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BIBLE VERSUS NATURAL SCIENCE? SOME EXEGETICAL CONSIDERATIONS ON GEN 1–2

KORINNA ZAMFIR

Abstract. The article proposes an exegetical discussion of the creation accounts, addressing some of the issues used by creationism, creation science and intelligent design to claim an alleged antagonism between bible and science, particularly evolution. In the case of the priestly creation account such critical aspects concern the (mis)interpretation of the six (seven) day scheme, the understanding of the goodness of creation, the inappropriateness of using Gen 1 to defend a special, immediate, *ex nihilo* creation in the way creationism does. The same creation account speaks not only of the creative acts of God, but also refers to the agency of creatures. With respect to the second creation account the essay addresses the meaning of the details referring to the creation of humans, and the relation between humans and their environment.

Keywords: Gen 1–3, creation, science, evolution

After two centuries of critical biblical scholarship any informed reader wonders whether there is real need to tackle with the alleged opposition between biblical and scientific approaches to topics like the origin of the universe or of life. So much ink has been spilled on the matter that it is rather frustrating to write about such issues. However, the persistent presence of pseudotheological creationist discourse and the increasing influence of pseudoscientific approaches like creation science and intelligent design justify the repeated discussion of the creation accounts. In what follows I propose an exegetical discussion of the main issues raised by the creation accounts, often used to underpin an alleged antagonism between bible and science. First, I reiterate some general questions about the composition, historical context, literary genre and purpose of the creation accounts. Second, I discuss a number of specific issues in the two creation narratives.

Cultural Context, Genre and Intent

In spite of the centrality of the doctrine of creation for systematic theology, the topic of creation does not stand at the heart of the Pentateuch, let alone of the Old Testament.¹ The topic of creation is deeply connected to that

¹ It is a classical claim that the Hebrew Bible is essentially historically oriented: see e.g. G. VON RAD, *Genesis: A Commentary* (The Old Testament Library; orig. *Das erste Buch Mose*, Göttingen, ⁹1972, transl. J.H. MARKS), Philadelphia: Westminster Press,

of salvation history, and gains certain autonomy after the exile, mainly in wisdom literature.²

The primeval history (Gen 1–11) functions as a sort of prologue to the history of Israel, and aims at integrating this history into the universal history of salvation. Connecting the history of Israel to the beginning of the world and of humanity may also reflect the topos of priority:³ Israel is able to draw back its origin to the beginning of the world, and stands thereby in an uninterrupted continuity with the first humans. Israel is therefore in no way inferior compared to the high cultures of the ancient Middle East.

The creation accounts establish a connection between the topics of salvation and creation: God who delivers Israel is the same God who created heaven and earth.⁴ No wonder that reflection over creation develops especially during the Babylonian captivity, a major crisis in the ancient history of Israel.⁵ Furthermore, the exile contributes to the development of creation-talk because of the close encounter with Mesopotamian creation myths.

It is common knowledge that Gen has two, originally independent creation accounts. The first, six-day or priestly creation account (Gen 1,1–2,4a) probably goes back to the exilic period. The narrative lays emphasis on the order(liness) of the world as manifestation of the divine power, addresses the place of humans in the world, and last, but not least, legitimises the šabat:

1972, 45–46; see also E. ZENGER, *Einleitung in das Alte Testament*, Stuttgart, ⁷2008, 70 on the Pentateuch as primeval history of Israel, that establishes the formative and normative basis for the existence of Israel. This view has been sometimes challenged: O. KEEL, S. SCHROER, *Schöpfung: biblische Theologien im Kontext altorientalischer Religionen*, Göttingen, ²2002, 11–29. However, the secondary historicisation of Canaanite festivals connected to creation, rightly argued by the authors, does not cancel out the fact that the OT as it stands is focused on history. Nor does the increased interest of contemporary theology in creation and ecotheology deny the focus of the OT on the history of salvation.

² This paper cannot address exhaustively the OT theology of creation, but see e.g. H.D. PREUB, *Theologie des Alten Testaments*, I, Stuttgart/Berlin/Köln, 1991, 259–274, the discussion of the biblical basis of the theology of creation by D. SATTLER, Th. SCHNEIDER, “Shöpfungslehre”, in Th. SCHNEIDER (ed.), *Handbuch der Dogmatik 1*, Düsseldorf, 1995, 120–238; P. RICOEUR, A. LACOCQUE, *Penser la Bible*, Paris, 1998, 19–102.

³ On the topos: K. THRAEDE, “Erfinder II (geistesgeschichtlich)”, *RAC* 5 (1962) 1191–1278; P. PILHOFER, *Presbyteron kreiton: der Altersbeweis der jüdischen und christlichen Apologeten und seine Vorgeschichte* (WUNT 2.39), Tübingen, 1990.

⁴ PREUB, *Theologie*, 272.

⁵ On the primeval history, and particularly the P creation account as fundament for Israel’s hope after the catastrophe: ZENGER, *Einleitung*, 170–171, 175.

world order is oriented toward the cult. The second creation account (traditionally called the “Jahvist”, Gen 2,4b-24, continued by the narrative improperly designated as the “fall”: Gen 2,25–3,24), is probably earlier.⁶ It focuses especially on humans, on their fate, on the relation between the sexes, and tackles with the frailty and ambivalence of human existence. The creation narratives are no historical accounts, even less scientific descriptions of the origins of the universe, of the species, or of humans. They have nothing to say about the *how* of creation, but everything about the ultimate ground of existence and about the human existence. Zenger speaks of the primeval history as the fundamental aetiology of life.⁷

The Six-day (Priestly) Creation Account

The *Sitz im Leben* of this creation account is the new political, religious and cultural situation brought about by the exile, the confrontation with the Mesopotamian creation myths, and the polemic with their image of the divine. It is a *mythopoetic narrative* focusing on the greatness of God, on the orderliness and harmony of the world. Humans have a prominent place in the world. The story culminates with the symbolic legitimation of the cult (the *šabat*) as rooted in divine activity. It has to do with the origins of the world only insofar as the author takes over some mythical motifs of the creation myths, such as the view that the creation of the orderly world is preceded by the defeat of the primordial chaos, the concept of creation through the word, the idea of spontaneous generation.⁸ While taking over such mythical motifs, the priestly creation account eliminates polytheism and astral cult,⁹ creation as procreation and theogony, as well as theomachy. Its image of God is lofty: God creates all things with no effort, solely by means of the fully effective creative

⁶ The dating is related to that of the “Jahvist”. On the various models regarding the composition of the Pentateuch, and on the difficulties of defining and dating the “Jahvist”: J.-L. SKA, *Introduzione alla lettura del Pentateuco. Chiavi per l'interpretazione dei prime cinque libri della Bibbia*, Roma, 1998, 161–165; ZENGER, *Einleitung*, 92–123; K. SCHMID, “Die Unteilbarkeit der Weisheit. Überlegungen zur sogenannten Paradieserzählung Gen 2f. und ihrer theologischen Tendenz”, *ZAW* 114 (2002) 21–39.

⁷ ZENGER, *Einleitung*, 63.

⁸ Compare with the *Enūma eliš*, J.B. PRITCHARD, *Ancient Near Eastern Texts relating to the Old Testament [ANET]*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1969, 60–72.

⁹ C. WESTERMANN, *Genesis I/1 (Genesis I–11)*, (BKAT), Neukirchen-Vluyn, 1974, 177–179; H. KESSLER, “Kreative Schöpfung – Kreativität Gottes. Überlegungen zum Spannungsfeld von Schöpfung und Evolution”, in J. KLOSE, J. OEHLER (eds.), *Gott oder Darwin Vernünftiges Reden über Schöpfung und Evolution*, Heidelberg, 2008, 27–57 (30).

word (will). God exists since the very beginning, is actively present, as the ultimate source and ground for all beings.¹⁰ The created world is well-ordered, good and teleologically oriented.

The World is Orderly and Good

The orderliness of the created world is a major theme of the account. The concept of order finds manifold expressions: in the six-day scheme, in the rhythmic succession of days, in the defeat of the chaos, in the acts of separation (light-darkness, waters from above and below, sea-land), as well as in the creation of light. Light, as principle of life and order, makes the world transparent and ordered. The acts of creation follow a well-established scheme: God commands, this command is fulfilled, the result is named, evaluated, and integrated in the order of time.¹¹

God names the creatures (day, night, heavens, land, sea). Naming establishes the essence and function of every creature, and again, it suggests clarity and order. Naming expresses thus teleology. Everything is oriented toward fulfilling the purpose established by God.

The narrative states six times that the result of creation is good (“God saw that it was good”: a light, the separation of the land and sea, the creation of plants, of heavenly luminaries and the implicit separation of light and darkness, the creation of reptiles, sea life and birds, that of animals); finally, for the seventh time God states as a sort of summary that everything is very good.

The optimistic assertion about the goodness of creation is meant to express the power of the Creator, and the teleological perspective: all beings correspond to the purpose established by God. The narrative does not intend therefore to assert the absolute perfection of beings as such. Creatures are not created/created as absolutely precise mechanic devices, as implied by the proponents of Intelligent Design.¹² On the other hand, remarkably, the priestly creation account does not address the origin of evil.

¹⁰ KESSLER, “Kreative Schöpfung”, 30–31.

¹¹ WESTERMANN, *Genesis I/1*, 117.

¹² The main postulate of ID, the alleged “irreducible complexity” of living beings and organs that requires an intelligent designer is commonly illustrated with examples from perfectly functioning mechanic devices. M.J. BEHE, “Molecular Machines: Experimental Support for the Design Inference”, in R.T. PENNOCK (ed.), *Intelligent Design, Creationism and Its Critics: Philosophical, Theological, and Scientific Perspectives*, Cambridge, MA, London, 2001, 241–256 (orig. in *Cosmic Pursuit* 1.2 [1998] 27–35); Ph.E. JOHNSON, “Creator or Blind Watchmaker?”, in PENNOCK, *Intelligent Design*, 435–449 (orig. in *First Things* 29 [1993] 8–14); W.A. DEMBSKI, “In Defence of Intelligent Design”, in Philip CLAYTON, Zachary SIMPSON (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science*, Oxford, 2006, 715–731; W.B. PROVINE, “Evolution, Religion,

The Question of Six (Seven) Days

The priestly creation account is built on a seven-day scheme. Against naïve views, the text does not deal with the duration of creation (six days or epochs), but the *seven-day* scheme has to do with the intention of the priestly author and with contemporary cultic practice. Its focus is actually on the seventh day, the šabat.¹³ To put it simple, we have a *six-day creation account because of the* eminent religious importance of the *seventh day*. Creation stretching over six days culminates in the cultic seventh day, established by God. The question is therefore not whether we have here real, so to speak 24-hours days.¹⁴ The question is what the actual purpose of the text is. Given the interests and intention of the priestly author, the literary-theological purpose and the historical context, the six-day creation account does not speak about how many days God needed to create the universe, but about the theological ground of celebrating the šabat, presented as rooted in the order of creation.¹⁵ The seven-day scheme has to do thus with the theological legitimation of the šabat: šabat exists and has to be observed because it was created and

and Science”, in CLAYTON, SIMPSON, *Oxford Handbook*, 667–680. See also A. KREINER, “Gott als Designer? Kreationismus, Intelligent Design und Darwinismus”, in G. AUGUSTIN, K. KRÄMER (Hg.), *Gott denken und bezeugen. FS für Kardinal Walter Kasper zum 75. Geburtstag*, Freiburg, Basel, Wien, 2008, 542–567, 552–565; R.L. NUMBERS, *The Creationists. From Scientific Creationism to Intelligent Design*, Cambridge, MA, London, 2006, 373–398; P.F. LURQUIN, L. STONE, *Evolution and Religious Creation Myth: How Scientists Respond*, Oxford, 2007, 15–18, 68; SCOTT, „Antievolutionism”, 279–285. However, for a criticism of ID: B. FORREST, “The Wedge at Work: How Intelligent Design Creationism Is Wedging Its Way into the Cultural and Academic Mainstream”, in PENNOCK, *Intelligent Design*, 5–53; R.T. PENNOCK, “The Pre-Modern Sins of Intelligent Design”, in CLAYTON, SIMPSON, *Oxford Handbook*, 732–748; for its scientific critique: Lurquin, Stone, *Evolution*, 58–62, 68–71; M.J. BRAUER, D.R. BRUMBAUGH, “Biology Remystified: The Scientific Claims of the New Creationists”, in PENNOCK, *Intelligent Design*, 289–334; K.R. MILLER, “The Flagellum Unspun. The Collapse of «Irreducible Complexity»”, in W.A. DEMBSKI, M. RUSE (eds.), *Debating Design: From Darwin to DNA Black Box. The Biochemical Challenge to Evolution*, Cambridge, 2004, 81–97.

¹³ WESTERMANN, *Genesis* I/1, 124–126; KESSLER, “Kreative Schöpfung”, 30.

¹⁴ For the sense of real days, WESTERMANN, *Genesis* I/1, 126.

¹⁵ On the P-creation account as etiology of the šabat: J. VAN SETERS, *The Life of Moses: The Yahwist as Historian in Exodus-Numbers*, Louisville, KY, 1994, 187–188; see also O.H. STECK, *Der Schöpfungsbericht der Priesterschrift: Studien zur literarkritischen und überlieferungsgeschichtlichen Problematik von Genesis 1,1-2,4a* (FRLANT 115), Göttingen, 1975, ²1981 191–192 (the šabat as given by God in creation, as basis of its later cultic celebration).

“observed” by God. This suggests that at the time the text is written, Jews may already observe the šabat, maybe as a mark of their identity, and the author needs, for one or another reason, to consolidate this practice with theological arguments. The legitimating function of this aspect of the narrative is also suggested by the fact that the probably earlier,¹⁶ deuteronomistic version of the Decalogue legitimates the šabat with the liberation from Egypt (Deut 5,12-15). The intentional application of a purposeful seven-day scheme is also suggested by the fact that the author has to squeeze eight acts of creation into six days.

The seven-day scheme and the periodisation also suggest order and harmony. To sum up, the six days are not scientific information about the time-span of creation, but, beyond providing rhythm and structure to the narrative, they emphasise the order intended by God and the importance of the šabat. It makes no sense therefore to attempt to harmonise the six days of creation with the effective time (or timelessness) of the universe.

Creatio ex nihilo and Absolute Beginning or Defeat of the Primordial Chaos?

The translation and interpretation of the opening words (b^erē³šît bārā³ ^elōhîm) is a matter of debate, partly because traditional theology saw in this line the biblical ground of the doctrine of *creatio ex nihilo*. According to traditional translations (“in the beginning God created heaven and earth”) b^erē³šît refers to the absolute beginning; in this case rē³šît is in the absolute state, and v. 1 is a main clause.¹⁷ The beginning would then be the “very first moment” at the

¹⁶ VAN SETERS, *Life of Moses*, 280; J. HAUSMANN, “A tízparancs – egy univerzális etika?”, in BENYIK Gy. (ed.), *Mózes törvénye – Krisztus törvénye*, Szeged, 2007, 97–105 (98, following E. NOORT, “Der Dekalog und die Theologie im Alten Testament”, in id. (ed.), *Religion und Normativität: Interdisziplinäre Überlegungen zum Dekalog damals und jetzt. Vorträge der dritten Konferenz der Mittelsüdosteuropäischen und Niederländischen Fakultäten in Groningen 2002*, Groningen, 2004, 1–4, 5–14.). Van Seters argues that in Exod it is the J to take over and modify the tradition found in Deut: the J makes of the general commandment of observing the šabat (a gift received in the wilderness) the testing of Israel’s obedience, a motive that is also found in Ezek 20,10ff; further, the law of šabat is edited by P (190–191, 251).

¹⁷ On the various options and the structure of vv. 1-3: WESTERMANN, *Genesis I/1*, 108–109; 130–136; O. LORETZ, *Schöpfung und Mythos: Mensch und Welt nach den Anfangskapiteln der Genesis* (Stuttgarter Bibelstudien 32), Stuttgart, 1968, 82–84; H. RECHENMACHER, “Gott und das Chaos. Ein Beitrag zum Verständnis von Gen 1,1–3”, *ZATW* 114 (2002) 1–20 (1-8; v. 1 subordinate clause of v. 3); V.P. HAMILTON, *The Book of Genesis. Chapters 1 – 17* (NICOT), Grand Rapids, MI, 1990, 103–108 (defending the traditional translation). Westermann regards v. 1 as a summary, but discovers the

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beginning of time, when God starts creating the universe, the absolute beginning before which no creature existed. Yet, if רֵאשִׁית is in the construct state, v. 1 is a subordinate clause (“in the beginning of the creation of heaven and earth”), the main clause being in either v. 3 (in this case v. 2 is a parenthesis) or in v. 2 (v. 3 being an independent main clause).¹⁸ Thus vv. 1-3 may be translated as follows:

In the beginning, <i>when</i> God created the heavens and the earth	[subordinate clause]
– the Earth was a formless and waste and darkness covered [...]–,	[parenthesis]
<i>Then</i> God said: let there be light. ¹⁹	[main clause]
In the beginning, <i>when</i> God created the heavens and the earth,	[subordinate clause]
<i>then</i> the Earth was a formless and waste and darkness covered [...].	[main clause]
God said: let there be light.	[independent main clause]

In both cases we have the “when... then” structure, typical for creation myths or myths of origins.²⁰

An alternative approach suggests that *b^crē^cšîṭ* should not be taken in any temporal sense, either absolute or relative, but to mean “as firstling/firstfruits or first product/result” of creation.²¹

This syntactic analysis is not mere hairsplitting. Some biblical scholars prefer the traditional translation, based on dogmatic considerations,²² and discover in v. 1 a reference to the absolute beginning. Yet, such abstract

“when... than” structure in vv. 2-3 (*Genesis* I/1, 132–133, 135). For an overview of the various translations: D.W. COTTER, *Genesis* (Berit Olam. Studies in Hebrew Narrative & Poetry), Collegeville, MN, 2003, 13–14.

¹⁸ בָּרָא should be vocalized than not as בְּרָא, but as the inf. בָּרָא.

¹⁹ The translation preferred by the NAB.

²⁰ The “when... then” structure is supported by parallels with the opening of *Enūma eliš*. Westermann adheres to this structure, but as noted above, discovers it in vv. 2-3 (*Genesis* I/1, 130–131).

²¹ J. L’HOUR, “Ré’shîṭ et beré’shîṭ encore et toujours”, *Biblica* 91 (2010) 51–65, following W. OSWALD, “Das Erstlingswerk Gottes – zur Übersetzung von Gen 1,1”, *ZAW* 120.3 (2008) 417–421. Both decide on this meaning based on the uses of *rē^cšîṭ* in the Hebrew Bible, not least in Prov 8,22. If this were the case, *b^c* should be taken as *beth essentiae*.

²² VON RAD, *Genesis*, 48–49; to some extent RÓZSA H., *A Genesis könyve I (A bibliai őstörténet)*, Budapest, 2002, 71–73 (though admitting that v. 2 describes the chaos).

conception is hardly characteristic for the concrete Semitic way of thinking. The Hebrew Bible does not use the abstract concept of “nothing” and “creation out of nothing”. V. 2 goes on with the description of the primordial condition, of the primordial chaos, signified by epithets like “formless and waste” (tōhû wābōhû), by the abyss or water flood (t^ehôm),²³ and by the darkness,²⁴ and probably also by the rû^aḥ ʔelōhîm.²⁵ Thus according to the Hebrew Bible creation essentially implies the defeat of the chaos and the creation of the orderly world.²⁶ The creation of order is followed by the shaping and population of the spaces. Psa 74,12-16 proposes a similar picture: creation starts with the defeat of the sea and of the sea monsters, followed by positive creating acts (compare Isa 51,9-10, assimilating the defeat of the chaos, of the sea monsters – rahab, tannîn – with the sea miracle of Exod).

The doctrine of *creatio ex nihilo* may therefore not be found in Gen 1,1, just as its opposite, creation from pre-existent matter, may not be found either.²⁷ The author simply does not conceive reality in this manner, his perspective is not marked by these alternatives, but such options are the result of later reflection.²⁸

The topic of *creatio ex nihilo* is traditionally related to 2 Macc 7,28, a text reflecting the mentality of Hellenistic Judaism. Yet, not even 2 Macc 7 is immediately aimed at establishing a systematic doctrine of creation. The speech of the mother actually drafts a parallel between resurrection, the shaping of the child in the womb and the creation of the world: all three imply bringing to existence from the state of non-existence, and all three emphasise the

²³ WESTERMANN, *Genesis* I/1, 145–146.

²⁴ See also RECHENMACHER, “Gott und das Chaos”, 8–12; RÓZSA, *Genesis*, 73; HARLOW, “Creation”, 170–171.

²⁵ WESTERMANN, *Genesis* I/1, 149; RECHENMACHER, “Gott und das Chaos”, 9, 13. This is supported by the parallel between “waters” and “abyss”, between rû^aḥ ʔelōhîm and darkness. See also VON RAD, *Genesis*, 49 (storm of God, terrible storm).

²⁶ K. BERGER, “Die Schöpfung ist wie eine Hallig – nicht aus dem Nichts gemacht, sondern Ordnung statt Chaos”, in KLOSE, OEHLER, *Gott oder Darwin*, 73–80 (75–76). This may be an elimination of the mythical motif of chaos generating the gods: KESSLER, “Kreative Schöpfung”, 30. Pace VON RAD, *Genesis*, 49; COTTER, *Genesis*, 10, 16.

²⁷ WESTERMANN, *Genesis* I/1, 150–152; LORETZ, *Schöpfung*, 84–86; PREUB, *Theologie*, 267; BERGER, “Schöpfung”, 74–75. Westermann notes with good reason that “matter” is an abstraction unlikely to be thought of by the author (151).

²⁸ The idea of absolute beginning may have been suggested by the LXX ἀρχή, but the idea of *creatio ex nihilo* is the result of ulterior reflection (rightly RICOEUR, “Penser la création”, in P. RICOEUR, A. LACOCQUE, *Penser la Bible*, 57–102 [61]).

(re)creative power of God.²⁹ (The patent doctrine of *creatio ex nihilo* is in fact a Christian teaching, formulated under the influence of Middle Platonism.³⁰)

Given these considerations, Gen 1,1 may not be taken to prove a special (immediate), *ex nihilo* creation of the universe and of life, in the manner defended by creationism, nor can one postulate a chronological gap between the creation of the universe, its destruction through some catastrophe and its recreation, allegedly sustained by the sequence of vv. 1 and 2-3.³¹

The Verb *bārāʾ*. Creation is Not Special Creation

The verb *bārāʾ* describes a creative act specific for God.³² It is particularly frequent in exilic texts (P, Dt-Isa). In the priestly creation account it is used for the creation of heaven-and-earth (the universe), the creatures of the sea and air, and of humans. However, the creation of the vault and of the luminaries, of the creatures of the earth, and the project of creating humans are described with the verb *āśāʾ*^h, to fashion, shape. This brief overview shows on the one hand that the verb *bārāʾ* is particularly important, as it is eminently used for God's creating activity. On the other hand, the text uses another verb, as well, and diverse imageries, to describe creation. This prevents the theologian from attributing a quasi-magical significance to *bārāʾ*. Moreover, as it will be shown in a while, creation may also occur through the intrinsic creative power of creatures. We should also note that the concrete *how* of creation is not

²⁹ See B. SCHMITZ, "Geschaffen aus dem Nichts? Die Funktion der Rede von der Schöpfung im zweiten Makkabäerbuch", *Sacra Scripta* 7.2 (2009) 199–215.

³⁰ G. MAY, *Creatio Ex Nihilo. The Doctrine of "Creation out of Nothing" in Early Christian Thought*, Edinburgh, 1994 (on 2 Macc 7,6-8); cf. BERGER, "Schöpfung", 74–76.

³¹ On creationist interpretations of Gen 1, see Numbers, *Creationists*, esp. 268–372; H. HEMMINGER, "Die Geschichte des neuzeitlichen Kreationismus. Von «creation-science» zur Intelligent-Design-Bewegung", in M. NEUKAMM, *Evolution im Fadenkreuz des Kreationismus. Darwins religiöse Gegner und ihre Argumentation* (Religion, Theologie und Naturwissenschaft 19), Göttingen, 2009, 15–36; E.C. SCOTT, "Antievolution and Creationism in the United States", *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 26 (1997), 263–289 (266–270); KREINER, "Gott", 543–552; A.E MCGRATH, "Darwinism", in Ph. CLAYTON, Z. SIMPSON (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science*, Oxford, 2006, 681–696 (692). Creationist gap theory is based on the supposition that Gen 1,2 would describe conditions that succeeded (after an indeterminate period), the original creation of a perfect universe. See HAMILTON, *Genesis*, 115–116.

³² On the meaning: BDB s.v. See further Berger, "Schöpfung", 75. As opposed to the common view, the verb is not used exclusively of God (except in its sense of "create"), but in its primary meaning (to cut), is also used of humans: Josh 17,15.18: wood; Ez 23,47: humans; Ez 21,24: an indicator).

described. It may be approximated with the concept of creation through word (speech), not infrequent in antiquity, e.g. in the Memphis theogony.³³ But precisely this somewhat more elevated image prevents us from imagining a God directly intervening as a sort of artisan. The narrative emphasises the effectiveness of the divine creative will, and not the way creation actually occurs. This creation does not exclude, however, the role of creatures.

The Agency of Creatures

The priestly creation narrative describes creation as gradually emerging through the divine word or will, in certain cases involving the agency of creatures. Plants do not appear as a result of direct divine intervention, but they emerge from the soil (a view otherwise typical for myths of origins).³⁴ To take another, somewhat different example, living beings have certain autonomy and creativity;³⁵ they share the ability to transmit life. God creates plants bearing seed, trees, whose fruit bears seed. Animals multiply. Humans' sexuality and capacity to multiply is understood as an expression of divine blessing.³⁶

For the first example, the author did certainly not think of a spontaneous generation in modern terms, even less of a theory of evolution. It is also true that a development of species could not have been envisaged, mainly because the author wishes to emphasise the divinely established order and stability.³⁷ Yet, it is remarkable that God is understood to create in some cases indirectly, making use of the agency of a creature.³⁸ As for the second example, its significance may be downplayed, if we distinguish between creation as primary act of calling into being, achieved by God, and the ability of creatures to pass

³³ WESTERMANN, *Genesis I/1*, 36–57. For the creative act of Ptah by means of his tongue, i.e. word see the inscription of the Shabaka-stone, ll. 52–54, in Pritchard, *ANET*, 5.

³⁴ WESTERMANN, *Genesis I/1*, 122, 174.

³⁵ KESSLER, “Kreative Schöpfung”, 30.

³⁶ On the emphasis of P on fertility as blessing: Ph.A. BIRD, “ ‘Male and Female He Created Them’: Gen 1:27b in the Context of the Priestly Account of Creation”, *HThR* 74.2 (1981), 129–159; ead., “Bone of My Bone and Flesh of My Flesh”, *Theology Today* 50.4 (1993), 521–534.

³⁷ W. PANNENBERG, *Systematic Theology* 2, (tr. G.W. Bromiley), Grand Rapids, MI, Edinburgh, 1994, 118–119.

³⁸ On the differences and similarities between creation myths and myths of origin: WESTERMANN, *Genesis I/1*, 28–30, 34–36. The image has to do with the mythical image of the ground as mother of the living beings (cf. Psa 139,15), yet it also modifies the concept insofar as life emerges from the soil due to the will of God.

on life. Yet, passing on life is both the continuation of the activity of the Creator during times,³⁹ and the own agency of creatures.⁴⁰

The Anthropology of the Priestly Account. Creation in the Divine Image

Humans (the generic ʾādām) appear as a result of the last creating act; they are created in the image (šelem) and likeness (d^omût) of God.⁴¹ This divine resemblance is achieved by humans in their quality of persons (not through one particular aptitude), as male and female.⁴² The concept of creation in the image of God is connected with the ancient idea of representation, and may have its roots in the Mesopotamian and Egyptian royal ideology: the king is created in the image and likeness of God, being therefore God’s representative, and holding divine authority.⁴³ The application of this concept has a twofold implication. First, the text continues the “democratisation” of the concept: not only the king, but humans as such bear the authority of God.⁴⁴ We encounter a similar “democratisation” in other ancient sources as well.⁴⁵ Second, as opposed to Mesopotamian myths, humans are not slaves of the gods,⁴⁶ but the representatives of God in the created world.

³⁹ WESTERMANN, *Genesis* I/1, 23–24.

⁴⁰ W. PANNENBERG, “The Doctrine of Creation and Modern Science”, *Zygon* 23.1 (1988) 3–21 (8–9).

⁴¹ On the background and meaning of this imagery, see A. R. MILLARD, P. BORDREUIL, “A Statue from Syria with Assyrian and Aramaic Inscriptions”, *The Biblical Archaeologist*, 45.3 (1982), 135–141; A. SCHÜLE, “Made in the Image of God: The Concepts of Divine Images in Gen 1–3”, *ZAW* 117 (2005), 1–20.

⁴² HAMILTON, *Genesis*, 137–138.

⁴³ VON RAD, *Genesis*, 58; H. SEEBASS, *Genesis I. Urgeschichte (1,1–11,26)*, Neukirchen-Vluyn, 1996, 80–83; G.J. WENHAM, *Genesis 1–15* (WBC 1), Waco, TX, 1987, 29–33; J. SCHARBERT, *Genesis 1–11*, Würzburg, 1985, 44–45; KESSLER, “Kreative Schöpfung”, 30–31. See also J.M. MILLER, “In the ‘Image’ and ‘Likeness’ of God”, *JBL* 91.3 (1972), 289–304; J. FERRER, “Imatge de Déu, un concepte ambigu”, in A. Puig TÀRRECH (ed.), *Imatge de Déu*, (Scripta Biblica), Barcelona, 2006, 11–30. Westermann’s questioning of the idea of representation is not convincing (*Genesis* I/1, 211–212, 214–218). But he notes with good reason the frequency of the motif in ancient literature (51–52).

⁴⁴ HAMILTON, *Genesis*, 137; KESSLER, “Kreative Schöpfung”, 30–31.

⁴⁵ The teaching of Merikare; the *Gilgamesh* (WESTERMANN, *Genesis* I/1, 49, 51–52, 213).

⁴⁶ As in the *Atramhasis*; Pritchard, *ANET*, 99–100; cf. S. DALLEY, *Myths from Mesopotamia: Creation, the Flood, Gilgamesh, and Others*, Oxford/New York, 1998, 14–16. On the biblical perspective: HAMILTON, *Genesis*, 140.

Being created in the image of God elevates humans over the created world, an idea strengthened by the topic of dominion over the world (compare Psa 8,6-9⁴⁷). The verb *rādāh* (1,26.28) basically means to „tread”, „trample” (e.g. the grapes, Joel 4,13); figurately it may refer to the rule of the king (Psa 72,8; 110,2), to prevailing over the enemy (Isa 14,2), or to social oppression (Ezek 34,4).⁴⁸ The verb suggests therefore dominion, superiority, and often has a negative connotation. The other verb used to express human domination, *kābaš*, to tread, subjugate (v. 28) is also quite negative.⁴⁹ The strong anthropocentrism of Gen 1,26.28 is problematic from a scientific and ecological perspective. While according to Gen creation proper culminates with the creation of humans, according to evolutionary theory humans are not the result of a necessary process, and, objectively speaking, they are not more valuable than other living beings.⁵⁰ From an ecological perspective anthropocentrism and dominion over the world seem to legitimate the waste of natural resources.⁵¹ Biblical scholars defending a biblical hermeneutics of recovery argue nonetheless that it is not the text of Gen 1,26-28, but its erroneous interpretation that legitimises the devastation of the environment by humans.⁵²

To decide over the significance of this passage one needs to look again at its historical-cultural context. Creation in the image of God, understood in terms of representation, has a major religious and social importance: contrary to myths, it emphasises the dignity of the human person. Second, if one compares it with Mesopotamian myths, the narrative probably refers to labour, more precisely to the tilling of the soil, as foremost form of dominion over the earth, and if so, it values labour. Certainly, however, dominion over all spaces and almost all living beings extends this dominion beyond that over the soil,

⁴⁷ J.S. KSELMAN, M.L. BARRÉ, „Psalms”, in R.E. BROWN, J.A. FITZMYER, R.E. MURPHY, *NJBC*, 523–552 (810).

⁴⁸ BDB, s.v. רדה.

⁴⁹ BDB, s.v. כבש. See 2 Sam 8,11; Jer 34,11.16; Est 7,8.

⁵⁰ See R. SPAEMANN, „Sein und Gewordensein – Was erklärt die Evolutionstheorie?”, in KLOSE, OEHLER, *Gott oder Darwin*, 81–94 (91).

⁵¹ L. WHITE, „The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis”, *Science* 155 (1967), 1203–1207. Cf. also KESSLER, „Kreative Schöpfung”, 31.

⁵² On the various hermeneutical trends in issues concerning ecotheology: D.G. HORRELL, C. HUNT, Ch. SOUTHGATE, „Appeals to the Bible in Ecotheology and Environmental Ethics: a Typology of Hermeneutical Stances”, *Studies in Christian Ethics* 21.2 (2008) 219–238. For an example of a hermeneutic of recovery: R.J. Bauckham, *God and the Crisis of Freedom: Biblical and Contemporary Perspectives*, Louisville, KY, 2002, 128–177.

through labour. Yet, one cannot expect modern concern with environmental issues from an ancient text that addresses humans' relationship with God; other topics are subordinated to this purpose.

No doubt, from the perspective of the priestly author, humans are superior to other humans. From the viewpoint of evolutionary biology humans may be just one species among others, but this is the perspective of one discipline, and hardly the motivating factor for civilisation and culture. Perhaps two more points that show the limits of human dominion are worth considering. (1) The dominion of humans does not extend to other humans. (2) The text reflects an ancient perspective according to which humans were initially vegetarian, a motif signifying the original peace between humans and animals. Thus – at least according to the order of creation, animals may not be slain.

These reflections show that the biblical perspective is certainly anthropocentric, but the purpose of vv. 26-28 is to assert human dignity, against contemporary myths, and not to legitimate irresponsibility vis-à-vis the environment.⁵³

The necessary or contingent character of the existence of humans is not a scientific issue strictly speaking, but rather a matter of worldview. Those asserting a difference between the scientific and the biblical perspective point to the role attributed to hazard in evolutionary biology. But if we compare the unintentionality of mutations leading to better accommodation or to the apparition of new species to the philosophical-theological idea of contingency, the two perspectives are not so very different. The biblical narratives assert that God created humans, i.e. God is the necessary and ultimate ground for their coming to being, but not that God created humans out of necessity or constraint.⁵⁴ Human existence is contingent. Theology does not necessarily exclude the role of hazard.⁵⁵ A more problematic aspect of the role hazard has in evolution, at least for some theologians, is the view that under different circumstances, evolution could have lead to a different outcome, which may have not included the apparition of humans.⁵⁶ But, in principle, why could one

⁵³ It is amazing of the other hand how fundamentalist biblical interpretation may justify the waste of natural resources and ecological irresponsibility, through the idea of a wrongly understood dominion, and through apocalyptic texts allegedly foretelling the imminent end of the world. For examples, see HORRELL, HUNT, SOUTHGATE, "Appeals", 230–231 (the hermeneutics of resistance to ecology, and the statement of James Watt, former Secretary of the Interior in the Reagan administration).

⁵⁴ KREINER, "Gott", 563–564.

⁵⁵ KREINER, "Gott", 563–564.

⁵⁶ KREINER, "Gott", 564–565.

not imagine that God could have created an entirely different world? One thing is sure: the world as it exists now, as it actually evolved, did lead at a certain moment to the apparition of humans. If one may say so, from the perspective of God, human existence is hardly a necessity. The Bible says only that the ultimate ground of the apparition of humans is the creating intention of God. It does not say that God could not have done otherwise. On the contrary, the Hebrew Bible is very well aware of the frailty and contingency of humans (Job 4,19-20; 14; Psa 90). Pannenberg has a good point noting that the very assertion of creation expresses the contingency of all beings.⁵⁷

The Limits and Polemic Character of the Text

The narrative clearly reflects the ancient, geocentric worldview, with heavens conceived as a vault on which sun, moon and stars hang as luminaries, a vault separating waters from below and from above, with apertures that allow rain to fall. It is common knowledge that for centuries this view has been taken to be part of revelation, – precisely because of an epistemological monism and because of the naïve interpretation of inspiration. Yet, these aspects pertain to the cultural limits of the author. Some of the elements, while ostensibly naïve in terms of scientific understanding, actually reflect polemics with contemporary beliefs and practices, such as those related to astral cults.⁵⁸ For the author, the Sun, the Moon and the stars have nothing divine in them; they are merely God's creatures, fulfilling a practical function. To be sure, as Pannenberg remarks, this image has to do not that much with an outdated cosmology, as with an outdated theological controversy.⁵⁹

The Second Creation Account (Gen 2,4b-24)

Contrary to naïve views, the Eden-narrative has nothing to say about how humans were created. It is a metaphoric narrative about the essence of human existence, about its typical traits.⁶⁰ Gen 2–3 is an *aetiology* of phenomena like

⁵⁷ PANNENBERG, "Doctrine", 8.

⁵⁸ HAMILTON, *Genesis* 1, 55.

⁵⁹ PANNENBERG, *Systematic Theology* 2, 1994, 117.

⁶⁰ KESSLER, "Kreative Schöpfung", 30–31 ("Urmuster des menschlichen Daseins"). "Gen 2 sagt, wie der Mensch von Gott eigentlich gemeint ist (im vertrauten Verhältnis zu Gott, zu Tieren und zum Partner, seine Endlichkeit als Grenze anerkennend, den Garten bebauend und bewahrend: *so* müsste es sein, *so* wäre es gut). Aber – sagt dann Gen 3 – so ist es faktisch ja nicht (und ist es bis jetzt auch noch nie gewesen). Die Worte „Sünde“ und „Sündenfall“ kommen im Text nicht vor, aber es ist die Rede vom faktisch gebrochenen, nicht mehr vertrauten Verhältnis zu Gott, zum Mitmenschen und zu allem."

the frail nature of humans, labour and related failure, the origin of sexes, the community of man and woman, the origin of sexuality and procreation, the ambivalence of the relation between sexes, the social status of man and woman, and probably death. It is uncertain whether death is regarded as punishment, or the conclusion of a life of hardship.⁶¹ The narrative certainly speaks about the unattainable desire of humans of all times to live forever. The aetiology becomes the metaphor of human existence.

The Creation and Nature of Humans

The creation of humans is depicted in highly anthropomorphic and metaphorical terms. God creates, more precisely fashions the human being (the ʾādām)⁶² from earth/clay (ʾādāmā^h), as/from dust (ʿāpār), and breathes into his nostrils the breath of life. The verb yāšar frequently denotes the work of the potter, a common metaphor for creation (Psa 103,14; Isa 29,16; 45,9; 64,8; Jer 18). This very common motif of ancient creation myths⁶³ ultimately expresses the frail character of human existence (compare Qoh 12,5-7). The creation and the naming of humans point to the twofold dimension of human existence: humans are creatures of God, in a dialogical relation with God; in the same time they are intimate part of this world. The breath of life is shared with animals. This multiply metaphoric narrative may not be contrasted with the scientific models describing the origin of humans, as it addresses a totally different dimension. Ricoeur has made an excellent point: the distinctiveness of primordial and historical time leads to the liberating insight that we do not have to date the creation of Adam with relation to the Pithecanthropus or the

⁶¹ WESTERMANN, *Genesis* I/1, 363.

⁶² The ʾādām of Gen 2 is not a proper name, nor does it refer to an individual, but is a generic term that denotes humans or humanity. On the generic, collective, gender-inclusive meaning of ʾādām: BDB s.v.; F. MAASS, s.v. אָדָם, *ThDOT* 1,75–87; V.P. HAMILTON, NIDOTTE, s.v. אָדָם. Compare WESTERMANN, *Genesis* I/1, 275–276; SEEBASS, *Genesis* I, 81; Ph. TRIBLE, *God and the Rhetoric of Sexuality*, (Overtures to Biblical Theology), Philadelphia, 1993, 18; see also R. ALBERTZ, “Die Frage des Ursprungs der Sprache im Alten Testament”, in R. ALBERTZ, I. KOTTSIEPER, J. WÖHRLE with G. KERN (eds.), *Geschichte und Theologie: Studien zur Exegese des Alten Testaments und zur Religionsgeschichte Israels*, (BZAW 326), Berlin, 2003, in *Geschichte und Theologie*, 2003, 65–84 (76). Pace J. BARR, “One Man, or All Humanity?”, in A. BRENNER, J.W. VAN HENTEN (eds.), *Recycling Biblical Figures*, Leiden, 1999, 3–21). Barr’s contention is challenged by J.C. de MOOR, “The First Human Being a Male? A Response to Professor Barr”, in the same volume, pp. 22–27, and by D.J.A. CLINE, “אָדָם, the Hebrew for «Human, Humanity». A Response to James Barr”, *VT* 53.3 (2003) 297–310.

⁶³ As in *Atramhasis*, *ANET*, 99–100; DALLEY, *Myths*, 14–16. According to the Memphite myth, Hnum shapes man out of clay.

Neanderthal man.⁶⁴ Should we continue this line of reflection, there is no need to date Eve with the theory of the “mitochondrial Eve”.

The Relation between Humans and their Environment

Humans and their world are inextricably bound, as suggested by the word-play ʾādām-ʾādāma^h.⁶⁵ They share the breath of life (nešāmā^h) with the animals (Gen 7,22, compare 1,20-21.24.30; 2,19 *passim*). Humans and animals belong together in a sense: they are all created out of the ground (2,7.19). The metaphor of humans working (ābaḏ) and keeping (šāmar) the garden describes them as fulfilling through labour a task received from God, one of the essential criteria defining human condition.⁶⁶ They are thereby, metaphorically speaking, also stewards of the world:⁶⁷ to put it in modern terms, they are responsible for their environment.

Notwithstanding this community with the created world, humans have a special position within it (2,18-20): God creates the animals for the ʾādām, and the ʾādām names them, establishing thereby their purpose. The text is thus ambivalent: humans and animals share something in terms of nature, but we would look in vain for regulations on the protection of species. One can hardly expect such modern insights from a text dealing with the overall purpose of human existence, and with humans’ relationship to God.

Man and Woman

The relationship between man and woman is a major topic of the narrative. Distinction according to gender becomes explicit with the creation of the woman (ʾiššāh), when the ʾādām, the earthly creature, becomes (ʾiš), man.⁶⁸

⁶⁴ RICOEUR, “Penser la création”, 59. (“Combien est libérant l’aveu qu’il n’y a pas lieu de dater la création d’Adam par rapport au pithécantrophe ou à l’homme de Neandertal.”)

⁶⁵ HAMILTON, *Genesis*, 156; Th. HIEBERT, “Re-Imaging Nature. Shifts in Biblical Interpretation”, *Interpretation* 50. 1 (1996) 36–46 (41–42).

⁶⁶ See R. ALBERTZ, “Die Kulturarbeit im Atramhasis-Epos im Vergleich zur biblischen Urgeschichte”, in ALBERTZ *et. al.*, *Geschichte und Theologie*, 2003, 1–21.

⁶⁷ Interestingly the voidness of the world preceding creation is explained not only with the lack of rain, but also with the absence of humans to work the land (Gen 2,4-5). G.M. TUCKER, “Rain on a Land Where No One Lives: The Hebrew Bible on the Environment”, *JBL* 116.1 (1997) 3–17 (8).

⁶⁸ Ph. TRIBLE, *God and the Rhetoric of Sexuality*, (Overtures to Biblical Theology), Philadelphia, 1993, 98; R.J. CLIFFORD, *Genesis* (1,1–25,18), *NJBC*, 8–43 (12); E. NOORT, “The Creation of Man and Woman in Biblical and Ancient Near Eastern Traditions”, in G.P. LUTTIKHUIZEN, *The Creation of Man and Woman: Interpretations of the Biblical Narratives in Jewish and Christian Traditions* (Themes in Biblical Narrative 3), Leiden/Boston/Köln, 2000, 1–18 (11). Pace R.S. KAWASHIMA, “A Revisionist Reading

The narrative is implicitly androcentric, since it reflects a patriarchal society where woman exists for man. However, the images used in the narrative, – the creation of the woman from the rib of the ʔādām, as well as the ʔiššāh-ʔiš wordplay, the idiom “bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh”, commonly used in the Hebrew Bible to describe kinship, are metaphors expressing the idea of intimate relationship, consubstantiality and belonging together.⁶⁹ These considerations show that the creation of the woman does not speak about the *how*, either. The narrative is the aetiology of the relationship between the sexes.

Transcending One’s Limits and Attaining Everlasting Life. The Unattainable Desire

The drama developing in Gen 2–3 focuses on two symbolic trees, the tree of life, and the one of the knowledge of good and evil. The first is a mythical motif embodying the eventually unattainable (v. 22) desire for everlasting life.⁷⁰ The second probably reflects the desire for omniscience as expression of *hybris* that makes humans wish to transcend their human condition⁷¹ (“you will be like the ʔēlōhîm”, 3,5).⁷² Rainertz has argued for a less negative interpretation of Gen 3, actually reflecting human striving for wisdom, with its ambivalent consequences.⁷³ Eventually however, wisdom remains imperfect, its consequences ambivalent, and everlasting life may not be acquired. In a sense, Gen 2–3 expresses the deepest human desires and their failure, eventually the tragic dimension of human existence. It would be therefore utterly mistaken to search in this narrative a natural scientific account of the first humans and their condition.

Revisited: On the Creation of Adam and Then Eve”, *VT* 66.1 (2006) 46–57.

⁶⁹ WESTERMANN, *Genesis* I/1, 313–314, 317–318.

⁷⁰ WESTERMANN, *Genesis* I/1, 370–371.

⁷¹ VON RAD, *Genesis*, 86–90.

⁷² I do not find convincing the sexual interpretation of the fall, since sexual encounter is certainly implied already in the 2,24 (“they will become one flesh”), i.e. before the “fall”, and this union is described in positive terms. That the *Gilgamesh* links sexual encounter to the loss of the primitive bliss does not mean that Gen 3 necessarily implies the same. Pace LORETZ, *Schöpfung*, 112–114.

⁷³ R. ALBERTZ, “«Ihr werdet sein wie Gott». Genesis 3,1-7 auf dem Hintergrund des alttestamentlichen und des sumerisch-babylonischen Menschenbildes”, in id., *Geschichte und Theologie*, 23–47; orig. in *Die Welt des Orients* 24 (1993), 89–111. Albertz is certainly right about the negative impact of dogmatic readings on the interpretation of this text. Yet, he may be minimising the fact that striving for wisdom is eventually assessed in negative terms, should one consider nothing else but the definition of acquiring wisdom as infringement of a divine prohibition.

Conclusions

No doubt, exegesis can say much more about the creation accounts. On the other hand, what cannot be deduced from these texts is also obvious. The creation accounts provide no natural scientific explanation, whatsoever, about the origins of the universe, of life or of humans. Attempts of harmonisation are therefore needless. These texts have all to do with the relationship of the world and of humans to God. Through their symbolic and their metaphoric language they also provide an enduring assessment of the human condition.

Only proponents of an epistemological monism would argue that natural science (*or* the bible) has the one and only response to all human questions. And one could argue only from the viewpoint of fundamentalist biblical interpretation that the assertions made by natural science can be or should be rejected for being (allegedly) incompatible with the bible, i.e. that faith must go against reason. As Tillich put it:

Since neither ecstasy nor miracle destroys the structure of cognitive reason, scientific analysis, psychological and physical, as well as historical investigation are possible and necessary. Research can and must proceed without restriction. It can undercut the superstitions and demonic interpretations of revelation, ecstasy and miracle. Science, psychology and history are allies of theology in the fight against the supranaturalistic distortions of genuine revelation. Scientific explanation and historical criticism protect revelation; they cannot dissolve it, for revelation belongs to a dimension of reality for which scientific and historical analysis are inadequate. Revelation [...] points to the mystery of existence and to our ultimate concern. It is independent of what science and history say about the conditions in which it appears; and it cannot make science and history dependent on itself. No conflict between different dimensions of reality is possible. Reason receives revelation in ecstasy and miracles; but reason is not destroyed by revelation, just as revelation is not emptied by reason.⁷⁴

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⁷⁴ P. TILlich, *Systematic Theology* I, Chicago, 1973, 117–118.

DARWINS ZUFALL CONTRA EINSTEINS GOTT? QUANTENPHYSIK – EVOLUTION – SCHÖPFUNG

ANNA IJJAS

*... if God's process of creation is through unbroken law,
then He had to do it as He did –
natural selection, pain and agony, imperfection, and all.*

Michael Ruse

Zusammenfassung. Die aktuell meist diskutierte Frage im Schnittbereich von Theologie und Naturwissenschaften ist die Vereinbarkeit von Schöpfung und Evolution. Im vorliegenden Aufsatz diskutiere ich, inwiefern die Quantenmechanik zur Beantwortung dieser Frage beitragen kann. Ausgehend von der Klärung der Problemsituation formuliere ich notwendige Bedingungen der Vereinbarkeit von Evolutionstheorie und Theismus. Nachfolgend untersuche ich, ob die Quantenmechanik als empirisches Argument für die Erfüllbarkeit dieser Bedingungen eingesetzt werden kann bzw. ob das quantenmechanische Argument für die Vereinbarkeit von Evolutionstheorie und Theismus gleichsam hinreichend ist.

Schlagwörter: Theologie und Naturwissenschaft, Theismus, Schöpfung, Evolution, Quantenmechanik, Deutung des Wahrscheinlichkeitsbegriffs

Die Quantenmechanik wird vielfach zur Lösung bislang ungeklärter philosophisch-theologischer Fragestellungen eingesetzt; der postmoderne Anti-Realismus, die Unsterblichkeit der Seele oder die Zwei-Naturen-Lehre des katholischen Lehramtes sollen quantenmechanisch untermauert werden können, um nur einige der skurrilen Vorschläge zu erwähnen. So verwundert es geradezu, dass im Kontext der Debatte um die Vereinbarkeit von Evolutionstheorie und Theismus nur äußerst selten quantenphysikalisch argumentiert wird.

Dabei erscheint der Rekurs auf die Quantenphysik im Kontext der Evolutionstheorie – im Gegensatz zu den zahlreichen fragwürdigen Versuchen – (auch) unter wissenschaftlichem Gesichtspunkt als angemessen: Sowohl die Evolutionstheorie als auch die Quantenmechanik sind nämlich Theorien statistischer Natur; d.h. es handelt sich in beiden Fällen um Theorien, die die jeweiligen Naturphänomene im Sinne von Wahrscheinlichkeitsaussagen explizieren. In der Quantenmechanik wird der physikalische Zustand nicht exakt, sondern nur mit einer gewissen Wahrscheinlichkeit vorausgesagt. Im Übrigen wies *Albert Einstein* die Theorie genau aufgrund dieser Eigenschaft zurück und forderte ihre Überwindung im Sinne exakter Voraussagbarkeit. Die grundlegenden Mechanismen der Evolutionstheorie, die Variationen im Erbgut sowie ihre zeitliche Konservierung, stellen ebenso statistische Prozesse dar.

Auch ist es in beiden Fällen der statistische Charakter, der die Deutung bzw. theologische Integration der Theorien erschwert. Eine Welt, in der die entscheidenden Naturvorgänge vom blinden Zufall kontrolliert werden, ist kaum als planvolle Schöpfung eines fürsorglichen Gottes zu denken.

Die Frage ist natürlich, ob aus dem statistischen Charakter der Theorien auf den blinden Zufall als Motor der Entwicklung zu schließen ist, so dass die Schöpfungs idee im Lichte der naturwissenschaftlichen Ergebnisse tatsächlich obsolet wird. Im Folgenden werde ich versuchen, auf diese Frage eine Antwort zu finden. Ausgehend von der Klärung des theologischen Problems werde ich *notwendige* Bedingungen der Vereinbarkeit von Evolutionstheorie und Theismus formulieren. Danach zeige ich, inwiefern die Quantenmechanik als empirisches Argument für die Erfüllbarkeit dieser Bedingungen fungieren kann. Schließlich diskutiere ich, ob das quantenphysikalische Argument gleichsam hinreichend ist, um Evolutionstheorie und Theismus zu vereinbaren.

1 Das Problem

Als aktuell meist diskutierte Frage im theologisch-naturwissenschaftlichen Dialog gilt die Frage nach der Vereinbarkeit von Evolutionstheorie und Theismus. Die Palette der Stellungnahmen ist dabei äußerst breit. Sie reicht von Kreationisten, die die Evolutionstheorie mit Rekurs auf die Verbindlichkeit einer wörtlichen Auslegung der Bibel ablehnen, bis hin zu Theologen, die das Problem der Vereinbarkeit nicht nachvollziehen können, da für sie Theologie und Naturwissenschaften zwei völlig isolierte Bereiche darstellen, zwischen denen folglich keine Konflikte entstehen können.

Ich werde nun versuchen, in einem ersten Schritt das Problem der Vereinbarkeit von Evolutionstheorie und Theismus als *doppeltes Inkohärenzproblem* herauszustellen; d.h. ich werde zwei Grundaussagen des Theismus formulieren, die mit der Evolutionstheorie gleichzeitig nicht vereinbart werden können. Anschließend plädiere ich dafür, diesen Widerspruch ernst zu nehmen und nach einer möglichen Auflösung desselben zu suchen.

1.1 Darwins Zufall contra Einsteins Gott?

Die theologische Bedeutung der von *Charles Darwin* bzw. *Alfred R. Wallace* begründeten Evolutionstheorie¹ brachte der Oxford-Biologe *Richard Dawkins* folgendermaßen auf den Punkt: Dawkins behauptet, erst Darwin habe

¹ Für eine vorzügliche Einführung vgl. E. MAYR, *Das ist Evolution*, München, 2005.

es ermöglicht, ein „intellektuell befriedigter Atheist“² zu sein. Denn die Evolutionstheorie mache die Gotteshypothese nicht nur überflüssig, sondern widerspreche ihr. Rationalerweise solle man also den Gottesglauben aufgeben.

Im Mittelpunkt der Dawkins'schen Argumentation steht die Deutung der evolutionstheoretischen Wahrscheinlichkeitsaussagen im Sinne von *Zufall*; der Motor der Entstehung und Entwicklung des Lebens sei – so Dawkins – Willkür. Wenn aber die Entstehung und Entwicklung des Lebens nichts anderes als eine Reihe aufeinander folgender unkontrollierbarer Naturprozesse darstelle, ergäbe es so gut wie keinen Sinn, von einem planvollen Schöpfungsakt Gottes zu sprechen. Zufall schließt Planung eben *per definitionem* aus. Die Schöpfungs-idee wäre nur zu retten, wenn die evolutionstheoretischen Wahrscheinlichkeitsaussagen *epistemisch* gedeutet würden. Die Unsicherheit der theoretischen Vorhersagen würde gemäß dieser Sichtweise ausschließlich in unserer Unkenntnis gründen und wäre nicht auf die Natur zurückzuführen; die Wahrscheinlichkeitsaussagen in der Evolutionstheorie würden also lediglich unsere Unwissenheit widerspiegeln, die Naturvorgänge liefen in Wirklichkeit strikt deterministisch ab. Diese Deutung der evolutionstheoretischen Wahrscheinlichkeitsaussagen wäre zweifellos mit der Schöpfungs-idee vereinbar. Indem Gott (faktisch und/oder zeitlich) den physikalischen Anfang setzt, erschafft er gleichsam das Leben. Die gegebenen physikalischen Anfangsbedingungen und die Gesetze der evolutionären Dynamik führen nämlich immer zu demselben Ergebnis, zur Welt, wie wir sie heute erleben. Quasi als Preis der Vereinbarkeit von Evolutionstheorie und Schöpfungs-idee entsteht aber eine neue Schwierigkeit, die traditionell *Theodizee-Problem* genannt wird. Die Welt, wie wir sie erleben, lässt sich nämlich kaum dem Plan einer vollkommenen Person zuschreiben. Wenn das unermessliche Leid und Übel, dem empfindungsfähige Organismen Tag für Tag ausgesetzt sind bzw. das sie einander zufügen, dem Willen Gottes entspricht, ist er nicht der allgütige Gott des Theismus und er ist es auch nicht wert, Gott genannt oder als solcher verehrt zu werden.³

Konfrontiert er die Gotteshypothese mit der Evolutionstheorie, steht der Theist also vor folgender Alternative: Es ist die Alternative von Darwins Zufall

² R. DAWKINS, *The Blind Watchmaker*, London, 2006, 6: „[...] although atheism might have been logically tenable before Darwin, Darwin made it possible to be an intellectually fulfilled atheist.“

³ Vgl. ähnlich K.R. MILLER, *Finding Darwin's God. A Scientist's Search for Common Ground Between God and Evolution*, New York, 2002, 232–239, insbesondere 234: „When a stray bullet is randomly fired into a crowd, God decides who will get hit, and who will survive. When the biggest hurricane of the year hits Key West and not Miami, it had to be God's will. You could, I suppose, cast the Almighty in this guise, make Him a cosmic tyrant, a grand puppeteer pulling every string at once, and than nothing would be left to chance.“

und Einsteins Gott. Denn entweder ist die Deutung der Wahrscheinlichkeitsaussagen im Sinne blinden Zufalls die richtige, so dass die Idee eines planvoll handelnden Schöpfers unhaltbar wird. Oder die Deutung im Sinne anscheinender Zufälligkeit ist korrekt, so dass auf das Prädikat der Allgüte Gottes verzichtet werden muss. – Mit dem Theismus ist allerdings keine dieser Alternativen vereinbar.

1.2 Warum das Problem ernst nehmen?

Eine Möglichkeit, sich aus der Affäre zu ziehen, würde darin bestehen, derartige logische Widersprüche für gänzlich unproblematisch zu erklären. Als problematisch gelten diese Widersprüche nämlich erst, wenn man auf der realistischen Idee der objektiven Wahrheit und somit auf der Verbindlichkeit der Logik beharrt. Die Verabschiedung des Realismus verbunden mit einer postmodern-relativistischen Redefinition von Wahrheit dispensiert von der Einhaltung logischer Regeln.

Nun erscheint aber die relativistische Option kaum als annehmbar, wenn man theologische Aussagen nicht mit einer Willens- oder Gefühlsäußerung gleichsetzen möchte. Mit dem Verzicht auf logische Widerspruchsfreiheit gehen nämlich gleichsam Intelligibilität und Wahrheitsfähigkeit theologischer Aussagen verloren.⁴

Wenn also der Theist die Verständlichkeit und Wahrheitsfähigkeit seines Glaubens nicht aufgeben will, bleibt ihm folgende Aufgabe: Er muss *erstens* zeigen, dass die Wahrscheinlichkeitsaussagen der Evolutionstheorie nicht notwendigerweise epistemisch zu deuten sind. *Zweitens* muss er zeigen, dass diese Wahrscheinlichkeitsaussagen auch nicht im Sinne von Willkür verstanden werden müssen. Schließlich muss er *drittens* zeigen, dass die neue Deutung der Wahrscheinlichkeitsaussagen mit der Schöpfungsidee vereinbar ist, ohne im Theodizee-Problem zu münden. Kurz, wenn der Theist auf den Rationalitätsanspruch nicht verzichten will, muss er zeigen, dass es neben Darwins Zufall und Einsteins Gott eine dritte, theistische Option gibt.

⁴ Vgl. N. RESCHER, *The Coherence Theory of Truth*, Oxford, 1973, 235: „To say of reality per se that it is incoherent would be to say of it something that, in the final analysis, is simply meaningless. The hypothesis, that reality is incoherent is ultimately senseless because to ask of reality that it meet this condition is to ask of it something in principle impossible.“ Vgl. auch A. KREINER, *Das wahre Antlitz Gottes oder was wir meinen, wenn wir Gott sagen*, Freiburg im Br., 2006, 186–195, insbesondere 189: „Durch die Zulassung von Widersprüchen degeneriert die Rede von Gott zu einer Artikulation von Worten, unter denen sich niemand mehr etwas bzw. jeder sich alles vorstellen kann.“

2 Quantenphysik als Rettung?

Offenbar sind Theismus und Evolutionstheorie nur dann widerspruchsfrei vereinbar, wenn die Wahrscheinlichkeitsaussagen in letzterer weder im Sinne von Determinismus noch im Sinne von reiner Willkür zu deuten sind. Dass die Quantenphysik als Stütze einer theistischen Evolution fungieren könnte, liegt vor diesem Hintergrund auf der Hand, ist doch die Quantenmechanik aktuell die einzige naturwissenschaftliche Theorie, die mehrheitlich für indeterministisch gehalten wird.

Notwendige Voraussetzung für eine quantenphysikalische Argumentation im Kontext der Evolutionstheorie ist natürlich die Relevanz der Quantenmechanik für die evolutionäre Dynamik. Zwar gilt es in der Biologie als umstritten, in welchem Verhältnis Biologie und Physik zueinander stehen.⁵ Auch ist es fraglich, welche Momente der evolutionären Dynamik quantenmechanisch zu behandeln sind. Unumstritten ist jedoch, dass (zumindest) einige Wahrscheinlichkeitsaussagen quantenmechanischen Ursprungs sind. Mit anderen Worten: Es steht außer Frage, dass die Quantenmechanik für die evolutionäre Dynamik Relevanz besitzt.⁶

⁵ Besonders deutlich wird die Meinungsverschiedenheit in der Debatte um den *sog. Evolutionären Indeterminismus*. Diskutiert wird hier die Frage, ob die Biologie über die Physik auf eine Art superveniert, so dass einige Wahrscheinlichkeitsaussagen der Evolutionstheorie autonom, d.h. unabhängig von der zugrunde liegenden Physik, gedeutet werden können; für einen guten Überblick vgl. T. SHANAHAN, „The Evolutionary Indeterminism Thesis“, in *BioScience* 53, 2003, 163–169.

⁶ Welche konkreten, der Evolutionstheorie zugrunde liegenden Prozesse quantenmechanischer Natur sind, ist Objekt aktueller naturwissenschaftlicher Forschung. Mögliche Kandidaten sind etwa *sog. Punktmutationen*; vgl. D.T. STAMOS, „Quantum Indeterminism and Evolutionary Biology“, in *Philosophy of Science* 68, 2001, 171–180. Es handelt sich dabei um einen Spezialfall von Genmutationen, die punktuelle DNA-Veränderung einzelner bzw. weniger Nukleotide; vgl. etwa V. STORCH, U. WELSCH, M. WINK, *Evolutionbiologie*, Berlin u.a., 2007, 241–249. Der Schwerpunkt aktueller Forschungsprojekte im Schnittbereich von Quantenphysik und (molekularer) Evolution liegt in der Untersuchung des Informationstransports. Angestrebt wird hierbei die Aufstellung eines (Quanten)Modells, das den Einfluss der Umgebung auf die Induzierung und Konservierung bestimmter genetischer Variationen beschreiben könnte; vgl. hierzu etwa A. PATEL, „Why Genetic Information Processing Could Have a Quantum Basis“, in *Journal of Biosciences* 26, 2001, 145–151; P.C.W. DAVIES, „Does Quantum Mechanics Play a Non-Trivial Role in Life?“ in *BioSystems* 78, 2004, 69–79, bzw. A. GOEL, „Molecular Evolution. A Role for Quantum Mechanics in the Dynamics of Molecular Machines that Read & Write DANN“, in D. ABBOTT, P.C.W. DAVIES, A.K. PATI (Hrsg.), *Quantum Aspects of Life*, London, 2008, 97–108.

Die Relevanz der Quantenmechanik für evolutionsbiologische Prozesse bedeutet allerdings nicht automatisch, dass die logische Vereinbarkeit von Evolutionstheorie und Theismus kein Problem mehr darstellt. Wie unter Punkt 1.2 formuliert, muss als notwendige Voraussetzung der widerspruchsfreien Vereinbarkeit von Evolutionstheorie und Theismus erstens gezeigt werden, dass die Quantenmechanik tatsächlich indeterministisch ist. Zweitens darf der quantenmechanische Indeterminismus nicht Willkür bedeuten. Ob diese zwei Bedingungen erfüllt sind, werde ich im Folgenden untersuchen.

3 Bedingung #1: Quantenmechanischer Indeterminismus

In der *sog. klassischen Physik* schien alles für ein deterministisches Weltbild zu sprechen.⁷ Mithilfe der Newtonschen Gesetze vermochte man stets aus dem Anfangszustand den Zustand für jeden zukünftigen (und vergangenen) Zeitpunkt *exakt* vorauszusagen. Die moderne Atomphysik leitete dagegen einen Paradigmenwechsel ein. In der Quantenmechanik kann aus dem Anfangszustand mithilfe des neuen Bewegungsgesetzes, der Schrödinger-Gleichung, lediglich die Wahrscheinlichkeit, mit der ein zukünftiger Zustand tatsächlich eintritt, vorausgesagt werden.

Ob die probabilistische Natur der Quantenmechanik mit Indeterminismus gleichzusetzen ist, wird kontrovers diskutiert. Diese Frage bildet einen Teil der *sog. quantenmechanischen Interpretationsdebatte*. Denn obwohl die theoretischen Vorhersagen im Experiment bislang stets mit erstaunlicher Genauigkeit bestätigt worden sind, versteht man die Quantentheorie – fast hundert Jahre nach ihrer Entwicklung – immer noch nicht so recht, der Formalismus scheint sich dem Begreifen geradezu zu verschließen. *Richard Feynman* hat im diesem Zusammenhang einmal behauptet, er sei sich sicher, dass *niemand* die Quantenmechanik verstehe.⁸

Die Quantenmechanik auf ihren vermeintlich indeterministischen Charakter zu untersuchen, ist also kein leichtes Unterfangen. Es empfiehlt sich jedenfalls, in einem allerersten Schritt den Begriff des Determinismus zu klären, bildet er bzw. seine empirische Widerlegung doch den eigentlichen Gegenstand der nachfolgenden Untersuchung.

⁷ Der deterministische Charakter der klassischen Physik, insbesondere im Hinblick auf die klassische Thermodynamik, wurde allerdings bereits mehrfach bestritten, vgl. etwa W. HOERING, „Indeterminism in Classical Physics“, in *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 20, 1969, 247–255, bzw. K. HUTCHISON, „Is Classical Mechanics Really Time-Reversible and Deterministic?“ in *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 44, 1993, 307–323.

⁸ Vgl. R.P. FEYNMAN, *Vom Wesen physikalischer Gesetze*, München, 2007, 129.

3 1 Zum Begriff „Determinismus“

Zwar hat sich der Begriff „Determinismus“ erst im 18. Jahrhundert eingebürgert, das mit diesem verbundene Problem dürfte jedoch genauso alt sein wie die Menschheit selbst.⁹ Wie die Überlegungen der alten Griechen zum Schicksal, so kreist die Prädestinationslehre Luthers um die Thematik der Vorausbestimmtheit. Der Wissenschaftstheoretiker und Philosoph *Karl R. Popper* bringt diese Idee des Determinismus wie folgt auf den Punkt:

Die Welt ist wie ein Kinofilm, wobei das Bild, oder was gerade projiziert wird, die Gegenwart ist. Die schon gezeigten Teile des Films sind die Vergangenheit, und die noch nicht gezeigten Teile sind die Zukunft. Im Film existieren die Zukunft und die Vergangenheit zusammen; und die Zukunft ist genau in dem gleichen Sinne festgelegt wie die Vergangenheit. Obwohl der Zuschauer die Zukunft vielleicht nicht kennt, ist grundsätzlich jedes zukünftige Ereignis, ohne Ausnahme, mit Gewissheit erkennbar, genauso wie die Vergangenheit, denn es existiert im gleichen Sinne wie die Vergangenheit.¹⁰

Wie also im Kinofilm auch die Szenen festgelegt sind, die der Zuschauer erst später zu sehen bekommt, so ist in einer deterministischen Welt jedes zukünftige Ereignis durch das vorhergehende *vollständig* festgelegt. Die Zeit spielt keine Rolle, die Zukunft ist bereits in der Vergangenheit enthalten. Gleiche Anfangsbedingungen führen zu identischen Endzuständen.

3.2 Metaphysischer Determinismus versus Prinzip der Berechenbarkeit

Offensichtlich ist der soeben erläuterte Determinismusbegriff keine empirisch prüfbare Hypothese. Einmal zu eigen gemacht, kann die Welt stets von der deterministischen Position aus betrachtet werden: Jedes Ereignis, das einem irgendwie zufällig oder gar als Ergebnis einer freien Entscheidung vorkommt, ist aus deterministischer Sicht kausal zwingend; die scheinbare Zufälligkeit oder lediglich teilweise Vorausbestimmtheit gründet jeweils in der Unkenntnis des Betrachters.¹¹ Diese empirisch nicht prüfbare, also metaphysische Variante des Determinismus wird auch *metaphysischer Determinismus* genannt.

Das empirisch prüfbare Pendant hierzu ist das *Prinzip der Berechenbarkeit*. Im Gegensatz zur metaphysischen Variante wird nun nicht *a priori*

⁹ Zur Begriffsgeschichte vgl. G. FREY, „Determinismus/Indeterminismus“, in J. RITTER, K. GRÜNDER (Hrsg.), *Historisches Wörterbuch zur Philosophie* (Band 2), Basel, Spalte 1971, 150–157.

¹⁰ K.R. POPPER, *Das offene Universum. Ein Argument für den Indeterminismus*, Tübingen, 2001, 7.

¹¹ Vgl. POPPER, 6–11.

irgendeine Position eingenommen, auf deren Hintergrund die Welt betrachtet werden soll. Das Prinzip der Berechenbarkeit formuliert vielmehr ein *Kriterium* empirischer Natur, dessen Erfüllung ein starkes Indiz für eine deterministische Welt wäre. Dieses Kriterium besteht in der Forderung der Berechenbarkeit oder besser qualitativer, d.h. zahlenmäßiger Voraussagbarkeit zukünftiger Ereignisse. Sind also sämtliche physikalische Zustandsänderungen aus dem jeweiligen Anfangszustand mithilfe der zum gegebenen Zeitpunkt bekannten Regeln bzw. Naturgesetzen genau voraussagbar, spricht dies für eine vollständige Determiniertheit der Welt. Können dagegen mindestens einige Zustandsänderungen aus dem jeweiligen Anfangszustand nicht präzise prognostiziert werden, ist dies ein Argument gegen den metaphysischen Determinismus.

Noch einmal zur Verdeutlichung des Unterschiedes: Während die Position des metaphysischen Determinismus die vollständige Vorausbestimmtheit als evident ansieht und die Nicht-Voraussagbarkeit eines Ereignisses stets auf die menschliche Unkenntnis zurückführt, macht das Prinzip der Berechenbarkeit keine *a priori* metaphysische Annahmen, sondern sieht den aktuellen Stand der Voraussagbarkeit als Argument für oder gegen den Determinismus an. Mit anderen Worten, der metaphysische Determinismus sagt, wie die Welt beschaffen zu sein hat, das Prinzip der Berechenbarkeit stellt die Frage, wie die Welt beschaffen ist.

Nun könnte man natürlich fragen, welcher Determinismusbegriff der angemessene ist.

Doch auf diese Frage gibt es *keine* allgemein gültige Antwort. Weshalb nämlich jemand eine metaphysische Hypothese vertreten oder eben nicht vertreten soll, dafür gibt es allenfalls gute Argumente, denen man zustimmen oder eben die Zustimmung verweigern kann. Das Prinzip der Berechenbarkeit ist ein solches Argument - je nach Forschungsstand ein Argument für bzw. gegen den metaphysischen Determinismus.

3.3 Quantenmechanischer Indeterminismus?

Wendet man das Prinzip der Berechenbarkeit auf den quantenmechanischen Formalismus an, müsste die Frage nach dessen indeterministischem Charakter eigentlich als eine leichte empfunden werden. Anstelle exakter Vorhersagen können in der Quantenmechanik lediglich Wahrscheinlichkeitsaussagen gemacht werden. Es folgt also der indeterministische Charakter. Dieser Argumentation wird allerdings vorgeworfen, dass sie keineswegs zwingend sei. Im Gegenteil, die Anwendung des Prinzips der Berechenbarkeit soll im Falle der Quantenmechanik geradezu *unzulässig* sein, der quantenmechanische Formalismus sei nämlich *adäquat* deterministisch zu interpretieren. Die Strategie der Verfechter einer deterministischen Interpretation besteht darin, die den Wahr-

scheinlichkeitsaussagen impliziten Unsicherheiten auf unsere Unkenntnis zurückzuführen. Denn nicht die Natur sei indeterministisch, sondern unser Erkenntnisvermögen beschränkt.

Die prominenten deterministischen Interpretationen der Quantenmechanik sind die *Viele-Welten-Theorie*¹² und die *Bohmsche Mechanik*¹³. Erstere postuliert die Existenz unzähliger Welten, die entstehen, wenn die Lösung der Schrödinger-Gleichung nicht eindeutig ist, d.h. wenn für das gegebene physikalische System mehrere wahrscheinliche Zustände infrage kommen. In der Viele-Welten-Theorie gibt es folglich keine Unsicherheiten mehr, jeder mögliche Zustand realisiert sich mit Sicherheit – in einer hierzu neu entstandenen Welt. Die Bohmsche Mechanik schlägt einen weniger spektakulären Weg ein; hier wird versucht, den quantenmechanischen Formalismus deterministisch zu vervollständigen. Gemäß der Bohmschen Mechanik existieren die exakt voraussagbaren Teilchenbahnen und -orte sehr wohl, sie werden von der Wellenfunktion geführt, sind jedoch prinzipiell nicht messbar.

Die Beurteilung dieser alternativen Interpretationen ist nicht einheitlich. Während die Viele-Welten-Theorie immer populärer wird, gilt die Bohmsche Mechanik unter der Mehrheit der Physiker als verpönt. Bei näherer Untersuchung entpuppen sich beide Interpretationen als wenig überzeugend und schon gar nicht zwingend.¹⁴ Beide Interpretationen scheinen nämlich *erstens* die Richtigkeit des metaphysischen Determinismus *a priori* vorauszusetzen; der quantenmechanische Formalismus soll auf dem Hintergrund dieser (weltanschaulichen) Annahme gedeutet werden. Würde ihnen dies gelingen, stellten die Interpretationen allenfalls eine Möglichkeit dar, den quantenmechanischen Formalismus zu deuten. Sie würden aber weder die Unmöglichkeit einer Interpretation auf dem Hintergrund des Indeterminismus bedeuten, noch würden sie die Anwendung des Prinzips der Berechenbarkeit auf den quantenmechanischen Formalismus als unzulässig herausstellen. *Zweitens* scheinen beide Interpretationen der eigenen Zielsetzung nicht zu genügen: Die Viele-Welten-Theorie scheitert an der Erklärung der Wahrscheinlichkeiten ungleich Eins. Es stellt sich nämlich die Frage, wozu diese gut sein sollen, wenn sich

¹² Vgl. etwa B.S. DEWITT, „The Many-Universes Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics“, in B.S. DEWITT, N. GRAHAM (Hrsg.), *The Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics*, Princeton, 1973, 167–218.

¹³ Vgl. etwa O. PASSON, *Bohmsche Mechanik. Eine elementare Einführung in die deterministische Interpretation der Quantenmechanik*, Frankfurt a. M., 2004.

¹⁴ Für eine detaillierte Untersuchung der Stichhaltigkeit dieser Deutungen vgl. A. IJJAS, *Der Alte mit dem Würfel. Ein Beitrag zur Metaphysik der Quantenmechanik*, [in Vorbereitung].

ohnehin jeder Zustand sicher (d.h. mit einer Wahrscheinlichkeit gleich Eins) realisiert. Die Bohmsche Mechanik versagt an der Wahrscheinlichkeitsdeutung im Sinne relativer Häufigkeiten. Das Argument ist hierbei ein mathematisches: Relative Häufigkeiten eignen sich aus rein formalen Gründen nicht als Wahrscheinlichkeitsdeutung!¹⁵

4 Bedingung #2: Quantenmechanischer Indeterminismus \neq Willkür

Die Vermutung, dass die Quantentheorie den Indeterminismus *als Natur-eigenschaft* nahe legt, wird durch den Erfolg derjenigen Interpretationen gestärkt, die die quantenmechanischen Wahrscheinlichkeitsaussagen *ontisch* deuten, die Unsicherheiten der theoretischen Vorhersagen also auf die Natur selbst zurückführen. Beachtenswert ist in diesem Zusammenhang die Deutung der Wahrscheinlichkeitsaussagen im Sinne von *sog. (Einzelfall)Propensitäten*.

Propensitäten sollen dabei Dispositionen, d.h. kategorial irreduzible Eigenschaften physikalischer Systeme, darstellen. Sie werden in konkreten Situationen aktualisiert und durch Wahrscheinlichkeiten manifestiert. Gleichsam sind Propensitäten nicht mit Willkür oder blindem Zufall gleichzusetzen. Im Gegenteil, gemäß der Propensitätsdeutung bringen quantenmechanische Wahrscheinlichkeitsaussagen die Irreduzibilität der Erste-Person-Perspektive in der Natur zutage. Mit anderen Worten: Der Grund dafür, dass ein gewisser Zustand eingenommen wird, liegt letztlich im System selbst und kann allenfalls im Sinne von Wahrscheinlichkeit bzw. Möglichkeit verobjektiviert werden.

Propensitätsdeutungen des quantenmechanischen Formalismus sind nicht unumstritten. Die Kritik betrifft jedoch zumeist keine grundsätzlichen Fragen, sondern technische Probleme. Diese scheinen durch neuere Vorschläge lösbar zu sein.¹⁶

5 Zwischenfazit

Als notwendige Voraussetzung für die Vereinbarkeit von Evolutionstheorie und Theismus wurde eingangs der Indeterminismus formuliert, und zwar ein Indeterminismus, der nicht mit Willkür bzw. Zufall gleichzusetzen ist. Sofern Wahrscheinlichkeitsaussagen in der Evolutionstheorie quantenmechani-

¹⁵ Vgl. J. ROSENTHAL, *Wahrscheinlichkeiten als Tendenzen. Eine Untersuchung objektiver Wahrscheinlichkeitsbegriffe*, Paderborn, 2004, 64: „[...] jeder Zusammenhang zwischen Wahrscheinlichkeiten und relativen Häufigkeiten ist durch weitere Wahrscheinlichkeiten vermittelt, und daher taugt der Verweis auf Häufigkeiten, so naheliegend er ist, nicht zu einer Interpretation des Wahrscheinlichkeitsbegriffs.“

¹⁶ Für einen einschlägigen Entwurf vgl. M. SUÁREZ, „Quantum Propensities“, in *Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics* 38, 2007, 418–438.

schen Ursprungs sind, erscheint dieses Kriterium als erfüllbar. Es lassen sich nämlich gute Argumente dafür anführen, dass die quantentheoretischen Wahrscheinlichkeitsaussagen – gedeutet im Sinne von (Einzelfall)Propensitäten – eine intrinsische Natureigenschaft zutage bringen, die gleichwohl nicht mit Willkür gleichzusetzen ist.

Es stellt sich natürlich die Frage, wie diejenigen Wahrscheinlichkeitsaussagen theologisch integriert werden können, die *nicht* quantenmechanischen Ursprungs sind. Um diese Frage zu beantworten, müssen zwei Fälle unterschieden werden: In dem *einen* Fall sind alle Wahrscheinlichkeitsaussagen, die nicht quantenmechanischen Ursprungs sind, epistemischer Natur; d.h. nur die Wahrscheinlichkeitsaussagen quantenmechanischen Ursprungs offenbaren echte Natureigenschaften. In diesem Fall reduziert sich die theologische Integration von Wahrscheinlichkeitsaussagen auf die Integration der Wahrscheinlichkeitsaussagen quantenmechanischen Ursprungs. In dem *anderen* Fall sind zumindest einige Wahrscheinlichkeitsaussagen, die nicht quantenmechanischen Ursprungs sind, ontischer Natur; d.h. auch sie offenbaren eine intrinsische Natureigenschaft. An der Strategie der schöpfungstheologischen Integration der Wahrscheinlichkeitsaussagen würde sich nur dann etwas ändern, wenn diese genuin evolutionstheoretischen Wahrscheinlichkeitsaussagen im Sinne von blindem Zufall bzw. Willkür gedeutet werden müssten. Sofern ihre Eigenständigkeit proklamiert wird, werden aber genuin evolutionstheoretische Wahrscheinlichkeitsaussagen im Sinne von Propensitäten gedeutet. In diesem Fall lässt sich die quantenmechanische Argumentation – auf dem Hintergrund der Propensitätsdeutung – für alle evolutionstheoretischen Aussagen verallgemeinern.

Ob das quantenphysikalische Argument gleichsam hinreichend ist, die Evolutionstheorie mit dem Theismus zu vereinbaren, entscheidet sich aber erst daran, ob gezeigt werden kann, dass die Propensitätsdeutung nicht zum Theodizee-Problem führt und sich gleichsam schöpfungstheologisch integrieren lässt.

6 Die dritte Option: Schöpfung im Modus der Möglichkeit

Das Theodizee-Problem¹⁷ ist aufs engste mit der Schöpfungs idee verbunden: Es entsteht, wenn man annimmt, dass die Welt von einem gütigen und allmächtigen Gott erschaffen wurde. Die Tatsache von Leid und Übel in der Welt will sich nicht so recht mit dieser Annahme vereinbaren lassen. Ein guter und allmächtiger Gott wollte und könnte nämlich Leid und Übel verhindern – so die Argumentation. Theodizee-Vorschläge wurden entwickelt,

¹⁷ Vgl. A. KREINER, *Gott im Leid. Zur Stichhaltigkeit der Theodizee-Argumente*, Freiburg im Br., 2005.

um diesen Widerspruch als einen scheinbaren zu entpuppen. Konkret geht es den Theodizee-Vorschlägen stets darum, die Existenz *moralischer* und *natürlicher* Übel auf dem Hintergrund der Gotteshypothese plausibel zu machen. In dem einen Fall handelt es sich um die Erklärung der Existenz durch menschliches Verhalten bzw. Handeln verursachten Leides, in dem anderen Fall um die Rechtfertigung von Naturkatastrophen, Krankheiten, Seuchen, etc.

Die traditionelle christliche Theodizee ist das *sog. Argument der Willensfreiheit*. Hierbei wird das moralische Übel auf den Missbrauch menschlicher Willensfreiheit zurückgeführt, die Existenz natürlicher Übel wird wiederum in irgendeiner Form an die Existenz menschlicher Willensfreiheit gekoppelt. Wie stichhaltig das Argument der Willensfreiheit als Theodizee ist, wird unterschiedlich beurteilt. Bestritten wird etwa von neurobiologischer Seite, dass es die menschliche Willensfreiheit überhaupt gibt. Ob die menschliche Willensfreiheit einen so großen Wert darstellt, dass sie das Ausmaß an Übel und Leid in der Welt aufwiegt, ist ebenfalls fraglich. Die Rechtfertigung der Existenz natürlicher Übel ist auch nicht zwingend.

Angenommen aber, dass diese Probleme lösbar sind. Angenommen also, es ist wahr, dass einige Menschen zumindest manchmal freie Entscheidungen treffen können, dass die Willensfreiheit das Ausmaß an Leid und Übel aufwiegt und die natürlichen Übel mit der menschlichen Willensfreiheit irgendwie zusammenhängen. Ich behaupte, dass diese Annahme eine in unserem Kontext äußerst interessante schöpfungstheologische Konsequenz nach sich zieht, und zwar die *Notwendigkeit der Schöpfung im Modus der Möglichkeit*.

Will nämlich Gott freie Wesen erschaffen, die sich allmählich aus einfacheren Lebensformen entwickeln, *muss* er eine Welt erschaffen, für die Freiheit – auch wenn graduell verschieden – von deren Erschaffung an charakteristisch ist. Gott muss also eine Welt erschaffen, die sich im Sinne der Möglichkeit und nicht der Zwangsläufigkeit, aber auch nicht im Sinne der Beliebigkeit entwickelt.

Was dies im Hinblick auf die Naturgesetze bedeutet, hat *Kenneth Miller* folgendermaßen auf den Punkt gebracht:

[...] our freedom to act has to have a physical and biological basis. Evolution and its sister sciences of genetics and molecular biology provide that basis. A biologically static world would leave a Creator's creatures with neither freedom nor the independence required to exercise that freedom. In biological terms, evolution is the only way a Creator could have made us the creatures we are – free beings in a world of authentic and meaningful moral and spiritual choices.¹⁸

¹⁸ MILLER, 290f.

Mit anderen Worten, die eingangs problematisierte Vereinbarkeit von Theismus und Evolutionstheorie erscheint im Kontext der *free-will-defense* in einem ganz neuen Licht. Die evolutionstheoretischen Wahrscheinlichkeitsaussagen – gedeutet mithilfe der Quantenmechanik im Sinne von (Einzelfall) Propensitäten – werden zum Bindeglied von Schöpfung und Evolution.

7 Fazit

Ausgangsfrage der Diskussion war die Möglichkeit einer quantenmechanischen Argumentation für die Vereinbarkeit von Evolutionstheorie und Theismus. In meiner Untersuchung wollte ich zeigen, wie eine solche Argumentation aussehen könnte. Ich glaube, mein Vorschlag ist in sich schlüssig, er ist aber keineswegs zwingend oder endgültig. Auch ließe sich in diesem Zusammenhang noch vieles sagen. So möchte ich, dass mein Vorschlag verstanden wird als ein möglicher neuer Ausgangspunkt der Diskussion um die Vereinbarkeit von Evolutionstheorie und Theismus, als eine mögliche dritte Option neben den Alternativen von Darwins Zufall und Einsteins Gott.

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GOD AT QUANTUM LEVEL – OR WHO IS THE EXTERNAL OBSERVER?

LÁSZLÓ NAGY

Abstract. Some important aspects of modern physics, mainly quantum mechanics, are presented, which may influence our perception on the world. The author argues, that the modern scientific world view is compatible with religious belief. The scientific and religious descriptions are complementary, in the meaning introduced by Niels Bohr.

Keywords: quantum physics, complementarity, determinism, anthropic principle, Platonism

1. Introduction

The perception of the science–religion relationship for most of the people (even for some with university degrees in science or theology) is one of contradiction, incompatibility or mutual misunderstanding. This situation is partly the consequence of the educational system (at least in Romania). Young children have in school both science and religious education courses and most typically no one attempts to explain or to discuss the apparent or real contradictions between the two world views. Many students remain with the idea, that they have to choose one of the two explanations of the world, and they cannot be both true. This feeling is often strengthened by their studies about the past conflicts between some outstanding scientists and the church (the most known being the trial of Galileo Galilei) and some present debates between some churches and scientists. Among the types of relationships between science and religion introduced by Ian Barbour¹, that of dialogue and integration is typically ignored in the education, and if not the conflict is emphasized, the independence is the practice.

In the present paper I will mostly write about the interaction between physics and religion. I start from the following premises: science cannot prove the existence or the nonexistence of God; theology or religious belief should not influence the scientific research; I do not put any religion above the others, in the present treatment I consider them on equal footing.

I will show, that modern physics brought the scientific and religious descriptions of the world more compatible than they were in the 19th century, when the classical physics determined the scientific world view. I will use the idea of complementarity in the treatment of the science–religion relationship.

¹ I. BARBOUR, *Religion in an Age of Science*, Gilford Lectures 1, San Francisco, 1990.

This notion was introduced by Niels Bohr into the quantum mechanics in order to explain the wave–particle duality of light (or of any electromagnetic radiation).² Later, Bohr himself used complementarity in order to characterize the scientific and religious concepts on the world³. This idea means, that the world can be described in several different ways, starting from different axioms. Logically these descriptions cannot be all true at the same time. Depending on the investigation method and the adopted axioms, the investigator observes only one side of reality, which formally excludes the others. However, the same investigator may observe the other sides of reality, starting from different axioms and using different methods. We can generalize the idea of quantum mechanics, that the observer always influences by his/her methods the observed reality. Admitting complementarity we can say, that both the scientific and the religious descriptions of the world may be true, and depends on the observer’s method, which one is brought to front.

2. The historic science – religion debate

As I have stated in the Introduction, many people think at the science–religion relationship as an antagonistic one. The most known conflict between a scientist and church is the trial of Galileo Galilei. Galileo was one of the most brilliant and innovative minds in the history of science. He formulated the law of inertia, which states that a moving body preserves its velocity and direction forever, unless disturbed by an interaction with another body. This law, which is at the basis of classical mechanics, at the first sight does not agree with observation: a moving or rolling body on a flat surface always stops after a while. The revolutionary innovation of Galileo was in his capacity of neglecting the unimportant aspects when studying a physical process, for the present case the friction. Only neglecting some aspects, and concentrating to the essential, one can formulate a law of physics.

Related to the law of inertia is another very important principle formulated by Galilei, the relativity principle. This states, that all systems moving with constant velocity (called inertial systems) are equivalent with each other, i.e. the laws of mechanics are the same in all inertial systems. In other words we do not “feel” if the Earth is moving or not.

Because Galileo was the first scientist, who understood deeply, what motion is, and formulated the relativity of motion, he adopted immediately without any problem the heliocentric system of Copernicus. He has written about this system, and introduced the above mentioned new ideas in physics in

² N. BOHR, *Atomphysik und menschliche Erkenntnis*, Braunschweig, 1958.

³ W. HEISENBERG, *Physics and Beyond*, Harper and Row Publishers, 1971.

his famous book, *Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems*⁴, published in 1632. It is well known, that because of this book he was ordered to stand trial by the Inquisition, and he abjured his views under pressure. Although he formally fulfilled with his book the requirements of the ecclesiastical censors, presenting the Ptolemaic and Copernican systems as alternatives, the way of presentation was strongly pro-Copernican. Moreover, he ridiculed the Aristotelian views of the Pope at that time, Urban VIII.⁵ His punishment, fortunately for science, was just house arrest, where he continued his scientific work until his death, and had many more important discoveries in kinematics.

The trial of Galileo is often given as an example for the conflict between science and religion. But if we look at the conflict more closely, we observe, that this is not between the basic ideas of science and religion. First, formally the debate was about the reference system: the Sun is moving or the Earth? Nowadays, from the point of view of the general relativity, one may describe the movements in a reference system attached to any body. Galileo had right, that taking the Sun as the center, the movements of planets are simpler, but attaching the reference system to the Earth is equally correct. Second, Galileo had a strong religious faith and was keen to relate his discoveries about the world to his religious understanding⁶. Third, he was a disputatious and difficult character, practically provoking the reaction of the papal authorities. In these conditions we can state, that the conflict was more personal, than a conflict between the world views.

Another example of the antagonistic science–religion relationship may be the execution of Giordano Bruno in 1600. He was more a philosopher than a natural scientist. Nowadays he is mainly appreciated because he has introduced in the western thinking the notion of the infinity of the Universe.⁷ He claimed, that every star is like our Sun, with planets and living creatures on these. Although the Catholic Church could not agree with the plurality of worlds, the reasons of his execution were mainly his heretic views on religion, and not his description of the Universe. We can say, that this was neither a conflict between science and religion, but more an internal conflict of the Catholic Church on some dogmatic issues.⁸

⁴ G. GALILEI, *Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems* [translated from the original Italian by S. DRAKE], University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1953

⁵ C. SOUTHGATE, *God, Humanity and Cosmos*, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, 1999.

⁶ SOUTHGATE.

⁷ VÉGH L., *Természettudomány és vallás*, Budapest, 2002.

⁸ S. JÁKI, *God and the Cosmologists*, Edinburgh, 1989.

After some decades of initial resistance, the Church admitted the heliocentric world. At the time of Newton (at the beginning of the 18th century), there was an apparent harmony between the scientific investigation of the world and the religious belief. Newton himself, the creator of the classical mechanics, admitted that God sometimes intervenes in arranging the movement of celestial bodies. But later, when classical mechanics reached its highest stage of development, the belief of the scientists in the universal validity of Newton's laws became very strong. This, and other discoveries of science in the 19th century created a huge gap between the scientific and the religious world views, and they seemed to be irreconcilable.

One problematic issue in the science–religion relationship was the mechanical determinism formulated by Pierre Simon Laplace⁹. In Newtonian mechanics it is well known, that if we know the state of a closed system (i.e. the position and velocity of every particle from the system) at a given moment of time, it is theoretically possible to calculate the system's state at any future moment. Laplace applied this statement for the whole Universe. He has written:

We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its past and the cause of its future. An intellect which at a certain moment would know all forces that set nature in motion, and all positions of all items of which nature is composed, if this intellect were also vast enough to submit these data to analysis, it would embrace in a single formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the tiniest atom; for such an intellect nothing would be uncertain and the future just like the past would be present before its eyes.¹⁰

Nowadays we call this hypothetical powerful intellect the Laplace demon. And although we know that technically never will be possible to measure exactly the present state of the Universe and calculating its future, the basic idea remains, if we trust the laws of Newtonian mechanics: the present of the Universe uniquely determines its future. In these conditions no free will of any human being is possible: everything is set, all the particles, including those forming the living bodies, will have a well determined future movement. And even God cannot influence the future of the world unless He breaks the laws which He created.

Another scientific discovery, which influenced the science–religion compatibility was the conservation of energy. First formulated by Robert Meyer, measured precisely by Joule, and unambiguously declared by Hermann

⁹ P.S. LAPLACE, *A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities* [translated from the 6th French edition by F. W. TRUSCOTT and F.L. EMORY], New York, 1951.

¹⁰ LAPLACE.

Helmholtz, this principle governs physics since the middle of the 19th century. At the same time, conservation of mass was widely accepted in chemistry. If one extends the validity of these two principles to past and future, results the eternity of the world¹¹.

The laws of science (if one believes that they are universally valid) exclude the creation of the world by God, His influence on the happenings and the free will of men. For people in the 19th century was very hard to believe in science and God at the same time. And here I did not discuss another important scientific discovery of the 19th century, the Darwinian theory of evolution, which is a source of science–church debates till present times.

3. Quantum determinism

The widely accepted view on the world in the 19th century, that it functions like a precise instrument (a watch), which works deterministically governed by unambiguous laws, was blown by the new theories in the physics of the 20th century, mainly quantum mechanics. Quantum mechanics was formulated because of the necessity to explain some experimental findings related to the behavior of atoms and light: thermal radiation, photoelectric effect, linear spectrum of light emitted by atoms etc. The basic ideas of this new theory were set by Planck, Einstein and Bohr, but the precise mathematical formulation was done independently by Heisenberg and Schrödinger in 1925. According to quantum mechanics, any physical system is described by a wavefunction, and the behavior of this wavefunction is governed by a differential equation, which is called now the Schrödinger equation. The wavefunction (denoted usually by ψ) has no direct measurable physical meaning, but according to Max Born¹², the square of the absolute value of the wavefunction associated to a particle ($|\psi|^2$) gives the probability of finding the particle at a certain point in space. Solving the Schrödinger equation for a quantummechanical system, one can calculate (similarly to the Laplace demon) the wavefunction of the system in any future moment. However, this does not mean, that we can predict precisely the outcome of any future experiment or measurement: quantum mechanics provides us just with the prediction of the probabilities for the outcome of an experiment. In practice, the experimental verification of the quantum theory is done statistically: the measurements are done for a very large number of quantum systems, the results are registered, and the probability of a certain outcome is compared to the theoretical

¹¹ VÉGH.

¹² M. BORN, “Zur Quantenmechanik der Stoßvorgänge”, in *Z. Physik*, 37 (1926), 863–867; M. BORN, “Quantenmechanik der Stoßvorgänge”, in *Z. Physik*, 38 (1926), 803–827.

prediction. This is like, if we want to verify the theory, that in case of throwing by a dice the probability of obtaining a certain number (e.g. six) is $1/6$, we perform the experiment several thousands or millions of times, and we divide the number of throws with the outcome six to the number of total throws. And in these kinds of experimental verifications quantum mechanics is doing very well – it is clear, that this is the theory, which governs the behavior of microscopic systems.

The best example for the probabilistic behavior of quantum systems is the radioactive decay. It is well known, that some nuclei are not stable, and with a certain probability they emit a particle, while they transform to a different nucleus. As an example, radium can emit an α particle, and transforms to radon. Theoretically, nuclear physicists can calculate the probability of such a process. Experimentally we can measure the number of emitted α particles per unit of time by a given amount of radium, and determine, that the half life of radium is 1600 years (this means, that if we have 10 grams of radium, after 1600 years only half of this amount remains, 5 grams are transformed to radon). The interesting part of this phenomenon is that we are able to make predictions only if a large number of nuclei are involved. If we choose just one certain nucleus, we are not able to predict its future, we cannot predict when it decays. From two perfectly identical nuclei it is possible that one decays in the next second, and the other remains unchanged for billions of years. Quantum mechanics cannot predict the future of an individual system. It can predict just probabilities, which may be verified experimentally just by a very large number of experiments.

This understanding of quantum mechanics is the Copenhagen interpretation, formulated by the group of Niels Bohr¹³. This interpretation assumes that we may talk only about those physical quantities, which can be experimentally measured. In these conditions, from the present state of a quantum system, we cannot predict its future. One can calculate only the probability of obtaining a given result of a future experiment, but not a certain outcome. According to the Copenhagen interpretation, this uncertainty is not due to the imperfection of our knowledge of the system, nor to the imperfection of a given experimental apparatus. This uncertainty is a result of an inherent property of any microscopic system, which is formulated mathematically by the Heisenberg uncertainty principle. According to this principle there is theoretically impossible to measure exactly the position and the momentum (or velocity) of a particle at the same time. The measurement disturbs the system, and unlike in classical physics, this disturbance cannot be reduced to a

¹³ BARBOUR; BOHR.

negligible effect. If we measure with a high precision the position of a particle, its velocity becomes uncertain, and vice versa.

If one accepts this interpretation, the mechanical determinism disappears from the world. The present state of a system does not determine uniquely its future. There are several possible outcomes of an experiment, and all what we can predict is the probability of a certain outcome. This is quantum (or probabilistic) determinism. Our future is not anymore fixed, and all the dilemmas related to mechanical determinism and the Laplace demon (the impossibility of free will) disappear.

Not all physicist were pleased with the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. In a famous paper Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen¹⁴ argue, that the effect of a measurement on a quantum system according to this interpretation would lead to the transmission of the effect with infinite velocity, in disagreement with special relativity. They assume, that we cannot predict deterministically the future of a quantum system, because our knowledge on the system is incomplete. According to these authors the system may be characterized by some additional, hidden variables, which are not known to us at the moment, but their knowledge (and measurement) will be possible in the future. They argue that if our knowledge on the system will be complete, the probabilistic character of quantum mechanics will disappear.

Later, Bell¹⁵ has formulated his famous inequalities, which indicate the experimental possibility of testing the existence or inexistence of the presumed hidden variables. The first very convincing experimental results, which exclude the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen interpretation and the existence of the hidden variables was done by Alain Aspect and his collaborators in 1981.¹⁶ Since then, other experimental groups have confirmed their results: the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics is the correct one. The present state of a system (which can be the whole Universe) does not determine uniquely its future.

This quantum behavior is not just the property of microscopic atomic and molecular systems.¹⁷ Quantummechanical, probabilistic behavior influence also larger systems, like living beings and even humans. We have seen that radioactive decay is governed by the probabilistic laws of quantum mechanics. Biologists know that a radioactive radiation may cause genetic mutation in a

¹⁴ A. EINSTEIN, B. PODOLSKY, N. ROSEN, “Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Reality Be Considered Complete?”, in *Phys. Rev.* 47 (1935), 777–780.

¹⁵ J.S. BELL, “On the Einstein Podolsky Rosen paradox”, in *Physics* 1, (1964), 195–200.

¹⁶ A. ASPECT, P. GRANGIER, G. ROGER, “Experimental Tests of Realistic Local Theories via Bell’s Theorem”, in *Phys Rev. Lett*, 47 (1981), 460.

¹⁷ M.W. WORTHING, *God, Creation and Contemporary Physics*, Minneapolis, 1996.

cell, which may result in cancerous multiplication of the cells or other diseases. In these conditions the life of a human may be influenced directly by the quantum processes. Atheists may say, that depends just on the blind chance, that a certain individual develops a deadly illness or not. However, religious people may believe that the fate of a certain individual or of the whole humanity depends on the will of God. And this religious belief is not anymore in contradiction with the scientific predictions, as in the 19th century. God may influence the events at quantum level without breaking any law of physics. An event usually has a huge number of possible outcomes. In the religious interpretation God chooses, which one is realized at the end. An atheist refers just to chance. Science cannot prove the correctness or the incorrectness of none of these interpretations. It is a question of belief.

The interpretation, that God may influence the events at quantum level, is not sympathetic to several theologians. It resembles somehow to the “God of the gaps”, which interpretation assumes, that if science cannot explain a phenomenon, people tend to refer to God. However, as science evolves, there are more and more phenomena explained by science, and less and less place for God.¹⁸ It is obvious, why theology does not agree with the “God of the gaps”. But according to the Copenhagen interpretation, our knowledge on a quantum system is complete. If there are no yet unknown “hidden variables”, no scientific knowledge will replace in the future the will of God or the blind chance. This “gap” will never disappear. Quantum mechanics leaves room enough for religious belief, according to the complementarity formulated by Bohr.

4. The problem of the observer

A very interesting and spectacular behavior of waves is interference. If two waves meet in the same phase (crest with crest and trough with trough), the resulting wave will have a larger intensity, called interference maximum. If the two waves meet in opposite phase (crest with trough), the resulting wave will have a smaller intensity, called interference minimum. The classical Young two-slit experiment for visible light¹⁹ evidenced the interference maxima and minima if two coherent light rays meet, and proved unambiguously, that light has a wave character.

As we have seen, in quantum mechanics any particle has associated a wavefunction. However, this wave associated to a particle like the electron, has not a direct physical meaning. We have discussed, that this wavefunction has

¹⁸ A. PEACOCKE, *Theology for a Scientific Age*, SCM Press Ltd, 1993.

¹⁹ T. YOUNG, *A Syllabus of a Course of Lectures on Natural and Experimental Philosophy*, Royal Institution, London, 1802.

just a probabilistic interpretation: if $|\psi|^2$ is larger in a point, there is a larger probability to find the electron at that point of the space. The wave character of the electrons was first proved by the diffraction experiment of Davisson and Germer.²⁰

The Young-type two-slit experiment for electrons was done in an ingenious way by Tonomura.²¹ The waves associated to the electrons may have two different paths in reaching the detector, passing through one slit or the other. The two waves (traveling on different paths, but associated to the same electron) meet on the detector, and by interference we obtain maxima and minima, depending on the difference of the two pathways. What means in case of the electrons a maximum or a minimum? Just higher or lower probability of detecting the electron at a certain point of the detector. This means, that experimentally we cannot observe the interference by doing the experiment with one, two or a few dozens of electrons. We need a large (statistical) number. Tonomura has done his experiment with 70000 electrons, and one may observe very clearly the interference pattern: at some regions of the detector much more electrons were detected than at other regions.

In the last decade interference patterns were observed experimentally in the ejected electron spectra of diatomic molecules in collision with fast charged particles.²² The observed patterns were theoretically interpreted and even predicted by the author of the present article.²³ Nowadays the experimental evidence of interference of waves associated to particles, and its statistical interpretation is beyond any doubt.

In the double-slit experiment one may observe the wave–particle duality of electrons. Although the electrons are detected like particles (just one point on the detector), they propagate like waves, because they show the interference effect. At this point one could raise a logical question: couldn't we detect the electron on its way to the detector? Couldn't we determine through which slit the electron really passes? Yes, actually we can. But if we observe the electron passing through the slit (and determining through which slit it passes), we force it to behave as a particle on its way to the detector. In these conditions the

²⁰ C. DAVISSON, L.H. GERMER, “The scattering of electrons by a single crystal of nickel”, in *Nature*, 119 (1927), 558–560.

²¹ A. TONOMURA, J. ENDO, T. MATSUDA, T. KAWASAKI, H. EZAWA, “Demonstration of single-electron buildup of an interference pattern”, in *Am. J. Phys.* 57 (1989), 117–120.

²² N. STOLTERFOHT et al, “Evidence for Interference Effects in Electron Emission from H₂ Colliding with 60MeV/u Kr³⁴⁺ Ions”, in *Phys. Rev. Lett.*, 87 (2001), 023201.

²³ L. NAGY, L. KOEBACH, K. PÓRA, J.P. HANSEN, “Interference effects in the ionization of H₂ by fast charged projectiles”, in *J Phys. B*, 35 (2002), L453–L459.

interference pattern on the detector disappears. It was experimentally proven: if we observe each electron, through which slit passes, we force them to behave like particles, and the interference effect is lost.²⁴

Here we have arrived to a crucial point regarding the interpretation of quantum mechanics: the role of the observer. According to one of the axioms of quantum mechanics we can talk only about those physical quantities, which can be observed, can be measured.²⁵ But, as discussed earlier, by the act of the measurement we influence the system. The outcome depends on the way the system is observed.

In order to be more precise, let's go back to the wavefunction of a quantum system, and to the equation which governs its behavior, the Schrödinger equation. If we know the wavefunction of a system at a certain moment of time, the evolution of the wavefunction in the future is uniquely determined by the Schrödinger equation. In other words, the evolution of the wavefunction is deterministic. However, this wavefunction is usually a mixture of different quantum states called eigenstates. If we want to measure a certain characteristic quantity of the system, the result should be a so called eigenvalue of this physical quantity, corresponding to a certain eigenstate of the system. Important is, that by the act of the measurement we force the system to a certain eigenstate. The wavefunction (which was a superposition of several, usually an infinite number of eigenstates) collapses due to the interaction with the experimental apparatus (observer), and the system goes to a certain eigenstate. Quantum mechanics is able (as discussed before) to calculate the probability of obtaining a certain eigenstate by the measurement. Here we emphasize, that the act of the observation forces the system to an eigenstate, without the observation the system remains a mixture of different eigenstates.

This theory was in detail verified for small, microscopic systems (atoms, molecules and clusters of a few molecules), and all its predictions turned out to be true. However applying this theory for larger systems, strange paradoxes appear. The most known of these strange examples is the Schrödinger's cat.²⁶

Schrödinger has described the following thought experiment: let's assume, that we have in a closed box a cat, a small piece of radium, a detector (which may detect the emitted α particle) coupled through an electronic device

²⁴ HEISENBERG.

²⁵ HEISENBERG.

²⁶ E. SCHRÖDINGER, "Die gegenwärtige Situation in der Quantenmechanik", in *Naturwissenschaften*, 23 (1935), 807–812; 823–823, 844–849. [English translation: J.D. TRIMMER, *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 124, (1980) 323–38, Reprinted in *Quantum Theory and Measurement*, (1983) 152.]

to a hammer, and a flask with poisonous gas. The decay of the radium is governed by the probabilistic laws of quantum mechanics: let's assume, that in a time interval of one hour, there is a 50% probability that the radium emits an α particle, and 50% probability that it does not. In the first case the detector detects the particle, the hammer breaks the flask, the poison is released, and the cat dies. In the second case nothing happens, and the cat remains alive. According to the interpretation above, till we do not open the box, the quantum system formed by the radium, detector, device and cat is in a superposition of two eigenstates: dead cat and live cat. Actually, when after an hour we open the box, and observe the state of the cat, we cause the collapse of its wavefunction, and (if the final state is dead) we are 50% murderers, or (if the final state is alive) we are 50% rescuers.

Obviously, there are some problems with this interpretation: who or what can be considered an observer?²⁷ If we take the cat as an observer, it observes immediately the release of the poison, and its state never will be uncertain, or a superposition of two states. The answer to this question may be that the observer should be always outside of the quantum system. What if we place a camera or another apparatus which detects the state of the cat? Does it influence the state of the system?

What is clear, and was experimentally proven for small (atomic) systems is that we need an external observation in order to obtain a certain eigenstate of the system. In other words, we need an external observer in order to force the system to choose just one from a large number of possible behaviors, outcomes. What is the maximum size of the system to which this reasoning may be applied, is uncertain.

In spite of this uncertainty, let's try to apply it for the whole Universe. If we start from the present state of the Universe characterized by a wavefunction, the evolution of this wavefunction in the future is deterministic. But this wavefunction is a superposition of an infinite number of eigenstates, because every event in the Universe may have several outcomes. Applying the previous reasoning, without an external observer the Universe will continue to be a combination of all possible happenings. No specific happenings would occur. But obviously, in our world, specific, well defined events occur. We are not a superposition of several possibilities, but we are well defined persons, with a well defined past. As far as we know, from the different opportunities, choices which occurred in our past, just one route of our lives is realized. Quantum mechanics says that for this certainty we need an external observer. Who is the

²⁷ WORTHING.

external observer of the Universe? For religious people the answer to this question is obvious.

If one wants to avoid the existence of the external observer of the Universe, there is another possibility. A young PhD student, Everett came with a strange idea²⁸: every possibility happens, but in another world. In this world I am writing this paper, in another world I suffered an accident and I am in a hospital, in another world my mother and father even didn't met, and I do not exist. Since in each moment a large number of events have a large number of possible outcomes, and everything happens, our world splits at each moment to a very large number of worlds. These are called quantum parallel worlds.²⁹ Which is better or more simple, to believe in the existence of an external observer, or in the existence of an infinite number of parallel worlds, is a matter of individual choice and belief.

5. The creation of the Universe

The important religions of the world have essentially two kinds of views about the existence of the Universe. The western religions (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) teach that the Universe is the creation of God from nothing, at a certain moment of time, a unique and unrepeatable act. In contrary, eastern religions (Brahmanism, Buddhism, Chinese universalism) talk about very long cycles of the Universe with developing and decaying periods. Curiously, modern cosmology does not exclude any of these descriptions.

Since 1929, the experimental observation of distant galaxies by Hubble,³⁰ we know that the Universe is expanding. Every distant star is receding from us, and the larger the distance, the larger is the receding velocity. A logical consequence of this experimental observation is, that at a certain moment in the past the Universe was very (maybe infinitely) dense, and the present expansion is the cause of a past explosion. This is called the Big Bang, which according to our present knowledge³¹ happened 13.7 billions of years ago.

The expansion of the Universe may be described by the theory of general relativity. This theory states, that the mass and energy influence the structure of space and time, namely space may be curved (like a two dimensional surface

²⁸ H. EVERETT, "'Relative State' Formulation of Quantum Mechanics", in *Reviews of Modern Physics*, 29 (1957), 454–462.

²⁹ M. TEGMARK, "Parallel Universes", in *Scientific American*, May (2003), 41; M. TEGMARK, "Many lives in many worlds", in *Nature*, 448 (2007), 23.

³⁰ E. HUBBLE, "A Relation between Distance and Radial Velocity among Extra-Galactic Nebulae", in *Proc. of the Nat. Acad. of Sciences of the USA*, 15 (1929), 168–173.

³¹ NASA homepage: http://map.gsfc.nasa.gov/universe/uni_age.html.

may be curved in three dimensions). Applying this theory to the whole Universe, one may conclude, that depending on the average density of matter, several scenarios are possible: infinitely expanding Universe (with negatively curved space, Euclidian space or positively curved space), and oscillating Universe, with positively curved space. Recent measurements indicate, that our space is close to be Euclidian, and the Universe probably will expand forever, but the most striking discovery of cosmology in the last decades, that the expansion is accelerating, tells us that there are many unknowns yet in cosmology.

What is important from the point of view of the present paper is that the Universe was formed 13.7 billions of years ago most probably from a quantum fluctuation of vacuum. It is possible, that the total energy of the Universe is 0 (taking into account the positive energy accumulated in masses, and the negative energy as a result of gravitational attraction).³² In these conditions creation out of nothing is possible without violating the law of energy conservation. It is scientifically proven, that the Universe (at least in its present form) did not exist since eternity – it was “formed” or it was “created” at a certain moment of time.

An interesting consequence of general relativity applied to the whole Universe is that space, time and matter are strongly linked – they cannot exist one without the others. In these conditions we cannot ask the question “what was before the Big Bang (or Creation)?”. There was no before, without the Universe there is no time. This consequence of modern physics is very similar to the thoughts of St Augustine about time – he tried to define time by the movement of objects.³³

In the last decades, studying the proprieties of elementary particles, fundamental interactions, formation of nuclei and atoms, physicists realized, that the formation of complex structures (like living beings) in the Universe need several special conditions.³⁴ They have made calculations, that if the electric force or the mass of the electron would be slightly different than it actually is, the formation of atoms would be impossible. A slight change in the strong (nuclear) force would not admit the formation of the carbon nucleus, essential to the formation of any complex molecular structure and life. This observation was called by Barrow and Tipler³⁵ the anthropic cosmological principle. It seems (we don't know why), that the Universe (elementary

³² J.D BARROW, *The Origin of the Universe*, Harper Collins Publishers, 1994; WORTHING.

³³ SIMONYI K., *A fizika kultúrtörténete*, Gondolat, Budapest, 1981.

³⁴ P. Davies, *Cosmic Jackpot*, New York, 2007.

³⁵ J.D. BARROW, F.J. TIPPLER, *The Anthropic Cosmological Principle*, Oxford University Press, 1986.

particles and interactions) has just the right proprieties in order to make the formation of complex structures and human beings possible.

There may be several possible explanations for the fact, that our Universe is suitable for life and intelligence. The first one is, that in our single Universe we have a huge chance, that these constants have just the right values and the laws just the right form. The second one is that our Universe is just one of the infinite number of Universes from the Multiverse. In these Universes all possible values of constants and all possible forms of laws occur. Most of these Universes are not suitable for life. Our Universe is selected by observation: it is obvious, that the Universe were we, the observers live, should be suitable for life. A third theory assumes, that there is a law of nature (which we do not know yet), which uniquely determines the existing laws of nature and the values of the constants. We can mention here the studies of Hawking³⁶ for the self-explanation of the Universe, and the different superstring theories.³⁷ Anyway, it seems that we are far from finding such a law.³⁸

Finally, the explanation with the religious background assumes that God created the Universe with the purpose of appearance of human beings. In these conditions He created a Universe with just the right values of the natural constants, and just the right forms of the natural laws, in order to make possible the formation of complex structures, the evolution of living beings and intelligence. This kind of creation shows in a more magnificent way the omnipotence of God, then the presumed creation of each animal and man separately.

6. Platonism in mathematics

Different kinds of symmetries are very important in modern physics. However, the first philosopher, who considered that symmetry is essential in understanding the structure of the world, was Plato in the 4th century B.C. He assumed, that there is a world of ideas, which exists independent of matter, and this world is perfect, symmetric and beautiful. Nowadays we would say that these ideas are mathematical relations, fundamental laws and symmetry proprieties. The material world is governed by these “beautiful” ideas, laws. Plato said, that the material world “tends” towards these ideas.

³⁶ S. HAWKING, *A Brief History of Time*, BNew York, 1988; S. HAWKING, *Black Holes and Baby Universes*, New York, 1994.

³⁷ B. GREENE, *The Elegant Universe: Superstrings, Hidden Dimensions, and the Quest for the Ultimate Theory*, Vintage Books, 2000; R. PENROSE, *The Road to Reality – A Complete Guide to the Laws of the Universe*, New York, 2005.

³⁸ J.D. BARROW, *New Theories of Everything*, Oxford University Press, 2007.

What is important from Platonism in modern physics is that the fundamental laws of physics are really symmetric.³⁹ Some scientist would say even “beautiful”. It is well known, that some theories of physics (the Maxwell equations, the theory of general relativity, the quark structure of matter) were formulated because of the wish of their discoverers for a simple, symmetric theory. Later these theories were confirmed by experimental observations. Till now every time a large variety of complex phenomena were explained by a few simple and symmetric laws.

One could ask: why can be described the physical phenomena by mathematically expressed formulae? Why are these laws symmetric? At present science has no answer to these questions.

A century ago there were two possible perceptions about mathematics.⁴⁰ The formalists said that the mathematical laws and relations are created by men. A certain law (e.g. Pythagoras’ theorem for a right angle triangle) did not exist before it was formulated. We create these relationships only in order to describe the material world.

On the other hand, the Platonist perception of mathematics says that the mathematical relationships exist independent of men and of the material world.⁴¹ Mathematicians, when they formulate a law, discover something, which always existed.

Materialist philosophers denied the existence of ideas without the material world. However, discoveries of mathematics in the 20th century suggest, that the Platonist description may be closer to reality.

One of these discoveries is Gödel’s theorem.⁴² This states that if we start from a set of axioms, and construct from these a set of statements, there will be always statements of which true or false value cannot be determined within the considered set of axioms. This means, that a mathematical construction never can be complete. Mathematicians don’t do what they want: they are restricted by some laws, independent of them.

Another example is the construction of the Mandelbrot set.⁴³ These structures are created by very simple mathematical formulae, but the outcomes of the calculations have infinite richness. These Mandelbrot sets have a fractal structure, with new and new structures appearing if we magnify a small part of the set. No mathematician can predict how a small part of this structure will look

³⁹ PENROSE.

⁴⁰ P. DAVIES, *The Mind of God*, New York, 1992.

⁴¹ PENROSE.

⁴² DAVIES.

⁴³ PENROSE.

like. Using their computers in studying the fractals, it is closer to the reality that mathematicians discover these rich structure than they create them.⁴⁴

Choosing between materialist and idealist philosophy may be a personal option. In the 19th century natural scientists were much closer to materialism. Nowadays, the discoveries of modern physics and mathematics, the symmetries of the laws and the infinitely rich structures discovered in mathematics, brought us closer to idealism and Platonism.

7. Conclusions

In this paper I tried to review some aspects of modern physics, mainly quantum mechanics, which may influence our world view. I did not want to argue for or against the religious world view. I hope I could convince the reader, that modern science and religious faith do not exclude each other. The complementarity principle of Bohr may be applied to these two different perceptions of the world: they describe different aspects of reality, and depends on our method, which one is brought to front.

Essential is (for believers and non believers) to talk about these issues influencing our world view, at a high, scientific level. Dialogue, and why not, sometimes integration⁴⁵ is essential in the science–religion relationship.

Unfortunately an important part of the present society is against science, or ignores science. Fortunately most of this anti-science current does not come from the part of the religion or of the important churches. Maybe natural scientists and theologians could work together for the benefit of both, science and theology.⁴⁶

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⁴⁴ PENROSE.

⁴⁵ BARBOUR.

⁴⁶ W.M. RICHARDSON, W.J. WILDMAN, *Religion and Science*, Routledge, New York and London, 1996.

A SCIENTIFIC GRAND VIEW OF THE WORLD

PETER ULMSCHNEIDER

Abstract. The article is an attempt to present a grand view of nature and religion as seen from the vantage point of science. After describing the different concepts of truth in these disciplines a number of surprising scientific discoveries are presented, the Big Bang, the Big Freeze and the Point Omega recently made in the areas of astronomy, biology and biological evolution. These phenomena could be explained by a God-hypothesis, that is, by postulating a natural phenomenon God who has created the world. From the viewpoint of the natural sciences the problem then is how such a hypothesis is to be verified and what role the religions play. I advocate a careful examination of the probabilities and conclude that such a God-hypothesis seems quite plausible.

Keywords: religion, creation, evolution, Big Bang, Big Freeze, Point Omega, God-hypothesis.

Introduction

There is little doubt that natural scientists and theologians often feel a noticeable uneasiness in dealing with each other, if not outright resentments. This is despite of famous persons such as Max Planck or Albert Einstein that usually get mentioned bridging the disciplines. In normal academic life one attempts to be conciliatory and plasters over the profound differences that arise from the dissimilar understanding of truth but also from the lack of knowledge about the other field. Also in public the grand religions and sciences tolerate one another despite the fact that time and again controversies arise.

These conflicts are illustrated in an extreme and sometimes even grotesque manner by “hate-preachers” of the respective fields. So the zoologist *Richard Dawkins* (Book: *The God Delusion*¹) presents himself as a militant atheist: The God of the Old Testament is portrayed as an “unjust, unforgiving control-freak; a vindictive, bloodthirsty ethnic cleanser; a misogynistic, homophobic, racist, infanticidal, genocidal, [...] filicidal, capriciously malevolent bully.” Consequently, Dawkins's target is to abolish the religions.

An opposite standpoint is taken by the televangelist *Jimmy Swaggart*. Before an audience of millions on television, he presents himself as a militant enemy of science and explains: “Evolution is a bankrupt speculative philosophy, not a scientific fact. Only a spiritually bankrupt society could ever

¹ R. DAWKINS, *The God Delusion*, Transworld Publishers, London, 2007.

believe it. Only atheists could accept this satanic theory”. The Bible should be the sole guide. His minimum demand: “Intelligent Design” should be taught in school on the same footing as science.

In my article I aim to present a rational, ideology-free grand view of the world, where the natural sciences and religions both play their rightful roles, without discarding my steadfast basis as a natural scientist.

1. Basis of the religions

Although theologians probably protest, and rightly accuse me of lacking competence, it is my opinion that the big differences in the basis of the religions as compared to that of the natural sciences is that the religions possess a *revealed truth* and *frequently contradict one another*.²

A well-known example is the assessment of the person of Jesus Christ by the different religions: For *Judaism* Jesus was a blasphemer who presumptuously claimed to be the Messiah and was therefore rightly punished with death (John 19,7: “The Jews insisted: We have a law, and according to that law he must die, because he claimed to be the Son of God”). In *Islam*, Jesus is regarded as a prophet, and such as John the Baptist a forerunner of Muhammad. *Christianity* sees Jesus as God who descended from heaven to save mankind.

These statements are blatantly contradictory. Which of them is true?

The religions are based on holy books such as the Quran and the Bible that are perceived as written revelations of God. Since they are from God, they must be true and on authorized interpretation irrefutable.

A typical controversy between science and religion was that of Galilei (1564–1642): He postulated that “the Sun stands firmly and motionless in the center of the universe and the Earth moves around it.” Against this the *Inquisition* decreed that “the picture that the Sun stands motionless in the center of the world is absurd, philosophically wrong and formally heretic, because it expressly contradicts the Holy Scripture”, which maintains that the Earth rests and the Sun moves (Ps 104,5: “He set the Earth on its foundations; it can never be moved.” 1Chr 16,30: “The world is firmly established; it cannot be moved”). Only in 1992 was the controversy settled and Galileo rehabilitated by Pope John Paul II. But there still remain numerous other controversies such as on “Intelligent Design”, stem cells, homosexuality, contraception etc.

² Heresies are a perpetual occurrence in the religions.

2. Basis of the natural sciences

The *research topics of the natural sciences* comprise everything that happens or possibly happens in nature, all that exists independently of mankind, everything except man-made art objects. The *concept of truth in mathematics and the natural sciences* is: Statements are true, if they can prove themselves in front of the judicial bench of reason, by empirical and logical verification. A true statement must always again be verifiably true.

As examples *black holes* may be cited that originally had only the status of a postulate, but now are unambiguously confirmed stars. *Dark matter* is presently still a postulate, for which there is much evidence, but its existence is not unambiguously verified. Although *Centaur*s in the literature of the classical antiquity are well known mythological figures, taken as a scientific postulate, however, there is now clear evidence that they never existed. *God* is a postulate for which there is scientific evidence, but this is not yet sufficient for an unambiguous confirmation.

3. The Universe

For further arguments it is necessary to first discuss a number of surprising scientific discoveries made in the last ca. 80 years in areas such as the astronomy, biology and biological evolution. Let me start with the universe.

Figure 1 shows that the universe is filled with roughly 10^{11} galaxies, each with about 10^{11} stars.³ How is the distance to these objects measured? In many galaxies one observes *supernovae type Ia* (Fig. 2). These are gigantic stellar explosions that are visible for a few weeks and can be employed as standard candles for distance measurements.

They have three important properties:

1. All are end stages of stars that are members of galaxies.
2. They all have the same peak brightness which permits a precise measurement of their distance.
3. Their spectra allow an accurate determination of their motion away from us.

³ The mathematical expression 10^{11} of a number denotes a 1 followed by 11 zeros.




Fig. 1 Long-time exposure of a small area of the sky by the Hubble Space Telescope. Virtually every tiny spot in the picture is a distant galaxy




Fig. 2 Photos from the Hubble Space Telescope of supernovae of type Ia: Left: a supernova at great distance, right: the close by supernova Ia 1994D in the galaxy NGC 4526

From the measured recessional velocities and the distances, one of the most famous laws of astronomy, the *Hubble law* is derived (Fig. 3).




Fig. 3 Hubble law after Freedman et al. (2001)⁴

If v denotes the recessional velocity, and d the distance, then the Hubble law can be written $v = H_0 d$, with the Hubble constant: $H_0 = 72 \text{ km/sec/Mpc}$.⁵ Figure 3 shows that the more distant a supernova is, the larger is its recessional velocity. This recessional velocity is not caused by a rapid movement of distant galaxies away from us as a result of an explosion in space, but is due to the growth of the universe, that is, space itself expands together with the embedded galaxies. Tracing back this expansion it was found that all galaxies once were at a single spot and that the universe started 13.7 Billion years ago from a tiny volume with a diameter much less than one millimeter.

This surprising discovery implies two possibilities of the origin of the universe: Either one has a *Big Bang* or a *Bottleneck*. In a *Big Bang* the universe originates in a minute spot and from there expands. In a *Bottleneck* a vast universe contracts to a tiny spot and from there expands again like in the Big Bang.

⁴ W.L. FREEDMAN et al., “Final Results from the Hubble Space Telescope Key Project to Measure the Hubble Constant”, in *Astrophys. J.*, 553 (2001), 47.

⁵ 1 Mpc = 3.1×10^{19} km.

Friedmann models and the Big Freeze

From Einstein's general theory of relativity one can derive the so-called Friedmann equations which are used for the construction of the *Friedmann world models*. They permit to theoretically predict the time-development of the expansion of the universe under different initial conditions (Fig. 4). Among these model parameters, which can be freely chosen, are the density parameters Ω_m , Ω_Λ and the Hubble constant H_0 .




Fig. 4 The expansion of the universe as a function of time for various Friedmann world models (after WMAP Science team)

In Fig. 4 the scale factor, a , is plotted against time, that is, the diameter of the universe in terms of today's diameter. Today we are at time zero and diameter $a = 1$. Of the four displayed models the American WMAP satellite, launched in 2001 and observing the *cosmic microwave background*, was able to unambiguously identify model 1 as the valid world model. At 13.7 Billion years ago the universe thus started with a diameter $a = 0$ and today has expanded to the size $a = 1$. In 20 Billion years the universe will have three times its present diameter. Model 1 shows also that the expansion of the universe presently progresses relatively slowly but will be more rapid in the future.

The end of the world will be reached in roughly at 10^{100} years.⁶ By then the stars, galaxies, matter and even black holes will all have decayed until eventually only neutrinos and extremely long wavelength photons remain.

⁶ F.C. ADAMS, G. LAUGHLIN, "A dying universe: the long-term fate and evolution of astrophysical objects", in *Rev. Mod. Phys.* 69 (1997), 337, Appendix B.

These then occupy a practically empty universe, in which less than one particle will remain per cube of Light year size.⁷ The temperature is going to approach the absolute zero: 0 K or -273.15 °C. One therefore speaks of the *Big Freeze* of our world.

World history and the cosmic archive

Our knowledge of the history of the universe is gained almost exclusively from the observation of photons that arrive on Earth. The optical, ultraviolet and infrared photons coming from the Andromeda Nebula e.g. reveal how that galaxy looked like more than 2 Million years ago, because it takes that long for the photons to travel the great distance of 2.5 Million Ly. On the other hand, the cosmic background radiation with photons in the microwave range at a wavelength of 1.8 mm show our universe as it looked 13.7 Billion years ago, 380 000 years after the Big Bang, at the so-called recombination time. In the same way the photons eventually collected by the Hubble Space Telescope that were used for producing Fig. 1 tell from times of billion years ago and have traveled all that time through the universe. Here the few trapped photons from distant galaxies are only a tiny fraction of all emitted photons. The vast majority of them will never encounter a material object. In addition, space serves as a repository of photons that were emitted from terrestrial radio stations since the 1920's, and even in a remote future will report from our times. *The photons flying in space, therefore, constitute an archive in which the history of our world is recorded.*

At the Big Freeze an end-state is reached, since as a result of the disintegration of all matter the number of photons will then have attained a maximum. Because of the mentioned low probability of an encounter of photons one no longer has changes, except for the permanent increase of the photon wavelength due to the expansion of the universe. As past events cannot be changed and there are no alterations in the future one will then have an *archive of world history, which from then on remains immutable and frozen for all eternity.* Here the history information is contained in the different wavelengths and flight directions of the photons. This archive, however, could no longer be read by an instrument or intelligent being because all material bodies will have decayed.

⁷ 1 Light year (Ly) = 9.5×10^{12} km.

4. Life and Biological Evolution

Consider now life and its development. The surface of the Earth consists of 71% ocean and 29% land. Over 3.5 billion years life existed exclusively in the oceans, and only in the last 500 million years did life exist also on land.




Fig. 5 The evolution of life on Earth over 4 Billion years of time

Figure 5 shows the evolution of life on Earth. Out of a first *prokaryotic cell* 4 Billion years ago the *eukaryotic cell* developed about 2 Billion years ago. The latter is an extraordinarily complicated organism with flagella for its movement, a nucleus to contain its DNA and many highly specialized organ-like internal complexes, called organelles. A particularly important step occurred roughly 1 Billion years ago with the invention of multicellularity. Not merely the accumulation of many cells to a powerful organism was important here but that the individual cells could now highly specialize as skin cells, muscle cells, bone cells, brain cells etc.

Only due to this development was it possible to create organs (e.g. lungs) and body parts (e.g. legs) that enabled animals to leave the oceans. Starting from lung fish our ancestors, 390 Million years ago in the Devonian, conquered the land. Finally 2 Million years ago our type of intelligence developed.

Development of Intelligence

Only 10 years ago it was textbook knowledge that the appearance of intelligence had been an exceedingly rare event with practically no chance of recurrence, if the evolution should ever be repeated here on Earth or on other planets.⁸ In the light of recent research this opinion is now outdated.⁹ In the last

⁸ E. MAYR, "Darwin's influence on modern thought", in *Scientific American*, July 2000, 67; S.J. GOULD, *Wonderful Life: the Burgess Shale and the Nature of History*, New York: Norton, 1989.

few years it has been discovered that intelligence developed in a broad manner over a wide range in the animal kingdom. The human level of intelligence was in due course attained over the hominid evolution after splitting off from our common ancestors in the great ape evolutionary line.



Fig. 6 Animals recognize themselves in a mirror. Left: a capuchin monkey, right: a dolphin, after De Waal et al. (2005) as well as Reiss and Marino (2001)¹⁰

A particularly high level of intelligence is documented in *mirror-self-recognition*. Putting a mirror in front of a cat or dog, these animals are not able to realize that the images are themselves (Fig. 6). However, newest research can unambiguously show, that in some animals such a highly developed brain function exists and that they can recognize the mirror image as themselves. Among these animals are the great apes, the capuchin monkeys, the dolphins (that developed from pig-like ancestors that migrated back into the oceans), elephants and even corvids, the crow and raven type birds that have a brain very different from that of mammals.¹¹

From the fact that intelligence obviously developed in a wide field of animal species it can be concluded that it is a general result of the evolution of

⁹ S. CONWAY-MORRIS, *Life's Solution. Inevitable Humans in a Lonely Universe*, Cambridge Univ. Press, 2003.

¹⁰ F.B.M. DE WAAL et al., "The monkey in the mirror: Hardly a stranger", in *PNAS* 102 (2005), 11140; D. REISS, L. MARINO, "Mirror self-recognition in the bottlenose dolphin: A case of cognitive convergence", in *PNAS* 98 (2001), 5937.

¹¹ J.M. PLOTNIK et al., "Self-recognition in an Asian elephant", in *PNAS* 103 (2006), 17055; H. PRIOR et al., "Mirror-Induced Behavior in the Magpie (*Pica pica*): Evidence of Self-Recognition", in *PLoS Biol* 6(8): e202, 2008.

life on a planet. This is not surprising since intelligent behavior leads to a very high chance of survival in the relentless struggle of all life forms on Earth or elsewhere.

The Future Evolution of Mankind

What is the direction of evolution, where does this development aim to? Here we are particularly interested in the evolution of humans. From the past development that led from the use of simple stone tools to today's computer main boards (Fig. 7) one can recognize that human knowledge since the creation of man, first grew rather slowly but later increased exponentially at an ever more accelerating pace. This rapid growth of knowledge in turn produced an enormous enhancement of human power for ruling the world. We are the only organisms that succeeded to fly to the Moon.




Fig. 7 The evolution of knowledge. Left: a hand axe was an important tool in the Stone Age. Right: a computer main board is an important tool in today's world

This evolution that obviously progresses inexorably seems to aim towards omniscience, omnipotence and immortality. That aiming point, to which life aspires probably everywhere in the universe, has been called *Point Omega*.¹² It surprises a natural scientist very much that by merely observing the

¹² The term *Point Omega* has been introduced by the French palaeontologist, philosopher and Jesuit *Teilhard de Chardin* (1881–1955). P. Teilhard de CHARDIN, *The phenomenon of man*, Harper Perennial, Harper Collins, New York, 1976. In contrast to Teilhard's mystical use, that term is employed here to describe only the asymptotic goal or end-state of the evolution of life discovered by science

development of natural processes one suddenly comes upon the attributes of God.

To better understand the terms omniscience and omnipotence in connection with the development of intelligent civilizations towards the Point Omega, it is necessary to outline the possible differences among presumed intelligent societies in the universe. Here it should be emphasized that there are no doubts among astronomers about the existence of other intelligent civilizations outside Earth – only the number of such societies is a matter of contention.¹³




Fig 8 The temporal development of the universe and the Earth

In Fig. 8 the history of the universe over 13.7 Billion years is displayed (top), compared with the history of the Earth (beneath), which started 4.6 Billion years ago. The first Earth-like planets, that is, sufficiently large terrestrial planets on which life is possible, orbiting in a so-called habitable zone around their central star, presumably appeared 10 Billion years ago. Since our type of intelligence developed on Earth about 2 Million years ago – that is 4.6 Billion years after the formation of the solar system – one can assume that this development will take a similar length of time on other planets. From the figure it can therefore be deduced, that intelligent civilizations should exist, which presumably are 5 Billion years older than we.

Such life forms would have performed science not only thousands or millions, but billions of years longer than we and presumably must be considered almost omniscient, omnipotent and immortal compared to us. It is

¹³ P. ULMSCHEIDER, *Intelligent Life in the Universe, Principles and Requirements behind its Emergence*, 2nd Ed., Springer Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2006.

absolutely impossible to comprehend the magnitude of the enormous difference between us and such civilizations. At most a very inadequate analogy can be made. The difference should be comparable to that between us humans and the single-cell organisms that swam in the Earth's oceans billions of years ago.

5. The God-hypothesis

After summarizing the scientific facts about the origin and fate of the universe as well as the surprising aim of the evolution of life, the question arises whether these surprising discoveries can be integrated in a consistent and convincing grand picture of the world. For this purpose the aiming point of evolution, the Point Omega with its divine attributes appears to give a particularly clear hint by pointing to a God-hypothesis:

This hypothesis, the validity of which will be discussed below, is the *postulate*: There is a being God that has created our world.

The God-hypothesis would naturally explain the unusual attributes of the Point Omega, but also the other two observed fundamental asymptotic events, where the term asymptotic denotes that the discovered events are phenomena that attempt to approach limits and perhaps hint towards another possible world. In support of the God-hypothesis, therefore, three basic scientific events can be cited:

1. *The Big Bang or Bottleneck*
I and the objects around me have not created themselves. Where does our world come from?
2. *The Big Freeze*
Through it the cosmic archive of the unique history and individuality of our world gets forever sealed. Why and to what purpose is this archive constructed?
3. *The Point Omega*
Why does the evolution of life aim towards the attributes of God, omniscience, omnipotence, immortality?

The God-hypothesis explains the origin and the preservation of the world, as well as the aim of the evolution.

6. The reasons for the God-hypothesis

Before we turn to the question of how to verify the God-hypothesis it is necessary to first become aware again how situations of insufficient knowledge are generally handled.

a. Our behavior in cases of insufficient knowledge

We live with many natural phenomena of which the existence is plausible but not confirmed. This is valid e.g. for objects of physics such as the *Higgs-boson* that is postulated as a hitherto not detected, but essential particle of elementary particle physics. But also *dark matter* has not been unambiguously confirmed in cosmology so far. The confirmation of the existence of black holes was a 200 year affair. First proposed by the English geologist *John Michell* around 1784 they were confirmed only in 1972 with the analysis of the strong x-ray source Cygnus X-1 in the constellation Cygnus. This shows how difficult it often is to verify natural phenomena.

It is important to realize that the *state of insufficient knowledge* does not only concern prominent phenomena of nature *but also normal situations in our daily life*. We are used since childhood to daily make decisions on the basis of incomplete knowledge: *When walking to work* a possible death by a falling roof tile, a road accident, or a robber's assault is always possible. But we do not stay at home. *When boarding airplanes* we know that there might be a crash, but we trust the accident statistics according to which airplane crashes are highly unlikely. A rational strategy in the situation of incomplete knowledge consists, therefore, to base our decisions on a sensible and prudent appraisal of probabilities, and to trust, that the likely will happen.

b. How should a verification of the God-hypothesis look like?

The frequently discussed so-called "*proofs of the existence of God*" are attempts to confirm the proposed natural phenomenon God by using arguments purely from the humanities.¹⁴ To my knowledge there is a consensus in philosophy today that these proofs do not work. This is not surprising because for other natural phenomena (light quanta, black holes) such a procedure outside the natural sciences would also not have succeeded. Therefore, God as a postulated natural phenomenon can only be confirmed by methods of the natural sciences.

c. The scientific reasoning for the existence of God

The reasoning for the verification of the God-hypothesis can be summarized as follows:

- Big Bang, Big Freeze and Point Omega represent clear and solid indications for the existence of God.

¹⁴ J.L. MACKIE, *The Miracle of Theism: Arguments for and against the Existence of God*, Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford, 1982; G. PRIEST, *Logic. A very short introduction*, Oxford University Press, 2000.

- They are not yet sufficient evidence to prove the God-hypothesis beyond reasonable doubt.
- We must therefore proceed with the well tried method for cases of insufficient knowledge: by trusting a factual probability assessment.
- From this one finds that it is plausible that God exists, as one can see from the following analogous example:

I *believe* in a safe flight – I *believe* in the existence of God
I am *fairly confident* to arrive safely – I am *fairly confident* that there is a God

The counter assumption “*God does not exist*” appears to be not very likely, because

- our world cannot be created from the absolute nothing (Big Bang),
- the unique individualistic world, with its indestructible history archive (Big Freeze), appears to be inconsistent with a lack of meaning and purpose.¹⁵ Why construct a detailed archive when nothing is done with it?
- the common end state of the evolution with God-like attributes, towards which life everywhere in the universe inexorably heads (Point Omega), cannot be a state without significance.

7. The role of the Religions as seen from the natural sciences

If the belief in God is plausible, what role do the religions play? In behavioral biology Harvard Prof. E.O. Wilson has founded a new field “sociobiology”, which deals with the evolutionary basis of the behavior of socially living organisms such as insect states, baboon groups, and humans. In these studies it has been recognized that religion represents an important behavior in the social life of humans, and offers human groups a clear advantage in their struggle of survival.¹⁶ Religion makes evolutionary sense.

a. Religions have a sociobiological purpose and offer an evolutionary advantage

They

- form a mental bond for organized and efficient communal action,

¹⁵ Here supporters of Darwin's theory could perhaps argue that “selection with a purpose” is teleological thinking and must therefore be excluded. However, the Darwinian Theory in its purposeless form is valid only before the appearance of intelligence. Since man can intervene in the evolution of life there also is a selection that pursues a purpose. Examples are the evolution of dogs with human-like faces having a short snout, and the many modern crops, which of course have been developed in a purposeful manner

¹⁶ E.O. WILSON, *On Human Nature*, Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge MA, 1978, Chapter 8.

- provide consolation and mental strength,¹⁷
- create social norms for the behavior towards others, handicapped, elderly,
- organize services for the community such as social assistance, education, alms,
- promote art and culture through buildings, sculpture, painting, music.

b. Religions provide a concept of God

Because I owe my knowledge of God to the Catholic Church it is clear to me that religions have an important function in communicating the concept of God. However, this does not mean that all such concepts can be accepted at face value. Claims and allegations of the religions have to be evaluated in the same manner as scientific postulates and theories: There is always the demand for vigilance, healthy distrust, consistency, and for the absence of internal contradictions.

In an effort to get to a rational picture of the world, it is therefore necessary to answer the question: Are the attributes of God consistent?

Omniscience:

Is omniscience not incompatible with the free will of people because God knows their future decisions when they are born?

Already *Boethius*¹⁸ has noted: God resides in time-less eternity, his knowledge derives from the observed actions.

Is God's omnipotence unrestricted?

Can God do absolutely everything, cancel the laws of logic, decree laws of nature and retract them again, create humans with free will and take it away again? This type of omnipotence would have internal contradictions and would be inconsistent.

Is a consistent omnipotence possible?

There exists a type of omnipotence that can be derived from the direction of evolution of intelligent civilizations towards omniscience: More

¹⁷ V. SHALAMOV (1907–1982), a Russian writer who spent 17 years in the Gulag in the region Kolyma, Russian Far East. The *Kolyma Tales*: “What I experienced in the camps” is “the extraordinary fragility of human culture and civilization. Within three weeks humans became beasts”...“under heavy labor, extreme cold, hunger and beatings”. “I have seen that the only group of people which behaved even a little humanely in spite of hunger and derision – were the religious.”

¹⁸ A. BOETHIUS (ca. 480–525 AD), *Consolation of Philosophy*, book V, c.2.

knowledge leads to more power, which causes an evolution towards omnipotence. During that evolution the laws of nature and rules of logic never get violated. Such a type of omnipotence would be consistent.

The theodicee-problem:

Why does a loving God permit evil and death? Is this not inconsistent?

- The tendency towards evil: fraud, infidelity, infanticide, and murder already existed among animals, long before humans appeared. This is a natural behavior that must be explained by sociobiology.
- All material things suffer death, living organism, stars, galaxies, even the universe.

Death is a basic architectural element of our world. Why our world has the property to develop towards the state of maximum entropy (Big Freeze) must be explained by physics.

8. How to handle Religions?

How do we handle the facts, that

- religions and their believers adhere with fervor to wrong or irrelevant beliefs?
- they have concepts that under no circumstances we can follow?
- we hear prayers that we cannot support?
- believers do things that we find abominable?

Our reaction should be:

- Appreciate the good (charitable, unselfish, sensible) aspects, and
- reject the bad (oppressive, cruel, absurd) ones.

Summary

Both militant atheists and evangelicals are wrong:

- There are reliable indications for the existence of God
 - *Big Bang (Bottleneck)*: Our being does not come out of nothing.
 - *Big Freeze*: Our universe has an indestructible history and individuality.
 - *Point Omega*: The aiming point of evolution has the attributes of God.
- These indications constitute not yet conclusive evidence for the existence of God.
- The religions have their role and function, they
 - promote communality and mediate social behavior,
 - are able to deliver a consistent concept of God.
- What should we do?
 - We daily make decisions based on insufficient knowledge.

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- Therefore: We should trust the assessment of probabilities as was explained in the example of dealing with airplanes.
- Conclusion:
 - The belief in God is reasonable, because God's existence is probable.
 - In dealing with the religions: we should accept the good aspects and reject the bad ones.

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DER HEILIGE AUGUSTINUS ÜBER DIE TAUFTE IN „*DE BAPTISMO LIBRI SEPTEM*“ UND SEINE STELLUNGNAHME ZU DER LEHRE DES HEILIGEN CYPRIAN (TEIL 2)¹

EDE CSONT

Zusammenfassung. Um den theologischen Disput über die Gültigkeit bzw. Ungültigkeit der „Ketzertaufe“ in ihrer Reichweite verstehen zu können, ist es erforderlich, manche historische Ereignisse in Betracht zu ziehen und die Begriffe, die den Mittelpunkt des Disputes bildeten, zu klären. Ein wichtiges historisches Ereignis war der Ketzertaufstreit zwischen Papst Stephan I. und Cyprian. Weiterhin ist es von großer Bedeutung, welche konkrete Lebenserfahrungen das Bild der Väter über die Kirche – Gemeinschaft der Heiligen – bestimmten. Wer gehört zur Kirche und welche sind die Bedingungen der Kirchenzugehörigkeit in der Auffassung des heiligen Augustinus? Diesen Fragen ist der folgende Artikel gewidmet.

Schlagwörter: *communio sanctorum*, *communio sacramentorum*, Schisma, Häresie, *Catholica*, der Heilige Geist, sichtbare und unsichtbare Dimension der Kirche

Exkurs: Der Ketzertaufstreit zwischen Papst Stephan und Cyprian

Vom Papst Stephan I. (254–257) selbst sind uns keine Schriften überliefert worden. Wir kennen seine Stellungnahme nur durch die Briefe des heiligen Cyprian und den Bericht des Eusebius von Cäsarea.² Der Letztere berichtet von einem „heftigen Streit“ bezüglich der Notwendigkeit der Ketzertaufe, da der ältere Brauch besagte, daß es genüge, den rückkehrenden Häretikern die Hände aufzulegen.³ Cyprian bestand darauf, die Häretiker durch die Taufe in die Kirche aufzunehmen, und verschaffte seiner Meinung auf zwei Konzilien

¹ In der *Studia Universitatis Babeş-Bolyai, Theologia Catholica Latina*, LIV, 2/2009 habe ich begonnen den ersten Teil meiner Arbeit „Die Taufe aus der Sicht der christlichen Einheitsbewegung“ zu veröffentlichen. Die Arbeit selbst besteht aus zwei Teilen: „1. Der heilige Augustinus über die Taufe in ‚*De Baptismo libri septem*‘ und seine Stellungnahme zu der Lehre des heiligen Cyprian“ und „2. Tauftheologie und ekklesiologische Selbstwahrnehmung“. Nun folgt die Fortsetzung des ersten Teils „Der heilige Augustinus über die Taufe...“.

² B. STUDER, „Stefano I papa“, in *NDPAC*, 5115–5116.

³ EUSEBIUS VON CÄSAREA, *Kirchengeschichte*, 7.2/ 322–323, in J.-P.MIGNE (Hg.), *Patrologiae cursus completus. Series Graeca*, Paris, 1857–1866 (im Folgenden: *PG*), 20, 640–641. Diesen Brauch bezeugt auch Dionysius, von seinem Vorgänger Heraklas übernommen zu haben; vgl. EUSEBIUS VON CÄSAREA, *Kirchengeschichte*, 7.7.4/ 325–326, in *PG* 20, 648–652.

Geltung. Diese wurden im Herbst 255 und Frühjahr 256 in Karthago abgehalten.⁴ Cyprian wollte jedoch niemand die eigene Meinung aufzwingen.⁵ Die Beschlüsse des zweiten Konzils wurden Papst Stephan zur Kenntnisnahme mitgeteilt, ohne für diese eine Billigung des Papstes zu erwarten oder für nötig zu halten.⁶ Um so größer war die Überraschung Cyprians, als er den Unwillen Stephans zur Kenntnis nahm, der beteuerte, daß man „keine Neuerung einführen und nicht in Gegensatz zu althergebrachter Überlieferung treten“⁷ solle, und Cyprian mit der Exkommunikation drohte.⁸

Darauf ließ Cyprian ein drittes Konzil am 1. September 256 in Karthago abhalten, auf den der Brief des Bischofs Jubaianus an Cyprian, dann dessen Antwortbrief (*epist.* 73) und schließlich das Dankschreiben des Jubaianus auf den Antwortbrief Cyprians verlesen wurde. Auf die Aufforderung Cyprians, daß jeder Bischof sich zur Frage äußern solle, mit der Bemerkung,

[...] ohne daß wir über jemand richten oder ihn von dem Rechte der Gemeinschaft ausschließen wollten, wenn er eine entgegengesetzte Ansicht hat. Denn unter uns ist keiner, der sich als Bischof der Bischöfe aufstellt oder seine Amtsgenossen durch tyrannischen Schrecken zu unbedingtem Gehorsam zwingt, da ja jeder Bischof kraft der Selbständigkeit seiner Freiheit und Macht seine eigene Meinung hat und ebensowenig, wie er selbst einen anderen zu richten vermag, von einem anderen gerichtet werden kann.⁹

⁴ Ch. MUNIER, „Cartagine; V. Concili“, in *NDPAC*, 881.

⁵ CYPRIANUS, *epist.* 73.26/ 356, in *Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum latinorum*, Wien (im Folgenden: *CSEL*), 3/2, 798.

⁶ A. NOCENT, „San Cipriano e la controversia battesimale“, in *DSBP*, 209: „Non chiedendo niente, il sinodo affermava al papa la propria volontà di proseguire nella pratica di ribattezzare coloro che avevano ricevuto il battesimo nell’eresia o nello scisma.“

⁷ EUSEBIUS VON CĀSAREA, *Kirchengeschichte*, 7.3/ 323, in *PG* 20, 641: „πρώτος τῶν τότε Κυπριανός, τῆς κατὰ Καρχηδόνα παροιχίας ποιμήν, οὐδ’ ἄλλως ἢ διὰ λουτροῦ πρότερον τῆς πλάνης ἀποχαθηραμένους προσέειπεν δεῖν ἡγεῖτο. ἀλλ’ ὁ γε Στέφανος μὴ δεῖν τι νεώτερον παρὰ τὴν κρατήσασαν ἀρχῆθεν παράδοσιν ἐπιχαινοτομεῖν οἰόμενος, ἐπὶ τούτῳ διηγανᾶχτει“.

⁸ MUNIER, 881.

⁹ CYPRIANUS, *sent. episc. praef.* 354, in *CSEL*, 3/1, 436: „[...] neminem iudicantes, aut a iure communicationis aliquem, si diuersum senserit, amouentes. neque enim quisquam nostrum episcopum se esse episcoporum constituit, aut tyrannico terrore ad obsequendi necessitatem collegas suos adigit, quando habeat omnis episcopus pro licentia libertatis et potestatis suae arbitrium proprium, tamque iudicari ab alio non possit, quam nec ipse potest alterum iudicare.“

Diese Bemerkung mag sich auch gegen den Papst Stephan gerichtet haben. Jedenfalls bestätigten die anwesenden Bischöfe die Beschlüsse der vorigen Synode und weigerten sich, die römische Praxis zu übernehmen.¹⁰

Auf die Ansicht von Papst Stephan, man möge „nichts Neues einführen, als was schon überliefert ist, nämlich die Handauflegung zur Buße“¹¹ geht Cyprian in seinem Brief an Pompejus ein (*epist.* 74.4) und drückt seine Empörung und Unverständnis darüber aus, daß Stephan kein besseres Argument zur Verteidigung seiner Meinung hervorbringen kann, als die Tatsache, daß die Häretiker es genauso machen. Wie kann sich Stephanus auf die Heiden berufen, so daß „das Licht sich die Belehrung von der Finsternis borgt“?¹² Augustinus weist diese Anschuldigung mit der Bemerkung zurück, daß Stephan jedenfalls sicher nicht deswegen an der Gemeinschaft der Taufe mit den Häretikern festhielt, weil er es nicht gewagt hätte, das Falsche an den Häretikern zu mißbilligen.¹³ Wenn Stephan trotzdem auf die Praxis der Häretiker, sich gegenseitig nicht wiederzutaufen, hinweist, so läßt sich daraus die Konsequenz ziehen, daß sie eine Übereinstimmung im Hinblick auf das Wesen der Taufe haben.¹⁴ Beiderseits meinte man unter der Taufe die allgemeine urchristliche Taufweise mit der Trinitätsformel.¹⁵ Wenn sowohl Cyprian als auch Stephan den Ausdruck „im Namen Jesu Christi die Taufe empfangen“¹⁶ unbefangen benützen, so deswegen, weil sie darunter die mit der Trinitätsformel gespendete Taufe verstehen.¹⁷ Es gibt zwar in den ersten Jahrhunderten die weniger verbreitete Praxis, die Taufe „im Namen Jesu“ zu spenden, aber auch in

¹⁰ CYPRIANUS, *sent. episc.* 1–86, in *CSEL* 3/1, 436–460.

¹¹ CYPRIANUS, *epist.* 74.1/ 358, in *CSEL* 3/2, 799: „[...] nihil innouetur nisi quod traditum est, ut manus illis inponatur in paenitentiam.“

¹² CYPRIANUS, *epist.* 74.4/ 361, in *CSEL* 3/2, 802: „[...] disciplinam lux de tenebris mutuatur.“

¹³ AUGUSTINUS, *bapt.* 5.23.31/ 287, in *CSEL* 51, 289.

¹⁴ J. ERNST, *Ketzertaufangelegenheit in der altchristlichen Kirche*, Mainz, 1901, 91–92: „Es ist die Taufe Christi, welche auch die Häretiker spenden wollen, und darum taufen sie nach der Meinung Christi, und darum auch auf die wirkliche Dreifaltigkeit, in deren Namen Christus die Taufe erteilt haben will. [...] Eine vollständig korrekte fides, einen tadellosen Trinitätsglauben, wie ihn Cyprian und Genossen forderten, hielt Stephan, was die Gültigkeit des Sakramentes anbelangt, mit Recht für entbehrlich. Der Glaube an Christus, die Intention, das Sakrament in nomine Christi zu spenden und zu empfangen, macht die Schäden des häretischen Trinitätsglaubens wieder gut, weil dadurch indirecte die Beziehung der Taufformel auf die göttliche Trinität wieder hergestellt wird.“

¹⁵ J. ERNST, *Papst Stephan I. und der Ketzertaufstreit*, Mainz, 1905, 100.

¹⁶ So z.B. CYPRIANUS, *epist.* 73.4/ 339, in *CSEL* 3/2, 781: „[...] quod iam in nomine Iesu Christi baptizati esse uideantur.“

¹⁷ J. ERNST, *Papst Stephan I. und der Ketzertaufstreit*, 110–111.

diesem Fall steht Jesus für die ganze Dreifaltigkeit: „Die Nennung Christi beinhaltet das Bekenntnis zum Ganzen. Es offenbart den salbenden Gott (Vater), den gesalbten Sohn und die Salbe selber, den Geist.“¹⁸

Stephan wird weiterhin vorgeworfen „die Taufen aller Ketzler als gültig und rechtmäßig anerkannt“¹⁹ zu haben, den Ketzern gegenüber also Nachsicht walten zu lassen, ja mit ihnen sogar Gemeinschaft zu haben, da er eben ihre Taufe anerkennt und dadurch behauptet, daß die Häretiker an der Sündenvergebung, an der Gotteskindschaft und an der Heiligung teilhaben. Das ist aber gegen die Einheit der Kirche und verdunkelt die „Wahrheit des christlichen Felsens“, worauf sich Stephan als Nachfolger Petri bezieht.²⁰ Das sind aber nicht dessen eigene Behauptungen, sondern sie werden ihm vielmehr unterstellt. Stephan will die Taufe als Werk Christi herausstellen und behauptet nicht, daß die Häretiker mit der Taufe zu der vollen Gotteskindschaft innerhalb der Kirche gelangen,²¹ sondern sieht das erst durch die Rekonziliation und Handauflegung vermittelt.²²

Eine Ursache des Mißverständnisses könnte darin liegen, daß der Handauflegung unterschiedliche Bedeutungen zugeschrieben wurden. Cyprian sieht die Handauflegung innerlich mit der Taufe verbunden, während Stephan diese hauptsächlich als Versöhnungsakt der Sünder auffaßt.²³ Für Cyprian macht uns die Taufe zu Kindern Gottes und vergibt die Sünden, nicht die Handaufle-

¹⁸ BASILIUS VON CÄSAREA, *De Spiritu Sancto*, 12.28.17–20/ 153, in *PG* 32, 116: „Ἡ γὰρ τοῦ Χριστοῦ προσηγορία τοῦ παντός ἐστὶν ὁμολογία δηλοῖ γὰρ τὸν τε χρισσαντα Θεὸν καὶ τὸν χρισθέντα Υἱὸν καὶ τὸ χρῖσμα τὸ Πνεῦμα“.

¹⁹ CYPRIANUS, *epist.* 74.2/ 358, in *CSEL* 3/2, 799–800: „[...] omnium haereticorum baptismata iusta esse et legitima iudicavit.“

²⁰ CYPRIANUS, *epist.* 75.17/ 385, in *CSEL* 3/2, 821: „[...] nec intellegit offuscari a se et quodam modo aboleri christianae petrae ueritatem.“

²¹ STUDER, 5115: „Le due posizioni si distinguono per un concetto diverso del battesimo. Cipriano lo considera come incorporazione nella chiesa, mentre S[tefano] vede in esso un atto di Cristo.“

²² B. NEUNHEUSER, *Taufe und Firmung*, Freiburg im Breisgau, ²1983, 57.

²³ P. HINCHLIFF, *Cyprian of Carthage and the unity of the Christian Church*, London, 1974, 94: „Part of the trouble in the controversy between Cyprian and Stephen may, then, have been the result of a confusion over the two different but related acts of laying on of hands in baptism and in the reconciliation of sinners. Stephen, thinking of it as reconciliation of erring Christians, thought it sufficient that the bishop should lay his hands upon them, signifying their new solidarity with the church. Cyprian, regarding them as being utterly outside the church, believed that they must be initiated into it and, in initiation, water and the laying on of hands were inseparable.“

gung.²⁴ Zwar kennt Cyprian eine von der Taufe getrennte Handauflegung für die Versöhnung der Sünder,²⁵ aber er betont die Einheit der verschiedenen zu der Taufe gehörenden Riten viel stärker, als Stephan. Cyprian lehnt die römische Position deswegen ab, weil er für ihn der gültige Taufakt die Sündenvergebung mit einschließt und diese Letztere können die Häretiker keinesfalls erhalten oder verleihen.²⁶

Die unterschiedlichen Erwartungen, die Cyprian und Stephan voneinander hatten, erschwerten zusätzlich die theologische Verständigung. Cyprian hätte angesichts seiner Rivalen im eigenen Umkreis eine Unterstützung von außen brauchen können und anders als erwartet, sollte er eine harte Zurechtweisung erhalten. Stephan hat ihm nicht nur mit der Exkommunikation gedroht, falls er sich der römischen Überlieferung nicht fügen sollte, sondern hat der nordafrikanischen Delegation auch die Gastfreundschaft verweigert.²⁷

Sicherlich war sich Cyprian der Vorrangstellung des römischen Bischofsitzes bewußt. Rom war an Bedeutung Karthago überlegen und hatte den Primat innerhalb der ganzen katholischen Gemeinschaft inne, ähnlich wie Karthago den Primat innerhalb Nordafrikas für sich beanspruchen konnte. Jeder Vorrang sollte sich jedoch im Glauben, in der Eintracht und in der Liebe auszeichnen.²⁸ Einen Vorrang in der Kirche wahrzunehmen, bedeutet Christus gleich zu werden, den Vorrang in der Liebe inne zu haben und sich im Dienst der Mitmenschen zu stellen.²⁹

²⁴ CYPRIANUS, *epist.* 74.7/ 363, in *CSEL* 3/2, 804. Siehe weiter unten: Handauflegung und Salbung,

²⁵ CYPRIANUS, *epist.* 71.2/ 329, in *CSEL* 3/2, 772–773.

²⁶ NEUNHEUSER, 58.

²⁷ CYPRIANUS, *epist.* 75.25/ 391, in *CSEL* 3/2, 826: „[...] a quibus legatos episcopos patienter satis et leniter suscepit ut eos nec ad sermonem saltem colloquii communis admitteret, adhuc insuper dilectionis et caritatis memor praeciperet fraternitati uniuersae ne quis eos in domum suam reciperet, ut uenientibus non solum pax et communitio sed et tectum et hospitium negaretur.“

²⁸ HINCHLIFF, 86: „In any case, whatever Cyprian may have believed about the theological significance of the Roman primacy, he must have recognized that the city, and therefore the church and bishop of Rome, were as much more important than Carthage as Carthage was than the other cities of the province of Africa. But we have to remember that when Cyprian believed a Christian to occupy a position of pre-eminence this did not mean that he thought of him as being important in a worldly sense. It just meant that he had a greater obligation to be faithful, courageous, pastorally perfect and full of love.“

²⁹ HINCHLIFF, 91: „This is the kind of primacy Cyprian expected in Peter’s successor, a primacy in gentleness and long-suffering, not the pulling of rank. The requirement for eminence in the church is that one should be Christ-like, and it is a shock to find an eminent servant of Christ claiming the power to lay down the law for everyone else.“

Cyprian war sich im Klaren über die theologische Tragweite der Frage um die Ketzertaufe, und war überzeugt, daß sich Stephan irrt.³⁰ Er glaubte aber die Irrtümer durch Geduld und Festhalten an der Einheit des Geistes durch den Band des Friedens (vgl. Eph 4,3) aus dem Weg räumen zu können. Somit verleiht er seiner Enttäuschung Ausdruck, nachdem er die Antwort Stephans erhalten hat:

Wir wissen allerdings, daß manche Leute etwas, was sie sich einmal in den Kopf gesetzt haben, nicht mehr aufgeben wollen und einen gefaßten Vorsatz nicht so leicht wieder ändern, sondern unbeschadet der die Amtsgenossen verbindenden friedlichen Eintracht an gewissen Eigenheiten festhalten, die sie einmal angenommen haben. Hierin wollen auch wir niemand Gewalt antun oder Vorschriften machen, da in der Verwaltung der Kirche ein jeder Vorsteher die volle Freiheit seines Willens hat und für sein Tun dereinst dem Herr Rechenschaft ablegen muß.³¹

Cyprian sah Petrus immer als Symbol der Einheit und Autorität der Kirche.³² Da Stephan als Bischof von Rom seine Autorität auf Petrus gründet, argumentiert Cyprian ausgehend von der Person Petri: obwohl Petrus den Vorrang unter den Aposteln hatte, ließ er sich von Paulus belehren, und erwog nicht, daß Paulus erst später zu der Kirche kam (vgl. Gal 2). Dadurch lehrt uns Petrus, nicht hartnäckig an unserer Meinung festzuhalten, sondern das anzunehmen, was besser und vernünftiger ist.³³

Man hat oft versucht, Cyprian für oder gegen den römischen Primat auszuspielen.³⁴ Eine solche tendenziöse Interpretation wäre aber der komplexen

³⁰ HINCHLIFF, 101–102.

³¹ CYPRIANUS, *epist.* 72.3/ 334–335, in *CSEL* 3/2, 778: „ceterum scimus quosdam quod semel inbiberint nolle deponere nec propositum suum facile mutare, sed saluo inter collegas pacis et concordiae uinculo quaedam propria quae apud se semel sint usurpata retinere. qua in re nec nos uim cuiquam facimus aut legem damus, quando habeat in ecclesiae administratione uoluntatis suae arbitrium liberum unusquisque praepositus, rationem actus sui Domino redditurus.“

³² HINCHLIFF, 110–111.

³³ CYPRIANUS, *epist.* 71.3/ 330, in *CSEL* 3/2, 773–774.

³⁴ Vgl. z.B. W. MARSCHALL, *Karthago und Rom*, Stuttgart, 1971, 86–87, Kommentar zu *epist.* 71,3: „Das kann hier zweierlei bedeuten. Entweder will er sagen, Petrus habe sich nicht eines solchen Vorranges oder besonderen Vorzuges gerühmt, folglich hast auch du keinen solchen; oder der Satz bedeutet: Petrus hatte zwar einen ‚primatus‘ der zeitlichen Erstberufung, hat aber daraus keine Gehorsamspflicht für andere Apostel abgeleitet, so daß auch du anderen Bischöfe gegenüber kein solches Recht beanspruchen kannst. [...] Wie immer man diese Briefstelle übersetzen mag, es steht fest, daß Cyprian hier den Anspruch Stephans als nicht gerechtfertigt ansieht,

Sachlage sicher nicht gerecht. Es stimmt, daß Cyprian dem Papst gegenüber behutsam vorgeht. Er brandmarkt Stephan nicht schlicht und einfach als Häretiker, sondern spricht in seinem Falle von einem Irrtum.³⁵ Das erklärt sich jedoch nicht nur damit, daß Cyprian mit Achtung dem römischen Bischofssitz entgegenkommt und dessen Vorrang anerkennt. Auch sein friedfertiges Bemühen, die Einheit der Kirche zu bewahren spielt eine große Rolle. Andererseits kann die Weigerung Cyprians, die römische Tradition zu übernehmen, nicht einfach als Aberkennung des römischen Primats seinerseits gedeutet werden. Zum einen sah er sich im Recht, und zum anderen bestand er auf das Recht eines Bischofs, eigene Beschlüsse zu treffen.

Augustinus fällt über diesen Streit ein besonnenes Urteil:

Cyprians Invektiven gegen Stephan will ich nicht kommentieren, weil es zu nichts führt. Es sind ja dieselben Punkte, die schon erörtert wurden und es ist besser sie zu übergehen, da sie das Risiko einer Verderben bringenden Zwietracht in sich bergen.³⁶

Stephan hat die Vertreter der entgegengesetzten Meinung ausschließen wollen, Cyprian hat die andere Meinung in der Einheit geduldet. Auch wenn sie in Streit waren, standen sie im Dialog miteinander und schließlich entstand keine Häresie und kein Schisma.

1.4 Die Catholica

1.4.1 *Communio sanctorum – communio sacramentorum*

Die Heiden, die sich zum Christentum bekehren wollten, konnten in Nordafrika zwischen den Donatisten und der katholischen Kirche wählen. Sicherlich war die Partei des Donatus im 4. Jh. von den beiden die mächtigere. Zudem war sie rigoristisch geprägt und schien höhere Erwartungen an ihre Gläubigen zu stellen, was den Anschein erwecken konnte, daß nicht die katholische, sondern die donatistische Kirche die Reinheit des Evangeliums bewahrt hätte und sie die wahre Kirche Christi sei.³⁷

zumindest in dieser konkreten Situation, und ebenso nicht die Ausdrucksformen oder den Ton, die der römische Bischof in seinem vermutlichem Schreiben gebraucht hat.”

³⁵ HINCHLIFF, 106–107.

³⁶ AUGUSTINUS, *bapt.* 5.25.36/ 293, in *CSEL* 51, 191–292: „iam illa quae in Stephanum iritatus effudit, retractare nolo, quia et non opus est. eadem quippe ipsa dicuntur quae iam satis discussa sunt et ea praeterire melius est, quae periculum perniciosae dissensionis habuerunt.”

³⁷ AUGUSTINUS, *bapt.* 1.3.4-1.5.6/ 59–67, in *CSEL* 51, 148–152.

Somit ist es für Augustinus von entscheidender Bedeutung herauszustellen, daß die katholische Kirche die Kirche Christi ist. Anhand ausgewählter Schrifttexte (Ps 60,3; Mt 13,25) definiert er die *Catholica* als die „Gemeinschaft des einen Leibes Christi“,³⁸ „die sich gemäß der Verheißung auf dem ganzen Erdenrund ausbreitet und sich bis zu den Grenzen der Erde ausdehnt, die mitten unter dem Unkraut heranwächst.“³⁹

Für die Ekklesiologie Cyprians und Augustins ist die Bezeichnung der Braut im Hohenlied – allegorisch die Kirche Christi- als Taube (*una est columba mea* – Hld 6,8) grundlegend. Die Taube hat die Vollmacht zu lösen und zu binden, sie spendet die Taufe.⁴⁰ Dadurch, daß die Taube die Sakramente verwaltet, kann Augustinus die Kirche als *communio sacramentorum* bestimmen. Nicht alle aber, die durch ihre Teilnahme an den Sakramenten zur *communio sacramentorum* gehören, sind auch wahrhaftig in der eigentlichen Kirche, in der *societas sacramentorum* bzw. *communio sanctorum*. Nur diese Letztere ist die wahre Kirche, die Taube (Hld 6,8), die Arche (1Pt 3,20f), die Braut Christi ohne Flecken und Makel (Eph 5,27).⁴¹

Mit dieser Unterscheidung hebt sich die Ekklesiologie von Augustinus am deutlichsten von der Cyprians und der Donatisten ab.⁴² Die *communio sacramentorum* steht für die irdisch-sichtbare Dimension der Kirche, die *communio sanctorum* dagegen weist auf die himmlisch-unsichtbare Dimension hin. Die Kirche ist zugleich menschliche Institution und Mysterium Gottes, Entfaltung des göttlichen Heilsplanes.⁴³ Das Menschliche öffnet sich auf das

³⁸ AUGUSTINUS, *bapt.* 1.4.5/ 65, in *CSEL* 51, 151: „[...] eligunt extra communionem unitatis corporis Christi accipere baptismum Christi.“

³⁹ AUGUSTINUS, *bapt.* 1.4.5/ 63, in *CSEL* 51, 150: „[...] non esse catholicam ecclesiam nisi eam quae, sicut promissa est, toto terrarum orbe diffunditur et extenditur usque ad fines terrae, quae crescens inter zizania.“

⁴⁰ D. LAU, „Columba“, in *AL*, 1073–1075.

⁴¹ AUGUSTINUS, *bapt.* 4.3.4/ 187, in *CSEL* 51, 225.

⁴² V. GROSSI, „Il battesimo negli scritti di S. Agostino“, in *DSBP*, 316: „Essere stati battezzati tuttavia non significa per ciò stesso essere nella comunione della Chiesa, come volevano i donatisti i quali, in forza dell’argomentazione di Agostino, si opponevano all’unione. Essi infatti concludevano che chi ha il vero battesimo ha anche la vera Chiesa.“

⁴³ W.-D. HAUSCHILD, *Lehrbuch der Kirchen und Dogmengeschichte*, 1, Gütersloh, 1995, 238: „Augustin hat seine Ekklesiologie v.a. gegen den Donatismus seit 394 entwickelt, allerdings nirgends umfassend-systematisch dargestellt. Er hat mehrere Konzepte verbunden: Kirche als *communio sanctorum*, *Volk Gottes* und *Leib Christi* ist Realität und Geheimnis gleichermaßen; sie ist zugleich *communio sacramentorum* und *societas sanctorum*, Institution und Personenverband, irdische und himmlische, gegenwärtige

Göttliche hin, die Gegenwart auf die Zukunft und somit auf die eschatologische Vollendung der Kirche beim letzten Gericht. Anhand des Gleichnisses von der Unkraut (Mt 13,24-30) kann Augustinus die komplexe Realität der Kirche beschreiben: „Getreide“ und „Unkraut“, Gute und Schlechte gibt es sowohl außerhalb, als auch innerhalb der Kirche. Die Sakramente aber, an denen gleichermaßen die Guten wie die Schlechten teilhaben, sind wie der Regen, der über das Unkraut wie über das Getreide niederfällt und sie wachsen läßt. Vor allem wenn man Unkraut und Getreide im Bezug auf das ewige Gericht nennt, muß man sagen, daß „draußen viel Getreide und drinnen viel Unkraut“⁴⁴ zu finden ist.

Obwohl in der sichtbaren Kirche Gerechte und Sünder beisammen leben, können die Sünder die Heiligen durch das Beisammensein in der einen Kirche nicht beflecken. Somit müssen die Heiligen die Sünder mit Geduld bis zum letzten Gericht ertragen. Dann wird es sich durch das göttliche Urteil herausstellen, wer die Guten waren und das eigentliche *corpus Christi* als die Kirche bilden, und wer als Bösen aus dem *corpus permixtum* ausgeschieden werden, damit die Kirche geläutert wird.⁴⁵

Unabhängig davon, ob er die sichtbare oder die unsichtbare Dimension der Kirche im Blick hat, verwendet Augustinus den Begriff *communio* um die Kirche zu definieren.⁴⁶ Er stellt somit ein wesentliches Merkmal der Kirche heraus, das in Gott selbst seinen Ursprung hat: „[...] da es ein und derselbe Herr ist, der in uns wohnt, so vereinigt und verknüpft er die Seinigen allenthalben durch das Band der Einheit.“⁴⁷ Eben weil dieses Merkmal in der Einheit der göttlichen Personen gründet, kann es nicht durch die Sünde zerstört

und zukünftige Wirklichkeit. Kirche ist eine differenzierte Einheit, eine komplexe Realität. Die Verbindung der Begriffe *communio sacramentorum* (Teilhabe aller Christen, auch der nicht wirklich bekehrten, am sakramentalen Leben) und *societas bzw. congregatio sanctorum* (Gemeinschaft der Heiligen als der von Gott erwählten Gläubigen) drückt das Spezifikum von Augustins Lehre aus.“

⁴⁴ AUGUSTINUS, *bapt.* 4.10.14/ 207, in *CSEL* 51, 239: „[...] foris multa frumenta sunt et intus multa zizania.“; vgl. *bapt.* 4.9.13/ 205, in *CSEL* 51, 237–238.

⁴⁵ HAUSCHILD, 239: „In Anlehnung an den Reformdonatisten Tyconius [...] hat Augustin im Blick auf die altkirchliche Typologie der Kirche als Arche Noahs und auf die Auslegung des Unkrautgleichnisses Mt 13,24-30 eine weitere Differenzierung eingeführt, die für die spätere Ekklesiologie konstitutiv geworden ist: die Unterscheidung zwischen theologischer und soziologischer Realität, zwischen *corpus Christi* („Leib“ im paulinischen Sinne) und *corpus permixtum* („Körperschaft“ im Rechtssinne).“

⁴⁶ A. TRAPÈ, „Agostino di Ippona“, in *NDPAC*, 155.

⁴⁷ CYPRIANUS, *epist.* 75.3/ 373, in *CSEL* 3/2, 811–812: „nam cum Dominus unus atque idem sit qui habitat in nobis, coniungit ubique et copulat suos uinculo unitatis.“

werden. Cyprian sieht die *communio* ebenfalls in Gott begründet und führt als Beweis die Verse des Johannesevangeliums „Ich und der Vater sind eins“ (Joh 10,30) und „Es wird eine Herde und ein Hirt sein“ (Joh 10,16) an.⁴⁸ In dieser *communio* werden die Gläubigen durch die Initiationssakramente eingeführt.⁴⁹ Alle Kirchenväter stellen heraus, daß die *communio*, die in der Taufe grundgelegt ist, in der Eucharistie zur Vollkommenheit geführt wird. Die Eucharistie ist somit Höhepunkt und Abschluß der in der Taufe begonnenen christlichen Initiation:

Denn wenn der Herr seinen Leib als Brot bezeichnet (vgl. Joh 6,52), das aus der Vereinigung vieler Körner entstanden ist, so weist er damit auf unser geeinigtes Volk hin, das er trug, und wenn er sein Blut Wein nennt (vgl. Mt 26,26-29), wie man ihn aus einer Masse von Trauben und Weinbeeren preßt und gewinnt, so meint er ebenfalls unsere Herde, die sich aus der Mischung einer großen vereinigten Menge zusammensetzt.⁵⁰

Aus der Sicht Cyprians ist die Kirche *communio sanctorum*, und zugleich *communio sacramentorum*. Das eine kann ohne das andere nicht bestehen. Deswegen fragt sich Cyprian, wie sich einige anmaßen können Ämter der Kirche außerhalb der katholischen Gemeinschaft wahrzunehmen, wo sie doch nicht zu der Herde Christi gehören. Jene sind von keinem rechtmäßig in ihrem Amt eingesetzt worden, sondern haben sich dessen bemächtigt.⁵¹ Augustinus jedoch bemerkt anhand des Beispiels von Simon der Magier (vgl. Apg 8,9-25) und der fleischlich denkenden Korinther, die in der dortigen Gemeinde Spaltungen verursachten (1Kor 3,1-13),⁵² daß auch innerhalb der katholischen

⁴⁸ CYPRIANUS, *epist.* 69.5/ 310–311, in *CSEL* 3/2, 753.

⁴⁹ M.G. MARA, „Koinonia“, in *NDPAC*, 2722–2723 „Al seguito dei passi soprattutto paolini, la k[oinonia] tra Dio e l'uomo si attua, secondo i Padri, grazie alla mediazione di Cristo particolarmente nell'eucaristia, che viene essa stessa indicata con il termine k[oinonia ...] Ma piu o meno tutti i riti dell'iniziazione cristiana hanno come scopo la realizzazione di tale k[oinonia...].

In ambiente latino la *communio*, o *concordia* o *unanimitas* è vista soprattutto come caratteristica della chiesa [...] che è partecipazione e riflesso della k[oinonia] esistente tra il Padre, il Figlio e lo Spirito [...] La k[oinonia] ecclesiale non puo mai essere abbandonata dal credente, nonostante si verificino in essa delle colpe.”

⁵⁰ CYPRIANUS, *epist.* 69.5/ 311, in *CSEL* 3/2, 754: „nam quando Dominus corpus suum panem uocat de multorum granorum adunatione congestum, populum nostrum quem portabat indicat adunatum: et quando sanguinem suum uinum appellat de botruis adque acinis plurimis expressum adque in unum coactum, gregem item nostrum significat commixtione adunatae multitudinis copulatum.”

⁵¹ CYPRIANUS, *epist.* 69.5/ 311, in *CSEL* 3/2, 753.

⁵² AUGUSTINUS, *bapt.* 1.10.14/ 77–79, in *CSEL* 51, 158–160.

Gemeinschaft nicht alle, die zur *communio sacramentorum* gehören, tatsächlich auch in der *communio sanctorum* sind. Wenn aber in der *catholica* die sichtbare und die unsichtbare Gemeinschaft nicht deckungsgleich sind, dann kann es Sakramente außerhalb der wahren Kirche Christi geben.⁵³

1.4.2 Schisma und Häresie

Überraschend ist zunächst mit welcher Entschiedenheit die Kirchenväter das Schisma als die schwerste Sünde überhaupt verurteilen. Schisma ist schwerwiegender als der Götzendienst oder die Auslieferung der heiligen Bücher, da anhand des Zeugnisses der Bibel⁵⁴ die schwerste Strafe an die Schismatiker erging. Diese wurden gleich von der Erde verschlungen. Die Götzendiener wurden „nur“ durch das Schwert vernichtet und die Verbrennung der heiligen Bücher bestrafte Gott mit der Niederlage im Krieg und Gefangennahme.⁵⁵ Ein ähnliches Urteil fällt auch Cyprian:

Wie kann es aber ein größeres Vergehen, wie einen häßlicheren Makel geben, als wenn man sich wider Christus erhoben, als wenn man seine Kirche, die er mit seinem Blute erworben und gegründet hat, zerstört und gegen das einmütige und einträchtige Volk Gottes mit der Wut feindlicher Zwietracht gekämpft hat, ohne an den Frieden und die Liebe des Evangeliums zu denken?⁵⁶

Die Väter vergleichen Schisma und Häresie oft mit dem Geiz. Dieser ist nämlich als Zeichen einer fehlerhaften Bekehrung zu betrachten. Ein Geizhals hat nur mit den Worten, nicht aber mit den Taten auf die Welt verzichtet. Augustinus setzt diese Sünder, die nur dem Anschein nach in der Kirche sind (1Kor 6,10) mit den Häretikern und Schismatikern außerhalb der Kirche gleich. Wenn aber einer trotz seiner sündhaften Leben weiterhin als getauft gilt, so gilt das auch für den, der im Schisma getauft wurde. Und wie der eine keinen

⁵³ AUGUSTINUS, *bapt.* 7.50.98/ 417, in *CSEL* 51, 369–370: „in qua utique non erant illi inuidi, et sine caritate maliuoli, qui tamen baptizabant. ex quo apparet et in eis esse posse, adque ab eis dari posse sacramentum Christi, qui non sunt in ecclesia Christi, in qua non nisi unanimes et concordēs habitare Cyprianus ipse testatur.“

⁵⁴ Die folgenden Bibelstellen werden von den Vätern als Zeugnisse aufgeführt: Num 16; Jer 36; Ex 32.

⁵⁵ AUGUSTINUS, *bapt.* 1.8.10/ 73, in *CSEL* 51, 155–156; *bapt.* 2.6.9/ 119, in *CSEL* 51, 183–184.

⁵⁶ CYPRIANUS, *epist.* 72.2/ 334, in *CSEL* 3/2, 777: „quod autem maius potest esse delictum aut quae macula deformior quam aduersus Christum stesisse, quam ecclesiam eius quam ille sanguine suo parauit et condidit dissipasse, quam euangelicae pacis ac dilectionis oblitum contra unanimum et concordem Dei populum hostilis discordiae furore pugnasse?“; vgl. J.P. BURNS, *Cyprian the Bishop*, London, 2002, 127.

Nutzen aus den Sakramenten ziehen kann und nicht „Tempel Gottes“ wird, so auch der andere nicht, es sei denn, er würde sich bessern und Buße halten.⁵⁷ Dieses Argument wiederholt Augustinus am häufigsten vor allem an den Stellen, wo er auf die Stellungnahme der verschiedenen Bischöfe eingeht, die sich am Konzil von Karthago 256 beteiligt haben.⁵⁸

Zu einer anderen schweren Gefährdung der Einheit der Kirche, diesmal auf doktrinaler Ebene, kommt es durch die Häresien. Zunächst kann ein Irrtum (*error*) entstehen, aber der Irrtum wird nur dann zur Häresie, wenn „willentliche und bewußte Abkehr von der Wahrheit sowie ‚starrsinniges Festhalten am Irrtum‘ hinzukommen“.⁵⁹ Demzufolge trifft Augustinus drei Unterscheidungen:

– der Häretiker innerhalb der Kirche, der sich seines Irrtums nicht bewußt ist. In diesem Fall ist es richtiger von Irrtum zu sprechen als von Häresie.

– der Häretiker, der den Glauben der Kirche nicht in seiner Ganzheit annimmt und deswegen das Schisma wählt. Hier kommt zum Irrtum die Spaltung dazu.

– der Häretiker innerhalb der Kirche, der sich de facto durch seine Häresie von der Kirche getrennt hat, aber um eines Vorteils willen weiterhin in der Kirche aufhält. In diesem Fall wird das Irrtum und die Spaltung durch den Betrug noch vergrößert.

Häretiker im eigentlichen Sinne sind nur jene, auf welchen die letzten zwei Unterscheidungen zutreffen. Sie verbleiben bewußt in ihrem Irrtum, auch als es ihnen kundgetan wurde, was die Lehre der Kirche ist.⁶⁰

Augustinus rechnet mit dem Fall solcher, die ohne ihr Wissen in Häresien gelangen. Da die Sünden, um die man weiß, schwerer wiegen als die, welche man im Unwissen begeht, ist ein unwissender Häretiker außerhalb der Kirche keinesfalls schlechter als ein bewußter Geizhals in der Kirche.⁶¹ Mehr noch, „es sind viele, die offen draußen sind und Häretiker genannt werden, besser als viele gute Katholiken.“⁶²

⁵⁷ AUGUSTINUS, *bapt.* 4.3.4/ 185–189, in *CSEL* 51, 224–226.

⁵⁸ AUGUSTINUS, *bapt.* 4.5.7/ 193, in *CSEL* 51, 228–230; *bapt.* 6.7.10–6.44.87/ 313–371, in *CSEL* 51, 304–341.

⁵⁹ G. WURST, „Haeresis, haeretici“, in *AL*, 293.

⁶⁰ AUGUSTINUS, *bapt.* 4.16.23/ 223, in *CSEL* 51, 249–250.

⁶¹ AUGUSTINUS, *bapt.* 4.5.7/ 193, in *CSEL* 51, 228–230.

⁶² AUGUSTINUS, *bapt.* 4.3.4/ 187, in *CSEL* 51, 225: „[...] multi etiam, qui aperte foris sunt et haeretici appellantur, multis et bonis catholicis meliores sunt.“

Die Trennung von der Einheit des Glaubens und der von der Einheit der Hierarchie bedingen sich gegenseitig. Die Schisma hat meistens eine Häresie zur Ursache:

Schisma trage also immer schon den Keim der [Häresie] in sich, da es ohne irgendeine Lehrdifferenz nicht entstehen könne. Wesentlich für die Unterscheidung sind der zeitliche Faktor und das Verharren im Irrtum, so daß nicht nur für die Donatisten – gilt: „schismatici crimen, quam etiam haerese[m] male perseuerando fecistis“ (ep. 87,4).⁶³

Andererseits kann auch ein Schisma häretische Züge aufnehmen. Cyprian wertet grundsätzlich jedes Schisma als Häresie. Auf die Frage der Bischöfe aus Numidien bezüglich der Aufnahme von Schismatikern, die den katholischen Glauben bewahrt hatten, versucht Cyprian klarzustellen, daß es dabei eigentlich um eine Häresie geht, da die Macht der Kirche, Sünden zu vergeben, bei ihnen in Frage gestellt wird.⁶⁴ Es ist wichtig hervorzuheben, daß Cyprian die Begriffe „Schisma“ und „Häresie“ als Synonyme verwendet, während Augustinus zwischen den beiden eindeutig unterscheidet. Daher ist auch die unterschiedliche Einstellung der beiden Kirchenväter zu der Wiedertaufe eher zu verstehen. Augustinus bemerkt jedenfalls, daß ein Schisma früher oder später auch zur Häresie führen wird.⁶⁵ Augustinus erkennt auch die intellektuelle Leistung der Häretiker im Sinne der natürlichen Fähigkeiten des menschlichen Geistes an.⁶⁶ Somit fällt die Beurteilung der Häretiker bei Augustinus insgesamt positiver und ausgeglichener aus als bei Cyprian.

1.4.3 Drinnen – Draußen

Es ist ersichtlich geworden, daß Augustinus die Kirche auf zwei Ebenen wahrnimmt. Entsprechend kann auch die Trennung von dieser auf zwei Weisen erfolgen: durch den offenen Frevel der Trennung verläßt man die sichtbare Einheit der Kirche und dann befindet sich man „draußen“. Durch eine schlechte Lebensweise aber trennt man sich von der unsichtbaren Kirche ohne Flecken und Makel (Eph 5,27) und wird zur „Spreu“, auch wenn man der Einheit formal weiterhin angehören sollte. Die Einheit geht verloren, wenn die Liebe verloren geht. Trotzdem gehen viele „auch nach Verlust der Liebe, nicht nach draußen, weil sie durch weltliche Vorteile festgehalten werden und weil sie ihren Vorteil

⁶³ WURST, 298.

⁶⁴ BURNS, 103.

⁶⁵ V. GROSSI, „Scisma-Scismatico“, in *NDPAC*, 4779–4780.

⁶⁶ WURST, 298.

und nicht den Jesu Christi suchen.⁶⁷ Damit wird aber nur eine Scheineinheit bewahrt. So kann es sein, daß zwar viele leiblich in der Kirche sind, aber von diesen nur ein Teil wahrhaft auch von der Gesinnung her in der Kirche ist. Aus diesen letzteren wird die Kirche als der Leib Christi aufgebaut:

Die einen sind so im Hause Gottes, daß sie selber auch eben dieses Haus Gottes sind, von dem es heißt, daß es auf dem Felsen gebaut wird (vgl. Mt 16,18), das die einzige Taube genannt wird (vgl. Hld 6,9) und schöne Braut ohne Flecken und Makel (vgl. Eph 5,27), und *verschlossener Garten und versiegelter Quell, Brunnen des lebendigen Wassers, Paradies mit der Frucht der Äpfel* (Hld 4, 12 f), Haus, das auch die Schlüssel und die Vollmacht zu lösen und zu binden empfangen hat (vgl. Mt 16, 19) [...]. Von anderen aber sage ich, daß sie so in diesem Hause sind, daß sie weder zum Zusammenhalt des Hauses gehören noch zur Gesellschaft der fruchtbringenden und friedfertigen Gerechtigkeit (vgl. 2 Kor 9,10), sondern so, wie Spreu sich erklärterweise im Getreide befindet (vgl. Mt 3,12).⁶⁸

Schließlich gibt es jene, die weder formal, noch mit der Gesinnung zu der Kirche gehören. Trotz des unterschiedlichen Grades der Zugehörigkeit können all diese die Taufe spenden.⁶⁹ Die Taufe bewirkt das Heil und wird nützlich, wenn man das Band des Friedens bewahrt und in der Einheit der einen Kirche bleibt. Anders ausgedrückt: es zählt „Getreide“ zu sein und nicht „Spreu.“ Für den Empfänger der Taufe ist es nicht bedeutungslos, aber doch zweitrangig, ob man „drinnen“ oder „draußen“ ist, beziehungsweise in welchem Gnadenzustand der Spender sich befindet. Die wahre Einheit der Kirche kommt durch die Einheit des Herzens und der Lebensweise zustande und nur die, die darin bis zum Ende standhaft bleiben, werden das Heil erlangen.⁷⁰

⁶⁷ AUGUSTINUS, *bapt.* 4.10.15/ 207, in *CSEL* 51, 239: „sed multi amissa caritate propterea non exeunt foras, quia saecularibus emolumentis tenentur et sua quaerentes, non quae Iesu Christi“.

⁶⁸ AUGUSTINUS, *bapt.* 7.51.99/ 419, in *CSEL* 51, 370–371: „alios ita esse in domo dei, ut et ipsi etiam sint eadem domus dei, quae dicitur aedificari super petram, quae unica columba appellatur, quae sponsa pulchra sine macula et ruga, et hortus conclusus, fons signatus, puteus aquae uiuae, paradisi cum fructu pomorum, quae domus etiam claves accepit, ac potestatem soluendi et ligandi. [...] alios autem ita dico esse in domo, ut non pertineant ad conpagem domus, nec ad societatem fructiferae pacificaque iustitiae, sed sicut esse palea dicitur in frumentis.“

⁶⁹ AUGUSTINUS, *bapt.* 7.51.99-7.52.100/ 419–421, in *CSEL* 51, 370–372.

⁷⁰ AUGUSTINUS, *bapt.* 1.10.14/ 77, in *CSEL* 51, 158–160.

Indem die Donatisten mit dem Vorwand, keine Gemeinschaft mit den Bösen haben zu wollen, das Band des Friedens zerrissen,⁷¹ ließen sie außer acht, daß sie durch ihr Handeln gerade das Wertvollste zerstören.⁷² Einer kann nämlich Gutes lehren, aber ohne die Liebe zu haben (vgl. Mt 23,2f), ein anderer kann die Liebe besitzen und sich in der Lehre irren (Gal 2,14).⁷³ Den Vorrang jedoch hat die Liebe, wie das auch der Apostel im ersten Korintherbrief (1Kor 13) deutlich macht.⁷⁴ Gerade Cyprian, auf den sich die Donatisten berufen, sollte ihnen als Vorbild dienen, denn er hat die Gemeinschaft mit den Bösen nicht gebrochen, trotz seiner Überzeugung, im Recht zu sein.⁷⁵

Wir wollen jedoch damit niemandem Vorschriften machen oder vorgereifen, sondern jeder einzelne Bischof mag tun, was er für richtig hält, da er ja in seiner Entscheidung freie Gewalt hat. Wir, soviel an uns liegt, streiten uns wegen der Ketzer nicht mit unseren Amtsgenossen und Mitbischöfen, mit denen wir an der göttlichen Eintracht und dem Frieden des Herrn festhalten [...]. Mit Geduld und Sanftmut bewahren wir die Liebe des Herzens, die Ehre der Amtsgenossen, das Band des Glaubens, die Eintracht des Priestertums.⁷⁶

Der Brief an Jubaianus, aus dem das obere Zitat stammt, gibt nach der eigenen Meinung von Cyprian seine Lehre am besten wieder.⁷⁷ Deswegen wird dieser Brief als Begründung der Position Cyprians auf dem Konzil von Karthago verlesen. Zu dieser Gelegenheit wiederholt Cyprian den Gedanken, den er schon ausführlich im Brief an Jubaianus vorgestellt hat und bittet die anwesenden Bischöfe, ihre eigene Meinung darzustellen, „ohne, daß wir über jemand richten oder ihn von dem Rechte der Gemeinschaft ausschließen

⁷¹ AUGUSTINUS, *bapt.* 2.6.7/ 115, in *CSEL* 51, 181–182.

⁷² AUGUSTINUS, *bapt.* 1.9.12/ 75, in *CSEL* 51, 157–158.

⁷³ AUGUSTINUS, *bapt.* 4.11.17/ 211, in *CSEL* 51, 241–242.

⁷⁴ AUGUSTINUS, *bapt.* 1.18.28/ 97–99, in *CSEL* 51, 170–173; *bapt.* 2.5.6/ 115, in *CSEL* 51, 180–181.

⁷⁵ AUGUSTINUS, *bapt.* 2.6.7/ 115, in *CSEL* 51, 181–182.

⁷⁶ CYPRIANUS, *epist.* 73.26/ 356, in *CSEL* 3/2, 798: „[...] nemini praescribentes aut praeiudicantes quo minus unusquisque episcoporum quod putat faciat, habens arbitrii sui liberam potestatem. nos, quantum in nobis est, propter haereticos cum collegis et coepiscopis nostris non contendimus, cum quibus diuinam concordiam et dominicam pacem tenemus, maxime cum et apostolus dicat: ‚si quis autem putauerit contentiosus esse, nos talem consuetudinem non habemus neque ecclesia Dei.‘ seruatur a nobis patienter et leniter caritas animi, collegii honor, uinculum fidei, concordia sacerdotii.”; vgl. AUGUSTINUS, *bapt.* 4.8.11/ 201–203, in *CSEL* 51, 235–236.

⁷⁷ CYPRIANUS, *sent. episc.* 87/ 354, in *CSEL* 3/1, 461.

wollten, wenn er eine entgegengesetzte Ansicht hat.⁷⁸ Diese Stelle wird von Augustinus ganz oft zitiert oder erwähnt,⁷⁹ weil sie als Hauptargument gegen die Donatisten dient. Diese befolgen die falsche Lehre des Cyprian, und nicht sein rechtes Handeln, dem zu folgen viel wichtiger wäre. Was die Lehre des Cyprian anbelangt, so wendet dieser ein, daß die Kirche Christi ein verschlossener Garten und eine versiegelte Quelle (Hld 4,12f) ist. Nur die, welche drinnen sind, können von den Früchten essen und aus der Quelle trinken.⁸⁰ Durch dieses Schriftwort begründet er, daß die Taufe nicht außerhalb der Kirche sein kann: „Kann aber etwa einer, der nicht drinnen in der Kirche ist, aus den Quellen der Kirche bewässern?“⁸¹ Zu diesem Einwand bemerkt Augustinus, daß die Flüsse zwar aus dem Paradies entspringen, aber auch außerhalb des Paradieses fließen (Gen 2,10-14) und erklärt, daß die Taufe außerhalb der Kirche sein kann, aber das glückselige Leben, das von der Taufe versprochen wird, nur innerhalb der Kirche zu erlangen ist. Nur die auf dem Felsen gegründete Kirche hat Macht zu lösen und zu binden.⁸² Wenn nun Cyprian anhand von 1Kor 13,3 sogar den Märtyrern, die ohne das Band der Liebe zu haben, gestorben sind, das Heil abspricht und betont, daß „es außerhalb der Kirche kein Heil gibt,⁸³ dann kann Augustinus dieser Aussage zustimmen, eben weil auch er ausschließlich der Kirche als Braut Christi die Macht zuschreibt, durch die rechtmäßige Taufe das Heil zu schenken. Die *eine* Taufe ist grundsätzlich Besitz der *einen* Kirche. Wenn nun die Taufe auch außerhalb der katholischen Gemeinschaft gespendet wird, so ist diese Taufe zwar echt, aber nicht rechtmäßig, weil sie dem rechtmäßigen Besitzer entwendet wurde: „Außerhalb der Kirche gibt es kein Heil.’ - Wer leugnet das? Und deswegen führt außerhalb der Kirche nicht zum Heil, was immer als Eigentum eben dieser Kirche besessen wird.“⁸⁴

⁷⁸ CYPRIANUS, *sent. episc. praef.* 354, in *CSEL* 3/1, 436: „[...] neminem iudicantes, aut a iure communicationis aliquem, si diuersum senserit, amouentes“.

⁷⁹ AUGUSTINUS, *bapt.* 2.1.2/ 105, in *CSEL* 51, 176; *bapt.* 2.2.3/ 107, in *CSEL* 51, 17); *bapt.* 2.5.6/ 113, in *CSEL* 51, 180; *bapt.* 2.6.7/115, in *CSEL* 51, 182; *bapt.* 2.10.15/ 129, in *CSEL* 51, 190; *bapt.* 2.15.20/ 137, in *CSEL* 51, 196, etc.

⁸⁰ CYPRIANUS, *epist.* 69.2/ 308, in *CSEL* 3/2, 751.

⁸¹ CYPRIANUS, *epist.* 73.10/ 344, in *CSEL* 3/2, 785: „numquid de ecclesiae fontibus rigare potest qui intus in ecclesia non est?“

⁸² AUGUSTINUS, *bapt.* 4.1.1/ 183, in *CSEL* 51, 223.

⁸³ CYPRIANUS, *epist.* 73.21/ 352, in *CSEL* 3/2, 795: „[...] quia salus extra ecclesiam non est“.

⁸⁴ AUGUSTINUS, *bapt.* 4.17.24/ 225, in *CSEL* 51, 250: „salus extra ecclesiam non est. quis negat? et ideo quaecumque ipsius ecclesiae habentur, extra ecclesiam non ualent ad salutem.“

Augustinus stellt sich die Frage um das Heil der „guten Häretiker“, die nicht in der sichtbaren Einheit geblieben sind, nur beiläufig. Aus dem oben Angeführten kann man aber schlußfolgern, daß die wahre Kirche Christi auf der Erde von der *Catholica* vertreten wird, ohne jedoch vollständig deckungsgleich mit dieser zu sein. Damit eröffnet sich der Weg zur Anerkennung des Heils auch außerhalb der katholischen Gemeinschaft.

Was die Katholiken anbelangt, warnt Augustinus davor, sich das Heil dadurch gesichert zu glauben, daß man in der katholischen Gemeinschaft ist: „Laßt uns also einem Katholiken, der von all diesen Lastern umgeben ist, nicht schmeichlerisch zureden, und wagen wir ihm nicht, weil er ein katholischer Christ ist, Strafflosigkeit zu versprechen, die die heilige Schrift nicht verspricht!“⁸⁵ Zur Zeit Noahs hat das Wasser den Menschen außerhalb Arche Vernichtung gebracht, denen jedoch, die in der Arche waren, das Heil. Ähnlich werden durch dieselbe Taufe die guten Katholiken gerettet und die schlechten Katholiken, beziehungsweise Häretiker zugrunde gerichtet.⁸⁶

1.5 Der Heilige Geist – Prinzip der Einheit

1.5.1 Der Geist und die Taufe

Ausgehend von der Heiligen Schrift und der kirchlichen Praxis, die Mysterien zu feiern, begannen die Väter eine Theologie der Initiations sacramente zu entwickeln. Dazu gaben vor allem die mystagogischen Homilien der Osteroktav die Gelegenheit. In diesen wird die Einheit zwischen Theologie und Lebensweise, Orthodoxie und Orthopraxis sichtbar. Aus diesem Grunde nahm Mt 28,19-20 eine hervorragende Stelle ein unter den Schriftstellen, welche die Väter mit Vorliebe als Ausgangspunkt zu ihrer Taufmystagogie wählten. Mt 28,19-20 ist Schriftstelle und Taufformel, Glaubensaussage und Gebet zugleich. Als Schriftstelle bezeugt sie eindeutig den christlichen Glauben an den dreifaltigen Gott. Das mag dazu beigetragen haben, daß sie als Taufformel Ende des I. Jh.- Anfang des II. Jh. immer häufiger bevorzugt wurde, bis sie schließlich als einzig gültige, anerkannte Taufformel die Taufpraxis der Kirche

⁸⁵ AUGUSTINUS, *bapt.* 4.19.26/ 227, in CSEL 51, 252: „His igitur omnibus utiis circumsaeptum catholicum non adulemus nec ei, quia christianus catholicus est, impunitatem quam scriptura divina non promittit, promittere audeamus. nec si aliquid unum habeat ex his quae dicta sunt, debemus ei societatem supernae illius patriae polliceri.“

⁸⁶ AUGUSTINUS, *bapt.* 5.28.39/ 299, in CSEL 51, 296–297; *bapt.* 6.40.78/ 365, in CSEL 51, 336.

bestimmte.⁸⁷ Dadurch erklärt sich der maßgebende Einfluß von Mt 28,19-20 auf die Trinitätslehre und die Pneumatologie in der Patristik.⁸⁸

Auch andere für die Taufe wichtige Bibelverse erwähnen den Heiligen Geist.⁸⁹ Daraus ergibt sich zunächst die innige Verbundenheit zwischen der Taufe und dem Heiligen Geist. Durch die Taufe gebiert die Kirche Kinder Gottes als Braut Christi und Mutter. In der Taufe bewirkt der Heilige Geist die Vergebung der Sünden und die Heiligung des Menschen. Es wird deutlich, daß Ekklesiologie und Pneumatologie sich gegenseitig bestimmen. Das kommt z.B. in Augustinus zum Vorschein, wenn er das Bild der Taube aus dem Hohelied nicht nur auf die Kirche, sondern auch auf den Geist anwendet.⁹⁰ Die Taube steht für Werte wie Einheit, Einfachheit und Frieden. Diese sind sowohl dem Heiligen Geist, als auch der *Catholica* eigen.⁹¹ Die Taube wohnt nicht nur in den Herzen der einzelnen Gläubigen, die sie zum Tempel Gottes macht (vgl. 1Kor 3,16-17; 6,19), sondern auch in der Kirche, als Gemeinschaft der Gläubigen (vgl. Eph 2,21).⁹²

Cyprian setzt diesen Ansatz der heiligen Schrift fort und leitet die Macht der Kirche, in der Taufe die Sünden zu vergeben und den Heiligen Geist zu vermitteln, aus Joh 20,21-23 ab.⁹³ Petrus und die Apostel wurden als Vorsteher in der Kirche vom Herrn eingesetzt. Nur die eine wahre Kirche hat den Heiligen Geist und kann die Wiedergeburt *aus beiden Sakramenten*,⁹⁴ aus Wasser und aus dem Heiligen Geist (vgl. Joh 3,5) schenken.⁹⁵ Auch wenn Cyprian anhand von Joh 3,5 zwischen Wassertaufe und Geistverleihung unterscheidet, so liegt es ihm sehr am Herzen, die Einheit der beiden hervorzuheben. Die beiden Taufriten

⁸⁷ F. BOLGIANI, „Spirito Santo“, in *NDPAC*, 5094.

⁸⁸ Basilius von Cäsarea leitet zum Beispiel eines der wichtigsten Argumente für die Gottheit des Heiligen Geistes aus der Taufformel ab.

⁸⁹ Vgl. z.B. Joh 20,21-23; Joh 3,5; Eph 4,4-6.

⁹⁰ Das NT verwendet das Bild der Taube für den Heiligen Geist bei der Taufe Christi im Jordan (vgl. Mt 3,16; Mk 1,10; Lk 3,22; Joh 1,32).

⁹¹ M.W. LIBAMBU, „Colomba“, in *NDPAC*, 1113–1114.

⁹² BOLGIANI, 5095.

⁹³ CYPRIANUS, *epist.* 73.7/ 341–342, in *CSEL* 3/2, 783–784.

⁹⁴ CYPRIANUS, *epist.* 73.21/ 353, in *CSEL* 3/2, 795: „[...] regeneratione diuina praeparantur sacramento utroque nascantur“.

⁹⁵ BURNS, 129: „That someone could quit the unity of this assembly, rebel against the authority of its bishop, establish a competing community within the same town, and there exercise the power to forgive and sanctify, was unimaginable and inconceivable to Cyprian. In his view, the Holy Spirit and thus the power to purify simply could not be found on both sides of such a division between churches.“

bilden gemeinsam den einheitlichen Taufakt und sind dadurch unzertrennbar.⁹⁶ Deswegen kann man ohne den Heiligen Geist nicht taufen. Die, die sich von der Einheit der Apostel und ihrer Nachfolger getrennt haben, sind des Heiligen Geistes verlustig geworden, weil der Geist der Einheit und des Friedens nichts mit der böswilligen Trennung und Zwiespalt gemeinsam haben kann.⁹⁷ Wie soll ein Bischof ohne den Heiligen Geist das Wasser und das Öl weihen und schließlich den Geist verleihen können?⁹⁸

Auch Augustinus bezeugt, daß Cyprian deswegen die Taufe der Häretiker nicht annehmen konnte, weil nach seiner Meinung Kirche, Geist und Taufe von einander nicht getrennt werden können.⁹⁹ Augustinus wendet ein, daß in diesem Fall die, die aus der Kirche heraustraten, auch die Taufe verlieren müßten. Das geschieht aber nicht, denn keiner wird wiedergetauft, wenn er die Kirche verlassen hat, und später zurückkommt. Der Geist meidet den Heuchler (vgl. Weish 1,5), nicht aber die Taufe.¹⁰⁰ Cyprian wertet es als einen halben Erfolg, daß seine Gegner wenigstens anerkennen, daß die Häretiker und Schismatiker den Heiligen Geist weder besitzen noch spenden können. Gerade deswegen sollten sie auch einsehen, daß in der Trennung weder der Geist, noch die Taufe

⁹⁶ G.W.H. LAMPE, *The seal of the spirit*, London, 1951, 172: „The disintegration of the ancient and Scriptural conception of Baptism has evidently proceeded so far that even Cyprian interprets the ‚water‘ and ‚Spirit‘ as indicating two *sacramenta* of Baptism and the laying on of the hand, instead of as denoting the inward and outward aspects of the single sacrament of Baptism; but, at the same time, he is fighting hard, against the views of Stephen’s party, to retain the closest association of the two rites and to treat them theologically as virtually constituting one sacrament.”

⁹⁷ NOCENT, 207: „Se un eretico o uno scismatico è stato capace di conferire il battesimo, ciò significa che è stato capace di conferire lo Spirito. Ma se non può donare lo Spirito, perché fuori dalla Chiesa, egli non può essere con lo Spirito e non può battezzare chi si presenta per essere battezzato, poiché il battesimo è uno, lo Spirito è uno e non vi è che un’unica Chiesa, fondata dal Cristo Signore nostro con un’unità di origine e di struttura intorno a Pietro.”

⁹⁸ BURNS, 113: „One set of arguments pointed to the inseparable link between the Spirit, the unique church, and the one baptism. [...] A second set of arguments focused on the ritual of baptism itself. How could a bishop who Was himself loaded with sins and deprived of the Holy Spirit sanctify the waters of baptism; how celebrate the sacrifice through which the oil of anointing was hallowed; how offer the solemn prayer for the neophytes; how confer the Holy Spirit?”; Cyprianus, epist. 74.4-5/ 361–362, in *CSEL* 3/2, 802–803.

⁹⁹ AUGUSTINUS, *bapt.* 5.23.33/ 289, in *CSEL* 51, 290: „ecclesiam et spiritum et baptismum, dixit, ab inuicem non posse separari et ideo, qui ab ecclesia separati sunt et a spiritu sancto, etiam a baptismo uult intellegi separatos.”

¹⁰⁰ AUGUSTINUS, *bapt.* 5.23.33/ 289, in *CSEL* 51, 290.

gespendet werden kann.¹⁰¹ Für Cyprian macht es keinen Sinn, die Taufe eines Häretikers anzuerkennen und zugleich ihm den Heiligen Geist abzusprechen, „[d]enn entweder konnte er kraft seines Glaubens draußen beides erlangen, oder er hat keines von beiden bekommen, weil er draußen war.“¹⁰²

Die Beweisführung Cyprians ist folgende: wenn die Taufe gültig ist, so sind die Getauften Tempel Gottes geworden, haben ihre Sünden abgelegt und haben Christus angezogen (Gal 3,27). Warum sollte also über diesem Tempel der Heilige Geist nicht ausgegossen sein, warum soll der von seinen Sünden Gereinigte nicht zum Empfang des Heiligen Geistes fähig sein, wie kann jemand Christus angezogen haben, ohne den Geist zu haben? Alleine vermag das Wasser von den Sünden nicht reinigen. Entweder haben die Häretiker sowohl die Taufe als auch den Geist, oder keines der beiden, „weil es eine Taufe ohne den (Heiligen) Geist nicht geben kann.“¹⁰³

Augustinus will keinesfalls behaupten, daß die Häretiker und Schismatiker das Heil erlangen könnten, sind sie doch außerhalb der *Catholica*. Damit entspricht seine Meinung dem Grundanliegen Cyprians, daß nur in der Einheit der wahren Kirche die Taufe die Heiligung bewirken kann. Das soll aber nicht ausschließen, daß auch außerhalb der *Catholica* die Taufe gespendet werden kann, wenn auch vorerst ohne Nutzen. Ob nun der Heilige Geist tatsächlich von der Taufe nicht getrennt werden kann, das läßt Augustinus offen, auch wenn er geneigt ist, den Besitz des Geistes den Häretikern abzusprechen:

Entweder werden die, die auf trügerische Weise auf die Welt verzichten, aus dem Geist geboren, jedoch zu ihrem Verderben und nicht zu ihrem Heil, und so können auch die Häretiker aus dem Geiste geboren werden; oder wenn das Wort: *Denn der Heilige Geist der Belehrung wird den, der vortäuscht, meiden* (Weish 1,5), auch hier gilt, daß die auf trügerische Weise auf die Welt Verzichtenden nicht aus dem Geist wiedergeboren werden, dann ist es möglich, daß jemand mit Wasser getauft wird und nicht aus dem Geist geboren wird, und es ist falsch, was Nemesianus sagt: ‚Weder kann der Geist ohne das Wasser noch das Wasser ohne den Geist wirken.‘¹⁰⁴

¹⁰¹ CYPRIANUS, *epist.* 69.10/ 315–316, in *CSEL* 3/2, 759.

¹⁰² CYPRIANUS, *epist.* 73.6/ 341, in *CSEL* 3/2, 783: „aut utrumque enim fide sua foris consequi potuit aut neutrum eorum qui foris fuerat accepit.“

¹⁰³ CYPRIANUS, *epist.* 74.5/ 362, in *CSEL* 3/2, 803: „[...] quia baptismus esse sine spiritu non potest.“

¹⁰⁴ AUGUSTINUS, *bapt.* 6.12.(18)19/ 323, in *CSEL* 51, 310: „aut illi qui fallaciter saeculo renuntiant, nascuntur de spiritu, quamuis ad perniciem, non ad salutem, adque ita

1.5.2 Die Vergebung der Sünden in der Taufe

Der Heilige Geist wirkt auf unsichtbare Weise im Herzen der Menschen. Um die Gegenwart des Heiligen Geistes und dadurch die wahre Kirche herauszustellen, versuchen die Donatisten die Wirkung des Geistes in den Seelen zu erfassen. Damit folgen sie dem Gedankengang Cyprians: wenn die Katholiken zugeben, daß die Donatisten in der Taufe die Sünden nachlassen, dann folgt daraus, daß die Donatisten auch den Heiligen Geist haben. In diesem Fall ist die donatistische Kirche die wahre Kirche Christi, denn es gibt nur eine Kirche (vgl. Hld 6,8). Außerhalb von ihm bewirkt der Heilige Geist keinen Nachlaß der Sünden. Wenn die Katholiken somit Donatisten aufnehmen, ohne diese wiederzutaufen, geben sie zu, nicht die Kirche Christi zu sein.¹⁰⁵

Dem entgegnet Augustinus mit einem ähnlichen Gedankengang: Die katholische Lehre besagt, daß ein jeder, der in Christus getauft wurde, Christus angezogen hat, zum neuen Leben wiedergeboren wurde und den Nachlaß der Sünden erhalten hat. Wenn es dabei um einen Heuchler geht, dann müßten ihm die Donatisten die Sündenvergebung absprechen, denn der Geist meidet den Heuchler (vgl. Weis 1,5). Würde dieser aber später Reue zeigen, müßte er neu getauft werden, was sicher abwegig wäre. Damit sollten die Donatisten zugeben, „daß jemand mit der wahren Taufe Christi getauft werden könne und er es dennoch nicht zulasse, daß die Vernichtung seiner Sünden geschehe, weil sein Herz in der Bosheit oder im Frevel verharrt.“¹⁰⁶

Sollte man indessen die Frage um die Vergebung der Sünden so beantworten, daß der Heuchler den Sündennachlaß in der Taufe bekommt, aber wegen seiner schlechten Gesinnung auch gleich verliert, so gilt das sowohl „drinnen“ als auch „draußen.“ Am Nachlaß seiner Sünden kann sich der Heuchler genau so wenig erfreuen, wie sich einer am Licht erfreuen kann, der aus der Finsternis durchs Licht wieder in die Finsternis geht.¹⁰⁷ Ähnlich erging es dem Knecht, dessen Schulden erlassen worden sind, aber er selbst die Schuld seines Mitknechtes nicht erlassen wollte. Am Ende befand er sich in demselben

possunt et haeretici, aut si illud quod scriptum est: sanctus enim spiritus disciplinae effugiet fictum, etiam ad hoc ualet, ut fallaciter saeculo renuntiantes non nascantur de spiritu, potest quis baptizari aqua et non nasci de Spiritu; et frustra Nemesianus ait: „neque spiritus sine aqua operari potest, nec aqua sine spiritu.“

¹⁰⁵ AUGUSTINUS, *bapt.* 1.11.15/ 79–81, in *CSEL* 51, 160–161.

¹⁰⁶ AUGUSTINUS, *bapt.* 1.12.18/ 83, in *CSEL* 51, 162: „[...] fateantur uero baptismo Christi baptizari posse hominem et tamen cor eius in malitia uel sacrilegio perseuerans peccatorum abolitionem non sinere fieri“.

¹⁰⁷ AUGUSTINUS, *bapt.* 1.12.19/ 83–85, in *CSEL* 51, 163–164.

Zustand wie vor der Erlassung seiner Schuld (vgl. Mt 18,23-34).¹⁰⁸ Aus dieser Parabel leitet Augustinus seine Meinung ab, daß die Sünden bei einem Heuchler zwar nachgelassen werden, dann aber wiederkehren:

So wird die Gnade der Taufe zwar nicht daran gehindert, alle Sünden nachzulassen, auch wenn der Haß der Brüder im Herzen dessen, dem sie nachgelassen werden, fortbesteht. Nachgelassen wird der gestrige Tag und alle Zeit zuvor, nachgelassen wird selbst die Stunde und der Augenblick vor der Taufe und in der Taufe. Dann aber beginnt der Getaufte sofort schuldig zu werden nicht nur für die folgenden, sondern auch für die vergangenen Tage, Stunden, Augenblicke, weil alles zurückkehrt, was nachgelassen worden war. Und so etwas passiert oft in der Kirche.¹⁰⁹

Augustinus denkt bezüglich der Sündenvergebung nicht dichotomistisch, sondern er sieht den Willen Gottes, die Sünden in der Taufe zu vergeben. Dieser Sündenvergebung kann sich aber der Mensch widersetzen. Abgesehen davon, ob in der Taufe auch nur für kurze Zeit die Sünden vergeben wurden und dann zurückkehrten oder ihm gar nicht erlassen worden sind, bleibt ein solcher Mensch schließlich mit seinen Sünden beladen: „Ob sie nun nachgelassen oder nicht nachgelassen werden, notwendig ist danach eine Arznei.“¹¹⁰

Nur in der Einheit der Kirche werden die Versöhnung und der Frieden gewährt. Die Gebete der Heiligen können denen nicht helfen, die sich in Häresie und Schisma befinden oder durch eine schlechte Lebensweise sich von der Einheit trennen. Unabhängig, ob man vom „Falken“ oder von der „Tauben“ getauft wurde, hat man den Nachlaß der Sünden, wenn man den Frieden mit der Taube hat: „gelöst wird, wer mit der Taube Frieden gemacht hat, und gebunden wird, wer mit der Taube keinen Frieden hat, sei er nun offen draußen oder sei er anscheinend drinnen.“¹¹¹

¹⁰⁸ AUGUSTINUS, *bapt.* 1.12.20/ 85–87, in *CSEL* 51, 164–165.

¹⁰⁹ AUGUSTINUS, *bapt.* 1.12.20/ 87, in *CSEL* 51, 165: „sic non impeditur baptismi gratia quominus omnia peccata dimittat, etiamsi odium fraternum in eius cui dimittuntur animo perseuerat. soluitur enim hesternus dies et quidquid supra est soluitur, etiam ipsa hora momentumque ante baptismum et in baptismo. deinceps autem continuo reus esse incipit, non solum consequentium sed etiam praeteritorum dierum horarum momentorum, redeuntibus omnibus quae dimissa sunt. et saepe ista contingunt in ecclesia.“

¹¹⁰ AUGUSTINUS, *bapt.* 1.13.21/ 87, in *CSEL* 51, 165: „siue ergo dimittantur siue non dimittantur, necessaria est postea medicina.“; vgl. *bapt.* 1.12.18/ 81–83, in *CSEL* 51, 162–163.

¹¹¹ AUGUSTINUS, *bapt.* 3.18.23/ 171, in *CSEL* 51, 216: „[...] sed soluitur qui cum columba fecerit pacem, et ligatur qui cum columba non habet pacem, siue aperte foris sit, siue intus esse uideatur.“

1.5.3 Handauflegung und Salbung

In der frühchristlichen Zeit stellt die Taufe als Wiedergeburt „aus Wasser und Heiligem Geist“ (vgl. Joh. 3,5) einen einheitlichen Initiationsritus dar, in dem es keine klare Zuordnung der Gnadengaben zu den einzelnen Handlungen gab. Eine Ausnahme stellt Tertullians Sichtweise dar, der innerhalb der einzigen Initiationshandlung die Gabe des Heiligen Geistes ausdrücklich der Salbung zuordnet und der Wassertaufe nur eine reinigende Kraft zuspricht.¹¹² Erst in den späteren Jahrhunderten vollzieht sich im Westen die Trennung der zwei Initiations sakramente Taufe und die Firmung voneinander.¹¹³ Die Krönung und der Abschluß der christlichen Initiation bildet das dritte Initiations sakrament, die Eucharistie.¹¹⁴

Cyprian hält grundsätzlich an der Einheit des Initiationsritus fest.¹¹⁵ Trotzdem ist ihm der Gedanke, im Zusammenhang mit Apg 8,5-17 die Gabe des Heiligen Geistes hauptsächlich der Handauflegung zuzuschreiben, nicht fremd: Die Apostel führten bei den gültig Getauften das Fehlende zur Vollendung, indem sie durch Gebet und Handauflegung den Heiligen Geist vermittelten. Diese Praxis der Kirche wird auch zur Zeit Cyprians befolgt: „die in der Kirche getauft werden, bringt man vor die Vorsteher der Kirche, und durch unser Gebet und unsere Handauflegung erlangen sie den Heiligen Geist und die Vollendung durch das Siegel des Herrn.“¹¹⁶ Cyprian kennt auch eine *geistliche Salbung*¹¹⁷ bzw. Besiegelung als Teil der christlichen Initiation. Anhand der biblischen Texte verbinden die Väter die Gabe des Heiligen Geistes mit der Handauflegung, aber wenn es um die Liturgie geht, dann

¹¹² NEUNHEUSER, 50–51.

¹¹³ NEUNHEUSER, 71: „Was eine spätere Zeit als zwei klar geschiedene Sakramente, als Taufe und Firmung, im Brauch hat, bildet damals ein einziges Gesamtgefüge von heiligen Handlungen, eine einzige Initiationshandlung, ‚baptisma‘ genannt im umfassendsten Sinne des Wortes.“

¹¹⁴ M. AUGÉ, *L'iniziazione cristiana. Battesimo e Confermazione*, Roma, 2004, 170: „[...] si ricordi che nel Nuovo Testamento, il battesimo ‚da acqua e da Spirito‘ (Gv 3,5) indica tutto il complesso dell'iniziazione che prepara alla celebrazione eucaristica e che coinvolge il credente in quegli eventi di salvezza che lo introducono nella storia del regno di Dio e lo avviano alla pienezza del ‚giorno del Signore‘.“

¹¹⁵ LAMPE, 172.

¹¹⁶ CYPRIANUS, *epist.* 73.9/ 343, in *CSEL* 3/2, 785: „qui in ecclesia baptizantur praepositis ecclesiae offerantur et per nostrum oratinem ac manus inpositionem spiritum sanctum consequantur et signaculo dominico consummentur.“

¹¹⁷ CYPRIANUS, *epist.* 70.2/ 325, in *CSEL* 3/2, 768: „unde nec unctio spiritalis apud haereticos potest esse, quando constet oleum sanctificari et eucharistiam fieri apud illos omnino non posse.“

kommt die Salbung als Zeichen der Geistgabe in den Vordergrund. Immerhin ist vorauszusetzen, daß auch die Handauflegung als liturgische Geste im Gebrauch war, und zwar als eine eigene, vom AT unabhängige Tradition.¹¹⁸ Man kann in der Patristik jedenfalls von keiner klaren Zuordnung der Vermittlung des Geistes zu einem bestimmten Ritus sprechen.¹¹⁹

Solange die Einheit der christlichen Initiation bewahrt wird, spielt es keine große Rolle, welchem Ritus man die Gabe des Geistes zuschreibt. In zwei Fällen jedoch kommt Wassertaufe und Handauflegung getrennt voneinander vor. Dadurch gewinnt auch die Frage Bedeutung, durch welchen Ritus der Heilige Geist empfangen wird. Im ersten Fall geht es um die sogenannte Klinikertaufe: Gläubige in Todesgefahr wurden durch Besprengung getauft und erhielten die postbaptesimalen Riten nicht. Im Falle der Genesung wurden diese nachgeholt. So wurde zum Beispiel Novatian durch Besprengung getauft und Kornelius bestand darauf, daß er das Siegel vom Bischof erhalten muß,¹²⁰ um am Heiligen Geist teilhaben zu können.¹²¹

Im zweiten Fall geht es um die Praxis, die Häretiker durch die Handauflegung in die Kirche aufzunehmen.¹²² Diese Praxis bezeugt die Überzeugung, daß die Häretiker außerhalb der Kirche zwar die Wassertaufe, nicht aber den Heiligen Geist haben konnten. Auch Magnus formuliert in seinem Brief an Cyprian diese These. Er vergleicht die durch einen Diakon oder Priester gespendete Taufe, die später durch die bischöfliche Salbung abgeschlossen wird, mit der Aufnahme der Schismatiker, die durch die Handauflegung in die Kirche aufgenommen werden. Demgemäß könnte die Wassertaufe ein jeder spenden, aber Bischöfen alleine stehe es zu, das Ritual abzuschließen. Cyprian akzeptiert den Vergleich zwischen einem Diakon/Priester innerhalb der Kirche und einem vermutlichen Bischof außerhalb der Kirche nicht. Immerhin hatte Cyprian in seinem Brief an Jubaianus eine Unterscheidung zwischen der Vergebung der Sünden in der Wassertaufe und

¹¹⁸ LAMPE, 223–231.

¹¹⁹ B. NEUNHEUSER, P. DE NAVASCUÉS, „Confermazione“, in *NDPAC*, 1151: „Però, come è probabile, il momento liturgico dell’iniziazione rimane un’azione unitaria, il battesimo, detto anche battesimo in Spirito, senza che in esso si possano distinguere singoli riti come momenti sacramentali a sé stanti.“

¹²⁰ Brief des Papstes Kornelius an Fabius über die Taufe Novatus; vgl. EUSEBIUS VON CÄSAREA, *Kirchengeschichte*, 6.43.14–15/ 315, in *PG*, 20, 624.

¹²¹ LAMPE, 179: „In any case, the Spirit is explicitly said to be bestowed, not in Baptism, but in a rite of ‚sealing‘, which in certain cases, such as clinical Baptism, may be separated from Baptism by a considerable interval of time.“

¹²² BURNS, 102.

die nachfolgende Gabe des Heiligen Geistes in der Handauflegung nicht ausgeschlossen.¹²³ In diesem Sinne versteht Cyprian die Handauflegung, die Papst Stephan und seine Anhänger praktizierten, als Vorhaben, den Heiligen Geist zu spenden.¹²⁴ Auch Augustinus verbindet die Vermittlung des Heiligen Geistes mit der Handauflegung:

Daß aber der Heilige Geist durch die Auflegung der Hände nur in der katholischen Kirche gegeben wird, wie behauptet wird, das ist nach der Meinung unserer Vorfahren selbstverständlich aus dem Apostelwort zu ersehen, das da heißt: *Denn die Liebe ist in unseren Herzen ausgegossen durch den Heiligen Geist, der euch gegeben wurde* (Röm 5,5). [...] Es hat jedoch nicht die Liebe Gottes, wer die Einheit der Kirche nicht liebt. Und von daher begreift man, daß es richtig ist zu sagen, nur in der katholischen Kirche werde der heilige Geist empfangen.¹²⁵

Augustinus behauptet hier eindeutig, daß der Heilige Geist nur in der *Catholica* gegeben wird. Wenn er zugleich eine Wirkung des Heiligen Geistes außerhalb der *Catholica* nicht vollkommen ausschließt, so begründet er diesen Gegensatz mit der Unterscheidung zwischen dem Sakrament, dem Wirken des Geistes zuweilen auch in bösen Menschen¹²⁶ und dem Wirken desselben Geistes nur in den guten Menschen.¹²⁷ Diese Letztere ist die Liebe, die mit der Handauflegung gegeben wird. Dazu bemerkt aber Augustinus: „Die Auflegung der Hände kann, anders als die Taufe, wiederholt werden. Was ist sie nämlich anderes als ein Gebet über einen Menschen?“¹²⁸ Es stellt sich die Frage, ob Augustinus tatsächlich die Vermittlung des Heiligen Geistes durch die Handauflegung als wiederholbar betrachtete, oder ob an dieser Stelle die Handauflegung im Sinne eines Bußaktes zu verstehen ist.¹²⁹ Wenn Augustinus

¹²³ CYPRIANUS, *epist.* 73.9/ 343, in *CSEL* 3/2, 784–785; BURNS, 111–112.

¹²⁴ CYPRIANUS, *epist.* 69.11/ 316, in *CSEL* 3/2, 759–760; *epist.* 73.6/ 341, in *CSEL* 3/2, 783.

¹²⁵ AUGUSTINUS, *bapt.* 3.16.21/ 165, in *CSEL* 51, 212: „Spiritus autem sanctus quod in sola catholica, per manus impositionem dari dicitur, nimirum hoc intellegi maiores nostri uoluerunt, quod apostolus ait: quoniam caritas dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per spiritum sanctum, qui datus est nobis. [...] non autem habet dei caritatem, qui ecclesiae non diligit unitatem, ac per hoc recte intellegitur dici non accipi nisi in catholica spiritus sanctus.“

¹²⁶ Auch König Saul erhielt die Prophetengaben. (Vgl. 1Kön 10,6.10).

¹²⁷ AUGUSTINUS, *bapt.* 3.16.21/ 167, in *CSEL* 51, 213.

¹²⁸ AUGUSTINUS, *bapt.* 3.16.21/ 167, in *CSEL* 51, 213: „manus autem inpositio non sicut baptismus repeti non potest. quid est enim aliud nisi oratio super hominem?“

¹²⁹ NEUNHEUSER, 71: „Von der Salbung klar geschieden ist der Ritus der ‚impositio manuum‘. Mit aller Bestimmtheit erklärt Augustinus, daß auf niemanden der Heilige Geist herabkommt [...], wenn ihm nicht die Hand aufgelegt worden ist. [...] Neben diesen

tatsächlich darauf bestehen sollte, daß anders als bei der Taufe, die Vermittlung des Heiligen Geistes nur in der katholischen Gemeinschaft sich ereignen kann, dann ist die geistvermittelnde Handauflegung nicht als ein vom Spender unabhängiges Sakrament zu sehen, sondern als eine seelsorgerliche Handlung.¹³⁰ Dazu kommt noch, daß Augustinus die Geistmitteilung zum Teil der postbaptismalen Salbung zuschreibt,¹³¹ was die Interpretation der Handauflegung zur Verleihung des Geistes weiter relativieren würde.

Dieselbe Geste der Handauflegung drückt oft sehr Verschiedenes aus: außer der Vermittlung des Heiligen Geistes bei der Taufe ist die Handauflegung bei der Wiederaufnahme der Büsser, bei der Ordination, beim Exorzismus als Heilungs- und als Segensgeste anzutreffen. Augustinus selbst versteht in den meisten Kontexten die Handauflegung als Geistmitteilung.¹³²

Wenn Häretiker in die Kirche aufgenommen werden, kann die Handauflegung sowohl als Versöhnungsakt verstanden werden, als auch als Akt der Geistvermittlung. So bleibt diese liturgische Geste mehrdeutig.¹³³ Es steht

klaren Zeugnissen stehen aber auch andere in denen die Handauflegung eigentümlich geringer bewertet ist. „Die Handauflegung kann, anders als die Taufe, wiederholt werden. Denn was ist sie anderes als ein Gebet (oratio) über den Menschen? Wir fragen erstaunt: Handelt es sich hier um die gleiche Handauflegung, die wir heute ‚Firmung‘ nennen, so daß also Augustinus von ihr eine Wiederholbarkeit behauptet hätte?“

¹³⁰ A. SCHINDLER, „Baptismo (De -)“, in *AL*, 580: „Ein besonders schwieriger Einwand gegen A[ugustin]s Position ist die Verbindung von Taufe und Handauflegung (Impositio manus) zur Sündenvergebung, welche letztere auch er (cf. col. 577) außerhalb der wahren Kirche nicht gelten lassen kann. Die Handauflegung wird jedoch bei der Aufnahme aus dem Schisma in die wahre Kirche wiederholt, im Unterschied zur Taufe. A[ugustinus] ist deshalb gezwungen, Taufe und Handauflegung zu trennen, was zur Folge hat, daß die Handauflegung nicht als Sakrament, sondern als freie seelsorgerliche Handlung verstanden werden muß.“

¹³¹ NEUNHEUSER, 71: „Es scheint nun, daß Augustinus diese Geistmitteilung als erste Ausgießung des Geistes – der Salbung nach dem Taufbad zuschreibt. [...] Was ist hier gemeint? Postbaptismale, aber zur Taufe selbst noch gehörende Handlung oder das Sakrament der Firmung im Sinne unserer heutigen Terminologie? Letzteres dürfte sicher nicht das Richtige treffen. Aber wir sind auf Grund der vorliegenden Stelle nicht einmal gezwungen, diese Handlung irgendwie zur Firmung zu rechnen, die in der Handauflegung noch folgt.“

¹³² M. KLÖCKENER, „Impositio manus“, in *AL*, 561–563.

¹³³ LAMPE, 176: „The question is further clouded by the difficulty of deciding what Stephen intended to signify by the practice of the laying on of hands in the reconciliation of schismatics. It seems to have been generally agreed on both sides of the controversy that in the laying on of hands there was bestowed a gift of the Spirit; but Stephen explicitly declares that it is a form of the practice of the imposition of hands in penance, whereas Cyprian clearly thinks it is a part of the ritual of initiation.“

jedenfalls fest, daß der Heilige Geist, die Vergebung der Sünden, die Eingliederung in der Kirche, mit einem Worte das Heil, in der Taufe vermittelt wird. Taufe ist in diesem Fall als Einheit der christlichen Initiationsriten zu verstehen, so wie die altchristliche Kirche sie in der Regel spendete. Indessen wurden die postbaptesimalen Riten in den ersten christlichen Jahrhunderten immer bedeutender und die Gabe des Heiligen Geistes wurde zunehmend mit diesen im Zusammenhang gebracht.¹³⁴ In der patristischen Zeit war jedoch nie festgelegt worden, wann oder durch welchen Ritus genau der Heilige Geist empfangen wird. Es gab immerhin die Tendenz, die Bedeutung, das Heilige Geist zu vermitteln, von der Handauflegung allmählich auf die Chrisamsalbung zu übertragen. Die Gabe des Heiligen Geistes wurde entweder auf die Taufe in seiner Gesamtheit oder im Falle der Trennung von Taufakt, Handauflegung und Salbung auf die letzten zwei Riten bezogen. Daher ist es unwahrscheinlich, daß die Geistvermittlung ursprünglich der Taufe, verstanden als das Untertauchen ins Wasser, zugeordnet war.¹³⁵ Das Verhältnis der Taufe zu der Geistvermittlung darf lange nicht als geklärt erscheinen¹³⁶ und bleibt weiterhin eine interessante Frage der Theologie.

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¹³⁴ B. NEUNHEUSER, P. DE NAVASCUÉS, 1152: „Anche se dopo il IV sec. il significato delle azioni postbattesimali, imposizione delle mani o unzione o entrambe, è individuato con maggior evidenza, resta tuttavia la concezione tradizionale: all'interno di un'azione rituale unitaria, la *initiatio christiana*, che nel suo insieme procura la remissione dei peccati, l'innesto in Cristo e nella sua chiesa, il dono dello Spirito santo, cioè, in una parola, la salvezza cristiana, le singole azioni rimangono come parti reciprocamente solidali di un'unica azione sacramentale, in cui però il particolare modo della trasmissione dello Spirito, del 'compimento' (teleiosis), è chiaramente inquadrato in un rito a sé stante, senza negare con ciò all'immersione battesimale la sua (del resto fondamentale) efficacia sacramentale.”

¹³⁵ Das behaupten vor allem die Protestanten, da sie die Firmung als Sakrament nicht anerkennen (vgl. LAMPE, 193; 306–309).

¹³⁶ LAMPE, 190; 306.

EVES AND MARY¹

Female Roles and the Image of Women in Early Modernity, with special reference to András Illyés's collection of legends entitled *A keresztyéni életnek példája avagy tukore...* [The exemplum or mirror of Christian life...]

ANNA-RÓZSIKA SZILÁGYI

Abstract: The tradition of perceiving women exclusively as Eve's sinful, luring, artful, and perilous daughters was very much alive in the Early Middle Ages. The 11th-12th centuries brought about the slow altering of this image. This was the time when the veneration of Mary was increasingly spreading in clerical as well as monastic communities. This moment marked the outset of two opposing images of women, which were to define the perception of women in the early modern age as well. Their condemnation, deriving from Eve's deed, lives on, but it is increasingly paralleled by the image of the blessed woman, devoid of the original sin. András Illyés employs and transforms Mary's figure in such a way as to instruct and educate his audience and offer solutions for various conflicts and problems of his age. He takes on several roles to this end, presenting Virgin Mary in turns from the viewpoints of a narrator, a presenter, a preacher, an exegete, or a catechist.

Keywords: medieval image of women, early modern image of women, clerical image of women, veneration of Virgin Mary, early modern female roles, legend collection, narratorial roles.

1 Introduction

Speaking of medieval women, Georges Duby regretfully remarks that for us, readers, the lives of these women will never be more than some blurred shades the contours or depths of which we can never fully grasp today.² The reason for this is that only a very small number of texts have survived about these women. Those which are still extant, mostly speak about aristocratic

¹ During the preparation of this paper I was supported by the scholarship of the program POS DRU 6/1.5/S/4 – “Doctoral Studies, a Main Factor in the Development of Social-Economic and Humanities Research”, co-financed by the European Social Fund.

² Georges DUBY, *Doamnele din veacul al XII-lea*, București, 2000, 8. [Georges DUBY, *Dame du XII^e siècle*, Paris, 1995 pour le tome I, 1996 pour les tomes II et III, Romanian transl. Maria CARPOV]

women, but in all cases they represent an authorial, that is, a male viewpoint.³ The early modern image of women sometimes only insignificantly diverges from the medieval one. In this paper I shall recall the image of women from this age, emphasizing at the same time the clerical interpretive tradition which underlies this approach. Thus, when speaking about the sinful woman, I employ one single medieval interpretation of the issue. Making use of this, I intend to embed the discourse on women into a well defined tradition, signalling at the same time that its roots are much deeper than that. On account of the length and topic of my paper, I cannot undertake a detailed presentation of the formation of this tradition. I shall only display, with no claim of comprehensiveness, certain female roles, prevailing or newly formed during the early modern age, based on aspects of the medieval clerical image of women.

The veneration of Virgin Mary as a result of *amor sanctus* continues well into this period as well. In order to outline the image of Mary as apparent in András Illyés's collection of legends entitled *A keresztyéni életnek példája avagy tukore...* (Exemplum or mirror of Christian life), I felt the need of sketching certain key elements and moments of dogmatic evolution for offering a more nuanced interpretive context. Familiarity with the social, political, or ecclesiastical political background, the evolution of the worship of Mary, and knowledge of various narratological elements assist in understanding András Illyés's image of Mary.

2 Eve and her daughters...

(Ideas on the issue of the medieval and early modern sinful woman)

*To the woman he said, "I will greatly increase your pains in childbearing; with pain you will give birth to children. Your desire will be for your husband, and he will rule over you."*⁴

2.1 Eve

The image of women prevalent already in Hebrew society had lived on during the early modern period as well.⁵ In this sense the medieval and early

³ The author can be identified as a man, taking into account the educational possibilities of the age, and the social roles of men and women. Cf. for example BERTÉNYI Iván, *A középkori művelődés* [Culture in the Middle Ages], in KÓSA László (ed.), *Magyar művelődéstörténet* [The cultural history of Hungary], Budapest, 2003, 131–133., KÜLLÖS Imola (ed.), *Hagyományos női szerepek. Nők a populáris kultúrában és a folklórban* [Traditional female roles. Women in popular culture and folklore], Budapest, 1999.

⁴ Gen 3,16.

⁵ The Old Testament Hebrew family was patriarchal. The wife called her husband *baal* (lord, master) or *adon*, just as they called God. (Some occurrences of the word *adon* in

modern church partakes in a well-founded tradition, when pointing at the woman's secondary place in the creation. This secondary place is considered highly justified by the fact that, by virtue of the original denial, it was Eve who led Adam to sin. Eve undertook a role which allowed the propagation of the original sin. Thus the leadership of the church saw it legitimate that women's rights can be restricted.⁶ What is more, not only *can* these rights be restricted, but they *must* be restricted, since it is only her sex of the two that bears the trait of *imbecilitas sexus*: moderate intelligence, wantonness, deceitfulness, and avarice.⁷

Of the many examples to prove this, let me only detail one to explain this phenomenon. Georges Duby mentions the learned clergyman, Robert de Liège, who in his writings and sermons repeatedly returned to the story of the original sin.⁸ He also – similarly to other erudite preachers – claimed that Eve had a

the Bible: Gen 18,22; Judg 19,26; Amos 4,1). The woman addressed her husband as a slave did his lord. This clearly signals that the woman always had fewer rights than her husband, or than men in general. Cf. SZIGETI Jenő, *Nők az ószövetségi héber családban* [Women in the Old Testament Hebrew family], in KÜLLÖS, 281–282.

⁶ Shulamith SHAHAR, *A negyedik rend. Nők a középkorban*, Budapest, 2004, 22. [Shulamith SHAHAR, *The Fourth Estate. A history of women in the Middle Ages*, New York, 2003, Hungarian transl. PUKÁNSZKYNÉ KIRÁLY Katalin]

⁷ SHAHAR, 22.

⁸ Duby remarks that several medieval learned men and monks discussed the subject of the original sin, usually also emphasizing the woman's greater role in the original denial of God. He only mentions a few of them: Hrabanus Maurus (9th century), Hugh of Saint-Victor (12th century), Andrew of Saint-Victor (12th century), and Abélard (12th century). See DUBY, 259–271. In order to present the image of women as seen by the medieval church, in his monograph he borrows some ideas of the above listed authors. So, for example, divorce is a sin according to Robert of Liège, but depending on whether it is initiated by the husband or the wife, its seriousness varies. If the divorce happens because of the husband, it is bad for him, but if it is initiated by the wife, it is much worse for her. The author explains this with the fact that the woman ever since her creation has never been an individual body, but a part of the man's body. Therefore the woman cannot fulfil her role as a separate individual in the society. DUBY, 260. According to Abélard, it is only the man who was created by the image of God, the woman is only similar to it. Thus, since the man is closer to God, he rules over the woman. DUBY, 266. Obviously, the medieval opinion about women is not this unanimous. Hugh of Saint-Victor says that the woman was created from the man's rib, so she cannot order her husband, but neither can she be oppressed in the family. She – the woman – is a partner. DUBY, 260. Clearly this opinion greatly differs from the rest. This dissonance points to the fact that the image of motherhood, marriage, and women in general has undergone to a process of change. Cf. NAGY Emőke, *Anyaság és szentség (Szent Anna és Szent Erzsébet Temesvári Pelbárt prédikációiban)* [Motherhood and

greater sin in the original temptation than Adam. In proving this idea, he set out from the scene of divine impeachment. When God questions the disobedience of the first human couple, and makes them face their act, Adam defends himself, but also accuses in the same time. He accuses God, pointing out that it was He who set to his side the woman who led him into sin.⁹ But even in this situation, Liège considers Eve's sin greater than Adam's. He thinks that Eve's answers prove her deceitfulness. Eve pretends not to understand the question, that is why she refers to the snake.¹⁰ Her deceitfulness thus enforces her sinfulness. By disobeying God's first – and then only – command, Eve committed in fact three sins: she was tempted, gave in to the pleasure that this temptation induced in her, and also led Adam, the man for whom she was created, into sin.¹¹ This is the source of how the woman presents danger for the

holiness], in GÁBOR Csilla, KNECHT Tamás, TAR Gabriella-Nóra (eds.), *Árpád-házi Szent Erzsébet. Magyar-német kultúrkapcsolatok Kelet-Közép-Európában* [Saint Elisabeth of the Árpád Dynasty. German-Hungarian cultural connections in Eastern and Central Europe], Kolozsvár, 2009, 33. Why was it so then that women received more of a dismissive treatment, making their socialization more difficult? One possible answer is that, as also shown by the proportion of the two kinds of views, the number of those learned clergymen who more emphatically undertook the socialization of women was still low as compared to those who still saw the woman as the embodiment of Eve. I wish to stress that not all women pertain to the category of women that I am speaking about, only those who “chose” a secular life. However, even among these women there occurred some who managed to take over a male role after their husbands' death. Such a woman was no longer respected as a woman, but almost as a man. Duby mentions a certain dame, Mahaut, widow of the Count of Flanders, who managed to fulfil her late husband's ruling role to such an extent that her vassals always knelt down in front of her. Such a woman was called *virago* in that age, that is, one who can give up her characteristic *appetitus* with the help of *ratio*, which was undoubtedly an accessory of the male principle. Cf. DUBY, 220. Such a respect of secular women does not cancel those previously said, on the contrary, it grounds them. It is worth noting that the woman does not emerge as an outstanding value of society when acting as a representative of her own sex, but first and foremost when appears as the manifestation of the male principle.

⁹ Adam answers God's question referring to the man's knowledge of his *nakedness*, and the source of this information, as follows: “The woman *you put here with me* – she gave me some fruit from the tree, and I ate it.” [Emphasis by author] Gen 3,12.

¹⁰ Eve replies to God: “The serpent deceived me, and I ate.” Gen 3,13. Duby explains Liège's train of thought by saying that the preacher interiorizes the presence of the snake. The snake is none other than Eve's sinful inclination, Eve's revolt, clearly deriving from her previously mentioned weakness. Cf. DUBY, 267.

¹¹ Cf. DUBY, 267.

man, and for world order. The man must defend himself against this negative power, and he can do this by restricting the woman's rights and power.

2.2 ... and her daughters

The opinion of ecclesiastical eminences greatly determined medieval and early modern society,¹² and therefore, naturally, the image of women changed accordingly. Although the "image of Eve" discussed in the previous chapter sprang from medieval mentality, its traces are still found in the early modern period as well. Natalie Zemon Davis in one of her articles even states that the subordination of women increased in a certain sense in the 16th through 18th century. She explains this phenomenon by saying that the development of the state and the extension of capitalism withheld human autonomy.¹³ This also caused a setback in women's possibilities for socialization.

The way of life practiced, the culture, the entire society of the age brought about situations which had invested women with roles sometimes incomprehensible for today's readers. Of the many roles I should mention those of the healer, the succubus/seductress, the witch, and the poetess, since these roles in my opinion were defining states of women. The political opportunities of princesses and countesses, due to their social status, again need special attention. It must be stressed, however, that the most important role of a woman remained that of a wife. Due to matters of length and the nature of the

¹² Although Marc Bloch emphasized the increasing discrepancy between the clergy and the secular masses in the 12th century, the feudal oath, regulating the connections of the clergy and secular power, continued to exist until the 13th century, and even as late as the 16th century in France. Marc BLOCH, *A feudális társadalom*, Budapest, 2002, 379. [Marc BLOCH, *La société féodale*, Paris, 1940, Hungarian transl. SUJTÓ László]. Among other things, André Vauchez finds the reason of this discrepancy in that the clergy expropriated for itself the prayers, the possibility of reading the psalms and the Scripture, since all these texts were in Latin, a language not understood by the masses. André VAUCHEZ, *Spiritualitatea evului mediu occidental secolele VIII-XII*, 1994, 21. [André VAUCHEZ, *La spiritualité du Moyen Age occidental VIII^e-XII^e siècle*, 1975, Romanian transl. Daniel BARBU, Doina MARIAN], BLOCH, 97-99. However, all this was partly solved by the reforms of Pope Gregory VII. VAUCHEZ, 60.

¹³ For instance in 18th century France and England married women no longer counted as independent legal entities, they had less rights to dispose of their dowry and goods; wealthy women were less drawn into local and regional political assemblies. Natalie Zemon DAVIS, *A nők felülkerekedése*, in SEBŐK Marcell (ed.), *Történeti antropológia. Módszertani írások és esettanulmányok* [Historical anthropology. Methodological writings and case studies], Budapest, 2000, 251. [Natalie Zemon DAVIS, "Women on Top", in *Society and Culture in Early Modern France*, Stanford, 1965, 124-151, Hungarian transl. ERDŐSI Péter].

literature, I shall leave aside the presentation of the wife's role, focusing instead on the social opportunities and drawbacks related to the other feminine roles.

I shall discuss the roles of the healer, the succubus, and the witch as a single group; however, all three roles shall be presented individually, in order to stress the characteristics distinguishing one from the others.

The healer acts mainly in the field of curing during the early modern age. Speaking of 16th-17th century diseases, István György Tóth remarks that high-level medical instruction was very rare in that age. In Hungary for example there was no such institution until as late as the age of Maria Theresa.¹⁴ On this account barbers grouped in guilds and healer women also practiced healing besides the medical practitioners educated at foreign universities. City dwellers mostly appealed to learned medical doctors, while in the countryside this task was carried out by healer women. On occasions it also happened that learned physicians were absent even from the cities. Taking into account the poor learning opportunities of the age, this is understandable.¹⁵ It is interesting to note that in case of more severe illnesses the lord was not content with only medical advice, and also turned to the barber or the healer woman for help.¹⁶

¹⁴ István György Tóth mentions that the medical faculty of the University of Nagyszombat (Trnava) only became active in 1769. TÓTH István György, *A magyar művelődés a kora újkorban* [Early modern Hungarian culture], in KÓSA, 170.

¹⁵ Mihály Szabó and Sándor Tonk compiled an index of the names and data of the persons who attended foreign universities, as found in official documents. In the introduction to their text, Sándor Tonk points out the deficiencies of this index, of which I only mention two. One is that the data found do not prove that the person managed indeed to complete his studies. The other is that not everybody whose name appears in the list left the country for purposes of learning. SZABÓ Mihály, TONK Sándor, *Erdélyiek egyetemjárása a korai újkorban 1521–1700* [Transylvanians at foreign universities in the early modern period], Szeged, 1992, ix. Sándor Tonk signals that the list only refers to the early modern data, therefore the number of students travelling abroad as established by the two authors (2854) is only orientative. Cf. SZABÓ, TONK, vii., 286. In the light of later references, this number is not high. István György Tóth mentions in his already quoted article that the schooling system and network in Hungary prior to the *Ratio Educationis* (1777) was quite underdeveloped. On the one hand, not all villages had their own schools. For instance in Vas County at the end of the 17th century, only every 7th village had a school. The building itself was small: “It is a hut, not a house” – they noted about the school of a Vas County village. On the other hand, there was no teacher training, and so the children were taught by the schoolmaster. As for the content of this education, there was no teaching of writing in most schools. TÓTH, 181–183. The remarks of these two pieces of bibliography show that this institutional system was quite deficient on all levels, not only in higher education.

¹⁶ Gábor Bethlen, for example, when feeling his death approaching, did not call his physicians, but the executioner from Lőcse (Levoča). TÓTH, 170.

What is the reason of this decision? Such choices prove the still effective influence of tradition, superstitions, and popular culture on the life conduct and mentality of the aristocracy.

The group of the seductresses/succubi must be divided in two. One is the adulteresses, who commit adultery while living in marriage. The other group was regarded as a special “social-professional” class, the prostitutes. The society of the time considered their activity as a profession like any other. Saint Augustine himself wrote about them, that if you expel prostitutes from society, prostitution will spread everywhere.¹⁷ Shulamith Shahar points out the reasons of prostitution: poverty, emotional causes deriving from childhood experiences, natural inclination.¹⁸

A witch’s role can be determined from the deeds of a witch. Such a deed is, for example, the forfeiting of the cow’s milk, or riddling.¹⁹ Naturally, whoever was accused of such practices, only very rarely could escape punishment. A law was issued on Feb. 13th/March 16th, 1614 against “seers, fortune-tellers, enchanters, that is, devilish practices”. The Diet of Gyulafehérvár (Alba Iulia) on May 5–26, 1619 renewed the law against the enchanters with the completion that they must not be freed with only a fine.²⁰ Obviously, the graveness of the act for the society was also emphasized by the enforcement of the law. The discussion of the role of the witch will also emphasize the undoubtedly negative influence on the community. The men of law place this role into an interpretive context built on certain cardinal narratives of Christian dogmatics. Such are the narratives connected to the enemy of God and man: the angel cast out from heaven, and his troops. This also appears in the language of the law:

¹⁷ Quoted by Shulamith Shahar. SHAHAR, 269.

¹⁸ SHAHAR, 271.

¹⁹ It was commonly believed that the cow’s lost milk was sucked out by a witch, so she must be questioned for it. Riddling served for disclosing, on the one hand, and hexing, on the other. If something disappeared, the “expert” stabbed two pairs of scissors into a winnow, which started spinning as the name of the suspected person was uttered. In case of hexing the foe’s name is written on a piece of paper, stabbed into the heart of a doll, which they start to riddle. Consequently the person slowly starts to decay, his/her fortune lessens. LEVELES Erzsébet, *Bakos Balás prókátor elleni boszorkányvád* [Witchcraft trial against prosecutor Balás Bakos], in KLANICZAY Gábor, KRISTÓF Ildikó, PÓCS Éva (eds.), *Magyarországi boszorkányperek. Kisebb forráskiadványok gyűjteménye* [Witchcraft trials in Hungary. A collection of lesser source editions], Budapest, 1989, 176–178, here: 176–177. [Published earlier in *Történelmi és régészeti közlemények Miskolc város és Borsod vármegye múltjából I*, 1926, 7–12.]

²⁰ SZILÁGYI Sándor, “A boszorkányok történetéhez” [Additions to the history of witchcraft], in KLANICZAY, KRISTÓF, PÓCS, 31–38. [Published earlier in *Századok XV*, 1881, 593–602].

the men of law speak about *satanic sciences / devil's knowledge*. Therefore everybody who practices such “sciences” will be a secret accomplice of the enemy in preventing the spiritual, material, or intellectual advancement of those in his neighbourhood. As foremost sinners of society and mankind, they deserve the pain of death – *burning*.²¹

As I have stated before, the three roles previously presented must also be discussed together, since they are interlinked. Their connection becomes obvious especially through the charges formulated in witchcraft trials. Néda Relkovics mentions that the reason of several trials was curing with the use of magic, a practice that healer women applied on those who requested their help. These women often became victims of their own treatment.²² If they happened to propose an unsuccessful cure, or applied the wrong treatment due to their lack of knowledge, they died as witches.

Next to magic-aided curing, adultery was the other basic sin which often occurred as a charge. First of all, the kind in which the woman, due to her social status, is not forced to practice the “profession” of a prostitute, but she cheats on her husband nevertheless. The other case, when a woman is accused of prostitution, occurred much less frequently in the documents of witchcraft trials that I saw.²³

²¹ Néda Relkovics names the source which contains the Schwab mirror, the Buda Book of Laws, and the “tavernical law” (*ius tavernicale*, law of the treasury). On the basis of these she remarks that the witch’s punishment is burning on the stake. The named source is: Martin Georgii KOVACHICH, *Codex authenticus iuris tavernicalis*, Budae, 1803, no. 88., 185–186. 1. RELKOVICS Néda, *Újbányai boszorkányperek a XVI–XVII. században* [Witchcraft trials in Újbánya in the 16th and 17th centuries], in KLANICZAY, KRISTÓF, PÓCS, 46–48. [Published earlier in *Ethnographia XXIII*, 1912, 155–158.] Cf. also VILLÁNYI Szaniszló, “Esztergomi boszorkánypörök” [Witchcraft trials from Esztergom], in *Esztergom és vidéke*, 1892, no. 54., Thursday, July 3, 218–221.

²² In Újbánya in 1683 a lady called Zsuzsanna Schuster was accused of witchcraft. The main charge against her was that she recommended some healing plants to cure a certain György Hundstesser (who had been suffering of a pain in his head and legs for some time). These plants had an even worse effect on the man’s health. Next, she applied some rabbit’s fat. The accuser – the same György Hundstesser – said nothing of its effect. She was burnt on the stake. RELKOVICS, 46–48. In other cases the treated person was indeed healed; nevertheless, during a trial even these successful healings counted as serious charges for a severe punishment. Cf. MAJLÁTH Béla, *Levéltári adatok Regécsvára történetéhez a XVII. század második feléből* [Archival data to the history of Regécsvára from the second half of the 17th century], in KLANICZAY, KRISTÓF, PÓCS, 4–12. [Published earlier in *Történelmi Tár* 1889, 1–25.]

²³ Cf. SZÁDECZKY Lajos (ed.), *Székely oklevéltár* [Collection of Sekler charters], VII., 96, Kolozsvár, 1898, 213.

The pitfalls of the three female roles just discussed are all consequences of Eve's act. She fell, so her daughters are also fallible.

The role of the poetess is completely different from all the others in what concerns her social assessment. Of course, this is not to say that such a self-expression of women was always positively judged all throughout the 17th century; it is more important to stress that literacy started to gain more ground among women as well. At this time one can only speak of a small group of women taking on the role of a poetess. Margit S. Sárdi finds only 10 women as poets during a 100-year time span.²⁴

Much discussion is given to princesses and countesses (*nobilis femina, nobilis mulier*), their influence, and their roles in state- and regional leadership. I only refer to three authors in this respect: Shulamith Shahar, Georges Duby, and Gábor Klaniczay. The writings of the first two have already been mentioned. I cannot analyze this status in detail here, I only wish to point out that all three texts conclude that on occasions a noble lady could have had great influence over her husband, or shaped social or ecclesiastical matters.²⁵ In one of his monographs, Gábor Klaniczay examines the lives of holy women, and the process how the lives of these women were embedded into Christian culture and faith.²⁶ Holy women are also Eve's daughters, but they are purified as a result of their ascetic way of life.

One may conclude that all early modern female roles bear the consequence of Eve's sin: deceitfulness, fornication, and revolt.

²⁴ Székely Mária, Csáky Krisztina, Rákóczi Erzsébet, Petrőczy Kata Szidónia, Révay Erzsébet, Apafiné Bethlen Kata, Esterházy Magdolna, Zay Anna, Kajali Klára, Barkóczy Borbála. S. SÁRDI Margit, *A költőnő szerepe a XVII–XVIII. században* [The role of the poetess in the 17th-18th century], in KÜLLŐS, 135–149, here: 135.

²⁵ Duby mentions clergyman Thomas de Chobham, who compiled a book for the use of pastors in which he recommends as a penitence for women to intervene with their husbands in finding solutions to certain problems. DUBY, 216. Probably these solutions primarily served the social and political welfare of the church. This practice was worth applying mostly in the case of influential noble families. More on the powers of women: DUBY, 165–200. Cf. SHAHAR, 194–212.

²⁶ KLANICZAY Gábor, *Az uralkodók szentsége a középkorban. Magyar dinasztikus szentkultuszok és európai modellek* [Sainthood of rulers in the Middle Ages. Hungarian dynastic saint cults and European patterns], Budapest, 2000, 70–107, 170–239.

3 The “other” Eve: Mary, the Queen of Heavens²⁷

*My Lord, if I err by believing what I believe, then you deceived me. But as it is impossible that you deceived me or anyone else, it is also impossible that I would err.*²⁸

3.1 Fragments from the “history” of the formation of the veneration of Virgin Mary

In the above motto András Illyés cites the words of Saint Anselm in emphasizing the concealed nature of the Holy Trinity. He stresses that this mystery of God is incomprehensible by the human mind, yet He disclosed a small part of it to humans. It is only by the faith received from God that the man is able to use the small part of this great mystery to perfect his relationship with the Almighty. The evolution of dogma makes some theologians think that Mary’s entire life, her connection with transcendence is one of the divine mysteries. They explain it by saying that the qualities the church assigns to Mary differ from the usual characteristics of human nature. The church concludes from this that in choosing Mary, in turning to her, God has bestowed a new mystery on mankind. Ferenc Gál speaks about Mary being the one who most intimately partakes in Christ’s humanity, because she receives the entirety of divine grace, she is devoid of the original sin, she is taken to heaven and blessed with perpetual virginity.²⁹

In what follows, I wish not to perform a deep historical analysis of the cult of Mary; instead, I only wish to point at certain phenomena which will be most helpful in my further investigations, namely the Immaculate Conception, and Mary’s perpetual virginity.

²⁷ László Vanyó draws attention to the parallel between Eve and Mary at Justinian, evidently built on the analogy of the Christ-Adam typology to be found at Saint Paul. Irenaeus takes this parallel further when calling Mary “*advocata Evae*”, “*causa salutis*”. [Emphasis by author]. Cf. VANYÓ László, *Bevezetés az ókeresztény kor dogmatörténetébe 787-ig* [Introduction to Early Christian dogma history before 787], Budapest, 1998, 550.

²⁸ “Uram Isten, ha én azt hívén, a' mit hiszek, tévelygésben vagyok, te csaltál meg engem. De a' mint lehetetlen hogy te meg csaly engem, se másokat, úgy lehetetlen hogy én tévelygésben legyek.” This is how András Illyés cites Saint Anselm’s prayer. ILLYÉS András, *A Szent Háromság egy Istenrol*, in ILLYÉS, *A keresztényi életnek példája avagy tukore...*, I. rész, Nagyszombat, 1705, 1–135, RMK. I. 1707.

²⁹ GÁL Ferenc, *Jézus Krisztus, a Megváltó* [Jesus Christ, the Saviour], Budapest, 1972, 81.

The parallel between Mary and the church occurs as early as the 2nd century.³⁰ Mary is the bride of the Holy Spirit,³¹ and similarly, the church is Christ's bride, whom God adorns adequately for meeting Christ. Moreover, the holy church must relate to Christ in the same way as Mary did.

Writing about the Immaculate Conception, Ferenc Gál finds that the feast connected to this dogma appeared first in the East in the late 7th century,³² yet without the clarification of its dogmatic content. Later, in the 9th century, it was also introduced in southern Italy.³³ Klaniczay emphasizes that Virgin Mary was worshipped in the liturgy of the Hungarian Catholic Church already in the 11th century, while in the West only from the 12th century.³⁴ The statement of

³⁰ GÁL, 82. László Vanyó also states that already in the early 2nd century Mary was part of the creed-like formulae of Christian tradition. He refers to Saint Ignatius of Antioch in supporting his statement. VANYÓ László, 550.

³¹ Cf. GÁLOS László, *A Szentlélekisten* [The Holy Spirit], Budapest, 1934, 90.

³² Heinrich Denzinger and Peter Hünermann have compiled a "collection of creeds" of the Catholic Church. This several hundred pages long book contains the presentation of the evolution of a number of dogmas by an account of synodical decrees and the correspondence of the erudites of the church connected to the issues which have later become dogmas. Next I would like to draw attention to one single point of the dogma of perpetual virginity, signalling at the same time that there was a dialogue about Mary going on already as early as the 5th century between eminences of the Western and the Eastern Church alike. The editors point to the letter of Pope Saint Leo the Great (*Lectis dilectionis tuae*) written to Flavianos, Bishop of Constantinople, dated June 13, 449. This letter contains the following passage: "He was conceived indeed by the power of the Holy Spirit in the womb of Virgin Mary, who delivered him with unharmed virginity, just as she conceived him with unharmed virginity." And onwards: "And originating from a new birth, because her unharmed virginity knew no desire and it provided the matter of her body". Cf. Heinrich DENZINGER, Peter HÜNERMANN, *Hitvallások és az egyház tanítóhivatalának megnyilatkozásai*, Budapest, 2004, [H. DENZINGER, P. HÜNERMANN, *Kompendium der Glaubensbekenntnisse und kirchlichen Lehrentscheidungen*, Freiburg im Breisgau, Basel, Rom, Wien, 1991], 124–125.

³³ GÁL, 83.

³⁴ Klaniczay tackles the origin of the worship of Mary, and its embededness into Hungarian spirituality. He refers to Margit Waczulik, who sought the origins of this cult in several directions. One alternative she finds is that Mary's cult was introduced this early to the Hungarians by the missionary work of Saint Adalbert, since he was himself an ardent follower of the Mother of Christ, as claimed by his biographers, Canaparius and Bruno of Querfurt. The other alternative is that Mary became part of the Hungarian "Pantheon of Saints" that early due to the influence of Saint Gerhard (Gellért). Waczulik also mentions the possible influence of the Orthodox, Eastern Church, which is enforced by Klaniczay's opinion, who points out that "the European triumph of the cult of Mary began in the Eastern Church, in Byzantium". KLANICZAY, 127.

Mary's immaculate conception gains increasingly more ground in ecclesiastical circles and popular culture alike. Already the Scotists proclaimed a life devoid of the original sin; it was declared by the synodical fathers on the 36th Synod of Basel on September 17, 1439. This caused a sharp conflict within the church in the time of Pope Sixtus IV, due to the heavy criticism of a few Dominican friars against this teaching.³⁵ These sharp disputes had to be calmed down, while there was a purposeful work going on for establishing the cult of Mary. See in this respect the activity of Leonardo de Nogarola, who compiled the mass for the veneration of Virgin Mary, and the text of the Office *Sicut lilium*, also in view of Mary's veneration.³⁶ The Council of Trent was again an important station in the development of this dogma. This council started quite languidly on account of historical and social issues, and the conflicting relationship of religion and politics, but its decrees became almost at once the *Magna Charta* of the Catholic Church.³⁷ It was here that the traditional teaching concerning Mary's exemption of all personal sins, even venial sins, all throughout her life, was ceremoniously proclaimed.³⁸

Although it is not strictly part of this investigation, I wish to highlight some crucial moments in the further development of the dogma. December 6, 1708 is an important date from this point of view: it was then that Pope Clement XI decreed in the constitution beginning *Comissio nobis divinitus* that the feast of the Blessed Virgin Mary must be celebrated everywhere.³⁹ Finally, on December 8, 1854 Pope Pius IX defined the teaching of the Immaculate Conception as doctrine in his constitution *Ineffabilis Deus*.⁴⁰

Such a development of this dogma fundamentally determined the popular cult of Mary as well. The secular power also enforced it on several occasions. The figure of the Holy Virgin gains more and more emphasis in the royal court as well during the 11th-12th centuries, in parallel with the *amour courtois* which propagates an idealized image of women.⁴¹ Klaniczay seeks the roots of the *amor sanctus* in Cistercian circles. Cistercians applied the metaphor of the love

³⁵ For example, Nicolaus de Pornussio OP and Vincenzo Bandello OP. In the *Grave nimis...* constitution Leonardo de Nogarola took a stand against the Dominicans who questioned the truth of the Immaculate Conception. Cf. DENZINGER, HÜNERMANN, 356–357.

³⁶ DENZINGER, HÜNERMANN, 357.

³⁷ MOLNÁR Attila, *A trienti zsinat* [The Council of Trent], in POÓR János (ed.), *A kora újkor története* [The history of the early modern age], Budapest, 2009, 334.

³⁸ GÁL, 86.

³⁹ DENZINGER, HÜNERMANN, 357.

⁴⁰ DENZINGER, HÜNERMANN, 357; 554–555.

⁴¹ KLANICZAY, 172. see also DUBY, 222.

between a mother and her child to describe man's relationship to Christ.⁴² This is only a step away from the *amor sanctus*. The *amor sanctus* was first emphasized by the representatives of mysticism. They defined it as a special emotion similar to fleshly love, but it extends to one's entire lifetime, and it is much more intense and much deeper than the *amor carnalis*. Franciscans and Dominicans paid much attention to women's movements in the 13th century. Both mendicant orders primarily focused on missionary activities. Thus, regarding their geographical distribution, Dominicans settled in larger towns, while Franciscans settled down along main circulation roads together with Augustinian hermits and the Carmelites.⁴³ Here, right in the middle of society, they could get closer to marginalized groups of people, too, so women could also enjoy their patronage. As a result of this, the community of the Order of Saint Clare was formed within the Franciscans.

Accordingly, as of the early 11th century, most places of prayer were dedicated to Mary, and the collection of relics also thrived.⁴⁴ The veneration of Mary – as we have seen also by the evolution of the dogma – continued throughout the following centuries, determining popular mentality and behaviour (primarily during the early modern period).

3.2 An early modern image of Mary

(The image of the Virgin Mary in András Illyés's collection of legends *A keresztényi életnek példája avagy tukore...*)

András Illyés (1637–1712) was Doctor of philosophy, Bishop of Transylvania. He was born in Csíkszentgyörgy (Ciucsângeorgiu, present-day Romania). He occupied his see on January 19, 1696, but did not stay long in Transylvania. He stated the reason himself on the title page of his work *Jóra Intő Énekecskék* (Songs leading to righteousness): “As he entered Transylvania

⁴² KLANICZAY, 172.

⁴³ Ferenc Hervay mentions in connection with Franciscans that they settled in these locations because they needed the gifts of the people. HERVAY Ferenc, *Szerzetesrendek Magyarországon 1600-ig* [Monastic orders in Hungary before 1600], in HÖLVÉNYI György (ed.), *Katolikus Egyháztörténeti Konferencia* [Conference on Catholic ecclesiastical history], Keszthely, 1987, 8. See also BERTÉNYI Iván, *A középkori művelődés* [Culture in the Middle Ages], in KÓSA, 2003, 96–97, NÓDA Mózes, *Szent Erzsébet liturgikus tisztelete* [The liturgical veneration of Saint Elisabeth], in GÁBOR, KNECHT, TAR, 179–180.

⁴⁴ For example, in 1091 Ide de Boulogne, mother of Godefroi de Bouillon, had a chapel built in the honour of Mary (Capelle-Sainte-Marie) next to the castle of Guînes. Another example: Arnoud I takes a relic of Mary to the church of Ardres: Mary's hair and some pieces of Mary's clothes. See DUBY, 222.

and visited the unjustly oppressed Catholicism, the villainous heretics forced him to leave to Hungary”.⁴⁵ “As a many-sided and prolific representative of Hungarian Baroque ecclesiastical literature, he equally published moralizing books, collections of sermons and biblical sentences, as well as translations.”⁴⁶ As a learned clergyman and orator, he was mostly active at the University of Nagyszombat (Trnava), and that is also the place of his death. József Szinnyei mentions as the first of his best known works his collection of the life of saints entitled *A keresztyéni életnek példája avagy tukore...* (The exemplum or mirror of Christian life...).⁴⁷ Szinnyei knew of six editions of this collection of legends between 1682 and 1813.⁴⁸

In this paper I used the second edition of the collection, as this is the only complete copy extant in the local libraries.⁴⁹ The author divides the text in five parts. In the first part he speaks, among others, about the Mother of God, in the second of the life of the holy Apostles, in the third of the holy martyrs, in the fourth of the holy confessors, while in the fifth of saint virgins and widows. Unlike the medieval collections of legends, the author orders the text not by the

⁴⁵ ILLYÉS, *Jora Into Enekecskek Igasság ellen tusakodo gonosz emberek ellen, Igasság szerető Hivének vigasztalására. Mellyeket szerzett: Illyes Andras, Erdelyi Puspok. Minekutánna Erdélybe bémenvén: És hamissan elnyomattatott kevés Pápiastaságot meglátogatván, a Diplomás Ertetnekektől Magyar Országba kijoni kinszerítettet, Nyomtatott M.DCCII. Esztendobe*, Nagyszombat, 1702, RMK. I. 1659.

⁴⁶ KÖSZEGHY Péter (ed.), *Magyar Művelődéstörténeti Lexikon IV* [Lexicon of Hungarian cultural history], Budapest, 2005, 281.

⁴⁷ SZINNYEI József, *Magyar írók élete és munkái* [Life and works of Hungarian writers], V, Budapest, 1897, 48–49. Réka Tasi writes about the collection of legends that it was first published in 1682. This first edition is philologically most valuable because this is the only edition in which András Illyés mentions in the preface as one of his sources the title of Alfonsus de Villegas’s collection, *Flos Sanctorum*. (Cf. the title of the first edition: ILLYÉS András, *A keresztyeni életnek példája vagy tukore, Az-az: A szentek eleje. Mely minden szorgalmatossággal, Nevezetes Autorok Irásiban, kivált képpen Villegas Alfonsus irásiban fel-kerestet, Sommában foglaltatot, és Olaszbol Magyarra fordittatot, s rendesen ott Részre osztatot. Illyes Andras, Posoni Kanonok-által. Ki nyomtatott Nagy-Szombatban az Academiai Bottukkel, Srnensky Mátyás által, M.DC.LXXXII. Esztendoben.*, RMK. I. 1291.) TASI Réka, *Magyar nyelvű Szent Erzsébet-prédikációk a 17–18. század fordulóján* [Hungarians sermons for the feast of Saint Elisabeth at the turn of the 17th-18th century], in GÁBOR, KNECHT, TAR, 48. Cf. also KÖSZEGHY, 281–282.

⁴⁸ Szinnyei also notes that the collection was published in Latin in Vienna in 1694, and it was translated into Slovak by János Vallasik in 1768. SZINNYEI, 49.

⁴⁹ The second edition of the collection was published in two parts: vols. I–III in 1705, and vols. IV–V in 1707. SZINNYEI, 49.

ecclesiastical year, but by the subject, and also by keeping an eye on the life conduct deriving from the saints' mentalities, and the church's reactions to it.

The first part of the legend collection contains the following texts: *A' Szent Háromság egy Istenrol* [On the Holy Trinity]; *Szent Joachim, és Szent Anna, a' Boldogságos Szuz Mária Attyának, és Annyának élete* [The life of Saints Joachim and Anne]; *Az Ur Isten Annyának makula nélkül való fogantatásáról* [On the Immaculate Conception]; *A' Szentséges Szuz Mariának születéséről* [On the birth of the Virgin Mary]; *Boldog Aszszony templomba viteléről* [Presentation in the Temple]; *Szent Josef a' Szentséges Szuz Maria jegyese élete sommába foglaltatott* [Life of Saint Joseph]; *Gyumolcs olto Boldog Aszszony napjáról, és az emberré lott Istenrol* [On the Annunciation]; *Boldog Aszszony látogatásáról* [On the Visitation]; *Gyertya szentelo Boldog Aszszony napjáról* [Christ's Presentation in the Temple]; *Nagy Boldog Aszszony napjáról* [On the Assumption]; *Havi Boldog Aszszony napjáról* [On the feast of Mary "ad nives"]; *Szent Mihály Arkangyal megjelenéséről, és a' több Angyalokrol* [On archangel Michael and other angels]; *Szent Mihály Arkangyal Innepéről* [On the feast of the archangel Michael]; *Szent Gábor Arkangyalrol* [On the archangel Gabriel]; *Az Orizo Angyalokrol* [On guardian angels]; *Az Apro Szentekrol* [On the Holy Innocents]; *Keresztelo Szent János élete* [Life of Saint John the Baptist]; *Nyaka vágása, és Mátyrdomsága* [His beheading and martyrdom]; *Minden Szentek Innepéről* [On the feast of All Saints]; *Istenben elnyugott Halottakrol, és a Purgatoriomrol* [On the dead and the Purgatory]; *A' kozonséges Itiletrol* [On the Last Judgement].⁵⁰

A question that arises in connection to the structure of the collection is related to the place of the legends connected to certain events of the life of Virgin Mary: why are they placed after the text on the Holy Trinity, and before the legends of the angels and of Saint John the Baptist? This structural problem deserves our attention – albeit only in short – because it can be linked to the veneration of Mary. This is a way for Illyés to signal Mary's place in salvation history: as the Mother of God, her honorary place comes after the Holy Trinity, but precedes by far that of the angels. This is partly justified by the fact that – as I have already noted – the texts connected to Mary precede the legends of the

⁵⁰ ILLYÉS, *A keresztyéni életnek példája avagy tukore...*, part I, 1–135. András Illyés divides his text about Saint Michael into three parts. He does the same about his text on *A kozonséges Itiletrol* (On the Last Judgment). The texts on the Feast of the Holy Innocents and All Saints are both divided into two parts. As for the structure of the texts, the author employs a special division in the legend of Saint John the Baptist, where the story of the saint's life is divided in two, followed by the narration of his death. This part bears an individual title as well (See: *Nyaka vágása, és Mátyrdomsága*, [His beheading and martyrdom], in ILLYÉS, 99–107).

angels; moreover, Mary's life is presented by a much greater number of discriminative texts than the legend of the angels or the life of Saint John the Baptist.

In what follows I shall discuss the nine texts about the birth of Mary and other events of her life.⁵¹ In the course of my analysis I shall use examples in order to point out the accepted roles of the narrator⁵² which shape the image of Mary, lining it up with the social expectations and ecclesiastical confession of the time.

The narrator of the analyzed texts takes on several roles while depicting the image of Mary. The roles are as follows: the narrator, the presenter, the characterizer, the apologist, the exegete, the preacher, the catechist. These roles overlap on many occasions. Therefore I shall discuss the last three roles together, but all the others shall be taken one by one. The reason of this division is to display a range of early modern approaches to the figure of Virgin Mary, her clerical profile,⁵³ as well as the resulting sophisticated image of Mary.

⁵¹ ILLYÉS, *Szent Joachim, és Szent Anna a Boldogságos Szüz Maria Attyának, és Annyának élete*, in ILLYÉS, 8–10. ILLYÉS, *Az Ur Isten Annyának makula nélkül való fogantatásáról*, in ILLYÉS, 10–16. ILLYÉS, *A Szentséges Szüz Mariának Születéséről*, in ILLYÉS, 17–21. ILLYÉS, *Boldog Aszszony Templomba viteléről*, in ILLYÉS, 21–24. ILLYÉS, *Gyümölcs olto Boldog Aszszony napjáról, és az emberré lott Istenről*, in ILLYÉS, 29–35. ILLYÉS, *Boldog Aszszony látogatásáról*, in ILLYÉS, 35–42. ILLYÉS, *Gyertya szentelo Boldog Aszszony napjáról*, in ILLYÉS, 42–49. ILLYÉS, *Nagy Boldog Aszszony napjáról*, in ILLYÉS, 49–57. ILLYÉS, *Havi Boldog Aszszony napjáról*, in ILLYÉS, 57–58.

⁵² Illyés's texts about Mary are legends. By definition, legends are the depictions of the life and activity of the saints. The legend is in fact a synonym for *vita*, and as such, it relies primarily on narration. See Gert UEDING (ed.), *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik*, Tübingen, 2001, 80–85. Therefore I see it justified to consider the roles I speak about as role changes of the narrator. Cf. MAÁR Judit, *A drámai és az elbeszélő szöveg szemantikai vizsgálata* [A semantic analysis of dramatic and narrative texts], Budapest, 1995, 12–20.

⁵³ Of course, one should not only think of the person who writes the text, but also of the intended audience. Illyés says nothing about it in the preface. Therefore one must take into account that legends were read out loud in monastic communities, clerical circles, but at the same time they could also be used as exempla in sermons. In other words, they could be addressed to everybody. Still, it is more or less possible to distinguish between texts primarily intended for clerical use, and those meant for the audience at large. In the texts included into the first group, Illyés names several Church Fathers, reporting their ideas, names the popes who were involved to a greater or lesser degree in the propagation of the cult of Mary. For instance, in the text on the birth of Mary, *A Szentséges Szüz Mariának születéséről*, he mentions the names of Popes Innocent IV and Celestine IV, who, to his knowledge, were responsible for the celebration of Mary's birthday. Cf. ILLYÉS, *A Szentséges Szüz Mariának születéséről*, in ILLYÉS, 17–21. The A

The narrator contributes to the formation of the image of Mary by featuring certain peculiar scenes of Mary's life. These scenes usually also imply the knowledge of other texts. Such are, for example, some of the scenes from the legend of Saint Joachim and Saint Anne, the father and mother of the Blessed Virgin Mary (*Szent Joachim, és Szent Anna, a' Boldogságos Szuz Mária Attyának, és Annyának élete*).⁵⁴

The story in a nutshell: on a feast day in Jerusalem, the priest Isakar [sic!] refuses to accept Joachim's [sic!] gift because of his wife's barrenness. Joachim withdraws with his shepherds, and an angel appears to him, bringing him the promise of a daughter, whom he must call Mary. The sign is also presented to him: he should go back to the temple in Jerusalem, because he will find his wife there at the "golden gate",⁵⁵ who also rejoices because of this great gift, as she was also told about the child. So, such is one of the short scenes of the legend.

It needs no special evidence to claim that this text is linked with all other biblical texts presenting theophany in which the Lord proclaims the birth of a prophet, a chosen person, or even his Holy Son by an *angelos* (a messenger).⁵⁶ The connection is the strongest with the biblical texts proclaiming the birth of Christ, as proved by the parents' joyful reaction and their true faith as they accept God's message. The differences for their most part could hinder one's attempt to prove this strong connection; however, there is a definitive linkage point which undoubtedly sets this text side by side with the other biblical texts mentioned, even intertwining them occasionally.⁵⁷ This point is none other than the promised child – Mary, who will later become the mother of the Messiah.

Not only does the narrator prove his erudite attitude by linking several texts, but also his skills as a cultural historian, an anthropologist, and a knower of the law. He points to both the ancient, and the contemporary views on barrenness. In such cases the church held it evident that the family members

Havi Boldog Aszszony napjáról szóló legenda [the Legend of Mary "ad nives"] is addressed to a more extensive audience due to its miracle-centrism. Cf. ILLYÉS, *Havi Boldog Aszszony napjáról*, in ILLYÉS, 57–58. Or is it merely that the learned clergy of the church tried to make the religious doctrines available to a more extensive level of the audience?

⁵⁴ ILLYÉS, *Szent Joachim...*, in ILLYÉS, 9.

⁵⁵ ILLYÉS, *Szent Joachim...*, in ILLYÉS, 9.

⁵⁶ Gen 17,15-22 (God promises the birth of Isaac), Judg 13,1-25 (God promises the birth of Samson), Luke 1,5-25 (God promises the birth of Saint John the Baptist), Matt 1,18-25 and Luke 1,26-38 (the promise of the birth of Christ).

⁵⁷ See the place, the sadness preceding the birth and the promise, the joyfulness on hearing the message, the immaculateness and purity of the child born.

must have seriously sinned against God.⁵⁸ This is the context in which the narrator “places” Mary, whose mediating role is already outlined at this point. By her birth she intervenes in justifying the chastity of her father and mother.

Turning to the roles of the presenter and the characterizer, I wish to draw attention to a description: „she is of medium stature [i.e. the Virgin Mary]; she is the colour of ripe wheat; her face is somewhat longish, her eyes large and of a nice colour, her eyebrows black and thick, her mouth small, her lips of nice colour, her teeth small and white, her hair red, her hand and fingers long and all her parts were nicely ordered, and she was more beautiful and adorned than any other woman”.⁵⁹ András Illyés probably depicted the ideal of beauty of his age in this description. It can be asked, however, why he borrowed the description of Saint Epiphanius and Saint Nicephorus. Perhaps in order to maintain the constancy of her image, or for the sake of authenticity, showing that he also follows the tradition?

The description may also hint to the possibility that the authors conceived this external characterization of the Virgin on the basis of contemporary icons of Mary. In fact this characterization does not only reveal the external traits of the Mother of God, but with the use of certain rhetorical figures and Baroque colour symbolism it also refers to the inner nature of the Queen of Heavens. The prevalent rhetorical figures of the fragment (enumeration, simile, the repetition of the word *szép* [beautiful], gradation/hyperbole) highlight Mary’s immaculateness and holiness. This characterization is also enforced by the use of colours: “she is the colour of *ripe wheat*”, “her eyebrows are *black*”, “her teeth are small and *white*”, “her hair is *red*”.

⁵⁸ Mihály Balázs pointed it out in one of his lectures held in the framework of a series of textological seminars organized by the Transylvanian Museum Society (EME) in Kolozsvár (Cluj) on March 13, 2010, that one of the most important historical personalities of the turn of the 16th-17th century, István Báthory of Ecsed, did not speak to his wife, Fruzsina Homonnai, for five years, on account of her barrenness. He accused his wife of that, considering it as a sin, following the mentality of his age. Georges Duby in his previously quoted monograph mentions a certain Mathieu, son of Count Thierry of Flanders, who drives away his wife because she bore him no sons. DUBY, 211. The attitude of the count’s son also mirrors that it is the woman who is held responsible, as according to contemporary medical knowledge the woman alone is responsible for barrenness.

⁵⁹ „[...] közép termetu [ti. Szűz Mária]; olyan szinu, mint a megért búza; kicsinnég hosszu ábrázatu a' szemei nagyok, és szép színuek voltak, a' szemoldoki feketék, és husosok, a' szája kicsin, az ajaki szép színuek, a' fogai kicsinek, és fejekek, a' haja szálai veresek, a' kezei, és ujjai hosszak és minden tagjai szép rendesek voltak, és minden aszszony állatoknál sokkal szebb, és ékesb volt.” ILLYÉS, *Boldog Aszszony templomba viteléről*, in ILLYÉS, 24.

The first of these examples only hints to the colour, the rest directly names them. “Ripe wheat” can be connected to several biblical motifs. Some of these refer not the colour evoked by the expression, but emphasizes the relationship of Christ and Mary. Saint John is the only Evangelist of the four who transmits Christ’s following statement about himself: “I am the bread of life. He who comes to me will never go hungry, and he who believes in me will never be thirsty.”⁶⁰ Christ’s identification with the bread of life also determines the previous analogy. It is not accidental that the author speaks about *ripe* wheat, referring by this expression to her state of preparedness. As remarked by several dogmaticians, Mary’s Immaculate Conception means exactly this state of preparedness, ready to fulfil all of God’s wills at all times – of her free will. The relation of wheat and bread needs no further explanation; yet I must add that it may also be the expression of motherhood, in this case referring to the Mother of God.

Another biblical motif drawing on the colour of *ripe wheat* (*golden* colour) is the motif of the New Jerusalem. Here the angel sent to John guides the Apostle through the city. Let us see what has here the colour of gold! The angel holds a golden measuring rod in his hand, the street of the city is made of bright gold.⁶¹ Would it be too daring to assume that the “ripe wheat” is a prediction that Mary will definitely be an inhabitant of this city? Or, what is more, she will be made Queen of this city?

Speaking about the colour symbolism of Péter Beniczky, László Pószán marks the Baroque meaning of certain colours and shades. Accordingly, in medieval times black was the colour of hell, of the evil, and of mourning. The early modern connotations of this colour were similar, as it was used to express hatred, egoism, amorality, and denial. Pószán also draws attention to another use of the colour black in European culture, somewhat unusual for our contemporary culture – religious purity. This meaning was still widespread during the early modern period.⁶² White is the colour of chastity, purity, celestial sphere, great sacredness, and the break with the secular.⁶³ Red is on the one hand the chief colour of evil, on the other hand the colour of love, affection,

⁶⁰ John 6,35.

⁶¹ “The angel who talked with me had a *measuring rod of gold* to measure the city, its gates and its walls.” (Emphasis by author). Rev 21,15. “The twelve gates were twelve pearls, each gate made of a single pearl. The great street of the city was of *pure gold*, like transparent glass.” (Emphasis by author). Rev 21,21.

⁶² PÓSZÁN László, *Beniczky Péter és a barokk színszimbolika* [Péter Beniczky and Baroque colour symbolism], in BITSKEY István (ed.), *Toposok és exemplumok a régi irodalmunkban* [Topoi and exempla in early Hungarian literature], Debrecen, 1994, 185.

⁶³ PÓSZÁN, 186.

life, joy, and also the colour of Christ's blood. This latter correspondence also involves another meaning – the acceptance of martyrdom.⁶⁴

The colour symbolism I have just outlined cannot be fully applied to the presentation of the Virgin Mary. One must only keep in mind the meanings which match the church's confession and worldview. These are: the purity of faith, chastity, purity, celestial sphere, great sacredness, the break with the secular, the acceptance of martyrdom.

The third role I mentioned among narratorial roles was that of the apologist. This attitude of the defender of faith underlies several of Illyés's legends. Many of the problems of his age are voiced in this attitude, primarily those which the church, the community had to face as a result of the process of reformation and confessionalization.⁶⁵ The division made religious conflicts sharper, which brought about the formation of the genre of religious disputes.⁶⁶

⁶⁴ PÓSÁN, 182.

⁶⁵ Lilla Krász points out that the age of reformation was exchanged from the mid-16th century by the age of confessionalization, when the social and political consequences of confessional division were handled by way of legal and institutional modernization. KRÁSZ Lilla, *A reformáció és a német vallásháborúk* [Reformation and the German religious wars], in POÓR János (ed.), *A kora újkor története* [History of the early modern age], Budapest, 2009, 283. Actually, this age witnessed the stabilization of the schism of the church. This does not mean of course the lack of a movement of re-Catholicization. Although it was difficult for the Catholics living on the territories under Turkish occupation to receive the Sacraments as administered by their church on account of the small number of priests, missionary activities were still gaining strength. For example, the Capuchin Franciscans settled on the western borders of Hungary in 1674; the province of Dominicans was emptied in 1570, but Sigismundo Ferrari de Vijevo revivified it in 1636 in Szombathely; the Observant Franciscans also had an important role in Hungary in the first part of the 17th century. Cf. TÓTH István György, *Misszionáriusok a kora újkori Magyarországon* [Missionaries in early modern Hungary], Budapest, 2007, 132–134. The Jesuits also undertook an important missionary work, as allowed by their financial resources, and the cooperation within their order and with other monastic orders. See MOLNÁR Antal, *A jezsuita missio Turcica* [The Jesuit *missio Turcica*], in SZILÁGYI Csaba (ed.), *A magyar jezsuiták küldetése a kezdetektől napjainkig* [The mission of Hungarian Jesuits from the beginnings to the present], Piliscsaba, 2006, 150–162.

⁶⁶ It is not my purpose to offer a detailed analysis of the relationship of various confessions; I only mention some instances. Religious disputes were the main battlefield for the clash of opposing views on the veneration of saints. I will only give some account of this in order to present the methodology of religious disputes. John Calvin mentions in his *Institutio* that saints need not be called for help because they have the same way to present their requests to God as mortal men. Cf. KÁLVIN János, *Institutiója*. [1536], [John Calvin's *Institutio*], Budapest, 1995, 103. Of the literature of religious disputes I only mention the dispute between András Monoszlói, Catholic Bishop of Veszprém and Provost of Pozsony

The literature of religious disputes should be recognized as the starting point for the defence of Catholic faith and Catholic doctrines. This attitude appears in several legends of the collection; let me only highlight one example. In the already cited legend about the parents of the Virgin Mary, entitled *Szent Joachim, és Szent Anna, a' Boldogságos Szuz Mária Attyának, és Annyának élete*, the narrator informs that after the death of her husband, Saint Joachim, the young widow Saint Anne marries again for the second time. Her second husband is Cleophas, their daughter is called Mary. After the death of her second husband, Saint Anne married again for the third time. Her daughter from her third marriage is also called Mary. This part is followed by a short survey of her grandchildren. The text attempts at clarifying certain things which are unclear in the gospels, such as, for example, the relationship of Christ to some of his disciples besides the fact that they considered him their master. More specifically: why does the author of the gospel speak of Christ's brothers?⁶⁷ The apologist answers these issues because he finds them problematic with respect to Mary's perpetual virginity, and also he wants to clarify the offensive questions. The answer is that the sons of Mary, daughter of Cleophas (*a kissebbik Szent Jakab, Szent Judás Tadaeus, Szent Simon Zelotes, valamint József*)⁶⁸ are all disciples of Christ. The sons of the third Mary (*nagyob Szent Jakab Apostol, Szent János Apostol és Evangelista*)⁶⁹ also belong to Christ.

The roles of the exegete, the preacher, and the catechist, as well as the image of Mary unfolding with their help – as I have previously noted – will be analyzed together. From the point of view of its train of thought, the legend on Mary's Immaculate Conception (*Az Úr Isten Annyának makula nélkül való*

(Bratislava), and Miklós Gyarmathi, Calvinist preacher of Királyhelmec, focusing precisely on the issue of the veneration of saints. Csilla Gábor highlights the overlapping instances of the two texts: e.g., the saints' proximity to God, the belief that the saints pray for the salvation of the church, the example of the saints must be followed, etc. Besides these, Gyarmathi also emphasizes Calvin's idea quoted above, taken a bit further: he mocks the so-called auxiliary saints. Differences exist therefore in this field as well. GÁBOR Csilla, *Hagiográfia és polémia. Monoszlói András és Gyarmathi Miklós vitája a szentek tiszteletéről* [Hagiography and polemics. The dispute of András Monoszlói and Miklós Gyarmathi on the veneration of saints], in GÁBOR Csilla (ed.), *Szöveghagyomány és íráskultúra a korai újkorban* [Textual tradition and the culture of literacy in the early modern age], Kolozsvár, 2007, 127.

⁶⁷ Matt 12,48; Mark 3,31; Luke 8,19.

⁶⁸ ILLYÉS, *Szent Joachim...*, in ILLYÉS, 9–10.

⁶⁹ ILLYÉS, *Szent Joachim...*, in ILLYÉS, 10.

fogantatásáról)⁷⁰ can be matched on many occasions to the genre of the sermon. I am not interested now in the genre of the text, but I wish to examine the roles I set forth. Illyés begins his text with the analysis of the original denial, or more precisely with the explanation of the recurring question concerning the purpose of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. Why did the Lord place that tree in the Garden of Eden? The answer is threefold: “*ne lenne kevély*” [not to be proud], “*magát teremtett állatnak lenni emlékezzék*” [to remember that he is a created being], “*Teremtő Uráról el ne feledkezzék*” [not to forget his Creator the Lord].⁷¹ The first two explanations point to man’s correct self-assessment, while the third refers to the correct, laudable relationship to God. One should not forget his Creator the Lord, that is, one should live like somebody who is aware that he spends every moment of his life before his Saviour. The role of the preacher (who informs, transmits the meaning of the biblical text) is apparent here next to the role of the exegete (who analyzes the biblical verse), asking questions, marking the introductory idea of the function of instruction (*docilitas*). Besides these two roles (exegete and preacher) the catechist (teacher, instructor, guider to the true faith) also appears, when explaining the reason and purpose of the tree’s placement in the Garden of Eden. Thus the question loses its sharpness, in fact its rebellious, revolting tone. Clearly such questions also have answers suitable for instructing the audience. But how does Mary’s image fit into this context? Evidently, these are the introductory lines of the legend. The author outlines the basic situation with the help of cause exploration and gradation – the consequences of the ancient sin on the entire mankind: death and the original sin. Virgin Mary is born into such a context, yet she remains exempt from both the original sin and personal sins. András Illyés explicitly states: she never committed any mortal or venial sin. (“*Soha sem halálos, sem bocsánatos bünt el nem követett*”).⁷²

Therefore the narrator, with the help of the presented roles – the presenter, the characterizer, the apologist, the exegete, the preacher, and the catechist – artistically represents all the dogmatic stations connected to the Virgin Mary.⁷³ She is thus an immaculate Virgin, who knows not the burden of

⁷⁰ ILLYÉS, *Az Úr Isten Annyának makula nélkül való fogantatásáról*, in ILLYÉS, 11–16.

⁷¹ ILLYÉS, *Az Úr Isten Annyának...*, in ILLYÉS, 11.

⁷² ILLYÉS, *Az Úr Isten Annyának...*, in ILLYÉS 13.

⁷³ Apart from the excerpts examined, there are other references in the legends, drawing our attention to further statements about the Virgin Mary. One such reference is her assumption to heaven in the legend of The Assumption of Mary (*Nagy Boldog Asszony napjáról*), the perpetuation of her cult in the legend of Mary “ad nives” (*Havi Boldog Asszony napjáról*). Cf. ILLYÉS, *Nagy Boldog Asszony napjáról*, in ILLYÉS, 49–57. ILLYÉS, *Havi Boldog Asszony napjáról*, in ILLYÉS, 57–58. The voice of the apologist,

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original sin; the Virgin Mary is the Mother of God, who gave way to the embodiment of the Logos; the Mother of Messiah; the Virgin Mary is the Queen of Heavens, ruling on the side of her Son in the Eternal Realm; the Virgin Mary is the perpetual virgin, whose virginity was not corrupted by the birth of Christ; the Virgin Mary is the utterly pure woman, who has never committed even a venial sin; the Virgin Mary is the self-sacrificing Mother, who, although knowing the passions of her Son from the outset, undertook them, accepting thus his martyrdom.⁷⁴

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the exegete, and the preacher is heard again in the legends of the Annunciation (*Gyümölcs oltó Boldog Aszszony napjáról, és az emberré lott Istenről*), the Visitation (*Boldog Aszszony látogatásáról*), and the Presentation of Jesus at the Temple (*Gyertya szentelő Boldog Aszszony napjáról*), where Mary appears again as an example for everybody. The most important method of creating an exemplary image is the reference to, and explanation of, the biblical context. Cf. ILLYÉS, 29–49.

⁷⁴ Cf. GÁL, *Katolikus hittételek*, 156–157. 160–161., GÁL, *Jézus Krisztus...*, 83–84. VANYÓ, 548–553.

BOOK REVIEW

Andrei Marga, *Absolutul astăzi. Teologia și filozofia lui Joseph Ratzinger* [Das Absolute heute. Die Theologie und Philosophie von Joseph Ratzinger], Cluj Napoca: Eikon, 2010.

Jedes Werk wird meistens als ein „eigenes, hiesiges, für uns“ geschriebenes Werk gelesen. Es „gehört uns“, es „spricht uns an“. Der Denker wird als ein „Diakon“ unserer Kultur, unseres Systems betrachtet. Normalerweise erweist sich solch eine Haltung als begrenzt; sie schließt die Möglichkeit einer breiteren Interpretationsstruktur, einer breiteren Symbolökumene aus. Man sollte die Grenzen der oberflächlichen, vielleicht leichtsinnigen Hinordnung zu einem bestimmten Kultur-, Denk- und Geschichtsraum überschreiten. Wesentlich zweckdienlicher ist, wenn sowohl der Denker als auch sein Werk gleich von Anfang an als etwas „Fremdes“ betrachtet werden. Die Ideen, die Konzepte des Denkens werden so am Anfang fremd vorkommen, langsam aber Interesse erwecken und zur Aneignung locken.

Das zu zeigen versucht ein Philosoph, der versteht, dass die Theologie sich heute als weniger technisch und pragmatisch orientiert erweist; der weiß, dass die Philosophie, die sich auf die primären Erfahrung baut und sich daher in ihrer berechtigten Vielfalt zeigt, doch die einzige Aufgabe hat: die Wahrheit zu suchen. Dieses Wahrheit-Suchen eines Philosophen (mit theologischem Interesse) wird zu einem berechtigten Versuch: Andrei Marga versucht das Lebenswerk eines Theologen auf einer Art und Weise vorzustellen, dass es zur allgemeinen Legitimität und zur universellen Relevanz gelangt. Darin besteht – meines Erachtens nach – das Hauptanliegen des Buches von Andrei Marga.

Ein neues Zeitalter des Humanismus scheint in der Epoche der „späten Modernität“ angebrochen zu sein – stellt Marga fest. Er spricht von einer Kultur der Modernität, die durch Individualismus, Überlegenheit der instrumentalen Ratio, durch Atomisierung der Individuen, durch Wertverluste charakterisiert wird. Diese Epoche wird (wie das auch im Werk von Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Husserl, Marcuse, Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida, Rorty, Habermas zu finden ist (*Absolutul astăzi*, 166)) immer wieder mit dem Begriff „Krise“ zusammengebracht.

Huntington spricht von der Krise der Kultur (Samuel Huntington: *The Clash of Civilizations* (1996)), die sich durch ein gewisses Sinn-Vakuum (*Absolutul astăzi*, 114) und durch ein spürbares „moralisches Defizit“ (*Absolutul astăzi*, 45) zeigt. Dies Krise kreierte eine Welt der Profanität, die jede Form der Hoffnung vermisst (*Absolutul astăzi*, 115); eine Welt, die sich von der

Geschichte und Metaphysik Abschied genommen hat (*Absolutul astăzi*, 114). In diesem Kontext spricht man auch von der Krise des kirchlichen Bewusstseins (*Absolutul astăzi*, 78, 207). Die angesprochene Krise ist eigentlich die „Krise des Humanismus“ (Henri de Lubac: *Le drame de l'humanisme*), die zur „Abschaffung des Menschen“ (C.S. Lewis) hinsteuert (*Absolutul astăzi*, 198-99).

Dabei geht es heute, wie dies viele Denkversuche unterstreichen, trotz dieses ziemlich düsteren und pessimistischen Befundes, um den Menschen, der nach Frieden sucht, sich nach Liebe sehnt und nach Gerechtigkeit ruft, der sich bemüht, den Verachteten und Benachteiligten, den nach Menschenwürde Verlangenden hilfreich zu sein. Es geht letztendlich auch um die Verifikation des christlichen Glaubens an Gott, um die Kluft zwischen Gott und Mensch.

In einer Gedanken- und (Er)Werbungs-satten, politisch-ökonomisch manipulierten und Medien-zentrierten Gesellschaft wird der Mensch, mit seiner gleichgültigen und passiven Haltung jeder metaphysischen Realität gegenüber, ins Zentrum der Interessen gestellt – der Mensch, der oft die Existenz eines persönlichen Gottes ablehnt und in eine selbstgenügsame, gottverachtende Isolierung versinkt, oder nach dem „unbekannten“ Gott inner- oder außerhalb der Kirche sucht, oder durch Bemühungen und Sehnsüchte nach Wiederherstellung seiner persönlichen Beziehung zu dem „toten“ Gott seiner Kirche charakterisiert ist.

Die theologische/ bzw. philosophische Tradition wird in diesem Kontext stärker als jemals zuvor herausgefordert. In einer Zeit, in der sich die Wissenschaft, die kulturellen Werte, Prinzipien, die alles bestimmenden Wirklichkeiten, Philosophien stark verändern, in der die Theologie sich und der Welt neue Fragen stellen und beantworten soll, versucht Joseph Ratzinger Benedikt der XVI. – Marga – als „lebendiges Gewissen des Christentum und der theologischen Tradition“, als „Anwalt des Humanismus“, die Würde und den Wert des theologischen, bzw. philosophischen Denkens zurückzugewinnen, indem er theologische, spirituelle und moralische Werte der Katholizität in Bezug auf Menschen- und Weltverständnis ins Gespräch bringt.

Ratzinger stellt das „neue Imperativ“ der Mensch-Werdung (*Absolutul astăzi*, 30), das „existenzielle und geschichtliche“ Konzept des Menschen (*Absolutul astăzi*, 35). Er versucht die Konturen eines „wahrlich menschlich gewordenen Christentums“ (36), einer Welt „der Annäherung“ (*Absolutul astăzi*, 38) zu skizzieren, die Grundsteine eines „Ethos der Brüderlichkeit“ (*Absolutul astăzi*, 89) zu legen, der „die Ganzheit der Menschheit“ im Visier hat (*Absolutul astăzi*, 93).

Joseph Ratzinger Benedikt der XVI. meldet sich – im Wortlaut von Andrei Marga, als „einer der originalsten und profilierten Theologen“ (*Absolutul astăzi*, 7), der die Mut ergreift (= „Mut zum Selbstzweifel“ (*Absolutul astăzi*, 102)) sich mit der „Krise traditionellen Theologien“ (Nietzsche) ausein-

anderzusetzen und eine angemessene Plädoyer für die „Rückkehr der Religion“ und der Gottesfrage anzuführen (*Absolutul astăzi*, 9).

Ratzinger wagt das gefährliche Terrain der Re-Interpretierung des Christlichen zu betreten, und eine (von Gianni Vattimo vorgeschlagene) innere Transformierung fortzuführen (*Absolutul astăzi*, 10). Er erarbeitet eine „integrative Vision“ (*Absolutul astăzi*, 151) der christlichen Identität (*Absolutul astăzi*, 160), und betont die Notwendigkeit der Werte in Zeiten des Umbruchs (2005), die Unverzichtbarkeit des Christlichen in der modernen Gesellschaft (1987). Er sieht darin die „Chancen“ Europas (*Absolutul astăzi*, 209). In der Wendezeit (*Absolutul astăzi*, 197) der europäischen Geschichte, erscheint Europa als „ein verpflichtendes Erbe für die Christen“ (*Absolutul astăzi*, 192). Europa als „christliche Synthese“ (*Absolutul astăzi*, 195) soll – in der Denkwelt Ratzingers den „Rückweg zum Absoluten einschlagen“ (*Absolutul astăzi*, 255). Dabei soll die Kirche ihr zur Hilfe kommen, durch die gerechte Antwort des Glaubens auf die Krise, sich gegen ein düsteres Bild des Menschen (1988) stellt. Das leitet Ratzinger aus dem Absolut-Charakter des Christentums, aus seinem universalen Anspruch, aus seinem missionarischen Eifer (*Absolutul astăzi*, 261) ab.

„Wesen und Auftrag der Theologie“ (1993) ist in diesem Zusammenhang die klare Selbstbehauptung (*Absolutul astăzi*, 210), die Stellung eines Weltethos, was sich gegen die Entfremdung des Menschen setzt (*Absolutul astăzi*, 215, 240). Die Theologie soll die „Stimme der ethischen Vernunft“ (2007) werden, die den Weg eines „neuen Humanismus“ bereitet (*Absolutul astăzi*, 307). Man soll tiefgravierende Korrekturen wagen. Weder „sympathische“ noch „pragmatische“ Lösungsversuche bieten dem „kirchlichen Bewusstsein“ und dem heutigen Menschen den richtigen Ausweg für die „effektive Auflösung der Problemen“ an (*Absolutul astăzi*, 42).

Kann die christliche Tradition die sinndeutende Rolle der Existenz übernehmen? Kann sie dem negativen Kurs der europäischen Geschichte entgegenhalten, bzw. kontrarieren?

Andrei Marga bejaht kategorisch diese Frage. Klar, unter gewissen Bedingungen: die Theo-Logik soll zum wahren „Dialog“ werden (*Absolutul astăzi*, 23); sie darf keine Gerede bleiben, sondern soll zum Ort der Begegnung werden (*Absolutul astăzi*, 219). Sie, ein „rationaler Diskurs über Mensch und Welt“, setzt – und da spricht ein Philosoph – die philosophische Tradition voraus. Theologie und Philosophie sind „zwei Fächer, die sich gegenseitig bereichern können“ (*Absolutul astăzi*, 323-24). „Realistische Antworten“ – meint Marga, „die die heutigen Problemen der Menschheit lösen, können ohne die Mitarbeit von Philosophie und Theologie nicht erzielt werden.“ (*Absolutul astăzi*, 7)

BOOK REVIEW

Marga versucht die innere Verbundenheit der Philosophie und des Glaubens zu bewahren. Dadurch entstehe eine christliche Philosophie, die sich mit der Beschreibung der Realität und der Phänomene nicht zufrieden gibt, sondern das Wesentliche, den letzten Sinn, die letzten Fragen und Fundamente der Wirklichkeiten sucht.

„Die Erstellung einer Monographie über das Werk der Theologen ist nicht üblich unter den Philosophen“ – lese ich im Buch von A. Marga. Wie die Theologen die Philosophen mit Skepsis betrachteten, so ignorierten ihrerseits die Philosophen die Theologen. Jeder Theologe und Philosoph gibt sich im Rahmen der Selbstgenügsamkeit zufrieden, und dementsprechend gibt es ganz selten eine systematische Untersuchung eines Theologen seitens eines Philosophen“ (*Absolutul astăzi*, 7). Doch wage ich, gibt Marga zu, „den Kern des Ratzingerischen Denkens zu folgen (*Absolutul astăzi*, 170), und „öffne ein intellektuelles Front, das Historismus und Dogmatismus bestreitet (*Absolutul astăzi*, 184), und das „die amputierte und beschränkte Vernunft befreit“ (*Absolutul astăzi*, 185).

Mit dieser denkerischen Voraussetzung spannt er den Bogen der Harmonie über das Werk Ratzingers. Auf 367 Seiten schildert Andrei Marga, Professor für Philosophie der Gegenwart an der Babes-Bolyai Universität in Klausenburg, zugleich Rektor derselben Uni, ehemaliger Bildungsminister in Rumänien zwischen 1996-2000, die ganze Palette des Ratzingerischen Opus. Diese Ganzheit impliziert 59 Werke Ratzingers und 24 Werke über Ratzinger.

Reviewed by Liviu Jitianu