moved elsewhere. No one risked to losing their place and returning home without bread.⁵¹ Here is a type of heroism that is not observed at all in literature centered on the Hungarian Revolution – that of Budapest housewives who, unlike combatants, were directly exposed to shooting, but who, without looking for cover, had as a priority the supplying of their families.⁵²

⁵⁰ Erik Durschmied, *op. cit.*, pp. 376-440; Andre Fontaine, *op. cit.*, pp. 321-322; Michael Korda, *op. cit.*, p. 156; Cristopher Andrew, Oleg Gordievski, *KGB. Istoria secretă a operațiunilor sale de la Lenin la Gorbaciov*, București: All, 1994, p. 301.

⁵¹ Alexandru Murad Mironov, “În vârtoarea «contrarevoluției»: mărturia unui membru de partid român”, in Cătănuș, Dan; Buga Vasile (coord.), *op. cit.*, pp. 471-509.

⁵² Andre Fontaine, *op. cit.*, p. 325.

Meanwhile, Nagy's attitude is increasingly converging with revolutionary demands. Across the country, in cities like Győr or Debrecen, workers organize their own councils, called ironically "«anti-Soviet Soviets»", making regional committees through which they demanded free elections, the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the neutrality of Hungary and the release from prison of Cardinal József Mindszenty, a symbol of Hungarian anti-communism, imprisoned in 1949.⁵³ More under the pressure of events than on his own initiative, Nagy will gradually put into practice these measures. He began by affirming, in October 25, when street fight amplified, the withdrawal of the Red Army from Hungary, an event that will be consumed, only in appearance, a few days later.⁵⁴

After two days, Nagy will form a new government ("People's Patriotic Front") to continue implementation of reforms and restore control of the situation.⁵⁵ But street fighting still went on, as the polarization of what could inappropriately in that context be called the Hungarian political elite. Some wanted to moderately continue the reforms, accepting that the revolution had a legitimate basis, while others cataloged the insurrection as "counterrevolutionary" calling for its defeat by any means possible.

Trying not to further inflame the atmosphere, the Szabad Nép newspaper, which was suspended briefly, but had resumed its appearance, recognized the justified grievances of the population, which in October 23 manifested for the implementation of "fair, national and democratic" reforms. However, it warned against "bad elements" who "took part in the demonstration at the first outset. They have committed armed excesses, especially after the fighting outbreak". The accusations continued. "They rose against our People's Democracy. They killed innocent people, unarmed, and prisoners", even engaging, if we were to give credence to the article, in looting and theft from shops.⁵⁶

Meanwhile, Nagy had issued a cease-fire order, which, however, had no effect. Regarding the ideological meaning of events, it was firmly against cataloging them as "counterrevolutionary". The demonstrations, even if at times had been infiltrated by "counterrevolutionary elements", were the expression of the Hungarian workers' will for democracy, dignity

⁵³ R.J. Crampton, *op. cit.*, p. 328.

⁵⁴ Paul Zinner, *op. cit.*, pp. 417-418.

⁵⁵ R.J. Crampton, *op. cit.*, p. 328.

⁵⁶ Paul Zinner, *op. cit.*, pp. 425-427.

and living conditions, if not compatible with the aspirations of the socialist ideal, then at least decent.⁵⁷

Later, after the imposition of house arrest at the villa in Snagov, Nagy's view on the subject will be radicalized. Explicitly condemning "the great power Russian chauvinism", the Hungarian politician will blame those who are stubborn enough to see the Hungarian Revolution a "counterrevolution" of ignoring Marxism itself and of trying to restore "the old Stalinist subordination in the relations between countries, peoples and Communist parties". Not the Hungarian people, but those who are incriminating it, Nagy concludes, are "the real counterrevolutionaries". And continues rhetorically: "Can a popular movement in which the working class, the former main representative of national interests, in addition to armed struggle, uses such a characteristic weapon for it, the weapon of the general strike, of passive resistance, the specific and tested weapon of workers, be seen as a counterrevolution?" In addition to workers, even the vast majority of inferior members of the HWP have actively participated to the street fighting, which makes Nagy ask himself again: "Is it counterrevolution the people's movement or struggle – or the most desperate armed struggle – in which is involved all the working class led by hundreds of thousands of communists?"⁵⁸

A few days after creating the new government, the Soviet contingents' withdrawal from Hungary is announced. It was, however, a manipulative movement made by Moscow that, sending its representatives in Budapest, sought to mislead Nagy, mainly through official statements on the absence of any interference in internal affairs of socialist states and on respecting the egalitarian bases of the relationship between them.⁵⁹ When, on October 30, he announced the restoration of the multiparty system, followed two days later by the declaration of Hungarian neutrality by waiving membership of the Warsaw Treaty Organization⁶⁰ – the Soviet plan for a second military intervention was already materialized, being put in place the morning of November 4. The Hungarian revolution would be

⁵⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 429.

⁵⁸ Imre Nagy, *Însemnări de la Snagov. Corespondență, rapoarte, convorbiri*, Iași: Polirom, 2004, p. 79.

⁵⁹ Paul Zinner, *op. cit.*, pp. 485-489.

⁶⁰ *Ibidem*, pp. 453-454, 463-464.

crushed by a huge military force, 2,000 tanks and 60,000 troops methodically eliminating a significantly lower resistance in all respects.⁶¹

The same day that Hungary declared neutrality, the First Secretary Janos Kadar announced the formation of a new communist party on the ruins of the former HWP. It was called the Hungarian United Socialist Party (HUSP), calling amidst its lines “workers, peasants, and intellectuals” to “fight for the socialist future of our people”. Making known its solidarity with other political parties (in that context, there could be no alternative), HUSP required “the overcoming of the danger of a damaging counterrevolution” and called at the aid of the government for external support⁶², knowing, of course, that this “fraternal aid” had already been set in motion. The notification of the establishment HUSP was not done in Budapest, because Kadar mysteriously quit the scene a few days before, and would not return in the Hungarian capital until November 7 to reconfigure, in Soviet parameters, the Hungarian communism.⁶³ Thus, the HUSP first secretary, after initially asserting the Hungarians grievances will now move to the other side, directly and even in a vilifying manner condemning the Hungarians’ fight for a better life, which could be built up outside the Soviet sphere of influence. “The power of truth will conquer Kadar and his comrades, as well as all those behind them and covering their treachery”, will prophetically write Nagy, while he was in captivity in Snagov.⁶⁴ However, more than three decades will pass until the desideratum of the iconic figure of the Hungarian revolution will be put into practice.

The second Soviet intervention was not caused by assertion of Hungarian neutrality. Conversely, Nagy resorted to this move because “he knew that the country was invaded”⁶⁵, probably seeking to terminate any legal basis of Moscow’s aggression, which now had no justification for its intervention under the principles of the military Treaty that the communist countries had signed in Warsaw the last year.⁶⁶ No matter how loyal to the Soviet Union, Nagy was overtaken by events and was no longer

⁶¹ Adrian Pop, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

⁶² Paul Zinner, *op. cit.*, pp. 464-467.

⁶³ Johanna Granville, “Imre Nagy, hesitant revolutionary”, p. 27.

⁶⁴ Imre Nagy, *op. cit.*, p. 120.

⁶⁵ R.J. Crampton, *op. cit.*, p. 331.

⁶⁶ Adrian Pop, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

trustworthy for Moscow. Also, he made the statement when the consequences of the Soviet decision for a new military involvement had become apparent by that the army sent in Hungary was not withdrawing, but increasing its numbers.⁶⁷

A particularly controversial aspect of the 1956 events in Hungary lies in the role played by the West. One of the main myths that persist in this regard is that of direct military support that the United States could have granted the Hungarians, helping them to get out from under the Soviet hegemony and creating a hole inside the Iron Curtain. That is not true. Washington morally supported the Hungarians' struggle, not getting involved beyond this level. The existing geopolitical situation, the Cold War, made the risk of any conflict between the superpowers to escalate uncontrollably to a nuclear catastrophe, perhaps even a third world war, which would have turned out to be highly disadvantageous to both parts.⁶⁸ President Dwight Eisenhower was explicit in this regard, publicly stating, "«Nothing did disturb the American people so much that the events in Hungary. Our heart was with the Hungarians and we did everything possible to soften their suffering. But»", Eisenhower insists, "«I must emphasize the following fact: the United States never encouraged and never will encourage defenseless population open riots against superior forces»".⁶⁹

Unfortunately, this was not true. Radio stations like Radio Free Europe and Voice of America incited demonstrators in protests and announced armed support from the West, namely from the United States. The situation went so far as "clear advice" was given to "rebels" to give "new claims" and cause "mistrust against Imre Nagy and his government".⁷⁰ The brochures later distributed on the "popular democracies" territories to "process" the revolution have fully insisted on this point.⁷¹ Henry Kissinger explained: "Although Radio Free Europe was

⁶⁷ Johanna Granville, "Imre Nagy, hesitant revolutionary", p. 27; Csaba Békés, "Could the Hungarian Revolution have succeeded in 1956? Myths, legends and illusions", in Dan Cătănuș, Vasile Buga, (coord.), *op. cit.*, p. 332.

⁶⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 322.

⁶⁹ Tibor Meray, *op. cit.*, p. 311; Michael Korda, *op. cit.*, pp. 103-104.

⁷⁰ Tibor Meray, *op. cit.*, p. 231; Adrian Pop, *op. cit.*, pp. 92-93.

⁷¹ *Rolul forțelor contrarevoluționare în evenimentele din Ungaria din luna octombrie*, vol. IV, București, Editura de stat pentru literatură politică, 1958, pp. 11-21.

a station funded by the U.S. government, it was led by an independent board of directors which did not receive formal instructions from the administration".⁷² But this does not exonerate him of the responsibility it bears in the unnecessary extension of the tragedy and of the need to pertinently obtain information before encouraging gullible and saturated with Western triumphalist propaganda Hungarians to a suicidal resistance. A later investigation established that Hungarian employees of Radio Free Europe, expressing their hopes rather than the realities, mislead the listeners, due to Radio Free Europe's leadership lack of surveillance over the content of the transmissions. Consequently, several organizational reforms will be implemented, among others journalist behaviors Code that will strictly forbid any kind of news or commentary dissemination with revolt or interethnic conflict potential.

As mentioned in the introductory section of the essay, CPSU's 20th Congress can be considered the symbolical birth moment of Europeanized Leninism. Meanwhile, as we have seen, HWP, after a brief but nevertheless intense 'new course', returned, if ever departed, to post-revolutionary Leninism. However, due to mounting popular and, *a fortiori*, Soviet pressures, the Hungarian leaders tried to 'simulate' de-Stalinization by instrumenting Nagy's image and ended up with the disintegration of the vehicle of Leninism, the party itself. Moscow could have never tolerated this outcome. Europeanized Leninism intervened against the 'bourgeois' tendencies of Hungarian society influenced by 'imperialist propaganda' and reinstated Leninism through the new HUSP. However, the ideologically immature Hungarians were offered a temporary compromise: a partially milder form of Leninism. Its analysis is, however, beyond the scope of the present essay.

A parallel crisis

International attention on the Hungarian revolution was overshadowed by a crisis that the western world simultaneously experienced, namely the event that has remained known in history as the Suez crisis. Gama Abdel Nasser, Egypt's leader at that time, decided, following an unfulfilled promise made by Washington to help modernize the canal, its nationalization. The United States decided to use this gesture

⁷² Henry Kissinger, *Diplomația*, București: Bic All, p. 486.

to punish Egypt's receptivity to Soviet advances, however not materialized in any way until then. Nationalizing the channel to gain from taxation of all vessels which were to cross it, Nasser directly touched the colonial interests of Great Britain and France. These, together with Israel, initiated a military incursion to win control of the channel. The United States will publicly admonish this action, which will therefore fail. It was the first time since World War II when the West had to deal with a resounding domestic conflict.

Moscow offered to join efforts with those of Washington to address the crisis, a proposal promptly rejected by the Eisenhower administration, which would have thus seen as damaged its international prestige.⁷³ Instead, the Soviets took advantage of the synchronization of the two conflicts to resolve as quickly and discreetly as possible the one in their geopolitical area. Moreover, Kremlin gained even a moral support through the Suez crisis: why should the Red Army activity be condemned on Hungarian territory when Britain and France proceeded exactly the same in Egypt?⁷⁴ In addition, Moscow was given the opportunity to draw Nasser towards the communist world and strengthen some relatively modest diplomatic relations until then, taking advantage of the weaknesses and inconsistencies with which the United Nations finally addressed the Suez crisis.⁷⁵ Faced, in the Security Council, with a resolute condemnation of hostility and a decision of "ceasefire", London and Paris will gradually withdraw troops from Egypt, which were, by the end of December, substituted by "the U.N. «Blue Helmets»". The fact that led to the greatest extent towards this outcome was, writes Alfred Grosse, the "brutal financial pressure of the American government", which initiated a systematic devaluation of the pound campaign, placing in circulation enormous sums of this currency on the international market.⁷⁶

⁷³ *Ibidem*, p. 474.

⁷⁴ Michael Korda, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

⁷⁵ Roger Martelli, "Râsul lui Nasser, lacrimile Budapestei", in *Le Monde Diplomatique*, nr. 7, 2006, p. 26; Brian McCauley, "Hungary and Suez, 1956: the limits of Soviet and American power", in *Journal of contemporary history*, nr. 4, 1981, pp. 777-800; Stanley Hoffman, "Sisyphus and the Avalanche: the United Nations, Egypt and Hungary", in *International Organization*, nr. 3, vol. 11, 1957, pp. 446-469.

⁷⁶ Alfred Grosser, *Occidentalii. Țările Europei și Statele Unite după război*, București: Du Style, 1999, pp. 199-200.

One of Barry Buzan and Richard Little's work⁷⁷ offers an interesting and pertinent approach to the interplay between Hungarian and Suez crises within the binary logic of the Cold War. The authors distinguish, following Buzan's older conception of weak, respectively strong states⁷⁸ – weak and strong international systems. A strong state possesses internal legitimacy, a strong civil society and behaves efficiently at the economical and international levels. A weak state represents just the opposite. Its power is coercive rather than convincing and therefore its insecurity is much more protean and therefore powerful than in the case of a strong state. Furthermore, a weak state can simultaneously be a great power (Soviet Union or contemporary Russia, to extend the argument), while a strong state (Holland, Austria) is not necessarily a great power. At the international level, however, a strong system is generally made of weak states. "Here interstate processes and system structures are powerful and penetrative."⁷⁹ Basically the same concepts of politics, ideology or economics are spread along the entire system. On the other hand, weak systems are populated by strong states. Here, the unit is more important and determines "interstate processes", unlike strong systems, where "interstate processes" have a constitutive influence over the units.

Following Buzan and Richard's line of argumentation, I propose viewing the international system that existed during the Cold war as consisting of two distinct and also interdependent subsystems: The Leninist and, respectively, the Western subsystem. The first can be referred to as a strong subsystem composed of weak states, while the last can be understood more or less as a weak subsystem composed of strong states, although strong interstate behavior were nevertheless present, especially during the Suez Crisis. In this point, one could justifiably argue that Egypt was not part of the Western subsystem and thus the Suez crisis cannot be explained using this theoretical model. However, my assumption is that, due to British and French position in the area, Egypt can be included in what can be called the distant periphery of the Western subsystem. In fact, even the nonaligned movement and the Group of 77, both composed of

⁷⁷ Barry Buzan, Richard Little, *International systems in world history. Remaking the study of international relations*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.

⁷⁸ Barry Buzan, *Popoarele, statele și teama. O agendă pentru studii de securitate internațională în epoca de după Războiul Rece*, Chișinău: Cartier, 2000, pp. 105-120.

⁷⁹ Barry Buzan, Richard Little, *op. cit.*, p. 412.

states which rejected “bloc policy”, to use an expression preferred by Romanian communists – developed patterns of behavior along the coordinates established by the two above analyzed subsystems, while nevertheless exerting upon them an influence of their own, although considerably smaller.

The comparison between the means used by each subsystem to resolve its own crisis points out the important reciprocal influences they have exchanged until that particular moment. The Soviet Union, as hegemon of the strong Leninist subsystem made of weak states, appealed to force in order to contain and dismantle the Hungarian crisis. This was nurtured relatively spontaneously by the Hungarian society but also potentiated in a great extent by the Western subsystem, which, once again, proves the weakness of unities and the strong nature of the Leninist subsystem. On the other hand, Soviet influence played a major role in triggering the Suez crisis. The United States, as hegemon of the weaker Western subsystem composed of stronger states, resorted to a behavior much similar to the Soviet one when it forced France, Great Britain and Israel to redraw from the region. On their turn, the last three states acted exactly like the Moscow and therefore offered a temporary strong image to the otherwise weak or weaker Western subsystem. During and after the Suez crisis, Moscow tried to circumscribe Egypt to its own distant periphery while Washington tried, although not so visible, to maintain it in its own distant periphery. On the long term, none of the two hegemonies was truly successful. And, once again on the long term, the influence of the Western subsystem over the Leninist one proved stronger, turning out to be one of the causes of its demise.

Aftermath and symbolical meaning

It is estimated that over 2,500 Hungarians and about 700 Soviet troops died during the Hungarian revolution. The disproportion is even greater when it comes to the number of wounded: around 20,000 in the first case, respectively, 1,500 in the second.⁸⁰ One must take into account also the disproportion between manpower and equipment of the combatants: several tens of thousands of professional soldiers, properly equipped, certainly faced fewer opponents and much less well equipped. However,

⁸⁰ Johanna Granville, *The first domino. International decision making during the Hungarian crisis of 1956*, College Station, TX: A&M University Press, 2004, p. 97, 99.

military operations have lasted considerably longer than anticipated by Marshal Ivan Konev, the commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact.⁸¹

The revolutionaries fighting against the regime revived by the “fraternal aid” of the Soviet Union, now led by First Secretary Janos Kadar, will continue sporadically until January 1957. In Budapest, armed conflicts ended earlier, in mid-November. The Hungarian Revolution was over. But its ghost will haunt the international Communism spectrum until *annus mirabilis* 1989, when the revolutions then produced in Eastern Europe had in it an essential reference and an impressive moral inspiration.

Emphasizing upon its evenimental dimension, this paper tried to present the Hungarian revolution mainly as a result of the ideological desynch that occurred within the “socialist camp” or Leninist subsystem as a direct result of Moscow’s centre ideological metamorphosis. While the Soviet Union could afford to embrace, despite the risks, a new ideological shape – Europeanized Leninism, meaning, as we have seen, a more conciliatory approach towards “imperialism” doubled by a sincere effort to redefine its self in a revolutionary Leninist way and therefore not renouncing the aim of global revolution but trustfully (and mistakenly) changing the battleground from “hard” to “soft power”⁸² – the “popular democracies” and particularly Hungary tried to hold on to post-revolutionary Leninism or “simulate” Europeanized Leninism, although HWP, unlike other of its counterparts, became seriously committed at some point to the “new course”.

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⁸¹ *Ibidem*, p. 98.

⁸² See in this regard Joseph Nye’ Jr.’s classical work *Puterea blândă. Calea către success în politica mondială*, Iași: Institutul European, 2009.

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**A SUPPLEMENT OF THINKING
YOUTH FESTIVAL AS COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA:
REFLECTIONS ON THE OLD NEW ORDER**

Ileana Nicoleta Sălcudean *

Abstract

My paper brings forth an event that took place in Romania in 1953, a youth festival that functioned as communist propaganda¹. I am trying to decode the mass media perception of the staged event, which occurred few months after Stalin's death. The festival was an event of a great magnitude, concentrating many efforts and was perceived as an applied ideology. It started with the Communist Youth Third Congress (24th – 30th of July 1953) followed by the Global Youth Festival (the first 2 weeks of August 1953). For this review, I consulted particularly two newspapers from that period in order to observe the way the festival was both built as an event and reflected as an event. The stereotypes encountered during the festival as religious counterfeit, strategies for mass-control on the one hand, and stereotypes regarding the foreigners' perception of this time and space on the other hand, opened new territories as the paper unfolded.

Key words: communist propaganda, Youth Festival, old order, new order, event and meaning

1. Introduction

Are men first caught in analyzing the events they encounter, and only afterwards they analyze themselves and to what degree they are affected by these events, or do they start with themselves and perceive the events in the light of that reflection? Are these two attempts chronological or do they occur at the same time?

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¹ The idea of this article emerged from a research I did few years ago during the master degree program regarding the Romanian Hospitality. The outcome of that research was an article: "Literature and Totalitarianism – The Warm Romanian Hospitality", *Caietele Echinox*, [Equinox Notebooks], 7/2004.

People often engage in searching the truth defined as true facts and their proper interpretation. Too often are we satisfied with facts only and belittle the freedom or the limitations that come with the interpretation of those facts.

My paper brings forth an event that took place in Romania in 1953, a youth festival that functioned as communist propaganda. I am trying to decode the mass media perception of the staged event, which occurred few months after Stalin's death. The festival was an event of a great magnitude, concentrating many efforts and was perceived as an applied ideology. It started with the *Communist Youth Third Congress* (24th – 30th of July 1953) followed by the Global Youth Festival (the first 2 weeks of August 1953). For this review, I consulted particularly two newspapers from that period in order to observe the way the festival was both built as an event and reflected as an event. The stereotypes encountered during the festival as religious counterfeit, strategies for mass-control on the one hand, and stereotypes regarding the foreigners' perception of this time and space on the other hand, opened new territories as the paper unfolded.

Human beings encounter events either directly, as they face them, or, indirectly, as mirrored in the media. Therefore, I attempt to enroll in a double approach: to measure the distance between the event and its consequences as well as the distance between the event and its reflection in mass media. Yet, nobody is bold enough to claim that he owns the absolute truth; not even an eyewitness can allege that. Still, human beings have the duty and the privilege of moral engagement translated in asking questions, getting involved, and activating their critical thinking. The event I chose proved to be the starting point that unleashed a *memory* of events joint together by threads of personal experience, media reflections and created images. The insertion of other events that took place after the Revolution is meant to show some developments of the old order into the new one. For these approaches I used media analysis of the magazines from 1953 as well as some newspapers and magazines from the '90s.

2. Events, Images and Media

I remember Miklos Peternác's words: "any photography is only a part of a bigger picture that does not exist. It gives frame only to the singular and repetitive second of the exterior world, the 'now and here',

'anywhere', 'anytime'. The viewer is 'anybody'... there is no image in general terms, what exists is only the concrete image."² As the puzzle is re-creating the image, the details are the only ones able to reanimate the memory. Often, the memory is the image itself, the only reference point.

One might try to envision the big picture, only that there is not such a thing when taking photos. In my readings about post communist countries often I had the impression that certain authors tried to recreate this big picture starting from a photo. Baudrillard would put it this way: "Do not believe that the truth remains truth if you take its veil - so, truth doesn't have a nude reality. Do not believe that realism stays real once you drive away the illusion - so, realism does not have an objective reality."³ The gap between events and their interpretation represents both our greatest frustration and our greatest pleasure. As Christine de Bihan would observe, ethics comes into picture: "It is true that we do not find the meaning in things, but, on the contrary, freedom is the element that gives value to the circumstances through our deeds."⁴

In my attempt to analyze this communist event, I would use the model that Paul Ricoeur proposes in "*Event and Meaning*"⁵ - a model in two steps. The first moment marks the occurrence of the event and that is producing a gap, a disorder in the existing order. The second moment, dependent on the first, requires the re-establishment of order and meaning; the event ought to be "recognized, honored and exalted as the pick of meaning".⁶ Thus, we are confronted with another language - the infra-language that is able to alter the margins and appeal to us through an everlasting adapting process perceived as a *vortex*. (Paul Virilio used the

² Miklos Peternác, "About Photography with no Purpose", (from his speech at the opening of the photo-compositions exhibition of Christian Schad, on the 6th of November in Budapest, in Mai Manó Ház), quoted in *Balkon* no 8, 2001, p. 10.

³ Jean Baudrillard, *Paroxitul indiferent [The Indifferent Paroxist]*, Cluj-Napoca: Idea Design&Print, colecția Panaptikon, 2001, p. 93.

⁴ Christine Le Bihan, *Marile probleme ale eticii, [The Great Issues of Ethics]*, Iași: Institutul European, 1999, p. 39.

⁵ Unless otherwise noted, all translations from Romanian to English are done by the author.

⁶ Paul Ricoeur, "Evenement et sens", in *L'évenement en perspective*, (sous la direction de Jean-Luc Petit, Paris: Editions de L'EHESS, 1991), p. 52, quoted in Ciprian Mihali, *Anarhia sensului - o fenomenologie a timpului actual [The Anarchy of Meaning - a Phenomenology of Our Actual Time]*, Cluj-Napoca: Idea Design&Print, colecția Panaptikon, 2001, p. 83.

concept of “technological space-time”).⁷ This game of interpretations is both dangerous and appealing.

3. About the Old and the New Paradigm.

I could start from Alexandru Duțu’s statement: “the clichés and the stereotypes stamp realities with labels that are easy to memorize and accept and one could assimilate them without any supplementary thinking”.⁸ This is exactly what I would like to invite you to: a “supplement of thinking”, the process of reflecting on some events, of analyzing ourselves - the events’ actors or the public, and at the same time to ponder on how these processes are mirrored in the media. Between an old world that collapsed and a new one that emerged, the shift was neither easy nor clearly cut, displaying a vast territory for transition.

The youth festival from 1953 is a fact. How do we interpret it? In our search for truth we definitely need a proper interpretation. The preparation happened for months prior to the event itself, similar to a purification ritual.⁹ How did the hosts experience the Festival? I believe we encounter at least three categories of participants: the oblivious ones who did all these sincerely – conforming, because they did not have another model or reference point¹⁰, the ones who understood everything but were forced to be the actors on the stage, and the last group of people who actually believed in this veil of reality. I dare to ask a question: can we find a privileged group out of these three categories? How was their mentality influenced?

In order to get to the atmosphere of the event, I will introduce a short vocabulary of the festival as I learnt it in the media: flags, flowers (“in Arad in the railway station, crowds with flowers, young artists welcome the guests”¹¹), doves, gifts (books, cards), Romanian songs, exchanging badges, stamps, programs running in the stations, decorations in the

⁷ Paul Virilio, *Spațiul critic [Critical Space]*, Cluj-Napoca: Idea Design&Print, colecția Panaptikon, 2001.

⁸ Alexandru Duțu, *Ideea de Europa și evoluția conștiinței europene, [The Idea of Europe and the Evolution of European Conscience]*, Bucharest: All, 1999, p. 49.

⁹ I will refer to this later when I de-code other links to communism as a state religion.

¹⁰ I think this “state religion” can be compared with the *iavaşlık* in the Ottoman Empire – a passive acceptance, a non-conscious one.

¹¹ *Scânteia Tineretului, [The Youth Spark]*, 25th of July, 1953.

streets, houses, trains, windows etc. Many articles mention Vasile Buliga, responsible for the bookshops, becoming the voice of the hospitable Romanians who, in fact, had hardly any contact with books in foreign languages before. The normal reality was quite different: "dangerous" books were never seen. But now, the festival creates another image of the *real reality*: "Our desire is that the peace messengers from all over the world that have come to the festival to find interesting books in our book shops. That is why half of our books are in foreign languages."¹²

Image is very important. "The train is coming. A pioneer¹³ is carefully arranging his tie."¹⁴ The hosts have dressed up: "György Elisabeta, after her shift in the factory, runs to the tailor to make a blue skirt and a white blouse."¹⁵ There is a special attention to image, a frenzy that combines the apollinic with the Dionysian (Nietzsche) and insinuate the returning to the Ancient mysticism.

New songs were written to honor the guests of the Festival: "Greetings to the Guests" by A. Mandelsohn, "Song for the Festival" by Matei Socor or "The Youth Hora" by Teodor Bratu.¹⁶ The meanings are double or even multiple. "Our traditional dances (*Hora, Ardeleanca*) speak to our guests about the new life of the Romanian people, about their peaceful and laborious work, their passionate desire for peace, their hospitality and joy for hosting this great celebration."¹⁷ Jakobson's¹⁸ model of communication is not relevant anymore; everything exists but the decoding.

The warmth and deep feelings in welcoming the guests are mentioned every second paragraph in the media reports. The reply of the delegation from the northern countries is worth mentioning: "in our

¹² *Ibidem*.

¹³ The pioneers were a sort of cub scouts, the main radical difference consisting in the political education that was behind all their activities.

¹⁴ *Scântea Tineretului*, [*The Youth Spark*], Sunday, 2nd of August 1953.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, Thursday, 13th of August.

¹⁷ *Scântea*, [*The Spark*], Tuesday, 28th of July 1953.

¹⁸ Roman Jakobson (1896-1982), linguist - his well-known communication model consisted of the addresser, the message, the addressee, the context, the code and the contact.

countries it is not as warm as here.”¹⁹ A certain communication code requires specific responses, conventional actions and ceremony. The emotional temperature is obvious. In all this social kinesics, the symbolism is not forgotten. The right hand is the favorable one; it is the force, the order, and the sign of work, authority, stability and trust. The left one, the unfortunate one (that stands for disorder, uncertainty, movement, searching for progress, new things, etc.) is avoided.

Texts like “as a sign of our friendship, from a Romanian”, “out of love for our Soviet friends”²⁰ appear on the gifts that are given. The pioneer Vesa Tatiana writes on the book of a young artist from Teheran: “Welcome to consolidate the peace and the friendship between the peoples of the world.”²¹ The language is a counterfeit accolade, creating a meta-narrative, but unfortunately the words lost their meaning and the world they articulate is an empty but polished space, a gap.

I am reminded of another gap as an artificial language, but this time, the reality it creates is playful and not endangering anyone. Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart marked the most ambiguous border between Western and Eastern Europe: “In 1787, Mozart was in Prague to conduct *Figaro*, and because he did not speak the language, in his fantasy he created new identities for him and his companions: ‘I am Punkitititi. My wife is Schabla Pumfa. Hofer is Rozka Pumpa. Stadler is Notschibikitschibi’....”²² The distance between this playful example and the reality of the festival is the distance between a short joke and a long propaganda.

It is so easy to be ironical when reading articles about the festival. I am wondering how much language reflects the mentality changes. The transition in words is easier to be observed, but the content is still a challenge. Together with the shift towards the new paradigm, after 1989, the patriotic imposed language was replaced by a revolutionary enthusiastic one: files, open cases, freedom, liberty, dialogue, interview, exile, rally, democracy... and the frustration of truth, the greatest frustration

¹⁹ *Scântea Tineretului*, [The Youth Spark], Sunday, 2nd of August 1953.

²⁰ *Ibidem*, Saturday, 1st of August, 1953.

²¹ *Ibidem*, 23rd of July, 1953.

²² Larry Wolff, *Inventând Europa de Est*, [Inventing Eastern Europe], București: Humanitas, 2000, pp. 148-149.

of all. That brought about the need of evaluating, re-evaluating and starting all over again as a continuous metamorphosis reflected in the media as well. I tried to observe the change that occurred in some magazines/newspapers that were issued before and also after the Revolution and distinguish the echoes of the propaganda available in the old paradigm. *Scânteia* (*The Spark*) is printed twice in the same day (22d of December, the great day of the Revolution from 1989). I found it rather fallacious to read the discourses of Ceaușescu on the 21st of December and all sorts of propaganda articles (figures about our great industry and agriculture) in the first issue on the 22d of December and then to read another issue, called *Scânteia Poporului* (*the Spark of the People*) later that day, a complete change of the paradigm it seemed. Yet, there is still difficult to distinguish clearly the line between those two types of languages: the propaganda and the new conceived message of freedom covered many times in the old language or the other way around. This can be depicted as the fortunate and painful instant in history when the event is searching for meaning or, at least for official recognition. Many other magazines and newspapers from this period, the early years after the Revolution, are exhaustively dealing with the communism, they allocate a lot of space to a number of writers who were censored during the communist regime and now are repeatedly found in the pages of any written media in Romania. Remembering the past is a good therapy: escape and healing. Many flashes back in time, many documents from the old regime are published in order to reconstitute *the real past*. Also, the search for the guilty ones, a witch-hunt is the prominent fashion that is preserved up to the present as a good mechanism of finding *the real truth, what really happened*. A political guilt syndrome is established. Politics and culture are the two binding elements. There is a certain triumphant courage in the first articles after the Revolution that looks a bit painful (*Vatra*, December 1989).

The necessity of having a superior body above, replacing the *state that decides everything* is a remainder of the old times. The crisis of the Romanian culture was a great issue and was considered to be the fault of the government and the parliament. They were responsible for solving all kinds of logistical and administration problems as well. To recuperate the *glorious past* is the hope for the future and a fashionable therapy to escape frustrations. The great transition, always searching for better reference

points, this is the new therapy! Are these therapies perceived as freedoms or as limitations in interpreting the facts? People became entirely trapped in them as in a new utopia. The new world is struggling; the new reality is claimed every day. But this changing reality is also exhausting. The human being and the event are negotiating the terms of the new world. The meaning of the new world is searched and learned again and again, it is like a foreign language. Decoding some of the main signs of communist propaganda can be a good exercise for understanding our inheritance and our present "behavior". The purpose of this paper is to help us mirror ourselves by remembering old events and understanding the new ones. In the economical world there is certain equivalence between efficiency and image, in the political world image is a language, an instrument of check and balance for both sides. Media is the mirror of the two sides, or at least of the images of the two sides. The new bridge or, more accurately, the new tunnel that is built is replacing the culture and politics bondage with the new emerging couple: politics and economy. And when there are no meanings, it only underlines the fact that communication exists. We are decorating the long waiting room of the French philosopher Deleuze between *already* and *not yet*.

4. "The Warmest Hospitality "

Romanian hospitality, Balkan hospitality – *real clichés*. What can be known about the realities behind them? If the International Youth Festival from 1953 was just a set up, how was the Romanian hospitality used from the ideological point of view?²³

The façade of the Festival promoted no boundaries. There was a new language – the peace language that is triumphant! This is serving the purpose of the great power that is the communist party, an elaborate conspiracy using the language as a vehicle that can manipulate the people's minds.²⁴ Young and old people are caught in this utopia, becoming agents of the party.

²³ Alexandru Duțu, *op. cit.*, p. 57 - "Besides political or geographical borders we can talk about the existence of the mental borders that are marked usually by the decisions of the great powers...".

²⁴ Larry Wolff, *op. cit.*, pp. 148-149.

During the festival, a volunteer reporter age 16, Train Sima, was keeping a newspaper informed.²⁵ It seems that all the people became volunteers for different jobs, but it is impossible to know whether they were *asked* to do it, or it never really happened but was just a nice presentation in the media for the enthusiasm and the inflated contribution of the participants. Voluntary actions are a good subject to tackle, especially if compared to the actual ones. I continued to believe for a long time that voluntary acts could not be authentic anymore after communism depleted it of meaning. I was wrong. Words can be a successful trap or a good excuse to prevent us from claiming the true meaning behind them and to act according to it. An imposed language can damage a people but it cannot destroy it.

An impressive grandeur was dominant at the festival: handkerchiefs in the air, orchestras, and brass bands, shaking hands, greetings, “obstinate hospitality”²⁶. I am not referring here to the traditional Romanian hospitality. I am not talking about bread and salt.²⁷ I am making the impossible attempt to illustrate what Derrida called “absolute hospitality.” Among other things, the festival from 1953 had that target. “In other words, the absolute hospitality demands that I will open my home (read country) and give not only to the stranger (with a foreign name and the social status of a foreigner etc) but also, to the absolute stranger, totally unknown, anonymous, to let him come, and to offer him a place, without asking for the same thing instead (without any obligations or pact) even without asking his name.”²⁸ René Girard talks about rituals as a way of purifying the violence. Who is the scapegoat in our event? This religiosity becomes in Schleiermacher’s terms the “pure dependency feeling”. The first thing we were told by the foreigners who were coming to Romania after 1989 had to do with how hospitable we are as a people. Was this hospitality still the traditional one?

²⁵ *Scânteia Tineretului*, [The Youth Spark], Friday, 24th of July 1953.

²⁶ The ideas and some quotations regarding the Romania Hospitality are taken from the article I wrote: “Literature and Totalitarianism – The Warm Romanian Hospitality”, *Caietele Echinox*, [Equinox Notebooks], 7/2004.

²⁷ Bread and salt are the Romanian symbols for hospitality, a traditional way of welcoming guests.

²⁸ Jacques Derrida, *Despre ospitalitate – de vorbă cu Anne Dufourmantelle*, [About Hospitality – Talking with Anne Dufourmantelle], Iași: Polirom, 1999, p. 2.

The guests perfectly fit the *typology of the stranger*, but the reverse of this hospitality could not be imagined since the Romanians did not receive passports in order to become guests themselves. It was just a stage play where the friendships among people happened quickly and with no need for translation to the point of not even knowing each other's names. The psychology student, Victor Vişinescu has a début in poetry. He is addressing a Moroccan student in this way: "My dark haired friend from Morocco/ with your sparkling coffee eyes/ I write to you though I do not know your name/ today I start off at the musical theatre/ may your song be also heard on the stage in my country/ I know you will bring your own song with you for the festival."²⁹ Carnival, sports, art exhibitions, poetry are enumerated as bounding activities. Lots of poems are dedicated to the young Koreans as our youth "has a special appreciation for their wonderful heroism"³⁰. "Friendships are easy to make."³¹ It happened in ten minutes on the platform. The railway station is the center of the world. Sigmund Freud is the first one to see human body as a language body. A grandma took her grandchild of three there *to see*. Creţu Florentina succeeded in convincing her older sister to take her to the station as well in order *to see* the Russian sportsman, Ciucarin. In another station we can see the pioneer Arsene Gheorghe. "He is caressing a white dove and is giving him to the cyclist Vadim Banvalov"³². The student Moga Elisabeta went to the Italian lady Pira Wander from Ferrara: "the little shy girl overwhelmed by a charming feeling gives the lady a book by Gorki with the note 'I am happy to welcome you in our country'. The lady is holding her and kissing her."³³ Julia Kristeva was wondering whether the analysis of the body language should be subordinated to linguistics and its categories and models.

All sorts of lofty, patriotic things are reticulated in the media: "The hard rain cannot drive away the spring from the young peoples' hearts."³⁴ The masses stood up, waving their handkerchiefs, flowers; "thousands of people welcome warmly each delegation big or small, as a manifestation of

²⁹ *Scântea*, [The Spark], Friday, 24th of July 1953.

³⁰ *Ibidem*.

³¹ *Scântea Tineretului*, [The Youth Spark], Sunday, 2nd of August 1953.

³² *Ibidem*, 1st of August, 1953.

³³ *Ibidem*.

³⁴ *Ibidem*, Sunday, 2nd of August 1953.

the friendship feelings that our people have towards the other people.”³⁵ The correct term for it would be “retrospect utopia”, a universal one this time. Alexandru Duțu calls “retrospect utopia” what happens when ethnic constructs are tried out in the national state. We have the example of the former Yugoslavia.

In the former Yugoslavia new elements were added that made the ethnic conflicts increase to the point that the war was stirred up. Nerenka Trop-Vrkić underlined that the ideas of ‘ethnic cleansing’ supported by Serbians and Croats had an utopist character, similar to the one proposed by communists. We can go on with this and we will discover that most of the totalitarian projects have as a starting point the search for ‘the lost purity’; instead of purity that comes from Christianity, the atheist world wants a material purification and builds up the political programs on vague weak terms as ‘class’, or ‘race’... The Yugoslav drama is multidimensional because history, the social and economical differences, the ideologies have their role: but the conflict is primarily political, as it is a conflict of power.³⁶

So much applause. “Friendship, peace!” Magical words. Plato said it long ago: “A story can imitate when it presents the dialogues as they are, or can be non-imitative if it presents them indirectly.”³⁷ Even the gestures can claim meaning sometimes when they imitate: “For instance, if we wanted to express ‘up’ and ‘light’, would we not raise our hands to the sky imitating the mere nature of the things? While for ‘down’ and ‘heavy’ we would not push our hands down?”³⁸

The journalists are the ones who impose the image, as it should be. The role of mass media is decisive regarding the way we assimilate things. The images are able to identify the events as the pressure for information is heavier and we are moving from photography to collage. Trying to reflect

³⁵ *Ibidem*, 1st of August, 1953.

³⁶ Nerenka Trop-Vrkić, *Vampires Untamed. National Images, Stereotypes and Myths in East Central Europe*, (Amsterdam, 1995), quoted in Alexandru Duțu, *op. cit.*, pp. 81-82.

³⁷ Plato, *Republica 394a*, quoted by Lucian Ionică, *Imaginea vizuală – Aspecte teoretice, [The Visual Image – Theoretical Aspects]*, Timișoara: Editura Marineasa, 2000, p. 27.

³⁸ Plato, *Cratylus 423a*, quoted by Lucian Ionică, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

the role of media in politics, Doru Pop writes: “Contextualizing is another major function that represents a constant interpretative pressure on the events. Including a certain topic in a certain context and associating it with other events having a negative or a positive connotation would lead to a total manipulation of the entire informational situation.”³⁹

When the borders are defined, we also define *the stranger*. The scapegoat mechanism requires irrational violence that will always find a good reason to explode.⁴⁰ The same is true for sacrifice. And the substitution ritual is emerging. The ritual directs violence, while the ritual is regulated by the sacrifice. In our case, the rituals were still able to direct violence, but the sacrifice was enormous.

We have an innocent joke in Romania about the communist period: “four out of three people were secret agents”. During the festival, that might have been totally true. The names and professions are carefully chosen.⁴¹ The speeches that were heard denied any possibility of raising question, the dialogue was aborted. The primates can learn the deaf and mute language, but they cannot ask questions; the metalinguistic function belongs only to the human beings and is linked to the capacity of asking questions. When man cannot ask anymore he is doomed.

5. Conclusion

Is my memory puzzle incomplete? Or is it all a media product, pure marketing? The photos I chose are bringing a part of reality, raising questions more than drawing conclusions. To depict events and to interpret them is to define us as human beings. Julian Barnes defines the memory: “not as a thing, but as the memory of a memory of a memory, parallel

³⁹ Doru Pop, *Mass media și politica, [Mass-Media and Politics]*, Iași: Institutul European, 2000, p. 29.

⁴⁰ René Girard, *Violența și sacralul, [Violence and the Sacred]*, București: Nemira, 1995.

⁴¹ The hero of the Socialists, the turner-student Nicolae Vasu and the stahanovist Sarköszí Amelia, the engineer Vlad Cornel from the “23rd of August Factory”, the farmer-worker Rădulescu Ion from Mironcești, the poet Dan Deșliu, who won the State Prize, the student Geta Apostol, the apprentice Gălman Eugenia, the shoe maker Schneider Ștefan from Medgidia, Cristici Elena – teacher from Belobresca, Timișoara etc - *Scânteia Tineretului, [The Youth Spark]*, 23rd of July.

mirrors.”⁴² The *first memory* (Julian Barnes) of this paper is a counterfeit memory (the festival), “an artistic improved lie”⁴³ that had the purpose of underlining the doubt about reality itself. The memories replaced reality. Then the *memory alliance/pact* (Julian Barnes) follows and it is valued as the first deal with life itself (the border of Communism with Freedom). The Youth Festival from 1953 helps us understand the communism propaganda and its mechanisms as well as the consequences that can be depicted even during the freedom period that followed.

My attempt to measure the distance between the event and its reflection in mass-media translated into an album of photography from the Youth Festival encapsulating the vocabulary, the stage, the program, the main actors and the resulting theatrical propaganda. To measure the distance between the event and its consequences is a more difficult attempt, but it is indeed a challenging one. The model proposed by Paul Ricoeur helped in depicting the first moment of the event - marked by the occurrence of the event and the gap and disorder that appeared in the existing order. This moment can be recognized during the Festival as well as it translates with the change of the existing order after the fall of the communism. The second moment, dependent on the first, requires the re-establishment of order and meaning. Regarding the Festival from 1953 that was visible during the Festival, when the counterfeit reality became for a couple of days the meaningful reference. Also, later on, when departure from communism and propaganda was possible, this moment translated into a transitory period marked by continuous efforts of re-establishing the order and finding the meaning. Analyzing such communist events help us *remember* and memory is an important side of our identity.

After the disillusionment, the innocent age ends and coming out of the orderly communist universe we are confronted with the chaos of life. From there we are responsible to create the *future memories* (Julian Barnes).

⁴² The reverse of reality takes place similarly to what happens in the engraving from the small restaurant where Martha was challenged to formulate her opinion about the Project: “an engraving was hanging on the wall where two dogs were behaving as human beings; all around them, men in dark suits were barking and yelping”. Julian Barnes, *Anglia, Anglia*, [England, England], Iași: Polirom, 2002, p. 79.

⁴³ *Ibidem*.

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4. *Scânteia* [The Spark] – 18, 24, 26,28, 29, 30 July 1953
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**IT IS DIFFERENT FROM INSIDE:
PERCEPTIONS OF NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN IDENTITY IN THE
2004 EU NEW MEMBER STATES**

Sergiu Gherghina*

Abstract

The 2004 enlargement meant the formal inclusion of 65 million citizens into the European Union. To what extent do they perceive themselves as Europeans and how did the identity attitudes transform after the accession? To answer these questions this article focuses on eight new member states and uses individual level data from the 2002-2006 Candidate Countries and Standard Eurobarometers. The results are counterintuitive and show that accession acts as a catalyst for the national identity. The European identity loses ground starting with the accession year (and follows an irreversible trend), whereas the national identity grows stronger.

Key words: identity, EU accession, public opinion

Introduction

The most recent institutional developments within the European Union (EU) – the enlargement, the Constitutional and the Lisbon Treaties – were accompanied by extensive debates about the European identity and its consequences. In its basic form, this type of identity refers to a common set of values and references that ensure the coherence and legitimacy of the European community's actions. Moreover, the citizens' loyalty towards their political community enhances their acceptance of inconvenient decisions and policies.¹ Previous research also emphasized the importance of identity or support of the European integration.² Following these

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¹ Thomas Risse and Jana Katharina Grabowski, "European Identity Formation in the Public Sphere and in Foreign Policy", *RECON Online Working Paper*, 04/2008, p. 1.

² Gary Marks and Liesbet Hooghe, "National identity and support for European integration", *WZB discussion paper SP IV 2003-202*, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für

arguments, the formation of an identity would represent a necessary condition for the formation of a European *demos* – the missing link in the EU. The on-going construction of the EU and the numerous challenges encountered in this process make the concept of identity very difficult to grasp and to conceptualize. Moreover, the vague notion of “EU” for many of its citizens combined with their relatively low levels of knowledge³ about the European level developments.

The great diversity of opinions within the literature generates at least four dimensions on which we can observe and analyze the identity formation and persistence/decline. First, although the contemporary understandings connect it with the EU institutional and political developments, the origins of European identity can be traced in the expansion of the Charlemagne’s kingdom in the 8th and 9th century.⁴ This historical perspective is complemented by the philosophical considerations, specific to the Renaissance and Enlightenment where many ideas revolved around what Europe should be.⁵ Second, from a philosophical and normative perspective, this identity should be formed on principles of solid political achievements in which the EU acts as an arena in which citizens have a word to say about their future.⁶ Third, in institutional terms, the identity rests on complex sets of rules, laws, and public policies shaping the sense of community.⁷ These do not refer solely to the political and economic developments, but include also cultural components, vital to

Sozialforschung, 2003; Bernhard Wessels, “Discontent and European Identity: Three Types of Euroscepticism”, in *Acta Politica*, vol. 42, pp. 287-306.

³ The citizens’ self-evaluation about their knowledge of the EU are quite low. Available data are in the Standard Eurobarometers.

⁴ Gerard Delanty, *Inventing Europe. Idea, Identity, Reality*, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995, pp. 16-21; Rosamond McKitterick, *Charlemagne. The Formation of European Identity*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

⁵ Enno Rudolph, “Historical manifestations of European identity and its failures”, in Furio Cerutti and Enno Rudolph (eds.) *A Soul for Europe: on the political and cultural identity of the Europeans*, Vol. 1, A Reader, Leuven: Peeters, 2001; Vivien A. Schmidt, *Democracy in Europe: the EU and National Politics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

⁶ Jurgen Habermas, “Why Europe Needs a Constitution”, in *New Left Review*, vol. 11, 2001.

⁷ Michael Bruter, *Citizens of Europe? The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, Houndmills: Pgrave Macmillan, 2005; Brigid Laffan, “The Politics of Identity and Cultural Order in Europe”, in *The Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 34, no. 1, 2008, pp. 81-120.

shape an identity in the “unity in diversity” context.⁸ Starting with the 1979 direct elections for the European Parliament and the numerous institutional reforms aiming to ensure the political and decision-making equilibrium aimed to create such a sense of community. The EU policies and institutions help the identity formation. For example, the European security and defense identity are illustrative in this respect.⁹ Finally, the subjective identity tackles the way in which the European citizens perceive the EU and how far they consider themselves as parts of this Union.¹⁰

Based on the latter public opinion approach to identity, this article investigates the extent to which such a feeling is present among the citizens from eight new member states (chosen on the bases of their commonalities) and whether the European identity is altered by the EU membership of their country. In doing so, I focus on the two years prior to accession (2002 and 2003), the accession year (2004), and two years following the accession (2005 and 2006). This symmetrical observation allows a longitudinal tracing of trends in citizens’ identification with their county or nation. This exploratory study – using individual level data from the Candidate Countries and Standard Eurobarometers¹¹ and employing descriptive statistics – brings three major contributions to the existing research. First, it complements previous studies focusing mostly on the behavior and attitudes of citizens from old member states¹² or accounting for specific cases among the new joiners. Thus, the comparison between the eight new joiners not only provides a clearer general picture of the attitudes, but also allows the identification of similarities, differences, and specificities among the analyzed countries. Second, some of the results ask for a theoretical rethinking. There is a growing orientation of the respondents towards their

⁸ Wendy Ellen Everett (ed.), *European Identity in Cinema*, Portland: Intellect, 2005; Monica Sassatelli, *Becoming Europeans. Cultural Identity and Cultural Policies*, Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.

⁹ Furio Cerutti, “Why Political Identity and Legitimacy Matter in the European Union” in Furio Cerutti and Sonia Lucarelli (eds.), *The Search for a European Identity. Values, Policies and Legitimacy of the European Union*, New York: Routledge, 2008, p. 3; Ulrich Sedelmeier, “EU Enlargement, Identity and the Analysis of European Foreign Policy. Identity Formation through Policy Practice”, in *EUI Working Papers RSC*, no. 13/2003.

¹⁰ Furio Cerutti, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

¹¹ I am grateful to GESIS ZA Eurolab Cologne for the provision of the datasets.

¹² Richard Robyn (ed.), *The Changing Face of European Identity*, New York: Routledge, 2005.

national identity immediately after the accession, mostly against the European identity. Such a shift has both theoretical and empirical explanations. Third, related with the previous point, it sets the ground for causal investigations of the detected patterns.

The first section provides the basic conceptual framework and sketches the logical setting in which the analysis takes place. It is followed by the research design where the case selection and variable operationalization are explained. The third section includes the results of the analysis, whereas the conclusions delve into the theoretical and empirical implications of the main findings.

National vs. European Identity?

Identity is politicized in the recent decades. The title of this section includes a question mark as the two levels – national and European – are strongly interconnected in the contemporary world. Influenced by the rise of nationalism in Europe (to be discussed later in this section) targeting the identity at national or regional level (e.g. Catalonia), the European identity witnessed cosmopolitan and populist conceptions at the most recent failure to adopt the EU constitution. The debates from 2005 in France and the Netherlands reveal these two different identity perspectives: the cosmopolitan project corresponds to the elite-level appealed to political citizenship and rights, whereas the national-populist project centers on social citizenship, ethnic elements, and cultural authenticity, emphasizing the economic and cultural threats of enlargement.¹³ It is beyond the goal of this article to identify which of these perceptions prevail and how the interaction between the national and European level identities takes place. Instead, I focus on four major theoretical bases that constitute the departure point and core of this analysis. First, defining “who we are” is a dynamic process, not static irrespective of the level of identity. The reasons for which

¹³ John Erik Fossum and Agustin Menendez, “The Constitution’s Gift? A Deliberative Democratic Analysis of Constitution-making in the European Union”, *Working Paper* 13/2005, Oslo: Arena Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo (March 14); Jeffrey T. Checkel and Peter J. Katzenstein, “The Politicization of European Identities” in Jeffrey T. Checkel and Peter J. Katzenstein (eds.), in *European Identity*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 11-12.

individual attach loyalty to a certain group¹⁴ are constantly evaluated and, consequently, the belonging is redefined. This happens as the sense of common identity that bound the members,¹⁵ the value and emotional significance attached to the membership¹⁶ are sometimes lost. There are instances in which the modification is rarely possible. For example, once the identity is formed on the basis of experiences accumulated within specific social culture, the bonds can hardly be broken.¹⁷ However, the key point to remember is that identity shifts can sometimes occur.

This process can happen due to the fact that identity is not primarily based on exclusion. This constitutes the second major fundament. Although Huntington's claim according to which we can define our belonging to a group as soon as we know the principles we are against¹⁸ does not completely lack empirical support, it also fails to capture the reality. In order to maintain the collective/group identity, the members have to retain particular norms, values, interests, and attitudes which provide a self-contained image shaping both their identity and relationships with other groups. However, these components are not always opposed to others and thus multiple identities are possible. The latter is the third component of my theoretical argumentation and a crucial component of the European identity. The multiple identities interact differently with each other: some are separate identities (no overlap), others are cross-cutting (overlap without integration), others are nested (integrated), and marble cake (reciprocal influences).¹⁹ Empirical evidence supports the idea that the European citizens display multiple identities. While there are continuous

¹⁴ Identity is defined as the belonging to a certain group perceived by its members as different from other groups. For details, see Martha L. Cottam, Beth Dietz-Uhler, Elena Mastors, Thomas Preston, *Introduction to Political Psychology*, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2004, pp. 45-46.

¹⁵ Anthony D. Smith, *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995.

¹⁶ Henri Tajfel, "Social Categorization, Social Identity, and Social Comparison" in Henri Tajfel (ed.), *Differentiation Between Social Groups: Studies in the Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations*, New York: Academic, 1978, pp. 63; Henri Tajfel, *Human Groups and Social Categories*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.

¹⁷ Gertjan Dijink, *National Identity and Geopolitical Visions. Maps of Pride and Pain*, London: Routledge, 1996.

¹⁸ Samuel P. Huntington, *Who are We: The Challenges to America's National Identity*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004.

¹⁹ Thomas Risse and Jana Katharina Grabowski, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

debates regarding the core common elements of such an identity (e.g. cultural vs. political vs. economic), there is a certain trend towards the European becoming a secondary identity for many citizens. The third section of this article illustrates the extent to which these results are verified in the case of eight new EU members.

Finally, following Anderson's conceptualization of the nations as "imagined communities,"²⁰ the rise of nationalism within contemporary Europe cannot be neglected. It supposes a strong linkage between the individual and the nation-state, with numerous manifestations throughout the European continent from the Eastern borders of former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia to the Southern extremes of the continent - Spain with the Basque Country) – or Western Europe (in Northern Ireland). The nationalism plays a more dominant role in those countries gaining independence in the early 90s and becoming nation-states after a few decades of forced cohabitation with other nations and accepting foreign rule. This is the case with the post-Soviet and post-Yugoslav Republics – some of them included in this analysis. Apart from these large scale conflicts and major breakthroughs in countries' history, there is an increased tendency of the citizens from diverse European countries to favor radical right parties, with nationalist emphasis. Austria, Bulgaria, France, Hungary, the Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia are a few illustrative examples where such forces gained strong representation in Parliament and even got into coalition governments in the last decade. Moreover, in the recent 2009 European elections citizens from a few countries decided to send such representatives in the EP. The main challenge faced by the European officials when facing nationalism resides in the degrees of specificity of values and norms. The European idea, animated by intellectual origins and democratic ideals, recent economic success, cultural diversity, redefined during the numerous accession waves faces the very narrow claims of nationalism oriented towards the preservation of national values and norms.

With all these considerations in mind, there is a lot of room for maneuver when trying to answer the following question: What type of

²⁰ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, London: Verso, 1983; Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, London: Verso, 1991.

identities are the citizens of the new member states²¹ likely to display? In other words, are they supposed to continue the national line, embrace a European identity or mix the two? There are logical expectations for each of the third instances. First, given their past, it is quite difficult to expect an abandonment of the national identity that they searched for many years. In this respect, the chronological formation of their identities – first the national, then the European – is one plausible argument. Second, for many years, the EU was seen in a positive light as its efforts in the region lead to democratization and market economy.²² Thus, as soon as these citizens become part of the EU, their identification may suffer modifications. Third, a mixture between the two levels of identity is also quite likely to occur as the European level assumes no exclusion of the national identity. In fact, this is an advantage of being in the EU: citizens may use multi-layered identification depending on the point of reference. For example, within Europe they use their national identity, whereas if they are in the US they can use their European identity. All these aspects are explored in the analytical section of this paper.

Research Design

Before conducting the analysis, a few words about how to study identity in empirical terms are necessary. When referring to such a complex concept, I consider the qualitative analysis as the most appropriate tool to examine and to explain the development over time and across countries. However, the quantitative analysis can prevail in the first approach to the issue – the case of this article. It is true that opinion surveys can be sometimes distorted by ill-formulated questions. However, if they are carefully dealt (e.g. probabilistic results, attention to conclusions) the quest for observable patterns of behavior reaches useful ends. Given these precautions, I use descriptive statistics to estimate how citizens from the

²¹ In this study I strictly refer to the selected countries.

²² Jon C. Pevehouse, *Democracy From Above. Regional Organizations and Democratization*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005; Frank Schimmelfennig, "Strategic Calculation and International Socialization: Membership Incentives, Party Constellations, and Sustained Compliance in Central and Eastern Europe", in *International Organizations*, vol. 59, no. 4, pp. 827–860; Sergiu Gherghina, "The Helping Hand: The Role of the EU in the Democratization of Post-Communist Europe", in *Romanian Journal of Political Science*, vol. 9, no. 3-4, 2009, pp. 65-79.

new member states perceive who they are and to observe the relationships between the two levels of identity – national and European.

I have selected eight out of the 10 new member states from 2004 on the basis of their similarities. All these countries are post-communist, initiated their political and economic transition around the same period, and initiated the accession procedures simultaneously. Thus, the selected countries are: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. The countries left aside, Cyprus and Malta, significantly differ from the selected cases and the comparison would have been hard to make.

The individual level data come from the Candidate Countries and Standard Eurobarometer surveys from 2002 to 2006 (one per year). These surveys are appropriate to map trends as they include large comparable datasets in terms of standardized questionnaires, sampling method, and data collection. For this study, all the “do not know/do not answer” responses were eliminated from the sample, being considered missing values.

The national and European identities are operationalized through proxies. For the 2002-2005 surveys, the national identity is considered the answer of the respondents to the question directly involving this issue: “Would you say you are very proud, fairly proud, not very proud or not at all proud to be [NATIONALITY - refer to citizenship]?” There are four initial response alternatives: “very proud”, “fairly proud”, “not very proud”, and “not at all proud”. The variable is recoded, the categories being merged two by two: the first two form the national identity category, whereas the last two form the category of people who lack national identity. The European identity is operationalized as the answer of the respondents to the following question: “Would you say you are very proud, fairly proud, not very proud or not at all proud to be European?” The answer categories and the recoding is similar to the national pride question. For 2006, when the battery of questions is modified and these items no longer appear in the questionnaire, I use a different proxy. The asked question is: “People may feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, to the region, to their country or to Europe. Please tell me how attached you feel to (...) our country; Europe?”. The available answers are “very attached”, “fairly attached”, “not very attached”, and “not at all

attached". These are recoded into two categories, similar to the procedure from the 2002-005 surveys.

Three problems have to be briefly discussed. First, the proxies used for the identity variable are not identical. The pride of belonging to a nation is not the same thing with feeling attached to the same nation. However, I argue that they are functional equivalents for the purpose of this study. They both catch specific attitudes towards the country and Europe. Second, for the 2006 survey there may be a contamination effect given the formulation of the question (i.e. both country and Europe are in the same item). However, this is not a major issue of concern as in the previous surveys these questions are asked consecutively although as separate items. Furthermore, the empirical results show no major discrepancies between the 2006 survey and the previous ones. Third, the used data do not come from panel surveys that allow capturing the shift in identity over time at the same individuals. Instead, I rely on data where different individuals are included in the surveys: Consequently, I cannot draw conclusions regarding the individual behavior. Whenever I refer to a change in the direction of national identity, I imply the general trend of the respondents from a specific country to position themselves more in this category than before. Once these issues are clarified, the following section presents the main results, sketching also a few possible explanations to be closely examined in further research.


The Importance of Accession

The previous argument regarding the prominence of the national over the European identity is supported by evidence for each investigated country. Graph 1 illustrates that, on the average, there are more respondents attach loyalty to their own country than to Europe.²³ Complementary to these average percentages of identity, the figures in tables 1 and 2 strengthen this first observation: there is no moment in time in which any country to have higher levels of European than of national identification. Slovenia, Poland, and Hungary are the countries with the highest level of identification with the country (more than 94% of the respondents), whereas Lithuanians are those who display the least national

²³ I consider Europe to be a functional equivalent of the EU for the citizens of these countries.

identity feelings among the examined countries (78%). At a glance, this situation is somehow counter-intuitive at least in the Latvian case where the negative attitudes against the Russian minority are well-known and thus we would expect a higher level of national identity. However, considering that in the selected sample of respondents are included also Russian nationals, the surprise component may disappear. Regarding the attitudes towards Europe, the same three countries peaking in terms of national identification fill the top positions with respect to European identity. As graph 2 illustrates, these are also the countries with most citizens who, on average, hold both identities. At the other extreme, the Lithuanians identify the least with Europe and are also those who hold the least both identities (see graph 2). This is somehow counterintuitive when looking at the post-communist of the Baltic states where nationalism and the rejection of communism went hand in hand.

Graph 1: The Average Frequency of Respondents with National and European Identity



Overall, approximately 87% of the respondents see themselves as nationals, whereas only 74% perceive themselves as Europeans.²⁴ Regarding this difference, two categories of countries can be distinguished in this general picture. On the one hand, there is a high discrepancy between the levels of national and European identities among the

²⁴ The percentages do not add up to 100% due to the overlapping identities (see later in this section).

respondents of the Baltic states. Such an observation strengthens the previously emphasized low levels of attachment to Europe. On the other hand, the rest of analyzed countries are characterized by relative small differences between the average levels of identity. Some (e.g. Hungary, Poland) reach levels of attachment to Europe that are higher than the peak of national identification in the Baltics (e.g. Latvia).

The averages are useful for an indication of the situation in the analyzed countries for the entire analyzed period. The dynamics of the loyalty – in aggregate figures - is presented in tables 1 and 2. Table 1 refers to the evolution of attachment to the country before and after the accession. Two trends are visible, both with relative oscillation: some countries revolve around similar levels of national identity, whereas others display an increase in these tendencies. Three countries display the former trend, although at different levels: Hungary and Slovakia around 94% and 96%, Slovakia with 86%. Among the countries where an increase can be noticed, the trend dramatically starts in the accession year and continues a steep ascendant trend. For example, in Estonia the national identity was until 2004 at a level of 63-64%, it suddenly increased to approximately 90% and it kept growing. A similar story is valid for Lithuania and Latvia, with less magnitude in the latter. Poland is the country with a small, but steady, increase over time, the initial level being over 90%. Summing up, the respondents in five countries display more attachment to their country starting with the accession year. Two possible explanations may be at work, both deserving further testing. On the one hand, it may be that once these countries got into the EU, the mirage of accession was over and the need for national differentiation increased. On the other hand, related to this issue, the some of the countries suffered almost immediate drawbacks in economic terms after their accession. Such processes may determine a reorientation from Europe and an emphasis on their national characteristics.

Table 1: The Evolution of the National Identity

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Czech Republic	80	77	85	90	90
Estonia	64	63	89	90	94
Hungary	93	94	93	92	97
Latvia	78	76	88	86	92
Lithuania	57	63	89	87	93
Poland	92	95	95	96	96
Slovakia	87	86	84	86	89
Slovenia	96	95	97	97	96

Note: The reported numbers are percentages.

The figures in table 2 illustrate that with one (surprising) exception – Estonia – the respondents from all the other countries to gradually abandon their attachment to Europe. In some cases, the accession moment is the critical juncture triggering a more abrupt decline. For example, Latvia drops from 72% in 2003 to 58% in 2004 and the descendant slope never readjusts. The same happens with Poland, although at a higher level, which decreases from 94% in 2003 to 87% in 2004. However, for most of the countries, the year following the accession appears to be critical. In this respect, Hungary is a good example where the attachment to Europe dropped to 81%, with 9% less than the previous year or Lithuania where the decrease was with 10% (from 59% to 49%). However, the difference between citizens' attitudes in the two countries is that Hungarians registered an increase the following year, whereas the Lithuanians followed the descendent trend. Thus, the former provides partial evidence for the previous argument according to which the relationship with Europe may have been formed on the basis of the domestic ups and downs. The same situation is in Poland, country with many internal problems in the aftermath of accession, but which improved its domestic situation once with the 2005 elections. However, this is a paradoxical case given the orientation of the political forces running Poland starting 2005, the Kaczynsky brothers, president and prime-minister of the country, promoting an anti-European message. The increase and the high level of attachment to Europe reflect no direct relationship between the message of the leaders and the attitudes of the citizens.

Table 2: The Evolution of the European Identity

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Czech Republic	81	80	79	79	74
Estonia	59	60	58	60	38
Hungary	94	92	90	81	84
Latvia	75	72	58	55	51
Lithuania	59	62	59	49	43
Poland	92	94	87	82	86
Slovakia	93	87	81	82	62
Slovenia	92	90	86	81	62

Note: The reported numbers are percentages.

So far, two trends appear to dominate citizens' attitudes in the new member states with respect to their levels of identification: an increase of their national identification and a decrease of their European identification starting around the accession moment. The following paragraphs approach the issue from the perspective of multiple identities exploring the longitudinal evolution. The average percentages presented in graph 2 strengthen the previous findings according to which the citizens of the Baltics are the most reluctant in attaching loyalty to their country and to Europe. Czechs and Slovaks have similar levels with respect to double identity, whereas the performers are Hungary and Poland with averages above 85%.

Graph 2: The Averages of Respondents Holding both Identities




Table 3 reflects the longitudinal perspective of the double identity. Over the entire period, the picture is rather puzzling, with most countries presenting oscillations. The exceptions are Latvia and Slovenia with a constant decrease from 2002 onwards. Poland can be considered a partial exception as starting with 2003 the percentage of people holding these two identities decreased from 90% to 84% in 2006. However, if we consider the accession year as a cutoff point, the situation is much clearer. Six out of the eight countries – the exceptions re the Czech Republic and Slovakia – are characterized by loses of double identity. Almost all those falling within the latter category (the exception is Hungary) have a linear descending slope with Latvia reaching the lowest level of 36% in 2006. With respect to the double identity, the accession moment appears to be again a crucial moment when certain trends are visible. The statistical analysis indicates that the lower percentages are due to the abandonment of the European identity. However, these issues will become clearer as soon as tables 4 and 5 are discussed.

Table 3: The Evolution of People Holding both Identities

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Czech Republic	75	74	73	75	70
Estonia	52	54	57	57	36
Hungary	91	90	87	79	83
Latvia	67	65	56	52	50
Lithuania	49	54	57	47	41
Poland	88	90	84	80	84
Slovakia	85	82	74	76	61
Slovenia	90	89	85	80	61

Note: The reported percentages are calculated from the total of respondents in each country.

All these results indicate a priority of the national over the European identity. Moreover, two opposite trends are visible starting with the EU accession year: the level of national identity increases, whereas that of European and double identity decreases. Table 4 examines the direct relationship between these variables at individual level, by reporting the percentage of respondents who attach loyalty to their country and reject the European identity. The percentage of respondents displaying such

attitudes gradually increases in all the examined countries, with 2004 being again a crucial moment. The direction of this process is irreversible: there is no country in which the percentage reached during the accession period to be smaller than in the years to follow. The reasons to abandon the European identity around accession deserve further scrutiny. At this moment, without accounting for any explanatory variable any possible explanation resembles speculations. What clearly derives from this longitudinal examination is that more citizens from the new EU member states orient exclusively towards national identity after they join the Union. Good examples in this respect are Estonia and Lithuania, countries with 56% and 51% of their citizens rejecting the European identity while feeling proud to be nationals of their countries. In Estonia such results are not surprising, being the country with the strongest manifestation of Euroscepticism among the political parties. It is the only new member state with a single-issue anti-EU political party (Estonian Future Party) that has similar messages with the Republican Party and the Christian People's Party.²⁵ In relative terms Slovakia has the most spectacular development from 3% in 2002 to 27% in 2006. Such attitudes were clearly reflected in the support provided to political parties in their national elections. Since its 1995 application to join the EU, Slovakia had in government parties characterized by soft Euroscepticism²⁶. However, in 2006 the Slovak National Party, with clear nationalist tendencies, gained almost 12% of the votes and joined the coalition government. At the same time, the fact that less Poles are oriented in 2006 exclusively towards their national identity than in 2005 confirms the previous argument about the partial disconnection between their behavior at polls, elite messages, and citizens' attitudes.

²⁵ Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak, "Parties, Positions and Europe: Euroscepticism in the EU Candidate States of Central and Eastern Europe", in *SEI Working Paper No. 46*, Sussex, 2001, p. 17.

²⁶ Karen Henderson, "Euroscepticism or Europhobia: Opposition attitudes to the EU in the Slovak Republic, in *SEI Working Paper No. 50*, 2001, p. 14.

Table 4: Percentage of people with National and no European Identity

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Czech Republic	6	6	12	15	19
Estonia	12	10	32	32	56
Hungary	3	5	6	14	15
Latvia	11	12	31	34	41
Lithuania	9	10	32	40	51
Poland	5	5	11	16	13
Slovakia	3	4	10	11	27
Slovenia	6	7	11	18	34

Note: The reported percentages are calculated from the total of respondents in each country.

Table 5 is complementary to the previous and reflects the percentages of people holding solely the European identity. The numbers tell a similar story with the European hardcore supporters decreasing over time, especially after the accession moment. The Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, and Slovenia (at a minimum level, it is the country with the smallest percentage of citizens exclusively oriented towards Europe) provide rather stable attitudes over the five examined years, a decline being still visible. Lithuania and Slovakia are the countries with a more dramatic evolution in this respect, initial levels of 11% and 9% dropped to 2% and 1% by 2006. returning to the particular case of Estonia, the exclusive attachment to Europe during the accession year is smaller than in the years to follow.

Table 5: Percentage of people with European and no National Identity

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Czech Republic	5	7	5	5	4
Estonia	7	7	1	2	2
Hungary	3	3	3	3	2
Latvia	8	8	2	3	2
Lithuania	11	8	3	2	2
Poland	5	3	3	3	2
Slovakia	9	6	7	5	1
Slovenia	2	2	1	1	1

Note: The reported percentages are calculated from the total of respondents in each country.

Conclusions

Three major conclusions can be derived from this exploratory analysis. First, the identity of citizens from the new EU member states is altered starting with the accession year. The attachment to Europe decreases and simultaneously the orientation towards national identity is stronger. There are also less citizens holding double identity. Without being able to imply a causal mechanism in the absence of other explanatory variables, the observations represent valuable points of departure for further studies. Second, the trend initiated during accession is clearer than in its eve and appears to be irreversible. More specific, while the identity oscillates before 2004, it has a linear development afterwards. This observation is valid independent from the initial levels of identity (in 2002). Third, the results provide bases to distinguish similarities and difference between countries. Thus, the citizens of the Baltic states have similar reluctant attitudes towards the EU marked by severe drops after 2004. The Central European countries cluster two by two on different dimensions, no clear distributional pattern being visible. In terms of differences, the Baltics are characterized by more visible and stable patterns, whereas the rest are moderate and oscillatory.

The main theoretical implication of the study is that the accession can be considered a critical juncture in terms of identity. The self-identification of the citizens as Europeans decreases as soon as the countries join the EU. Following this logic, it will be difficult for the EU to enhance the notion of European citizenship as long as individuals feel less attracted by the EU once they are inside. The latter raises serious problems for normative thinkers: what can be the norms and values that drive the individuals after becoming Europeans? Furthermore, the analysis drives us back to the Anderson's notion of "imagined communities" and sheds doubt on the understanding of this concept with respect to the European dimension after accession. Although the European identity should be refined during the pre-accession process, it is expected to reach its peak once the countries are inside. Otherwise, the entire European construction is highly problematic.

In empirical terms, this article provides two new pieces of evidence. On the one hand, it reveals that in some cases (e.g. Poland) citizens do not translate their opinions in political preferences. It is a lack of

synchronization between voting preferences, elite messages and attitudes of the citizens. However, in other instances (e.g. Slovakia) the political support of nationalists in 2006 can rely on the abandonment of orientations towards the European community – an issue that still needs testing. On the other hand, the results show that the exposure to symbols, institutions, and actions of the EU prior to accession were more favorable to the European identity than afterwards. The shifting identities should be intensively researched as the sources of identification are scarcely investigated until now. Although this article does not provide an-in-depth analysis of such causes, it opens the floor for a diversity of further studies.

A priority can be the individual level testing of alternative explanations regarding the formation, persistence, and shift of identities. Additionally, a qualitative assessment of the identity components is necessary. The descriptive quantitative analysis presented in this text investigated a general trend without delving into explanations and possible causes for which such a pattern is observed. By departing from these trajectories and distinguishing between identity components (e.g. social, cultural, political or economic), further research can explain the cross-national and longitudinal variation. Thus, it can solve the puzzles of how identification prevails in certain contexts and how it diminishes in other instances. At the same time, the qualitative proceedings will disentangle the complex web existing between the national and the European identities. In both scenarios, such a research would fill an existing gap, slightly narrowed by the content of this article.

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THE ROMANIAN CIRCULATORY LABOUR MIGRATION TO ITALY - *OUT OF NECESSITY OR OUT OF CHOICE?*

Romana Cramarenco Cucuruzan*

Abstract

For the last decade, the Romanian circulatory labour migration became a widespread phenomenon. Italy and Spain represent the first destination countries for Romanians seeking better job and life opportunities, in their attempt to overcome the difficulties back home. The present article focuses on the dynamics of the phenomenon in the two mentioned destinations, with a special focus on Italy, where the Romanian migrants register the highest number among migrant population (according to ISTAT Caritas Italia data). We also added some insights on several migration experiences, based on a micro study carried out in May, 2010.

Keywords: labour migration, migration networks, migrant strategies

The migration out of choice and out of necessity in the context of migration - development nexus

Several important studies were carried out in order to analyse the migration–development nexus.¹ The most relevant contributions belong to Papademetriou & Martin², Skeldon³, Nyberg–Sorensen et al⁴ and Wets⁵ for

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¹ See a more detailed *literature review* in Romana Cucuruzan, “The labour migration - development nexus. The case of two rural communities in Romania”, in *Romanian Journal of Population Studies*, Vol. 2, 2008, p. 32

² Papademetriou D. G., P. Martin, *The Unsettled Relationship: Labor Migration and Economic Development*, Greenwood Publishing Group, 2001.

³ Ronald Skeldon, *More than remittances: other aspects of the relationship between migration and development*, UN - Population Division, 2004.

⁴ Nina Nyberg-Sorensen et al, “The migration - development nexus. Evidence and policy options”, in *International Migration*, 2002, pp. 49-73.

⁵ Johan Wets, *The Value of the Migration and Development Nexus, and Migration Out of Choice versus Out of Necessity*, 2007

[http://smooz.gfmd_civil_society.org/gfmd/files/sessions_6.pdf], February 2008

the *global approach*, while the works of Zimmermann⁶ or Andrade-Eekhoff⁷ focused on the *European perspective* and *non-European perspective*. Other contributions analysed the *migration outflows*, different forms of *return migration and remittances' channels*⁸ or the specific features of the *remittances' impact on the source communities*⁹). While identifying various forms of migration, we may use different criteria. One refers to the type of migration decision, which differentiates between two main forms of migration: migration *out of choice* (migrants searching for better economic and social opportunities or migrants interested in family reunification) and migration *out of necessity* or *forced migration* (we refer mainly, but not exclusively to asylum seekers and refugees trying to escape political oppression or other hardships in their home country). This classical approach was widely used while differentiating between these forms of migration, but the specific case studies revealed that the delimitation sometimes became fuzzy in real migration flows and practices. In other words, we may find migrants willing to escape poverty, declaring that their choice to leave the home country was a necessity and not at all a matter of choice, or migrants seeking asylum status declaring that leaving the country of origin was their choice not to accept political oppression, etc.¹⁰ The migration–development nexus asks for comprehensive analysis, and identifying the peculiarities of migration *out of choice* and migration *out of necessity* might be helpful. Therefore, we carried out a qualitative research in Italy, focusing on Romanian migrants, in order to identify their initial decision to migrate, the

⁶ Klaus Zimmermann, *Migration and economic development*, Springer – Verlaag, Population Economic Series, 1997.

⁷ Katharine Andrade-Eekhoff, “Migration and Development in El Salvador: Ideals Versus Reality” , *Migration Information*, 2006

[<http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/print.cfm?ID=387>], February 2008.

⁸ Philip Martin, *The trade, migration and development nexus*, 2006

[<http://www.dallasfed.org/news/research/2006/06migr/martin.pdf>], November 2008.

⁹ Rannveig Agunias, “Remittances and development: trends, impacts and policy options”, *Migration Policy Institute Papers*, 2006

[http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/mig_dev_lit_review_091406.pdf], November 2008.

¹⁰ A more detailed analysis may be found in Johan Wets, *The Value of the Migration and Development Nexus, and Migration Out of Choice versus Out of Necessity*, 2007

[http://smooz.gfmd_civil_society.org/gfmd/files/sessions_6.pdf], February 2008,

various strategies to enter the labour market, and the *thin red line* between migration *out of choice* and migration *out of necessity*.

The Romanian labour migration

The Romanian migration phenomenon has changed over time in terms of flows and stocks, but also in terms of forms of movement, as a response to the “push and pull” factors. Before 1989, the Romanian out-migration was strictly controlled, the internal mobility triggered by the industrialization process (rural – urban) representing the main form of movement. The Iron Curtain ceased to represent not only a metaphor, but revealed a tough, tangible reality, denying the Romanian citizens the right to hold a passport.

After the collapse of communism, the Romanian migration has changed quantitatively, as well as in qualitative terms. In the first part of the 90's, the ethnic migration continued to register a high level, along with the migration for family reunification, while the number of asylum seekers kept on fluctuating. In the late '90s, we witness a new form of short term, *back and forth* labour migration (sometimes covered by tourist visas or political asylum applications), while the other forms of migration started to become less and less visible.

Sandu *et al* (2006) considers that, after 1989, we might find 3 distinct Romanian migrants' profile:

Table 1: The stages of the Romanian labour migration (1990-2006)

Period	Annual emigration rate	Destination countries	Migrant profile
1990-1995	3‰	Israel, Turkey, Italy, Hungary, Germany	Young men, from the urban area, with general education, leaving from Moldavia, Muntenia and Transylvania

			(equal representation)
1996-2001	7‰	Spain, USA, Canada	Young men and women equally represented, urban and rural areas equally represented. The migrants leave mainly from Moldavia.
2001-2006	28‰	Italy, Spain, Germany, Israel, Hungary	

Source: Sandu *et al* (2006), pp. 13-40.

The data above reveals the dynamics of the labour migration phenomenon: the emigration rate increased significantly, while the destination countries targeted by the Romanian economic migrants changed. The migrant profile also changed in the last 16 years, with women starting to gain visibility in the migration flows, equalising the proportion of men. Mainly after 2001, the urban area remained an important area of origin, while the rural areas were catching up steadily.¹¹

The present statistical methods used by the *Romanian National Institute of Statistics*¹² fail in measuring the labour migration phenomenon, especially the short term, temporary forms of migration. One individual can experience several migration episodes, both under legal and illegal conditions, hampering the efforts to provide accurate statistics in terms of migration flows and stocks¹³. Therefore, the Romanian labour migration might be considered a massive phenomenon, changing at an accelerating pace.

¹¹ The economic migrants originating from rural areas represent a special target group investigated by Romanian sociologists and economists. Among the most relevant studies, we mention: Dumitru *et al*, 2004; Sandu, 2002; Bleahu, 2004, Ciobanu, 2004; Cucuruzan, 2009.

¹² www.insse.ro.

¹³ Romana Cucuruzan, *op. cit.*, p. 32

In 2005, an IOM study based on a survey on 1,384 households stated that 15% of the Romanians had worked, at least once, abroad and 9% of the investigated households had at least one member working at the time abroad. More recent studies¹⁴ reveal that, since 1990, almost 10% of the total adult population of Romania was involved in labour migration (counting for almost 30% of the total employed population of Romania) and 1/3 of the households and 1/5 of the families had at least one member working abroad.

In order to overcome the limits of the national statistics system, we may also confront the estimations based on representative samples with the data provided by the destination countries, *i.e.* Italy and Spain, the main countries targeted by the Romanian economic migrants.

Romanian economic migrants in Italy and Spain – an insight

After 2002, the presence of the Romanian migrants in EU member states has increased annually, an important change being registered from 2007 (1.7 million, out of a total of 31 millions migrants) to 2009 (almost 2.3 millions, out of a total of 32 millions migrants), according to the data provided by Caritas Italia.¹⁵ Thus, the Romanians became the second largest migrant group in EU, after the Turks, surpassing the Poles and the Albanians.

Italy became the main destination country, with an annual flow of 100.000 new comers, reaching a total number of 796.477 migrants in 2008, and 953.000 at the end of 2009 (according to the data provided by the *Italian Institute of Statistics* - www.istat.it). Other data provided by Caritas Italia in *Dossier Statistico Immigrazione* show that more than 1.100.000 Romanian migrants are working and living in Italy (it is also important to mention that the number could be even higher, due to Caritas estimations that around 12% weren't registered yet, at the time of the report!). The *Bossi* –

¹⁴ Dumitru Sandu et al, *Locuirea temporară în străinătate. Migrația economică a românilor: 1990-2006*, București: Fundația pentru o Societate Deschisă, 2006; UN, *NHDR Report Romania*, 2007

[<http://www.undp.ro/download/files/publications/NHDR%202007%20RO.pdf>], April, 2009; ANBCC– *Cu bine, din Europa! Studiu despre migrația românilor în UE*, 2007

[www.robcc.ro/Publicatii], January 2009.

¹⁵ Caritas Italia, *I Romeni in Italia – tra rifiuto e accoglienza*, 2010, [www.caritasitaliana.it], May 2010.

Fini Regularization Law supported the migrants to escape their illegal status, thus Italy started to register higher inflows. As far as the gender distribution is concerned, women outnumber men, registering more than 53% of the total migrant population.

The geographical distribution of the Romanian migrants in Italy is presented in the following table:

Tabel 2: Romanian migrants in Italian regions (2008)

Region	Residents	Province	Residents
Lazio	158.000	Roma	122.000
Piemonte	121.000	Torino	86.000
Lombardia	118.000	Milano	41.000
Veneto	91.000	Padova	25.000
Toscana	64.000	Bologna	15.000
Emilia Romagna	54.000	Firenze	15.000

Source: Caritas Italia, *I Romeni in Italia – tra rifiuto e accoglienza*, 2010, p. 2 [www.caritasitaliana.it], May 2010

The data shows that we can find Romanian migrants in the entire Italy, from north to south. The highest concentration is registered in the Lazio Region, with the capital Rome as the most important destination city. This is a common situation; the capital of any Western country attracts the greatest number of migrants searching for job opportunities and temporary accommodation (the centre-periphery theory is useful for explaining the migration flows).

Romanian migrants in Italy count for $\frac{1}{4}$ of the total migrant labour force and $\frac{1}{10}$ of the total labour force in Italy. Their contribution as tax payers cannot be ignored: almost 3 billions euro in 2009. What might be relevant is the Romanian migrants' interest for starting a business in Italy – 28.000 companies registered in Italy in 2009, especially operating in the construction sector. The first position in terms of entrepreneurial activity is represented by the Moroccans.

As far as the situation of Romanian migrants in Spain is concerned, the data for 2008 shows the following:




Figure 1: Foreign population by countries of origin (2008)

Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE) [<http://www.ine.es>]

Thus, we notice the presence of the Romanian migrants, who, in the last years, became one of the strongest ethnic groups, progressively outnumbering the Moroccans. Romanians are the EU's citizens most largely represented, their number having continuously grown since the last decade of the '90s, more visible after 2002 (the removal of the visa system in the Schengen agreement).

The data provided by the *Spanish Ministry of Labour and Immigration* reveals the following dynamics of the Romanian migration to Spain:




Figure 2: The evolution of the number of Romanians registered in the Padrones Municipales (1998-2008)

Source: *Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigracion*

[<http://extranjeros.mtin.es/es/InformacionEstadistica/Anuarios/Anuario2008.html>]

The graph above shows a continuous increase of the number of Romanians in Spain, especially after 2005. The most important Romanian communities in Spain can be found in Madrid (140.333 persons)¹⁶, Com. Valenciana (87.156 persons), Andalucia (78.528 persons), Cataluna (74.659 persons) and Castilla-La Mancha (65.099 persons).¹⁷

While in the first ten years after the collapse of communism, the labour migration of Romanians to Italy and Spain had a temporary character, nowadays we witness a tendency to long term stay, and even a clear intention not to return to Romania (a recent study¹⁸ shows that more than 60% of the Romanian migrants in Italy intend to remain, and less than 10% are still balancing between returning to Romania or staying in Italy).

¹⁶ The same preference for capital and big cities, like in Italy.

¹⁷ INE database for 2008.

¹⁸ Andreea Raluca Torre, "Socio-professional integration. The Romanian community's point of view", in Caritas Italia, *I Romeni in Italia – tra rifiuto e accoglienza*, 2010.

The ones willing to leave Italy intend to relocate to UK or Germany). The Romanian migrants chose these destinations due to the labour market opportunities, both formal and informal, to the cultural closeness and the relatively cheap transportation costs.

Despite the economic crisis that strongly affected the migrants' jobs, returning to the country of origin is still not an option, the financial support for unemployment received in Spain or Italy granting the Romanian migrants the possibility to remain in the countries of destination while keeping on searching new job opportunities. The Romanian migrants might probably return to migration *out of necessity*, after a prosperous period that made their migration experience a subject of personal choice.

Due to the lack of studies investigating the impact of the economic crisis on the Romanian migration, we cannot accurately describe the changes induced by the economic turbulence on migrants' plans to relocate or remain in their country of destination. Nevertheless, the data reveals that the remittances flows were 30% less than in 2008, so probably some of the migrants returned or they started to earn and remit less (previous studies couldn't identify a strong correlation between return migration and decrease of remittances). The economic instability in the countries of destination seems not to panic the Romanian migrants. Moreover, the lack of opportunities back home remains an important push factor. Most of the time, the migrants choose between facing unemployment in areas of destination and relocating to other areas in the country. Sometimes they end up choosing another country of destination, *out of necessity*.

For a better understanding of the labour migration phenomenon, *meso* and *micro* studies are needed, investigating the impact of the migration experience upon migrants' lives and their families, as well as the socio-economic impact on both sending and receiving communities.

The short term migration has become a *life strategy*, and sometimes, a *survival strategy*, adopted especially by the rural households, in order to escape poverty, to diversify the income sources. The subsistence agriculture is still unable to provide a decent living for most of them¹⁹. The *out-migration* has been used as a buffer by the households facing financial

¹⁹ Romana Cucuruzan, *op. cit.*, pp. 24-44.

difficulties, relying on the migrants' altruism²⁰. Therefore, during the 90's we may talk about migration *out of necessity*, the economic migrants risking a lot because of their illegal status. After 2002, the Romanian labour migration gained a more permanent status, the first wave of migrants developing efficient social networks offering support to the new comers. The new forms of migration, like family reunification, emerged and migration became an alternative to the life back home, not only an act of despair.

Romanian migrants in Pisa, Italy

In May 2010, we carried out a *micro* exploratory study in Pisa, Italy, where Romanians counted for more than 55% of the total foreign population (in 2008, according to ISTAT). Pisa became an important destination city due to the relocation of Romanian migrants from Naples. We used the snowball technique in order to reach our respondents, trying to preserve the gender equality. The main difficulties we faced in the field study resulted from the migrants' reluctance to reveal details on their *personal journey* to Italy, especially the ones with previous illegal status.

The qualitative data collected through semi-structured interviews confirm the hypotheses that Romanian migrants prefer to remain in the country of destination, despite the economic instability which is still perceived as being a temporary one. Starting with the main reasons for leaving Romania, we found that the economic ones prevail (the *necessity* to escape from poverty), while family reunification comes second:

"I had a lousy job in Romania, I couldn't cover the rent. I left, never looking back." *woman, age 28*

"I had no job at home. My parents couldn't support me and my brothers. So I left and now I can help them with money and goods from Italy." *man, age 22*

²⁰ In the sense developed by Stark's *new economics of migration theory*; Nevertheless, a field study carried out in 2 rural areas in Romania revealed the presence of an *inverted* form of altruism - new form of support that the family back home is offering for the migrant's benefit (see, Cucuruzan, *op. cit.*).

"I graduated high school and I couldn't find anything with a decent salary. Firstly, I worked in Naples in constructions and now in Pisa, in a bakery."
man, age 31

"I worked a lot in Romania, but the money weren't enough. I came here, started to work, than I married. I and my husband opened a small business in Florence. I cannot be more pleased with my present life!" *woman, age 37*

Most of the respondents stated that they came alone, without any labour contract and started to search for any kind of job at the beginning – the *speculative* or "try your luck" method. They changed several jobs in search for more stable and better paid ones. This might be explained by the fact that migration networks developed especially after 2000.

"I didn't care that I had to work as a waitress. I wanted to earn money to continue my studies in Romania." *woman, age 21*

"Dear God, I made all kinds of jobs... But now I earn enough money to live here and to send to my mother. I help her, every month I send money to her. She is sick and her pension is nothing." *man, age 31*

Some of the respondents shared several sad episodes, where they had to accept all kinds of work, hoping for an improvement in the near future. Some of the migrants used the social networks to enter the Italian labour market, looking for financial and non-financial support:

"I arrived in Italy with some money, but no idea how to find a job. A cousin of mine was already working here, illegally, and he talked to his employer to take me at least for some months." *man, age 27*

"I first went to Napoli, where some neighbours from Maramures were leaving in a house with people from Serbia and other countries. It was like an *open house*, everybody knew about it – you paid some euros, not much, sometimes the owner let you stay without paying until you got a job. But, the others helped me with the money and everything. We were like

brothers, but after a while we moved, some of us to Rome. I came to Pisa and remained here." *man, age 22*

As far as the return is concerned, most of the respondents rejected the idea of coming back to Romania, the lack of opportunities being the main reason for their choice:

"It is not easy here. I work as a manual worker, it is not much, but at home I have nothing." *man, age 31*

"To return? I have my family with me, nobody wants to leave Italy. For what?" *woman, age 28*

"I know a lot of people lost their jobs in Romania. I prefer to be unemployed here, at least I have a hope that I can find something to work here." *man, age 47*

"Me and my husband were in Spain, but I lost a good job there. I came to Italy because I knew that I had no chance to find a job in Romania." *woman, age 44*

This attitude towards return might be interpreted as a normal one in the present economic context. In the international migration system, Romania remains mainly a country of origin, the economic and political instability pushing Romanians to other destinations.

Concluding remarks

The Romanian labour migration has changed in the last 20 years, starting as a temporary movement and, then, becoming permanent, especially after 2005. We may probably consider the '70s slogan "there is nothing more permanent than the temporary guest workers" valid for the economic migration of the Romanians, searching for integration in the main countries of destination: Italy and Spain. The available data cannot support us in stating that no important return migration flows will occur, but the probability for other relocations of economic migrants within EU remains.

From a migration *out of necessity*, the Romanian migrants enjoyed the benefits of migration as *an alternative*. Still, the economic crisis affected mainly the migrants' jobs, so, they seem to opt for continuing their migration journey *out of necessity*...

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ERASMUS – EUROPEAN EDUCATIONAL MOBILITY PROGRAM AND CROSS-CULTURAL SHARED EXPERIENCE AND IDENTITY

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Abstract

The present article aims to interlink the following aspects related to cross-cultural European experiences: the educational mobility, as a subtype of modern physical and cultural flexibility, the cosmopolitan identity and values, to whom this type of mobility can give birth to, in similar circumstances all over the continent, and the way these are shared by individuals. The paper draws on the empirical research performed in an intercultural community, amongst Erasmus students incoming to Bordeaux, France, during the former academic year.

Key words: Erasmus program, cross-cultural European experience, mobility, identity, cosmopolitanism

Introduction

Mobility nowadays has become a central focus of social research, its interests varying from the almost mythic figure of the transnational migrant,¹ to the subject of tourism² and last, but not least, to the educational mobility, as a growing European phenomenon with its extending implications at the social and cultural individual level, as well as on the continental labor market.

The impact of the Erasmus educational mobility program cannot be found in its statistical descriptions, even though they may be impressive: by the end of the academic year 2009/2010, 2,2 million students coming from more than 4000 higher education institutions, from the 33

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¹ Anghel Remus Gabriel, Horvath Istvan (eds.), *Sociologia migrației. Teorii și studii de caz românești*, Iași: Polirom, 2009.

² Raluca Nagy, „Articulații între turism și migrație în Maramureș”, in Anghel Remus Gabriel, Horvath Istvan (eds.), *ibidem*, pp.231-248.

participating countries, including all the members of the EU and the following countries: Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Turkey, Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, have experienced this mobility.³ Therefore, the educational mobility's consequences need to be sought from another perspective, an anthropological one, that aims to find out what does this cross-cultural European experience presuppose at the quotidian level of individuals' lives. In order to achieve this latter objective of research, it is imperious to take into consideration the variety of cultural contexts in which the program takes place, but as well the macro conditions it creates for the participants, all over the continent: a plunge into the unknown, with no familiar cultural or social landmarks and, at the same time, fewer normative constraints etc.⁴ Of course, let us not forget that at the individuals' level, several variables can influence one's trajectory - language, interests, projects, first contacts, residence's characteristics etc. But what needs to be underlined in this article is the opportunity that comes with the Erasmus program to experience pretty much the same cross-cultural European experience in different spaces all over the continent at the same time, or even in different generations.

The ethnographic data that brings forward new questions and hypothesis about European educational mobility and its influence at the individual and small collectivities' level is drawn from a field research I have conducted on the intercultural community of the Erasmus students, during the previous academic year, 2009/2010, in Bordeaux, France. The details of the methodology and the context of the research are presented in the next section, along with the results of the few studies conducted by other authors on similar subject matters. Following this section, the three

³ European Commission, Education and Training, [http://ec.europa.eu/education/erasmus/doc1709_en.htm], 29 September 2010.

⁴ Fred Dervin, *The Erasmus experience: halcyon days of hypermodernity*, 2007, [<http://users.utu.fi/freder/general.pdf>], 15 January 2009; Melissa Härtel, « *Erasmus* » ou la construction d'un espace culturel européen, Geneva: Institut européen de l'Université de Genève, 2007; Immacolata Fiorella De Nicola, *Antropologia dell'Erasmus. Partire studenti, vivere sballati, tornare uomini*, unpublished Master's thesis, 2005, [<http://www.sodeni.it/erasmus/introduzione.html>], 16 January 2009; de Federico, de la Rúa Ainhoa, *Amitiés européennes. Les réseaux transnationaux des étudiants Erasmus*, in *Informations sociales*, n° 147, 2008, [<http://www.cairn.info/revue-informations-sociales-2008-3-page-120.htm>], 24 January 2009.

major implications of the educational mobility program studied will be presented: the shared cross-cultural experience that Erasmus students live, the cosmopolitan identity and values that are born out of this experience, along with its associated European social network.

Sociological studies of the subject and methodology of research

Although there is not much literature dedicated to the present subject, most independent researches concentrate, unlike the official EU statistical studies, on the daily life of Erasmus students. The main conclusions to draw from these theses are grouped under the thematic areas of identity, (feeling of belonging or) membership and community. Even though in sociological and anthropological theory these three concepts are intertwined and hard to grasp independently⁵, they are nevertheless useful in understanding the subjective experiences of students that enroll in the mobility program. Therefore I will enounce here the following hypothesis, assumptions and conclusions that define their social and cultural micro-cosmos (as one of the interviewees sees this context, in normative and interactive terms: “our life here in the campus is a micro-cosmos, you know what everybody does and everybody know who you are and what you do”, A.L., 23 years old, Romanian student in Germany, Erasmus in Bordeaux).

Firstly, the social groups that Erasmus students form in the first period of the semester they spend abroad are mostly intercultural, or even constituted only by students that share the same status – the Erasmus student or “foreigner” one. Thus, the usage of the term “community” becomes relevant in order to address this interactive phenomenon; especially if we take into account de Federico’s works that state the following percentages regarding the interactions that Erasmus students have (see Table 1, Annexes) or their evolution on the length of a semester, statistically analyzed insomuch that it offers a clear image of the dynamics that Erasmus students go through (evolution of Erasmus students’ network dynamic in Chart 1 and 2, Annexes).

⁵ Gilles Ferreol, Guy Jucquois, *Dicționarul alterității și al relațiilor interculturale*, Iași: Polirom, 2005.

Other perspectives, as the postmodern constructivist one that draws from Bauman's theories,⁶ exemplified by the Finish researcher Fred Dervin,⁷ close to a similar conclusion: the Erasmus students are members of a "peg community". This type of belonging is tied to the individual security that affiliations to communities nowadays offer for a short while, as Bauman puts it: while the spectacle lasts, the spectators are members of the same audience group.⁸

Secondly, an essential observation is the opposition that the Erasmus students' community faces (or perceives to be facing) against the locals' one (this is attested in all research on the subject,⁹ usually as a "parallel community"¹⁰).

The main points to be made in the paper draw on the empirical base of an ethnographical study I have performed on the Erasmus students' community, in Bordeaux, France, during the academic year of 2009/2010. The priority of the research was to uncover the identity strategies of the international students, and during the initial observation phase of the field research, the paramount importance of the shared mobility experience in the students' lives was revealed.

⁶ Zygmunt Bauman, *Globalizarea și efectele ei sociale*, București: Antet, 1999; Zygmunt Bauman, *Etica postmodernă*, Timișoara: Amarcord, 2000; Zygmunt Bauman, *Liquid Modernity*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000; Zygmunt Bauman, "Identity in the globalising world", in *Social Anthropology*, vol. 9, nr.2, European Association of Social Anthropologists, 2001, pp. 121–129.

⁷ Fred Dervin, « Mascarades estudiantines finlandaises dans le sud de la France », in *2èmes rencontres jeunes et sociétés dans le sud de l'Europe et autour de la méditerranée*, 2004 [<http://jeunes-et-societes.cereq.fr/PDF-RJS2/DERVIN.pdf>], 23 January 2009; Fred Dervin, *Se déconditionner en déconditionnant? Regards sur des discours d'enseignantstagiaires FLE en mobilité en Finlande*, 2008 [<http://users.utu.fi/freder/rennes.pdf>], 23 January 2009; Fred Dervin, *The repression of us and wehoods in Erasmus students' narratives about their experiences in Finland*, Department of French Studies, University of Turku, 2009 [<http://users.utu.fi/freder/>]; Fred Dervin, *The Erasmus experience: halcyon days of hypermodernity*, 2007 [<http://users.utu.fi/freder/general.pdf>], 15 January 2009.

⁸ Zygmunt Bauman, *Identity in the globalising world...*, pp. 121–124.

⁹ Fred Dervin, *The Erasmus experience...*, pp. 1-6; Melissa Härtel, *op. cit.*, pp. 43-63; de Federico, de la Rúa Ainhoa, *op. cit.*, pp. 120-124.

¹⁰ Sofie Ørsted Sauzet, *Youth and the Erasmus Programme - An Analysis of how the European Youth is Shaped and Reshaping in the Erasmus Programme as Policy and Practice*, Pædagogik og Uddannelsesstudier, Roskilde Universitetscenter, unpublished Master's thesis, 2008 [http://en.scientificcommons.org/sofie_%C3%98rsted_sauzet], 13 January 2009.

The corpus of research that I have performed sheds new light upon the subject. Firstly, it manages to synthesize, as in the previous section, the main directions and conclusions drawn from various field researches. Secondly, it approached a more extensive field research than any of the previous studies on the subject matter, and thirdly, it tackles the subject of the quotidian life of the Erasmus students from another angle, by focusing on cross-cultural experience and networks that come forth in the mobility period and their affiliated cosmopolitan identity and its related values.

The design of the field research includes an extended 8 months participative observation field, when informal unstructured interviews were sustained and finally 30 semi-structured interviews with Erasmus and international students, as well as with the director of the association responsible of the Erasmus students' social and cultural activities. I have therefore managed to explore in depth the daily universe of the *incoming* Erasmus students to the academic city of Bordeaux, by being in constant contact with them in the following period: October 2009 – May 2010, which mainly describes the trajectory of one Erasmus generation. The selection of the observed groups and interviewed subjects always kept in mind, in order to raise the diversity degree of the studied aspects, the following variables: the homogeneity of the groups (international, national, regional, language-friendly or mixed), the types of residence (campus student halls or rented rooms in the city), faculty/university and domain of studies (essential criteria given the high academic diversity of Bordeaux's four Universities), the length of the Erasmus program for each individual and group, the number and level of spoken languages and the length of the educational stay in France.

All this characteristics being so varied, there is little to be shared by the subjects. Thus, the feeling of belonging, of membership, the affiliation to the rest of the Erasmus students' network constituted the basis in selecting the interviewees. This was essential not only because of the visibility of shared interests, practices and values among the studied community, but more so because of the impossibility the subjects found themselves in to give a straight answer when asked to explain what is it that they share. This particular point will be discussed further in the next section.

Sharing the same cross-cultural experience

Indeed it is difficult to answer to the “trick question” mentioned earlier because there are more than enough reasons for these young European citizens (and not only) not to get along very well: belonging to different and sometimes far away cultural areas, social classes, the different levels and number of languages spoken, and the, not to be neglected, study domains, as well as some “natural” diversity due to postmodern affiliations to “neo-tribes”.¹¹

The answer to the question “What do you [the Erasmus students] have in common?” is hard to grasp for most of the interviewees. Some of them answer that there are similar interest that bring them together; others’ intuition helps them blame the (foreign) language competences for the lack of communication with the locals on one hand, and on the other for binding the international students. Some sincere answers, as the following two, show the high level of reflexivity amongst the students: “we all share something... even if we have nothing in common” [A.L.] or “even if you made your Erasmus in a small provincial city in Spain you have shared a similar experience with someone that did it in Helsinki” [M.R., Romanian, 25 years old]. On one hand, we notice the personal relationship that students have with their mobility experience, through the constant reference to the European educational program as a personal experience or even “adventure”: “my Erasmus”. Utilizing the same term “Erasmus” as a coin that has the same referent for all the students that experienced the Erasmus mobility program, implies that a common life is shared, no matter where or when it was experienced, while the personal pronouns highlight the differences in perception, evaluation and interpretation of the experience, the subjectivity of mobility.

The feeling of sharing a very personal experience with individuals that belong to the same collectivity is always present in the students’ discourses. The most obvious references are the plural forms “We, Erasmus...”¹² or “les autres Erasmus”¹³, identified in previous studies and confirmed by the field study that I have performed.

¹¹ Andy Bennett, “Subcultures or Neo-tribes? Rethinking the Relationship Between Youth, Style and Musical Taste”, in *Sociology*, vol. 33, No. 3, August, 1999, pp. 599–617.

¹² Fred Dervin, *The repression of us...*, pp. 3-5; Magali Ballatore, “The Erasmus programme: toward more cooperation or more competition between Higher Education institutions?”, in

The EU educational program reappears in the subjects' discourses as well as a identity label (or as Jenkins (2000) puts it – nominal identity) mark: “*I am Erasmus*”¹⁴ [as most of the interviewed students stated], or as Dervin¹⁵ discusses on the Erasmus students' experiences in Finland and their feeling of membership to a “peg community”¹⁶: “*We Erasmus*”. Apart from this high level of identification to the Erasmus experience, I have discovered yet another interesting way of expressing one's temporary identity: “When in Erasmus” [G.B., Italian, 24 years], the which highlights the contextual cosmopolitan values that come with the mobility experience and the high importance of time pressure on individual behavior.

On the other hand, we observe that sharing, what the students themselves call „a common, collective experience”, becomes possible only by the rise of what Appadurai¹⁷ calls „social imagination”. In the age of “print capitalism”,¹⁸ the modern technology and the high mobility of individuals permits the development of transnational and cross-cultural networks of individuals that blossom a feeling of identification to the experience of mobility on one side, and to the actual community of Erasmus students, on the other side. The former statement underlines the point made in the previous section about the methodology of selection of interviewees and observation groups, which involved partially the individuals' subjectivity regarding his or her membership to the Erasmus students' groups and the large “invisible” network. Here comes forth the feeling of belonging that Erasmus students have towards their „local” Erasmus community, by identifying themselves with other Erasmus students, but as well to the „continental Erasmus community”, that extends itself at the European level in almost all the European academic cities and

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[http://www.fup.pt/cipes/docs/eventos/pdf_docs/Magali%20Ballatore.pdf], 23 January 2009.

¹³ Patricia Kohler-Bally, *Mobilité et plurilinguisme, le cas de l'étudiant Erasmus en contexte bilingue*, Fribourg: Editions Universitaires, 2001, p. 16 *apud* Melissa Härtel, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

¹⁴ Melissa Härtel, *op.cit.*, pp. 43-63.

¹⁵ Fred Dervin, *The repression of us...*, p. 2.

¹⁶ Zygmunt Bauman, *Comunitate. Căutarea siguranței într-o lume nesigură*, Filipeștii de Târg: Antet, 2001.

¹⁷ Arjun Apparudrai, *Modernity at Large. Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000, pp. 6-10.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, pp. 8-9.

even further to the identification with ex-Erasmus students, who „know what it means to be Erasmus” [M.J., Slovenian, 22 years old].

The latter idea can be supported not only by the affiliations shown between these social actors, but as well by Bauman’s¹⁹ postmodern social theory, in particular by the difference between mobile and non-mobile individuals. The mobiles – in this case the Erasmus students – develop a certain “(sub)culture”, or as Fredrik Barth²⁰ would explain, the borders that are drawn to separate the mobiles from the locals give birth to commonalities and practices, that are reinforced through the process of symbolic construction of the community.²¹

All of the aspects discussed here are possible through two interlinked aspects of modern life – mobility and social imagination, in Appadurai’s²² perspective, these two giving birth to what the students really share, which is a commonality, a system of values and norms, or a cosmopolitan identity, as I entitled it.

This commonality’s main characteristics are contoured in the following section, by pointing out its main attributes: the thirst for the unknown, the valorization of cultural flexibility and physical mobility.

Cosmopolitan identity and values

The cosmopolitan identity stands at the intersection of the multiple identification processes that Erasmus students go through during their period of mobility and it constitutes a shared identity based on a cross-cultural mobility experience. The associated values and praxis issue from the following aspects that characterize the Erasmus students’ life-style: time pressure, cultural consumerism, flexibility in all of its forms: cultural, social and physical mobility, spontaneity, availability towards the group and its members and at the same time interchangeability of group members and permeability of the groups.

Although their priorities may differ (some have clearly marked Erasmus as an asset for their CVs, while others are living it as an

¹⁹ Zygmunt Bauman, *Globalizarea ...*, Bucureşti: Antet, 1999.

²⁰ Fredrik Barth, *Ethnic groups and boundaries. The social organization of cultural difference*, Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1969, pp. 9-38.

²¹ A.P. Cohen, *The Symbolic construction of Community*, New York, London: Routledge, 2001.

²² Arjun Apparudrai, *op. cit.*

adventure, a pause from “normal life” or a “language camp”), the interviewed students share the same way of seeing things, a cosmopolitan perspective that is “not a thing in the world, but a perspective on the world”.²³ This actually means that they show a coherent system of values, institutions and way of making sense out of the social world, by means of perceptions, interpretations, representations, categorizations and identifications.

Regarding the institutions, the example I will provide is a central activity of quotidian life in the Erasmus life style: the dinner party. Along with the praxis of the party: the large number of “representatives” of cultures, nations and spoken languages, the sharing of traditional food, drinks and customs (most of which are “re-invented on the spot”²⁴), spontaneity is institutionalized in the Erasmus life style and showing up for these kinds of parties without a prior invitation is not an issue, especially as most of the dinner parties are not scheduled, but unpremeditated. The analysis of the observational data shows that students tend to interact following unwritten codes that get set from the first weeks of their mobility: the possibility to approach any person present without prior contact or introduction is facilitated by the five standardized questions meant to approach and ease the beginning of the conversation²⁵. Another aspect characteristic of these “mixing parties” [C.H., Italian, 25 years old] is *the shift*, changing the language of communication from one participant of the party to another, which is an “exciting thing” [M.R.] and is actually a sought experience.

Thus, the lack of codification of interactions, of precise rules of conduct and the time pressure that comes from the limited amount of time that the subjects can experience the mobility, give birth to a central value of the cosmopolitan identity: spontaneity. This is another way of saying “social flexibility” or adaptability to day-to-day practical social aspects.

²³ Rogers Brubaker, Mara Loveman, Peter Stamatov, “Ethnicity as Cognition”, in *Theory and Society*, Vol. 33, No. 1, Feb., 2004, pp. 31-64.

²⁴ Eric John Hobsbawm, Terence Osborn Ranger, Christine Vivier, *L'invention de la tradition*, Paris: Ed. Amsterdam, 2006.

²⁵ *Where are you from? Where do you live? What do you study? When did you arrive? Are you here only for one semester?*. There are as well, several other questions that serve pretty much the same purpose, of classification and categorization of the collocutor: *What other languages you speak? Why did you choose this city, or country for your Erasmus?* Etc.

Some students' high reflexivity brings into discourse even the impact of this lively spontaneity and of the "physical and cultural flexibility" as an advantage on the European labor market (e.g.: E.M., Italian, 25 years old, who considers himself "a citizen of the world", or C.J., Belgian, 24 years old, who concentrates his history on the work opportunities that study abroad brings).

But the flexibility that characterizes the cosmopolitan identity is more centered on the cultural and physical mobility that Erasmus students face. As Dervin²⁶ and de Federico²⁷ note, the Erasmus tend to form groups that could be called "family nuclei", because of their daily common activities. I prefer utilizing the expression extracted from one student's interview: "[our life here in the campus is a] *micro-cosmos*" [A.L.]. This micro-cosmos is characterized by a high inter group cultural diversity, that can lead to a exacerbation of the *in statu nascendi* valorization of the Other. This form of "cultural consumerism" is was present in an incipient form before the mobility experience starts in the shape of expectations and projects students had before parting with the Erasmus scholarship, e.g.: in some cases the cultural interest in the host country's culture "getting to know another culture [the French one, in general]" [C.H., J.S., Swiss, 24 years old], while in others the accents falls on the intercultural interactions "getting to know a lot of cultures", "people from all over the world" [I.L., Slovak, 25 years old]. Thus, Erasmus students learn to communicate and interact in intercultural spheres and their perception of their own cultural flexibility is definitely higher due to the mobility program. Nevertheless, it is imperious to note that all of the students, regardless of their field of study (even those who are studying anthropology or sociology) and of their affirmed political correctness and relativistic point of view, eventually speak of culture in a purely deterministic, substantialist and essentialist manner. In addition, the ethnocentrism present in any human is not completely whipped out by the mobility and intercultural experience, as some pretend it to be (the most obvious example is the student that considers himself "a citizen of the world", while discussing on a patronizing tone about other "inferior, well less developed cultures", E.M.).

²⁶ Fred Dervin, *The Erasmus experience: halcyon days of hypermodernity*, 2007, [http://users.utu.fi/freder/general.pdf], 15 January 2009, pp. 2-3.

²⁷ de Federico, de la Rúa Ainhoa, *op. cit.*, pp. 124-127.

Physical mobility is valued to an enormous extent by the Erasmus students and it becomes part of their cosmopolitan identity. During the observational study, I was amazed at the rate at which different forms of mobility – tourism, educational mobility, migration – were called upon to be the center of discussions, ranging from small talk to educated argumentations. In addition to this, at the behavioral level, most of the activities planned individually or mostly in groups, were traveling experiences. The most important aspect that highlights the central value of mobility in cosmopolitan identity is that the destination itself was not the goal of the trip, but merely a pretext. Of course, the presence of conational Erasmus students in the destination chosen for a trip helped for socializing, guide and accommodation purposes, but in the end, mobility in itself became the goal.

Flexibility is not only a characteristic of the individuals, but a practice of the group, the fluidity of personal identities influences the collective identity and the members of the groups, even the most cohesive and structured groups I have studied, show a high degree of interchangeability. Most of the daily practices are contoured in the group activities and some individuals feel that the norm of availability towards the group and its members is sometimes over dosed. In order to exemplify the previous restriction I will present two extracts from two students' discourses.

The first passage underlines the codification of solidarity behavior and the availability rate in the group: "it's a terrible crime if you don't show up at your friends' goodbye party, even if you have the worst exam of your life the next day. You go, you say hello, you have a drink and then you go, after an hour or two..." [A.L.].

While the second one emphasizes the mobility's influence on one's identity and behavior, and strikes in its sincerity: "I'm not a very nice person [...], but here I smile all the time, you have to smile to everyone, all the time. Otherwise... And my friends from home told me that I've changed... - What happened to you? ... You smile in all the pictures?! " [C.G., Romanian, 22 years old].

What these two extracts also point out is that although members need to follow the unwritten social code (for that matter, Anselm Strauss'²⁸ interactionist's point of view on creation and negotiation of social order and social norms is brilliantly at work in the Erasmus case), simply following it will not change the "disposable nature" of individuals' in the group. This high degree of interchangeability of members is also due to permeability of the group; very few relationships that the Erasmus students have with peers could be classified as "strong ties".

In connection to the cultural flexibility stands what I call cultural consumption of the Other: the excessive valorization of the Other, or more specifically, the valorization of meeting and getting to know Other, rather than the valorization of the Other, as a concept. As I mentioned earlier, the students expose an essentialist perspective on cultures, the other international students becoming automatically representative enough exponents of their cultures, countries, regions etc. This aspect facilitates the cultural consumption of the Other and stimulates the curiosity, which is based on the principle that meeting and knowing a person is meeting and knowing his or her culture.

This means that what the subjects gained by alienation and distancing themselves from all familiarity, is the tourist's gaze. This manner of seeing things, as new and fascinating is due to the limited amount of time they can attribute to them. Hence, an almost childish curiosity for all different social customs characterizes the discourses and behaviors of all studied Erasmus students.

Moreover, the time pressure is present in the subjects' stories, all of the interviewed students' description of their Erasmus experience being in direct connection with the following engagement statement: "I/we must make the best of it" (as most interviews were conducted in French, the original expression is the impersonal "il faut profiter").

In addition to this and in connection to the spatial context of the experience, the unknown and, sometimes, even unfriendly social landscapes that greet the foreign student in the first days of the mobility program become gradually domesticated social spaces. Moreover, I have observed, in many cases, personal and sometimes almost romantic visions

²⁸ Anselm Leonard Strauss, *La trame de la négociation. Sociologie qualitative et interactionnisme*, Paris: L'Harmattan, 1992, pp. 11-61.

and relationships to the city – “I just love walking in the city, it’s my city now, I feel it’s mine more than I felt with my hometown!” [A.N., German, 25 years old], “Sometimes, when I get bored, I go out by myself and take Rue Sainte Catherine....” [C.J.].

It would be interesting to observe the evolution of this *in situ nascendi* cosmopolitan identity and its corresponding values, in order to find out if they will be kept at work in the following years after finishing the Erasmus mobility program. Since this kind of approach implies a rather difficult task from the methodological and field research point of view, I will only ascertain some perspectives that stem from my analysis and that link the “present” cosmopolitan identity of the Erasmus students to its future. Therefore, the Erasmus program’s influences over the daily lives of the students that benefit of it are not to be discussed in their long-term perspective. Nevertheless, some conclusions can be drawn due to the materials collected in the field research that touch the subjects’ future projects and intentions.

Thus, I have found that the intercultural socialization that the Erasmus students go through influences their future projects by restating them in relationship to the new internalized social values. Therefore, cosmopolitan interactions will be sought and integrated in the daily prospects that Erasmus students have for the moment they will return to their home universities and communities. More precisely, many of the Erasmus students declare that they will be more than willing to know the “Erasmus life” in their home towns or Universities. The latter is yet another manner in which “social imagination” is at work, by outlining the multiplications of interactions between individuals that have been exposed to the same intercultural socialization process.

On the other hand, thanks to the reflexive identity quest Erasmus students have been on, they perceived the difference in their behavior vis-à-vis the Other. They acknowledge the fact that changes in their identity came along with changes in the way of relating to *strangers*. And, even if this is not the core issue of the present article, it is imperious to make a point out of the changes (perceived or “real”) that go on at the identity level of these students, as most of them point out (e.g.: “I’ve changed a lot, in many ways... [it’s not only my opinion], but my friends and family, who visited me told me several times...” [A.B., Italian, 23 years old]).

The European network

The third pylon of the present study of the Erasmus cross-cultural phenomena is constituted by the European network that Erasmus students build during their mobility, and that is reinforced afterwards through mutual visiting and maintaining contacts.

Another point of interest in investigating the cross-cultural phenomenon that this mobility constitutes is the virtual network that Facebook puts at the individuals' disposal. Although it needs further investigation, from my observations and the methodology used in the field research (e.g. approaching the Erasmus students and then maintaining contact with them on Facebook, being always up to date with their activities, intentions and even feelings) I can assert that networks are essential to the Erasmus "spirit", as the interviewees call it. Networks play a central role because of the value it is given to them in the process of intercultural socialization. To understand its paramount importance to the daily life of the students we need to remember the initial context in which the subjects find themselves. Thus, the individual plunged into an unfamiliar milieu, has to develop social ties and reinforce them, thus during the mobility period, although at a certain moment their intentions and their networking activities diminish, "getting to know people" [M.J.] remains equivalent to "getting to know cultures"[M.J.] which is the central goal of this whole experience, for many of them.

Let us consider that networks do not disappear after the end of the mobility experience, when their existence was fundamental to the social "survival" and the maximization of cultural and social opportunities, but that instead they fade slowly, and along with their purely contextual relationships to time and space. In this situation, we can ask the following question: how much of the cosmopolitan identity associated to it will survive after the mobility experience ends? Are the attached values going to stain one's system of values? Or in Bauman's words, imprinted with Dervin's vision of the Erasmus students' lifestyles, are these peg communities going to unfold totally? This inquiring is meant to accentuate the visibility of the impact that the educational mobility program has at the individual level, regardless of each case's context and characteristics. Thus, the present work on the subject can be furthered in areas of transnational

networks and practices and on inter-generational Erasmus students' interactions, thus emphasizing the cross-cultural dimension of this European phenomenon.

Conclusions

The paper manages to bring together different perspective on the Erasmus students' daily life, and transform them into a coherent description of their experience. The main advantage of the present paper is the lap it brings in its domain by the field extended research performed on the subject. The depths of interviews offer a new vision of the topic by focusing on the cross-cultural experience and its related identity issues, the paper hence mending the weak spots of previous researches on the subject.

Overall, I have shown that the Erasmus educational program stimulates vast interacting networks of European and international students, who share more than a sense of belonging to the same community, rather a common a cross-cultural experience of socialization that gives birth to cosmopolitan identities and associated values. The latter are tied to the following aspects of the Erasmus students' life style: time pressure, cultural consumerism, flexibility in all of its forms: cultural, social and physical mobility, spontaneity, availability towards the group and its members and, at the same time, interchangeability of group members and permeability of the groups. There is therefore a preeminence of valorizing time, physical, social and cultural flexibility/mobility, and the cultural consumption of the Other. All of aspects mentioned earlier characterize the Erasmus students lives, their individual and collective identities, the values and the praxis of their groups are part of, paraphrasing Brubaker,²⁹ "a *cosmopolitan* way of seeing things".

²⁹ Rogers Brubaker, Mara Loveman, Peter Stamatov, *op. cit.*, pp. 31-64.

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Annexes

The friends' network inside the ERASMUS community.
T0 – at the beginning of the ERASMUS program.




Chart 1.

Chart realized by de Federico de la Rúa presented in *“La dinámica de las redes de amistad. La elección de amigos en el programa Erasmus”*, 2003, pp.20-23

Erasmus students' friends	Percentages
Erasmus students	80%
French students (locals)	17%
International (non-European) students	3%

Table 1 (realized by Federico de la Rúa, 2003)

The friends' network inside the ERASMUS community.
T1 – after the end of the first semester of ERASMUS




Chart 2.

Chart realized by de Federico de la Rúa presented in *“La dinámica de las redes de amistad. La elección de amigos en el programa Erasmus”*, 2003, pp.20-23

BOOK REVIEW

Stephen Launay, *Chávez/Uribe, deux voies pour l'Amérique latine ?*, Paris, Buchet/Chastel, 2010

Sergiu Mișcoiu*

Depuis Aristote, l'étude comparative des systèmes et des régimes politiques a toujours préoccupé une bonne partie des chercheurs en sciences sociales. Des critères divers de comparaison ont été proposés, à commencer par le nombre de dirigeants (monarchies ou polyarchies), le type de relation entre les composants du pouvoir (concentration ou séparation des pouvoirs), la manière dont les dirigeants se rapportent au peuple (représentation ou participation directe), etc. Plus récemment, la démarche comparative se rapporte de plus en plus aux conditions empiriques, dans un effort de tester, de valider et de raffiner les classifications théoriques en fonction des évolutions constatées.¹

Le livre de Stephen Launay s'inscrit logiquement dans cette série d'analyses comparatives, ayant en plus le grand mérite d'éviter l'erreur typique de ce genre de démarche – le fait de forcer les données de la réalité afin de valider les critères de la comparaison. Ainsi, le miroir bâti par Stephen Launay dans lequel se reflètent les « deux frères jumeaux ennemis » n'est pas déformant : notre auteur préfère ne pas comparer là où la réalité ne se prête pas aux comparaisons et renforcer les différences structurelles là où elles ont une valeur explicative ajoutée. Logiquement conçu en deux parties, qui traitent du Venezuela et, respectivement, de la Colombie, le volume analyse minutieusement et, à la fois, synthétiquement

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¹ V., par exemple, Alfred Stepan, "Paths toward Redemocratization: Theoretical and Comparative Considerations", in G. O'Donnell, Ph. C. Schmitter, L. Whitehead (eds.), *Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives*, Baltimore-London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1986, pp. 64-84.

les trajets politiques des deux pays qui ont abouti aux régimes de Hugo Chávez et d'Alvaro Uribe.

Quelles sont en fait les similarités et les différences entre ces deux régimes ? Donnent-ils lieu à deux voies vraiment opposées ? Même si au début on est plutôt enclin aux réponses tranchantes (par exemple, rejeter dos-à-dos les deux régimes comme étant populistes ou, par contre, dénoncer la « dictature rouge » de Chavez et louer la « démocratie à l'américaine » d'Uribe), la lecture du livre de Stephen Launay nous procure des arguments pour une attitude plus modérée. Car l'héritage historique commun, et les structures sociales semblables ont fait en sorte que les deux régimes comportent une série de similarités, dont la plus évidente est la personnalisation populiste du pouvoir, nourrie par le système présidentiel qui confère au chef de l'Etat et du gouvernement des pouvoirs institutionnels élargis et des pouvoirs informels exceptionnels. La colonne vertébrale de cette personnalisation est le « télévisonnisme », exemplairement illustré par l'auteur à travers l'évocation du rôle des émissions télévisées hebdomadaires de Chavez (*Allo, Presidente*) et d'Uribe (qui n'avait pas sa propre émission, mais participait à une émission hebdomadaire à la chaîne publique). Puis, on peut très bien constater que les deux régimes se trouvent dans un état de dépendance par rapport aux Etats-Unis, même si cette dépendance est idéologiquement inverse : alors que le Président Uribe a utilisé l'appui des Etats-Unis en pleine ère de Bush Jr. pour endiguer avec succès l'action terroriste des Forces Armées Révolutions de Colombie (FARC), en obtenant des résultats historiques, Hugo Chavez a utilisé une sulfureuse rhétorique antiaméricaine² pour renforcer ses positions et pour projeter son pouvoir bien au-delà des frontières vénézuéliennes.

Stephen Launay accentue à juste titre les différences entre les caractéristiques des deux régimes. Elles tirent leurs sources surtout de l'héritage inégal du rôle de Simon Bolivar : assumé comme un Père Fondateur par la Colombie, mais rangé dans une panoplie plus ample de personnalités politiques et culturelles du pays (ce qui diminue ainsi son poids relatif), Bolivar est cultivé, mythifié et divinisé par la propagande chaviste, qui n'hésite pas à repeindre radicalement le personnage pour en

² Pour l'anecdote, Stephen Launay reprend une citation de Chavez où il traite George W. Bush de *pendejo* (crétin), p. 111.

faire un révolutionnaire continental à orientation « proto-socialiste ». Présenté ainsi, Bolivar devient un précurseur de Chavez, qui se prétend son digne héritier politique. Il n'est pas étonnant donc que le révolutionnarisme transnational sépare la logique chaviste de la stratégie uribienne : tandis que la Colombie reste réservée sur le plan international, en se limitant à miser sur l'appui américain, le Venezuela prétend au leadership régional, en appuyant la révolution bolivarienne en Equateur (par Raphaël Correa), en Bolivie (par Evo Morales), au Honduras (par le président actuellement suspendu, Manuel Zelaya) et... en Colombie (par l'appui des FARC).

Stephen Launay réussit à nous persuader ainsi que les deux voies suivies par la Colombie et le Venezuela sont quand même liées à la différence entre le respect (bien qu'imparfait et inconstant) par le régime de Bogota du cadre constitutionnel et démocratique établi (en témoigne l'application de la décision de la Cour Constitutionnelle qui a empêché Uribe de briguer un troisième mandat, en ouvrant ainsi la voie de Juan Manuel Santos à la présidence) et, de l'autre côté, l'irrespect patent de toute règle constitutionnelle, qui a permis à Hugo Chavez d'obtenir un troisième mandat en 2006 et d'en pouvoir briguer d'autres, après l'amendement contesté de l'Acte fondamental en 2009.

Pour conclure, le livre de Stephen Launay est un exercice comparatif inédit et particulièrement utile pour les observateurs des vies politiques des pays andines, ainsi que pour les spécialistes des autres espaces politiques acquis à la démarche comparative. Le livre plaira probablement moins à la partie des radicaux de gauche qui voient dans le bolivarianisme la seule doctrine capable de s'opposer à la mondialisation capitaliste à l'américaine. Mais pourra être apprécié même par les intellectuels et les politiques de gauche pour lesquels le léninisme et ses copies n'ont jamais été une option viable.

BOOK REVIEW

Wolf Lepenies, *Seduction of Culture in German History*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2006

Paul Terec*

Wolf Lepenies est un des plus prestigieux universitaires contemporains, sociologue de formation (spécialité dont le jargon n'est jamais exhibé comme le fort de ses démarches), auteur des ouvrages repères en sociologie et l'histoire intellectuelle, recteur du bien connu *Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin* pendant une période décisive de l'histoire européenne récente, les années 1986-2001, professeur de universités emblématiques: *Freie Universität Berlin*, *Collège de France*, *Princeton*. Parmi ses livres on rencontre de recherches à solide rigueur scientifique et académique, comme *Melancholie und Gesellschaft* (1969), *Das Ende der Naturgeschichte. Wandel kultureller Selbstverständlichkeiten* (1976), *Die drei Kulturen. Soziologie zwischen Literatur und Wissenschaft* (1985), *Autoren und Wissenschaftler im 18. Jahrhundert. Linné - Buffon - Winckelmann - Georg Forster - Erasmus Darwin* (1988), *Sainte-Beuve. Auf der Schwelle zur Moderne* (1997), mais également des réflexions engagées à discerner les traits intellectuels et politiques de l'histoire allemande et européenne contemporaine, *Folgen einer unerhörten Begebenheit. Die Deutschen nach der Vereinigung* (1992), *Aufstieg und Fall der Intellektuellen in Europa* (1992), *Kultur und Politik. Deutsche Geschichten* (2006). Ses ouvrages se distinguent par l'entrelacement de la sensibilité pour les structures et contextes du sociologue, avec la finesse de l'érudit et le savoir-faire d'un grand raconteur.

Son dernier livre, publiée directement en anglais, *The Seduction of Culture in German History*, pourrait être considéré comme une réflexion se situant en continuité aux développements de Norbert Elias de *Über den Prozeß der Zivilisation* de 1939, autours de la paire des concepts *Zivilisation /*

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Kultur posés comme antithétiques dans la culture intellectuelle de langue allemande: le concept de culture (*Kultur*) servait donc le plus souvent à identifier les faits spirituels, artistiques et religieux par leur délimitation par rapport aux faits politiques, économiques et sociaux (associés ces derniers à la *Zivilisation*). C'est bien dans le discours sur l'identité nationale qu'un telle distinction fonctionnait pour y donner la substance: la nature fondamentalement apolitique de l'âme allemande. Lepenies reprend la problématique indiquée par Elias, en lui mettant au jour ses hasards dans l'histoire des deux derniers siècles. Il ne s'agit pas d'une démarche systématique, dont les matériaux et les arguments soient péremptoires – le volume contient un peu plus de deux cents pages; il s'agit plutôt d'un des livres « engagés » de Lepenies, qui ne manque d'ironie et d'humour par l'appel à bien d'anecdotes, mais dont la rigueur et subtilité imposent sans défaut.

Dans les lignes qui suivent on va présenter quelques arguments du livre, sans prétendre fournir tout l'essentiel – le livre est à lire.

La démarche se donne comme objet le penchant – pas exclusivement allemand – vers la considération de la culture, dans son sens opposé à la civilisation, comme un « noble substitut pour la politique, sinon carrément une politique meilleure » (p. 5). L'auteur se distancie soigneusement de voir là la cause de l'ascension du nazisme, sans pourtant le marginaliser dans l'histoire intellectuelle et politique allemande. Le titre l'indiquant déjà, la tendance d'abaisser le politique pour vanter le caractère primordial de la culture, tient de l'histoire de l'Allemagne, dont les tournants et intrications nous empêchent de soutenir le discours d'un *Sonderweg*, qui reprendrait un phantasme isolationniste passé. De plus, il s'agit d'une démarche d'histoire intellectuelle dont les prémisses méthodologiques sont énoncées sans détours : « L'histoire intellectuelle est dans un degré considérable l'histoire d'un petit groupement, l'histoire des intellectuels. Seulement les intellectuels eux-mêmes prend l'impact des intellectuels sur le cours des événements comme indéniable; la question si et comment leurs idées ont été transmises à une plus large audience, et quelle sorte d'influence ont exercé celle-ci doit rester le plus souvent sans réponse » (p. 8). Ceci dit, il faut noter la place de « guide » que prend Thomas Mann dans la démonstration. Chez Mann l'attitude allemande par rapport à la culture et à la politique possède un caractère exemplaire.

Le premier chapitre offre des arguments contre la persistance des positions découlant de l'endossement d'une « voie à part » allemande. Un argument est le fait que dans l'histoire moderne la culture s'est substitué maintes fois à la politique, et dans des places bien différentes; la figure de Pouskine en Russie a été souvent donnée comme exemple de l'art jouant un rôle politique, ses écrits présageant l'écroulement du régime tsariste. Et les exemples sont encore nombreux, sans même ajouter les plaidoyers pour la légitimité d'une « résistance par culture ». Un autre type d'argument serait de mettre un bémol aux thèses telles que celles formulées par Dewey ou George Santayana concernant une dissolution des traditions politiques allemandes dans une histoire des idées, où Kant et la philosophie transcendantale constituerait un tournant vers l'intériorité de mauvais augure (p. 11). Toutefois une telle réfutation – nous avertit l'auteur – ne doit pas conduire à considérer le national-socialisme hitlérien comme intégré dans la « normalité » historique d'une époque où les fascismes étaient bien populaires (p. 10). A l'encontre de telles positions Lepenies attire l'attention sur les causes historiques de l'accentuation d'un rôle politique de la culture. Le long ratage de toute unification administrative et politique allemande a favorisé la promotion d'une cohésion exclusivement culturelle (p. 15).

Le second chapitre met ensemble de façon apparemment surprenante les réflexions que Thomas Mann publiait en 1918 sous le titre *Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen*, avec la rhétorique d'une légitimité culturelle de l'avancée nazie, souvent employée par les figures principales du régime. Des personnages radicalement opposés, mais qui ne pouvait pas s'empêcher d'engager arguments analogues en ce qui concerne la relation culture-politique. – Dans le livre de 1918 Mann promouvait l'exceptionnalisme allemand, en passant à travers des thèmes classiques de l'inappétence allemande pour les institutions et procédures démocratiques. Après le commencement du régime républicain de Weimar, Mann va se modifier radicalement la position plutôt conservatrice, pour un républicanisme décisif, mais – le note Lepenies (p. 31) – sans se soucier d'en formuler une position doctrinaire, se déclarant alors attaché de « tout son être » à la nouvelle république. Le profil bien spécifique de son engagement se trahit également dans un discours prononcé à Berlin, en 1930, intitulé « Un appel à la raison », où Mann alléguait que la république allemande ne

pourrait pas se légitimer sans appeler à la poésie, à l'art en général, un discours manifestement transpercé par scepticisme face à l'institution parlementaire.

La démarche de Lepenies devient encore plus invitante dans le troisième chapitre. Les remarques sont ici des plus subtiles. La conférence de 1922 de Mann, qui marque sa conversion au credo républicain et démocrate, est en effet une mise face à face de deux auteurs, Novalis et Walt Whitman, affaire d'attirer le jeune auditoire à la démocratie en parlant du noyau romantique de la démocratie américaine. L'érotisme social et la sensualité politique invoqués par le poète américain venaient en premier rang comme les clés d'une compréhension authentique de la démocratie. Un des arguments de son discours, non repris dans le volume où son texte fût publié, allait jusqu'à articuler un thème de la compatibilité entre homosexualité et démocratie, force d'évoquer la glorieuse origine athénienne de la démocratie américaine (p. 68). En fait, Mann citait alors le livre *Democratic Vistas* de Whitman, véritable appel aux armes adressé au poète, pour l'instauration de l'authentique démocratie menacée par la corruption des élites financières. – De façon paradoxale, la réserve des intellectuels allemands envers le politique a eu également des correspondances américaines. En effet, les poètes transcendentalistes américains, Emerson ou Thoreau, s'inspirant du romantisme allemand, plaidaient pour des nouvelles voies de faire la politique, où les émotions et les sentiments personnels auraient pu y participer.

L'exposé hâté des sources allemandes de l'appauvrissement de l'âme américaine que Allan Bloom entreprend dans une section de son célèbre *Closing of the American Mind* (1987) fait l'objet de critique dans la quatrième chapitre. La lecture partielle de auteurs comme Weber, Heidegger, Freud, Marx, l'ignorance de leur caractère de classiques des sciences humaines dans tout milieu universitaire, mais aussi l'omission des influences réciproques entre la culture humaniste allemande et américaine font de la démarche de Bloom une incidence exemplaire d'une attitude bien éloignée de la lucidité de l'évaluation historique rigoureuse. Cette manière d'interprétation, distinguant et opposant sans équivoque une tradition républicaine et démocratique, soit elle américaine, anglaise ou française, et une tradition de retournement vers l'intériorité, carrément allemande, fait écho aux préjugés anciennes, tels s'articulant au long de l'histoire moderne

dans la dite guerre culturelle franco-allemande (chapitre 5): les remarques d'un Alfred Rosenberg, exaltant l'authentique révolution nazie comme une « révolution positive », culturelle, qui dépasserait la révolution française, en la terminant (p. 115), ou d'un Charles Maurras, identifiant la source de tout barbarisme moderne chez Kant (p. 104), illustrent deux manières (extrêmes) de promouvoir une si nette distinction.

Le sixième chapitre porte sur les débats allemands d'après guerre sur la dénazification, la culpabilité ou sur la repentance. Le thème de la préemption de la culture par rapport à la politique revient alors de façon très significative. Frank Thiess, écrivain allemand mineur, attaque Thomas Mann, dont l'exil aux Etats-Unis l'avait auréolé, en réclamant la légitimité morale de l' « exil intérieur » et de la « résistance par culture »: Thiess prétendait que les exilés à l'intérieur, écrivains, intellectuels en général, ont contribué beaucoup plus à la survivance de l'esprit allemand que les expatriés. Ils ont évité ainsi la déchéance complète de la culture, justement par s'abstenir de faire le moindre geste politique (p. 139). En fin de compte, c'est bien l'exclusive légitimité de la culture qui a conduit à l'échec de la dénazification: la culture, la seule qui compterait véritablement, doit se maintenir forte, moins les institutions politiques et leur ressortissants.

La manière de faire de Goethe une des références légitimatrices principales d'un régime politique tellement dépourvu que la République Démocratique Allemande fait l'objet du septième chapitre. Il peut être lu en guise d'introduction à la problématique de chapitre 8, sur la condition des intellectuels en RDA. En effet, la promotion de la culture comme remplaçante de la politique, ou – dans le cas échéant – de la légitimation culturelle aux dépens d'une légitimité proprement politique, se trouve après 1949 son relais majeur en RDA. Les mécanismes y participant sont subtilement identifiés et décrits par Lepenies. Une place centrale détient la réussite du régime communiste de maintenir le statut des intellectuels en tant que statut d'une élite (p. 170). La culture se constituait alors non seulement comme capital symbolique, à l'investir dans les échanges spécifiques du champ de la production intellectuelle, mais aussi – et, étant donné la censure, probablement plus – comme capital social employé dans les négociations avec la *nomenklatura*. D'autre part, opposition anti-communiste se trouvait en grande mesure sous l'influence de l'église protestante, dont le discours visait surtout le renforcement de l'âme, et pas

la lutte contre l'état autoritaire. Cette moralisation de la politique guida vers une mentalité radicale de « tout ou rien », qui, à la longue, a compromis tout concept de politique (p. 174). L'ascèse mondaine prônée par l'église soutenait en fait une interprétation du socialisme plus authentique que celle du socialisme au pouvoir. C'est bien cette attitude qui conduit à la situation gênante des intellectuels allemands de RDA en novembre 1989, de se croire les représentants socialistes d'une révolte anti-socialiste.

Par le concept de *Mitteleuropa*, dont la signification équivalait à mettre au rancart le terme de l'Europe de l'Est avec les spectres funestes l'accompagnant, la culture arrive à jouer un véritable rôle politique (chapitre 9). Elle légitimait la position politique des intellectuels dans les pays comme Tchécoslovaquie, Hongrie ou Pologne après la chute du communisme en 1989 (p. 179).

Le chapitre 10 se retourne à Thomas Mann, qui fait figure centrale tout au long du livre. Après la guerre Mann regagne l'Europe pour s'établir en Suisse. Ses écrits de la période, sa correspondance, attestent le dédain pour les Etats-Unis pour leurs institutions économiques et politique, exaltant Amérique justement pour ...sa culture.

Le dernier chapitre contient un éloge discret de l'écrivain Günther Grass, dont l'engagement politique dans la campagne électorale de 1989 pour le Parti Social-Démocrate est l'opposé de tout mépris hautain de la politique (p. 202). Pour contraster à l'humilité de Grass acceptant le rôle d'un « political worker », il s'agit ici – comme d'un dernier aspect de l'ascendant immortel de la culture – de la politique des monuments de la ville de Berlin, et de la dispute autour de l'opportunité de consacrer des œuvres esthétiquement très élaborés pour remémorer les crimes des nazis. Le Mémorial de l'Holocauste, dont la monumentalité impose, semble pourtant céder à l'apparemment indestructible attrait de resituer la morale dans l'esthétique.

Le riche livre de Wolf Lepenies pourrait paraître trop court. La finesse de l'argument semble toujours fraîche et inépuisable. De surcroît, la position prise par l'auteur au début en ce qui concerne la méthode, et le détail de la démarche, semble autoriser à conclure sur la nécessité de se formuler une option éthique ou politique pour rendre compte de façon sensée des tribulations de l'histoire intellectuelle récente.

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