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NIETZSCHE, WAGNER,
AND THE "JEWISH QUESTION"

Robert S. Wistrich*

Abstract:

The young Friedrich Nietzsche was not immune to cultural prejudice against Jews which was part of his general outlook during the period that he came under the spell of Richard Wagner. Aspects of this cultural antisemitism can still be found in Nietzsche's tirades against Judeo-Christianity which would later influence Fascists and Nazis. However, after breaking with Wagner in 1878, Nietzsche emerged as the most anti-antisemitic of all the modern German philosophers. This essay explores the nature and reasons for Nietzsche's vehement opposition to antisemitism.

Key words: anti-semitism, Nietzsche, prejudice, Jews, Christianity

Friedrich Nietzsche was one of the great intellectual iconoclasts of the 19th century. In some respects more radical than even Marx or Freud, this descendant of generations of German Protestant pastors became perhaps the most implacable foe of Christianity in modern times. His narrative voice was often deliberately prophetic in tone, his writings were at times even apocalyptic in their resonance (e.g., *The Twilight of the Idols* and *The Antichrist*), with all of the puzzling strands of obscurity, enigma and paradox that frequently accompany such dramatic modes of utterance. In *Ecce Homo*—written in 1888—the last and the most productive year of his intellectual life (shortly before the onset of insanity)—it seemed as if he had a frantic premonition of his fate: “The memory of something dreadful will be linked with my name, of an unparalleled crisis.... I am no man; I am dynamite.” In the same text, Nietzsche envisages terrible political convulsions and disasters, cryptically warning his readers, “There will be

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wars such as never were on earth. Only after me will there be high politics on earth."

On 18 October 1888 he wrote to his friend Franz Overbeck from Turin that he was now

"moving against the Germans on all fronts; you'll have no cause to complain about ambiguity. This irresponsible race, which has on its conscience all of our civilization's great disasters, and which at every decisive moment of history had "something else in mind"—today has in mind "The Reich"... [T]here has never been a more crucial moment in history—but who'd be expected to know that?"¹

Yet, despite Nietzsche's revulsion from the national vanities and bombastic pomposity of a newly united Germany, after his death in 1900 he would be rapidly converted by some of his right-wing disciples into an advocate of German imperialism, militarism, and great power politics.² To some extent, as we shall see, this was a shameless manipulation of his legacy. At the same time, there was clearly something elusive in Nietzsche's fragmented, diffuse, and lyrical oeuvre—experimental in method, aphoristic in style, and anti-systematic in nature—that laid itself open to such uses and abuses, to multiple and opposed interpretations, not to say misappropriations; so much so, that it often seemed difficult to ascertain who the "real" Nietzsche was or if such a person actually existed. His life and work appears in retrospect like a battlefield of contending polarities—suspended between the Apollonian and Dionysian impulses, between and beyond good and evil, or the "master" and "slave" moralities—antitheses he harbored within his soul until the twilight of madness descended upon him in 1889, leaving the final verdict to the care of posterity. For some, he will be primarily remembered as the atheistic philosopher of nihilism, who first pronounced that "God is dead" (by which he meant the 19th-century "Christian God"); or the Antichrist who came to reevaluate all values (the notorious *Umwertung aller Werte*); for others, he is more like the first moralist of what has been called a post-God society. Among his contemporaries there were those, like Max Nordau,

¹ Quoted in Weaver Santaniello, *Nietzsche, God and the Jews: His Critique of Judeo-Christianity in Relation to the Nazi Myth*, Albany: SUNY Press, 1994, p. 115.

² Steven E. Aschheim, "Nietzsche and the German Radical Right 1914-1933," in Zeev Sternhell (ed.) *The Intellectual Revolt against Liberal Democracy 1870-1945*, Jerusalem: Israel Academy of Science and Humanities, 1996, pp. 159-176.

who caricatured his thought, damning it as the diseased reflection of a decadent Europe, disconnected from its ethical moorings; yet others, regarded this lyrical apostle of existentialism with his relativistic, perspectival search for truth, as a great liberator; as a truly "free spirit" (Stefan Zweig) who broke the yoke of sham certainties, moral absolutes, and fixed truths, teaching humankind the harder, more courageous path of self-overcoming.

The Nietzschean message of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, "I am that which must always overcome itself," certainly breathed a fresh music into European philosophy—that of Dionysian laughter, the will to power and a pagan affirmation of life in all its suffering and tragedy. Yet the individualistic philosopher of the *Übermensch* who passionately strove for self-transcendence and appealed to human beings to rise above their mundane limitations, was nonetheless interpreted, as if he were the prophet of a Germanic *Herrenvolk* (master race) seeking to dominate the world. This process of creeping annexation began shortly after Nietzsche's mental collapse, with his own sister Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche—who would in later years foster an image of his work as "proto-Nazi" in spirit.³

Already at the age of twenty, in 1864, the young Friedrich Nietzsche had written the following revealing words to Elisabeth: "If you want to find peace of mind and happiness, then believe. If you want to be a disciple of truth, then search."⁴ By then, he had repudiated the Protestant Christian faith bequeathed to him by his country clergyman father from Saxony (who died from brain disease when Friedrich was only five) and his fanatically pious mother. Elisabeth Nietzsche would, however, combine her strict allegiance to Christianity with a belief in Aryan racial supremacy, and in the 1920s, with loyalty to Hitler. This development was already prefigured by her marriage in 1885 to a leading Berlin antisemitic agitator and high school teacher, Bernhard Förster, who had instigated the notorious 1881 national petition to limit Jewish immigration and participation in German

³ On these falsifications, see H. F. Peters, *Zarathustra's Sister: The Case of Elisabeth and Friedrich Nietzsche*, New York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1985.

⁴ In Walter Kaufman (ed.), *The Portable Nietzsche* (1954; rpt. New York: The Viking Press, 1976), p. 30. Here, as in other places, I have somewhat modified the translation in accordance with my reading of the complete critical German edition, Giorgio Colli and Mazzimo Montinari (eds.) *Friedrich Nietzsche, Kritische Gesamtausgabe* (henceforth, KSA), Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1982.

public life. Elisabeth's marriage to Förster outraged Nietzsche, leading to a break with his sister, with whom he had previously enjoyed a remarkably close relationship.⁵ Now, as he confided to a friend, there could be no question of reconciliation "with a vengeful antisemitic goose."

To make matters worse, the Förster couple married on Wagner's birthday—seven years after Nietzsche's final break with the illustrious German composer. A year later, in 1886, the Försters embarked on an extraordinary utopian settlement project—bringing blond-haired, blue-eyed German families to the jungles of Paraguay to establish Nueva Germania—a breeding colony devoted to the ideals of Aryan racial purity, free of Jewish capitalist influence.⁶ Shortly after Förster's suicide in 1890, Elisabeth returned to Germany to take care of her mentally paralyzed brother until his death in 1900. She would be responsible for compiling Nietzsche's posthumous *The Will to Power* (1901) presenting her own tendentious editing of this unfinished work as his last great "synthesis." From 1892 onward, she edited and censored Nietzsche's unpublished works, forging, altering, or destroying documents, especially those concerning herself, their split over Christianity and antisemitism, or negative remarks about Wagner. Elisabeth's school of falsification would be continued by the Nazis when they decided thirty-five years later to place Nietzsche in the service of their own racist ideology. Indeed, the official philosopher of National Socialism, Alfred Rosenberg, did not hesitate to mendaciously distort citations and alter Nietzsche's remarks, especially on Judaism and the Jews, even inventing quotes when it suited his purpose.⁷

⁵ Walter Kaufmann, *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*, 4th ed., (Princeton: University Press, 1974), pp. 42-45. On antisemitism as "the cause of the break between myself and my sister...." and his alienation from Wagner, see Nietzsche to Franz Overbeck, 2 Apr. 1884, quoted in Peter Bergmann, *Nietzsche: The "Last Anti-Political German"*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987, p. 157; Weaver Santaniello, "A Post-Holocaust Re-examination of Nietzsche and the Jews: Vis-à-vis Christendom and Nazism," in Jacob Golomb (ed.) *Nietzsche and Jewish Culture*, London: Routledge, 1997, pp. 20-25.

⁶ See Ben MacIntyre, *Beyond the Fatherland: The Search for Elisabeth Nietzsche*, New York: FSG, 1992.

⁷ See Alfred Rosenberg, *Friedrich Nietzsche*, Munich: Zentralverlag der NSDAP, 1944 and Hans Sluga, *Heidegger's Crisis: Philosophy and Politics in Nazi Germany*, Cambridge: University Press, 1993, pp. 232-33. Santaniello, "A Post-Holocaust Re-examination," p. 42, suggests that when Rosenberg placed a wreath on Nietzsche's grave, dedicated "to the great fighter," it was a sinister way of silencing his true views rather than a genuine tribute from the leading ideologue of Nazism.

More sophisticated Nazi philosophers like Alfred Bäumler took greater care to qualify their statements by phrases suggesting that certain words "could have been spoken by Nietzsche" or sounded as if they came from one of his works.⁸

This tradition of historical falsification had begun in Nietzsche's own lifetime. In a letter to his close friend, Franz Overbeck (Professor of Church History at the University of Basel) in 1886, he ruefully observed that his *Zarathustra* book "has charmed the antisemites." Nietzsche also mentioned that in the *Antisemitic Correspondence* published by the insatiable racist demagogue Theodor Fritsch, his name was "mentioned almost in every issue." He subsequently reproached Elisabeth with some bitterness for her complicity with the antisemites.

"One of the greatest stupidities you have committed—for yourself and for me! Your association with an antisemitic chief expresses a foreignness to my whole way of life which fills me ever again with ire or melancholy. It is a matter of honor to me to be absolutely clean and unequivocal regarding antisemitism, namely *opposed*, as I am in my writings. I have been persecuted in recent times with letters and *Antisemitic Correspondence* sheets; my disgust with this party (which would like all too well the advantage of my name!) is as *outspoken* as possible, but the relation to Förster, as well as the after-effect of my former antisemitic publisher Schmeitzner, always brings the adherents of this disagreeable party back to the idea that I must after all belong to them."⁹

Nietzsche had been warned some time earlier by an Austrian Jewish admirer, Dr. Josef Paneth, that such associations could only damage his credibility.¹⁰ He now informed his sister that every time *Zarathustra* was mentioned in Fritsch's antisemitic rag sheet, he became almost physically sick.¹¹ A year later, in his last book, *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche expressed his

⁸ See Alfred Bäumler, *Nietzsche als Philosoph und Politiker*, Leipzig: Reclam 1931, p. 157, which dismisses Nietzsche's philosemitic responses. See also Yirmiyahu Yovel, *Dark Riddle: Hegel, Nietzsche, and the Jews*, Cambridge: University Press, 1998, pp. 127-29. In a letter of 29 Mar. 1887, Nietzsche attacked the antisemitic views of Dühring, Wagner, Drumont, and de Lagarde. Caustically, he asked Fritsch, "Finally, what do you think I feel when Zarathustra's name is borne in the mouths of antisemites?"

⁹ Nietzsche to Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche, in *The Portable Nietzsche*, pp. 456-457.

¹⁰ See Siegfried Mandel, *Nietzsche and the Jews. Exaltation and Denigration*, New York: Barnes & Noble, 1998, p. 188f.

¹¹ *Portable Nietzsche*, pp. 456-457.

unqualified horror that the right-wing, antisemitic Junker newspaper *Kronenzeitung*, cited him with approval as if he embraced its own blinkered nationalist philosophy. He was becoming literally obsessed with the need to "expel the antisemitic screamers out of the country."¹² In the margin of his last letter (January 1889) to his colleague, the great Swiss historian of the Italian Renaissance, Jacob Burckhardt, Nietzsche scrawled, "Abolished [Kaiser] Wilhelm, Bismarck and all antisemites"—while a final note to Overbeck concludes, "Just now I am having all antisemites shot."¹³ Nietzsche's last words to Fräulein von Salis were no less graphic: "I have just taken possession of my kingdom, am casting the Pope into prison, and am having Wilhelm, Bismarck and Stöcker shot." Adolf Stöcker, the Protestant *Hofprediger* (court-preacher) and founder of the Christian Social party in Berlin, along with the Prussian nationalist historian von Treitschke, symbolized in Nietzsche's eyes everything he hated about the new German Reich.¹⁴

Nietzsche's antipathy to German nationalism and to overblown Teutonic rhetoric also comes out clearly in many other texts, standing as an important argument against tainting him with the swastika. In *Ecce Homo* he notes disapprovingly that "Germany" has become an argument, "Deutschland, Deutschland über alles," a principle: the Teutons supposedly represent the "moral world-order...." There is now a historiography that is *reichdeutsch*; there is, even I fear, an antisemitic one...and Herr von Treitschke is not ashamed."¹⁵

Nietzsche had no time at all for the new myths of Aryan racial superiority (though on occasion, terms like "Aryan" humanity occur in his writings) and sharply rejected popular concepts of "pure blood." These categories, which he examined in his "Law of Manu" observations dealing with outcasts, struck him as far from harmless. He feared that they might someday be invoked to justify the oppression of non-Aryans. He also observed in the notes of *The Will to Power* that "the Aryan influence has corrupted all the world"—a characteristic Nietzschean way of

¹² Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, trans. by Marianne Cowan Chicago: Chicago Press, 1965, § 251, p. 187. I have modified the translation.

¹³ Letters to Burckhardt and Overbeck, in *Portable Nietzsche*, 687. I have slightly changed the translation.

¹⁴ For Nietzsche's view of Stöcker, see Kaufmann, *Nietzsche*, pp. 172-173.

¹⁵ Quoted in *ibid*, 163; from *Ecce Homo (EH)*, "The Case of Wagner," p. 2.

counteracting the arguments of contemporary German racists against so-called "Semites." Significantly, too, in a passage of *On the Genealogy of Morals* that discusses the "blond beast," Nietzsche insisted that "between the old Germanic tribes and the Germans there exists scarcely a conceptual relation, not to speak of a blood relation."

Nietzsche manifestly did not share Richard Wagner's enthusiasm for primordial Germanic myths and despised contemporary German culture. This was noted by at least one Nazi writer, Curt von Westernhagen, who announced in his book *Nietzsche, Juden, Antijuden* (1936) that the time had come to expose the "defective personality of Nietzsche whose inordinate tributes for, and espousal of, Jews had caused him to depart from the Germanic principles enunciated by Meister Richard Wagner."¹⁶

Nietzsche's relationship with Wagner had begun in 1868, when at the age of twenty-four he first came under the maestro's spell in Tribschen (Switzerland). A year later, Wagner republished his malevolent work of antisemitic incitement *Das Judentum in der Musik*, denouncing the "Judaization" of German art. Nietzsche did not comment on this inflammatory work. But his correspondence with Richard and Cosima Wagner before 1878 betrays a tendency to slide at times into mundane and stereotypical anti-Jewish remarks. In a notebook entry of January 1874, Nietzsche remarks with seeming detachment that Wagner "insults Jews who in present-day Germany possess the most money and own the press. At first, he had no vocational reasons, later his insults were acts of revenge."¹⁷

The young Nietzsche initially was bowled over by the "fabulously lively and fiery" Wagner. Not only was the composer witty, entertaining, and a musical genius but also a father figure to venerate and to fear. No doubt, when he aped the anti-Jewish slurs of the Wagners (Cosima was at times more virulent than her husband), Nietzsche may have genuinely believed that the "Jewish press" had been persecuting his much-admired mentor. But by the time of their break, Nietzsche would better understand

¹⁶ Von Westernhagen (whose book was published by Alexander Duncker in Weimar, 1936) was a convinced Nazi but one who could see the difference between Nietzsche and Gobineau. See Mandel, *Nietzsche and the Jews*, p. 13; Kaufmann, *Nietzsche*, 267, n. 6.

¹⁷ Mandel, *Nietzsche and the Jews*, p. 288, deals at some length with the more offensive earlier characterizations of "Judaization," "Jewish money-bags," etc., in Nietzsche's work.

the raw emotions (especially the psychology of envy) behind Wagner's antisemitism. Nietzsche remarks at one point that "Wagner is Schopenhauerian in his hatred of the Jews to whose greatest deed he is not able to do justice: Christianity! After all, the Jews are the inventors of Christianity."¹⁸ Increasingly, however, he saw Wagner as a decadent antisemite to be vigorously opposed. Nor could he stomach Wagner's growing German chauvinism, Francophobe abusiveness, and evolution toward Christian religious piety in his final opera, *Parsifal*. It was no accident that Nietzsche would positively invoke Jews like Jacques Offenbach and Heinrich Heine (with his "divine sarcasm") whom the Wagnerian antisemites vilified as destroyers of "German values." In 1884, Nietzsche observed,

"Offenbach has even more right to the title of "genius" than Wagner. Wagner is heavy, ponderous: nothing is more alien to him than moments of exuberant perfection achieved by this buffoon [Hanswurst] Offenbach."¹⁹

In 1887, Nietzsche would call Offenbach "that most sophisticated and exuberant satyr, who keeps to the great tradition as a musician"—a real relief from the sentimental and "at bottom the *degenerate* [*entarteten*] composers of German romanticism." Nietzsche thereby turned Wagner's own term of "degenerate" against its originator; to execrate the man whom he had once hailed in his first book, *The Birth of Tragedy* (1872), as a redeemer-prophet of Germanic rebirth.²⁰ But ever since seeing the *Ring* at Bayreuth in 1874, Nietzsche had become increasingly allergic to the "brutal Teutonisms" of Wagner's operas. He could no longer bear the mean-spirited antisemitism or xenophobic Germanness of the master's propaganda organ, the *Bayreuther Blätter*.²¹ Nietzsche's admiration for

¹⁸ Santaniello, *Nietzsche, God and the Jews*, p. 163, n. 78. This is, of course, a double-edged tribute.

¹⁹ See *Die Nachgelassenen Fragmente. Eine Auswahl*, Stuttgart: Reclam, 1996, p. 277.

²⁰ Sebastian Hausmann ("Eine Erinnerung an Nietzsche" [1922]) believed that the deepest reason for his break with Wagner was personal rather than an issue of their respective worldviews. Nietzsche was "far too conscious of his own intellectual importance to submit to being used as a mere instrument in the hands of a supposedly greater genius." Quoted in Sander L. Gilman (ed.) *Conversations with Nietzsche. A Life in the Words of his Contemporaries*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1991, p. 138.

²¹ On the rupture between Wagner and Nietzsche, see also Robert Gutman, *Richard Wagner* 1968; San Diego: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1990, pp. 358-60; David Large "Wagner's

Bizet's *Carmen*—given the Spanish-Jewish ancestry of the composer—was another ostentatious turning of his back on the Wagnerian "sickness."²² Bizet clearly exemplified the *revised* Dionysian principle of Nietzschean aesthetics—that whatever is divine "moves on light dancing feet."

In his *Human, All Too Human* (1878), Nietzsche unequivocally concluded that Wagner was nothing but a lamentable *decadent* ready to crawl on his knees before the Cross, while pathetically clinging to his dark Teutonic gods. It was the beginning of a long grueling vendetta that would culminate in 1888, five years after the composer's death, with *Nietzsche contra Wagner*. But already in 1878, much to the Wagner's fury, Nietzsche referred admiringly to the accumulation of capital, spirit, and will by the European Jews. More ominously, he observed that this was an acquisition "so huge that it had to incur envy and hate-filled measures in the form of literary indecencies in almost all our nations...making Jews scapegoats for all conceivable public and private misfortunes and leading them to the slaughter house."²³ Nietzsche deplored the narrow nationalism that was already then seeking to exclude the Jews—an outlook that stood in sharp conflict with his own "good Europeanism." The Germans, he insisted, must accept the Jews (as the English and the French had already done), thereby benefiting from their high intelligence and economic abilities.

At this time [in 1876] Nietzsche also told his Austro-Polish Jewish admirer Siegfried Lipiner of his "very great expectations" concerning young people of Jewish origin.²⁴ It was the same decade during which he enjoyed an intimate friendship with a highly assimilated, self-effacing, and alienated Jewish intellectual, Dr. Paul Rée, whom he valued highly for his acute insights into human behavior. Both his sister and the Wagnerians in Bayreuth predictably blamed this cool, cerebral, "Israelite" for the rift between Nietzsche and Wagner.²⁵ But it would be more accurate to say that

Bayreuth Disciples," in David C. Large, William Weber (ed.) *Wagnerism in European Culture and Politics*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984; Mandel, *Nietzsche and the Jews*, p. 112.

²² For the electrifying effect on Bizet's music on Nietzsche, see the remarks of Resa von Schirnhofer in *Conversations with Nietzsche*, p. 150.

²³ *From Human, All to Human*, in *Portable Nietzsche*, p. 62; I have modified some of Kaufmann's translation.

²⁴ On Lipiner, see William McGrath, *Dionysian Art and Populist Politics in Austria*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974.

²⁵ Cosima Wagner wrote to a friend, that in the end "Israel took over in the shape of a Dr. Rée, very slick, very cool...representing the relationship of Judea and Germania.... It is the

Nietzsche's emancipation from Wagner's influence opened the door to novel insights into Judaism, Christianity, antisemitism, and modern culture.

By the late 1870s, Nietzsche had voluntarily exiled himself from the new German Reich. He led a life of continual wandering in Southern France, Italy, and the Swiss Engadine Mountains seeking more conducive climes for his mental and physical health. He had little regard for the Prusso-German cult of the authoritarian state (that "coldest of all cold monsters") and openly mocked the obscurantism that he came to detect in German Christian antisemitism.²⁶ In *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche commented that he had not met a German "who was favorably disposed towards Jews." This was not intended as a compliment. His remarks about Germans as a national group, throughout the 1880s, became more acerbic, at times even openly offensive. He deplored their obtuseness, "the blond head, the blue eye, the lack of "esprit," on their faces, language and bearing," above all "the hideous excitation brought on by alcoholism"; the endemic German cultural and political provincialism, and especially the Förster-Wagner-Dühring morass of racist antisemitism. In the *Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche savaged that

"apostle of revenge in Berlin, Eugen Dühring, who in the Germany of today employs the most indecent and repulsive moralistic trash; he is the prime moral big mouth in existence, even among like-minded antisemites. All of them are people of *ressentiment* (II:11)."²⁷

Nietzsche's contempt for these "latest speculators in idealism—the antisemites," rolling their eyes heavenward in the "Christian-Aryan petty-bourgeois mode" knew no bounds. Behind the gathering drumbeat of antisemitic German nationalism, he detected "worm-eaten physiological mishaps" and pathological self-haters infecting the happiness of the healthy with their own sense of misery. As Nietzsche put it in 1888, antisemite was another name for the "socially lowest people," the losers, the misfits, the bungled, botched, and so-called underprivileged—the

victory of evil over good." See Erich Heller's introduction to *Human, All Too Human*, transl. by R. J. Hollingdale, Cambridge: University Press, 1986.

²⁶ See *Portable Nietzsche*, p. 160; the expression comes from *Z, I*, "On the New Idol."

²⁷ Compare also Ernst Nolte, *Nietzsche und der Nietzscheanismus*, Frankfurt a.M.: Propyläen Verlag, 1990, pp. 104-106.

Schlechtweggekommene.²⁸ Moreover, the comparison between Germans and Jews in Nietzsche's writings of this period invariably rebounds to the detriment of the former. Thus in *The Gay Science*, the Germans are described as a lamentable, unreasoning race into whose thick heads sense literally needs to be knocked by force.²⁹ Jews, on the other hand, have always had to rely on logic and persuasion:

"Everywhere that Jews have come into prominence, they have taught more keen decision-making, sharper analysing, and more precise writing: it was always their task to bring reason [*raison*] to a nation."³⁰

Such statements did not stop Nazi academic propagandists like Heinrich Härtle from claiming that "never has anyone attacked Jews more sharply than Nietzsche" — a comment whose self-serving cynicism it would be difficult to equal.³¹ But Nietzsche's confessional "autobiography," *Ecce Homo*, gives the lie to such assertions, reminding his readers that to be "a good German" one must first "de-Germanize" oneself (*entdeutschen*), unless one is of Jewish descent: "Jews among Germans are always the higher race—more refined, spiritual, kind. "L'Adorable Heine," they say in Paris."³²

It is worth recalling in this context that it was the Danish literary critic Georg Brandes (Morris Cohen), an exemplar of Jewish *délicatesse* and a model "good European," who first "discovered" Nietzsche for the world of academia in 1887. Brandes admired what he called the "aristocratic radicalism" of the German philosopher—a label that Nietzsche happily

²⁸ Nietzsche made it plain that he regarded antisemitism as a deliberate effort to try and "rouse up all the horned-beast elements in the people by a brazen abuse of the cheapest of all agitators' tricks, moral attitudinizing." That such a "swindle" could succeed in Germany was "connected with the undeniable stagnation of the German spirit"—the exclusive diet of "newspapers, politics, beer and Wagnerian music" and the "strong but narrow principle *Deutschland, Deutschland über alles*." This was a prescient, not to say prophetic, insight.

²⁹ Mandel, *Nietzsche and the Jews*, p. 226.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 228.

³¹ Heinrich Härtle, *Nietzsche und der Nationalsozialismus* (Munich: Zentralverlag der NSDAP, 1939). Härtle was nonetheless aware that there were discrepancies between Nietzsche's thought and National Socialism—especially in his "inadequate" attention to biological facts and belief in the virtues of racial mixing. See Sluga, *Heidegger's Crisis*, pp. 84-85.

³² Kaufman, *Nietzsche*, pp. 376-78; see Sander Gilman, "Nietzsche, Heine and the Idea of the Jew," in Jacob Golomb (ed.) *Nietzsche and Jewish Culture*, London: Routledge, 1997, pp. 76-100, for the Heine connection.

accepted.³³ There were, however, no Germans of whom he could say as much—indeed, apart from a few artists (Wagner above all), he claimed to have never enjoyed “a single good hour with Germans.”³⁴ On 15 October 1888, his forty-fourth birthday, he summed it all up by declaring, “What a blessing it is to find a Jew among the German horned cattle!” At least Jews, unlike the typical German professors, appreciated him. In a letter to Theodor Fritsch of 23 March 1887, he scolded the antisemitic propagandist (a true “proto-Nazi”), telling him that the most valuable contribution he could make to the history of German culture would be to publish a lengthy list of German scholars, artists, poets, writers, actors, and virtuosos of Jewish descent! Jews, he told Fritsch, were much more interesting than Germans.³⁵ Antisemitism had evidently become a contributing factor to his great estrangement from the prevailing German spirit epitomized by “the books of the puffed-up and sentimental blockhead named Paul de Lagarde!” (De Lagarde was a leading German academic orientalist and a rabid antisemite, highly appreciated by the Nazis).³⁶ Furthermore, in his unpublished notes of 1887, we find Nietzsche raging against the “damnable Germans” and the poisonous *névrose nationale* of antisemitism that had so ruinously intruded into his own personal life.³⁷ He was, for example, aghast at the thought that his epic *Zarathustra* had entered the world as “indecent literature” since its publisher, Ernst Schmeitzner, “was an antisemite.”³⁸ And then, there were the ubiquitous Wagnerians—“a hair-raising company!” “Not a single abortion is missing among them, not even the

³³ For the Brandes-Nietzsche correspondence, see Georg Brandes, *Friedrich Nietzsche: An Essay on Aristocratic Radicalism*, 1889; London: The Macmillan, 1914.

³⁴ In “Why I am so clever,” 5, he emphasized that his relation with Wagner had been the most intimate and profound of his whole life but that he felt only contempt for the Wagnerians.

³⁵ Quoted in Yovel, *Dark Riddle*, p. 127.

³⁶ With regard to de Lagarde, it is interesting to read Richard Reuter’s testimony, first published in 1895, which states that Lagarde’s *Deutsche Schriften* had a considerable impact on Nietzsche in the summer of 1876. De Lagarde’s critique of conditions in the German Empire, his devastating judgment on Protestant Christianity, and his sharply polemical style impressed the younger Nietzsche—though he was later led to diametrically opposite conclusions. See Gilman, *Conversations with Nietzsche*, pp. 81-82.

³⁷ *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, transl. by Walter Kaufmann, New York: Modern Library, 1968; Appendix, p. 798.

³⁸ *Ibidem*.

antisemite. Poor Wagner! Where had he landed!—If he had at least entered into swine! But to descend among Germans!"³⁹

In *The Case of Wagner* (1888), Nietzsche definitively closed the account:

"Wagner's stage requires but one thing: Germans! The definition of a German: an obedient person with long legs.... There is a deep significance in the fact that the rise of Wagner should have coincided with the rise of the "Empire": both phenomena are proof of one and the same thing—obedience and long legs—never have people been more obedient, never have they been so well ordered about."⁴⁰

"*Wagner est une névrose*"—this Nietzschean denunciation exposed his narcotic art as diseased, morbid, hysterical, and brutal. Wagner was "a great corrupter of music"—the opiate of the Second German Reich—a master of hypnotic trickery, an incomparable histrionic personality, a tyrant with an actor's genius. To me, this reads like an uncanny anticipatory description of Wagner's political alter ego, Adolf Hitler. Can we really doubt, then, where Nietzsche would have stood with regard to the politics of the Nazis? Could the man who saw with such clairvoyance through the original Bayreuth circle (a key link in the German ideology that led to National Socialism) have been taken in by its plebeian offspring? This is hardly likely. Yet through the efforts of his sister, Elisabeth, and the German *völkisch* Right, before and after 1914, Nietzsche—the great anti-dogmatist, anti-antisemite, and unmasker of Wagnerian *Kitsch*—could still be mythified into a war-mongering Jew-baiter und ultimately into a philosophical alibi for Adolf Hitler.

Clearly, there must have been some intellectual ingredients that made such a distortion possible. For instance, Nietzsche does at times seem to accept the biological discourse of his contemporaries depicting the battle of races and castes as the verifiable stuff of history. He appears to condone the aesthetic justification for elitist rule and even for slavery, as in the case of classical antiquity. Moreover, he did envisage a new "master race" for Europe (though one of mixed blood, which would include the Jews)—a

³⁹ From *EH*, "Human, All Too Human," 2, cited in Mandel, *Nietzsche and the Jews*, p. 245.

⁴⁰ For other polemics in this vein, see Friedrich Nietzsche, "What the Germans Lack," in *Twilight of the Idols*, transl. and ed. by R. J. Hollingdale, London: Penguin 1968, pp. 60-66.

ruling caste whose model was ultimately taken from the ancient Greeks.⁴¹ Similarly, Nietzsche accepted a Lamarckian view about the inheritance of acquired characteristics. He believed in the degeneracy of half-breeds and consistently abhorred the "herd mentality" as well as the egalitarian doctrines of democrats, anarchists, and socialists. Above all, he declared a war to the death against Christianity—one that had important implications for his view of Judaism, since the two were, as he put it, "racially related." Nietzsche insisted that Christianity was "to be understood entirely in terms of the soil from which it grew—it is *not* a countermovement to the Jewish instinct; it is the successor itself, a further step in its frightening logic."⁴² At the same time, he denounced in *Daybreak* "the attempt to pull away the Old Testament from under the feet of the Jews—with the claim that it...*belongs* to the Christians as the *true* Israel, while the Jews had merely usurped it." This, he vehemently rejected as a philological farce fraudulently practiced by Christian theology throughout the ages.

Although he was strongly opposed to Christian antisemitism, Nietzsche nonetheless blamed the Jews for the "denaturalization [*Entnatürllichung*] of natural values" implemented by Christianity. The Jews, he wrote in the *Antichrist*, had "made humanity into something so false that, still today, a Christian can feel antisemitic without understanding himself as the last stage of Judaism." Nietzsche's unfavorable contrast of the "holy unnaturalness" of the Judaic features in Christianity with Greek *naturalness* and pagan nature-worship is a recurring and significant refrain. So, too, is his hatred of "the Jewish fanaticism of a St. Paul"—the "greatest of all apostles of revenge"—responsible in his eyes for the most fateful and catastrophic revaluation (*Umwertung*) of values in world history."⁴³ Paul had brought with him from Judaism an enmity to everything noble, proud, and privileged—in short, precisely that disastrous subversion of the reigning order that produced the downfall of the Roman Empire and

⁴¹ See Hubert Cancik, "Mongols, Semites and the Pure-Bred Greeks: Nietzsche's Handling of the Racial Doctrines of His Time," in *Nietzsche and Jewish Culture*, pp. 55-75.

⁴² Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Antichrist*, transl. and ed. R. J. Hollingdale, London: Penguin 1968, p. 44, pp. 157-159. In this section, Nietzsche wildly fulminates against Judeo-Christian megalomania and the "*arrogance of the elect*."

⁴³ *Ibid.* The Jews are even described by Nietzsche as the "*most catastrophic* people of world history," for having radically falsified natural values—a process that reached in culmination in Paul.

destroyed the values of the classical world. There can be no doubt that Nietzsche detested the "priestly" Judaism of the Second Temple period for being the parent of Christianity, "the one immortal blemish of mankind." The Jewish priests had spread wholly spurious ideas of a "moral world order," sin guilt, punishment, repentance, pity, and the love of neighbor. According to this debasing gospel, the wretched, the poor, the lowly, the humble, the meek, the sick, and the weak are those who truly deserve salvation—not the strong, the healthy, the brave, and the beautiful. Worse still, according to *The Antichrist*, Judeo-Christian doctrines of mercy were full of malice and *ressentiment* against the powerful and self-assured; they were nothing but the vengeance of "slaves" against their "masters." The so-called "slave revolt in morals,"—an event of world historical importance—had been invented by priestly Judaism (synonymous for Nietzsche with the early Christians) as a form of self-affirmation and ascetic will to power.⁴⁴ This "slave revolt" had then been propagated and expanded by official Christianity throughout the world. In its modern secularized forms such as liberalism, scientific rationalism, or socialism, the "slave revolt" had emerged as the prime source of Western decadence against which Nietzsche fought so fiercely.

Ressentiment, according to Nietzsche, had first succeeded in becoming a revolutionary force in ancient priestly Judaism. It was an agent of change that had indeed created *new values* (abhorrent though they might be) subsequently to be transformed by Christianity into a powerful universal religion. Nietzsche's attack on this value system in *The Genealogy of Morals* is, of course, uncompromising. Judeo-Christianity is the petty, rancorous gaze of the slave at what *he* is not—the very opposite of a noble, life-affirming ethic. According to Nietzsche, the Jewish revolution in ethics triumphed in Pauline Christianity as a victory of *ressentiment*, one through which the Jews took vengeance on a hostile Gentile world.⁴⁵ "Jewish hatred" was the trunk of that tree of revenge that had created new ideals and values, beginning with Christian love, which was not the antithesis of

⁴⁴ *Ibid.* Nietzsche recalls here his arguments in *Beyond Good and Evil*, where the historic significance of the Jewish people is identified with "the beginning of the *slave revolt in morality*."

⁴⁵ *The Antichrist*. For Nietzsche, this was the "*most fundamental of all declarations of war*," but in the course of two millennia, it had proven victorious.

its parent but rather its fulfilment.⁴⁶ Thus Nietzsche could claim that it was "the Jews who with awe-inspiring consistency dared to invert the aristocratic value equation (good = noble = powerful = beautiful = happy = beloved of God) and to hang on to this 'inversion' with all their strength."⁴⁷

In these and other texts Nietzsche interprets priestly Judaism as being identical with early Christianity. Thus, when he refers to the Apocalypse of John (a quintessentially Christian book), he treats it as a purely Jewish text that expresses Jewish hatred of Rome.⁴⁸ In the deadly confrontation between two opposing value systems, aristocratic Roman values had been totally vanquished by Judeo-Christianity. Under the sign of the Cross, Israel had in fact achieved the ultimate "revaluation of all values." To provoke the Christian antisemites and illustrate the historical triumph of Judea over Rome, Nietzsche wrote in the *Genealogy* (1:16),

"Consider to whom one bows down in Rome itself today, as if they were the epitome of all the highest values—and not only in Rome but over almost half the earth...: *three Jews*, as is known, and *one Jewess*."

Who are the members of this Christian holy quartet? Jesus of Nazareth, the fisherman Peter, the tentmaker Paul, and Mary, the mother of the afore-mentioned Jesus—all of them Jews! This was a useful rhetorical device with which to bash Christians, but it also had a nasty sting against Jews. For if antisemites traditionally indict Jews as Christ-killers, Nietzsche finds them guilty for having begotten him! Was the "Redeemer" not a "seduction and a by-path to precisely those *Jewish* values" (i.e., victory of the poor, the sick, and the sinners!)? "Did Israel not attain the ultimate goal of its sublime vengefulness through the by-path of this 'Redeemer,' the ostensible opponent and disintegrator of Israel?" This is an astonishingly

⁴⁶ *Genealogy of Morals*, 1:8. Jesus, with his gospel of love, was in Nietzsche's eyes the ultimate consummation and triumph of Jewish hatred and "sublime vengefulness"—the victory of the grand politics of revenge.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 1:7. This inversion was for Nietzsche the demonstration that the Jews embodied "the most deeply repressed priestly vengefulness." This was perhaps the most flawed and potentially pernicious of his claims about Judaism.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 1:16. Nietzsche presents ancient Judea as an "antipodal monstrosity," a symbol of "anti-nature itself" in Roman eyes, while the Jewish hostility to Rome is misleadingly represented as a wanton hatred—a notion that all too easily provided grist to the antisemitic mill. Ironically, the Gospel of John is the most *anti-Jewish* book of the New Testament—something that Nietzsche failed to address.

Machiavellian scenario. The Jews crucified the man Jesus as an enticing bait for the world to swallow—to create the ghastly paradox of a “God on the Cross,” the awesome image of “an unimaginable ultimate cruelty and self-crucifixion of God for the salvation of man.” Through the “Redeemer,” and the intoxicating power of the symbol of the “Holy Cross,” Jewish ideals had triumphed over Rome. The Jews had created Christianity—a religion in which they did not themselves believe - in order to sap and weaken their Roman conquerors.

One can see how such statements might easily be manipulated by antisemites. After all, Nietzsche tells us that the Jews had always known how “to place themselves at the head of all movements of decadence.” Yet, they themselves were “the antithesis of all decadents,” a people who used the power of these instincts of decadence as a strategy for their own survival and self-preservation.⁴⁹ Nietzsche certainly detested the content of Judeo-Christianity for its denigration of the world, “unnatural” and anti-life character—but he also admired the tough vital energy that the Jews had retained throughout their history. This heroism was especially visible in the early biblical period, before the fall of the First Temple and the Babylonian exile. The Israelites of that era are very positively portrayed by Nietzsche as a proud, sovereign people of high spirit, courage and unconquerable will. In the *Antichrist* he writes:

At the time of the kings, Israel also stood in the right, that is, the natural relationship to all things. Its Yaweh was the expression of a consciousness of power, of joy in oneself, of hope for oneself: through him victory and welfare were expected, through him nature was trusted to give what the people needed—above all, rain. Yaweh is the god of Israel and therefore the god of justice.

Biblical Judaism as recounted in the stories of the Patriarchs and of Moses, Joshua, Samson, Samuel, David, and Solomon—expressed the people’s own self-affirmation and flowing power. In *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche glowingly contrasts this vitality with the “rococo taste” of the New Testament.

In the Jewish “Old-Testament,” the book of divine justice, there are human beings, things and speeches in so grand a style that Greek and

⁴⁹ *The Antichrist*, p. 135.

Indian literature have nothing to compare with it. With terror and reverence one stands before these tremendous remnants of what man once was.

There is here, perhaps an echo of Heine's confession: "I see now that the Greeks were only beautiful youths; the Jews, however, were always men...martyrs who gave the world a god and a morality and fought and suffered on all the battlefields of thought."

To have glued Old and New Testament together as *one* book, as the "Bible"—the book par excellence—was for Nietzsche a "sin against the spirit."⁵⁰ In the *Genealogy of Morals* the dichotomy is even more graphic. In the Old Testament one can find

Great human beings, a heroic landscape, and something of the very rarest quality in the world, the incomparable *naïveté* of the strong heart; what is more, I find people. In the new one, on the other hand, I find nothing but petty sectarianism, mere rococo of the soul, mere involution, nooks, queer things...a garrulous swell of feeling that almost stupefies; impassioned vehemence, not passion; embarrassing gesticulation.

Nietzsche, in one stroke, reverses almost two millennia of Christian dogma—Catholic, Protestant, and Eastern Orthodox. The movement from biblical Judaism to Christianity is *not* a progress but a *regression*; a path from Dionysian values of grandeur, nobility, and sublimity to decline, degeneration, and enfeeblement. In *The Antichrist* he specifically mocks "the simplicity of Christian theologians" who insist on the positive development from the "God of Israel," the god of the people, to the Christian God"—supposedly, "the quintessence of everything good." On the contrary, the priestly culture of Judaism that produced Christianity had "accomplished a miracle of falsification" and "denaturation" of natural values. Happiness was now a reward, unhappiness a "punishment for disobeying God"—all the "natural concepts of cause and effect were turned upside down once and for all. The history of Israel itself was reinterpreted as "a stupid salvation mechanism before Yahweh," in which the priest and "the Law" alone can redeem men from their sins. It was on this false soil that Christianity had grown up as a revolt against the natural instincts, expressing a disgust for reality and fabricating the illusions of the kingdom of Heaven. In Nietzsche's feverish indictment, as set out in the *Antichrist*,

⁵⁰ *Beyond Good and Evil*, 52. Indeed, for Nietzsche, this was "possibly the greatest recklessness...that literary Europe has on its conscience."

Christianity had turned every value into "an unvalue," every truth into a lie and "every integrity into a vileness of the soul."

It has been suggested that Nietzsche's demonization of Christianity was in essence *antisemitic*, since the Jews were its originators and therefore they bore ultimate responsibility for this supreme evil. This is, I believe, misleading. Nietzsche did lay the axe to the (Judeo-) Christian branches but did not seek to cut off the ancient Jewish roots of the tree, since he hoped to integrate the descendants of the Jews into a new society. He consistently distinguished between the grandeur and decadence of Judaism—something he did not allow for Christianity. Even priestly Judaism, in its perversity, was regarded as superior to Christianity, since it had at least created *new* values. Moreover, despite his hostility to rabbinical Judaism, Nietzsche expressed a complex admiration for Diaspora Jews (especially for his contemporaries)—convinced that they were specially suited to act as a catalyst in delivering Europe from the culture of decadence. He hoped that he would find in Jewry allies for his Dionysian culture war against a bankrupt, life-negating Christian morality and the detested imagery of a "God on the Cross."

Through their long history of suffering (*Leidenschule*) Jews had after all acquired unique mental qualities of intelligence and shrewdness, wit (*Geist*), intellect (*Geistigkeit*), and adaptability (*Anpassungskunst*) to add to their "moral genius" (*Genialität*), their money, and their patience.⁵¹ Adversity and profound suffering had turned them into the strongest, toughest, purest race in Europe ("*stärkste, zähste und reinste Rasse*")—not in the sense of brute force (*Kraft*) but of positive spiritual power (*Macht*).⁵² Hence, Nietzsche saw the Jews as very much a part of the new elite of the future that would rule over the West—an "aristocracy of the spirit," whose creative assimilation would help revive modern post-Christian Europe by giving it new norms and values. This does not mean that Nietzsche was an unqualified philosemite. He recognized that every nation possessed "unpleasant, indeed dangerous qualities" and in *Human, All Too Human* he summarily referred to the youthful stock-exchange Jews as perhaps "the most repulsive invention of the entire human race." But in the same text he

⁵¹ These positive characterizations are mainly from *Daybreak*, *Beyond Good and Evil*, and *The Gay Science*. See, for example, *Daybreak*, § 205, p. 206.

⁵² For a detailed distinction between *Kraft* and *Macht*, see Jacob Golomb, *Nietzsche's Enticing Psychology of Power*, Ames: State University Press, 1989, pp. 179-221.

also blamed Christian Europe for the grief-laden history of the Jews, who had given humanity "the noblest human being (Christ), the purest sage (Spinoza), the mightiest book and the most efficacious moral code in the world."

Moreover, in *Human, All Too Human*, Nietzsche asserted that in the darkest periods of the Middle Ages, Jewish freethinkers, scholars, and physicians held the banner of intellectual independence aloft and encouraged the humanist enlightenment that derived from Graeco-Roman antiquity. In a remarkable reversal of conventional Western Christian opinion, he added, "If Christianity has done everything to orientalize the occident, Judaism has always played an essential part in occidentalizing it again."⁵³

Nietzsche never concealed his high opinion of Jewish thinkers from Spinoza to Heine; he especially admired the German-Jewish poet, with whom he felt a great stylistic affinity:

"I seek in vain in all the realms of thousands of years for an equally sweet and passionate music. He possessed that divine sarcasm (*Bösheit*) without which I cannot imagine perfection.... And how he handles his German! It will be said one day that Heine and I have been by far the foremost artists of the German language—at an incalculable distance from everything mere Germans have done with it."⁵⁴

Nietzsche greatly valued the resilience and affirmation of life in the face of adversity that writers like Heine exhibited. The Jewish ability to survive as Christianity's "Other" in the harsh discipline of the Diaspora, fortified by the hatred of the Gentiles, was a strong point in their favor. In *Daybreak*, Nietzsche's evaluation of Jewish "psychological and spiritual resources" attains to a crescendo of praise. They were the "least liable to resort to drink or suicide in order to escape from some profound dilemma"; they [the Jews] possessed in their history "a great fund of examples of the coldest self-possession and endurance in fearful situations...their courage beneath the cloak of miserable submissions, their heroism...surpasses the virtues of all the saints."

⁵³ *Ibid.* Nietzsche credits the Jews with enabling Europe to reconnect to its Greek heritage and embrace a "more rational and certainly unmythical explanation of the world."

⁵⁴ *Ecce Homo*, "How One Becomes What One Is," in *Portable Nietzsche*, p. 660, my revised translation.

The Jews had successfully overcome two millennia of the Christian "teaching of contempt" and "never ceased to believe themselves called to the highest things." Barred from all honors, they had put to effective use the occupations left to them yet still retained a "liberality of soul" as a result of their extraordinarily diverse experiences of human society. Nietzsche also praised the way in which "they honor their fathers and children, the rationality of their marriages and marriage customs" which "distinguished them among all Europeans." True, they had not yet developed chivalrous or noble sentiments, but Nietzsche predicted that within a hundred years as a result of intermarriage "with the best aristocracy of Europe" they would acquire these virtues, too, and be willingly accepted as "masters." Hence, the coming 20th century would mark a fateful decision concerning the destiny of European Jewry—whether they would become "the masters of Europe" or "lose Europe as they once a long time ago lost Egypt, where they placed themselves before a similar either-or." Nietzsche somehow forgot to mention that in Jewish tradition the "loss" of Egypt became the exodus from servitude that led to the Promised Land of Israel.

The Jews themselves, according to Nietzsche, knew that the old continent might fall into their hands like a ripe fruit, once they had achieved the first rank in every domain of European distinction. Indeed, he welcomed the prospect of a future Jewish leadership in which they would become "the inventors and signposts of the nations of Europe," producing great men and great works that would make the ancient Jewish God "rejoice in himself, his creation and his chosen people—and let us all, all of us, rejoice with him!"⁵⁵

But how should we read Nietzsche's rather startling warning in *Daybreak* that the Jews must either master or "lose" Europe? By mastery, Nietzsche surely meant that Jews had the power to transform European values in depth, as they had already done before, through the medium of Christianity. "Losing" Europe may well have been a pointer to the antisemitic storm clouds on the horizon, suggesting deeply unpleasant possibilities of emigration or expulsion. In *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche tried to clarify the point:

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*; see also Yovel, *Dark Riddle*, pp. 172-77.

"[T]he Jews, if they wanted it—or if they were forced into it, which seems to be what the antisemites want—could even now have preponderance, indeed quite literally mastery over Europe, that is certain. Meanwhile they want and wish rather, even with some importunity, to be absorbed and assimilated by Europe; they long to be fixed, permitted, respected somewhere at long last, putting an end to the nomad's life, to the "Wandering Jew", and this bent and impulse (which may even express an attenuation of the Jewish instincts) should be noted well and accommodated."⁵⁶

In these and other passages it is apparent that Nietzsche grants remarkable centrality and potency to the Jews as a people with a world historical mission. Was this belief merely a kind of the paranoid concept of the Jews as a world power developed by antisemites and Nazis? This seems unlikely. There is no evidence that Nietzsche shared the Christian myth of the Jews as dangerously powerful and secretly striving for domination.⁵⁷ While Nietzsche seems to be playing a dangerous dialectical game with antisemitism by invoking the Jews' ability to become Europe's masters, his intentions are clearly not those of the antisemites. He wants to see Jews fully integrated into modern society, so that they can be a blessing for it. To that end, he favors the secularization and creative assimilation of Jews *as Jews* into the new Europe.⁵⁸ Precisely for that reason, he adds, that "it might be useful and fair to expel the antisemitic screamers from the country." Nothing could be more remote from the Nazi vision of a regenerated *Judenrein* Europe based on Aryan-German racial supremacy! Indeed, as Yirmiyahu Yovel tellingly formulated it, "If the Nazis considered the Jews as *Untermenschen*, for Nietzsche they were a possible catalyst of the *Übermensch*."⁵⁹

No doubt this exceptionally positive evaluation of their historic role was one reason for the attraction of many Central European Jewish

⁵⁶ *Beyond Good and Evil*, 251. In this same passage, Nietzsche observes that "a thinker with the future of Europe on his conscience, will count on the Jews" (and the Russians) and he advises a policy similar to that of the British aristocracy—to meet the Jews halfway, though with caution and selectivity.

⁵⁷ Hyam Macoby, "Nietzsche's love-hate affair. Are life-affirming Jews nearer to Superman than decadent Christians?," *Times Literary Supplement*, 25 June 1999, pp. 14-15.

⁵⁸ Yirmiyahu Yovel, "Nietzsche and the Jews. The Structure of an Ambivalence," in *Nietzsche and Jewish Culture*, pp. 158-192.

⁵⁹ Yovel, *Dark Riddle*, p. 176.

intellectuals to Nietzsche's work.⁶⁰ His influence on young Zionists like Martin Buber, who enthusiastically responded around 1900 to the Nietzschean call for a "transvaluation of all aspects of the life of the people," is well known. So, too, is Nietzsche's impact on Micha Josef Berdyczewski and the East European Zionists who sought to radically reconstitute a secularized Jewish national culture from the very foundations.⁶¹ It was indeed this radicalism that prompted Ahad Ha'am's fear that Nietzscheanism might dangerously threaten the ethical and spiritual continuity of Jewish values. The Nietzschean influence was, however, strong, precisely because it coincided with a Jewish artistic and national renaissance seeking liberation from the spiritual desiccation of the Diaspora.⁶² Nietzsche's assault on conventional morality and the spiritual discontents of bourgeois civilization appealed to many Zionists of this generation of 1900, who were looking for a life-affirming philosophy and an aesthetically oriented national rebirth. Nietzsche also attracted a broad array of "marginal Jews" — artists and intellectuals in Central Europe who had already lost their moorings in Jewish tradition without being fully absorbed by German or Austrian society. They included such diverse personalities as Arthur Schnitzler, Sigmund Freud, Stefan Zweig, Franz Kafka, Franz Werfel, Karl Kraus, Kurt Tucholsky, Walter Benjamin, and Theodor Lessing.⁶³ To this galaxy of talents one could also add a long list of prominent non-Jewish authors from Rilke and Thomas Mann to Stefan George, Gottfried Benn, and George Bernard Shaw, not to mention philosophers, historians, and military men such as Max Scheler, Ludwig Klages, Oswald Spengler, or Count von Stauffenberg, who planted the bomb that nearly killed Hitler in 1944. Gottfried Benn, the leading German expressionist poet of the 1920s, looking back fifty years after the

⁶⁰ Jacob Golomb, "Nietzsche and the Marginal Jews," in *Nietzsche and Jewish Culture*, pp. 158-192.

⁶¹ See David Ohana, "Zarathustra in Jerusalem: Nietzsche and the 'New Hebrews,'" Robert S. Wistrich and David Ohana (eds.) in *The Shaping of Israeli Identity: Myth, Memory and Trauma*, London: Frank Cass&Co., 1995, pp. 38-60.

⁶² Paul Mendès-Flohr, "Zarathustra's Apostle: Martin Buber and the Jewish Renaissance," in *Nietzsche and Jewish Culture*, pp. 233-43.

⁶³ Jacob Golomb, "Nietzsche and the Marginal Jews," pp. 162-173. Golomb emphasizes the attraction that Nietzschean concepts of personal authenticity, self-overcoming, and the "transfiguration of all values" exercised on the fin-de-siècle generation of secular, marginalized Jewish intellectuals in Central Europe.

philosopher's death, was not exaggerating greatly when he recalled that Nietzsche had found and *exhausted* all the definitive formulations for the next generation—"the rest was exegesis."⁶⁴

Nietzsche's hybrid status as a philosopher-artist, his critique of all established thinking, his creative use of the dynamic of incessant self-contradiction, and his refusal of the closure entailed by an internally consistent systematic worldview, help to account for the diversity and range of his influence. Nazi and fascist readings of his work were indeed only one among many examples of the possible outcomes of his philosophy, though they proved disastrous for his subsequent reputation. The "fascist" Nietzsche of the 1930s was considered to be a heroic irrationalist and vitalist who had glorified war and violence, inspiring the anti-Marxist revolutions of the interwar period.⁶⁵ According to the French fascist Pierre Drieu la Rochelle, it was the Nietzschean emphasis on the Will that inspired the voluntarism and political activism of his comrades.⁶⁶ Such one-dimensional readings were vehemently rejected by another French writer, the anarchist George Bataille, who in the 1930s sought to establish the "radical incompatibility" between Nietzsche (as a thinker who abhorred mass politics) and the "Fascist reactionaries." He argued that nothing was more alien to Nietzsche than the pan-Germanism, racism, militarism, and antisemitism of the Nazis, into whose service the German

⁶⁴ Quoted in Kaufmann, *Nietzsche*, p. 412.

⁶⁵ See, for example, Gilbert Merlio, "The Critique of Liberal Democracy in the Works of Oswald Spengler," in *The Intellectual Revolt*, pp. 177-89, who points to the "vulgarized Nietzscheanism" that became common ground between the conservative *völkisch* and fascist Right. Left-wing critics like George Lukács, *The Destruction of Reason*, London: Merlin Press, 1962, fully embraced the Nazi image of Nietzsche as a *true* reflection of his thought. For Lukács, Hitler was "the executor of Nietzsche's spiritual testament"—the link being the philosopher's "irrationalism," his hatred of egalitarian doctrines and loathing for socialism. More extreme still was George Lichtheim's claim that Nietzsche provided inspiration to the SS program of mass murder in Eastern Europe. See his *Europe in the Twentieth Century*, New York: Cardinal, 1972, p. 186.

⁶⁶ Drieu La Rochelle was a convinced Nietzschean and "socialist" fascist opposed to the historical materialism and determinism of the Marxists. In his *Journal 1939-1945*, Paris: Gallimard, 1992, p. 147, there is, however, a perceptive remark, dated 7 August 1944: "Nietzsche aurait vomé le Nazisme comme Weimar et Guillaume II. Mais n'empêche que le monde du XXe siècle ressemble à son ombre, qu'il en est le prophète. D'ailleurs, avec beaucoup de finesse il en a prévu toutes les rudesses et les grossièretés."

philosopher had been posthumously pressed.⁶⁷ Bataille was one of the few intellectuals (one might add the names of Thomas Mann, Jaspers, and Camus) who in the 1930s and 1940s tried to rescue Nietzsche's reputation from the rising fascist tide.⁶⁸ In Nazi Germany, at that time, pamphlets of Nazified Nietzschean *dicta* were indeed being produced, presenting him as an Aryan racial supremacist and ferocious antisemite.⁶⁹ What did it matter that in his own lifetime he had sharply opposed virtually every prominent antisemite including the Wagners, Dühring, de Lagarde, Stöcker, Förster, Gobineau, Renan, Wellhausen, and his own sister? What counted for the Nazis was their desire to politicize and militarize the Nietzschean concept of the will to power and to manipulate Nietzsche's onslaught against Judeo-Christianity for the benefit of the new German *Herrenvolk*.

Nietzsche's diatribes against the evil genius of "rabbi" Paul and the New Testament (which represented the depraved "priestly" element in Judaism) were naturally grist to the Nazi mill. So, too, were ranting passages like the following, in *The Antichrist*:

One does well to put on gloves when reading the New Testament. One is almost forced to do so by the proximity of so much uncleanness. We would no more choose to associate with the "first Christians" than we would with Polish Jews: not that one would need raise a single objection [*Einwand*] to them.... They both do not smell good.

Having yielded to crude German prejudices against Polish Jews, Nietzsche further aggravated this lapse by approvingly depicting Pontius Pilate as a "noble Roman" who could not persuade himself "to take Jew-dealings [*Judenhandel*] seriously.

⁶⁷ Georges Bataille, *On Nietzsche* (London 1992; French ed. 1945), pp. 169-73; also idem, "Sur Nietzsche," *Oeuvres Complètes*, vol. 4, Paris: Gallimard, 1970. In the second issue of *Acéphale* (Jan. 1937), Bataille sought to rescue Nietzsche from the fascists in the name of a left-wing existentialist interpretation. Elisabeth Roudinesco's biography, *Jacques Lacan*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1997, pp. 131-33 for the details.

⁶⁸ The most ambivalent and interesting of Nietzsche's defenders was Thomas Mann, who in the 1930s had been upset by Nazi efforts to mobilize the philosopher for their own goals. In 1947, Mann suggested that it was fascism that created Nietzsche, rather than the reverse. Yet his philosophy had "presaged the dawning imperialism and as a quivering floatstick indicated the fascist era of the West." See Steven E. Aschheim, *The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany. 1890-1990* Berkeley: University Press, 1992, p. 319.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 232-71; Aschheim failed to point out the massive distortions of Nietzsche's thought that were required to give some plausibility to this operation.

The Nietzschean image of Judeo-Christianity as “the vampire of the *Imperium Romanum*,” was another stereotype that found more than an echo in the Christophobia of leading Nazis like Hitler, Bormann, Rosenberg, Ley, and Himmler. Though there is no proof that Hitler ever seriously read Nietzsche, in his wartime *Table Talk* there are references to Rome, Judea, and early Christianity that do sound like a crude and vulgarised version of Nietzschean ideas.⁷⁰ For instance, on 11-12 July, 1941, shortly after the invasion of the USSR, Hitler called the coming of Christianity “the heaviest blow that had ever struck humanity,” since it had supposedly destroyed the Roman Empire and 1500 years of civilization. Like Bolshevism, Christianity had been invented by the Jews—so Hitler asserted—to subvert and destroy the foundations of culture. Like Nietzsche, the Nazi Führer was obsessed with the apostle Paul, whom he crassly described as the “first man to take advantage of using a religion as a means of propaganda.” In decadent Rome, Paul had found the ideal terrain for his egalitarianism, his “crypto-Marxist” theories, and the “insane idea” of a universal god, who stood above the state. For Hitler, this decadent Judeo-Christian monotheistic creed was part of a diabolical conspiracy to undermine the natural order, where the strong must always prevail over the weak and power alone can guarantee right. Hitler liked to denounce Judeo-Christian morality as antithetical to the life-force and the instinct of self-preservation. He, too, praised the healthy pagan values of classical Antiquity. At such moments, he seemed to come uncomfortably close to echoing Nietzsche without ever quoting him.⁷¹

By the same token, Hitler’s diatribes against the barbarism, credulity, ignorance, and “poverty of spirit” encouraged by the Christian churches also contain crude echoes of 18th-century rationalists like Gibbon and Voltaire—whom nobody has ever suspected of proto-Nazism. Even if Nietzsche’s anti-Christian animus (inadvertently) paved the way for some of the Christophobic *Judenhass* exhibited by the Nazi leaders, he can hardly be said to have caused it. Similarly, to radically question such sacred taboos

⁷⁰ See Adolf Hitler, *Table Talk 1941-1944*, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1985 1953, pp. 720-722.

⁷¹ Robert Wistrich, *Hitler’s Apocalypse. Jews and the Nazi Legacy*, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1985, pp. 145-153.

of Western culture as liberal democracy or Christianity does not make one into a fascist antisemite.

It is important to remember that Nietzsche sharply condemned anti-Christian antisemites like Eugen Dühring in his own day, no less fiercely than he mocked the attitudes of Christian anti-Judaism. He ridiculed Dühring's stance that the Germans should turn their backs on the Old Testament for racial reasons or the popular *völkisch* notion that Christ was an "Aryan" and antisemite—positions that came close to official policy under the Third Reich. Similarly, Nietzsche blasted the German-Christian-Aryan antisemitism of the Wagnerites, whose input into Nazi ideology and myth-making was much greater than his own. Above all, his hatred for German nationalists and his growing empathy for contemporary Jews, suggests how little Nietzsche and his philosophy were ultimately compatible with Nazism. He was after all a "good European," who believed in the value of "mixed races" and "mixed cultures."

At the same time, Nietzsche's ferocious critique of the idea of equality, as exemplified in democracy and socialism, is a reminder that this free-thinking "philosemite" could all too easily be annexed for authoritarian and fascist philosophies. His vision of a new European order transcended nationalism and decadent "particularism"—even including an honored place for Jews in its ranks—but it nonetheless contained a dangerously seductive sting that in certain circumstances could become deadly.

SHELBY STEELE AND THE CRITICISM OF THE AMERICAN POST-LIBERAL RACIAL POLICIES

Marius Jucan*

Abstract:

Weighing the consequences of post-liberal racial policies in the United States against the traditionally conflicting relations among whites and blacks and the present day unprecedented opportunity of reassessing the role of race calls for a better judgment of 1960's. Resurgence of religion, globalization, the role of education and the profound alterations undergoing the American creed blended in provocative instances demand a more accurate perception of transformations characterizing the black community and its identity at the beginning of the new millennium. Shelby Steele, one of the outstanding black conservative essayists and journalists takes the gauntlet of bringing a fresh outlook of race in nowadays America. The main thrust of his criticism focuses on the repercussions of affirmative action, showing that without warranting the black individual's free participating to the solving of the American community's impasses, will finally impair the credibility of American democracy.

Key words: cultural criticism, racial relations, guilt, stigma, victimization

*"Color prejudice is not the only prejudice against which a Republic like ours should guard. The spirit of caste is malignant and dangerous everywhere. There is the prejudice of the rich against the poor, the pride and prejudice of the idle dandy against the hard-handed workingman. There is, worse of all, religious prejudice, a prejudice which has stained whole continents with blood. It is, in fact, a spirit infernal, against which every enlightened man should wage perpetual war."*¹

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¹ „Life and Times of Frederick Douglass” in *The Oxford Frederick Douglass Reader*, edited by William L. Andrews, Oxford: University Press, 1996, p. 333.

On rereading Frederick Douglass's excerpt, having as a backdrop the historical opportunity of witnessing a black candidate running for the presidency of the United States², one should perhaps take advantage of the present moment to review the complexity of racial prejudice, remarking on its capacity to change, disguise and surface again in the imaginary of today's multiracial America. I have chosen the above fragment not only because racial relations have always been sensed as the inflammable heart of American democracy, a privileged field of anti-Americanism, but chiefly due to Douglass's emphasis put on the fact that racial prejudice was not the only enemy of American republicanism. In his time, Douglass warned his readers against the dissemination of racial prejudice in what today would appear as its "naturalized" components, merging into everyday habits, individual or collective experiences nurturing hostile racial differences. The overall picture of the social and cultural fundamentals underlying American democracy was not drawn by Douglass at that moment, or planned for the future, as eventually imagining a peaceful and decent existence of the black race amidst the white community. Quite on the contrary, he foresaw a 'perpetual war' ready to take its toll on social harmony, which points out to the solitude of the so-called 'enlightened man', imagined to be accountable for holding the appropriate answers regarding the tarrying dilemma of relations between whites and blacks.

The role of the "enlightened" man, as Douglass wrote, was invoked by all those who accused or deplored the intensity of racial conflicts, mainly black authors, but white ones, as well. So the more, in the period when the emancipation of the black community became effective, respectively in the second half of the 20-th century, racial prejudices have not disappeared in spite of the triumph of civil rights. Though the resources of the American democracy were definitely more dynamic and resilient in comparison with any other modern society, the emancipation of the victimized, the restoration of repressed, the reconstruction of the cultural memory have led to eventually newly-born forms of inequality among whites and blacks. The cherished hope that in postmodern times, racial prejudice will be effaced or be even forgotten due to the 'progress' of mentalities, because of the technological development, or due to the course

² The article was written in the summer of 2008.

of democratic policies and the novel amenities set by the consumerist society, was proven as utopian if not false.

In this respect, the unmasking of racial prejudice in the period following the victory of the civil rights movement found in Shelby Steele a genuine critical voice. Shelby Steele's essays collected so far in three volumes³, illustrate that putting into practice the concept of American citizenship was not effective beyond its constitutional provisions. Conceived as a sort of "coda" to the heroic period of the affirmation of civil rights, Steele's essays mirror that the cultural and economic pillars of the claimed equality among white and black did not bridge whites' and blacks' political ideals, and furthermore, the latter ones were not representative for all Americans.

Referring to the crucial period of the assertion of civil disobedience and of the right of association, Hannah Arendt noted that in the '60, in America, the two distinct forms of civil democratic practices were strongly tied to the country's liberal and republican past.⁴ Underlining the spiral of social turmoil which triggered the crisis of civic values in the postwar period, Arendt highlighted the dissolution of social trust, observing that at a given moment a significant party of citizens becomes aware that they were no longer equally represented. Civil disobedience set in America when the dialogue between citizens and authorities broke down, or when the legal norms were invalidated by faulting public practices. Leaving aside definitions given to civil disobedience and to the right of association, is it

³ *The Content of Our Character. A New Vision of Race in America*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990, *A Dream Deferred. The Second Betrayal of Black Freedom in America*, Harper Perennial, 1999, *White Guilt. How Blacks and Whites Together Destroyed the Promise of the Civil Rights Era*, Harper Collins Publishers, 2004. Shelby Steele is since 1994 a researcher at the Hoover Institute of the University of Stanford. He holds a Ph.D. in English literature (University of Utah), and he is a M.A. of the Southern Illinois University and a B.A. in political sciences (Coe College, Cedar Rapids, Iowa). He was awarded the National Book Critic's Circle in 1990 for *The Content of Our Character: A New Vision of Race in America*. Shelby Steele publishes currently in *The New York Times*, *The Wall Street Journal*, *Newsweek*, *Washington Post*. He is an editor of the *Harper's Magazine*. A recent publication of Shelby Steele features the Democratic candidate for the presidential race, Barack Obama.

⁴ Hannah Arendt, *Crizele republicii*, București: Humanitas, 1999, p. 89. (*Crises of the Republic*, A Harvest Book, Harcourt Brace, San Diego, New York, London, 1972). The text referred to was written in 1967.

worthwhile remarking that Arendt saw in the recurrent course of civil disobedience in the second part of the 20-th century, a non-violent response to alacrity with which the American society was changing. One remembers, for instance, the disparity between the intensity of the process of industrialization and the reaction of the transcendentalists, mostly of Henry David Thoreau's, the author who employed and put to test for the first time the notion of 'civil disobedience'. Later on, in the course of the 20-th century, it became clear that the conflict lied in cultural leveling, in restraining individual autonomy, in altering the traditional cast of mind, in the appearance of the multi-ethnic urban communities, later on racially divided and socially polarized.

Discussing the alacrity of change in respect to relations among whites and blacks, Arendt observed that segregation resisted alteration, being considered till late an irreplaceable, nonetheless tragic compromise. The doctrine of 'equal, but separated' attempted in vain to hide discrimination from the public eye, in spite of the global endeavors to denounce discrimination as a profoundly immoral social and cultural practice after WWII. The crisis of representing the non-white identity heightened the protest of the black community against the given social order. The example of the XIV-th amendment, of reactions and interpretations concerning its putting into practice underlined that the speed of change was obviously slackened in this particular instance due to the apprehension with which equality among races was regarded in America, which shows that the speed of change, as Arendt put it, had not happened with the same intensity in all sectors of American life, underlining deep cultural contradictions and eventually resistance to change. The content of the above mentioned amendment, the provisions of a certain number of local law courts and the birth of the civil right movement attested that it was civil disobedience which eventually brought to light America's dilemma (segregation), wrote Arendt.⁵ She emphasized that the way to conquer a different status of representation was for the blacks a way of opposing law, in a non-violent manner. Civil disobedience and the right of association safeguarded once more democratic ideals in America, sustained by the citizens' involvement into the public sphere, revealed the sharp contrast between citizens living in a democracy

⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 87.

(whereas acknowledging its imperfections), and the citizens of other political regimes other than democratic ones, especially those belonging to totalitarian states. Civil disobedience was regarded by Arendt as the most novel type of association in the history of American democracy, which determined the American historian and philosopher to value optimistically the future of American democracy.⁶

Three decades later, as the crisis of representation engulfed the whole American middle class, shattering the symbols of the American creed, Christopher Lasch did not believe any longer that there would be a successful sequel “story” to American democracy. The antagonistic relations set between the middle class and the new elites, surfacing at the beginning of the postwar period when political and cultural wars occurred on the stage of political representation, were seen by Lasch as caused by “a revolt of elites”.⁷ The postwar era brought along an abrupt cleavage between the traditional elites and the new managerial and intellectual ones, the latter depicting middle class America as being politically reactionary and morally repressive, permeated by petty bourgeois self-satisfaction, remaining after all provincial and backward.⁸ Hoisting the colors of multiculturalism, preferring to equate America with the image of a universal bazaar, and to cultivate the ethos of an international tourist, as Lasch put it, new elites have oriented their creative endeavors toward the assertion of an alternative culture.⁹ Borrowing Alvin Gouldner’s term, who saw in the new elites “the culture of the critical discourse”¹⁰, Lasch wondered whether the idea of civil community meant a thing for the American community, in the sense of cultivating civil respect, implicitly of defending the autonomy of each member of the civil community. Following the remarks of Alan Wolf, Lasch thought that moral obligation was misappropriated, meaning that the personal decision of each citizen turned to be ineffective, and instead, institutions and especially the state were the decisional factors intervening and restraining the role of the

⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 107.

⁷ Christopher Lasch, *La révolte des élites et la trahison de la démocratie*, Paris: Champs Flammarion, 1996 (*The Revolt of the Elites and the Betrayal of Democracy*, W.W.Norton Company, New York, 1995).

⁸ *Idem*, p. 17.

⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 32.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 46.

private sphere.¹¹ The repercussions of these developments were that the representation of the American society was flawed by an increasingly obvious rupture between the remains of a traditional civil ethos and a so-called “ideology of compassion” which was claimed to solve or at least to look for an outlet freeing the tensions between majority and minorities. The existence of two public morals, said Lasch, was a bad omen for the advancement toward a more inclusive status of freedom and equality in the postwar liberal democracy.

In the following, I want to address Shelby Steele’s criticism of the postwar liberal racial policies initiated in the ‘60s from two perspectives: a). the condition of a black author in present-day America and the rendering of alterations undergoing black identity. b). essay writing as means of focusing on conflicting issues inside the black community while avoiding specialized political and/or sociological analyses.

Steele did not lodge his criticism of the changes occurring in the racial relations in an ivory tower. Similarly, he did not couch his judgment on the black identity in a racially biased rhetoric. For him, the main task, as an author of essays attempting to capture the largest audience possible, was to reveal the precariousness of a civic ethos claimed to have been appropriated by blacks in the absence of an individual exertion of civic virtues. The present-day complexity of racial relations must be warded off from the ambiguities of political affiliations as of the power play of the radical discourse, says Steele. It is within the role of an author, or rather in his mirroring ‘conscience’ to deal with the contradictory aspects of American liberal democracy insofar black community is regarded, and furthermore to investigate the much acclaimed achievement of racial politics thought to have solved racial conflicts.

A post-existentialist echo may be detected in Steele’s wish to account for the “lived” period which followed the 60’s, a time for civic engagement, of testing the community’s ideals, and a period of political disappointment while keeping abreast with the alacrity of the change, as Hannah Arendt would have said. Steele believed that for an author the experience of a “solitary” yet “solidary” life would keep clear from ideological rendering of all aspects of racial difference, mostly of those ‘forgotten’ to be accounted for. Steele is of the mind that moral reflection

¹¹ *Ibidem*, pp. 110-111.

based on personal experience may eschew ideological pitfalls. He looks skeptical at the possibility of achieving the unity of black community, whereas relying on the remembrance of the past, or, on the contrary, by extolling the enthusiastic promises of a postponed future and expunging in change the 'burden' of black history. Intuition of the power play going on at the heart of representing the status of the black community, or even fearing a 'betrayal' of the community's ideals, as Steele says, magnifies suspicion and disillusionment on the side of the average black American devoid of his/her own possibility of assessing for the actual forms of democratic life. Essay writing gains for Steele an experiential touch in that it matches everyday events with a necessary personal (and subjective) interpretation of what may be called the 'everyday' reality. In writing the author defines himself as *person and witness* describing the present condition of the post-liberal American society and of a 'newly-fashioned' black community, in comparison with the interwar one. It is relevant to note that for Steele, memory and forgetfulness shaping the identity of a member of the black community is enmeshed in the historical recent developments of American democracy, especially in its postwar period. Therefore, being a black American should be accounted for as a crucially relevant element of the content of American citizenship, since equality was claimed to have won over exclusion. Though reality may be found opposite to stating a complete victory of civil equality, Steele distances himself the viewpoint according to which racial identity automatically creates a fixed cultural and political affiliation, and that authors should build in their writing a racial persona.

"In the writing, I have had both to remember and forget that I am black. The forgetting was to see the human universals within the memory of the racial specifics. One of the least noted in this era when racial, ethnic and gender differences are often embraced as sacred is that being black in no way spares one from being human."¹²

Without catching a 'leading' tune other than of his experience as a former activist for civil rights and of a journalist, Steele remained distrustful of any calls attuned to race ideology. It is within the mettle of such an individual stand, as well as in its sometimes risky attitudes, rather

¹² Shelby Steele, *The Content of Our Character: A New Vision of Race in America*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990, p. ix.

than in sustaining ready-made “objective” formulas, that one seizes the hidden facets of the present-day racial conflict. The so-called scientific policies through which the identity of the black community was reshaped after the ‘60s, respectively the construction of such concepts as “multiculturalism” and “diversity”, are in Steele’s view examples of moral escapism, which besides attesting for social manipulation, diminish the role of minorities to that of perpetual victims. “Salvationist” liberalism, as Steele nicknamed the above mentioned policies, set up by the white society to actually defend its own interests, cannot build up the virtues of the emancipated black Americans. The latter ones need to unroll the map of their own developing vision, improving the understanding of emancipation, equality and freedom under the circumstances of consumerism, so that neither government officials, nor the leadership of the black community should find out loopholes to interfere. In this sense, Steele rejects the opinions of certain radical intellectuals, as for instance of Cornel West’s, concerning the role of the ideology of race in the rendering of black identity.¹³

Essay writing is for Steele the very place from where an author can denounce the bureaucratization of the debate on democracy, implicitly on racial relations. The author’s task consists after Steele, in revealing the manipulative political scenarios, and to resume the debate on civil participation and the consolidation of the ideas of republicanism. The question of the individual’s moral autonomy is obstinately reiterated, envisaging the individual’s capacity to get behind the rhetoric of emancipation, to become aware of the connections binding the interests of those at power and of the black leadership. Seen from this angle, Steele’s essays echo Frederick Douglass’s apprehension regarding the religious prejudice and its influences on the civic republican behavior. For Steele, American citizens, regardless of their color, may distinguish between the role of religion as a traditional foundation for the freedom of belief and religiousness which diffusely, yet efficiently has pervaded the public sphere, subverting the American creed. Reminding his readers that racial consciousness is a sphere made by beliefs which can quickly turn into clichés, unless critical examination of cultural developments regarding both races is not seriously undertaken, Steele intends to encode the surprising

¹³ *A Dream Defferred*, *op.cit.*, p. 65.

diversity of discrimination, and at the same time, its “discretion”. Due to his biography and to his vocation of an author who found himself time and again in the midst of racial confrontations, Steele is convinced that through his writing he filters “truth” from what he calls “the choreography” of the racial discourse. He thinks that before seeking victims and victimizers one should attempt to build a ground for a cultural knowing of both parties.¹⁴

The advantage of the essay form enabled the author to cover easily a large area of problematic topics, not losing from sight the rapid metamorphoses of present day black identity. The inner order of the essays is given by a narrative thread, evoking the great tradition of the autobiography in black writing, relating narrated events with a personal point of view, refuting cabinet theories about race. Assuming the part of an observer of the American race reality, Steele rediscovers the intricacy of racial conflict, raising it from under the cover of banality, demonstrating how ‘common’ it may appear: always amendable, never reaching a satisfying definitive solutions, remaining thus in a paradoxical way, linked to a kind of racial conflicting ‘normalcy’. Steele points to the discrepancy of attitudes, of entrenched political options among those who support the idea that emancipation of the black community has succeeded, the black radical groups who strongly deny the much desired result of emancipation, and those relatively few who realize that the identity of the black man depends on the moment’s solutions rather than on far reaching social and cultural vistas. Thinking that blacks’ emancipation in the ‘60s and afterwards was determined by an accidental political context, Steele brings into comparison the memory of slavery and/or segregation which strongly indented the imaginary of the black community and the present-day positive discrimination, ascertaining the vulnerability of black identity seen as against the white one. When for the blacks there was no “reusable past”, as James Baldwin was upholding in the ‘60s, the black American seemed to be destined to have but the legitimacy given by color and of the affiliation to a racial past. Steele succeeds in ferreting out the aggressiveness of racial stereotypes, pointing to their untamed persuasive force in resentments, avenging prophecies or the rewards of a superficial, if not frivolous

¹⁴ *The Content of Our Character. A New Vision of Race in America*, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990, p. ix.

conciliation between whites and blacks, in the absence of recognizing guilt and the necessity of critical perspectives.

In this light, Steele's essays experiment the limits of the discourse on race and racial identity. The author wonders whether the identity of the black individual may still be perceived as that of a free man. Steele does not want to find out who is more entitled to fight against discrimination at the beginning of a new millennium, or if this mission would be entitled only to a certain part of the American society, groups or persons. Admitting that there is no one to carry out this task without the involvement of the others, Steele presupposes that each member of the American society should enjoy the liberty of expressing such an attitude, or otherwise to become aware of the danger of transforming racist outbursts into a chronic ailment of American democracy. Seeking for a moral point of view which is devoid of didacticism, he brings to the fore certain sensitive areas encompassing both the private and the public spheres, where the struggle against discrimination has become particularly acute: education and its reform, black family and its unity, professional promoting, political careers and activism. Steele shows that these areas encompass additional difficulties for the black American, or they could be viewed as closed roads for blacks in their becoming equal citizens to white Americans. Racial prejudice continues to restrain the autonomy of the black community and the individual's identity by interlocking racial relations to the presence of the stigma, and to what the author names "white supremacy".¹⁵

"In the late 1960's, without much public debate but with many good intentions, the United States embarked on one of the most dramatic social experiments in history. The federal government, radically and officially, began to later and expand the concept of entitlement. Rights to justice and to government benefits were henceforth to be extended not simply to individuals but also to racial, ethnic and other groups. Moreover, the essential basis of all entitlement in America – the guaranteed of the Constitution – had apparently been found wanting ; there was to be redress

¹⁵ Zygmunt Bauman, *Etica postmodernă*, Timișoara: Editura Amarcord, 2000, pp. 212-217 (*Postmodern Ethics*, Blackwell Publishers, 1995). Bauman claims that getting out of the crisis of the fragmented ego is but apparently solved by placing individuals under the banners of "collective causes", since the latter ones cannot do otherwise but "collectivize" the individuals' fragmentation.

and reparation of the past grievances, and the Constitution had nothing to say about that.”¹⁶

Shelby Steele was perceived after the publication of his first volume of essays, *The Content of Our Character: A New Vision of Race in America*, as a new name in the camp of black conservative authors. The label of “conservative” was not completely assumed by the author, but it was not wholly rejected either. Rather, it was taken as a pretext justifying the ironical or polemical tone with which Steele examined the changes occurring inside the black identity in the postwar era, named “the era of the affirmative action” and of the “culture of preference”. Steele considered later that the reputation of a black conservative gained due to his persevering research and writing, was in itself a topic worth reflecting on, as far as new political conjectures helped him to clarify the perception of racial relations. Being catalogued as a conservative, a tag which separated the author from the majority of black authors and intellectuals as a kind of “scarlet letter”, signaled his position as a dissident among members of the black community.

„To be called a black conservative is, in fact, to be one, or at least to pay the price for being one. Besides, my life has been varied enough, that I can bow lay reasonable claim to many black identities, black conservative among them. [...] I realized finally, that I was a black conservative when I found myself standing on stages being shamed in public. I had written a book that said, among many other things, that black American leaders were practicing a politics that drew the group into a victim-focused racial identity that, in turn stifled black advancement more than racism itself did. For reasons that I will discuss shortly, this was heresy in many quarters.”¹⁷

The “heresy” of being a conservative and at the same time an African-American, or more simply said, a black American, as Steele underlined, was a refusal to accept the leveling of the political options, an attempt to single out the need of autonomy inside the black community, least but not last, an appeal to stand against salon radicalism or the chic activism of many of the intellectuals, black or white. Under the circumstances, when asserting black identity seemed to be definitely bound

¹⁶ Shelby Steele, *A Dream Deferred. The Second Betrayal of Black Freedom in America*, op.cit., p. 169.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, pp. 3-4.

to radical groups, Steele was not seduced by the sirens of the radical rhetoric. By dispelling the influence of the ideology of race, he did not do it to the detriment of the historical inheritance of the segregation period, as he did not omit to show that the development of the American society after WWII provided for different options for a great number of blacks, while these ones found themselves well-off inside the American middle class, sharing the liberal-conservative values of the American creed. Starting from the fact the term "African-American" was considered by Steele an artificial one, and that its use did not match the expected restoring or rescuing operation for the black identity, and going to the non-conformist if not shocking statements regarding the negative consequences of the affirmative action, the author described the appearance of new forms of inequality which enhanced at their turn the inferior status of blacks, hardly masked in the policies of preferential rights.

The "sin" of being a conservative in a sea of blacks who regard themselves as liberals or even radicals, was therefore "recognized", but only as a pretext to re-launch the debate about the acuteness of racial discrimination. The purpose of Steele's essays is clearly explained in the unmasking of the socio-cultural engineering by which the black identity was confiscated and reconstructed with the help of the postwar liberal policies, under the banner of emancipation. Steele does not forget to observe the discretionary manner in which the process was initiated and lead by government officials, later on sustained by black liberal circles. Measures taken for the implementation of equality did not cover but partially the demands voiced in the 1960s by Martin Luther King. One may perceive even more clearly Steele's critical intentions, as they describe the successful attempts of the American authorities in the '60s to enforce into the black community a *psychology of change*, as it were, instead of working out for premises engaging an authentic transformation of the condition the black people. In a volume dedicated exclusively to 'white guilt' and to what Steele saw as the condemnable distancing from the civil rights spirit (*White Guilt. How Blacks and Whites Together Destroyed the Promise of the Civil Rights Era*), the accent falls almost exclusively on the feeling of guilt of the white society, thought by the author of having been the cause which generated and instrumented the program of preferential right imposed on American blacks.

„Paradoxically, the black identity today involves a degree of nostalgia for some of the certainties that were the unintended consequences of racial oppression - the security of an enforced group identity, the fellow feeling of a shared fate, the comfort of an imposed brotherhood and sisterhood, the idea of an atavistic, God-given group destiny. But freedom has disrupted all this. As fervently as black America always longed for freedom – envisioning it as God’s promised land - the actual experience of freedom has involved a sense of loss.[...] Freedom can be seized only by individuals. And the fact is that we blacks are free.“¹⁸

How could a black American become the partisan of conservative ideals? The example set by Shelby Steele indicates not only his refusal to walk into the footsteps of collectivistic policies, but also that conservative options loomed larger for the black community once postwar liberalism slipped dangerously toward social democracy, by planning racial identity and by engineering the use of the civil rights¹⁹. Under the umbrella of “revolutionary” claims, whose towering repercussions were mirrored in the media, enthusiastic adhesions of transforming the black community’s status, hardly hiding collectivistic perspectives, as Steele thinks, have grown into instruments of control, or of moral pressure on black individuals, attesting the dirigisme of the protest, as well as the attempt to shape unanimity inside black community. The newly-born conformism which forced the black American to listen to the voice of a “collective” conscience, still dependent on the authority of the white society, otherwise condemned for its integrationist tentacles, was the factor which made Steele grow suspicious of the righteousness of transforming black identity. Steele joined other black conservatives such as Thomas Sowell, Clarence Thomas (the ex-president of the Supreme Court), Walter Williams, Robert Woodson, Stephen Carter, Glen Loury in condemning the flimsiness of the cultural policies and their counter effects after the 1960’s. The early pro-conservative positions taken by Steele soon solidified into a conservative viewpoint.

“Global racism prevails precisely where whites and institutions most aggressively search for moral authority around race. Even

¹⁸ *White Guilt. How Blacks and Whites Together Destroyed the Promise of the Civil Rights Era*, Harper: Collins Publishers, 2004, pp. 25-26.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 13-14

announcements of a new commitment to 'diversity' within an institution will very likely increase feelings of racial aggrievement in minorities. We blacks always experience white guilt as an incentive, almost a command, to somehow exhibit racial woundedness and animus."²⁰

During the stormy interval of cultural wars which was the benchmark of Steele's coming to public fame, a great number of questions remained unanswered. Mentioning a few of them, I want to point out that they create a space of moral interrogation over current issues splitting and riveting at the same time the racial frame of mind in present day United States. Some of them resound even farther than within the borders of the American world, due to their piercing sincerity, addressing the question of rights in late modernity. How would one account for the fact that "global" racism is caused by the 'whites' guilt? What are the public institutions or outlets channeling such a behavior? What is the present-day emphasis laid on the values of the American creed? Is there a religious dimension attached to them? Are they eventually differently interpreted by American liberals, communitarians and conservatives? Is emancipation a long term process which fares under the aegis of the American creed or against it? Why should one agree that the reflector of the public opinion must fall back on the period before the affirmative action, as Steele thinks? Such questions were brought to the readers' attention by Steele himself, to shed light on the *quid-pro-quo's* of the positive discrimination, and to examine the performances of the leadership of the black community in recent decades. One won't find immediate solutions to the issues raised by the author himself, mainly because the questions addressed intend to measure the impasses of a cultural reform. Steele did want to cast doubt only on the much acclaimed success of the positive discrimination, but also to launch accusations against the consequences of the preferential culture, and thus redefine from a black American conservative viewpoint the moral and civil obligations of the individual in present-day America. Steele believed that such questions strewn in the structure of the essay enhance civic responsibility.

Foucault's definition of the concept of author and authoriality could be relevant to perceive Steele's criticism. It is known that for Foucault the author is an "ideological" figure who plays a major role in regulating the

²⁰ *Ibidem.*, p. 39.

dissemination of meaning within a given society. Foucault detailed that the premises of this regulation would not last for ever the same ones, that they might undergo changes, keeping nevertheless a “constraining system” which “should to be determined and experimented”, even if eventually the “author-function” would no longer be in use.²¹ The connection between the “constraining system” and the author, in this case, Shelby Steele, is worth examining as it underlines the testimonial quality of an author who defied an established consensus about equality and emancipation achieved in the black community by the triumph of postwar liberal policies. The result of the latter ones was contrary to the very idea of emancipation, writes Steele, leading to the relativisation of civil virtues.

It is high time, therefore, one knew whether nowadays the conflicting identity of blacks comprised in W.E.B. Du Bois’s notion of ‘twonness’, could be thought as having been outmoded by recent transformations. In other words, it is important to account for the manner in which the black individual succeeds in being simultaneously a citizen of the liberal democratic republic and a member of a racial minority, still exposed, after Steele, to many forms of segregation. As the matter was traditionally raised by black authors and/or intellectuals, it seems almost natural to know whether today authors and/or intellectuals of the black community could launch themselves in defining black identity, as Washington T. Booker and W.E.B. Du Bois had done. Though Steele may well be regarded as having many of the accomplishments needed to be accounted for as a representative black intellectual or author, yet far from reaching to the daunting stature of his two legendary predecessors, he refuses to be viewed as an ‘intellectual’, shying away from this term, at least till now.

It is rather explainable why Shelby Steele or other remarkable American essayists avoided the tag of ‘intellectual’, which a century ago was shining glamorously in the public sphere, mostly according to elitist ring. Today, the status of the public intellectual became undermined by a host of suspicions. Among them, probably the most consistent one is the aura of superiority provided by the tradition of the Victorian intellectual. Actually, the nowadays intellectual has abandoned the center of the

²¹ See *Ce este un autor. Studii și conferințe*, Cluj: Idea Design and Print, 2004, pp. 53-54 (Romanian edition and selection of *Dits et Ecrits*, Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1994).

society, drifting toward a less conspicuous public places. He/she does not vaunt any longer as holding a creative visionary "essence", preferring to be recognized under the variegated nuances of activism. Regarding intellectuals as "exceptions of the margin", S.M. Lipset deplored the spreading of a wave of moralization, as a warranting clause evincing the author's fidelity to the cultural and racial identity of the community.²² Far from the Emerson's tradition, or from Dewey's optimism, the actual building and development of an intellectual under the auspices of the society of consumption may consist probably mainly in watching his/her fighting in the arena of ideological and gladiatorial spectacles.

Remarking that the Americans have grown obsessively preoccupied with their ethnic, religious and sexual identity, Tod Gitlin deplored the major upheaval caused by the attacks against tradition driven by of the supporters of the "difference".²³ He mentioned that the sphere of education had turned in the '60s into a battlefield where impressive struggles were waged to unmask power within every type of intellectual and artistic representation, as well as to enforce the idea that the white culture should be deemed as the source of the 'white supremacy', its canon being seen since its constituting oppressive and colonizing as to other cultures. Frederic Jameson upheld on his part the new role attributed to ideology, as a form of knowing and action against the so-called "theorists of the market"²⁴, by which he meant the supporters of the cultural leveling in the consumerist society. Sharing with Jurgen Habermas, an outstanding German philosopher, the belief that Enlightenment had not been accomplished yet in its ultimate humanistic projections, Jameson sought in the present-day metamorphoses of representation of identity for an alteration which could allow the passing toward a so-called 'return of the look' from the Other, legitimizing the discourse of difference in order to make more obvious the "colonizing" of minorities.²⁵ Reaching public attention from the other side of the ideological specter, Alan Bloom's

²² Martin Seymour Lipset, *American Exceptionalism. A Double-Edged Sword*, New York, London: W.W. Norton and Company, 1996, pp. 176-177.

²³ Todd Gitlin, "The Cant of Identity", in Daphne Patai and Will H. Corral (eds.) *Theory's Empire. An Anthology of Dissent*, New York: Columbia Press University, 2005, pp. 401-402.

²⁴ Fredric Jameson, *The Cultural Turn. Selected Writings on the Postmodern, 1983-1998*, London, New York: Verso, 1998, pp. 68-72.

²⁵ *Ibidem*, pp. 104-105.

criticism of the postwar liberal policies inquired into the fundamentals of the American liberalism, pointing out to their being distorted by the illusion of the ideological “change”, namely is by asserting a dogmatic radicalism whose main aim was to atomize the body of the majority into an archipelago of minority groups. Bloom sustains that confounding the nature of identity with racial prejudice gave birth to a new wave of conformism imperiling the cultural inheritance of tradition.²⁶

Emphasizing the role of radicalism in the assertion of black culture, Cornel West considered that the main weight of the intellectual consists in a “dialoguing experience”.²⁷ West accentuated that the true debate on race began only in the postmodern period, in the times expressing ‘fear’ for future, in the era of relativism and of the apprehensions to override it, a fact which dramatically influenced the black community’s outlets for a real economic, social and cultural development, by raising barriers against it, which in the 1960’s had have been thought as unthinkable.²⁸ Looking at the modern Western discourse as the being the hinterland of “white supremacy”, West applauded the “critical subculture” brought along by postmodern times, heightening the liberal discourse in a sort of “democratic libertarianism”, a salutary move to keep democracy clear from the bureaucratization of consumerist society.²⁹ The black philosopher wondered about the connection between the “moral content” of different identities and the political consequences branching out from it, speaking about the need to redefine liberal and democratic virtues, sketching thus a blueprint for a possible post-relativist humanism.

Against this diverse and contradictory background, Shelby Steele’s contribution to the criticism of post-liberal policies upholds the idea that a socio-cultural inquiry of present-day America should reconstruct the profile of the black identity, without falling into trap of “presentism” (the tendency to assess the innovations of the past through the standards of the present times). Such a perception illuminates the need to reassess the place

²⁶ Allan Bloom, *The Closing of the American Mind. How Higher Education Has Failed Democracy and Impoverished the Souls of the Today’s Students*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987, pp. 28-35.

²⁷ Cornel West, *The Cornel West Reader*, Basic Civitas Books, 1999, p. viii.

²⁸ *Ibidem*, pp. 67-69.

²⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 138.

of civic virtue today's American society, pinpointing especially the mistakes of the black leadership after the tragic death of Martin Luther King. Steele condemns the methods by which the black individual was incorporated into a collectivistic type of identity, falling under a sort of a unique 'will' to act, under the command of a group representing majority. In this way, emancipation of the American blacks was misappropriated by certain circles of power wishing to gain recognition by drawing public attention through protests campaigns. Once the personality of Martin Luther King was no longer considered as a symbol of black unity, the moral sense of the emancipation was liable to corruption, considers Steele. The idealism of emancipation was replaced by lucrative pragmatic methods, which did not have much in common with the development of the black community, merging later on with the social engineering of the "Great Society" program.

The failure of the post-liberal policies lies after Steele in the confusing interpretation of the idea of emancipation, namely in what the author names "the development" of the black community. The civilisational discrepancy existing for centuries between whites and blacks was put into bold relief by the conjectures of the Cold War, providing for the political occasion of eventually bringing the black cause to national attention, but it was not continued by further specific implementations. The civil rights movement was not grounded into a deeper and more comprehensive trend which could unravel on one side the cultural differences existing between the two communities, providing on the other hand the construction of cultural standards on which the idea of equality should have been concretized in the public sphere, and not contained only into the system of education. Trying to explain the causes of the above mentioned failure, Steele does not bring to the fore only the superficial reformism of Lyndon B. Johnson's administration, but also the psychological "pattern" of the black community shaped by the nature of racial relations in the course of time. Being receptive to the comeback of ethno-psychological theories in the reconstruction of the American cultural canon, Steele sought for a cultural invariant of the black identity, which he found in the psychology of the racial group.

It is not within the intention of this article to refer to the reasons backing up the belief that ethno-psychological theories might explain and

solve racial conflicts, but I should notice that while dealing with the notion of *character*, Steele relies also on conservative tenets. He presupposes that character expresses in an organic form both the individual and his community, symbolizing natural essence, a spontaneous manifestation of 'interiority' as opposed to the hostility of social milieu, including the course of a moral evolution against the datum of historical experience. However, touching lightly on the notion of character, not daring to venture farther into establishing whether it is character or social complexity which gives the imprint of 'cultural and social behavior' for the individual and community, Steele believes that character is 'revealing' for the perception of the cultural transformations of black identity.

Therefore, Steele is of the mind that the salutary moment of conquering the equality and the freedom to emancipate was wasted on petty conciliatory strategies, paradoxically in the very moment when the civil rights triumphed. Noticing that forgetting the past of slavery and segregation was an ancient desire of white America, Steele noticed that it came into fruition with the help of the black liberal circles interested in maintaining the imagery of the blacks' victimization as a political instrument of control of the community. The effect of such a strategy, compared by Steele with a socialist one, was the fact that segregation continued not only by positive discrimination, but also by constraining blacks to adhere to a collectivistic "ideology". The psychology of the change promoted from top to down by the policies of affirmative action inflicted an increasing vulnerability to the already enfeebled black identity. The black ego was fractured, writes Steele, creating a sort of "anti-ego", accentuating the already popular image that black people cannot succeed but by being assisted by whites. Lacking in their own developing strategies, remembering always that they were a community on which racial experiments had been enforced in the course of the 20-th century, the black failed to assert their own perspectives on emancipation. *Character* is therefore not a new theme in debating the weaknesses in the achievements of the civil right movement, as well as in the conservative philosophy professed by the author. Yet more than the metaphysical entity of the character attributed to the individual or the community, Steele envisages a complex evolution of the cultural behavior resulted from the repression undergone by blacks until the second half of the past century. Nonetheless,

to pretend that race gives birth to character, means to abandon the whole debate over the complex issues of the present-day black identity to the simplistic racist theories of the 19-th century. Steele does not share Du Bois's thesis concerning the existence of an unsurpassable, unchangeable ethnic reality:

„Work, culture, liberty, - all these we need, not singly but together, not successively but together, each growing and aiding each, and all striving toward the vaster ideal that swims before the Negro people, the ideal of human brotherhood, gained through the unifying ideal of the Race.”³⁰

When asking himself about conceptualizing the idea of race, Du Bois wrote that though race had been the matter to which he had dedicated his entire career, it was difficult for him to think of race under categorical terms, given its irrational components underlying “contradictory tendencies, facts, forces”³¹. Writing about the character of a community, Du Bois wanted to uphold the necessity of a civilizational development within the modern experiences of a given community, and more specifically, an organic expression of a “national black unity”, whose possible model he had found in the Japanese society. It was there that he remarked the existence of a national genius, spirit and art³². Nevertheless, for Steele race and character are not regarded as strictly intertwined.

“Elsewhere I have called this ‘race fatigue’, an almost existential weariness with things racial, not because you don’t care, but because the racial identity you are pressured to squeeze into is a mask you wear only out of calculation. This mask is untethered from your real life so that, over time, it draws you into a corrupting falseness – and an inner duplicity – that grows more and more rigid with the years. Ultimately it affects the integrity of our personality. You have to start living off rationalizations and falsehoods that a part of you knows to be false”³³.

³⁰ Du Bois, W.E.B., *op.cit.*, p. 370.

³¹ *Idem*, *Dusk of Dawn. An Essay Toward an Autobiography of the Race Concept*, in *Writings*, *op.cit.*, p. 651.

³² *Idem*, „*The Conservation of Races*”, in *Writings*, *op.cit.*, p. 829.

³³ Steele Shelby, *White Guilt*, *op. cit.*, p. 172.

Writing that the struggle of the American black was oriented toward the conquering of the condition of a fully fledged humanity³⁴, Steele dismissed the idea that the civil rights movement was oriented to get hold of the political power *per se* or to set the path war toward the constituting of racial enclaves inside modern America. At the same time, Steele acknowledged the peril of opportunism in racial activism, or in the intermittent calls to redefine black identity, according to which individuals were summoned to partake the strengthening of the traditional cultural bonds. Yet, one cannot overlook that blacks succeeded in tayloring their professional careers in the consumerist society, in spite of their being black, which might have made them reconsider the example of former generations. The position adopted by Steele does not simply encourage a nostalgic view to the essentialist nature of the character. The author wants to render his readers aware of the black people's shock of integration which cannot be measured but on strictly subjective reasons, as the transformations of identity manifest themselves ultimately at the level of individuals³⁵. But, since one reiterates the existence of a line of color, distinct but no separated from the rest of the American society, the integration shock caused after Steele new forms of discrimination by putting into practice an unexpected scale of life opportunities, estranging work, education, social status and chiefly social trust from the formally claimed and professed values. The importance of social trust was under the circumstances grossly underrated, or simply neglected. Implying that the past of slavery still influences the imaginary of the black community, Steele shows that apparently it is more comfortable to rally oneself to the reform of the identity, accepting for instance the appellative of African-American, than to discipline racial identity by civic standards.³⁶

“As a middle-class black I have often felt myself contriving to be ‘black’. And I have noticed the same contrivance in others – a certain stretching away from the natural flow of one’s life to align oneself with a victim-focused black identity. Our particular needs are out the sync with the form of identity available to meet these needs. Middle class blacks need to identify racially. It is better to think of ourselves as black and victimized

³⁴ *Ibidem*.

³⁵ *Ibidem*.

³⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 23.

than not black at all : so we contrive into an identity that denies our class and fails to address the true source of our vulnerability".³⁷

The "white" guilt which generated affirmative action transferred blacks into an experimental racial community, says Steele, refusing the "visibility" of its individuals, and accordingly denying their options. Steele sees in the "white" guilt and in the instituting of a preferential culture not only the white society's paternalism and the void of authority in American society. The restoration of the American democratic traditional values, of individualism and of the American creed are seen as warranting the possibility of leaving behind the crisis of relativism and the practice of inculcating race ideology as the crucial foundation of the black identity. Unfortunately, observes Steele, the majority of blacks preferred to be drummed in by the tune of collectivistic rights, wherefrom the position of a conservative should envisioned as one belonging to the spirit of "vanguard". But such a choice implies exposure to open condemnation. Nevertheless, the author's attitudes continued to point to the wrong directions affirmative action moved into, spelling out victimization as an accepted cultural genealogical reason for being a black, as it is remarked in *A Dream Defferred. The Second Betrayal of Black Freedom in America*.

"Very simply then, a black conservative is a black who dissents from the victimization explanation of black fate, when it is offered as totalism – when it is made the main theme of group identity and the *raison d'être* of a group politics.[...] It leads us to believe that all suffering is victimization and that all relief comes from the guilty good-heartedness of others.[...]When black group authority covers up these other causes of suffering jus so whites will feel more responsible – and stay on the hook then that authority actually encourages helplessness in its own people so that might be helped by the whites. It tries to make black weakness profitable by selling it as the white man's burden."³⁸

The American blacks have failed in freeing themselves from the practices of segregation, continuing to depend on decisional factors ultimately denying the values and beliefs founding their personality. Steele's pleading for the values of the conservative individualism, growing

³⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 106.

³⁸ Shelby Steele, *A Dream Defferred. The Second Betrayal of Black Freedom in America*, Harper: Perrenial, 1998, pp. 10-11.

frail under the impact of collectivistic policies, is grounded on the idea that each individual should exert his/her own power of judgment in the life of the community, since the "enlightened man" could and should be expected to speak through the voice of every citizen. Casting doubt on the utopia of certain projects in which the whites and the blacks are pictured as being able to overrun the cleavage between the victim and the victimizer, Steele sounds skeptical in respect to a possible real conciliation among blacks and whites, though he does not either support the continuity of the conflict. In this sense, Du Bois's prophetic words fleshing difference in color are as revealing as in the past.

„The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color-line, - the relation of the darker to the lighter races of men in Asia and Africa, in America and the islands of the sea.”³⁹

The experience of "feeling" that someone is "a problem", as W.E.B. Du Bois unforgettably defined the human condition of the black at the beginning of the 20-th century, proves that the Afro-American is nowadays chained to the uncertain memory of the past, exposed to the social-cultural experiments of finding a 'new' identity. To be black does not mean for Steele to be boxed as in a problematic compartment, a subject to social engineering or to psycho-cultural therapies, but to express the complexity of a real human being by a toning down of the differences⁴⁰, which might preserve the significance of a separated culture. Blackness means for Steele the opportunity to speak about human condition within change, the vulnerability of the 'other', especially when activism could bring radicals to final separatist options. Du Bois wrote:

“...to attain self-conscious manhood, to merge his double self into a better and truer self. In this merging he wishes neither of the older selves to be lost. He would not Africanize America, for America has too much teach the world and Africa. He would not bleach his Negro soul in a flood of white Americanism, for he knows that Negro blood has a message for the world. He simply wishes to make it possible for a man to be both a Negro and an American, without being cursed and spit upon by his fellows, without having the doors of Opportunity closed roughly in his face.”⁴¹

³⁹ W.E.B. Du Bois, *op.cit.*, p. 372.

⁴⁰ Shelby Steele, *The Content of Our Character, op.cit.*, p. ix.

⁴¹ W.E.B. Du Bois, *op. cit.*, p. 365.

The reality of social exclusion fomenting racial anxiety in nowadays America is so the more paradoxical as segregation and its practices have long been deemed to be part of a blamed past. Yet, as Shelby Steele notes, if racial prejudice does not raise ghettos, it marginalizes and antagonizes black people, separating political reformism from its moral basis. The freedom of the individual is posed as the determining condition of achieving equality in a republic where different ethnic communities participate to the representation of the citizenship as politically and culturally qualitative difference for other political regimes. Becoming aware of the discrepancies between democratic ideals and their being put into life, Steele believes that a sense of moral obligation should restore the condition of the repressed or marginalized by the invisible force of racial prejudice, even if the imperious call to observe such an obligation cannot come from outside the sphere of the political. Political life is portrayed as the cornerstone of the cultural metamorphoses in a society in which racial conflicts could flare up, in spite of the historical changes brought along by the civil rights movement. The black, seen as both an American and an individual is for Shelby Steele still *problematic*.

It is important to remark that the exploiting the memory of the repression has magnified racial antagonism, emphasizing the price of the so-called 'inversion' regarding racial prejudice. The memories of the past and its ensuing vulnerability are reconfigured in racial 'invulnerability' or racial pride which ascertains the cohesiveness of the community.⁴² Which makes Steele conclude that the black individual is still dependent on racism as a form of identity.⁴³ The semantic sphere of what Du Bois named the 'color line' has set the invisible frontier which maps the American world differently from the outset of the past century, true, preserving nevertheless the boundaries of race. Many authors have accepted that racial attitudes, beliefs and prejudices remained unchanged with the advent of postmodernism, but a great many noted the fact that the idea of race is undergoing a change, asking themselves whether globalization has not altered yet the content of race. Among these authors, Arjun Appadurai wrote:

⁴² *Ibidem*, p. 159.

⁴³ *Ibidem*, p. 163.

“The link between the imagination and social life, I would suggest, is increasingly global and deterritorialized one. Thus those who represent real or ordinary life must resist claims to epistemic privilege in regard to the lived particularities of social life. Rather, ethnography must redefine itself as the practice of representation that illuminates the power of large-scale, imagined life possibilities over specific line trajectories.”⁴⁴

If the tradition of the Enlightenment autonomy was targeted by activists militating for equality of rights and cultural patterns, respectively for the emancipation of individuals from under the authority of a single tradition and philosophy of action, the result was the ‘deconstruction of the American creed’⁴⁵, undermining the overall legitimacy of the American citizenship. Underlining the failure of the Enlightenment project and its repercussions for present-day civic virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre accused the managerial, therapeutic and aesthetic components of the postmodern American society⁴⁶. Hilary Putnam showed that considering individuals as ‘autonomous agents’, construes the claim that we should agree with their rights to choose their own standards and that the government should not mingle in their individual choices by imposing patterns of morality⁴⁷. The attempt to answer the dilemma of moral autonomy determines liberty, seen as a reachable option to every American to be understood as a ‘philosophy’, and not as *the* philosophy underlying the types of activism asserting cultural polycentrism, attempting to configure the ethos of each community in the name of justice⁴⁸. Steele remarks that in this way a forms of power is substituted by another, and the principality of the civil rights movement is no longer sought for in the age of ethnic activism.

⁴⁴ Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity at Large. Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*, Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press, 1996, p. 55.

⁴⁵ Samuel Huntington, *Cine suntem? Provocările la adresa identității naționale americane*, București: Antet, 2006, pp. 124-128 (Original version, *Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004).

⁴⁶ Alasdair MacIntyre, *Tratat de morală. După virtute*, București: Humanitas, 1998, *op. cit.*, p. 93 (*After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory*, Notre Dame University Press, 1985).

⁴⁷ Hilary Putnam, *Rațiune, adevăr și istorie*, București: Editura Tehnică, 2005, pp. 193-194 (Original version, *Reason, Truth and History*, Cambridge: Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, Cb2 1RP, UK., 1981).

⁴⁸ Shelby Steele, *White Guilt How Blacks and Whites Together Destroyed the Promise of the Civil Rights Era*, *op.cit.*, pp. 35-36.

“A fact that has escaped notice in the decades since the civil rights victories is that, after those victories, racism has become a bifurcated phenomenon in America, so that we have been left with two kinds of racism. The first is the garden-variety racial bigotry that America has, sadly, always known – the source of racial oppression and discrimination. But the new and second kind of racism is what might be called globalized racism. This is racism inflated into a deterministic, structural and, systemic power. Global racism seeks to make every racist event the tip of an iceberg so that redress will be to the measure of the iceberg rather than to the measure of its tip. It is a reconceptualization of racism designed to capture the fruit of the new and vast need in white America for moral authority in racial matters. True or not, global racism can have no political viability without white guilt. What makes it viable is not its truth but the profound moral need that emerged in the mid-sixties white America.”⁴⁹

Steele’s predictions on the course of racial relations in America reflect the alterations caused by the appearance of a ‘new consciousness’ purporting the symptoms of the crisis of traditional values⁵⁰. The author remarks that if the ‘color line’ had stood before as distinctive symbol for black identity, coalescing chiefly radical voices. Racial barriers have become nowadays less porous, allowing for a less strict assertion of the racial affiliation. Nevertheless, state interventionism drove black individuals into the situation of being responsible of their own social and cultural development, while lacking in the proper means of carrying into real life the ideals for which civil rights activists had fought. In this way, Steele observes, blacks’ strategy for emancipation was outmaneuvered, by forcing them to embrace cultural policies which had not been fully shared by the white community. It is the reason why in the post-liberal era, civic responsibility not only is perceived differently by whites and blacks, but it also illustrates disruptive racial connotations, so that ‘being responsible’ seen in its content of a moral obligation becomes an instrument of oppression, transforming blacks into the “accomplices of their own repression”⁵¹. The redistributing of the responsibility in the post-liberal era

⁴⁹ Shelby Steele, *White Guilt How Blacks and Whites Together Destroyed the Promise of the Civil Rights Era*, *op.cit.*, pp. 35-36.

⁵⁰ *Idem*, p. 30.

⁵¹ *Ibidem*, *op.cit.*, p. 52

appears to Steele as the major flaw of the programmed emancipation initiated by the 'Great Society'. Victimization of the past of the black community has grown into a source of moral pressure inside the black community, being at the same time forged into a political tool against the representatives of the white society, to ensure the obtaining of new concessions on the part of the black community. It was the privilege of the few to realize that deploying victimization as the token of identity could not but refuel racial anxiety.

"Why do we cling to an adversarial, victim-focused identity that preoccupies us with white racism? I think because of fear, self-doubt, and simple inexperience. /.../ Our culture was formed in oppression rather than in freedom, which means we are somewhat inexperienced in the full use of freedom, in seeing possibilities and developing them. In oppression we were punished for having initiative and thereby conditioned away from it. Also, our victimization itself has been our primary source of power in society – the basis of our demands for redress – and the paradoxical result of relying on this source of power is that it rewards us for continuing to see ourselves as victims of a racist society."⁵²

The paradox of the aftermath of civil rights movement shows that black activism which endeavored to curb down racial prejudice, favored its continuation, either by opening the doors to political concessions, or by walling the black community into the rhetoric of radical discourse. Both ways, considers Steele, substantiated allegations that blacks cannot pass beyond the consequences of racial repression. It is true that critics of conservatism interpreted its philosophy of merit and moral virtues as the dominance of a 'principle of egoism'⁵³, militating therefore to put into practice the forms of an equality of result than the one of a principle of equality. The conflict between the equality of opportunity and that of result cannot be imagined as ending in a sort of truce, meant to solve the new inequities. Equality of opportunity accentuates the merit of the individual acknowledging competition as the engine of the liberal society, whereas the equality of result tends to level down individuals within the frame of various cultural, social and educational policies, through which, for instance, positive discrimination accentuates the existence of various ethnic

⁵² *Idem, The Content of Our Character, op.cit.*, p. 170.

⁵³ Ted Honderich, *Conservatism*, Boulder, San Francisco: Westview Press, 1990, p. 239.

and social entities. The conscience of the free individual prevails in the first case, the ideology of egalitarianism in the latter. The dispute over a type of equality or the other cannot but worsen relations between whites and blacks, majority versus minority, polarizing the representing of identity.

In a tireless attempt to demonstrate that the outcome of affirmative action was far from the desired one, accusing the intensifying of racial anxiety, Steele wonders whether the sacrifices and the dramatic strivings of the black community were ever repaid by the new conscience of nowadays black America, and whether the political victory of the '60 paved the way for a long awaited emancipation so that blacks should be the beneficiaries of the much acclaimed social change. The cloud of ambiguity enveloping white society, which is perceived on one hand as the victimizer, on the other as the 'saver' of the black community (according to the proposals of the Great Society projects), is for Steele the supreme irony crowning the fight for civil rights, an evincing proof of the decline of values of the traditional liberal philosophy. Steele regards the unwanted 'visibility' given to blacks as a wrong orientation in racial dialogue, enabling political correctness the vigilant guardian of postmodern relativistic virtues. The activism of the racial difference engendered thus a basis for exclusive representation, says Steele, permanently antagonizing whites and blacks according to their beliefs, opinions, religious and political affiliations.

Steele is of the mind that the past continues to arrest the mind of both blacks and whites, not only because its teachings tarry to be shared, but because the past is employed as springboard for ideological representations of guilt and stigma and/or innocence. The unmasking of the power play which insinuated itself in the morality of the difference, as claimed by multiculturalism, has as a target the dissuading of the content of the concept of virtue, as it has been inherited from the experience of the American Enlightenment. Could one still imagine the role of democratic and republican virtues in the context of post-liberal interventionist policies? Steele thinks that postwar liberalism is a "preemptive one", driving blacks into an "elite" of contestations and turning them into a "sociological people"⁵⁴, bereft of the real possibilities to bring to their support personal merit and freedom in dealing with civic options. Multiculturalism is condemned as having misappropriated the memory of the suffering,

⁵⁴ Shelby Steele, *The Content of Our Character*, *op.cit.*, p. 60.

transforming it in a blueprint for reformist policies which did not go far from opportunism since they encouraged the “atavistic powers of race, gender and ethnicity.”⁵⁵ For Shelby Steele the datum the race should be disciplined by virtue than by ethnic or racial activism. In this sense, the debate over innocence, guilt, stigma and victimization should be dealt with in a phenomenological approach than be instrumented by ideological mechanisms inside the bureaucratic apparatus of the government.

The experience of victimization and its recursive influence on nowadays black identity illustrates that postwar liberal policies were but a failed attempt to atone racial repression, announcing at the same time the setting of new barriers deepening social separatism, exposing the American society to future convulsions.⁵⁶ One cannot deny that globalization effected into significant alterations of racial ideology, considerably diminishing the import of such terms as ‘victimization’ and ‘stigmatization’⁵⁷, but it accentuated in exchange the imagery of racial pride, throwing open the discussion about the communities’ rights to differentiated cultural policies which will not be overdue to show their unpredictable results. Current confrontations among liberals, communitarians and conservatives should answer the question whether a ‘me’ can exist before an ‘us’.

For Shelby Steele, the individual’s virtue is still a value in itself. It should be built inside the cultural frames of the American community without bonding it to the arraignment of political commandments. The individual’s freedom to build his/her personal merit may cast light on whether the post-liberal American democracy remained loyal to its founding philosophy, or if it did not create an ethos of separatism⁵⁸, dislodging virtue from its discipline, opening the door for new forms of discrimination.

⁵⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 128.

⁵⁶ *Ibidem, op.cit.*, p. 150.

⁵⁷ Anthony Appiah, Kwame, *Cosmopolitanism. Ethics in A World of Strangers*, New York, London: W.W. Norton and Company, 2006, pp. 101-111.

⁵⁸ Shelby Steele, *White Guilt, op. cit.*, p. 175.

FROM GORBACHEV TO PUTIN¹

Albert P. van Goudoever*

Abstract:

Mr. Putin's administration often puts the analyst of Russian affairs in the dark. In order to obtain a framework of interpretation, the author compares Putin with his predecessor as leaders. Brezhnev's government of stagnation is contrasted to Gorbachev's policy of contraction and resulted in dissolution. The notion anarchy describes Yeltsin's administration. Mr. Putin's rule in the first part is characterized by stability, and afterwards restoration is the key notion. The price of this stability is a weak concept of democracy in Russian government. Putin as a pragmatist does not develop a large program like Khrushchev, Brezhnev and Gorbachev.

Key words: foreign policy, anarchy, pragmatism, leadership, Russia

The first period of Mr. Vladimir Putin's rule came to an end, after 8 years of the Russian presidency. In an ominous way the elections for the State Duma on 2 December 2007 already suggested that Russia did not part from Putin by his manipulated electoral victory. His appointment as prime minister corroborated all expectations about his effective continuation, and his dominance over his successor Dmitri Medvedev. In order to find a model of interpretation that gives a synthesis of Putin's rule, Russian contemporary history gives us some tools. A comparison is most useful to define the place of Mr. Putin in the last fifty or so years, starting with

¹ Presentation to the Institute of European Research, UBB, Cluj on the 29th November 2007; the author wishes to express his gratitude to professor Livius Ilea for his hospitality and comments. This contribution is written before the Russian-Georgian war of the summer 2008.

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Leonid Brezhnev, and continuing with Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin.²

Leonid Brezhnev's policy started with economic reform. As usual with leaders of the Communist Party of the USSR (CPSU) he developed a comprehensive program that would cause the major communist officials to follow him and establish his position of power, if only *primus inter pares*. The political system was untouched, and the pseudo-democracy continued, consisting of formal elections and parliamentary institutions that were completely dominated by the communist party and disguised by window-dressing. Brezhnev focused firstly on the economy and introduced a new system of account, for the first time in soviet history using the notion 'profit' in the accounts of companies to measure the rate of success. After some initial successes the program failed to reach consistent renovation of the Russian economy. Next Brezhnev called for a comprehensive program of peace, and started *détente* with his Cold War opponent the United States. Here the initial success was remarkable, by many treaties on nuclear armament control, treaties on Germany, and finally by the western recognition of the borders of the soviet empire in the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1975. However, Brezhnev failed to reach real *détente*, and the Soviet Union demonstrated a lack of soviet answer to new technologies and the *détente* moved to renewed tensions in the 1980's. Internally, Brezhnev gave in to a considerable cult of his personality, showing his experience of the Second World War as heroic and collecting many positions of honor. He used his power as Secretary-General of the CPSU to a most conservative policy of promotion: most communist officials were continued notwithstanding proven lack of competency, and only seconds-in-command were promoted to first

² See Albert P. van Goudoever and Zdenek R. Dittrich, *Post Stalinist Russia under Khrushchev and Brezhnev*, Cluj-Napoca: Editura Facultății de Studii Europene, 1997; Stephen White, *After Gorbachev*, Cambridge: University Press, 1993; Mary MacAuley, *Russia's Politics of Uncertainty*, Cambridge: University Press, 1997; Cameron Ross (ed.) *Russian Politics under Putin*, Manchester: University Press 2004; Anna Politkovskaya, *Putin's Russia*, London: Harvill Press, 2004. Important journals in English are *Europe Asia Studies* (Publ. Routledge) and *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* (Publ. Elsevier), and on the Web the publications of the Carnegie Center and the Levada Center, both in Moscow. The website of the Russian president (www.kremlin.ru) and the Russian government offers the texts of official documents.

positions. The main daily board of the party, the Politburo, consisted of elderly gentlemen. As a result, the soviet governance ended in full **STAGNATION** of society, the key notion to qualify the last phase of Brezhnev regime. Younger officials, much better educated than the Brezhnev-generation, had been waiting for opportunities to find a way for their energy.

Brezhnev passed away in 1982, and after an interlude of three party leaders, Gorbachev started in 1985. A relatively young man, he studied law at university and had a successful career in the party and made himself known to the top of the party in the neighborhood of their vacation resorts. When he was recommended for the succession, he was praised by the main, old ideologist Mikhail Suslov as a man with a smile, but behind the smile he kept his iron teeth. Gorbachev also began with an extensive program, as he recognized the failing party and state in its phase of stagnation. Gorbachev started a general reform movement, with his slogan of *glasnost*, *perestrojka*, and *uskorenie* (openness, restructuring, and acceleration). These words added a lot to western knowledge of the Russian language that so far was limited to the word 'njet', 'no', that Molotov and Vyshinsky taught the western public at the United Nations in its early phase. Like his predecessors, his goal was to reform the Soviet state and to improve the problems of communist rule. Openness proved the most effective of the new slogans, and many discussions took place about tricky subjects, this time far from being manipulated. Opening up the economy took hardly place, as of the communists' fear from market forces. But the nationalities saw their chances and started disusing their desires for more autonomy. Several severe clashes took place, in particular in the Caucasian area, and in the Baltics a movement started to memorize the interwar independence of these republics. Gorbachev tried to convince his colleagues in the communist-dominated Eastern European countries, but the conservatives in the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Bulgaria did not take him seriously at all. Elsewhere already reform was moving the countries ahead, like in Poland and Hungary. Gorbachev wisely considered the Soviet Union not strong enough for the Cold War confrontation with United States and really withdrew from the world scene, removing the soviet warships from the oceans, and by concluding treaties on armament control. In the international arena his policy is covered by the notion of

CONTRACTION. The crumbling down of the Berlin wall in November 1989 (11-9, the main international event before 9-11) constituted a clear ultimate proof of Gorbachev's decision not to intervene neither to assist the brother-communists in their final struggle, according to a policy of letting all regimes have it their own way, the so-called Frank Sinatra-doctrine, a variation on the famous singer's 'I did it my own way'. After a long history of silence in the Brezhnev era, finally the process of rehabilitation of Stalin's victims was continued. The infamous show trials of the 1930's were revised. Even the non-communist victims were rehabilitated, and survivors or family of victims were compensated. A beginning was made with democratic experiments, by allowing more candidates on the voting lists, still a pseudo-democracy.

Gorbachev's policy caused many people to react rather negatively on the new course. Conservatives within the party, but many common people were most disturbed by all changes. No longer was security offered to them about what to do. Gorbachev was most popular in western countries, but far from that was his reputation in the Soviet Union. Troubles with the ethnic nationalities, and failure of the economy to recover caused internal dissenters within the top of the party to act, and the conservatives tried a failed coup against Gorbachev in August 1991. He was not able to answer that effort properly and was overshadowed by Yeltsin, a former opponent of his. **DISSOLUTION** is the second characteristic of Gorbachev's government, as he could not prevent the end of communism and of the soviet state in December 1991.

The openness resulted in exposing the regime as the ultimate lie that Solzhenitsyn already in 1974 designated an empty system without any drive, and without inner conviction of even the communists themselves.³ An important factor as well was the high level of education of society and bureaucracy, and the desire of lower communist officials finally to get responsible positions helped to topple the regime. A large contribution came from national groups that used the openness for a direct claim on more autonomy and political responsibility.

Boris Yeltsin's regime started with many democratic and market-reform intentions, and he became the first democratically elected president of Russia. An important asset proved to be the introduction of a new

³ Alexander I. Solzhenitsyn, *Letter to the Soviet Leaders*, New York: Harper and Row, 1974.

Constitution and the establishment of a Constitutional Court, as the critical steps to introduce the rule of law in Russia. Before Yeltsin succeeded in this crucial reform, he made an end to the influence of the communist party by dissolving the Parliament. Because he used the military to execute this political move, he effectively organized a coup against the Parliament but with the aim of improving democracy as a larger common good. At the top, Yeltsin used trusted people from Yekaterinenburg, his original basis of power, the so-called *familiya*. By creating a new political party, he ensured support in parliament. Politics were far from stable, and integral nationalism seemed to dominate the scene. In economics the option was made to de-nationalize public property of companies, except the major public facilities and except land. Everyone could share in his or her supposedly part of property and got vouchers to prove. But what to do with vouchers unless selling them. As a result, the enormous state property came into the hands of a relatively small group of businessman (another new word in Russia then: *biznizmen*), who collected as many vouchers as possible, bought shares in other companies or took care to be paid in shares. This really was an era of the Wild East where business could act uncontrolled by law. And if law would constitute a problem, the scruples of the new elite were not sufficiently developed to avoid illegal means. The new rich were not satisfied to possess just economic property, but they became owners of broadcasting companies, television stations, newspapers, and had great influence in politics at all levels. To pay full taxes was beyond their dignity, they preferred to decide themselves upon the destiny of money they controlled. No wonder many people characterized the new situation as mafia controlled. The richest and most influential people were called the oligarchs. The state organization as well developed in the way of personalized control by high officials. Governors of provinces, presidents of republics-members of the federation declined to pay taxes and to act according to the ever changing central laws. This private behavior resulted effectively in dominance of centrifugal forces. Though Yeltsin tried to combat these misuses, he hardly could boast on successes. In a case on his own region of origin, Yekaterinenburg, he managed to get a governor out of his position, only to see him turning up at another place without much damage. Actually, Yeltsin did not succeeded in keeping the development in his hands. The free market led to great poverty for about 30% of the

population, the industrial production sank with large percentages up to 40%. Several regions were paying a high price for the uncontrolled turnover. Yeltsin's continuous change of laws and sudden decision-making did not help to establish credibility of the central power. After a promising start of democratic changes, *ANARCHY* describes his regime best.

The appearance of Vladimir Putin as successor of Yeltsin went quietly, at first without democratic legitimacy because Yeltsin suddenly stepped down and presented his recently appointed prime minister Vladimir Putin as his temporary successor, at the end of December 1999. A young man for this high office, - born in 1952, he was only 47 at the time- Putin represented a new generation of ambitious, dynamic persons. He had of course a communist background and more in particular a career in the secret service, KGB, followed by positions in the successor of this institution, the FSB. Not a man known by his smile or open attitudes, he rather is an enigmatic type of personality, more like a sphinx because his secretive ways. Rather unique, he is a very sportive person (Putin is a judoka, black belt) who does not drink alcoholic drinks. From this network, he brought in a great number of security men, and also recruited his collaborators from former Leningrad, now St. Petersburg. The new elite of top officials and advisers became known as the group *siloviki*, the men of power.⁴ Putin took his time to establish his authority. In contrast with his predecessors, Putin did not start a large public program. Instead, he focused on the recentralization of power. He succeeded in disciplining the governors and the oligarchs.⁵ By creating super-governors and dividing the country into super-regions, Putin send the newly appointed trustees to travel around and to inspect and to control the governors. Some of them remained pretty autonomous, the Moscow mayor Luzhkov for instance, who controls the city with his empire of the *systema*, a city administration that at the same time is a company, owning a bank, gasoline stations, and urban development centers etcetera. That is the vertical line of power that

⁴ Daniel Treisman, "Putin's Silovarchs", *Orbis* vol. 51 issue 1, Winter 2007, accessed 11 May 2007.

⁵ Cf. the critical opinion of Elena A. Chebankova, "The Limitations of Central Authority in the Regions and Implication for the Evolution of Russia's Federal System", *Europe Asia Studies* vol. 57 issue 7, November 2005. Also doubtful of the effectiveness of the central authority is Hager Ettner, "Föderalismus – To be or not to be? Das Gebiet Sverdlovsk in Russlands Föderationsgefüge", *Osteuropa* vol. 55 issue 2, February 2005.

means power in the hierarchy. A second line is the horizontal line, connected with those people who could be Putin's equals: the oligarchs. Concerning these oligarchs, rough methods belonged to his arsenal, as he succeeded in getting opponents behind bars or to exile them. One of them, former ally of Yeltsin Boris Berezovsky, was even accepted in Great Britain as political refugee. From his exile, Berezovsky started attacking Putin wherever he could and created a non-governmental organization to create a solid democratic image. In disciplining quite a number of oligarchs, and many governors as well, Putin effectively secured a major part of central power and succeeded in re-introducing the usual centripetal power in Russia. This part of Putin's policy may be the best result of his first part of government, the part characterized by *STABILITY*.

In the second term of his presidency, Putin already controlled political and public life, and started a personality cult. Youngsters were organized to support the Kremlin, like Young Unity, and *Nashi* (Ours).⁶ Shirts and busts of Putin are a normal commercial product. Recently, even a picture of the president, at the river with bare chest, was published and caused many women to fall for their hero, as well as quite some gay people. Control of newspapers and television-channels creates a favorable image of the situation. The popularity of Putin reached high levels: in the regular research on trust in sectors of Russian society he is the one who reaches acceptable and high scores followed by the Orthodox Church, and without much trust all segments of the state bureaucracy, parliament and the judiciary.⁷ His popularity with large masses of the population made it easy to discipline democratic opposition as he did with the governors and the oligarchs. Recently, Putin dealt with serious but small non-parliamentary opposition that combined a wide range of opponents with methods of repression that reminded of a long Russian tradition. This group is The Other Russia, and here the famous chess champion Garry Kasparov combines forces with communist leader Eduard Limonov and former Prime Minister Mikhail Kashanov, united only because of their opposition to the Putin regime. Besides harassing the extra-parliamentary opposition,

⁶ Ulrich Schmid, "Nasi – Die Putin-Jugend. Sowjettradition und politische Konzeptkunst", *Osteuropa* vol 56 issue 5, May 2006.

⁷ Vladimir Shlapentokh, "Trust in Public Institutions in Russia: the Lowest in the World", *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* vol. 39 issue 2, June 2006.

many journalists are not only harassed but quite a number are murdered, and hardly investigated. The Kremlin possibly is involved, in any case hardly showed interest in this lack of protection of the core human and civil right that freedom of the press is.

The economic development played well into his cards by the rise of oil and gas prices that made Russia a rich country with a couple of hundred billions of dollars to spend. International debts to the International Monetary Fund were paid before necessary. It is suggested that every year the Russian state can add another 170 billion dollar to its cash flow. New oil and gas pipelines are constructed and are planned to avoid unstable areas, new contracts are made with individual European countries, a Russian tradition of foreign policy to divide Europe. The European Union so far did not work on a common policy in this respect. The enormous reserves are at the disposal of the president to help him restoring the reputation of Russia as a great power, and in this light I think we should assess his movements on foreign political issues: challenging the West again with the old treaties from détente times, and reintroducing a language that strongly reminds of the Cold War. As the Russian army is still far from reliable, only the nuclear power of Russia is relevant and to start innovations to reach again a status of superpower is possible because of available funds. At the same time, because of the new large customer for energy: China, Russia turns to the East. This can be seen in denying the USA her military bases in Central Asia, -established in connection with the Afghanistan war- by cooperation in the regional strategic Collective Defense Organization in the Treaty of Tashkent. Also the cooperation with China and other Asian powers in the Shanghai cooperation points in the same direction.⁸ All in all, this puts on the map again and allows the Russian nationalist pride on their country, a powerful tool as precondition for the parliamentary and presidential elections of December 2007 and March 2008. The key notion for this show of power should be **RESTORATION**. Yet, one should take into account a large number of problems. Actually, the economic development is rather one sided: only the production of gas and oil is well-developed, other sectors are lagging behind. The population showed a sharp decline, and a

⁸ Sally N. Cummings, "Happier Bedfellows? Russia and Central Asia under Putin", *Asian Affairs* vol. 88, part II, June 2001.

large birth-promoting program has started in order to stop it.⁹ The economy is flourishing only partly, the agriculture still being the usual Russian problem.¹⁰ The social security system is still very poor; mortality is high and life expectancy far below standard for a developed country.¹¹

Several analysts' opinions give diverse option for an interpretation of Putin's regime, none of them is flattering. Lev Gudkov, of the Levada institute in Moscow; concludes to a corrupt police state.¹² Liliya Shevcova of the Carnegie Center expects the development of a dictatorship.¹³ Western observer Anatol Lieven concludes that Putin is the best option by lack of an alternative: what else?¹⁴ I think in the same direction, and see an alternative in Putin only in another oligarch. Power in Russia is a total embracing type of power, an **ORGANIC** system that is hardly suitable to develop a western interpretation of democracy.

In conclusion, Putin restored STABILITY in the country as well as the central power of the state. The option for 2 December as date for elections was ominous, as this is the historical day of Napoleon in French history. Obviously he prefers a puppet as president. The price of stability is related to a weak concept of democracy, nevertheless public opinion shows great support. Being a sort of sphinx, predictions cannot be read from Putin's lips, putting the analyst in the dark. In comparison, he represents a new generation of leaders who are pragmatists, and do not have a large program like Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and Gorbachev.

⁹ Vladimir Shlapentokh, "Russia's Demographic Decline and the Public Reaction", *Europe-Asia Studies* vol. 57 issue 7, November 2005.

¹⁰ Grigory Ioffe, "The Downsizing of Russian Agriculture", *Europe-Asia Studies* vol 57 issue 2, March 2005.

¹¹ United Nations Development Report 2006.

¹² Lev Gudkov, "Russlands Systemkrise", *Osteuropa* vol. 57 issue 1, January 2007.

¹³ Liliya Sevcova, "Garantiert ohne Garantie. Russland unter Putin", *Osteuropa* vol. 56 issue 3, March 2006.

¹⁴ Anatol Lieven, "The Essential Putin", *Foreign Policy* issue 146, January 2005.

DIE HOMOGENISIERUNG EINES PROFESSIONELLEN HABITUS : DIE AUSWAHL DER FRANZÖSISCHER ABGEORDNETER (1848- 2007)

Laurent Godmer *

Abstract

The selection of French MPs changed since the establishment of the masculine universal suffrage in 1848. The domination of “notables” (teachers, practitioners, lawyers...) had first replaced the initial overrepresentation of aristocrats, and had paved the way for a relative diversification of the parliamentary habitus in the inter-war period (e.g. with the presence of former workers within parliamentary parties of the left). However, recent evolutions during the Fifth Republic (from the 1st legislature elected in 1958 to the 13th legislature elected in 2007) show a relatively homogenised professional habitus especially because of the growing importance of the cultural capital in parliamentary recruitment.

Key words: homogenisation, parliament, elections, representation, France

Die Rekrutierung der französischen parlamentarischen Elite weist aufgrund der zahlreichen Regimewechsel und dem seit 1958¹ geltenden Mehrheitswahlrecht eine besondere Geschichte und spezielle Muster auf. Besondere Aufmerksamkeit verdienen dabei die Mitglieder (*députés*) der Nationalversammlung (*Assemblée Nationale*). Denn einerseits kann man an ihnen den Konvergenzprozess der Rekrutierung der Abgeordneten in West-Europa beobachten², andererseits unterscheiden sie sich hinsichtlich

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¹ Dieser Beitrag basiert auf einem Vortrag bei der internationalen Konferenz „Politik als Beruf/ Politics as a Profession. German MPs in European Comparison“, die am 15. Dezember 2004 von der Deutschen Vereinigung für Parlamentsfragen und dem Sonderforschungsbereich 580 (Friedrich-Schiller Universität) in der Parlamentarischen Gesellschaft in Berlin durchgeführt worden ist.

² Heinrich Best, Maurizio Cotta (Hrsg.), *Parliamentary Representatives in Europe 1848-2000. Legislative Recruitment and Careers in Eleven European Countries*, Oxford: University Press,

einiger Merkmale von ihren europäischen Kollegen. Dies zeigt sich nicht zuletzt an einer strukturellen Besonderheit in Frankreich: dem Kumulieren von politischen Mandaten (dem *cumul des mandats*). Im Rahmen der Problematik der französischen Ausnahme gliedert sich die vorliegende Analyse in vier Teile: Am Anfang steht die Darstellung der Logik der parlamentarischen Rekrutierung in Frankreich (Kap. 1). Daran schließt sich die Auseinandersetzung mit dem *cumul* (Kap. 2). Abschließend werden die Effekte dieser Ausnahme hinsichtlich des professionalisierten parlamentarischen Habitus (Kap. 3.) und die Veränderungen der parlamentarischen Rekrutierung (Kap. 4) untersucht.

1. Die Rekrutierungsmuster

Werden zunächst die verschiedenen Entwicklungen der Rekrutierungsmuster der parlamentarischen Elite beschrieben (1.1). Zweitens soll deutlich gemacht werden, dass die soziale und politische Geschichte Frankreichs immer in größerem Umfang als in anderen Staaten auch die Geschichte der zunehmenden Bedeutung kultureller Ressourcen (Diplome, Kenntnisse, Herkunft, usw.) für die parlamentarische Selektion ist (1.2).

1.1. Klassische Rekrutierungsmuster

Die Analyse der Änderungen der Rekrutierungsmuster der französischen Abgeordneten, weist folgende Merkmale auf:³

Oxford, 2000; Heinrich Best, Maurizio Cotta (Hrsg.), *Democratic Representation in Europe: Diversity, Change and Convergence*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007.

³ Daten: Best und Cotta, 2000 und 2007. Die Datenerhebung für die 12. Wahlperiode (2002-2007) der Nationalversammlung erfolgte durch Daniel Gaxie, Tanguy Coulouarn und Laurent Godmer. Für eine sozialgeschichtliche Perspektive, vgl. Heinrich Best, Daniel Gaxie, „Detours to Modernity: Long-Term Trends of Parliamentary Recruitment in Republican France 1848-1999“, in: Heinrich Best, Maurizio Cotta (Hg.), *Parliamentary Representatives in Europe 1848-2000. Legislative Recruitment and Careers in Eleven European Countries*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, S. 88-137; Mattei Dogan, „La stabilité du personnel parlementaire sous la IIIe République“, in: *Revue française de science politique*, 3. Jg, H. 2, April-Juni 1953, S. 319-348; Mattei Dogan, „Political Ascent in a Class Society“, in: Dwaine Marvick (Hg.), *Political Decision Makers*, Glencoe: Free Press, 1961, S. 57-90; Mattei Dogan, „Les filières de la carrière politique en France“, in: *Revue Française de Sociologie*, H. 8, 1967, S.468-492; Daniel Gaxie, „Les logiques du recrutement politique“, in: *Revue française de*

- *Entaristokratisierung*: Sie bildet das älteste langfristige Wandlungsmuster in der Geschichte der parlamentarischen Rekrutierung. Dieser Wandel begann schon sehr früh, er vollzog sich tatsächlich bereits in der Phase der vorparlamentarischen Politik. Der Abgang des Adels bot auch die Voraussetzungen für eine Professionalisierung und trug zur Entstehung einer unabhängigen politischen Klasse bei. Diese Veränderung hatte zur Folge, dass schon in der Zeit vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg nur mehr ungefähr zehn Prozent der Abgeordneten Adelige waren. Dieser Anteil war im Vergleich zum Deutschen Reichstag sehr gering und ist während der Fünften Republik (seit 1958) auf zuletzt 1.6 % gesunken.

- *Verschwinden der Abgeordneten des primären Sektors*: Bereits von einem niedrigen Niveau ausgehend (zwischen 10 und 20 % von 1848 bis 1967), stellen Abgeordnete mit beruflichem Hintergrund in der Landwirtschaft gegenwärtig nur ungefähr 3%.

- *Rückgang des Anteils der Rechtsanwälte*: Sie stellten in der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts und in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts zwischen 20 Prozent und einem Drittel der Abgeordneten. Nach dem Ende dieser so genannten Republik der Rechtsanwälte und nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg ging ihr Anteil weiter zurück und sie stellen heute weniger als jeden zehnten Abgeordneten (1997: 7 %, 2002: 6 %). Im Vergleich bleiben die Mediziner stark (etwa 10 % seit 1997).

- *Zunahme der Zahl der Unternehmer, Arbeitgeber und Manager*: Diese Abgeordneten machen heute (seit 2002 und 2007) etwa ein Viertel der französischen Abgeordneten aus. Sie finden sich mehrheitlich in der konservativen Union für eine Volksbewegung (*Union pour un mouvement populaire*, UMP) Fraktion.

- *Berufspolitiker*: Abgeordnete, die ihren Lebensunterhalt mit der politischen Tätigkeit verdienen, traten zum ersten Mal in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts in die Parlamente ein. Waren sie in jener Zeit hauptsächlich in der sozialistischen und danach in der kommunistischen Fraktion vertreten, nimmt ihr Anteil gegenwärtig in allen Parteien zu.

- *Soziale Homogenisierung*: Besonders zwischen 1936 und 1958 Beistrich weg gelangten zahlreiche Vertreter der Arbeiter ins Parlament.

Gerade die sozialistischen und kommunistischen Parteien⁴ versuchten durch eine Bevorzugung der Arbeiter, eine sozialstrukturell angemessene Repräsentation dieser Klasse herbeizuführen. Gegenwärtig bilden die Abgeordneten mit einer beruflichen Vergangenheit als Arbeiter nur eine mikroskopische Gruppe (1997: 3 %, 2002: 2 %, 2007: 1 %), die nur noch in der kommunistischen Fraktion anzutreffen ist. Sogar die Väter der Abgeordneten wurden homogenisiert: 2002-2007 waren nur etwa 15 % der Abgeordneten aus einer Familie worin der Vater Angestellter oder Arbeiter war.

- *Zunahme des Anteils von Abgeordneten aus dem öffentlichen Sektor*: Die Beamten – mit Ausnahme der Lehrer – waren in den Parlamenten der Dritten Republik (1871-1940) fast nicht vertreten. Danach nahm der Anteil der Angestellten des öffentlichen Sektors im Verlauf der parlamentarischen Professionalisierung und der Entwicklung des Wohlfahrtsstaates stetig zu, sodass sie heute die größte Gruppe im Parlament bilden. Während sie ungefähr ein Viertel der Erwerbstätigen ausmachen, betrug ihr Anteil an den Abgeordneten 47 Prozent im Jahre 1997 (nach dem Sieg der Linkskoalition) und ein bißchen mehr als ein Drittel 2002 und 2007 (doppelter Sieg der UMP). Die Beamten bilden innerhalb der sozialistischen Fraktion sogar die Mehrheit.

- *Herrschaft der Männer*: Die Frauen sind drastisch unterrepräsentiert. In der laufenden 13. Wahlperiode (2007-2012) stellen sie lediglich 18,5 Prozent der Abgeordneten.

Die Abgeordneten in der Zeit von 1946 bis 2007 rekrutierten sich überwiegend aus folgenden Berufen: Manager (ca. 20 %), gefolgt von Unternehmern (ca. 15 %) und Rechtsanwälten (10 %). Lehrer, die vor Mandatsantritt zumeist an Gymnasien oder Hochschulen arbeiteten, stellen zwischen 15 und 30 Prozent der Abgeordneten in der französischen Nationalversammlung. In der Tat, rekrutieren sich 80 % der Abgeordneten aus sozialen Milieus, die nur 15 % der Bevölkerung ausmachen.

⁴ Vgl. Bernard Pudal, *Prendre parti. Pour une sociologie historique du PCF*, Paris: Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1989 (2. Kapitel).

1.2. Die Zentralität der kulturellen Ressourcen bei der Auswahl der Abgeordneten

Die Mitgliederauswahl zur Nationalversammlung basiert auf Rekrutierungsmustern, die anspruchsvoll sind (mehr als 80% haben einen Universitätsabschluß). Dieser Trend scheint durch die zunehmende Bedeutung des „Kulturellen Kapitals“ (Diplome, Kenntnisse, abstrakte Kompetenzen, usw.)⁵ bedingt zu sein. Die Herrschaft des „kulturellen Kapitals“ stellt so etwas wie ein eisernes Gesetz der parlamentarischen Rekrutierung in Europa dar⁶. In Frankreich scheint dies besonders der Fall zu sein. So üben bestimmte Ausbildungsabschlüsse der verschiedenen Elitehochschulen eine sozial selektive Wirkung aus, die jenen von Adelstiteln vergleichbar ist⁷. Das „kulturelle Kapital“ stellt damit den wichtigsten Bestandteil des „Ressourcen-Portfolios“ (die verschiedene Typen von Ressourcen, die ein Kandidat besitzt⁸) dar, das von ambitionierten Politikern ausgebildet werden muss. Das heißt, man kann die Bildungsressourcen in politische Ressourcen konvertieren, um „wählbar“ zu werden. Folglich ist diese überragende Bedeutung des Kulturelles Kapitals ein Produkt der Professionalisierung der Politik und der Anwesenheit der Lehrer in der National-Versammlung (ungefähr 20 % seit 2002, aber ein Drittel bei den Sozialisten).

Die so genannte Republik der Lehrer⁹ besitzt eine lange Tradition in Frankreich. Aber heutzutage können die Diplome nicht mehr als distinktive Ressourcen innerhalb der innerparteilichen Verfahren zur Kandidatenselektion angesehen werden. Wie Bernard Lahire geschrieben

⁵ Pierre Bourdieu nannte es auch „Informatives Kapital“. Pierre Bourdieu, Loïc Wacquant, *Réponses. Pour une anthropologie réflexive*, Paris: Le Seuil, 1992, S. 94.

⁶ Daniel Gaxie, Laurent Godmer, „Cultural capital and political selection: Educational Backgrounds of parliamentarians“, in: Heinrich Best, Maurizio Cotta (Hrsg.), *Democratic Representation in Europe: Diversity, Change and Convergence*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, S. 106-135.

⁷ Pierre Bourdieu, *La Noblesse d'État. Grandes écoles et esprits de corps*, Paris: Minuit, 1989, S. 535.

⁸ Zu diesen Begriffen vgl. Laurent Godmer, „Les élus régionaux indépendantistes catalans et corses et la loi d'airain de la reproduction coloniale“, in: *Pôle Sud*, H. 20, 2004, S. 63-82; Laurent Godmer, „Les élus régionaux néo-communistes dans les territoires politiques issus de l'ex-RDA. Domination du capital culturel et conditions de sa conversion politique“, in: *Transitions*, 43. Jg., H. 2, 2004, S. 41-58.

⁹ Titel eines Buches von A. Thibaudet aus dem Jahr 1927.

hat: „die Demokratisierung des Zugangs zu einem Gut oder einer Aktivität (Lachs oder Gänseleber in den 90er Jahren, Tennis in den 80er Jahren usw.) trägt unvermeidlich zu einem Rückgang der Profitabilitätsrate für die kulturelle Unterscheidung bei“¹⁰. Dies führt dazu, dass seltene „Bildungsgüter“ bei der parlamentarischen Auswahl zunehmend geschätzt sind.

Die Abgeordneten der 12. WP (2002-2007) wiesen ein sehr hohes Bildungsniveau auf. Lediglich 7,5% verfügten nur über eine Grundschulausbildung. Mehr als 73 Prozent hatten eine höhere und 19,5 % eine mittlere Schulbildung genossen. Die einzige Ausnahme bildete die kommunistische Fraktion: Nur 13 Prozent ihrer Abgeordneten verfügten über einen Universitätsabschluss, im Vergleich dazu hatten 72 Prozent aus der PS-Fraktion und 77 Prozent aus den Reihen der UMP einen Hochschulabschluss oder eine vergleichbare akademische Ausbildung. Obwohl der Anteil der Rechtsanwälte auf sechs Prozent zurückgegangen ist, bildet das Jurastudium weiterhin eine klassische Station (41,7 %) auf dem Weg in das Parlament. Unter den universitären Abschlüssen der Parlamentarier überwiegen solche der Sozial- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften – ein für Wohlfahrtsstaaten typisches Phänomen. Die neugewählten Abgeordneten von 2007 entsprechen ebenfalls dieser Tradition: die UMP haben einen hohen Bildungsniveau, aber in unterschiedlichen Berufssparten: die neue UMP sind Ärzte, Unternehmer oder Manager), während die neue PS sind Lehrer, Beamte oder politische Mitarbeiter mit unterschiedlichen Bildungserfahrungen.

Als Rekrutierungsfelder der Eliten haben sich die *grandes écoles* in Form tertiärer Ausbildungsinstitute etabliert. Dass diese Zugangspfade selbst einen elitären Status aufweisen, zeigt sich daran, dass sie nur eine sehr geringe Anzahl von Studenten annehmen (weniger als 1 % der *master degree* Diplome). Dennoch ist dieser Ausbildungsweg unter den Parlamentariern keine Seltenheit. Etwa 15,7 % der heutigen Abgeordneten hatten 2002-2007 einen *grande école*-Abschluss, wobei einige der Parlamentarier sogar mehr als eine dieser Schulen absolviert haben (4,2 % hatten Abschlüsse an zwei und 1,4 % an drei Schulen erworben). Ebenso verbreitet sind unter den Abgeordneten postgraduale Abschlüsse. 14,3 % aller Parlamentarier waren promoviert, in der Mehrheit allerdings

¹⁰ Bernard Lahire, *La Culture des individus*, Paris: La Découverte, 2004, S. 40.

Mediziner. Ein dritter Weg in parlamentarische Verantwortung läuft über die Absolvierung der *École Nationale d'Administration* (ENA). Durchschnittlich 5 % der Abgeordneten haben diesen Ausbildungsweg absolviert, gehören also zu den so genannten *énarques*.

Ein vollständiges Bild der Rekrutierungspfade ergibt sich aber erst, wenn neben den eben aufgezeigten Wegen die französische Besonderheit der Institute für politische Studien (IEP), berücksichtigt wird. 14,6 % der Abgeordneten hatten 2002-2007 einen IEP-Abschluss, hauptsächlich vom IEP Paris (etwa 12 % aller Abgeordneten), die übrigen Abgeordneten kommen von sechs der regionalen IEPs (Aix-en-Provence, Bordeaux, Grenoble, Lyon, Toulouse, Straßburg). Als besonders vorteilhaft für die Erlangung eines Mandats ist dabei derjenige Ausbildungsweg, welcher es den Mandatsanwärtern ermöglicht, die für ein Mandat notwendige ‚Kapitalausstattung‘ zu akkumulieren. Die Hälfte der *énarques* verfügen zugleich über ein Diplom der IEP Paris. Ein kleiner Personenkreis von etwa 1 % der Abgeordneten sind *énarques*, die außerdem einen *grande école*-Abschluss und zudem auch die IEP Paris absolviert haben. Unter ihnen befanden sich oft bekannte Persönlichkeiten wie die früheren Premier Laurent Fabius (PS, 1984-1986) und Alain Juppé (UMP, 1995-1997) oder François Hollande, Erster Sekretär der PS (1997-2008).

2. Lokales Kapitals und *cumul des mandats*

Das *cumul* ermöglicht nach wie vor eine der wichtigsten Formen der Akkumulation von für die politische Karriere wichtigem Kapital, weshalb seine Mechanismen hier eingehender betrachtet werden sollen (2.1). Die problematischen Auswirkungen der politischen Ämterhäufung haben in der Vergangenheit aber auch Initiativen hervorgerufen, das *cumul* aufzulösen (2.2).

2.1. Logik einer französischen Ausnahme

In der französischen Politik ist durch das *cumul* hauptsächlich die vertikale Ämterkumulation beschrieben – und nicht, wie in plutokratischen Ländern wie den Vereinigten Staaten, die horizontale (d.h. verschiedenen Positionen in unterschiedlichen Sektoren). Im Gegensatz zu anderen Ländern übt der französische Parlamentarier generell verschiedene

politische Mandate parallel aus¹¹. Im Zuge der politischen Professionalisierung nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg war der Weg ins Mandat sehr oft mit einer Akkumulation lokaler Mandate und politischer Positionen verbunden. Es gab daher keinen Widerspruch zwischen dem *cumul* und der Zentralisierung¹², weil die Männer „im Zentrum“ und „im Dorf“ dieselben waren und weil die Abgeordneten sehr „lokal“ (die Hälfte ist in ihrem Kreis geboren) sind. Das dadurch entstandene *cumul* führte auch zur Herrschaft der „Weberischen“ Politiker, die dem Verfall der lokalen Persönlichkeiten (Mediziner, Rechtsanwälte, Grundbesitzer, usw.) folgte und ihn beschleunigte.

Der *cursus honorum* der französischen Abgeordneten schließt heutzutage mehr und mehr eine lokale politische Position ein. Dementsprechend haben ungefähr neun von zehn Abgeordneten zugleich eine lokale Position inne. Die Investition in die parlamentarische Arbeit wird getätigt, um eine potenzielle Wiederwahl zu ermöglichen. Die Bedeutung des *cumul* ist daher aus verschiedenen Gründen zu differenzieren: Erstens, verdeutlicht es eine französische Besonderheit in der parlamentarischen Professionalisierung und zeigt seine langfristigen Effekte auf die Rekrutierung politischen Personals. Zweitens, beinhalten die Reformbestrebungen auf dem Feld der politischen Professionalisierung immer wieder Ansätze und Bestrebungen, gegen das *cumul* vorzugehen. Drittens, drückt sich in der Rekrutierung von politischem Personal auch die Dominanz einzelner Kapitalien gegenüber anderen aus (z.B. früher ökonomisches Kapital und kulturelles Kapital). Die jahrelange Professionalisierung und Etablierung dieser Strukturen hat einerseits eine Legitimationsbasis für das *cumul* geschaffen, welche andererseits durch die gleichzeitige Herausbildung einer Berufsethik abgesichert wurde. Neben dem uniformierenden Effekt des *cumul* bleiben die nationalen Abgeordneten aber dennoch gleichzeitig eine lokale Elite. Dadurch verdeutlicht sich auch der dezentralisierende Effekt des *cumul* und stellt

¹¹ Philippe Augé, „Historique de la réglementation des cumuls“, in: Centre de recherche et d'études administratives de Montpellier (CREAM), *Le cumul des mandats et des fonctions. Une réforme au cœur de la modernisation de la vie politique*, Notes et études documentaires, H. 5085, 30. Dezember 1998, S. 11-26.

¹² Guillaume Marrel, *L'élu et son double. Cumul des mandats et constitution de l'État républicain en France du milieu du XIX^e siècle au milieu du XX^e siècle*, Doktoratsdissertation, Grenoble: IEP, 2003.

gleichzeitig einen Grund seiner Beständigkeit im französischen politischen System dar¹³.

Dennoch bleibt das *cumul* vor dem Hintergrund des relativ hohen „Berufsriskos“ der Politiker bis zu einem gewissen Grade „legitim“. Durch die lokale Verankerung, der Nutzung persönlicher lokaler Netzwerke und der Lokalisierung der Politik versuchen die Politiker, sich gegen die Berufsriskiken ihres politischen Geschäfts abzusichern. Dies geschieht einerseits dadurch, dass sie die lokalen Positionen als Rückfallpositionen nutzen, andererseits versuchen sie, die auf der lokalen Ebene gewonnenen Ressourcen auf die supra-lokalen Ebenen zu transferieren. Die Ämterkumulation ist auch Symbol für eine Reihe von territorialen Ressourcen. Seit den vordemokratischen Wahlen besaßen die Abgeordneten fast immer territoriales Kapital. Sogar eine politische Position in einer kleinen Stadt kann als Etappe des *cursus honorum* wichtig sein.

Es gab anti-*cumul* Reformen, die komplexe Effekte hatten. Das Gesetz vom 30. Dezember 1985 erlaubte den Abgeordneten nur noch *ein* wichtiges politisches Amt neben der Mitgliedschaft in der Assemblée (z.B. als *conseiller général*, Mitglied der Pariser Stadtversammlung, Bürgermeister einer Stadt von mehr als 20,000 Einwohnern, stellvertretender Bürgermeister einer Stadt von mehr als 100,000 Einwohnern¹⁴). Erstaunlicher Weise, hat diese Reform das *cumul* kaum reduziert¹⁵. Obwohl es noch ein weiteres wichtiges anti-*cumul* Gesetz gab (2000), nahmen dennoch viele Abgeordnete mehrere Mandate wahr. Das Ergebnis dieser Gesetzgebung war das Verbot des „*super-cumul*“¹⁶, das heißt, die Reduzierung der Zahl der *super-cumulards* (Abgeordneten mit vielen Mandaten). Doch auch weiterhin ist die Figur des Mandatsträgers im nationalen Parlament ohne lokale Mandate ist nach wie vor eine Seltenheit (weniger als 10 % der Abgeordneten). Das Gesetz aus dem Jahre 2000

¹³ J. Becquart-Leclercq, „Cumul des mandats et culture politique“, in: Albert Mabileau (Hrsg.), *Les pouvoirs locaux à l'épreuve de la décentralisation*, Paris: Pedone, 1989, S. 102-128.

¹⁴ François Barley, „La législation de 1985 sur le cumul des mandats“, in: CREAM, S. 29.

¹⁵ Laurent Olivier, „La perception du cumul des mandats. Restrictions contextuelles et politiques à un apparent consensus“, in: *Revue française de science politique*, 48. Jg., H. 6, Dezember 1998, S. 756-771.

¹⁶ Paul Allières, „Les effets du cumul des mandats sur le personnel politique“, in: CREAM, S. 67.

brachte auch keine tief greifenden Veränderungen mit sich¹⁷. Es hat aber die Akkumulierung von Wahlfunktionen etwas eingeschränkt. So nahm in der aktuellen Legislaturperiode im Vergleich mit den ersten Wahlperioden der fünften Republik die Zahl der *super-cumulards* wie z.B. Jacques Chaban-Delmas, Abgeordneter und Bürgermeister von Bordeaux von 1947/48 bis 1995, Gaston Defferre in Marseille, Jean Lecanuet in Caen, oder Jacques Chirac (Bürgermeister von Paris 1977-1995) deutlich ab.

Das Bild, das die Öffentlichkeit vom *cumul* hat, ist ein sehr negatives, welches sich unter anderem auf der Befürchtung gründet, dass der Kampf um politische Positionen fast die komplette Aufmerksamkeit der Abgeordneten absorbiert und sie deswegen ihre parlamentarischen Pflichten vernachlässigen. Die Einstellungen der Wähler gegenüber dem *cumul* sind trotzdem sehr widersprüchlich. Im Allgemeinen sind sie gegen das *cumul*, konkrete und greifbare Handlungen, die die vielfältigen Positionsverschränkungen ihrer Politiker aufheben könnten, erfolgen aber kaum. Dieser Widerspruch lässt sich dadurch erklären, dass die Dezentralisierung die Rolle der Abgeordneten in der Form gestärkt hat, dass sie in manchen Kreisen wie kleine Fürsten regieren können. Besonders berühmte Politiker, die zugleich lokale Persönlichkeiten sind, sei es als Präsident einer der einhundert *départements* fungieren, wie etwa Henri Emmanuelli (in *Landes*) oder als Abgeordneter und Bürgermeister einer Großstadt,, wie Fabienne Keller (Straßburg 2002-2008) oder Edmond Hervé (Rennes, 1977-2008) diese Unantastbarkeit genießen. Sie stärken das *cumul*.

2.2. Das Ende des *cumul*?

Für die Politikwissenschaft und für die politische Klasse ist es nichts Ungewöhnliches, dass über die Beendigung des *cumul* intensive Debatten geführt werden, die mitunter auch in Gesetze münden.¹⁸ Bisher blieb das *cumul* jedoch trotz dieser Diskussionen und Versuche unbeschadet, war es doch ein wichtiger Teil des „Systems der Notables“¹⁹ Das Gesetz aus dem

¹⁷ Philippe Augé, „La nouvelle législation sur le cumul des mandats électoraux et des fonctions électives“, in: *Regards sur l'actualité*, H. 270, April 2001, S. 19-32.

¹⁸ Bernard Roman, *La fin du cumul des mandats*, Paris: Bruno Leprince, 2000.

¹⁹ Albert Mabileau, „Le cumul des mandats“, in: *Regards sur l'actualité*, H. 169, März 1991, S. 18.

Jahre 2000 erzeugte aber einen ersten tiefen Einschnitt. War in der Nationalversammlung zuvor die Hälfte der Abgeordneten gleichzeitig auch Bürgermeister, mussten nun ungefähr 30 % der Abgeordneten von ihren lokalen Positionen zurücktreten²⁰.

Entsprechend waren die *cumulants* in der 11. Wahlperiode etwas zahlreicher als in der 12. und der 13. Vor der Gesetzgebung des Jahres 2000 waren 82 % der Abgeordneten Stadtversammlungsabgeordnete, 55 Prozent amtierten als Bürgermeister²¹. Mehr als ein Drittel fungierten zugleich als Kreistagsabgeordnete (*conseillers généraux*). 15 Parlamentarier amtierten als Präsidenten dieser Vertretungskörperschaften, manchmal von Kreisen mit mehr als einer Million Einwohner. 11 % waren Landtagsabgeordnete (*conseillers régionaux*) und immerhin vier übten parallel zum Mandat in der Assemblée die Funktion eines „Regierungschefs“ auf der regionalen Ebene aus. Zwischen den Parteien bestehen dabei nur sehr kleine Unterschiede: 2002-2007 waren 86 % der UMP- und UDF-Abgeordneten *cumulants*, 84 % der Sozialisten und 79 % der (kleinen) kommunistischen Fraktion. Hingegen bestehen durchaus qualitative Unterschiede (große Städte/Dörfer usw.). Die einzige Ausnahme im politischen Feld sind die Grünen, die jedoch schon immer eine sehr kleine parlamentarische Partei waren.

Insgesamt hat sich das *cumul* stabilisiert²²: Zwar sind auch noch heute einige Abgeordnete Präsidenten eines *conseil général* (3,3 %) oder Ministerpräsidenten von Ländern (0,5 %), aber diese Arten von *cumul* werden nach und nach immer seltener. Besonders deutlich haben sich die eingeführten Gesetze auf die bis dahin häufig zu findende Ämterkombination von Abgeordnetenmandat, Bürgermeister und Kreistagsmandat ausgewirkt. Gänzlich verschwunden sind die Kombinationen eines Bürgermeisterpostens mit einem Landtags- oder Europaparlamentsmandat. Allerdings suchten die Parlamentarier nach

²⁰ Fabienne Greffet, *The Political Dimension of French MPs' Backgrounds*, 19. Weltkongress der Politikwissenschaft, Durban, 1. Juli 2003, S. 7.

²¹ Bernard Roman, *Rapport fait au nom de la commission des Lois constitutionnelles, de la Législation générale de la République sur les projets de lois organiques et ordinaires limitant le cumul des mandats électoraux et des fonctions électives*, Assemblée Nationale, 909, 20. Mai 1998, Paris, S. 11 f.

²² Guillaume Marrel, „Le cumul des mandats contre la démocratie locale“, in: *Pouvoirs locaux*, H. 62, September 2004, S. 123 u. 125.

neuen Möglichkeiten der vertikalen Karriereabsicherung und lokalen Verankerung. Eine Strategie des Umgangs mit den neuen gesetzlichen Rahmenbedingungen war die Bekleidung von so genannten unsichtbaren lokalen Positionen in parallelen inter-kommunalen Strukturen. Besonders beliebt waren die Positionen eines Vizepräsidenten, stellvertretenden Bürgermeisters oder Präsidenten der Städte-Gemeinschaft. Zum Beispiel war Alain Juppé zwischen 2002 und 2004 gleichzeitig der erste Präsident der UMP, Abgeordneter, Bürgermeister von Bordeaux und auch Präsident der mächtigen Stadtgemeinde von Bordeaux. Der Haupteffekt der *Anti-cumul*-Gesetzgebung war, dass sich führende Politiker nunmehr für eine politische Ebene entscheiden müssen. Als prominentestes Beispiel sei hier François Hollande erwähnt, der im Jahre 2004 Erster Sekretär der PS war und gleichzeitig die Liste seiner Partei bei den Wahlen zum Europäischen Parlament anführte. Nach der Wahl musste er sich für ein politisches Amt entscheiden – und wählte die Position in der Nationalversammlung.

Wenn die französischen Abgeordneten eine über-professionalisierte parlamentarische Klasse darstellen, in die Zugang zu finden für Neulinge ausgesprochen schwierig ist, dann hat das *cumul* zur Schließung des Rekrutierungssystems wesentlich beigetragen. Sehr oft braucht man dieses lokale Kapital, um das „Recht“ zu erwerben, die anderen dominanten Ressourcen zu konvertieren und die Unterstützung der Partei zu bekommen. Weiterhin ist das Rekrutierungssystem auf die Kumulierung von lokalen Positionen und Ressourcen ausgelegt. Paul Alliès verweist zudem darauf, dass das *cumul* „zu der Oligarchisierung des demokratischen Systems [und] zu einer ungleichen Vertretung des Territoriums“ beiträgt²³.

Das *cumul* ist der sichtbare Teil eines Systems der Akkumulation von Ressourcen, umso mehr, als die politische Laufbahn eine Karriere von Akkumulation und Konversion ist. Die Abgeordneten haben in ihrem Berufsleben mindestens drei oder vier verschiedene Mandate und mehrheitlich bereits parallele Karrieren und politische Positionen auf verschiedenen Ebenen. Das *cumul* war ein Element, das die Homogenisierung einer parlamentarischen Klasse und eines professionellen Habitus beschleunigt hat.

²³ Paul Alliès, „Les effets du cumul des mandats sur le personnel politique“, in CREAM, S. 73 u. 74.

3. Die Homogenisierung des professionellen Habitus der Abgeordneten

Die geringere Vertretung bestimmter Berufskategorien in der Assemblée Nationale begünstigt eine Homogenisierung und das Auftauchen eines professionellen Habitus. Auf die Dauer hatte dies große Auswirkungen auf die Art und Weise, wie Parlamentarier ihr Mandat ausüben. Ungeachtet des Trends zur Homogenisierung bestehen deutliche Unterschiede zwischen den Fraktionen. So gibt es in den Reihen der UMP mehr Manager, während sozialistische Abgeordnete häufiger aus dem öffentlichen Dienst kommen. Generell bestehen Unterschiede hinsichtlich des wirtschaftlichen Kapitals und der sozialen Herkunft. Dies alles hat Auswirkungen auf die Unterschiedlichkeit des parlamentarischen Habitus. Doch der hauptsächlich strukturelle Unterschied der parlamentarischen Rekrutierung besteht in dem zunehmenden Einfluss der Inhaber von dominierenden kulturellen Ressourcen, insbesondere bestimmter Elite-Diplome.

Das Verschwinden der statusniedrigeren sozialen Gruppen aus dem Parlament ist nicht spezifisch für Frankreich. Es symbolisiert die Schließung und das Ausbleiben der Konstruktion eines verschiedenartigen Habitus. Als Beispiel kann man Patrice Carvalho erwähnen, einen kommunistischen Abgeordneten und ehemaligen Fabrikarbeiter, der bei seinem ersten Auftritt im Jahre 1997 in der Abgeordnetenversammlung im „Blaumann“ erschien, was eine verzweifelte Aktion gegen die Homogenisierung des parlamentarischen Habitus darstellte. Die Homogenisierung des Habitus beschleunigt die Professionalisierung des parlamentarischen Berufes. Diese begünstigt solche Personen, die schon zur Partielite gehören. Zudem mag es erklären, weshalb es immer mehr Abgeordneten gibt, die früher als Mitarbeiter von Abgeordneten tätig waren. Darüber hinaus, ist auch der Anteil der ehemaligen „Berufspolitiker“, zwischen 1998 (5,7 %) 1997 und 2002 (15,8 %) angestiegen.

Der französische parlamentarische Habitus ist technokratisch, besonders dank der Verbeamtung. Zu den Auswirkungen gehört, dass die politischen Parteien im Wohlfahrtsstaat dazu neigen, Kandidaten mit spezifischen Profilen auszuwählen. Daraus entsteht zweifellos ein

Teufelskreis einer Oligarchisierung, die einer gewissen Kompetenz Vorrang gibt und Personengruppen wie hauptamtliche Pädagogen aufgrund ihrer speziellen Wissens bevorzugt.²⁴ Dank ihrer Position im französischen System werden Beamte privilegiert. Die sonderbare Untergruppe der Elite der *énarques* (die am besten platzierten früheren Studenten der ENA) hat eine große Rolle in der Gestaltung eines dominierenden Habitus unter Politikern gespielt, obwohl die *énarques* nur ein bißchen mehr als 5 %²⁵ der Abgeordneten darstellen. Das System der ENA favorisiert gewisse Einstellungen und soziale Neigungen, speziell unter den Bestabschneidern, die Spitzenpositionen im öffentlichen Sektor sowie in den Ministerien monopolisieren und dadurch diverse Ressourcen akkumulieren. Der erste *énarque*, der in das Parlament eintrat, war Valéry Giscard d'Estaing 1956²⁶ (auch mit einer dynastischen Logik, da er der Nachfolger seines Großvaters war und von seinem Sohn 2002 ersetzt wurde). Der wirkliche Beginn der parlamentarischen Karrieren dieser eigenartigen Gruppe von Beamten war 1967 (11 neue Abgeordnete, hauptsächlich Gaullisten, darunter Jacques Chirac). Die ehemaligen ENA-Studenten dominierten hauptsächlich in der Regierung. Sie stellten zwischen einem Fünftel und einem Drittel der Minister zwischen 1976 und 1997. Die *énarques* haben eine Schlüsselrolle im Parlament und im Parteileben gespielt. Sie sind Politiker, die sich im Sinne einer politischen Arbeitsteilung von den „Profanen“ absondern²⁷. Daraus resultiert ihre „allgemeine“ oder „technische“ Sprache, die auch dazu beiträgt, ihnen *Autorität* innerhalb der Assemblée zu verleihen. Dies entspricht einer Kontinuität früherer Systeme, wo verachtende Reden gegen plebejische Parlamentarier gehalten wurden²⁸.

4. Die Veränderungen der parlamentarischen Rekrutierung

Es erscheint fast paradox, dass die französische parlamentarische Elite kaum etwas anderes als ein Modell des Archaismus ist. Allerdings lassen sich einige Veränderungen ausmachen, die die nationalen Wahlen

²⁴ Philippe Braud, *Le Suffrage universel contre la démocratie*, Paris: Le Seuil, 1980, S. 191.

²⁵ Jean-Michel Eyméri, *La Fabrique des énarques*, Paris: Economica, 2001.

²⁶ Thierry Pfister, *La République des fonctionnaires*, Paris: Albin Michel, 1990, S. 17.

²⁷ Daniel Gaxie, *La démocratie représentative*, Paris: Montchrestien, 1996, S. 100.

²⁸ François Grèzes-Rueff, *La culture des députés français (1910-1958). Essai de typologie*, Toulouse: Presses Universitaires du Mirail, 1994.

2007 teilweise bestätigt haben. Auch ein moderneres Image bedeutet jedoch keinen völlig transformierten Habitus, weil die lokalen Kapitalien und die kulturelle Differenzierung weiterhin mächtig sind. Man kann sogar sagen, dass diese Transformation die Distanz zwischen den Wählern und den Repräsentanten reduziert. Es scheint auch, dass andere „Ressourcen“ (nämlich eine Frau, eine Junge oder ein Politiker aus den ethnischen Minderheiten zu sein), die nicht nur sozialwirtschaftlich oder bildend sind, endlich als „repräsentative Ressourcen“ (d.h. Elementen die ein Kandidat mehr „wählbar“ macht) anerkannt werden²⁹.

Die Zahl der *Frauen* in der Nationalversammlung war immer niedrig, besonders zwischen 1946 und 1997³⁰. Zu einer echten ‚Revolution‘ führte die Regierungspolitik selbst. Tatsächlich hat das Gesetz des Jahres 2000 die Umwandlung des Legislatorsystems begünstigt, mit der Perspektive, nach und nach eine Geschlechts-Parität auf jeder Ebene zu erreichen³¹. Die Zahlen zeigen eine langsame Entwicklung (z.B. 2002-2007: 10.4 % der UMP Abgeordneten und 16.5 % der PS Abgeordneten – anstelle eines Durchschnitts von 10.7 % in der 11. WP (1997-2002)). Die sprichwörtliche gläserne Decke (*glass ceiling*) für *Frauen* oder die *pyramidale* Auswirkungen unverständlich bleiben stark. Doch einige Entwicklungen weisen auf eine neue Tendenz hin: Erstens, die anwachsende Zahl von weiblichen *Kandidaten* im Jahre 2002 (44 % bei der kommunistischen Partei, 36 % bei der PS, durchschnittlich 31.4 % für die vier parlamentarischen Parteien und nur 20 % für die UMP und die UDF³²). 2007 wurden so mehr *Frauen* gewählt: sie sind jetzt 18.6% der Abgeordneten (statt 12.3% 2002). Zweitens stieg in den französischen Landtagen die weibliche Vertretung von 27.5 % in den Jahren 1998-2004 auf ungefähr 47.6 % für die gegenwärtige Wahlperiode 2004-2010³³. Letztlich zeigte die Entwicklung

²⁹ Laurent Godmer, *Die Umwandlungen der repräsentativen Ressourcen*, Institut für Soziologie, Friedrich-Schiller Universität, Jena, 23. Juni 2004, S. 1-5.

³⁰ Janine Mossuz-Lavau, „La percée des femmes aux élections législatives de 1997“, in: *Revue française de science politique*, 47. Jg., H. 3-4, Juli-August 1997, S. 454-461.

³¹ Verona Christmas, Ulrik Kjaer, „Why so few and why so slow? Women as parliamentary representatives in Europe from a longitudinal perspective“, in: Heinrich Best, Maurizio Cotta (Hrsg.), *Democratic Representation in Europe*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

³² *Observatoire de la Parité*, Daten über die 2002 Wahlen, Paris, 2002.

³³ Manuel Domergue, Béatrice Jérôme, „Dans les conseils régionaux, les femmes sont mieux représentées mais loin du sommet“, in: *Le Monde*, 4-5. April 2004, S. 7.

des Senats, eine traditionell „archaische“ Versammlung, dass auch dort der Frauenanteil von 10.6 % auf 16.9 % anstieg (in jener Gruppe, die 2004 erneuert wurde, waren 24.3 % der gewählten Senatoren Frauen gegenüber 7.7 % vor der Wahl).

Verjüngung? In der Tat geht der Seniorenanteil im Parlament zurück. (Parlamentarische Rekrutierung war traditionsgemäß für ältere Politiker „reserviert“, ein Vorgang, der Platz für eine jüngere Generation schuf. (Von 1981 bis 1986 waren z.B. 2 % der PS Abgeordneten, 3 % der UDF und 4 % der gaullistischen RPR jünger als 35). Zudem scheint sich der Verjüngungsprozess im Vergleich zu Deutschland zu unterscheiden. Die Gruppe der jungen Abgeordneten (im Alter von ca. 30 bis 39 Jahren) war relativ klein (ungefähr 10 Prozent) und ist bei den letzten Wahlen (1997, 2002 und 2007) nicht angewachsen, bedingt durch die Wahlsiege der konservativen UMP 2002 und 2007. Der Anteil an Abgeordneten im Alter von 51 bis 60 ist zwischen 1997 und 2002 von 40.7 % auf 48.8 % bestanden, wobei die 41-50 Kohorte zurückging (23.8 %, anstatt 32.3 %). Es gibt aber auch eine Entwicklung, die perspektivisch zu einer weiteren Verjüngung führen wird, dann nämlich, wenn jungen Politiker, die führende Positionen in Hauptparteien innehaben, und junge Parteiflügel (z.B. die Jungsozialisten (MJS) oder die Jeunes Populaires (die Jugendorganisation der UMP)) ins Parlament einziehen werden. Auch ist eine jüngere Generation in die Landtage seit 2004 eingezogen. Im Durchschnitt sind die Abgeordneten ziemlich alt (etwa 55 Jahre alt seit 2002, mit viele „Baby boomers“: 2007 48 % sind zwischen 55 und 64). Die Jugend wird aber progressiv eine politische Ressource.

Was die Kandidaten mit „sichtbaren Unterschieden“³⁴ anbetrifft, scheint sich die französische Nationalversammlung vom Bundestag und dem *House of Commons* dahingehend zu unterscheiden, dass diese einer „deskriptiven“ Repräsentation näher stehen.³⁵ In der 11. Wahlperiode gehörte der Nationalversammlung nur ein Mitglied an, das aus einer Minorität stammte: Kofi Yamgnane, ein aus Togo stammender ehemaliger Minister, der in der Bretagne gewählt wurde³⁶. Er wurde 2002 nicht wiedergewählt. Gewisse Entwicklungen in der Parteipolitik und die

³⁴ Dominic J. Pulnera, *Visible Differences*, New York und London: Continuum, 2002, S. 6.

³⁵ Hanna Pitkin, *The Concept of Representation*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984.

³⁶ Kofi Yamgnane, *Droits, devoirs et crocodile*, Paris: Robert Laffont, 1992.

Landtags- und Europawahlen zeigen, dass diese für Minderheiten diskriminierende Situation möglicherweise nicht andauern wird. Im Jahre 2007 wurde endlich in Paris eine in der Karibik (Guadeloupe) geborene Rechtsanwältin, George Pau-Langevin gewählt. Obgleich hauptsächlich symbolisch,, war auch die Nominierung von drei Kabinettsmitgliedern algerischer Abstammung Beistrich weg durch die konservativen Raffarin- und Villepin-Regierungen (2002-2007), von Bedeutung. Noch wichtiger ist die gleichzeitige Anwesenheit von drei Frauen aus der 2.Generation (zwei aus Maghreb und eine aus Senegal) in der Fillon Regierung (seit 2007). Zuletzt sei erwähnt, dass bei den Wahlen 2002 und 2007 Kandidaten aus ethnischen Minderheiten ein wenig zahlreicher waren (einige Hundert insgesamt) und viele Faktoren darauf hindeuten, dass die nächsten Wahlen 2012 mehr ethnische Vielfalt in die Assemblée bringen werden.

**THE PROCESS OF BECOMING EUROPEAN OF THE ROMANIAN
ECONOMY IN THE VISION OF THE POSTDECEMBRIST PARTIES.
CASE STUDY: THE NATIONAL SALVATION FRONT AND THE
DEMOCRATIC AGRARIAN PARTY OF ROMANIA**

Gabriel Moisa*

Abstract:

In the following notes we are going to examine the way in which two newly created parties from post-communist Romania have gathered, at a declarative level, in their political programmes ways of making the Romanian economy compatible with those of Western countries. We have chosen two parties on purpose –The National Salvation Front and The Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania – regarded by specialists in the Romanian political phenomenon as obviously dating before 1989, in order to analyze the manner in which they understood, at the beginning of the '90, to take steps in providing Romania with a capitalist economic background like the one in the Western countries. Many of the ideologists of such economic ideas from these parties were the same persons as those supporting the idea of a centralized economy before 1989. It is not our intention to discuss here the fit or unfit relationship between the political programmes and the real events. In the first and a half decade of the post-communist era the results were obvious, as long as the two parties- first of all The National Salvation Front, but The Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania too, have led the country.

Key words: Romanian economy, post-communist, National Salvation Front, Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania, political programmes

The year 1989 marked the implosion of communist regimes from Eastern Europe¹. These started to fall one after another so quickly that in

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¹ Ion Alexandrescu, Stan Stoica, *România după 1989. Mică enciclopedie*, București: Meronia, 2006, p. 133.

only a few months they disappeared from the international political background. As a consequence, in all these areas, begins a process of retrieving the lost time and huge differences that separated the European East from the Western part of the continent. The phenomenon takes place in all ex-communist countries. Some of them moved faster and some slower. Without doubt, Romania is one of the ex-communist countries that moved on in a much more difficult way on its road to modernizing and becoming a European country². From an economic point of view, the process was even more complicated because of communist reminiscences found in Romanian economy for more than a decade after the events from December 1989.

However, all political parties newly created had as their principal goal a faster development of Romanian economy so that it might become compatible to all economies from European countries. In other words, they tried to make it European.

In the following notes we are going to examine the way in which two newly created parties from post-communist Romania have gathered, at a declarative level, in their political programmes ways of making the Romanian economy compatible with those of Western countries. We have chosen two parties on purpose – The National Salvation Front and The Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania – regarded by specialists in the Romanian political phenomenon as obviously dating before 1989, in order to analyze the manner in which they understood, at the beginning of the '90, to take steps in providing Romania with a capitalist economic background like the one in the Western countries. Many of the ideologists of such economic ideas from these parties were the same persons as those supporting the idea of a centralized economy before 1989. It is not our intention to discuss here the fit or unfit relationship between the political programmes and the real events. In the first and a half decade of the post-communist era the results were obvious, as long as the two parties- first of all The National Salvation Front, but The Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania too, have led the country.

A very important aspect to be mentioned is that the political programmes are full of good intentions, even if clumsily put down in

² Tom Gallagher, *Furtul unei națiuni. România de la comunism încoace*, București: Humanitas, 2004, pp. 17-33.

words. Almost all of the paragraphs underline the necessity of passing from the socialist economy to the capitalist one and the developing of a higher living standard.

From the beginning, the political ideas of The National Salvation Front were based on the fact that the party was a democratic one and its purpose was to realize in Romania *“a modern and efficient economy”*³, while the same document of The Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania mentioned as one of its main objectives *“the fight for economic reconstruction”*⁴ in the sense of *“modernizing and intensifying the agriculture, forestry, food industry, cooperation, the revival of the Romanian countryside, a higher living standard for those in the countryside areas”*⁵, this party assuming the role of spokesperson for the peasantry. Thus, at least at a declarative level, both parties were fighting for modernizing, in an European sense, the Romanian economy and organizing institutions in the process.

The political programmes of the two parties gave details further on in the chapter *“Economic Programme”* about the ways in which they wanted to transform the centralized Romanian economy into a modern European one. The political programme of The National Salvation Front underlined that *“the main purpose of the political organization called The National Salvation Front is to ensure the commonwealth of all citizens and the quality of life in all its aspects”*⁶ and these goals could not be achieved unless *“a gradually change of the Romanian economy into a market economy”*⁷ occurred, while a legal support was also provided.

The economic programme mentioned the necessity of price liberalization as an essential step in adopting the Western European economic pattern. This was to develop gradually, under the state supervision, to avoid negative effects on population and economy. The state was to control especially the prices for food, energy and fuels. The social aspect of the party's economic policy was to be emphasized here as

³ *Frontul Salvării Naționale. Platforma Program*, București, 1990, p. 1 (în continuare *Frontul Salvării...*).

⁴ *Programul Partidului Democrat Agrar din România*, București, 1990, p. 1 (în continuare *Programul P.D.A.R.*).

⁵ *Ibidem.*

⁶ *Frontul Salvării...*, p. 4.

⁷ *Ibidem.*

long as The National Salvation Front included itself in the democratic left political background⁸.

As far as the “private sector” of economy was concerned, the programme contained a series of references, even if they were quite vague. It says that “*The National Salvation Front is supporting the enlargement and diversification of the private sector in the national economy*”⁹, under the state supervision, mentioning that the vital areas of economy like the soil and subsoil wealth, the energetic system, the railways, sea and air transport, other branches of public interest should remain state properties.

It is of interest the manner in which The National Salvation Front treats the problem of the private sector. This issue is even more interesting because the party has been a leader for more than a decade and it is easier to appreciate the relationship between intentions and facts. The party declared: “*As far as the possibility of passing partially or fully a state factory into another form of possession, The Front considers that such measures must serve the interests of the Romanian state and of those working there*”¹⁰. In the same time, a wider vision in the sense of new foreign investors interested in new technology, diversification and making profitable different sectors of national industry was displayed. The ways in which foreign investors could act in the Romanian economy were mentioned: capital investment, supplying of machines and equipment, providing access to technologies and know-how, creating societies with mixed capital, offering of technical advice and staff training, assistance, management and marketing.

The programme established the main ways of transforming the Romanian economy for the years that were to come. Thus, the major economic branches that were to be regarded as national interests were agriculture, tourism, and some industrial sectors, industry being reshaped according to people’s real demands, the country’s resources and concerns about the protection of environment.

The development of agriculture was to become the major objective of The National Salvation Front. The goal was to create structures and institutions adapted to the Romanian realities in order to ensure the European modern standards for the Romanian agriculture. Due to specific

⁸ Ion Alexandrescu, Stan Stoica, *op. cit.*, pp. 285-286.

⁹ *Frontul Salvării ...*, p. 4.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 5.

conditions of Romania, The National Salvation Front considered it was necessary a combination of different types of property: private, state property and a mixed type.

In a very surprising manner, taking into consideration that the programme was conceived at the beginning of 1990, the party wanted to maintain the agricultural production co-operatives (CAPs), but only as *“independent organizations of the producers with the right to decide upon all matters concerning production, selling of products and use of incomes”*¹¹; the same happened to the agricultural state units (IASs) that were maintained as being very efficient from an economic point of view. All these institutions were to be supported from the state budget.

As far as industry was concerned, the economic programme of The National Salvation Front stated, in its attempt to make the Romanian industry more European that it must pass from centralized planning and bureaucratic leadership to a prospective planning of the economic activity. Everything was to be accomplished gradually, in small steps. Small and medium business should be encouraged, no matter the form of property; the priority was given to those with a more rapid capacity of adapting to the market request. The National Salvation Front also considered that it was necessary the development and diversification of the services sector, a completely ignored field before 1989. Like in other European developed economies, this type of activity could have become one of the most dynamic fields of the national economy. In order to create a more functional economy like the ones in the Western countries, The National Salvation Front *“declared itself against making any differences in the matter of accumulating possessions by different social strata”*¹². To accomplish this ideal, they introduced a complex system of economic devices that proved successful in Western European economies, including progressive duties and income taxes.

At the same time, the economic programme of The National Salvation Front was concerned about making efforts to integrate the Romanian economy into the European and worldwide economy. For this purpose, The National Salvation Front imagined new policies as far as the external economy was regarded, according to the requests of the free

¹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 6.

¹² *Ibidem*, p. 7.

market economy, based on the following principles: the disappearing of the state monopoly upon the external commerce, the decentralization of the decision of external commerce and the providing of the functional and financial autonomy of traders, no matter the type of property, the replacement of the centralized planning of the external commerce activity with prospective programmes controlled by economic means, the establishment of new institutions according to the free market specific conditions.

A new aspect of European origins which was described in the economic programme was that of setting up productive, efficient, competitive and balanced structures in the economy, as well as providing monetary and institutional conditions for the developing of the Romanian economy in the following years.

Finally, in this economic programme, The National Salvation Front tried to synchronize the environment policies from Romania to those European. Thus, *“The National Salvation Front considers as very necessary the establishment and application of a national programme concerning the restoration and preservation of the ecological equilibrium, the protection of the environment. The sources of pollution dangerous for the environment and population must be eliminated”*¹³. The discussed problem was of great interest in the European countries where they already had a policy of reducing the polluting emissions, the programme of The National Salvation Front trying to be an European one.

In its turn, The Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania had in its governing programme, as a main objective, the economic revival of the country. This ideal was to be achieved by a combination of private, group and state property. From the first paragraph, one could read: *“We try to catch up with the European economy, to develop and modernize industry, tourism, public services, technology, in order to ensure an efficient activity, profitable with the condition of protecting the environment”*¹⁴. The reason was, of course, related to the desire of synchronizing the Romanian economy to the modern, West-European one.

The ways of solving these problems revived what once was known as the liberal programme “through ourselves”, but in a more state-centered

¹³ *Ibidem*, pp. 7-8.

¹⁴ *Programul P.D.A.R.*, p. 7.

manner. Thus, the programme of The Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania claimed that *“the reconstruction of the economy must be based upon the natural resources and inner financial efforts, present and future”*¹⁵. Foreign capital was to be used only as a source of economic development, being limited by law. The foreign capital had the role of equipping Romania with new technology of European level.

In this modernizing process, The Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania suggested that the energy-consuming factories should be abandoned, as well as those which polluted or requested a lot of raw materials from import.

As far as the changes in the Romanian industry, The Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania wanted to maintain the sectors of national interest as state properties: national defense industry, mining and energy sector, railways, sea and air transport, metallurgy, machine construction, chemical and petrochemical industry, in order to reorganize them to be economically efficient, and to turn into private property the rest of the factories or to create new ones, small or medium in size, as requested by the free market¹⁶. Special attention was to be granted to the modernizing of food industry to an European standard. According to The Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania, the state should be involved in the developing and modernizing of production and services in industry, constructions, transport, commerce and tourism.

“The employees and the producers” were to be greatly supported by state. This should be accomplished by doing the following:

- developing of the financial system so as it would be able to support all economic activities, granting credits in worthy conditions;
- a price policy that would be able in a free market to maintain a balance between the price of the agricultural products and industrial products;
- the conversion of the national currency in order to facilitate the free exchange of products and services in the inner and outer market;

¹⁵ *Ibidem*.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 8.

- the guarantee of a minimum wages meant to ensure a civilized level of living for the people;
- application of a progressive taxing upon incomes.

Being mostly centered on the rural life, the party's programme would greatly address to the Romanian villagers. It would be especially interested in raising the living standards, closely to the European one, but also in the reconstruction of the rural economy according to the Western pattern.

These objectives were mentioned in the first paragraph of the economic programme referring to the agricultural field. Thus, we find out that *"The Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania has as its main goals the reorganization, revitalization and modernizing of agriculture, the regaining of the peasantry's dignity, freedom and equal rights with other social categories, the improving of the role and position of the Romanian village in the economic, social and cultural background of the country"*¹⁷.

The strategy it suggested in order to make European the Romanian rural world was extremely original. Thus, the party's programme contained a form of modernizing that began from the forms of property already existing by then:

- the group property in which the land belonged to the peasants from the Agricultural Production Co-operatives;
- state property;
- state and co-operative associations;
- private farms in the areas with no co-operative associations.

In other words, The Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania wanted to make the Romanian rural world European, but in a collective frame. In addition, this party claimed the land as a national treasure that cannot be commercialized only by Romanian citizens. Only houses and the nearby land could be sold with no restrictions, if situated in the village inhabited area.

Even if the programme has nuances about this problem, several Marxist accents are easily traced. Admitting that the collective structures in agriculture were forced ones, The Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania wanted to make right some of the injustices done to the peasantry during 1949-1962, without asking for the disappearing of the forms of agricultural

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 10.

exploitation from the communist era. That is why they wanted the land to be used in common, but in the form of free associations. A part of the land should, nevertheless, pass to the peasants, idea which could be found in the programme of The National Salvation Front, too, in order to work it individually and sell the products according to their will. The surface given to each peasant should depend on the capacity to work it alone or together with the family. In this way, The Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania wanted to create a village with *"a modern agriculture, a highly productive technology, with peasants able to master their work and products"*¹⁸, like in the Western rural world. The European influence was obvious as long as, in order to increase their profits, the Agricultural Production Co-operatives and the Agricultural State Units were allowed to create *"their own places for selling the products they obtained, meaning stores, small centers or kiosks, in rural or urban areas. The stores could belong to one or many such associations in order to ensure a diversified merchandise and a continuity in selling"*¹⁹.

The process of becoming European was even more obvious in the fact that The Democratic Agrarian Party considered the Agricultural State Units *"an important sector of Romanian agriculture equipped with all the necessary utilities, applying advanced technologies, modern methods of growing plants and breeding animals"*²⁰. All such institutions were to remain state properties, they could not become private. The party admitted, though, one concession: the above mentioned institutions could organize themselves, if the employees wanted, in private societies in which the state had to possess 51% of actions, the rest of 49% belonging to the employees or other citizens. As far as the I.A.S. were concerned, the party accepted the idea of creating their own stores to sell the products or even *"industrial unities and workshops to realize industrial products or provide services to other unities or population"*²¹.

Like in the case of the IASs, modernizing the agriculture implied the modernizing of the Stations of Mechanization of Agriculture (SMAs) by providing a mechanized way of harvesting, services for agricultural associations or private producers, making of tools, equipments, metal confections and specialized transport of agricultural products.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 11.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 14.

²⁰ *Ibidem*.

²¹ *Ibidem*, p. 16.

Like in the case of IASs, the SMAs should remain, in the vision of The Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania, as state property, but with the autonomy of making contracts, collaborate with other unities from agriculture, food industry or forestry. Only in a next stage, these could become private societies with the state possessing 51% of the actions.

As one can easily notice, as far as industry is concerned, the party's programme is opened to the innovation, to provide the Romanian industry with a European vision, but as far as agriculture is concerned, the programme is quite conservatory, with few new ideas.

By analyzing the economic programme of The National Salvation Front and that of The Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania it is easy to notice that, despite the efforts of breaking up with the past, they are still marked by the economic ideas promoted before 1989. The fact that they were conceived during January- February 1990 is very important. Anyway, they represent a first step in the attempt of transforming the Romanian economy into a European modern one. The years that were to follow brought many changes in the process of passing from a centralized to a free economy.

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**THE CONTRIBUTION OF MAYOR TEODOR POPOVICIU (FROM
VÂRCIOROG, BIHOR COUNTY) TO THE SALVATION OF JEWS
FROM “CERTAIN DEATH” (1944)**

Antonio Faur*

Abstract:

The aim of this paper is to reveal the actions carried out for saving the Hungarian Jews from deportation to the Nazi concentration camps (1944). Based on original documents, the paper presents the contribution of the mayor of Vârciorog (Bihor County), a village situated on the Romanian territory, close to the Hungarian-Romanian border, to this risky endeavour. Teodor Popoviciu succeeded in helping hundreds of the Jews to illegally cross the border, thus saving them from certain death. His deed was acknowledged in a document (see Appendix) by the chief rabbi of Arad, Ioachim Schreiber, himself a participant in the efforts to save the Jews.

Key words: Jews, salvation, frontier, Teodor Popoviciu, Bihor

Rightfully considered a ‘dangerous’ activity, the illegal border crossing from Hungary to Romania of some Jews could not have been carried out without the cooperation of the *Romanian intellectuals, priests and villagers*¹ (our emphasis – A. F.). This is a reality supported by numerous archival documents, the majority of which are original. This fact was noted in the spring and summer of 1944, when these rescue activities were vital for many Jews in Horthyst Hungary who had their lives saved only due to the fact that they were helped by various people to cross the border into Romania. The names of these guides do not appear in the sources dealing with the subject matter, with a few exceptions. That is why we consider it is time they were given more attention, because their deeds – which were risky in those troubles circumstances – represent a valuable testimony to

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¹ Moshe Carmilly- Weinberger, *Istoria evreilor din Transilvania (1623-1944)*, București: Editura Enciclopedică, 1994, p. 174.

solidarity, the only element that could counter on a moral level the antihuman actions of the fascist authorities in the Second World War. The sermon of the Greek-Catholic (Uniate) bishop Iuliu Hossu (April 2, 1944) had a great impact especially on people living in the country, as he anticipated the ghettoisation of the Jews in northern Transylvania. Through this document, the bishop urged the priests and believers not to remain passive to the suffering of the Jews but to support them: 'our calling goes out to all of you, dear brothers and beloved Sons, to help the Jews not only with your good thoughts, but also with your sacrifice, knowing that today there is no better thing we can do *than this Christian and Romanian help, out of true Romanian love*'² (our emphasis – A. F.). The call to Christian sacrifice undoubtedly echoed in the conscience of many Romanian people, who started acting, cooperating in the creation of some 'pathways' to Romania helping many Jews to illegally cross the border. They put their own lives at risk but they were rewarded, a fact that should be emphasised but not exaggerated³.

The bibliography of the subject⁴ mentions some names of people who played an obvious role in the organisation of these 'pathways' from

² *Ibidem*, p. 175.

³ With regard to this matter, one should note that the majority of the 'guides' received money (smaller or larger sums), as well as some border patrol officers and gendarmes, who avoided the capturing and arresting those people. Through this, they gave life priority, despite serious orders which were rarely applied, this was not some sort of business, but rather a reward for the risks taken, as it was known that when the final solution was applied on the Hungarian territory and when the ghettos were set up, '*the rescue activities were supervised and investigated not only by the Hungarian activities, but by the Germans as well*' (our emphasis – A.F.) (*ibidem*). For example, the German ambassador in Bucharest, dr. Manfred Killinger, sent a report to Berlin with regard to this aspect, in which he mentioned that '...the Jews take refuge from Hungary to Romania, where the Romanian government treats them as political refugees and facilitates their journey to Palestine' (*Ibidem*). Under these historical circumstances, when the dangers for those who carried out a heroic activity of rescuing northern Transylvanian Jews from death were all too real (their very own lives could have been in danger), there still were people (like professor Raoul Șorban, the Cluj lawyer dr. Aurel Socol, Emil Hațieganu, Titus Moga, Vasile Moldovan etc.) who took whatever chances to carry out their noble mission of 'helping' those who were exposed to the Nazi persecution.

⁴ Adrian Riza, *Rețelele omeniei. Despre salvarea evreilor din nordul României*, preface by Raoul Șorban, București: Editura RAI, 1995, 271 pp.; Gh. I. Bodea, *Tragedia evreilor din nordul Transilvaniei*, Cluj-Napoca: Hiperion, 2001, 429 pp.

Hungary to Romania used by hundreds or even thousands of Jews. But dozens of other Romanians, mostly villagers, remained anonymous although they had a great contribution to this humanitarian work. The time has come for us to know their work and name, because they deserve the gratitude of posterity. On this occasion we shall become acquainted for the first time to one of the Bihor peasants who could certainly belong to the 'righteous among nations'. In order to support our claim, we shall bring irrefutable arguments taken from documents that have not yet been brought to the light of historiography. We are referring to Teodor Popoviciu, the then mayor of the Vârciorog village in Bihor county⁵.

We think it is useful to provide some biographical data⁶. He was born and lived in the village of Vârciorog between 1906 and 1946. He only attended four years of primary school. His possessions consisted in 9,61 hectares of land, of which he got 60% through marriage, as this was his wife's property. Although he belonged to the middle peasant class, he did not get rich in 1944, but he had a decent financial status even before the war, being included among the important people in the village, who elected him mayor because he was a good manager, an enterprising person, as we would say nowadays. He died in February 1946⁷, immediately after the war, so that he did not take advantage of any political schemes as a result of his exceptional activity which resulted in the saving of the Jews in the area that, following the Vienna Award, August 30, 1944, was handed over to Hungary. The new border between Romania and Hungary was drawn near the village of Vârciorog.

The first archival document mentioning his name is a *Dare de seamă* (May 28, 1944) sent by agent 246 to the commander of the Bihor Gendarme Legion, Lt.-col. Ștefan Rusu. This agent had been given a 'search warrant' for Teodor Popoviciu from the village of Vârciorog, suspected by the Timișoara Gendarmen Inspectorate that he was 'smuggling gold'⁸ together with Vasile Deliman (from the village of Subpiatra). Following the

⁵ He was mayor of the village during 1940–1946, including the four years of Horthyst occupation of northern Transylvania.

⁶ They were sent to us (as a 2-page manuscript which is now in our possession) by his daughter Elena, married Suci, who lived until recently in Oradea.

⁷ One should note that he never went into politics and had four children.

⁸ National Archives – Bihor County (hereafter: A.N.-D.J.Bh.), fond *Legiunea de Jandarmi Bihor*, Inv. 32, dos. 45/1944, f. 1058.

investigation carried out in Vârciorog, it was revealed that Teodor Popoviciu had indeed '*contacts with Jews from Arad and Timișoara, where he travelled often*'⁹ (our emphasis – A. F.). The same agent also informed on other deeds and attitudes of the mayor, concluding that there have been some complaints made against him, because 'he was neglecting his duties' (he did not take care of the administration of the village – n. n.), but 'he was forever away on his personal business in Arad and Timisoara, being involved with all sorts of suspicious individuals'¹⁰. One of those, who was known as a lawyer in Timișoara, visited him on May 25, 1944, without one 'knowing what he did in Vârciorog'¹¹.

So, the first agent who arrived in the village investigating Teodor Popoviciu, who was a target for the Timisoara Gendarme Inspectorate and the Bihor Gendarme Legion) found no answer as to why there was a stranger in the village who had meetings with the mayor like many others before him. The village notary declared that Teodor Popoviciu had stated during a discussion with him that – eventually – '*it is the Jews who can help us overcome the difficulties confronting our country at the moment, so it is with them that we have to live*'¹² (our emphasis – A. F.), which contained an important meaning, especially from the point of view of the connections the mayor had with the Jewish communities in Arad and Timisoara, as well as with many Jews from the territory that had been handed over to Horthyst Hungary. The mayor's conviction confirmed the fact that he held positive opinions towards the Jews, when they were treated with discrimination by the Hungarian authorities who were setting up the ghettos, of which the largest was in Oradea, close to Vârciorog.

In order to better see how this Romanian peasant from Bihor became involved in the saving of the Jews, we will call on other documents containing useful information. Thus, according to his daughter Elena, we clearly see how the 'route' organised by mayor Teodor Popoviciu functioned. The temporary border between Romania and Hungary was crossed at night-time by the Jews from northern Transylvania (especially from Oradea) in a point between Hotar and Subpiatra (which was in

⁹ *Ibidem*.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, f. 1058-1059.

¹¹ *Ibidem*.

¹² *Ibidem*, f. 1059.

Hungary), being guided by young Romanians, of whom the documents mention Vasile Deliman from Subpiatra¹³, who was imprisoned for a year by the Hungarian authorities¹⁴.

If we refer to the village of Hotar, this is also mentioned in a *Dare de seamă* (on May 24, 1944) of the gendarme 245, who wrote the following: 'generally speaking, the border between Mierlău and Hotar is the place where the most illegal border crossings are done; conversely, the railway Oradea-Cluj is near the border, those who want to cross going by train to this region...Even the Jews coming from Hungary through this border sector enter Romania'¹⁵.

After arriving in Romania, the mayor of Vârciorog¹⁶ took the Jews and hosted them for three days, during which time the trip to Arad was prepared, a road full of dangers, such as being captured by the gendarmes. He would wait until they had a group of 14-15 Jews whom he dressed in 'local, peasant clothing'¹⁷, then he would take them by horse-drawn carts to the village of Dobrești. From here they would be taken by train to Arad, to the Jewish Community'¹⁸. The illegal border crossing, on the 'route' we referred to, and the road to Arad would take place over four years (1940-1944), reaching the climax during April-August 1944.

In 1945, the mayor T. Popoviciu obtained a paper certifying his deeds from the chief rabbi of the Orthodox Jewish Community in Arad, Ioachim Schreiber¹⁹, an exceptionally important document, which we would like to bring into discussion here. It starts by saying that 'the person referred to here' (namely, mayor Teodor Popoviciu from the village of Vârciorog), 'of Romanian origin and nationality' exhibited '*a very humane and exemplary behaviour towards our persecuted Jewish brothers who sought*

¹³ *Ibidem*, f. 1058-1059.

¹⁴ He was arrested and indicted by the Horthyst authorities before the spring of 1944, for 'gold smuggling'; in fact, this was about his involvement in something more serious, namely the illegal border crossing of the Jews into Romania.

¹⁵ A.N.-D.J.Bh., *fond Leg. Jd. Bh*, Inv. 32, dos. 45/1944, f. 1073.

¹⁶ He did not act alone, but together with a few villagers, a well-organised team (this information was given to us by his daughter).

¹⁷ Based on the story of Elena Popoviciu (Suciu), in our possession.

¹⁸ There were cases when this activity was carried out by his wife, Ileana Popoviciu (*ibidem*).

¹⁹ This document was written in three languages: Romanian, Hebrew and Hungarian. The original is in possession of the Suciu family from Oradea. We only have a photocopy of the document.

refuge [from Hungary] to our country [Romania]' (our emphasis – A. F.). As a result of this attitude, he gained all the 'trust and respect of the local Jewry'.

'Risking the punishment of the law in those days', the mayor Teodor Popoviciu 'saved hundreds of Jews from certain death. *Hundreds of our brothers were hidden and fed by him*'²⁰. (our emphasis – A.F.). Knowing these realities²¹, chief rabbi Ioachim Schreiber considers that it is 'his sacred duty' to 'recommend Mr. Popoviciu Teodor to all the Jewish communities and to all our Jewish brothers', so that 'they would give him all their support, should he need it'. He never managed to take advantage, as he died a few years later, at the beginning of 1946.

This was his destiny, that of 'saviour' of an impressive number of Jews (a truth still unknown), afterwards fleeing this world and leaving behind the memory of an exemplary human model.

DOCUMENTARY APPENDIX

THE CHIEF RABBI OFFICE ARAD

Arad, April 11, [1945]

The person referred to here, Mr. Popoviciu Teodor, living in the village of Vârciorog, of Romanian origin and nationality, has displayed a humane and exemplary behaviour towards our persecuted Jewish brothers who sought refuge [from Hungary] to our country [Romania].

²⁰ *Ibidem.*

²¹ The mayor Teodor Popoviciu had connections with Chief Rabbi Ioachim Schreiber, cooperating with him for saving hundreds of Jews from certain death, as he himself admits (in an official document). Probably, as a result of his activity (and of those who organised the 'route' and the transport of the Jews to Arad), the mayor Teodor Popoviciu did have some material gain (including gold objects that he sold); however, this reward for his services rendered to some people who were threatened with the pain of death (or losing their freedom) is only symbolic in comparison to the historical and humanitarian significance of the results obtained (the saving of hundreds of Jews from 'certain death').

Mr. Popoviciu Teodor has gained the trust and respect of the local Jewry.

Taking the risks involved in the letter of the law in those times, he saved from certain death hundreds of Jews. Hundreds of our brothers were sheltered and fed by him.

I consider it my sacred duty to recommend Mr. Popoviciu Teodor to all the Jewish communities and Jewish brothers and to give him all support, should he need it.

Chief Rabbi of the Orthodox Community in Arad,
Ioachim Schreiber

(a Xerox copy from the collection of the author, copied from the original document preserved by Mrs. Elena Suciuc from Oradea, daughter of Teodor Popoviciu)

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THE ADENAUER-ERHARD DISPUTE AND THE SHAPING OF THE GERMAN POSITION TOWARDS EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

Georgiana Ciceo*

Abstract:

The present article aims at analysing the different conceptions of Konrad Adenauer, the first chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (1949-1963), and Ludwig Erhard, minister of economic affairs in all Adenauer cabinets and second German chancellor after 1945 (1963-1966), on the future of European integration. Due to their position within the German political system and to their extremely convincing standpoints developed with regard to integration they both were in a very favourable position for influencing the German position in this respect during the founding years of the European construction.

Key words: Konrad Adenauer, Ludwig Erhard, European integration, political unification, Germany

In the early 1980s, the German historian Hans-Peter Schwarz launched a series of recommendations, aiming at facilitating the „liberation” of historical studies on integration from the „small-European” perspective, so that a new stage in the field of historical research on European integration could be achieved. In essence, Schwarz’s recommendations took into consideration the necessity of making three types of connections: one between the national and supranational perspectives on integration, another between the European and Atlantic dimensions, in the more general Euro-Atlantic partnership, and the third between the internal and foreign affairs constraints. They were regarded as necessary in order to better explain the political context which made

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possible the European integration process, in the first years after the war¹. Out of these three types of correlations, Schwarz considered the first as essential².

In Schwarz's opinion, offering a supranational perspective to integration analyses, assumed, in the first place, to connect the political actions of the participants in the process to the political finality of the European integration process as a whole. In this respect he supported the idea of analysing the integration strategies proceeding from the various concepts taken into consideration over the time for Europe's institutional moulding - the creation of a well defined institutional framework defined through a constitutional arrangement, a sum of partial integrations, intergovernmental cooperation, economic and monetary union etc³.

In the present approach we are aiming at evaluating Germany's role in the early years of European construction, through the lenses of the contributions to this process of the first two German chancellors. According to the dictionary, the notion of role refers in a broader sense to somebody's contribution to a particular activity⁴. We do not intend to define this role in a static manner, a record of Germany's mission in the integration process, but in a dynamic one, an evaluation of Germany's capacity to get involved in the moulding of the community aggregate. Moreover, taking into account the stage achieved by the historical studies on integration, and in particular the recommendations made by the German historian Hans-Peter Schwarz on the future orientation of these studies, we intend to assess Germany's role from a broader perspective, trying permanently to relate the role assumed by the Federal Republic to the major trends which were manifest in various stages of the community project, especially in the European Community member states. Within this ample research area, we intend to focus on the first two chancellors of Federal Germany - Konrad Adenauer and Ludwig Erhard, and on the way

¹ Hans-Peter Schwarz, „Die europäische Integration als Aufgabe der Zeitgeschichtsforschung. Forschung und Perspektive“ in: *Vierteljahrshäfte für Zeitgeschichte*, vol. 31, nr. 4, 1983, pp. 560-561.

² *Ibidem*, pp. 560.

³ *Ibidem*, pp. 562-563.

⁴ See for example *Dicționarul Enciclopedic Român*, vol. VI: R-Ș, București: Editura Enciclopedică, p. 160, 2006 or *Dicționarul Explicativ al Limbii Române*, București: Editura Enciclopedică, p. 932, 1996.

in which the battle of ideas between them shaped Germany's position in the European integration process. We would like to underline from the very beginning that Adenauer and Erhard were not the only politicians who, through the ideas they launched, tried to influence the European construction. In a broader sense, the present work aims at evaluating the factors which allowed that, from a multitude of ideas existent at the time, some came to be accepted and managed to assert themselves, whereas some did not. We are also looking at the way in which a supportive platform was built around some concepts, ideas and values.

Adenauer's Conception on European Integration

Looking closely at Adenauer's statements over the years with regard to the European integration, we can ascertain that he never came up with an integrated concept or even with a sketch in this sense. As it could be noticed, he conducted his whole political action starting from a set of principles⁵, which he afterwards tried to apply with maximum flexibility. "I did not consider European unification as being a utopia, he said in 1955, the road opening before us was not easy; it demanded strength even in relation to ourselves, strong nerves, perspective and a policy which, irrespective of the difficulties, could be easily adapted."⁶ The final form of the European construction was, from his point of view, less important⁷, „it had to be approached in a pragmatic way and it could not be let to fail due to perfectionism"⁸, he indicated in a circular letter issued to his ministers in 1955 in the context of the negotiations on the European Economic Community. Taken together, these principles offer an excellent orientation framework on Konrad Adenauer's European policy outlook. What is also remarkable about these principles is their extraordinary coherence and continuity. Leaving aside some inevitable changes of accent, they kept their actuality during his whole political career and could be detected behind all his major foreign policy decisions. Adenauer repeated and reaffirmed them

⁵ See Konrad Adenauer, *Erinnerungen*, 6-th ed., vol. I-IV, Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, vol. I, 1987, pp. 39-47, 96-97, 205-210, 244-247, 327-332, 534-540, 546-550; vol. II, 15-21, 63-66, 201-203, 264-269, 301-304, 408-410, 435-440, 468-486; vol. III, 13-23, 31-35, 109-113, 148-171, 252-255, 478-482.

⁶ *Ibidem*, vol. III, p. 22.

⁷ *Ibidem*, vol. IV, p. 56, 61, 162.

⁸ *Ibidem*, vol. III, p. 20.

constantly, he explained them in detail⁹, and this ensured predictability, consistency and continuity to his policy¹⁰. Apart from these leading principles in his political action, Adenauer manifested all over the time openness towards experimenting any new integration formulae – the Coal and Steel Economic Community, the European Defence Community, the European Economic Community, the French-German Treaty, the political union¹¹.

In essence, Adenauer considered the European unification process as being a political one, backed by a solid economic infrastructure. Economic integration was not sufficient. It had to be completed at political level¹², insisted Adenauer in the context of the negotiations on the Fouchet Plans. The economic integration was meant to allow the shaping of common interests, the understanding of advantages offered by a deepened cooperation, which, in return, would have created the foundation for the entire political structure so that this “was not built on sand”¹³. The political dimension of the whole project was essential, and a political construction had to be started without delay. Concrete steps to be followed were to be decided progressively on the way in order to give strength to the overall construction. Acting like this was in his opinion wiser than „agreeing first on treaties and only afterwards starting doing the work”¹⁴. His firm conviction was that, by creating a European Economic Community, it would not have been enough to reach a political construction that economic integration could not lead directly towards political integration. Undertaking such an enterprise was however meaningful in order to smoothen the road towards a political unification of the participant countries¹⁵. This is why he endorsed all the projects of economic unification

⁹ See Anneliese Poppinga, *Meine Erinnerungen an Konrad Adenauer. Die langjährige Mitarbeiterin des legendären Politikers erzählt*, Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1970, p. 26.

¹⁰ See Weidenfeld, Werner, *Adenauer und Europa. Die geistigen Grundlagen der westeuropäischen Integrationspolitik des ersten Bonner Bundeskanzlers*, Bonn: Europa Union Verlag, 1976, p. 24.

¹¹ Hans-Peter Schwarz, „Das außenpolitische Konzept Adenauers”, in: Klaus Gotto, Hans Maier, Rudolf Morsey, Hans-Peter Schwarz, (eds.), *Konrad Adenauer. Seine Deutschland- und Außenpolitik: 1949-1963*, München: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1975, pp. 97-154, here p. 123 and p. 148.

¹² Adenauer, *Erinnerungen*, vol. IV, p. 87.

¹³ See Poppinga, *op. cit.*, pp. 111-112.

¹⁴ Adenauer, *Erinnerungen*, vol. IV, p. 87.

¹⁵ See *ibidem*, vol. IV, p. 106. See also for comparison Poppinga, A., *op. cit.*, p. 111.

of the European continent while maintaining a keen interest for any proposal aimed at giving a political dimension to the process.

Erhard's Conception on European Integration

In opposition to Adenauer, Ludwig Erhard's European vision was strongly influenced by his ideas on the organisation of the German economy¹⁶. In his view, integration was to be related to a free and comprehensive competition, doubled by economic cooperation at a higher functional level¹⁷. The idea of European integration had nothing to do with creating a new autocracy, but it involved the reconstruction of an international liberal order¹⁸, extended to all free peoples, immune to any autarchic, isolationist or protectionist tendencies, able to allow the formation of an open international society. He was convinced that, at least in the Atlantic area, this endeavour was perfectly feasible. This is why he pleaded for „reconciliation“ between the European Association of Free Trade and the European Economic Community¹⁹, convinced that the notion of „Atlantic community“ cannot be limited only to aspects related to NATO-regulated security aspects. In this sense, he supported with great enthusiasm the adhesion of Great Britain, Denmark, Ireland and Norway²⁰ and a close association of neutral states with the European Economic Community, in accordance with Article 238 from the Treaty of Rome²¹.

¹⁶ Horst Friedrich Wünsche, „Wirtschaftliche Interessen und Prioritäten. Die Europavorstellungen von Ludwig Erhard“ in: Rudolf Hrbek, Volker Schwarz, (eds.), *40 Jahre Römische Verträge: Der deutsche Beitrag*, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1998, pp. 36-49, here pp. 39-40.

¹⁷ Ludwig Erhard, *Wohlstand für alle*, 8-th ed., edited by Wolfram Langer, Düsseldorf: ECON Verlag, 1964, p. 286.

¹⁸ Erhard, „Wer ist ein guter Europäer?“ 21 July 1955, article published in *Deutsche Korrespondenz* in: Ludwig Erhard, *Gedanken aus fünf Jahrzehnten. Reden und Schriften*, edited by Karl Hohman, Düsseldorf: ECON Verlag, 1988, pp. 442-445.

¹⁹ Speech Ludwig Erhard „Europäische Zwischenbilanz“ held in front of the Society for External Policy of the Austrian Industrial Union, Wien, 8 February 1961 in: Ludwig Erhard, *Deutsche Wirtschaftspolitik. Der Weg der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft*, Düsseldorf: ECON Verlag and Frankfurt am Main: Knapp, 1962, pp. 543-558, here p. 556. See also for comparison Ludwig Erhard, „Europäische Mißverständnisse“ in: *Europäische Integration*, vol. 1, no. 1, 1959, pp. 3-8.

²⁰ At that date the accession negotiations with these states were in full progress, following the requests submitted by these countries in 1961.

²¹ Speech Ludwig Erhard, „Neue Aufgaben der Europäischen und Atlantischen Zusammenarbeit“, held in front of the Commerce School from St. Gallen on 15 January 1962

Erhard watched with revolt how Adenauer, due to lack of trust in the detente policy promoted by the United States and to mere evasive guarantees obtained from NATO²² in the altered international context of the early 60s, engaged Germany in a restricted political cooperation of the six, rallying in this way to France's positions²³, and, after its failure, in a bilateral alliance with France. From Ludwig Erhard's perspective, the French-German reconciliation, perceived also as fundamental for the European unity, was absolutely necessary to be encapsulated in an „extended Europe [...] in strong connection with the Atlantic world“²⁴.

Starting from here, he ended up becoming a staunch supporter of an integration formula, which was to lead to the formation of a comprehensive free trade area, connecting all the democratic states. It is obvious that for Erhard the creation of a large free trade area in Europe would have meant a more attractive formula of deepening the European integration process.

The Adenauer – Erhard Dialogue

Proceeding from the points of view developed by the two politicians with regard to the manner of approaching the European integration, a first observation to be made is that their discussions did not take place as much around a certain theoretical framework that might shape the process of European integration, although both of them defined their ideas in terms of such a model, but around the nature of the whole process, namely if this should be an essentially political one supported by a solid economic infrastructure, as preferred by Adenauer²⁵, or an economic

in: Erhard, L., *Deutsche Wirtschaftspolitik*, pp. 608-621, and in Ludwig Erhard, *Wirken und Reden. 19 Reden aus den Jahren 1952 bis 1965 als Dokumentation eines mutigen und ehrlichen Regimes um Freiheit und Würde des Menschen und einer diesen Zielen dienenden Wirtschaftsordnung*, Ludwigsburg: Hoch, 1966, pp. 611-618.

²² See Christoph Hoppe, *Zwischen Teilhabe und Mitsprache: die Nuklearfrage in der Allianzpolitik Deutschlands 1959 – 1966*, Nuclear History Program (NHP), Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1993.

²³ See Robert Bloes, *Le ‚Plan Fouchet‘ et le problème de l'Europe politique*, Bruges: Collège d'Europe, 1970.

²⁴ Speech Ludwig Erhard, on the occasion of the 14th Toy Fair, Nürnberg, 9 February 1963 in: *Ludwig Erhard Stiftung (LESt)*, NE 96.

²⁵ See Adenauer, *Erinnerungen*, vol. IV, 87. See also for comparison Poppinga, A., *op. cit.*, pp. 111-112.

one, guided politically as proposed by Erhard²⁶. Clarifying the political or economic nature of the integration process proves to be of fundamental importance for any attempt to explain the process as a whole²⁷, as it offers solutions for sketching the final end of the integration. According to Haas, without determining the nature of the process it is impossible to establish the dependent variable which might offer in return the possibility of explaining the finesses of European integration²⁸. If for the first part of the '50s Europe was dominated by federalist ideas which laid emphasis on the political dimension of the integration process, after the defeat of the project of European Defence Community in the French National Assembly, the idea of economic integration gained a considerable ground over the idea of political integration.

Considering the two different conceptions on the nature of European integration, the discussions between Adenauer and Erhard show that a number of *cleavages lines* can be detected. In the attempt to give more coherence to the present analysis, we decided to structure the discussion around three categories of arguments that came most often to the forefront in the debates between the two politicians, namely, how to approach the process of integration, what role the European institutions should play, and, as already mentioned by Haas, what is to be the final goal of the European integration. Looking now back to the whole history of the European construction it is obvious that these problems came to become recurrent in the discussions regarding its future design and functions. Usually, in each of the key stages of the integrationist project one of these themes was dominant, whereas the other two remained in the background: when the creation of the Economic Coal and Steel Community was under way, the discussions between Adenauer and Erhard centered around the role of the institutions in the management and orientation of the integration

²⁶ Ludwig Erhard, „Gedanken zu den Problemen der Kooperation oder der Integration. Private Studie - Vertraulich“, p. 6 in: *LESt*, NE I.1) March 1955, 3. See also Volkhard Laitenberger, *Ludwig Erhard. Der Nationalökonom als Politiker*, Göttingen/Zürich: Muster Schmidt, 1986, pp. 131-137.

²⁷ See also Ben Rosamond, *Theories of European Integration*, Houndmills/Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000, pp. 11-12.

²⁸ Ernst Haas, “The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing” in: Leon Lindberg, Stuart Scheingold (eds.) *European Integration: Theory and Research*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971, p. 26.

process, then, around the mid '50s, when the process was to be moved further, the discussions were focused to a large extent around the question of whether the integration should be approached as a sum of partial integrations or as an overall process, and finally, in the beginning of the '60s, when the necessity of creation political union was more or less unanimously acknowledged, the dialogue between the first two German chancelors concentrated upon the future shape of the union and its purposes.

As far as the *meaning of European institutions* was concerned, the most stringent problem was connected with the role that was to be assigned to the European institutions in orienting and shaping the integrationist process. Whereas for Adenauer the supranational institutions represented an essential condition for the future unity of Europe because they had the capacity of contributing to the strengthening of the relations among the six²⁹, for Erhard the institutions were meant to represent the consequence of the whole process of integration³⁰. It is also worth to be mentioned that if Adenauer adhered initially to the idea of creating supranational institutions for managing the process of integration³¹, especially after the failure of the European Defence Community, he became much more prudent when taking position on the role and functions of supranational institutions³². Ludwig Erhard, in contrast, constantly opposed the creation of supranational institutions because he considered that they were in a state of incompatibility with a liberal economic order, which by no means could be imposed from above.

As far as the manner of *approaching the integration* was concerned, the essential problem was whether the process is to be developed in the shape of a bunch of partial integrations or as a „functional integration“ of the economies of those taking part in the process as preferred by Erhard.

²⁹ *Ibidem*.

³⁰ See Tim Geiger, „Ludwig Erhard und die Anfänge der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft“, in: Rudolf Hrbek, Volker Schwarz, (eds.), *40 Jahre Römische Verträge: Der deutsche Beitrag. Dokumentation der Konferenz anlässlich des 90. Geburtstages von Dr. h.c. Hans von der Groeben*, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1998, pp. 50-64, here p. 51.

³¹ See, for example, the meeting K. Adenauer – J. Monnet from 20 May 1950 in: Adenauer, *Erinnerungen*, vol. I, p. 336.

³² Speech Adenauer, on the occasion of ‚Great Catholic Conferences‘, Bruxelles, 25 September 1956 in: Weidenfeld, *op. cit.*, pp. 354-359, here p. 357.

These discussions were most vivid by the middle of the '50s, when the foundations of the future Economic Community were about to be laid. Adenauer was tempted to leave this problem open. From his point of view, the integration „was to be promoted by all means, both horizontally and vertically“³³ which meant that for him the manner of approaching the integration was relevant only inasmuch as it helped the process advancing and strengthened the relations among the six. His firm conviction was that by creating the European Economic Community, the goal of a political union could not be attained directly. However, economic integration could help by paving the way towards a political union.

As far as the *final end of the integrationist process* was concerned, the most debated issue was whether the integration should have a political or an economic end. For Adenauer the final end of the integration was from the very beginning the creation of a political union, irrespective of the form that this might have taken – federation, confederation or any other legal arrangement would have been agreed upon by the participating states. „We have to act, the most important thing is to begin“ said Adenauer on the occasion of his last great speech on foreign policy held in February 1967 in the Athenaeum of Madrid and unanimously regarded as his political bequest³⁴. As far as Erhard was concerned, the European construction ought to have an economic architecture and an economic finality. From his point of view integration meant an advanced form of cooperation at a higher functional level³⁵. The purpose of this exercise of advanced cooperation was the recreation of an international liberal economic order, at least within the Atlantic space. His idea was that in order to offer more coherence to the whole project was necessary to have a clear demarcation between the politics and economics of the intergration and that the process was to be controlled politically by the participants³⁶.

³³ Circular letter addressed by Konrad Adenauer to the members of his government, 19 January 1956 in: Adenauer, *Erinnerungen*, vol. III, pp. 253-255, here p. 254.

³⁴ Speech Adenauer, in the Athenaeum of Madrid, 16 February 1967 in: Konrad Adenauer, *Reden 1917-1967. Eine Auswahl*, edited by Hans-Peter Schwarz, Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1975, pp. 487-489.

³⁵ Erhard, *Wohlstand für alle*, p. 286.

³⁶ Speech Erhard, on the occasion of the Christian-Social Union Congress, München, 12 July 1964 in: *Archiv der Gegenwart*, vol. IV: 1962-1966, p. 3570.

There was also a number of problems that drew the attention of Adenauer and Erhard and were brought with lower intensity into their discussions. Without underestimating their importance, but intending to preserve their considerably limited weight in the overall discussion between the two politicians concerning the European integration and the integrated character of this analysis, we decided to shed light on them only to the extent to which they gained relevance. One of these problems was that of the *circle of participants* in the process of integration. Adenauer left this problem deliberately open. When making references to Europe, he stated clearly that he took into consideration all the states that belonged to the geographically determined Europe with the exception of Soviet Union despite its considerable presence on the European continent³⁷. The circle of participants played for him no significant role as long as France and Germany were a part of the integrationist arrangement, and the participants were keen to engage themselves in a project with a political finality. For Erhard it was essential that Europe would not be limited to the members of the European Economic Community, that the integration will engulf at least the free, democratic world and would represent a first step in the direction of a far-reaching process of liberalisation. From this point of view he regarded the participation of Great Britain in the project as essential and advocated vigorously the British membership.

Conclusions

An analysis of the first 15 years of European integration and of the German contribution to this process would be impossible without taking into consideration the standpoints of this two leading German politicians. Although very different in background and character, they both shared the belief that there was no other way out for saving Germany from the political, economic and moral impasse reached after the II WW but to integrate it deeply in the Western society, in general, in the geometrically variable structures of the Western world, in particular. They both wanted the best for their own country. However they arrived at different solutions for the shaping of this integration process. The underlying opposition between the solutions put forward by Adenauer and Erhard left a durable

³⁷ Speech Adenauer, in the Athenaeum of Madrid, 16 February 1967 in: Adenauer, *Reden*, pp. 484-491, here pp. 484-485.

imprint on the positions taken by the Federal Republic of Germany with regard to the European integration in the founding years of the process.

**LE PREMIER VETO DU GENERAL DE GAULLE A LA
CANDIDATURE D'ADHESION DE LA GRANDE-BRETAGNE DANS
LES COMMUNAUTES EUROPEENNES**

Claudia-Valentina Gîdea*

Abstract:

This paper attempts to analyze the position of General Charles de Gaulle concerning the first British candidature in European Communities.

Great Britain refuses to participate after the Second World War at the European construction, and from economical and political reasons it changes its position in the sixties. For Charles de Gaulle the British involvement in business affairs would compromise his European policy. French president, de Gaulle, has taken this decision motivated by economical, political and military aspects. Another reason not directly expressed by general for rejecting Great Britain, is the American immixture in the European problems.

In this article I don't look for the responsible, but I make an incursion in the history of European construction. By the SWOT analysis I want to focus on strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats of both actors.

Key words: veto, European construction, United States, derogation, arguments

La gestion de la construction européenne par Charles de Gaulle est illustrée par deux moments différents: d'une part, le soutien pour une Europe des intérêts nationaux, et d'autre part, son opposition aux projets européens qui ne correspondaient pas à sa politique et aux intérêts de son pays. De la seconde catégorie, on mentionne le rejet des deux candidatures d'adhésion de la Grande-Bretagne. Même si les deux guerres mondiales avaient rapproché la France et la Grande-Bretagne, qui ont lutté

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durant les siècles pour imposer leur hégémonie sur la scène internationale, la rupture entre les deux partenaires a été imminente. Quelles ont été les raisons qui ont déterminé le général Charles de Gaulle de refuser la première candidature d'adhésion de la Grande-Bretagne dans les Communautés européennes? Après le premier "non" accordé aux Britanniques, comment on voit la politique européenne du général de Gaulle ?

Par cette incursion dans l'histoire, on nous propose d'analyser la position du général Charles de Gaulle vis-à-vis de la candidature de la Grande-Bretagne dans les Communautés européennes. Nous allons nous concentrer sur les aspects liés de positions que le général Charles de Gaulle avait adoptées dans la direction du refus, en mettant en lumière les arguments invoqués par celui-ci. On ne va pas essayer de démontrer que la position adoptée par le général de Gaulle vis-à-vis de la Grande-Bretagne était adéquate ou non. Mais, par le biais de l'analyse SWOT¹, on mettra en lumière les points forts et les points faibles de la politique européenne menée par le général de Gaulle dans ce conflit avec la Grande-Bretagne.

Le 14 janvier 1963, à l'occasion d'une conférence de presse, le général de Gaulle exprime son refus concernant l'adhésion de la Grande-Bretagne dans les Communautés Européennes.

Les arguments économiques

Les arguments économiques que le général de Gaulle invoquait dans le cas de la Grande-Bretagne concernent les trois problèmes avec lesquels la Grande-Bretagne se confrontait: *les pays du Commonwealth, l'AELE et les relations étroites avec les Etats-Unis.*

L'un des problèmes invoqué par le général de Gaulle faisait référence au système de "préférences impériales" que la Grande-Bretagne avait avec les pays du Commonwealth. En 1960, la Grande-Bretagne détenait une moitié des exportations de la Nouvelle-Zélande et un quart des autres pays du Commonwealth, en incluant l'Australie et les Indes.

Charles de Gaulle ne pouvait pas accepter des dérogations quant à l'adhésion de la Grande-Bretagne, même si elle insistait en invoquant sa situation commerciale particulière. La seule concession que Macmillan

¹ Analyse qui met en évidence les points forts et faibles, mais aussi les opportunités et les menaces des acteurs qu'on trouve spécialement dans un conflit.

voulait accepter concernait la limitation des importations du Commonwealth aux produits tropicaux.

L'importance de la PAC² ne pouvait être ignorée. En 1961, on a élaboré "le plan Mansholt"³ qui proposait le remplacement de toutes les subventions nationales directes pour l'agriculture par un système de prix et taxes variables, sous le contrôle de la Commission. C'était important d'établir les mécanismes financiers pour la PAC, d'autant plus que des pays comme l'Allemagne était hostile, car ses subventions pour l'agriculture étaient les plus grandes du Marché commun. La France voulait que les systèmes financiers de la PAC soient dans son avantage, parce que ses importations étaient faibles. Si la Grande-Bretagne entrait dans le Marché commun avant de régler les financements pour la PAC, cela aurait pu empêcher la France d'atteindre ses objectifs concernant la PAC, c'est à dire de bénéficier de la contribution des autres membres dans cette direction. La Grande-Bretagne ne posait pas un grand accent sur l'agriculture européenne, elle était plutôt intéressée de l'industrie

En janvier 1961, le président américain soutenait le projet *Trade Expansion Act*, qui prévoyait le droit de réduire par des accords, tous les tarifs douaniers de 50% et dans certaines situations de les éliminer en totalité pour tous les produits dont les Etats-Unis et la CEE effectuent 80% du commerce mondial. En d'autres mots, selon les Américains, ce projet avait comme but l'association commerciale ouverte des Etats-Unis avec la CEE, et le pilon pour atteindre ce but était l'entrée de la Grande-Bretagne dans la CEE. Selon le président américain, cette entrée de la Grande-Bretagne dans la CEE aurait pu mettre fin aux oppositions des Six du Marché commun et des Sept de l'AELE. De plus, les préférences impériales des Britanniques auraient dû disparaître et dans ces conditions les Américains auraient gagné dans leurs relations commerciales, les Dominions britanniques.

De Gaulle avait compris la stratégie américaine concernant l'adhésion britannique au Marché commun, et il s'est rendu compte qu'au sein des Communautés européennes, la Grande-Bretagne aurait pu s'opposer à sa politique protectionniste. D'une part, le général de Gaulle voyait dans ce projet du *Trade Expansion Act* une menace pour l'industrie

² Politique Agricole Commune

³ Sicco Mansholt a été le commissaire pour l'Agriculture.

française qui ne pouvait pas faire face à la concurrence américaine. D'autre part, il craignait pour la politique agricole commune, indésirable par les Américains qui désiraient écouler leurs excédents et mettre accent sur la libération des produits industriels au détriment de ceux agricoles. Le plan américain représentait pour de Gaulle une menace pour la construction européenne.

Les arguments politiques

Charles de Gaulle a essayé de convaincre le Premier ministre britannique, Harold Macmillan d'embrasser la politique européenne de la France, en s'éloignant de politique américaine. Mais la Grande-Bretagne voulait imposer dans les négociations d'adhésion un statut particulier de rester proche d'Etats-Unis.

La politique de la Grande-Bretagne concernant la construction européenne était différente de celle que le général de Gaulle envisageait. Le général de Gaulle ne pouvait pas accepter qu'un état, même s'il s'agissait de la Grande-Bretagne change les règles du jeu de la construction européenne. Il ne pouvait pas accepter des dérogations des Six qui pouvait atteindre les objectifs communautaires.

Le général de Gaulle laissait prévoir que si la Grande-Bretagne entrait dans la Communauté avec une foule d'autres États, la cohésion de tous ses membres n'y résisterait pas et qu'en définitif il apparaîtrait une communauté atlantique colossale, sous dépendance et direction américaine, et qui aurait tôt fait d'absorber la Communauté européenne.

Dans sa conférence de presse, Charles de Gaulle insistait sur l'impossibilité pour l'Angleterre d'accepter l'acquis communautaire mis en évidence par les longues conversations de Bruxelles. Pour le général de Gaulle, l'Angleterre n'était que le cheval de "Troie des États-Unis" en Europe.

Les arguments militaires

Sauf les arguments politiques que le général trouve pour empêcher la Grande-Bretagne d'entrer dans les Communautés Européennes, on peut avouer, qu'il y avait aussi des obstacles du point de vue militaire. C'est le général de Gaulle qui avait proposé aux américains et aux britanniques de former un directoire à trois au sein de l'OTAN, mais c'est le refus que le

général a reçu de la part des autres deux grands. Les présidents américains Eisenhower et Kennedy avaient deux plans concernant l'OTAN: d'une part, ils voulaient une pluralité à l'intérieur de l'OTAN, et d'autre part, ils désiraient lancer un projet d'une communauté atlantique, cela signifiait une intégration des deux rives de l'Atlantique permettant aux États-Unis de contrôler les Européens. Pour de Gaulle les doléances américaines étaient impossible d'être accomplies tant qu'il était sur la scène politique.

Les Américains avaient proposé de fournir aux Britanniques une fusée Polaris lancée d'un sous-marin. Les Britanniques devraient placer leurs sous-marins munis de fusée Polaris sous le contrôle de l'OTAN, et l'emploi des fusées était soumis à un double contrôle: britannique et américain. Dans ces conditions, les Britanniques auraient dû abandonner leur indépendance atomique militaire. On doit préciser que la France du général de Gaulle n'avait pas construit de sous-marins ou des fusées nucléaires, car leur fabrication impliquait des coûts très élevés.

Ce qui est important de mentionner, c'est le fait qu'après le dessein du président américain Kennedy, dessein qui a reçu une formulation plus concrète avec le projet de "force multilatérale", par lequel les États-Unis devaient contrôler les armes britanniques et françaises, le général Charles de Gaulle a exprimé la volonté d'indépendance de la France par trois voies.⁴ La France ne voulait pas participer à une force multilatérale dans le cadre de l'OTAN, par ce que cela pouvait la priver de se doter d'une force de frappe nationale indépendante. Et à Nassau, le président américain Kennedy a montré qu'il voulait conserver le leadership du camp atlantique.

Une autre motivation non avouée était la volonté d'écarter un État puissant comme USA, qui pouvait être un rival de la France pour le leadership dans la Communauté. On parle plutôt d'un argument de stratégie que de Gaulle pensait, mais il essayait chaque fois de le cacher dans ses discours concernant l'implication des Américains dans les affaires européennes.

⁴ Serge Bernstein, Pierre Milza, *Histoire de l'Europe. Déchirures et reconstruction de l'Europe. 1919*, Paris: Hatier, Janvier, 1992, pp. 227-228.




Figure n°1 Le premier veto du général de Gaulle à la candidature de la Grande-Bretagne

La conférence de presse a produit un grand choc sur l'opinion publique et a entraîné des réactions très vives. Les partenaires de la France ont estimé que la méthode était inacceptable: c'est le gouvernement français qui avait exigé un front commun des Six dans la négociation et c'est lui maintenant, après seize mois de pourparlers, qui s'opposait à la candidature britannique sans avoir consulté les autres gouvernements. La Maison Blanche considérait que l'absence anglaise pouvait représenter un

manque pour la CEE qui pouvait perdre de crédibilité face au puissant voisin, l'Union Soviétique.

L'analyse SWOT

On va faire une analyse du conflit qui a éclaté entre la France, plus précisément entre son représentant- le général Charles de Gaulle- et la Grande- Bretagne, qui soutenait sa position d'entrer dans les Communautés européennes déjà créées. Pour comprendre mieux les faits dont on a déjà parlés, on mettra en évidence selon le modèle Swot,⁵ les points forts et les points faibles des deux acteurs du conflit, la France et la Grande-Bretagne.

En ce qui concerne *la France*, selon nous, elle avait un système politique étable parce que le *gaullisme*⁶ gagnait de plus en plus terrain, donc la popularité du général Charles de Gaulle représentait un grand avantage pour sa politique interne. Le gaullisme est le produit logique de l'histoire de la France, puisque la France est considérée un pays qui a une solide tradition nationaliste. On doit affirmer que chaque pays a son propre nationalisme et qu'une nation n'aurait pas d'avenir sans le nationalisme. Le général de Gaulle avait eu le mérite de traduire le nationalisme français dans la politique et ses actes, et en même temps de définir les limites d'actions de principe pour son pays quant aux problèmes internationaux relatifs à intérêt de la France.⁷

Le général de Gaulle était devenu l'une des personnalités les plus aimées par le peuple français. Il a su comment se faire respecter par les Français, et dans certains cas par ses ennemis. Dès qu'il est arrivé au pouvoir, il a fait des reformes au niveau politique en instaurant la V^{ème} République et le suffrage universel direct pour l'élection du président et une nouvelle Constitution.

L'éducation catholique reçue à la maison et l'école militaire ont fait de Charles de Gaulle un vrai nationaliste qui était disposé de faire n'importe quoi pour défendre les intérêts des Français et de la France.

⁶ Courant politique se réclamant de l'action de la pensée du général de Gaulle voir Jean-Christian Petitfils dans son oeuvre *Le gaullisme*, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1977.

⁷ Institut Charles de Gaulle, *De Gaulle et son siècle. La sécurité et l'indépendance de la France*, Paris: La documentation française-Plon, 1992, pp. 425-426.

Quant à la construction européenne, il n'a pas été d'accord avec le scénario que ses partenaires proposaient, mais en analysant les avantages que la France aurait pu avoir du modèle du supranationalisme de la CEE et EURATOM, il a changé son avis et il l'a accepté.

Le général de Gaulle a su que pour soulever la France au rang d'un grand pouvoir et de reconstruire l'Europe, il avait besoin des appuis de la part des partenaires européens. Plus proche des uns ou plus distant des autres, le général, Charles de Gaulle a essayé et dans certains cas, il a même réussi de signer des traités de coopération et de lier des amitiés avec les pays occidentaux les plus importants afin de construire une Europe selon le modèle qu'il rêvait.

Au total, le général de Gaulle, faute de pouvoir d'imposer l'Europe politique de ses vœux, il a accepté la Communauté telle qu'elle était, mais il a dû la faire fonctionner à coups de crises et de menaces. Le général de Gaulle n'a pas été anti-européen, et son défaut a été son projet qui supposait que la France était le cœur, l'âme et le noyau de l'Europe, et qu'il croyait dans l'indépendance mieux que dans la sécurité et que l'influence de la France était bénéfique au détriment de l'hégémonie des Etats-Unis.

De Gaulle devient une sorte d'européen malheureux, parce que son projet n'a pas été couronné du succès, son projet confédéral -le plan Fouchet- a été raisonnable, mais a daté peu de temps, et le rêve de l'Atlantique à l'Oural anticipait trop hardiment sur des évolutions attendues, grâce à ses principes la souveraineté des États de l'Union Européenne a été maintenue même aujourd'hui.

N'oublions pas que le général de Gaulle est la personnalité qui s'est impliquée le plus dans la libération de la France⁸ de régime de Vichy, c'est le général qui a cherché des appuis américains et anglais dans ce but, et c'est pour cette raison que les français l'aimaient beaucoup. Il est vrai que ses idées concernant les communautés européennes étaient différentes de ses politiciens, cela veut dire qu'il était un adepte du courant de l'intergouvernementalisme, qui ne pouvait toucher la souveraineté des états membres, tandis que Schuman ou Monnet préféraient plutôt le supranationalisme. Ce dernier courant avait comme but la cession de la

⁸ Pour en savoir plus, lire: Francis-Louis Closon, *Le Temps des passions, de Jean Moulin à la libération -1943-1944*, Paris: Éditions Famot, 1976.

souveraineté de la partie des états membres aux institutions, un courant dont le général de Gaulle doutait.

Il est important de souligner le fait que la France était l'un des pays fondateurs des communautés européennes, et que sa faiblesse ressentie pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale devait être compensée par une affirmation grâce au projet de reconstruction européenne. Par le biais de ce projet, le président de la République française, Charles de Gaulle, considérait que la France aurait pu gagner sa place dans l'Europe, et lui se voyait le représentant d'un pays qui dominait les autres pays des communautés européennes. L'unanimité dans la prise des décisions dans les communautés, donnait au général l'occasion d'exprimer son attitude négative dans les problèmes qui aurait pu représenter un danger pour les intérêts de la France et de ses partenaires européens -c'est le cas des deux veto exprimés à l'adhésion de la Grande-Bretagne dans les communautés.

À notre avis, le développement de la CEE et l'augmentation du nombre des participants aux communautés auraient pu représenter un avantage pour la France. Mais les membres qui voulaient adhérer à la CEE et aux autres communautés, devaient accepter sans aucune dérogation, et non comme la Grande-Bretagne qui avait demandé des dérogations, l'acquis communautaire. Ces nouveaux membres représentaient des pays riches avec des économies fleurissantes que la France imaginait dominer. Comme on a déjà souligné, la Grande-Bretagne n'était pas préparée, selon l'opinion du général de Gaulle d'entrer dans la CEE, et ses dérogations concernant l'intégration de l'acquis communautaire dans la politique interne jusqu'au moment où elle résolvait les problèmes avec les pays du Commonwealth, ne pouvaient pas être acceptées par le général de Gaulle.

Sur le plan international, pendant la Guerre Froide, le général Charles de Gaulle voulait devenir une sorte de médiateur entre l'Occident et l'Union Soviétique.

Mais pendant ce conflit, la France avait aussi *des points faibles* qui étaient fortement visibles. L'économie de la France n'était pas dans une très bonne situation; pour elle la CEE était un secours nécessaire pour sortir de l'impasse. La France, par la voix du général de Gaulle avait réclamé maintes fois que la Grande-Bretagne avait un commerce riche, mais une agriculture presque inexistante.

On doit prendre en considération qu'en 1963, l'un des plus important problème à résoudre, du point de vue économique, parmi les Six partenaires européens, a été le plan élaboré par Washington, qui prévoyait que GATT devait réduire les taxes pour les importations dans tous les pays. Ce plan devait être approuvé par des négociations connues sous le nom de "Kennedy round ". C'était une première chance pour la CEE comme une seule entité dans les négociations internationales. Le plan américain a divisé les attitudes des Six partenaires européens en ce qui concerne cette initiative, en deux directions: d'une part, les adeptes du commerce libre, représentés par Erhard, qui soutenait la réduction des tarifs, et d'autre part, on trouvait les protectionnistes, qui exprimaient leur position par la voix du général de Gaulle.⁹

Le courant politique qui dominait la France, on parle de gaullisme, aurait pu influencer les décisions prises hors du territoire français, les décisions pour les communautés européennes. N'oublions pas que la France avait rejeté la proposition de la Grande-Bretagne d'adhérer à la CEE sans consulter ses partenaires, et le paradoxe pour eux était le fait que c'était la France celle qui avait demandé une position commune des autres concernant ce problème et qu'après seize mois de négociations, le Gouvernement français s'opposait à la proposition de la Grande-Bretagne.

Les partenaires européens ont contesté sans cesse l'attitude rigide et intouchable du général de Gaulle en ce qui concerne la candidature de la Grande-Bretagne dans les Communautés européennes. Toujours eux, les partenaires européens, redoutaient la volonté du général Charles de Gaulle de faire de France la nation guide de l'Europe et craignaient un affaiblissement des liens avec les États-Unis.¹⁰ Au nom de l'incompatibilité, le général de Gaulle avait rejeté deux fois la candidature britannique.

En nous rapportant à l'autre acteur impliqué dans ce conflit, la *Grande-Bretagne*, on peut dire que l'un de ses points *les plus forts* était la relation favorable qu'elle détenait avec les pays du Commonwealth. On voyait que le commerce avec les pays de Commonwealth s'était diminué parce que des pays partenaires comme le Canada, la Nouvelle Zélande, les

⁹ Christopher Booker, Richard North, *Uniunea Europeană sau marea dezamăgire. Istoria secretă a construcției europene*, Filipeștii de Târg: Editura Antet xx Press, 2004, p. 88.

¹⁰ Gilles Ferreol, Marc Blanquet, Noel Flageul, Yves Jean Beloeil-Benoist, Dominique Breillat, *Dictionnaire de l'Union Européenne*, Paris: Armand Colin, 2000, p. 75.

Indes étaient plutôt intéressés de signer des accords avec leurs voisins, et la Grande-Bretagne préférait à faire du commerce avec ces pays grâce aux prix bas. Donc, son point fort était sa continuité du commerce avec les pays de Commonwealth, même après la demande d'adhésion dans la CEE. Les exigences du Marché Commun n'étaient pas en concordance avec les plans de la Grande-Bretagne, qui ne désirait pas de cesser son commerce avec les pays de Commonwealth, même si elle avait des problèmes avec ceux-ci concernant le commerce.

D'ailleurs, un autre point fort c'était le fait que la Grande-Bretagne se remarquait comme le pays fondateur de l'AELE. On ne doit pas oublier le fait que cette association était vue par les pays des communautés européennes comme une rivale, et que la Grande-Bretagne aurait dû renoncer sans aucune hésitation à n'importe quel contact avec elle, si elle voulait faire partie de la CEE. Mais la Grande-Bretagne, même si elle avait constaté apparition de GATT qui déterminait la diminution et la disparition du rôle de l'AELE, celle-ci avait hésité entre CEE et celle à laquelle nous nous sommes rapportés.

Un autre point fort de la Grande-Bretagne qu'on a remarqué, en mettant en lumière le modèle Swot, a été sa relation spéciale avec les États-Unis. Ceux-ci avaient un partenaire de confiance en Europe, dans une guerre très dangereuse avec l'ennemi, l'Union Soviétique, la Guerre Froide. Mais, même si le général de Gaulle n'a pas fait une référence directe dans une conférence de presse à cet argument du rejet de la demande d'adhésion de la Grande-Bretagne en 1963, il faut affirmer que cette relation très étroite entre les États-Unis et la Grande-Bretagne était fortement contesté par le général. Il faut mentionner, d'une part que les présidents américains Eisenhower et Kennedy voulaient lancer un projet d'une "communauté atlantique", il s'agissait d'une intégration politique des deux rives de l'Atlantique permettant aux États-Unis de contrôler les Européens considérés des concurrents économiques et politiques. Ce fait a marqué sans doute des inquiétudes pour le général de Gaulle, qui avait demandé la création d'un directoire à trois (La Grande-Bretagne, les États-Unis et la France) concernant les armes nucléaires et sa proposition a été rejetée.

D'autre part, le président américain, Kennedy, voulait que l'OTAN adoptât la doctrine de riposte graduée et pour que tous les alliés européens acceptassent des missiles américains sur leur sol. Les Britanniques et les

Français voyaient dans l'initiative américaine une perte d'autonomie, mais la réaction des deux a été différente, même s'ils partageaient la même idée. Le premier ministre britannique Macmillan avait accepté la collaboration nucléaire avec les États-Unis, mais en préservant l'autonomie stratégique de la Grande-Bretagne. Les deux exemples concernant l'intérêt des États-Unis dans l'Europe, notamment dans le domaine de l'armement, ont déterminé le général de Gaulle de prendre une attitude de méfiance vis-à-vis de ceux-ci, et de la Grande-Bretagne, leur "cheval de Troie" des États-Unis en Europe¹¹. Donc, cette relation étroite entre la Grande-Bretagne et les États-Unis, pouvait représenter un obstacle pour l'entrée de la Grande-Bretagne dans la CEE, un obstacle que le général de Gaulle exprimer par le biais du droit de veto.

Une raison pour laquelle le général de Gaulle montrait des hostilités vis-à-vis des aides militaires était liée de sa répugnance à penser que les forces américains pouvaient réussir là où les Français avait échoué et, que la culture américaine pouvait supplanter la culture française. Le général Charles de Gaulle surestimait les capacités de la France; mais les champions finissent par surestimer leurs capacités.¹²

On peut dire que la position géopolitique de la Grande-Bretagne représentait un avantage pour celle-ci, même si le Président de la République Française considérait la Grande-Bretagne hors des frontières européennes à cause de sa position insulaire et maritime. La persévérance des gens leaders britanniques dans la direction de l'adhésion de la Grande-Bretagne dans les Communautés Européennes a représenté un point fort dans la lutte avec les empêchements de adhésion.

Quelles auraient été *les opportunités* que le général de Gaulle aurait eu si la Grande-Bretagne était entrée dans les Communautés européennes ?

Si la Grande-Bretagne entrait dans les Communautés Européennes sans des dérogations, le général de Gaulle aurait pu influencer et contrôler un état avec une économie riche favorisée par le commerce avec Commonwealth. De plus, le marché britannique pouvait devenir un marché pour les produits agricoles français. Sur le plan politique, Charles

¹¹ Phillippe Valode, *L'histoire de l'Europe. L'idée européenne de 1945 à l'élargissement à 25 membres*, Paris: Éditions de Vecchi, 2004, p. 43.

¹² Bernard Ledwidge, *De Gaulle et les Américains. Conversations avec Dulles, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Rusk 1958-1964*, Paris: Flammarion, 1984, p. 154.

de Gaulle aurait gagné un partenaire qui se prononçait pour le modèle de l'intergouvernementalisme concernant la construction européenne. Sur le plan militaire, les Britanniques pouvaient devenir des partenaires pour la création des armes nucléaires.

Les opportunités pour la Grande-Bretagne, si elle devenait membre des Communautés européennes, étaient nombreuses. La Grande-Bretagne aurait pu devenir membre du Marché commun, et cela aurait signifié une stabilité économique en comparaison avec l'AELE qui avait un caractère artificiel. De plus, les pays du Commonwealth avaient abandonné le commerce avec la Grande-Bretagne et se sont dirigés vers le commerce avec les Etats-Unis. On trouvait le capital américain dans les pays de la CEE, et c'était important pour la Grande-Bretagne d'être parmi ses partenaires des Américains. Il faut ajouter que la Grande-Bretagne voulait pas participer à la formation du bloc franco-allemand, parce que la lutte pour la construction européenne et contre l'ennemi soviétique devait continuer avec l'appui des Britanniques.

Il y avait quand même des *menaces* qui devaient être prises en considération par les deux acteurs. D'une part, si la Grande-Bretagne entrait dans les Communautés européennes, de Gaulle devait accepter que l'économie britannique était supérieure à celle française et qu'elle aurait pu dominer le Marché commun, et l'agriculture britannique aurait pu être privilégiée. De plus, la Grande-Bretagne ne pouvait pas renoncer au partenariat avec les Américains, et ce fait aurait pu entrer en opposition avec la politique européenne du général.

D'autre part, si le général de Gaulle restait ferme sur ses positions, en rejetant la demande d'adhésion de la Grande-Bretagne, on pouvait assister à une crise sans précédent au sein des Communautés européenne. L'attitude du général français pouvait déterminer une isolation de la France sur la scène européenne.

Quant à la Grande-Bretagne les menaces existaient même si elle entrait ou non dans les Communautés Européennes. Si elle était acceptée par les Six, elle devait renoncer à ces dérogations et accepter l'acquis communautaire tel qu'il était. Ce n'était pas exclu d'avoir eu des oppositions avec le général de Gaulle concernant la construction européenne. Si la Grande-Bretagne restait à l'écart des Six, elle pouvait devenir isolée concernant la politique de construction européenne, et

n'oublions pas que la Grande-Bretagne avaient des problèmes économiques et politiques dont la résolution pouvait être l'intégration au sein des Communautés européennes.

Il faut mentionner les hypothèses qu'on peut déduire de la situation créée par le refus du général de Gaulle à l'entrée de la Grande-Bretagne dans la CEE. Si le modèle supranational avait pu gagner du terrain au détriment du modèle intergouvernemental, et le système de l'unanimité avait été éloigné, la Grande-Bretagne aurait pu être acceptée dans la CEE, même si la France avait rejeté sa candidature.

Une autre possibilité qu'on peut prendre en considération, serait l'existence des dérogations d'intégrer l'acquis communautaire, dérogations prétendues par les autres membres fondateurs. Ce qui est difficile à croire, qu'on prend aussi comme une hypothèse pour l'entrée de la Grande-Bretagne dans la CEE, c'est le changement des traités fondateurs, toujours éliminant le vote unanime dans la prise des décisions.

On considère qu'il est important de donner *des solutions* qu'on a envisagées en ce qui concerne ce conflit qui s'est déroulé en deux reprises, cela veut dire les deux rejets ou les deux "non" du général de Gaulle à l'entrée de la Grande-Bretagne dans la CEE. On veut souligner le fait que la construction de l'Europe ne doit pas représenter le produit de la force ou de la domination¹³. Le président de la République française, le général de Gaulle montrait par son attitude et ses politiques l'inverse de ce critère important de la construction européenne.

Pour la *Grande-Bretagne*, on a trouvé cinq solutions pour sortir de l'impasse. Premièrement, la Grande-Bretagne aurait pu accepter la situation créée et qu'elle ait réalisé des politiques intérieures pour éliminer les barrières qui étaient dans la voie de son adhésion aux Communautés Européennes.

En second lieu, comme on a déjà souligné, pour la Grande-Bretagne était favorable la situation d'éliminer le droit de veto des pays membres des Communautés européennes et d'introduire le vote de majorité simple ou qualifiée. Ce fait aurait pu représenter sans aucun doute le changement des traités fondateurs des communautés européennes.

Une autre solution pour que la Grande-Bretagne ne se trouve dans une isolation des partenaires européens, et pour sauver son économie qui

¹³ Louis Dubois, *L'UE*, Paris: Les notices de la documentation française, 2004, p. 5.

passait par une période délicate, c'était le renforcement de l'AELE. Cette association créée par la Grande-Bretagne et vue par les Six partenaires européens comme la rivale de la CEE, aurait pu représenter pour les britanniques à cette période là, un soutien.

En quatrième lieu, on a trouvé comme solution pour la Grande-Bretagne la situation dans laquelle celle-ci aurait pu accepter la situation. L'acceptation de la situation signifie pour la Grande-Bretagne d'essayer d'améliorer son économie pour que celle-ci soit acceptée et d'accepter un nouveau terme imposé par les Six pour entrer dans la CEE, donc ses représentants auraient dû se préoccuper de créer des politiques et réformes intérieures dans ce but. En temps que les politiciens se préoccupent de créer de politiques intérieures pour que la Grande-Bretagne soit acceptée parmi les autres six au sein des Communautés européennes, la relation avec les États-Unis ne soit pas assez étroite pour que la France ne réclame plus sa complicité avec le rival américain des français.

En dernier lieu, une solution pour la Grande-Bretagne aurait pu être le renforcement du partenariat avec les États-Unis et avec les pays du Commonwealth. On doit mentionner que les solutions qu'on vient de proposer dans ce dernier cas, sont dans une totale opposition avec les exigences prétendues par le général de Gaulle, donc cette alternative aurait pu représenter pour la Grande-Bretagne un échec dans sa volonté d'entrer dans la CEE.

Si on a donné quelques solutions pour l'un des acteurs impliqués dans ce conflit, il est nécessaire d'avouer quelles sont les alternatives que la France aurait pu avoir dans ce conflit qui était devenu très tendu pour la Grande-Bretagne et pour les autres cinq partenaires européens. Par son attitude et prise de position, le général de Gaulle a voulu montrer de nouveau que la grandeur de la France était plus importante que la grandeur des français ou les opinions de ses partenaires.¹⁴

Pour *la France* on a trouvé deux solutions pour sortir de l'impasse. D'abord, la France aurait pu accepter la Grande-Bretagne dans les structures européennes déjà formées et que la Grande-Bretagne ressoude les problèmes intérieurs avec lesquels se confrontait. L'entrée de la Grande-Bretagne dans les Communautés européennes aurait pu déterminer un développement de ceux-ci, une augmentation de la crédibilité des

¹⁴ Jacques Madaule, *Istoria Franței*, vol. 3, București: Editura politică, 1973.

communautés européennes et les demandes d'adhésion des nouveaux membres qui respectaient l'acquis communautaire.

Une solution extrême que la France pouvait trouver dans la situation conflictuelle- le veto -, aurait pu être son recul des Communautés Européennes à cause de la position et la pression de ses partenaires européens. Concernant l'abandon, il faut noter que c'était presque impossible de le faire, parce qu'elle risquait un isolement sur tous les plans.

Au contraire du statut du Conseil de l'Europe, les traités communautaires ne prévoient pas que les États qu'ils regroupent puissent perdre leur qualité de membres; ils sont muets tant sur le droit de retrait que sur la possibilité d'une exclusion. Il faut en déduire que les États membres ne puissent pas dénoncer unilatéralement les traités, combiné avec la durée illimitée de ceux-ci, cela signifie que l'appartenance aux Communautés est définitive. C'est fortement improbable que les certaines membres désirent le retrait des Communautés, tant parce que l'intégration a déjà été atteinte dans des domaines très importants. À la limite, ils pourraient se mettre d'accord, soit accepter le départ de l'un d'eux, soit même mettre fin aux Communautés.¹⁵ Les traités sont la base de tous les actes des Communautés européennes, la future Union Européenne¹⁶. C'était impossible de modifier les traités, s'il n'y avait pas l'accord de tous les pays membres.

Certes, le général Charles de Gaulle a provoqué la crise de 1965, et a été considéré le principal responsable des plans Fouchet et des candidatures britanniques. Par ses conceptions et exigences, mais aussi par les deux vetos, le général français a suscité des mécontentements des partenaires européens, qui ne voulaient pas faire des concessions à cause des exigences du président français. Le climat communautaire a connu des tensions depuis 1962, l'irritation, la méfiance et les marchandages remplaçaient la confiance réciproque et le désir de coopération. Chacun des partenaires européens soupçonnait l'autre, ou les autres, comme c'était le cas de la France, d'arrière pensée. Dans ces conditions mentionnées, c'était très difficile de surmonter les blocages au sein des Communautés. Mais le général Charles de Gaulle était suffisamment grand pour supporter

¹⁵ Guy Isaac, *Droit communautaire général*, 7^e Paris: Armand Colin, 1983, 1999, pp. 21-22.

¹⁶ Documentation européenne, *Comment fonctionne l'Union européenne. Guide des institutions européennes à l'usage des citoyens*, Communautés européennes, Belgique, 2003, p. 6.

la vérité,¹⁷ même s'il a été sévèrement critiqué par la presse parisienne, parce que "Le temps passant, les initiatives internationales du général de Gaulle effeuillent l'autorité, le crédit et la réputation de notre pays"¹⁸

Nous devons préciser que l'idée de l'Europe à laquelle le général Charles de Gaulle pensait était en contre-courant de tout ce qui désiraient les promoteurs de la Communauté à Six, en s'opposant aux bases d'une union qui progressait par le biais des institutions supranationales, l'élargissement de leurs attributions et actions. Il donnait comme solution contre le courant supranational, l'idée d'une "Europe des patries", totalement indépendante des deux superpuissances, et au sein de laquelle chaque État nation conservait sa souveraineté et son identité. La vision sur l'Europe était celle d'une "Europe française"¹⁹ qui a déclenché des crises au sein des Communautés européennes, des crises sans précédent qui ont difficilement dépassées.

Le 1 janvier 1973, l'Angleterre entre dans la Communauté européenne, devenant un troisième "grand" qui fait face au couple franco-allemand avec des atouts plus proches de ceux de Paris que de Bonn: force atomique, siège permanent au Conseil de Sécurité de ONU, responsabilités en Allemagne et notamment à Berlin. Rien ou personne ne pouvait changer le scepticisme du général français Charles de Gaulle, quant à la réalité des sentiments européens des Britanniques. On a dû l'écartier du pouvoir pour que le rêve britannique soit accompli, une situation qui l'a fait vraiment malheureux parce qu'il insistait toujours sur "un non" à l'entrée de la Grande-Bretagne dans les Communautés européennes, parce que la Grande-Bretagne ne pouvait pas supporter une transformation économique et politique, cela veut dire une position autonome vis-à-vis des États-Unis.

En dépit de ces situations conflictuelles, "l'histoire reconnaîtra le rôle du général de Gaulle à la construction européenne, ses grandes idées, mais aussi son étrange faiblesse: cette incapacité à s'associer aux hommes, à travailler -autrement qu'en grands mots impulsifs- à la mise en œuvre".²⁰

¹⁷ Pierre Péan, *L'homme de l'homme. Eléments d'enquête autour de Jacques Foccart, l'homme le plus mystérieux et le plus puissant de la V^e République*, Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1990 p. 7.

¹⁸ L'article "Sévèrement critiqué par la presse parisienne" dans *La Tribune de Genève*, N° 174, Jeudi 27 juillet 1967, p. 24.

¹⁹ Simon Bulmer, Christian Lequesne, *The Member States of the European Union*, Oxford: University Press, 2005, p. 100.

²⁰ Emmanuel d'Astier, *Les Grands*, Paris: Librairie Gallimard, 1961, p. 157.

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**FROM THE “RED ARMY” TO A “RUSSIAN PROFESSIONAL
ARMY” – VIA MILITARY REFORM:
IS THERE THE CASE FOR AN OBJECTIVE CIVILIAN CONTROL?**

Andreea Mocanu*

Abstract:

The army has always been an important dimension for the development of nation-state, one of the elements that distinguished this entity from the rest of the actors from the international arena. However, the interest for human rights, the current asymmetric warfare and the wide-spread of trans-national threats seem to question the existence of conventional armed forces and their place on the agenda. The article at hand explores the intricate dimension of military affairs, addressing a crucial question in terms of determining how exactly the balance of power, between civil and military structures, functions in the particular case of Russian Federation. The army has always been for the Russians a core element in their own existence. But after almost twenty years since the collapse of the Soviet system, successive military reforms of the Russian army failed in substantially modernize and professionalize the military sector.

Key words: armed forces, Russian military, civilian control, reform, control

Introduction

The end of the bipolar era not solely gave birth to a new world order, but it has also brought into scholars' attention the issue of *military affairs* and its evolution in the context of the vanishing of the “main enemy”. Since the Iron Curtain and throughout the entire Cold War period the issue of military affairs has been of high importance for both parts, the USSR and the West. However, the dismantling of the Soviet Union and the proclaimed victory of capitalism and democratic forces turn the attention of

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the Eastern Europe's leaders (both civil and military) towards a new challenge for them which could be no longer blithely ignored – civilian democratic/objective control of a social group that used to be, generally, the sword and the shield of the state (some argue that loyalty to the party was considered higher than state loyalty) – *the military*.

The paper at hand develops an analysis of the issue of civil-military relation within the framework of Russian Federation armed forces, weaving the historical perspective with the requirements implied by the concept of *objective civilian control*. However, what this paper wants to prove goes beyond the limits of the historical perspective as our purpose is to show why Russian reform programs in the military area failed, although from a rhetorical standpoint the Kremlin administration claims that the pursued reforms have reached its ends. Consequently, our analysis, whose purpose is to facilitate the comprehension of this realm, has as a starting point the development of a theoretical framework, followed by a case-study, *i.e.* the armed forces from the Russian Federation. The first part of the paper, designated to the theoretical framework, takes into consideration the opinions of some specialists in the area, like Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz, with a strong emphasis on the objective civilian control. The second part of the paper has the mission to expand the theoretical approach having as example the case of military forces within the Russian Federation.

Civil-military relationship – a theoretical point of view

The issue of civil-military relations appears to be a constant in the political-military equation. I found this domain to be fascinating and challenging at the same time. Due to its major importance for civic education, the purpose of this article is to establish the essence of this relationship, without claiming that this approach leaves no space for any further debates.

Sociologically, the military has always been an important part of the society. Politically, the military is a *prerequisite* for the existence of nation-state. More importantly, during the Cold War the idea of *security* was strongly linked to the military dimension, particularly due to the presence of the Red Army's tanks in Eastern and Central Europe. The key-concept during this time was defending national territory by means of conventional

weapons. Thus, the military took over such an important function under the circumstances of the existence of a great peril. Despite this powerful place that the army had within societies, during the '90s a substantial change occurred – the idea of security was consistently replaced by a new concept, *de-securitization* or, to be more precise, "demilitarization of security"¹. The '90s were a period when the issues of human rights, state-building and democratization were granted a salient role by the international community. Therefore, the military issue was pushed towards lower ranks on the political agenda and important post-communist leaders acquiesced that there is a need for military institutions to be accountable to civilian democratic control². Moreover, for all the countries, even for those from central and Eastern Europe that were part or just satellites of the Red Empire the necessity of reforming military sector was more and more evident.

In order to achieve a systematical and substantial military reform, these new states had to build democratic institutions, a process which turned out to be more problematic than many had thought. Unlike mature democracies, Central and Eastern European states, which were eager to become part of the democratic process, had to ensure that the military will not attempt a *coup d'état* or will not seek other means of defying civilian rule of society³. Having all these said, inevitable a civil-military conflict appears, delivering to us what Peter Feaver⁴ called "the civil-military problematique – because we fear others, we create an institution of violence to protect us, but then we fear the very institution we created for protection". Although for any democratic society civil control is very important, it is equally important for policy-makers to understand the advantages and disadvantages of such control.

For Western democracies, after WW II, civilian control was a constant preoccupation both at theoretical and practical level. From the

¹ Stephen Blank, "Security In and Around the Black Sea: Is a Virtuous Circle Now Possible?" in *The Mediterranean Quarterly*, 2005, summer issue, p. 65.

² Barry Buzan, "The War on Terrorism as Macro-Securitization?", 2006, [<http://www.nupi.no/IPS/?module=Files;action=File.getFile;ID=1675>], pp. 5-6, 12.01.2008.

³ Richard Kohn, "How Democracies Control the Military" in *Journal of Democracy*, 1997, vol. 8, nr. 4, p. 141.

⁴ Peter Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz and the Question of Civilian Control" in *Armed Forces and Society*, 1996, vol. 23, no. 2, p. 150.

theoretical point of view, Huntington's academic argument seemed to have been of high importance for these societies. Consequently, in our pursuance, we shall present the two major concepts he developed: *subjective civilian control* and *objective civilian control*.

Subjective civilian control refers to a logical reaction: maximizing civilian power while minimizing military power. However, the problem that seems to occur at this juncture is the following: civil power is characterized by an ongoing competition of interests and consequently it is not unified. As Huntington wisely points out, "civilian power" means civilian group power and in the context of maximizing civilian power – maximizing the civil power of certain groups⁵. Therefore, there is a strong sense of relation of power among these groups. Furthermore, subjective civilian control implies an alleged conflict between civilian control and the needs of military security⁶.

The dichotomy subjective-objective civilian control which we inherited from Huntington was understood by most of the countries by giving credit to the second option. According to Huntington, *objective civilian control* refers to the idea of "maximizing military professionalism", which, at its own turn, determines political neutrality. The essential element from this concept is the absence of military implication in politics, envisaged by Huntington as an "antithesis". If "subjective civilian control achieves its end by civilianizing the military, making them the mirror of the state, the objective civilian control achieves its end by militarizing the military, making them the tool of the state"⁷.

Of course, "the movement towards objective civilian control has been in the interest of both military and civilian leaders"⁸. In short, we can say that it has been a rational strategic movement, with a strong sense of democracy. Consequently, the issue of civil-military relations came to the forefront of policy-making, being a constant and important point on the agenda of governments and international intergovernmental organizations.

⁵ Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1959, p. 80.

⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 83.

⁷ *Ibidem*.

⁸ Samuel Huntington, "Reforming Civil-Military Relations" in *Journal of Democracy*, 1995, vol. 6, no. 4, p. 12.

Most importantly, this relationship has widened its coverage area from nation state to security international organizations such as NATO or the UN.

Additionally to the analysis undertaken by Huntington, we should also bring into discussion some principles that encompass civilian control⁹:

- Supremacy of civil authorities over the military ones corroborated with effective subordination of the army to the civilian supreme commander;
- Recognizing and accepting professional competence and autonomy of the militaries in their sphere of expertise;
- Minimizing of military intervention in politics and of political intervention in professional military issues.

It is extremely important to retain an essential aspect, *i.e.* the balance between civil and military structures, as it is in nobody's advantage to disturb this equilibrium. Such a balance means to make all the necessary efforts to prevent the temptation to offer to neither of the two sides the absolute control over the army, as the consequences will be supported firstly by the society. If the military acquires the power, then the society would face a "military sovereignty"¹⁰. However, as history has shown us, it is relatively easy for the military to seize the power, but they encounter difficulties in preserving it¹¹. On the other hand a thoroughly professionalization of the armed forces means imposing an easier control of the civil over the military. In a "normal" situation, the reaction of the military should not surprise us, materialized in a civil-military alliance. If the civil institutions are too powerful in the area of military affairs, they will create divisions among "the generals", deepening more and more the gap between civil-military instead of abridging it¹². However, in mature societies there are developed strong checks and balances that would not allow such "anomalies" to develop in the detriment of society. At this juncture it comes to the fore the civil-military balance we mentioned above.

⁹ Miroslav Timotici, "Civil-Military Relations and the Principle of Civilian Control of the Army" in Miroslav Hadzic (ed.), *Civilian Control of the Army and Police*, Belgrade: Media Centre, 2000, p. 18.

¹⁰ S. Huntington, *op. cit.*, 1959, p. 87.

¹¹ Morris Janowitz, *Military Conflict: Essays in the Institutional Analysis of War and Peace*, Beverly Hills: SAGE Publications, 1997, p. 136.

¹² Peter Feaver, *op. cit.*, p. 156.

This sort of balance can be obtained by means of objective civilian control, as this method is for the benefit of both civil and military sectors and, most of all, it implies professionalizing the military. Civil control becomes more and more important proportionally with the amount of money from the state budgets that are designated to defense¹³.

If we fail to maintain such balance, the situation can lead to “military sovereignty”¹⁴, a scenario where the authority is in the hands of military leaders. However, as history has proven to us, military regimes are ephemeral. In this sense, Morris Janowitz’s¹⁵ assertion is of high importance: “once political power has been achieved, the military must develop mass political organizations of a civilian type or it must work out viable relations with civilian political groups. In short, while it is relatively easy for the military to seize power, it is much more difficult for it to govern the society”.

Military professionalism conducts to an easier establishment of civil control over the military. However, we should always be aware and avoid the trap when the military has chosen the path of politics in order to counterbalance an effective civilian control. If the civil institutions become stronger than military institutions, they will try to make out of the military powerful allies for different political groups. Additionally, we can add that civilians can use the military to redistribute wealth, *via* the defense budget, to particular regions and corporate interests¹⁶.

Civil-military relationship in the post-Soviet space. Study-case: the Russian Federation

New East European democracies, which appeared after 1990, have inherited politicized military, accustomed to be subordinated and loyal to the party and to the leader, especially if the last one is endowed with military charisma¹⁷. As argued above, compared to Western Europe, in the authoritarian regimes, civil-military relations differed from the model of “objective civilian control”. “In the one-party states, the military was

¹³ M. Timotici, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

¹⁴ S. Huntington, *op. cit.*, 1959, p. 87.

¹⁵ M. Janowitz, *op. cit.*, p. 136.

¹⁶ P. Feaver, *op. cit.*, p. 156.

¹⁷ M. Timotici, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

viewed as the instrument of the party, military officers had to be party-members, political commissars and party cells paralleled the normal military chain of command and ultimate loyalty was to the party rather than the state¹⁸. Under those circumstances, one can argue that there was no civilian control over the military. Actually, the lack of public or parliamentary control enabled the apparition of an oversized, bureaucratic, politicized and ineffective army¹⁹.

The case of Russian Federation's army is somehow unique compared to most of all Eastern European countries because this state has been the "official" heiress of the Soviet Empire. But, Russian military has lost on the one side a war, an alliance and a country and on the other hand it has lost manpower, money and mission²⁰. Domestically, Russian military was confronted in the first half of the '90s with the problem of disintegration, *i.e.* bringing home all the militaries spread all over the Europe. But, at the international level, the fate of Russia's military inheritance, the content of Russia's defense policy, therefore, has enormous implications not only for the security of the Russian state but also for the security order in the post-Soviet space (which encompasses much of Eurasia) and even for global security²¹.

The general impression over the Russian military for the last decade of the past century is that this sector has been highly politicized and divided into factions and cliques²². This idea is supported by analyst Roy Allison²³ who suggests that "as central political control in Russia has weakened for periods of time and as regionalism has deteriorated into anarchy or ethnic conflict in the north Caucasus, the agencies holding the instruments of coercive power have become more indispensable for the political authorities". Taking these into account it is easily to notice how

¹⁸ S. Huntington, *op. cit.*, 1995, p. 10.

¹⁹ M. Timotici, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

²⁰ S. Huntington, *op. cit.*, 1995, p. 13.

²¹ Steven Miller, "Moscow's Military Power: Russia's Search for Security in an Age of Transition", in Steven Miller and Dmitri Trenin (eds.), *The Russian Military: Power and Policy*, Moscow: AAAS, 2004, p. 2.

²² S. Huntington, *op. cit.*, 1995, p. 13.

²³ Roy Allison, 'Military Factors in Foreign Policy', in Neil Malcolm, Alexey Pravda, Roy Allison and Margaret Light, (eds.) *Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 231.

difficult is has been for civil-military relations to evolve towards a positive accomplishment. Transforming civil-military relations was more than a challenge particularly because it was corroborated with the acquisition of democratic values and standards for the new Russian society. According to the specialists' opinions, military reform and democratization of Russian society have been parallel, if not, twin phenomena. "If the avowed goal is democratic and civilian control throughout and not just atop the multiple militaries and police, those forces must be subjected to full legal and institutional accountability to the legislature and judiciary which must remain truly independent of executive interference and restriction within their legally designated domains"²⁴.

Within academic specter it has been advanced the idea that Russian political authorities lacked the will to get involved in reforming the military in order to diminish the risk of a military taking over of the power. Many voices within the Kremlin administration are inclined to consider the military as a *partner* which has to be treated carefully, *i.e.* postponing military reform indefinitely²⁵. If we are to transform these facts into the realm of theoretical approach, then we might assume that this situation can be regarded, in Morris Janowitz's words²⁶, as a "civil-military coalition". This is a kind of scenario when the military expands its political activity and becomes a political bloc; additionally, the civilian leadership remains in power only because of the military's passive assent or active assistance²⁷.

As stated above, in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia had to undergo a complete process of acquiring democracy, but unfortunately this entire experience turned out to be a failure. A severe democratic deficit can be noticed at all societal levels, but as we are interested only in the military we shall focus our attention to this sector in

²⁴ Stephen Blank, "The Great Exception: Russian Civil-Military Relations", Conflict Studies Research – Defense Academy of the United Kingdom, 2001, p. 68, [<http://www.defac.ac.uk>], 20.03.2008.

²⁵ Isabelle Facon, "The Modernization of Russian Military: the Ambitions and Ambiguities of Vladimir Putin" in *Russian Series*, vol. 5, no. 19, 2005, Conflict Studies Research Centre – Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, p. 1, [[www.defac.ac.uk/colleges/csrfc/document-listings/russian/05\(19E\)-IF.pdf](http://www.defac.ac.uk/colleges/csrfc/document-listings/russian/05(19E)-IF.pdf)], 20.03.2008.

²⁶ M. Janowitz, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

²⁷ For further explanations, please see M. Janowitz, *op. cit.*, p. 139 and R. Allison, *op. cit.*, p. 277.

particular. This particular situation resembles with the general one we have analyzed earlier. Russian military is confronted with the lack of public control, where senior people account only to their personal superiors, not to law or legal institutions. Also, autocratic and patron-client relationship dominate the armed forces²⁸. In Steven Miller's words²⁹ as long as the Russian military, entirely comfortable in its Soviet ways, remained unanswerable to political authority, the prospects for achieving needed large-scale reforms were greatly diminished. A democratic Russia would require a military it could control and shape.

A serious drawback in the process of installing democracy in Russia and therefore civilian control over the military was constituted by the politicization of the military. Although in mature democracies military involvement in politics is not admitted, in the case of Russian Federation this kind of actions were constant features of the society for the first ten post-Soviet years. In this respect, recent history is abundant in examples. Although armed forces are presumably neutral, during the 1991 *coup*, the military was divided and sided with one of the two parts. Consequently, *pro-coup* forces were constituted from the leaders of Moscow and Baltic military districts, as well as the commanders of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet. The *anti-coup* party numbered only the aviation forces³⁰. The sense of neutrality was stronger (but not strong enough) on the occasion of the 1993 events, when Yeltsin needed some time to convince the Head of Defense Minister to let the army to intervene in the detriment of the Parliamentary forces³¹. This was a crucial moment which, to my mind, was decisive in bargaining the postponement of military reform.

The process of politicization of the military was conducted through other means as well. According to Roy Allison³² military officers have occupied numerous seats in the State Duma and officers' assemblies have engaged in political agitation. Furthermore, the political views of the military were an important stake on the occasion of elections, due to the

²⁸ S. Blank, *op. cit.*, 2001, p. 70.

²⁹ S. Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

³⁰ R. Allison, *op. cit.*, p. 233.

³¹ Richard Sakwa, *Russian Politics and Society*, London: Routledge, 2002, p. 410.

³² R. Allison, *op. cit.*, p. 232.

important number of the conscripts from the Russian army³³. Taking into account that the military sector has always had conservative views, we should not be surprised of the high electoral score of the Communist Party in the first two electoral cycles of the Russian state.

The military that Russia inherited reflected no reasoned military judgment, no coherent strategic design, no considered calculation of Russia's needs and interests³⁴. A similar incoherence and uncertainty featured the entire Russian society especially during the '90s. Between 1991-1995 the military has projected itself as the only institution capable of forestalling anarchy or civil war – at least until the first Chechen war exposed its limits³⁵. Following the argument that the armed forces sought to bring stability within Russian society, military elements were co-opted in the policy-making mechanism. For the mentioned period, Roy Allison³⁶ continues his analysis, noticing that military influence was expressed in three main areas:

- Military leaders have shaped the formation of military doctrine, including the nature of threats perceptions;
- Direct influence over major national security of foreign policy decisions;
- Promotion of military solutions, including the use of peacekeeping forces, to restore “stability” in the “near abroad”.

In spite of the quantitative legal material like drafting defense doctrines or national security concepts, the lack of a democratic civilian control could be noticed quite easily as Russia's policies were not predictable³⁷. As it is known in the field of International Relations, a foreign policy (and also the defense policy) is viable as long as it has a certain degree of predictability. For our particular case, the lack of such a policy corroborated with an ambiguous formulation of Russian national interest meant that new Russia was not a provider of security for its neighbors and for the region itself.

³³ R. Sakwa, *op. cit.*, p. 410.

³⁴ S. Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

³⁵ R. Allison, *op. cit.*, p. 277.

³⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 251.

³⁷ S. Blank, *op. cit.*, 2001, p. 70.

Before going to the next phase of our argumentation, I am inclined to think that we should pay attention to another phenomenon that characterizes any armed force – the conscripts. They require a special attention as they are those who sacrifice their lives for the national ideal. The military leaders of the Russian army are still guiding after the traditional thought that an effective army is a mass army, based on compulsory conscription³⁸. Apparently, political leaders shared their ideas, because in 1995 president Boris Yeltsin upgraded the period of military service from 18 months to 24 months. As we can notice at the end of the 20th century, the situation of conscripts was not as a future 21st century army might have looked like. The hard conditions and the ill treatment the Soviet and afterwards the Russian army provided did not convince young men to join military service. In fact, most of the conscripts had a poverty background and did not find themselves on a high social status.

Traditionally, the initiation ceremonies of the newcomers, together with the practice of *dedovshchina* (an action which has greater physical and psychological effects than an action of bullying) numbered more victims than combative actions. According to Richard Sakwa³⁹, in the second half of the '80s around 15-20 000 conscripts deceased in non-combat conditions and during the '90s the number of conscripts committing suicide was of 1 000 per annum. Things aggravated towards the end of the century and the 1997-1998 economic crises deepened these negative aspects. Regarding conscription in particular, young men had no motivation whatsoever, there was no sense of proud to be part of the army and everyone feared *dedovshchina*. In 2001, the officer-soldier rapport was of 1:2, which better highlights the situation depicted above. The only viable solution for Russian armed forces was military reform in terms of professionalizing the army.

Under these circumstances, military reform was required. During Yeltsin's mandate, reforms did not have substance, as they were conducted at a formal level. The greatest fault line in Russia's military reform debate lies between those powerful forces—notably the Russian defense establishment—that oppose reform and those who advocate significant reforms. This schism existed even within the Russian government, as in the

³⁸ I. Facon, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

³⁹ R. Sakwa, *op. cit.*, pp. 407-408.

friction during the late 1990s between Boris Yeltsin's reform-oriented Defense Council and the ministry of defense⁴⁰. A certain degree of substantiality started to be configured with the appointment as Head of Defense Ministry of gen. Igor Sergeev in 1997⁴¹. Military reform for an army as the Russian army has two important dimensions: profesionalization and modernization. Taking these into consideration, it is striking how this reform has many common elements with Huntington's concept of "objective civilian control". However, there is a long way until the moment such a concept shall be enshrined into the political and military leaders' mentality. First of all, modernization of the military presumes the existence of effective political institutions. Secondly, profesionalization of the military leads to competent logistical and administrative structures⁴². Thirdly, neither of those two dimensions can be spotted in the case of Russian military. Implicitly, this situation determines a high degree of military implication in politics, an antipodal feature of Huntington's objective civilian control.

It is no longer a secret that Russian military is one of the most conservative factions of the policy-making nexus. The rise of the military profession transformed the problem of civil-military relations, complicating the efforts of civilian group to maximize their power over the military⁴³. Under these circumstances, the reluctance of the military to their own reformation is inherent, as such a transformation, which consists of conscripts' reduction, reorganization and rationalization of resources, could jeopardize their status.

Boris Yeltsin bequeathed to Vladimir Putin a legacy of an unreformed and undemocratic policy process, pervasive corruption, internal war and military politicization⁴⁴. When it became obvious that Vladimir Vladimirovici Putin was Yeltsin's successor, the military establishment was relived, as they considered him to act according to the generals' will⁴⁵. Putin was an ex-KGB officer and he was aware of how

⁴⁰ S. Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

⁴¹ M. Timotici, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

⁴² R. Sakwa, *op. cit.*, p. 412.

⁴³ S. Huntington, *op. cit.*, 1959, p. 82.

⁴⁴ S. Blank, *op. cit.*, 2001, p. 67.

⁴⁵ I. Facon, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

important is for the existence of a country of such a power as the military. Moreover, the second Chechen war seemed to strengthen this belief, as Putin did not question the way that war was conducted, proving to be quite obedient. However, the second Chechen war has revealed great problems that Russian army was undergoing. Being a practitioner of *Realpolitik* and also a member of the armed forces, corroborated with the international context, Putin understood how important a reform of the military was. Although not solely the reformist deputies from the State Duma supported Putin's action in this direction, but the communists too⁴⁶, his plans met a strong resistance from the generals, who envisaged these actions as being too radical.

As the Russian Constitution proclaims defense and foreign policy under presidential prerogatives, Putin's actions were legitimated. His first step in this direction was to name Sergey Ivanov, a civilian and also an ex-KGB agent, as Defense Minister (29th of March 2001). It was for the first time that the tradition of naming a military as the head of the Defense Ministry was interrupted. Also in 2001, Putin has continued his plans in reforming the military, by expanding the concept of budget transparency to the defense budget. The military could not just control the amount of money, they had to spend money with the precise purpose of improving military capabilities and they had to be accountable for the spending of money. He named another civilian, Liubov Kudelina, as defense financial "manager". This has been an important move of Putin, if we take into consideration that Russian defense budget constitutes one fifth of the entire Russian budget⁴⁷. As the professor of Kent University, Richard Sakwa⁴⁸, suggests, "the establishment of parliamentary committees overseeing security policy and monitoring the budget marked important stages in the development of civilian control over the military".

For the military, an unexpected and undesirable move that Putin did was the downgrading in 2004 of the institutional status of Russian Federation General Staff⁴⁹. It no longer had operational and administrative control over the armed forces. Its functions were limited to the classical

⁴⁶ M. Timotici, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

⁴⁷ I. Facon, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

⁴⁸ R. Sakwa, *op. cit.*, p. 412..

⁴⁹ I. Facon, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

ones: danger evaluation, development of military doctrine, military strategy and planning. This was an unexpected hit, as the General Staff was the last bastion of the resistance to military reform. Because of this decision, the Head of General Staff, gen. Kvashin was replaced with gen. Iurii Baluyevsky, who was more open-minded regarding international cooperation.

Reforming the military sector refers in particular to a structural transformation of this establishment. In 2003 it was adopted, within the military reform framework, a new program which set precise objectives relating to the partial professionalization of the armed forces for 2004-2008. This program emphasizes the goal of creating an army that is smaller, highly mobile and manned by professionals capable of using high-technology equipment⁵⁰. These kind of programs should, however, been designed for long-term periods. Additionally, such programs should take into consideration the major demographic problems that the Russian Federation is likely to confront with for the next tens of years. A realistic approach of this phenomenon is the conscription reform, which contributes to the professionalization of the Russian army⁵¹. According to the plans of reductions of the number of conscripts, by 2008 the number of months spent during the military service will drop at half, *i.e.* twelve months. As a professional army means higher better prepared soldiers and higher sums of money, the decrease of human resource is more than necessary, as investment in technology should proportionally increase.

In a mature, democratic society, the support of society itself in such a crusade with the military is fully present. It is not, however, the case of Russian society, which after a long period of authoritarianism and totalitarianism, cannot easily trust civilians. Therefore, Putin's efforts lacked mass legitimacy. But Putin's plans also did not get enough consistency. Whether it was a domestic or external circumstances or pressures, he did not pursue his entire plan of reforming the military. It seems that his preoccupations were targeted towards a verticalization of control of the

⁵⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 1.

⁵¹ Keir Giles, "Where Have All the Soldiers Gone? Russia's Military Plan versus the Demographic Reality", Conflict Studies Research Centre – Defense Academy of the United Kingdom, 2006, p. 4, [[www.defac.ac.uk/colleges/csrc/document-listings/russian/06\(47\)KG.pdf](http://www.defac.ac.uk/colleges/csrc/document-listings/russian/06(47)KG.pdf)], 30.03.2008.

civilians over the military⁵². However, other scholars advance the idea that after 2003 Vladimir Putin simply abandoned the military reform, although the official version of end of military reform was that the reform was completed⁵³. In his attempt to control all the possible societal levels – which gave birth to the concept of *super-presidential system* – he lost sight of what objective civilian control means. Although initially his intentions seemed to have been encouraging in terms of structural reform of the military, he lost the battle. Consequently, the nature of control over the military is "presidential control"⁵⁴. Under these circumstances, the lack of checks and balances makes Putin institutionally and financially unaccountable concerning the use of the multiple armed forces⁵⁵.

In spite of his reforming efforts, Russian military specter keeps some features inherited from Yeltsin regime or even from the Soviet era. From this point of view, one can argue that the issue of military politicization remains a real drawback in the context of installing democracy. The law promulgated in 2004 by Putin himself regarding the president's prerogative to name governors for each Russian region, instead of organizing free elections, is a perfect example that supports our argument. Usually, these persons – "little Putins" as Darell Slider⁵⁶ calls them - come from defense and security organisms which highlight military involvement in politics. However, this procedure also demonstrates a total presidential control over the governors, as they are accountable to the institution that empowers them.

After almost twenty years since the demise of the Soviet Union, Russian military leaders still have little or no idea what civilian democratic control actually means⁵⁷. Absent sufficient political control, Russian military operations inherently tend to lead to a dead end where no political solution is foreseeable or achievable as in its peacemaking operations from

⁵² I. Facon, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

⁵³ Dmitri Trenin, "Gold Eagle, Red Star", in Steven Miller și Dmitri Trenin (eds.) *The Russian Military: Power and Policy*, Moscow: AAAS, 2004, p. 221.

⁵⁴ R. Sakwa, *op. cit.*, p. 420.

⁵⁵ S. Blank, *op. cit.*, 2001, p. 71.

⁵⁶ Darrel Slider, "Reforming the Regions", in Steven White, Zvi Gitelman and Richard Sakwa (eds.), *Developments in Russian Politics 6*, New York: Palgrave, 2005, p. 184.

⁵⁷ S. Blank, *op. cit.*, 2001, p. 70.

the frozen conflict area or Chechnya. In his analysis, Steven Blank⁵⁸ is extremely exigent regarding the failure of the military reform of the Russian army forces. According to him, Russia presents a virtual paradigm of Samuel Huntington's subjective civilian control over the multiple militaries whose net result is (1) a series of unwinnable domestic wars and (2) an armed force that cannot defend Russia, care for its men or provide them with quality weapons. Steven Blank's pessimism towards this situation should worry us, because his argument is quite logic: "Since Yeltsin gave the military uncontested control over its own administration and internal policy-making processes, he created the conditions for this stalemate. This outcome eliminated any real possibility for creating an organization to provide a balance or alternatives to the military's recommendations on defense issues or hope of genuine military reform".

Conclusions

Throughout this paper, I have tried to bring into attention an important issue for the international community – civil-military relations. From my point of view, this relation, based on objective civilian control, is one of the many criteria that makes a democracy work. Such a control and oversight of the military segment implies a concentrated effort on behalf of all three state branches: executive, legislative and judicial. In the case of the Russian Federation, I have demonstrated that things are different and that a proper reformation of the military could not take place. Distinctive factors, strange circumstances and the lack of political will are the main causes that determined the present situation.

Under Putin, the "civilianization" of Russia's military structures, meekly attempted by his predecessor, gave way to the pervasive militarization and securitization of the government at the highest level. His ambitions and his plans seemed at that time to be extremely well conceptualized and for the West it was a sign that Russia was willing to finally step on the path of democracy. In spite of these rhetorical attempts and an optimistic trend that had many adepts, Putin's plans failed. On the one hand, the chief factor that determined such a failure is due to the corrupted environment he has inherited from Yeltsin. However, it is of high importance to remind to everyone, that Putin misunderstood the

⁵⁸ *Ibidem*, pp. 80-81.

essence of the concept of *objective civilian control*. His eagerness to *control* (the political correct term is "manage", but under the circumstances I do not consider it to be appropriated) Russian society delivered us a sort of "presidential control", which is met in authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. As a country who claims that is willing to give up "old habits" and to embrace democratic values in order to integrate within this world, Russia has successfully failed. Perhaps the worst consequence that evolves from all these transformations is an inevitable political isolation of Russia at the international level.

Armed Forces in Russian Federation play a distinctive role at a both domestic and external level. Every year there are organized different military parades, whose main purpose is to impress the public. However, this is just an ephemeral image, which does not comply with reality. In her book, *Putin's Russia*, Anna Politkovskaya presents a total different image of the Russian armed forces. Her attention is focused on the human dimension, which should be considered *the main basis* when designing a frame or a reforming plane for this segment of society. Although it is widely known her criticism towards Putin's administration, we cannot overlook the fact that a thread of truth is behind her stories. It is a matter of future times if there is place for a different approach in truly reforming the Russian military complex.

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THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATION AT A LOSS: EUROPE AND THE USA IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER

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Abstract

The USA and the EU are two main actors, claiming the superpower position in the post-Cold War global order. Once being part of a unitary West, the two are nowadays promoting two conflicting perspectives and strategies in the international relations. The 9/11 events did nothing but worsen the transatlantic relation, by magnifying the dimension of the gap between the US "hard power" and the EU "soft-power" strategic cultures, reflected in the NSS (National Security Strategy) and ESS (European Security Strategy).

Key-words: strategic culture, National Security Strategy, European Security Strategy, hard power, soft power.

1. Introduction

Two conflicting perspectives over the world order and international security are the products of two schools of thinkers from the two Atlantic shores. On the one hand, the United States appear as a strong state, pledging on the one-sided international peace maker, into an anarchic Hobbesian world, in which international laws only have a marginal vocation. Contrapunctual to that is the European representation over the power sharing in a multilateral, cosmopolit, in a growing globalization world, where Europe is to take its place as super-power by civil means, by a mediatory intervention, given its social-economic strength. The question that arises inevitably is whether we can bring into this discussion a real european strategic culture, whether Europe can put up a real strategy of

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defense? And if this capability exists indeed, can it compel with the theoretical borders of the strategic culture? In strict correlation, we will try to establish whether the new world order is based on a unique polarity, standing for the American pre-eminence or a bipolarity, shaped by two conflicting poles-USA and Europe.

2. Old and new paradigms in global order

What kind of world order emerges at present? This concept defined by an intergovernmental arrangement meeting the contemporary demands for order in the major areas of concern¹, can be filtered from an analytical point of view through several paradigms belonging to international relations, *i.e.* realism, liberalism, constructivism, the theory of international political economy. In the modern epoch, the global order has been conceived in the terms of the balance of power, capable of assuring the peace and independence of sovereign states, with a consistent emphasis placed on their military function. Given the exaggerated conflict experience during the First World War, but especially during the second, the 20th century has undeniably remained in the parameters of this theorization. The collapse of the Soviet Union, and at the same time the collapse of the entire world order which *per se* was bipolar, brought all the countries face to face with the redefinition of both the concept of 'state' and their objectives in the international arena. The Cold War's legacy situates certain states in an advantageous position, while others are forced to choose resolutions, similar or alternatives, in order to compel recognition.

How can the world be mapped today? A first category includes all postmodern states, characterized by a strong power of institutional capabilities. In this sense, the power includes the state's capacity "to formulate and fulfill politics and to conceive and apply laws."² The economic attribute is added to this type of power, also completed by the military power up to a certain extent. In order to locate them from a geographic and geopolitical point of view, we mention that these states are

¹ George Sorensen, "What kind of world order: The International System in the new millennium", in *Cooperation and Conflict*, no. 41, 2006, p. 344, [<http://www.sagepublications.com>], 2 June 2008

² Francis Fukuyama, *State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century*, transl. Mihnea Columbeanu, București: Antet, 2004, pp. 5-22.

from Western Europe, North America and Eastern Asia. From the opposite angle of statehood spectrum there are the post-colonial, poor states especially those from the Sub-Saharan Africa. These countries are politically and economically less developed, given their internal state of conflict, guerilla and civil wars. Between these two typologies there are the modernizing, in progress states from Asia, Eastern Europe or Latin America. Their profile is set within a mixture of the particularities of the states featured in the first and second category, modern and post-modern state components, and joint to some post-colonial ones.

The realist and neorealist paradigms have faced crisis at the end of the Cold War. Global order could no longer be imagined in the simple terms of the balance of power, underlined on either multiple polarity, either on bipolarity, but as the conceptualization of an international system based on law rather than anarchy, a system for which to institutionalize and make values go global as well as economic cooperation were essential. Realists foresaw new or ancient conflicts on the "old continent", but objectifying of the potential conflicts appeared on the other shore of the Atlantic, with the attacks from September 11th. Not only has this event reorganized the global order, but it also reorganized the theories over the subject, providing the realists a chance to rehabilitate.

Liberalism, with its utopist-idealistic origin meant to pay tribute to the visionary Woodrow Wilson, declares the importance of international institutions as far as adjusting global order and the emergence of a new world-wide government or governance. This theory is validated by the reality made up of the ever more intense transnational relations, which, on the long run may create a 'sovereignty-free order'³. However, beyond the shadow of a doubt, at present, states defend their sovereignty jealously, this one being the element by which the negotiation of an international order is assured. Even more than that, after the 9/11, the USA have shown a decreasing involvement in developing a new institutionalized type of cooperation, taking to its one sided role more and more actively (the breaking out of the Iraq war without an ONU warrant or not ratifying the Kyoto Pact).

³ George Sorensen, *op. cit.*, pp. 342-352.

The third theory over the international system is provided by the constructivism which postulates the existence of common values worldwide. The human rights are part of the politic culture of Western states, being assimilated so profoundly as to become more than a *modus vivendi*. As for the states priory embedded in inferior categories belonging to the ax of force and development, the conformity to values submitted to democracy and political neoliberalism is further questionable. There are optimistic voices appreciating this issue as temporary, the modernism extension being the insurance of a resolution, but they omit the fact that in the Muslim world this attempt of penetration has caused an “identity resistance” carried out in radicalism and terrorism. It is the issue of double standards resulted from the opposition between the emblematically used values in the war against Iraq and the treatment undergone to the hostages which already became common knowledge that this theory leaves without explanation.

The forth paradigm is that of the international political economy (IPE)⁴, which is focused on the economic territory of production, capitals and distribution. In the international system, the IPE theoreticians appreciate that there is an almost unanimous consensus over the efficiency of capitalist economy as well as the unique market. This adhesion to a certain model, be it economic, offers the premises for a unitary and interdependent evolution of global order. However, the problem consists of the huge lagging existing between the countries firstly mentioned and the ones from the third category. The economic discrepancies are those who favour poverty, famine, diseases, murder and terrorism. These states should also become beneficiaries of the markets’ globalization and be efficiently turned part of the system.

All these theories have been made with the view to set the most appropriate boundaries for the concept of “world order”, but not in order to limit it, but to open it towards all possible approaches. Further on we shall focus on one of the dilemmas of this global order: the relation between USA and Europe, the collaboration or the differences, one’s primacy versus the other.

⁴ Michael Veseth, *What is International Political Economy?*, [<http://www.ups.edu/x12490.xml>], 2 June 2008

3. Hobbes, Kant or both?

To entirely comprehend the strategic differences that organize the Europe and the USA relation in the contemporary debate and international political behaviour, we ought to define the very specific term of 'strategic culture' employed in this study. The concept can be easily appreciated as a loosely-defined term, with a quite short history. Interest for strategic culture has been developed during the Cold War in order to explain the solid positions of the blocks on the international scene, and ever since it has not produced a massive literature tackling upon it⁵. Strategic culture can, nevertheless, be determined as a highly influential system of philosophical, political, cultural and cognitive characteristics and variables that can limit the behavioral choices and decisions in the international relations.⁶ Once accepted, this definition allows us regard the European position in the international relations as a strategic culture, indeed very innovative. In the further lines we will mark the fundamental divisions and analyze the two typologies that arose on the two Atlantic shores. The criteria to which we will permanently refer are based on the very behavioral variables of each society from which the two strategic cultures stem.

"It is time we stopped pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common point of view of the world or even that they were in the same world."⁷ Robert Kagan, the theoretician who focused on the fundamental difference between USA and Europe in the global order, highlights a difference between the two, situating Europe in a post historic world, in which "perpetual peace" invoked by Immanuel Kant is set up, governed by international laws, while USA drives through these laws, exerting its power in an anarchic, Hobbesian world. After the collapse of the bipolar system of the Cold War, USA remains the only superpower anchored in history, as Kagan appreciates, and by contrast, Europe is without relation to time, even without relation to history, standing for a paradise in which the threats towards security are almost inexistent.

⁵ Johnston, Alastair, "Thinking of Strategic Culture", in *International Security*, no. 4, 2006, pp. 32-64.

⁶ *Idem*, p. 43.

⁷ Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order*, transl. Bogdan Chircea, București: Antet, 2003, pp. 6-13

Actually, Kagan says the lack of menaces is inherent to a mediocre, stand-in role that Europe plays.

This bivalent definition of the global order after 1989 and mostly after 9/11 will be accepted in this study as partly pertinent, under the circumstances that a perception of a unitary West alongside the Atlantic has eroded once the East European communist regimes have fallen apart. However, our doubts regarding Kagan's discourse appear concerning the appreciation of the American strategic culture in the fault of the European one. In addition, the American culture and civilization owe so much to the European legacy, and Europe owes so much to the American support of reconstruction after Second World War (Marshall Plan) that the two Western powers will never be able to "divorce" completely. Europe may not have found yet the most coherent formula in the military domain, but its influence in a global multilateral order of trans-nationalism and globalization is undeniable.

Michael Smith prompts out a different approach, also dichotomical, which objectively outlines the differences between USA and Europe. If USA is a warrior state, militarized, interventionist, militarist, tributary to the westphalian system still, Europe is trading state, negotiator-like, civil, multisided and institutionalized (where EU is understood more like a federation of states rather than an institution based on intergovernmentalism) favouring the emergence of a post sovereign, cosmopolite system.⁸ Therefore, the USA go on using the tough power, the militarized "hard power" associated to the "hard security" concept while EU is based on a different kind of orientation, "soft power", to which "soft security" subscribes. If the first type consigned or the USA is already quasi-unanimously recognized (given its fustiness and ground-in on the international stage of the last centuries), being an associate of the military power and the economic penitence objectified as stimulants ("carrots") and threats ("sticks"),⁹ the "soft power" concept stems from a state's ability to obtain benefits and to inherently exert a certain power by the admiration with which other states look up to its values, by the ability to set an

⁸ Michael Smith, "Between Two Worlds? The European Union, The United States and World Order", in *International Politics*, no. 41, 2004, pp. 95-114.

⁹ Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power- the Means to success in the World Politics*, New York: Public Affairs, 2004, pp. 5-18.

example to generate emulating behaviours. These two approaches towards international relations put forward two antonymic behavioral types at the state level, one based on the westphalian coercion typical for the USA and the other one focused on cooperation, cooptation, on actions with adherence to other states too.

The “soft power” concept has two basic components that make possible the reception of a well defined meaning, *i.e. culture*, by the aspects that can be attractive for the others (literature, music, gastronomy, etc.), *political values* such as freedom, justice, democracy which should be simultaneously applied internally, exported and internationally accepted, compulsory supplemented by the foreign policies in which diplomatic conduit, legitimacy and a certain “moral authority” are of utmost importance¹⁰. These conceptualizations do not appear in the international practice as ideal types, as both US and EU resort to these types in order to make politics at different degrees, still the major orientations being undeniable: USA- “hard power” and EU-“soft power”.

The model promoted by EU is one to benefit from the innovative structure of organization that EU presents *per se*. This quasi federation(and I say so because one of the domains that stay at least partially in the area of state’s attributions is the very external politics) is the proof that the national model can be exceeded and must be exceeded because of the unending struggle for primacy that it entangles. EU is an actor that stands out because of its uniqueness in the new world order, it adapts to the rules of the game, but it takes action in full accord with the mediums developed in its own laboratory, especially by “ soft power”. The states from the Balkans, and Turkey the most, admire this model with the wish to gain access to it, as Timothy Garton Ash observes. ¹¹

Why can Europe have this approach with a teleological calling also, focusing on the status of superpower, yet opposed to the American militarism and imperialism? It affords that because this heavily tested space has turned into a space of peace and conviviality, the terrorist threats being perceived at much lower intensity as on the opposite shore of the

¹⁰ *Idem*, p. 11.

¹¹ Timothy Garton Ash, *Free World: America, Europe and the Surprising Future of the West*, transl. Anton Lepădatu, București: Incitatus, 2006, p. 92

Atlantic.¹² There is a fundamental difference between the two approaches of the international system, but the purpose of every research must be not just the highlighting of the advantages and drawbacks marked for each of the two actors, but also the manner in which the transatlantic relation can be stopped from compromise on the long run.

After war broke out in Iraq, in March 2003, the American secretary of defense, Donald Rumsfeld draw a marking line between a New and an Old Europe, in Winston Churchill's way, who over half a century ago would say: 'An iron curtain has fallen over the continent, from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea'.¹³, and Europe responded with the voice of its intellectuals. The New Europe was the one to support the American intervention in Iraq in a discursive and military manner, i.e. Great Britain, Spain, Italy and the states-member NATO in Eastern Europe (Romania included, as one of the most committed supporters), taking part in the so-called 'coalition of the willing'.¹⁴ In the vision of Rumsfeld, Old Europe was composed of the hard nucleus of West, France and Germany who denounced this unilateral American action, alongside the public opinion, which made public demonstrations in several European capitals. Following the dynamic of the American thinking, Manichean type of thinking, "with us or against us" (George W. Bush), it is a fact that *in extenso* this can not only be applied for those who are immediate threat, but also to those who do not support them. Although exaggerations lure in, our intention is not to say that European states or that EU run the risk of ever being attacked by USA or in the foreseeable future, but odds are that the gap between strategic culture will enhance.

Europeans did not stay unaffected by such opinions such as the one Robert Kagan has or to those loaded with a political message issued by Donald Rumsfeld. Renowned intellectuals such as: Jurgen Habermas,

¹² the terrorist attacks in Madrid and London were replies to the events in 9/11, Spain and Great Britain being attacked as USA allies and not as European countries *ipso facto*

¹³ Churchill referred to the URSS and communism expansion in Central and Eastern Europe, which was a reason for this space to be separated from the Western Europe.

¹⁴ to what extent this has really been a coalition of the willing is debatable given the fact that every state part of it had a certain obligations regarding the US.

Umberto Eco, Tzvetan Todorov or Jacques Derrida rallied around the idea of rehabilitate Europe.¹⁵ The war was Europeans' wake up time, which had to redefine Europe in geopolitical terms, as an actor of the international system, in order to avoid the already known definitions from abroad, to reveal a brand new strategic culture. Europe (by France and Germany) showed no weakness or lack of commitment in world order, but it had a different position from the realistic approach with military action inherent to the state. Europe showed that it can re-imagine itself in a broad meaning, gilding the edges of a new modernity, even postmodernity, of a new West, totally opposed to the strategic American culture. What is Jacques Derrida pleading for, for instance? For "a Europe which can show that a different kind of politics is possible, which can set up a political and ethical representation as to inherit the Illuminist tradition"¹⁶, a Europe to appear on the world stage based on rational and humanitarian fundamentals. This vision is completed by the perfectly suitable metaphor belonging to Tzvetan Todorov: "puissance tranquille" (a soft, quiet power) which follows the process rather than the results, by negotiation rather than decision. These positions are certainly external to the realist paradigm over international relations, but they do borrow elements from liberalism, constructivism and the theory of international political economy. Europe's almost pathological decline towards exaggerated sovereign and nationalism is explicable due to the troubled history of this continent, where fascism, Nazism and communism made too much victims. Europe prefers "to concert" the attributions, to cooperate, to assume a negotiating role instead of the role of a state "that has a hammer and in every problem sees a nail."¹⁷

The European Union has been riding a wave of popularity since 1989, due to the expansion of democracy, the values of the economic and political liberalism, in Eastern Europe. What makes the demarche special is its method, of "blackmail" one might say, by which these states have been talked into adhering to the Western principles, *i.e.* the conditioning of the

¹⁵ Luiza Bialasiewicz,; Claudio Minca, "Old Europe, new Europe: for a geopolitics of translation", in *Area*, no. 37, 2005, pp. 365-371, [www.epscohost.com], 28 May 2008

¹⁶ *Idem*, p. 368.

¹⁷ Robert Kagan, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-46.

member state or of close economic cooperation.¹⁸ Although the action can be catalogued as Realpolitik or the materialization of what we said “hard power” is, it cannot be compared with a military intervention which entangles the use of force, that is not completely acceptable in this space. Though the recent history of EU is that of a civil actor, who prefers the diplomatic and negotiator manner instead of the confrontation, the 9/11 events and the rise of the American military span spread over the Atlantic. The effect was EU’s orientation towards a beginner power, “hard”-like, meant to fulfill the “soft power” and to counterbalance the American supremacy by a *sui generis* strategic culture.

4. Security strategies in the mirror: The National Security Strategy (USA) vs. the European Security Strategy (EU)

In response to the 9/11 attacks, both USA and Europe have worked on two documents :NSS (*National Security Strategy* in the fall of 2002) completed by the next *National Security Strategy* in 2006 and ESS (*European Security Strategy - A Secure Europe is a Better World*) in an attempt to coherently affirm their role taken up in the new world order. These two documents could stand for a transatlantic on-coming, but they actually resize the gap between the two Atlantic shores.

Before we start the comparative analysis let us provide some insight into the dimension of these documents, which I consider a relevant aspect in the appreciation of how important security is for America and the EU. The first American strategy, the one from 2002 is 35 pages long¹⁹, and the revised and the updated form in 2006²⁰ is 54 pages long, while the European Security Strategy is limited to only 15 pages.

Regarding the responsibility each of the two take up in the world order, we can estimate that USA seeks to “rid the world of evil” in the

¹⁸ Janne Haaland Matlary, “When Soft Power Turn Hard: Is an EU strategic culture possible?”, in *Security Dialogue*, no. 37, 2006, pp. 105-110, [<http://www.sagepublications.com>], 21 May 2008.

¹⁹ *National Security Strategy 2002*, [<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf>], 3 June 2008

²⁰ *National Security Strategy 2006*, [<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf>], 3 June 2008

employ of values such as freedom and justice. Geographically speaking, USA's responsibility is unlimited thus being set up the imperial logic²¹.

In counterpoint, ESS does not define the EU's role in the same universal terms, as it does not have the missionary calling engraved in the American strategy. The status of global actor is defined by figures which prompt out the size of the population (400 millions in EU) or high incomes. From a geographic point of view, ESS contains itself to preserve order in Europe (a great part of the credit goes to the European integration), but it also focuses on the reinforcement of the laws governing the international system-which USA is trying to undermine with every one of its actions – and developing a new multisided world order.

The respect shown to international institutions and ONU firstly is limited and intuitively, we could say, in continual decrease in the American strategy. EU itself deeply institutionalized and dependent on the efficiency of legal and bureaucratic mechanisms, equally values international right and the institutions more or less engaged in the new world order.

As for the threats, NSS identifies terrorism globally, rough-states (Iraq and North Correa in NSS 2002, replaced in NSS in 2006 by Iran and Syria, those being suspected of sponsoring terrorism through Hezbollah and Al-Qaida) ran by authoritarian regimes which can favour terrorist behaviour, but also mass-destruction weapons. For EU the threats identified in ESS are: terrorism, the proliferation of mass-destruction weapons, bankrupt states, characterized by the lack of strong institutional structures (the powerless states in Fukuyama's representation), organized crime and regional conflicts (such as the one in former Yugoslavia)²². The EU approach to threats is one that considers the more dangerous can be "turbulences of domestic society"²³ or the ones in the surrounding

²¹ Felix Sebastian Berrenskoetter, "Mapping the Mind Gap: A Comparison of the US and European Security Strategies", in *Security Dialogue*, no. 36, 2006, pp. 70-80, [<http://www.sagepublications.com>], 28 May 2008

²² *European Security Strategy - A Secure Europe is a Better World*, [<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>], pp. 4-6, 3 June 2008.

²³ Susan E. Penska, Warren L. Manson, "EU Security Cooperation and Transatlantic Relationship", in *Cooperation and Conflict*, no. 38, 2003, pp. 256-260, [<http://www.sagepublications.com>], 29 May 2008.

territories, implying the spillover effect. However, in the preamble of the European document there is an elaboration that highlights the differentiated perceptions over threats, to be more specific: "Europe has never been so secure."

The means used in order to ascertain the role of the two entities in world order are different rather than similar. On the one hand, USA following the logic of universal responsibility does not set a target only out of the protection and preservation of democracy and freedom, but also out of its extension, which can also be made by force. Thus the Americans use military and ideological means in an attempt of legitimating, a strategy with prominent "hard power". USA appreciates that by this way a preemptive war (war against an imminent threat) is legitimate in moral and international legislation terms of world order. When does a preemptive war become necessary? When can a threat be considered imminent? These questions have not found answer neither in NSS in 2002 nor in the one in 2006 or in the American presidential discourse, hovering as a doubt over the American strategic culture suspected of imperialism, given its preemptive actions rather than a democracy pilgrimage and preservation of the collective security.

On the other hand, EU chooses the tactic of a politics oriented towards the prevention of conflicts, by negotiations, collaboration and multilateralism. According to ESS, Europeans are not engaged into a war against terrorism, but in an isolated battle that can be equally oriented towards an externalized danger as the US do, as well as against potential threats inside. By the means forwarded, EU endorses the creation of a "well-governed ring of states" around itself, states which are to be gradually attracted in the process of European enlargement. Therefore, the means used are similar: a mixture of different proportions of ideology and militarism, but the way in which they are implemented is completely different.

When he accuses Europe of idealism and he praises the American pragmatism, Robert Kagan deliberately elides the analysis of the strategic discourse of the two parts. In the light of the two security strategies content, the USA are the ones who try to turn the Kantian paradise into something tangible, by taking up the mission to spread democracy all around the world, while Europe chooses a smaller dimension by assuring

the regional stability and by promoting a new multilateral world order, which is as real as can be. Not only has Europe stayed hesitant in using force given its conflictual history, but it also lost the almost immature confidence manifested by the US in the universal truth. A complementary argument for the EU's hesitant attitude towards military power can also be NATO's "protective umbrella" and its "engine" USA. It is not much of a convenient reality for a Europe that wishes to accede to the role of superpower on the world stage, but the costs entangled are minimum and the advantages maximums, fact which does not force a strong and prompt EU position as far as developing a considerable armed force is concerned.

Actually, the politic exhibited by the Americans on the international stage is not only animated by missionarism and devotion for values, but also by the conscience of the capacities which are to be employed firstly for the American state and only secondly for the humanity. USA can be both idealistic and realistic, according to the international context.

5. CFSP and the gap between expectations-abilities

EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was included in the Union's structures with the Maastricht treaty in 1992, as the second of the three pillars (communitarian, CFSP and Justice and Internal Affairs). CFSP goals, set from the very beginning included the protection of common values (a luggage with decisive role in a EU that tended to a ever deeper integration), the consolidation of EU security, as well as maintaining world peace, promoting democracy, law and human rights supremacy. By the initial CFSP formula, EU transfers to NATO the responsibility to protect the European territories, but also for the preservation of peace, while EU takes up the role to organize conflict prevention missions or post conflicts and peace keeping²⁴ actions.

For EU's member states, formulating a common security policy can be assimilated to their capacity to constitute themselves into a superpower on the international stage. None of the European states could compete with the American hegemonic power, a valid solution being that of working together. Actually, CFSP does not work as the member states

²⁴ *Common Foreign Security Policy,*

[http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/intro/index.htm], 22 May 2008

would have wanted, a gap unfolding between the expectations and the possibilities, between the provisional accord among states and the consensus they were capable to reach. The decisions in the European Council and in the Council of Ministers' configuration at which member states' Foreign Affairs Ministers take part are taken by unanimity (actually the vote is often replaced by adopting a consensual position). Although everyone contributes to the decisional process, providing the called for input, the consensus reached after the debates is not favourable to all of interests, a phenomenon triggered by the Abilene paradox-a group decides on a certain action plan which contradicts the preferences of each member of that group²⁵.

The failure of the constitutional treaty which would have foreseen the implementation of a new position of EU's Foreign Affairs Minister, who should have been the voice of the 25 (27 starting with 2007) member states in common security and foreign affairs issues, it is a new demonstration of force from the state's sovereignty which stands out whenever there is an attempt to integrate deeper in the European structures.

EU is in the position of having dramatically changed its role in the new world order and CFSP does not show that things are different in military terms. Why should EU have chosen managing low profile missions and pre or post crisis minor situations? It had two reasons, for ideological reasons at once, and the second motive is one of institutional origin. Firstly, Europe can no longer take up a strong military position, in an era that it calls post modern. The military component- 'the hammer' can only be one of the numerous instruments of a *sui generis* strategic culture. Secondly, member states do not seem to be as willing as to transfer the security attributions from the state's level to a supranational level, as in the case of the Common Market's organization, a gesture like that being the equivalent of the sovereignty's bankruptcy²⁶.

²⁵ Asle Toje, "The Consensus Expectations Gap", in *Security Dialogue*, no. 121, 2008, pp. 125-130, [<http://www.sagepublications.com>], 20 May 2008

²⁶ Guillaume Devin, *Sociologie des relations internationales*, Paris: La Découverte, 2007, pp.31-33

Conclusion

After having emerged in the American and European strategic cultures (its broader representation – EU) we can conclude that in the era following 9/11 talking about a transatlantic cooperation is outdated and inadequate. What we can perceive is an enhanced gap separating the two powers, each taking up a unique and unrepeatable role in the new world order. The two empirical cases are two examples of the major differences that range in the contemporary world order, two samples of how strategic cultures can influence or even determine behaviours on the international scene. There is no need to translate this bivalence into a potential conflict; it should be understood as a separation of the West which inevitably leads to the weakening of the civilizing calling from the common liberal and enlightenment legacy. The irreversibility of such a tendency is questionable as the community of destiny of the two Atlantic shores can be reaffirmed at any time, but it is more likely to occur in circumstances of crisis.

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DIE ROLLE DER REGIONALEN IDENTITÄT AUF DEM EUROPÄISCHEN BINNENMARKT

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Abstract:

Europeanisation and globalization have led to the revival of the importance of the regional level. But the increased role of the regions leads in many areas to an increased competition between them. Therefore, the differentiation among regional products on the various markets constitutes the basis for development. The regions gain more and more importance which basically generates an increased competition in many fields. In this article, we try to emphasise the influence of regional identity on regional development.

Key words: identity, regionalisation, marketing, products, Europeanisation

Angefangen mit den 70er Jahre hat das globale Wirtschaftssystem die europäische Wirtschaft in einer Transformationsphase gesteuert, in welcher die Staaten die Kontrolle über die wirtschaftliche Entscheidung zugunsten von transnationalen Organisationen verloren. Die Globalisierung hat zum Dezentalisierungsprozess und zur Dekonzentration beigesteuert, und das aufgrund dessen, dass die Region sich schneller an die neuen wirtschaftlichen Bedingungen anpassen kann. Des Weiteren kann sie effizienter auf die Entwicklungspolitik antworten und wird auf einem demokratischeren Niveau im Entscheidungsprozess gesehen¹. Die Wichtigkeit der Regionen hat auf supranationalem, als auch auf subnationalem Niveau zugenommen. Die Mobilisation der regionalen Zivilgesellschaft verstärkt diesen Prozess.

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¹ M. Keating, *The New Regionalism in Western Europe*, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1988, p. 34.

Allgemein wird die Globalisierung als eine Verringerung von Raum und Zeit charakterisiert². Der Hauptpunkt, der uns in dieser Arbeit interessiert, ist die Definition der Globalisierung als „eine über die staatlichen Grenzen gehenden Sozialtransaktionen“³. Die „Entnationalisierung der Gesellschaft“ verursacht, dass der Sozialraum nicht mehr dem Nationalraum entspricht⁴. Die Globalisierung fördert den von oben kommenden Regionalismus (*top-down*), indem sie indirekt Druck auf die Zentralregierung ausübt. Dieses Phänomen wird von B. Anderson als eine „Mangeldezentralisation“ genannt⁵. Ebenso kann die Globalisierung den von unten kommenden Regionalismus (*bottom-up*) fördern, da nach A. Marga „die Globalisierung unsere Position in der Welt, ebenso unser Kenntnis und Leben beeinflusst und gleichzeitig kann es Veränderungen der Traditionen aufrufen“⁶.

Der europäische Aufbau hat einen Transfer in Gang gesetzt, der einige Autoritätsgebiete vom nationalen Niveau auf europäischem und subnationalem verschoben hat. Die Relation zwischen den verschiedenen Niveaus wurde insbesondere durch die Strukturfonds geändert und dadurch sind neue öffentliche und private Akteure aufgetaucht. Das Studium, das von N. Păun et al. durchgeführt wurde, zeigt, dass das multi-level governance eine neue Artikulation in der Politik fördert. Das bezieht sich auf ein mehrerebenes Spiel, welches je nach Problematik verschiedene Akteure begünstigt⁷.

Das Territorium war schon immer ein grundlegendes Element für das soziale, politische sowie für das wirtschaftliche Leben⁸. Das Territorium ist nicht nur für die Entwicklung der Kultur, für das Stimulieren von

² N. Păun, R. Barna, *Sisteme economice contemporane*, Cluj-Napoca: EFES, 2004, p. 27.

³ M. Zürn, N. Lange, *Regionalism in the age of Globalization*, Universität Bremen, INISS – Arbeitspapier nr. 16/99, 1999, p. 6.

⁴ *Ibidem*.

⁵ B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London: Verso, 1991, p. 28.

⁶ A. Marga, *Religia în era globalizării*, Cluj-Napoca: EFES, 2003, p. 16.

⁷ N. Păun, A-C. Păun, G. Ciceo, R. Albu-Comănescu, *Finalitatea Europei*, Cluj-Napoca: EFES, 2005, p. 263.

⁸ S. Rokkan, D. Urwin, *The Politics of Territorial Identity: Studies in European Regionalism*, London: Sage Publications, 1982, p. 7.

Innovationen und Bildung wichtig, sondern es stellt die Basis für die individuelle Identität und einer kollektiven Repräsentation dar⁹.

Im Allgemeinen waren die Regionalentwicklungspolitiken der 50-60er Jahren in Europa zentralisiert und galten als Bestandteil der Nationalpolitiken und auch als Teil der Konsolidierungsmechanismen des Nationalstaates. Ihr Ziel war die harmonische Entwicklung verschiedener Regionen im Rahmen des Nationalstaates. In dieser Periode hat die soziale Fairness an Bedeutung gewonnen. Diese Regionalismusform förderte die Aktivitäten in den unterentwickelten Regionen und orientierte die Investitionen in die angemessene Richtung¹⁰.

Mit der Zeit wurden die Regionalpolitiken komplexer und somit wurde die Kooperation mit den lokalen Partnern immer notwendiger. In den 70er Jahren wurde die Industrialisierung als Mittel der Entwicklung wegen einiger territorialer Probleme, die sich herausstellten, kritisiert. Die Dezentralisierung wurde als eine Möglichkeit für eine steigende Effizienz und eine sinkende soziale Verantwortung der Zentralregierung gesehen. Das Territorium hat seit den 80er Jahren aufgrund des funktionalistischen Drucks eine neue wirtschaftliche und soziale Bedeutung bekommen, dass als Folge den Verlust der Entwicklungskompetenzen des Staates mit sich zog.

In einer einfachen Analyse des wirtschaftlichen Prozesses sind die Produktionsfaktoren die Arbeit, das Kapital und die Humanressourcen. Je grösser die Qualität, desto höher die Produktion. Im Vergleich zu den klassischen Theorien ist in unserer Zeit die Art und Weise ihrer Benutzung ein wichtiger Faktor¹¹. Die optimale Verwendung dieser Faktoren hat neue Theorien der Regionalentwicklung geschaffen, die den Akzent auf die Innovationskapazitäten legen, und die auf die Spezialisierung der Basisfunktionen der Produktion orientiert sind. Die Entwicklungschancen der Regionen hängen daher von den Kooperationskapazitäten der regionalen Akteure und deren Bildung ab. H. Bratl und M. Tripl behaupten „die Region soll global werden“¹².

⁹ *Ibidem*.

¹⁰ M. Keating, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

¹¹ N. Păun, R. Barna, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

¹² H. Bratl, M. Tripl, *Systematische Entwicklung regionaler Wirtschaften. Überprüfung der Leistungsfähigkeit der Neueren Systemtheorie am Beispiel der Industrieregion Obersteiermark*,

Bis in den 60er Jahren wurde die Entwicklung durch die Steigerung des BIP gemessen, die durch die Industrialisierung realisiert werden sollte¹³. Heute wird das Konzept nicht mehr einstimmig akzeptiert, weil andere kulturelle, politische und soziale Elemente an Wichtigkeit gewonnen haben. Die Entwicklung wird als „*der Prozess durch den eine Gesellschaft seine grundsätzliche Bedürfnisse erfüllen kann*“¹⁴ definiert. Im Rahmen der PNUD spricht man nur über *Human Development* das „*eine Verbreitung der Wahlmöglichkeiten der Menschen*“¹⁵ beschreibt. Diese Entwicklungsform verlangt einen Bruch mit der funktionalen Logik und gleichzeitig ein Wiederfinden der territorialen Logik: „*im lokalen Rahmen und mit den lokalen Ressourcen bietet die Entwicklung eine passende Antwort zu den Bedürfnissen der Bevölkerung an*“¹⁶.

Es ist bekannt, dass das Entwicklungspotential eines Landes je nach Region variieren kann. Die Unterschiede zeigen sich meist an dem Lebensstandard und durch die technischen, humanen und natürlichen Ressourcen. Von diesen Elementen hängt die Art und Weise der Entwicklung ab. In der Literatur der Regionalwissenschaft finden wir mehrere Theorien, die die Art und Weise einer Entwicklung erklären. Diese könnte durch endogene oder exogene Einwirkungen beeinflusst werden. Im Bereich der Entwicklung, und besonders in der Regionalentwicklung gibt es keine allgemeine gültige Theorie, die die Wirtschaftsprozesse erklären könnten. Um die Regionalentwicklung erklären zu können, benötigt man die Anwendung mehrere Theorien, die aber meist widersprüchlich sind¹⁷.

Für die endogene Entwicklungstheorie gilt der Raum als ein Element, welches die Summe seiner Komponente übersteigt, diese wären: die gemeinsamen Werte, die Möglichkeiten der Interaktion erschaffen den Effekt der Synergie, humane Ressourcen, etc. Die endogene Dynamik schafft eine integrierte Entwicklung, damit ist die lokale Kontrolle über die Wirtschaft gemeint, die im kulturellen, technischen, sozialen und

Studie im Auftrag des Bundeskanzleramtes, Institut für regionale Innovationen GmbH, Wien, 2001, p. 30. [http://www.austria.gv.at/2004/4/15/bratl_trippl.pdf]

¹³ M. Keating, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

¹⁴ G. Grellet, *Les Politiques Economiques des Pays du Sud*, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, I.E.D.E.S., Collection Tiers Monde, France, 1994, p. 33.

¹⁵ PNUD, [http://www.lyc-arsonval-brive.ac-limoges.fr/secosoc/article.php3?id_article=4]

¹⁶ Ph. Aydalot, *Economie Régionale et Urbaine*, Paris: Economica, 1985, p. 109.

¹⁷ R. Scharff, *Regionalpolitik und regionale Entwicklungspotentiale*, Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 1993, p. 76.

politischen Leben integriert sind. Dieser Entwicklungstypus basiert nicht auf die großen Konzerne, sondern auf die Kleinen und sogar auf den informellen Sektor.

Die Koordinierungskapazität verschiedener Akteure ist eine Entwicklungssource, die die territoriale Konfiguration des Sozialkapitals gestaltet. Die Funktionalität der Märkte und Institutionen ist durch das Sozialkapital verbessert worden. Die Vertragskosten werden geringer, das Vertrauen grösser und die Kooperation verstärkt. Das Sozialkapital gewinnt seine Quellen aus der Entwicklung von Sozialinteraktionsnetzwerken und aus wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen¹⁸. M. Zürn und N. Lange bemerken, dass die Regionen, sowie die Nationalstaaten, dem sozio-demographischen Druck unterworfen sind. Das ist ein Grund dafür, dass die Regionen auch außerhalb Netzwerke benötigen¹⁹. Die Regionalisierung kann daher die Wohlfahrt sichern, doch dies geschieht nur unter bestimmten Konditionen.

Die Vergangenheit ist ein wichtiger Punkt für die regionale Kultur. Die nationale Kultur, die in den letzten Jahrhunderten als herrschende und vorgesetzte Kultur promoviert wurde, lässt heute Platz für die lokale und regionale Kultur. Der europäische Integrationsprozess führte dazu, dass die Regionen Europas auf dem freien Markt im Wettbewerb gebracht wurden. Die Regionalkultur müsste sich aufdrängen um überleben zu können²⁰. Die Gewinner dieses Wettbewerbes bauen oft Kulturzentren auf, die auch als Wirtschaftszentren funktionieren. Diese unterstützen sich gegenseitig. M. Casteigts betont „*die symbolische Kapitalisierung der Zentren im Vergleich zu den Peripherien. Ihre Position im Vergleich zu dem Zentrum schafft die Morphologie des Raumes und des Statuts ihrer Einwohner*“²¹. Das steigende Interesse für Tradition und Sprache in den Regionen führen auf eine sinkende Identifikation zurück. „*Die Leute möchten wissen woher sie kommen und wohin sie gehen. Sie suchen Identitäten die Sicherheit bringen und die sich nicht mit der Mode und der Zeit verändern*“²². Die regionale Identität ist

¹⁸ *Ibidem*.

¹⁹ M. Zürn, N. Lange, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

²⁰ *Ibidem*.

²¹ M. Casteigts, *L'aménagement de l'espace*, Paris: LGDJ, 1999, p. 59.

²² *Ibidem*, p. 20.

ebenso eine Ressource für Wirtschaft und Politik, da sie neue Aktionsräume für Leute, Firmen und Organisationen schafft.

Der wirtschaftliche Kontext und die Regionalisierung bestimmen die Regionen in einem neuen Kontext des Wettbewerbes fortzuschreiten, in derselben Zeit sind sie dazu gezwungen, untereinander zu kooperieren. Die Globalisierung wandelt die regionalen Wirtschaften in unabhängigere Teile einer mehr integrierten weltlichen Wirtschaft um. Die Regionen werden zu wahren Akteuren auf dem Investitionsmarkt. Heute existieren immer mehr regionale Akteure und im relativen Vergleich dazu existieren weniger Projekte. Die steigende Konkurrenz zwischen den Regionen zwingt sie zur Anwendung neuer Marketingtechniken auf einem wahren Markt der regionalen Investitionen.

Die Region ist sowohl eine politische, wirtschaftliche und soziale Konstruktion, als auch die durchgeführten Aktionen im Raum und die verschiedenen generierten Identitäten bedeutet. Die wirtschaftliche Relevanz der Region ist durch die Wechselkonditionen im Raum, durch die Beziehungen zwischen den Bürger, durch die existierenden Zusammenhänge in der Produktion und auf dem Markt bestimmt. Sie ist auch von den Interessenkoalitionen beeinflusst. Als soziale Einheit, durch den Austausch im sozialen Leben, bildet die Region die identitäre Basis der Zivilgesellschaft und der Solidarität. Die Identität ist also das Ergebnis komplexer Interaktionen zwischen den wirtschaftlichen, politischen und sozialen Milieus. Die Interpretation der Vergangenheit ist auch ein Schlüsselement der Repräsentation der regionalen Identität. Die regionale Kultur ist ein wichtiger Teil dieser Identität, weil sie als Basiselement der regionalen Konstruktion als wirtschaftlichen, politischen und sozialen Raum gilt. *„Es ist nicht einfach zu definieren worüber die regionale Identität entsteht, aber es ist deutlich, dass eine Charakteristika der regionalen Identität sind die regionalen Spezifitäten wie die unterschiedenen Werte, Normen oder Verhalten“*²³.

Sowohl von Innen als auch von Außen, braucht die Region eine Identität weil die Bewohner eine Identität brauchen. Die regionale Identität kann sowohl eine wirtschaftliche als auch eine politische Ressource sein, weil sie neue Aktionsräume für Unternehmen und Organisationen, für Vereine und Bürger eröffnet, sie schafft Stabilität in der Region und für

²³ E. Buss, *Regionale Identitätsbildung*, Münster: LIT, 2002, p. 22.

Unternehmen, und verringert das Emigrationsbedürfnis. Nach E. Buss²⁴, die Wichtigkeit der Identität steigt daher in mehreren Richtungen:

- die regionale Identität als politischen Wert: eine deutliche Identität schließt die Chance einen Ruf ein – die öffentliche Aufmerksamkeit wird bei diesem Ruf erweckt, und die Regionen haben die Möglichkeit schneller zu agieren, dank des Konsenses der durch den Ruf geschaffen wurde.
- die regionale Identität als wirtschaftliches Wert: eine gute regionales Bild kann das Ergebnis einer starken Identität sein. Das Bild sei daher Attraktiv sowohl für die Produktionsfaktoren als auch für die Nachfrage von Waren, die in derjenigen Region produziert sind.
- die regionale Identität als Motivationsfaktor: die Identität veranlasst die Bürger, aktiver im öffentlichen regionalen Leben zu handeln. Die staatsbürgerliche Zusage erhöht den Wert der Netzwerke²⁵.

Wegen der Vielfältigkeit der Informationsströme ist die Identität unter Druck gesetzt. So sollte eines der wichtigsten Ziele der lokalen Akteure die Regenerierung der regionalen Idee sein: *„die Regionen haben die Pflicht ihre Geschichte zum Leben ständig zu bringen“*²⁶. Im Kontext, *„die Symbolen und die Erfolgsgeschichten haben einen sehr starken Integrationsmacht... sie bilden die authentischen Wurzeln der Region. Eine Region ohne Geschichte ist eine Region ohne Gesicht“*²⁷. Der regionale Stolz ist sehr wichtig, da es den Menschen Mut macht und das Selbstbewusstsein der Gesellschaft erweckt. Die Konstruktion des regionalen Bewusstsein ist auch für der Effizienz der Menschen nötig, aber auch für ihren Zivilengagement: *„wenn der Mensch Stolz auf seine Region und seine Herkunft ist, überholt er die Ungültigkeit gegenüber dessen was ihm umgibt“*²⁸.

Die regionale Identität kann ihren Ursprung in der historischen Tradition haben, die aber als ein soziales Konstrukt erscheint, das durch

²⁴ *Ibidem*.

²⁵ M. Keating, *op. cit.*, p. 152.

²⁶ H. Hierl, *Europa der Regionen*, Bonn: Economica Verlag, 1995, p. 57.

²⁷ E. Buss, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

²⁸ R. Rorty, *Stolz auf unser Land, Die Amerikanische linke und der Patriotismus*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1999, p. 71.

wirtschaftliche, politische und soziale Faktoren gebildet ist²⁹. B. Anderson meint, dass die lokale Identität auf der persönlichen Erfahrung und auf den individuellen Kontext basiert ist, während die regionale Identität die Beziehungen mit Unbekannte benötigt (durch Medien, politische Parteien, soziale Institutionen); es ist eine „imaginäre Gemeinschaft“ wie die nationale Identität³⁰. Diese imaginären Gemeinschaften sind das Ergebnis sozialer und politischer Mobilisierung: die lokalen Akteure sollen in die regionale Konstruktion miteinbezogen sein und daher auch in die Kommunikation einer eigenen Identität.

Im interregionalen Wettbewerb haben die Regionen, was das Marketing betrifft, die Möglichkeit mehrere Variablen zu steuern, die Komponente der „Produkt Region“ sind. Aus diesen ist ein wichtiger Platz von der regionalen Identität besetzt, die als Basiselement des regionalen Bildes gilt. Dieses Bild reflektiert die regionale Identität und spielt eine wichtige Rolle im Lokalisationsprozess einer Investition. Das regionale Bild kann:

- der Unsicherheitsniveau einer Investition verringern;
- der Risikoniveau einer Investition verringern;
- eine positive Wirkung für den Namen der Investor haben;
- die Lebensqualität in die Region bekannt machen;
- den „Made in“ Ruf verbessern;
- über die Präsenz einiger Top Firmen informieren;
- über die Einstellung der Behörden was die ausländischen Investitionen betrifft zu informieren;
- über die Einstellung zur Arbeit der Bevölkerung und dessen Interesse für die Entwicklung Bescheid zu wissen.

In Deutschland kann die Kommunikation des regionalen Images erfolgreich sein, weil die Bundesländer tief im Bewusstsein der Bürger verankert sind, während das in Frankreich nicht der Fall ist. Die deutschen Bundesländer haben das Emblem der Geschichte geerbt, die deren historische Konstruktion und deren Herkunft beweist. Das Emblem ist


²⁹ Die gemeinsame Identität ist im Allgemeinen eine gemeinsame Erfahrung, während die individuelle Identität sich im Bezug auf den Kontext ändert. Eine politische Krise, eine empfindsame Hochzeit etc. können die kollektive Identität mobilisieren. Diese Identität schläft in jeder Person.

³⁰ B. Anderson, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

nicht nur ein Identitätssymbol, sondern auch Mittel für die regionale Wirtschaft. Im Fall Bayern zum Beispiel, haben die Farben Weiß und Blau eine sehr starke Symbolistik, so dass viele Unternehmen und Organisationen sie als Qualitätsvektor für ihre Aktionen und Produkte benutzen (die Firma BMW. AG z. B.). Im Falle Bayern ist die Flagge nur eine Vereinfachung des Emblems, die Bedeutung bleibt aber erhalten.

Die Symbole des Freistaats Bayern

Die Embleme



Quelle: www.bayern.de

Die Flagge



Regionen die eine historische Altgeschichte haben sind aber nicht viele in Europa. Die französischen Regionen, die künstlich geschaffen wurden oder seit langer Zeit von deren Geschichte getrennt waren, müssen sich eine neue Identität und ein neues Image bauen. Sie verfolgen die Strategie der Privatunternehmen die am Anfang eine Identität errichten sollen. Sie kleben diese Identität auf ein Bild und verbreiten sie danach so stark und so breit wie möglich. Diese Regionen entwickeln Werbekampagnen in Zeitungen, Fernseher und Zeitschriften und versuchen eine Identität aufzubauen, für dessen Anerkennung sie Logos und Hoheitszeichen aufbauen³¹. Deswegen haben sie Logos erbaut, das zur Anerkennung einiger positiven regionalen Aspekte dient. Die französischen Regionen haben dementsprechend gewählt, sich als irgendwelchen Konsumprodukt zu verkaufen und dementsprechend, durch Logos die Dynamismus, Erfolg oder Modernität zu zeigen. Manchmal sind diese Logos und Embleme nicht sehr schön aber sie haben

³¹ J. J. Hesse, *Regions in Europe*, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1996, p. 74.

kommerzieller Erfolg³². Laut J. Lendrevie et B. Brochand „strukturieren die Marken das öffentliche Raum“³³, was uns auf folgenden aufmerksam macht: dass die Beziehung auch umgekehrt funktioniert: die Einwohner einer Region können ein dynamisches und zukunftsorientiertes Verhalten dank der Embleme haben³⁴. Zum Beispiel, übermittelt die Region Rhone-Alpes eine dynamische und lebensvolle Image durch die Farben und der Form deren Logo:

Französische regionale Logos



Quelle: <http://emblemes.free.fr/dotclear/>

Hier basiert die Kommunikation auf die Tatsache, dass neben Rhonetal und Alpen (touristische Attraktionen, Schönheit, natürlicher Lebensraum, etc.) die Region die am weitesten entwickelte Region Frankreichs ist, was die modernen Technologien angeht. Seit 2005 hat doch der Conseil Regional die Ersetzung dieses Logos mit dem Namen Rhone-Alpes entschieden. Die Entscheidung wurde getroffen weil der Name in jeder Gelegenheit mehr lesbar gemacht werden kann. Darum benutzt auch Bayern oft die Flagge statt der Embleme. Außerdem hat man auch in Frankreich versucht, einige historische Elemente hervorzurufen, ohne Erfolg aber, weil die Angst um die Regionen zu groß war.

Diese Probleme sind auch in Rumänien zu finden, doch in viel höherem Maße. Hier deckt sich das Fehlen einer regionalen Identität mit der Tatsache, dass die Regionen nicht einmal einen Namen haben. Und nach unserem Beleg erklärt das größtenteils auch das Fehlen der Identität. Um

³² *Ibidem*, p. 76.

³³ J. Lendrevie, B. Brochand, *Publicitor*, Paris: Dalloz, 2001, p. 362.

³⁴ Die Embleme sowie die Flagge bedeuten die Zugehörigkeit zu einer Gruppe, die in unserem Fall eine erfolgreiche Region bezeichnet.

einige Charakteristika, Aspekte oder Qualitäten einer Region zu vermitteln, soll die Region einen Namen haben; darüber hinaus soll man auch wissen, dass nicht jeder Name auf dem Markt erfolgreich ist: der Name soll einen besonderen Klang haben, an einigen Besonderheiten der Region zu erinnern, einfach zu behalten sein, etc. Die „Nord-West Region“ oder „Süd“ besagt nur eine einfache geographische Lage, welche von Russland bis in Portugal gefunden sein kann. Eine Region darf aber nicht „no name“ kommunizieren. „no name“ kann eine Reaktion gegen Konsumerismus für ein Konsumprodukt bedeuten. Daher könnte das für eine Region genau das Fehlen des Etwas bedeuten, welches den Unterschied zu der Konkurrenz machen könnte. Die „Nord-West Region“, befindet sich nur irgendwo auf einer Karte, hat keine Geschichte, keine Kultur, keine Bürger die stolz auf dessen Region sind und auch keine Wirtschaft, weil man sich sehr schwer ein Produkt „made in Nord-West“ vorstellen könnte.

Die europäischen Regionen befinden sich in einem starken Wettbewerb in dem Versuch sich „einen Namen zu bauen“. Das bedeutet Erkannt und Anerkannt zu sein³⁵. „Das Wachstum des wettbewerblichen Druckes in Europa führt dazu, dass das Wettbewerb um die Lokalisierung, von dem Wettbewerb der Reputation und der Identität abhängt. Die Arbeit der Regionen muss darum auf der Schaffung einer regionalen Reputation basieren und die Region im Zusammenhang mit der Reputation bekannt machen“³⁶. Deswegen ist die regionale Identität eine der wichtigsten Elemente der Regionalwirtschaft. Ihre Rolle in einer globalen Wirtschaft wo nur die quantitativen Faktoren in Erwägung gezogen sind, ist aber unterschätzt. Der Erfolg einiger Regionen in Europa wird in der Zukunft zeigen, dass regionale Identität maßgebend für Erfolg sein wird.

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³⁵ R. Barna, *Dezvoltare regională în Europa*, Cluj-Napoca: EFES, 2007, p. 329.

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QU'EST-CE QUE C'EST LE MANAGEMENT INTERCULTUREL ?

Veronica Mateescu*

Abstract

The main aim of our article is to offer a clarification of the cross-cultural management concept, starting from the interest reasons for it and from the concrete contexts that force the management process to take into account the cultural differences. Because, the cultural differences, even if they are seen as a source of problems, or as a source of synergetic advantages, or they are not seen at all (cultural blindness), affect the managerial processes. Then, the following question arises: the lack of competence to economically manage the cultural differences isn't still a lack of managerial competence?

Key-words: cross-cultural management, cultural difference approach, cultural blindness, cultural synergy, interdisciplinary approach.

Introduction. Raisons d'intérêt pour le management interculturel

Le domaine du management interculturel peut être considéré un domaine d'étude encore émergent, sa sphère de compréhension étant encore mise en question. Une des principales raisons pour l'interrogation sur la sphère de compréhension du management interculturel est la superposition de celle-ci avec la sphère de compréhension d'autres disciplines intéressées aussi de l'étude de la différence culturelle et de l'impact de celle-ci sur l'activité d'une entreprise / organisation.

La présence de la différence culturelle dans les relations commerciales n'est pas de date récente (on peut même dire qu'elle date depuis milliers d'années, du premier contact commercial entre des personnes qui provenaient de cultures différentes), pourtant elle n'a pas bénéficié pendant une longue période de l'attention des chercheurs, des consultants, des managers et, en général, des personnes impliquées dans le monde de l'entreprise. D'où cet intérêt si accru (et en constante croissance)

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pour l'étude de l'impact des différences culturelles sur l'activité des entreprises, intérêt qui a donné naissance à un domaine d'étude indépendant : le management interculturel – MI ?

Une première explication serait le changement / l'évolution dans les conceptions sur l'entreprise et sur l'individu en tant que membre d'une entreprise. Ainsi, l'entreprise rationnelle et l'individu perçu comme *homo oeconomicus* ont été remplacés par l'entreprise comme un construit par des individus qui sont devenus acteurs, par l'entreprise comme système de liens sociaux et par l'entreprise comme lieu d'apprentissage de la coopération¹.

De même, on a démontré que l'entreprise est créatrice de culture et d'identité², ce rôle de l'entreprise en engendrant un intérêt croissant pour la culture organisationnelle (culture d'entreprise). L'intérêt pour la culture d'entreprise doit être compris par rapport au contexte économique et social caractéristique pour la période quand la notion de *culture d'entreprise* est apparue (les années 1970-1980) : la menace des compétiteurs japonais pour les entreprises américaines, la crise économique des années 1980, la restructuration industrielle ; tous ces facteurs ont posé pour le management des entreprises la question de la nécessité de réhabiliter l'image de l'entreprise par l'intermédiaire d'une approche plus orientée sur l'individu et de trouver une modalité de mobiliser le personnel employé³. La solution a été donnée par la culture d'entreprise.

Également, ont été réalisées des recherches à grande échelle qui ont mis en question l'universalisme qui a dominé pour longtemps le domaine du management, celles-ci en démontrant l'existence des différences dans la gestion et l'organisation des entreprises et dans le comportement de travail, différences données par la culture nationale. Pourtant, une des limites principales des recherches / études considérées parmi les plus influentes pour la démonstration de l'existence d'un impact de la différence culturelle sur le management, sur le comportement de travail et sur l'organisation des entreprises qui fonctionnent dans des milieux multinationaux et multiculturels (E.T. Hall et M. Reed Hall, F. Kluckhohn et F. Strodtbeck, G.

¹ Voir Philippe Bernoux, *La sociologie des entreprises*, Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1995.

² Renaud Sainsaulieu, *L'identité culturelle au travail. Les effets culturels de l'organisation*, 3^e édition, Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1988, p. 345.

³ Denys Cuche, *Noțiunea de cultură în științele sociale*, Iași: Institutul European, 2003, p. 144.

Hofstede, F. Trompenaars et Ch. Hampden-Turner) est exactement l'universalisme qu'elles critiquent, le résultat principal de ces recherches étant la création de modèles des dimensions de la culture nationale.

En même temps, une importance accrue est accordée par des entreprises à la ressource humaine, qui est perçue comme facteur d'avantage compétitif. Ainsi, dès les années 1980, l'importance stratégique de la ressource humaine est devenue un leitmotiv pour le domaine économique, la qualité et la mobilisation du personnel ayant tendance à devenir un atout pour une entreprise dans la même mesure que le progrès technologique ou une position dominante sur le marché⁴. Davantage, la ressource humaine est de plus en plus importante pour une entreprise dans les conditions dont on parle d'une « économie de la connaissance »⁵, pour laquelle le capital intellectuel constitue une ressource essentielle.

Aussi, le besoin des entreprises, que soit leur taille, pour rester compétitives dans un environnement de plus en plus concurrentiel les a menées sur la voie de l'internationalisation. Inévitablement, cette démarche d'internationalisation a engendré la confrontation des entreprises avec la réalité de la différence culturelle, même si à des degrés différents (en fonction de la forme d'internationalisation choisie⁶). Pourtant, que soit le degré d'interaction, on doit tenir compte de l'existence de la différence culturelle, car l'ignorance / la minimisation de l'impact de celle-ci sur l'activité d'une entreprise pourrait être génératrice de réels problèmes pour le management des entreprises internationales⁷. Par exemple, une des principales causes d'échec / des difficultés dans le management des alliances, des *joint-ventures*, des acquisitions internationales s'est avérée être

⁴ Bernard Gazier, *Strategie resurselor umane*, Iași: Institutul European, 2003, p. 21.

⁵ Le Conseil Européen de Lisbonne a assigné, en mars 2000, à l'Union Européenne l'objectif stratégique „de devenir l'économie de la connaissance la plus compétitive et la plus dynamique du monde, capable d'une croissance économique durable accompagnée d'une amélioration quantitative et qualitative de l'emploi et d'une plus grande cohésion sociale”, le terme étant l'année 2010 (Commission Européenne. Direction Generale De L'éducation Et La Culture, *Mise en oeuvre du programme de travail „Education et formation 2010”*, novembre 2004, [http://ec.europa.eu/education/policies/2010/doc/basicframe_fr.pdf], consulté le 24 novembre 2006).

⁶ N.-J. Adler, *International Dimensions of Organizational Behavior*, quatrième édition, Ohio: South-Western Thomson Learning, 2002, pp. 6-10.

⁷ Olivier Meier, *Management interculturel*, Paris: Dunod, 2004, p. 65.

la male gestion de la différence culturelle.⁸ Ainsi, une étude interne effectuée par Siebel Systems a indiqué que toutes les acquisitions de cette entreprise ont échoué à cause de conflits culturels⁹. De même, après la création de Daimler Chrysler (en 1998), les différences culturelles entre l'entreprise d'origine américaine (Chrysler) et l'entreprise d'origine allemande (Daimler-Benz) ont créé des difficultés dans les relations de travail, en générant des conflits en ce qui concerne les systèmes de compensation, le processus de prise des décisions (au niveau des cadres dirigeants), le code d'habillement, l'horaire de travail (au niveau des employés trouvés sur des niveaux hiérarchiques plus bas) etc.¹⁰

Également, une entreprise peut se trouver, grâce à la mobilité croissante de la force de travail, face à une composition multiculturelle du personnel dans son pays d'origine, le besoin de l'entreprise de rester compétitive en réclamant aussi la prise en considération de la différence culturelle et donc des compétences de management interculturel¹¹.

Un autre facteur qui doit être pris en considération dans l'effort de comprendre l'intérêt accordé à la différence culturelle et à son impact sur l'activité de l'entreprise est le fait que l'établissement (*establishment*) actuel valorise positivement la différence culturelle. Par conséquent, il y a une tendance générale – surtout dans l'Union Européenne et aux Etats-Unis – vers la reconnaissance et la préservation de la diversité culturelle.

Dans ces conditions, les entreprises multinationales (EMN) qui, par leur taille, par leur pouvoir et par leur contribution à l'économie mondiale, sont très visibles et constituent les cibles les plus accessibles pour le criticisme du grand public, ont adopté aussi le discours de la reconnaissance de la diversité culturelle. Reconnaissance qui, parfois, reste seulement au niveau des déclarations officielles. Car, même si le discours

⁸ John Harper, Sylvette Cormeraie, "Mergers, marriages and after: how can training help?", *Journal of European Industrial Training*, volume 19, no. 1, 1995, pp. 24-29 [http://caliban.emeraldinsight.com/vl=916747/cl=74/nw=1/fm=html/rpsv/cw/mcb/03090590/v19n1/s4/p24].

⁹ Günter K. Stahl, "Synergy springs from cultural revolution", *Financial Times*, 5 octobre 2006, [http://www.ft.com/cms/s/de124234-52fa-11db-99c5-0000779e2340.html], consulté le 21 décembre 2006.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*.

¹¹ N.-J. Adler (*op. cit.*, pp. 136-138.) parle d'un multiculturalisme domestique (*domestic multiculturalism*).

formel est celui de reconnaissance de la différence culturelle et de son impact positif sur l'entreprise, « [...] la mise en œuvre de ce principe se résume souvent à adjoindre aux opérations de gestion qui restent fondamentalement inchangées un vernis interculturel peu efficace »¹². Pourtant, il y a des entreprises qui ne perçoivent pas la reconnaissance de la diversité culturelle seulement comme une opportunité pour créer une bonne image parmi ses parties prenantes (*stakeholders*), mais comme un élément d'importance majeure pour leurs stratégies d'affaires, en existant une liaison entre la conscience culturelle, la stratégie et la performance d'une entreprise multinationale¹³. À présent, peu de multinationales sont restées ancrées dans une approche limitée / provinciale ou ethnocentrique, car ce type d'approches pourraient engendrer la diminution de leur compétitivité.

Des orientations par rapport à la différence culturelle dans le management

La différence culturelle n'est pas perçue / approchée d'une manière unitaire par les cadres dirigeants des entreprises. Par conséquent, on peut parler des perceptions et des approches multiples de la différence culturelle. Conformément au *Modèle du développement de la sensibilité interculturelle (The Developmental Model of Intercultural Sensitivity) (MDSI)*, modèle proposé par Milton Bennett (1986), il y a plusieurs réactions possibles des individus envers la différence culturelle, réactions qui varient en fonction de l'expérience de l'individu par rapport à celle-ci, la complexité de l'expérience dans les relations interculturelles en conduisant à une sensibilité croissante envers la différence culturelle. Bennett a identifié six stages parcourus par un individu dans sa démarche vers une sensibilité culturelle croissante, stages caractérisés par des orientations différentes par rapport à la différence culturelle : 1) négation ; 2) défense ; 3) minimisation ; 4) acceptation ; 5) adaptation et 6) intégration. Tandis que les premiers trois stages sont caractérisés par une orientation

¹² Sylvie Chevrier, *Le management interculturel*, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2003, p. 121.

¹³ Finn Drouet Majlgaard, *Release the Power of Cultural Diversity in International Business*, p. 1, [http://www.clubofamsterdam.com/contentarticles/cross_cultural_competence/Release%20the%20power%20of%20cultural%20diversity%20in%20international%20business.pdf], consulté le 25 novembre 2006.

ethnocentrique envers la différence culturelle – la culture propre est expérimentée comme centrale pour la réalité, les derniers trois stages sont plus ethno-relatives – la culture propre est expérimentée dans le contexte d'autres cultures¹⁴.

Paradoxalement, ayant en vue les raisons d'intérêt pour la différence culturelle mentionnées ci-dessus qui suggèrent les bénéfices qu'une entreprise pourrait obtenir à la suite de la prise en considération de la différence culturelle, l'attitude la plus répandue parmi les cadres dirigeants d'une entreprise est celle de considérer *la diversité culturelle* non comme une source des bénéfices pour l'entreprise, mais comme une *source de problèmes* pour celle-ci (on pourrait identifier une similarité entre cette approche de la culture et le stage de *défense* du MDSI dont une des caractéristiques est la perception de la différence culturelle comme une menace¹⁵).

Illustrative dans ce sens-là est une recherche effectuée parmi les communautés académiques et de management qui a indiqué que celles-ci avaient une meilleure compréhension des problèmes posés par le multiculturalisme que des avantages de celui-ci, le multiculturalisme étant donc considéré plutôt un problème qu'une ressource à utiliser¹⁶. Même si les résultats de cette recherche reflétaient la situation existante il y a 20 ans, la conception sur la diversité culturelle en tant que source de problèmes persiste encore. Ainsi, on même considère que l'entreprise multinationale diminuera sa cohérence si elle devienne multiculturelle¹⁷. Parmi les problèmes générés par la diversité culturelle on pourrait mentionner : la croissance de l'ambiguïté, de la complexité et de la confusion dans l'organisation, la difficulté d'obtenir le consensus, des mésententes dans la communication etc.¹⁸

Les définitions données au management interculturel renvoient aussi à la nécessité de dépasser les obstacles, les difficultés et les problèmes

¹⁴ ***, "The Developmental Model of Intercultural Sensitivity", p. 1, dans *The Intercultural Communication Institute*, [<http://www.intercultural.org/pdf/dmis.pdf>], consulté le 22 décembre 2006.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*.

¹⁶ N.-J. Adler, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

¹⁷ Pierre Conso, „Les stratégies des firmes multinationales”, dans Christian De Boissieu (ed.), *Les mutations de l'économie mondiale*, Paris: Economica, 2000, p. 85.

¹⁸ N.-J. Adler, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

posés par la gestion d'une ressource humaine culturellement différente.

Pourtant, nous avons pu remarquer que l'idée des difficultés posées par la diversité culturelle est toujours accompagnée par l'idée des bénéfices qu'on pourrait obtenir par la diversité culturelle. On peut identifier donc un changement, au moins au niveau de la communauté académique, dans la manière de comprendre le multiculturalisme dans l'entreprise. Par exemple, le management interculturel est défini « [...] par les questions auxquelles il tente d'apporter des réponses : quelles difficultés les différences culturelles suscitent-elles dans le management des entreprises et, surtout, quelles sont les voies envisageables pour dépasser ces obstacles mais aussi de profiter de la diversité culturelle »¹⁹ ou comme étant concerné par la construction « [...] des articulations entre porteurs de cultures différentes afin de minimiser les conséquences négatives des différences pour les individus et les entreprises et de bénéficier des ressources potentielles qu'offre chaque culture »²⁰.

La considération de la diversité culturelle comme une source de problèmes pour l'entreprise reste donc seulement une des approches possibles de la différence culturelle. Ainsi, comme on peut voir par les définitions présentées ci-dessus, une autre approche possible, on pourrait dire une approche idéale, est celle de considérer la diversité culturelle comme une ressource à utiliser et une potentielle source d'avantage compétitif. On pourrait identifier une similarité avec les stages d'adaptation et d'intégration du MDSI qui supposent une perception et des comportements adéquats pour communiquer plus efficacement avec une autre culture et l'extension de l'expérience du soi ainsi qu'on inclut le mouvement dans et au dehors de différentes conceptions sur le monde²¹. Parmi les potentiels avantages de la diversité culturelle, on peut mentionner : des perspectives multiples, un degré plus haut d'acceptation des nouvelles idées, une créativité et une flexibilité croissantes, une meilleure compréhension des employés locaux, une meilleure capacité d'interaction avec les clients locaux etc.²²

Autres approches possibles de la différence culturelle (on pourrait les appeler des approches intermédiaires sur une échelle où les deux pôles opposés sont « la diversité culturelle comme source de problèmes » et « la

¹⁹ S. Chevrier, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

²⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 4.

²¹ ***, "The Developmental Model of Intercultural Sensitivity", p. 1.

²² N.-J. Adler, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

diversité culturelle comme source d'avantage compétitif») sont : l'ignorance, la minimisation et la négation de la diversité culturelle et de l'impact de celle-ci sur l'activité de l'entreprise.

L'ignorance de la diversité culturelle peut prendre plusieurs formes et, par conséquent, peut avoir des effets différents sur l'activité d'une entreprise. Par exemple, une des formes d'ignorance (ou peut-être même de négation) de la diversité culturelle est la conception des politiques générales des entreprises sans prendre en considération le fait que les employés proviennent de cultures différentes²³. Une autre forme est celle de l'ignorance de la différence culturelle dans le cas des acquisitions et des fusions. Ainsi, une enquête effectuée parmi des managers français et allemands impliqués dans des acquisitions et fusions internationales a indiqué que la majorité des conflits ont une base culturelle, plus de 50% d'interviewés en déclarant que les différences culturelles dans la manière de travail représentent la principale source des tensions au lieu de travail. Pourtant, selon les déclarations des sujets interrogés, en dépit de leur rôle important pour les relations de travail, les différences culturelles n'étaient pas perçues comme importantes par les dirigeants du siège central des entreprises respectives²⁴. L'ignorance de la diversité culturelle peut produire, dans les cas les plus graves, l'échec des différents projets. Pourtant, elle continue se produire, pour des raisons variées : le management n'a pas les compétences nécessaires pour reconnaître la diversité culturelle ; le management reconnaît la diversité culturelle, mais il manque les compétences nécessaires pour la gestion de celle-ci ; la reconnaissance de la diversité culturelle peut produire des problèmes plus graves que l'ignorance de celle-ci ; les bénéfices attendus à la suite de la reconnaissance de la diversité culturelle ne justifient pas les coûts entraînés par celle-ci ; le travail, par sa nature, n'offre pas l'opportunité d'obtenir des avantages par la diversité culturelle²⁵.

Du point de vue du MDSI, le stage de *minimisation* suppose une conception universaliste sur le monde et l'expectation de l'existence d'une

²³ Guo-Ming Chen, William J. Starosta, *Foundations of Intercultural Communications*, Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1998, p. 215.

²⁴ J. Harper, S. Cormeraie, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

²⁵ Richard Mead, *International Management. Cross-cultural Dimensions*, Malden, Oxford, Carlton Victoria: Blackwell Publishing, 2005, p. 19.

similarité entre les propres comportements et les comportements d'autres, qu'on tente de modifier pour qu'ils soient conformes aux attentes initiales²⁶. La *minimisation* de l'impact de la différence culturelle sur l'activité d'une entreprise peut avoir aussi le sens d'une importance diminuée lui accordée. Ainsi, la minimisation de la différence culturelle peut se manifester sous la forme de la perception de celle-ci seulement comme un problème de gestion des demandes légales ou comme une partie de l'image d'une entreprise responsable sociale²⁷. Par exemple, l'emploi des managers locaux pourrait être considéré une pratique qui démontre l'intérêt du management de l'entreprise respectif pour la diversité culturelle et même une orientation polycentrique ou géocentrique de la part de celui-ci. Pourtant, une autre explication serait aussi possible : la législation du pays respectif ne permet pas que l'emploi d'un nombre limité de managers expatriés²⁸ ou demande un certain nombre obligatoire d'employés locaux. Par exemple, la législation ghanéenne prévoit dans le cas d'entreprises commerciales impliquées exclusivement dans l'achat et la vente des biens et qui sont la propriété totale ou partielle des non-Ghanéens, à côté d'une somme minimale obligatoire du capital d'investissement, l'obligation d'employer au moins 10 Ghanéens²⁹.

Une autre forme de minimisation de l'impact de la diversité culturelle qu'on peut rencontrer au niveau des entreprises multinationales est celle d'abandonner les questions liées à la diversité culturelle à la charge des individus impliqués dans les interfaces culturelles (l'expatrié, le membre d'une équipe de projet interculturel)³⁰. Par conséquent, la coordination interculturelle est réduite à l'ajustement mutuel, interpersonnel³¹, en manquant une politique officielle cohérente de l'entreprise dans ce sens-là. On crée ainsi une sorte de *kaizen*³² culturel.

²⁶ ***, "The Developmental Model of Intercultural Sensitivity", p. 1.

²⁷ G.-M. Chen, W.-J. Starosta, *op. cit.*, p. 220.

²⁸ R. Mead, *op. cit.*, p. 361.

²⁹ [<http://www.belonline.org/business2.htm>], consulté le 22 décembre 2006.

³⁰ S. Chevrier, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

³¹ *Ibidem*, p. 100.

³² Le concept de *kaizen* (élément spécifique pour le management japonais) suppose des améliorations (changements) graduelles et continues qui peuvent être effectuées par tout employé d'une entreprise [http://valuebasedmanagement.net/methods_kaizen.html], consulté le 22 décembre 2006.

La minimisation de l'impact de la diversité culturelle peut être aussi le résultat de l'hypothèse des dirigeants conformément à laquelle la diversité culturelle a un impact négatif sur l'organisation. Ainsi, ceux-ci choisiront des stratégies de minimisation des sources de diversité culturelle et de l'impact de celle-ci sur l'organisation, les manières d'implémentation de ces stratégies de minimisation étant la sélection d'une main d'œuvre culturellement homogène et / ou l'essai de socialisation de tous les employés de l'entreprise après les modèles comportementaux de la culture dominante³³.

Conformément au MDSI, la *négation* de la différence culturelle suppose le manque d'intérêt pour la différence culturelle (même une rejection, parfois agressive, de celle-ci), la culture propre étant considérée la seule réelle³⁴. Une des formes illustratives pour la *négation* de l'impact de la diversité culturelle sur l'activité de l'entreprise est la catégorie des perspectives considérées « à contexte faible » des auteurs dans le domaine du management et des affaires internationales. Le point commun de ces perspectives est donné par la minimisation de l'impact de la distinction nationale sur le management et l'organisation³⁵, l'hypothèse fondamentale de ces perspectives étant celle d'une convergence du management et de l'organisation des entreprises de pays différents, convergence qui est faite possible par l'engagement des entreprises dans une économie qui se globalise et par l'impact du changement de la technologie³⁶. Par exemple, une des principales causes de l'échec des missions des managers expatriés est l'hypothèse qui se trouve à la base de la sélection de ceux-ci, conformément à laquelle la gestion d'une entreprise est un art scientifique, la plus importante étant l'expertise technique qui permettrait aux managers expatriés d'avoir une bonne performance que soit le pays où ils/elles travaillent. Par conséquent, les managers sont souvent expatriés sans une formation préalable d'acculturation, ce qui affecte négativement la capacité de ceux-ci de s'adapter à la culture du pays hôte, en déterminant ainsi dans

³³ N.-J. Adler, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

³⁴ ***, "The Developmental Model of Intercultural Sensitivity", p. 1.

³⁵ John Child, David Faulkner, Robert Pitkethly, *The Management of International Acquisitions*, Oxford: University Press, 2003, p. 33.

³⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 33.

une très grande mesure l'échec de la mission d'expatriation³⁷. Les problèmes d'adaptation culturelle constituent la raison la plus souvent invoquée par les managers expatriés pour justifier leur retour avant que la mission internationale soit finie³⁸.

« L'invisibilité » de la culture pourrait être une explication pour les dernières trois approches de la différence culturelle mentionnées ci-dessus, peu de managers pouvant identifier un impact positif ou négatif de celle-ci sur l'activité quotidienne de leurs entreprises³⁹. Mais non seulement les managers sont affectés par cette « cécité culturelle » (*cultural blindness*), mais aussi les consultants dans le domaine du développement organisationnel et les spécialistes dans le domaine du management. Ainsi, une étude réalisée parmi 60 consultants dans le domaine du développement organisationnel de Montréal (1983), dont le but était la description de la part de ceux-ci de l'impact positif et négatif de la diversité culturelle sur leurs organisations et sur leur travail a indiqué que deux tiers de ceux-ci considéraient qu'en fait la diversité culturelle n'avait aucun impact, tandis que, à l'exception d'un seul consultant qui a mentionné un impact positif, les autres consultants ont rapporté seulement un impact négatif de la différence culturelle. De même, l'étude des recherches publiées dans le domaine du management pendant 1970-1990 a indiqué un nombre assez réduit des publications, par rapport à la croissance de l'activité internationale des entreprises, qui prenaient en considération le multiculturalisme international ou domestique⁴⁰.

Conclusion. Le management interculturel est un domaine d'étude encore émergent

Les différentes approches de la diversité culturelle sont importantes par la perspective des coûts et des bénéfices qu'elles impliquent pour une organisation, car : « *la diversité culturelle a des impacts potentiels tant positifs que négatifs ; l'approche organisationnelle de la diversité, et non pas la diversité en*

³⁷ Mark Mendenhall, Garry Oddou, "The Dimensions of Expatriate Acculturation: A Review", dans Terence Jackson (ed.), *Cross-Cultural Management*, Oxford: Butterworth Heinemann, 1995, pp. 342-343.

³⁸ Jean Marie Hiltrop, Maddy Janssens, "Expatriation: Challenges and Recommendations" dans T. Jackson (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 357.

³⁹ N.-J. Adler, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 106.

soi, détermine les coûts et les bénéfices finales pour l'organisation »⁴¹.

L'approche organisationnelle de la diversité culturelle aussi que les coûts et les bénéfices qu'en résultent pour l'organisation respective font partie de la sphère d'étude du management interculturel.

Le management interculturel est, le plus souvent, mis en relation avec l'idée de la gestion de la diversité culturelle dans le but d'assurer la compétitivité de l'entreprise⁴². On pose ainsi la question des actions que les managers doivent entreprendre dans le but d'obtenir des résultats efficaces et efficaces dans des milieux multinationaux et multiculturels⁴³ et des bénéfices économiques obtenus à la suite d'une bonne gestion de la diversité culturelle⁴⁴. De même, on perçoit une liaison entre le succès d'une entreprise globale et la conscience et la sensibilité culturelle du management de celle-ci. Par conséquent, nous considérons qu'une bonne définition du management interculturel serait : *la gestion économique des différences culturelles*.

À l'exception des problèmes et des bénéfices apportés à l'entreprise par une ressource humaine culturellement différente, le management interculturel essaye aussi de donner des réponses aux questions telles que : si la culture a de l'influence, et quelle est celle-ci, sur le comportement de travail des individus dans une organisation ; si / dans quelle mesure le style managérial doit être modifié si on travaille avec des individus qui proviennent des cultures différentes ; dans quelle mesure la gestion des interactions interculturelles est différente par rapport à la gestion des interactions interculturelles au sein d'un group homogène du point de vue culturel⁴⁵.

Toutes ces questions montrent la difficulté de définir exactement le domaine de recherche du management interculturel, dans les conditions dont celui-ci est encore émergent, en suscitant des débats sur sa sphère de recouvrement, sur les manières pertinentes de gérer la diversité culturelle et sur la notion de culture elle-même⁴⁶. La difficulté d'une définition exacte

⁴¹ *Ibidem*, p. 115.

⁴² S. Chevrier, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

⁴³ Nancy J. Adler, "Cross-cultural Management: Issues to Be Faced", *International Studies of Management and Organization*, vol. XIII, No. 1-2, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1983, p. 41.

⁴⁴ R. Mead, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

⁴⁵ N.-J. Adler, "Cross-cultural Management...", p. 8.

⁴⁶ S. Chevrier, *op. cit.*, pp. 6-7.

du management interculturel dérive aussi par le fait que son domaine d'intérêt se superpose avec celui d'autres disciplines. Ainsi, le sujet des différences culturelles et de leur impact sur les entreprises est abordé aussi dans le cadre des disciplines comme : management international / multinational/global, management comparé, management international de ressources humaines, marketing international, communication interculturelle, sociologie de l'organisation (de l'entreprise), psychologie organisationnelle, comportement organisationnel, culture organisationnelle etc.

Cette superposition des domaines d'étude des différentes disciplines se reflète aussi dans les définitions données au management interculturel. Ainsi, celui-ci est défini aussi en tant que domaine « indépendant » de recherche qu'en tant qu'une « extension » d'autres domaines du management. Car l'interdisciplinarité du domaine d'étude du management interculturel le transforme parfois, dans une certaine mesure, dans un prolongement des domaines dont sa sphère de recherche se superpose. Par exemple, la sphère de recherche du management interculturel se superpose dans une certaine mesure avec celle du management international des ressources humaines (MIRH), le MI pouvant être perçu comme une « extension » / branche du MIRH, orientée sur l'impact de la culture sur le management, sur l'organisation et sur le comportement de travail. La sphère de recherche du MI se superpose aussi dans une certaine mesure, par l'intérêt du MI pour comprendre et trouver des modalités efficaces pour travailler avec des clients, des partenaires, des fournisseurs qui proviennent de cultures différentes, avec celle du marketing international. Une définition illustrative pour la relation existante entre le management interculturel et le management international des ressources humaines et, aussi entre le management interculturel et le marketing international est celle donnée au management interculturel par Nancy J. Adler : *« [la gestion interculturelle] explique le comportement des personnes dans des organisations autour du monde et montre aux gens comment travailler dans des organisations avec des populations d'employés et de clients qui proviennent d'un grand nombre de cultures différentes [...] décrit le comportement organisationnel à l'intérieur des pays et des cultures ; compare le comportement organisationnel à travers des pays et des cultures ; et peut-être le plus important, recherche comprendre et améliorer l'interaction des collègues, des directeurs, des*

cadres, des clients, des fournisseurs, et des partenaires d'alliance qui proviennent de pays et de cultures de tout le monde »⁴⁷.

Pourtant, l'approche interdisciplinaire est inévitable, et même recommandée⁴⁸, dans le cas du management interculturel. Toutefois, même si sa sphère de compréhension est si complexe et pose beaucoup de questions, le MI est souvent approché, malheureusement, au niveau du sens commun.

Un exemple dans ce sens-là pourrait être « *Au-delà du choc des cultures. Dépasser les oppositions pour mieux travailler ensemble* », livre écrit par Charles Hampden-Turner et Fons Trompenaars⁴⁹. L'impression générale donnée par ce livre est celle d'un manuel extensif de *training* dans le domaine du management interculturel. Pour remédier ce petit inconvénient, les auteurs ont opté pour un style d'écriture qu'ils appelaient « *l'humour sérieux* »⁵⁰. Ce style est caractérisé par l'utilisation des dessins adéquats pour les thèmes abordés, par l'analyse / l'interprétation des films célèbres et des livres obligatoires de la bibliographie d'un étudiant diligent et par l'appel aux événements médiatiques connus. L'appel aux histoires et aux films « *emblématiques* »⁵¹ pour une culture est justifié par les auteurs ainsi : « *Une histoire est un moyen très puissant de transmettre une culture. D'ailleurs, elle adopte souvent une structure proche de celle du mythe et de l'archétype culturel* »⁵². Ces histoires et films « *idéalisent leurs valeurs préférées tout en intégrant des valeurs contraires* »⁵³. Tout au long du livre on est donc

⁴⁷ N.-J. Adler, *International Dimensions...*, p. 11.

⁴⁸ Geert Hofstede, *Culture's Consequences. International Differences in Work-Related Values*, Volume 5, Cross-Cultural Research and Methodologies Series, Beverly Hills, London: Sage Publications, 1980, pp. 34-35.

⁴⁹ Ceux-ci sont « [...] des spécialistes reconnus des questions interculturelles [qui] dirigent le centre de formation et de conseil en management interculturel Trompenaars-Hampden Turner (THT) » (ces informations peuvent être retrouvées sur la dernière couverture du livre). Le livre est apparu en 2004 aux Éditions d'Organisation, Paris, dans la collection *Manageris*, étant une traduction de „best-seller anglais” (précision faite sur la première couverture du livre) *Building Cross-Cultural Competence : How to create wealth from conflicting values* (publié en 2000 par John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.).

⁵⁰ Charles Hampden-Turner, Fons Trompenaars „*Au-delà du choc des cultures. Dépasser les oppositions pour mieux travailler ensemble*”, Paris: Éditions d'Organisation, 2004, p. XXXI.

⁵¹ *Ibidem*, p. 23.

⁵² *Ibidem*, p. 24.

⁵³ *Ibidem*, p. 23.

accompagné par des films plus ou moins célèbres et par des récits dont les auteurs consacrent une partie importante dans l'économie de l'ouvrage (les films sont présents dans une plus grande mesure que les récits, en existant même une rubrique de filmographie, insérée après celle de bibliographie⁵⁴).

Il semble donc que les *différences culturelles* aient tendance à s'intégrer dans la *culture générale* et que les auteurs en aient eu une assez bonne intuition⁵⁵. On crée ainsi une discordance entre l'étude scientifique de la culture et l'approche managériale de celle-ci. Cette situation est plus visible en Roumanie où la formation managériale se trouve encore à ses débuts et, en plus, on essaie encore de récupérer le décalage par rapport à l'Occident. Ainsi, le domaine de recherche du management interculturel risque à rester seulement au niveau du discours formel.

Nous proposons donc que le domaine du management interculturel bénéficie davantage de son interdisciplinarité et utilise une autre approche, par l'emprunt à la méthodologie des sciences sociales, comme l'anthropologie et la sociologie. Car l'interdisciplinarité constitue un plus et non pas un minus pour tout type d'approche. Le plus illustratif dans ce sens-là est le cas de l'anthropologie culturelle qui a emprunté des concepts et des méthodes tant aux sciences exactes, qu'aux sciences humaines.

De même, nous recommandons la réalisation de recherches qui mettent en évidence les conditions existantes – dans le cas ci-présent, la différence culturelle qui a un impact réel sur l'activité d'une entreprise – ainsi que celles-ci soient mieux comprises et gérées dans des buts d'efficacité de l'entreprise. De même, pour mettre en question l'universalisme des recherches réalisées à grande échelle, finalisées souvent par la création des modèles de la culture nationale, nous recommandons la réalisation de plusieurs études à petite échelle, car la réalité peut contredire les résultats des études à grande échelle.

⁵⁴ *Ibidem*, pp. 411-412.

⁵⁵ Veronica-Maria Mateescu, „Au-delà du choc des cultures. Dépasser les oppositions pour mieux travailler ensemble – compte rendu”, *Studia Europea*, vol. 1, 2006, pp. 336-337.

AU CARREFOUR DES IDENTITES

Adriana Marinescu*

Abstract:

The object of this research, carried out during my stay in France as an Erasmus Anthropology student, is to question an identity issue. How does a secular state (i.e. France) influence the way in which the members of a multi-ethnic community see themselves ? Which identity comes first : the religious one (orthodox) or the national one (as foreigner, immigrant or native) ? To what extent does the organisation of the church as cult and as administration influence the perception of the participants as « self » and towards the others ?

An important detail to be mentioned is the fact that this is only the second part of the research, the ethnological viewpoint, following the ethnographical one, that has been left aside due to space and time restrictions and to its degree of familiarity to the Romanian reader.

The items that have been chosen to insist upon are the personal conclusions and the potential of this research - to be continued as means of showing an alternative way to deal with the inclusion and appeasement issues in an multi-ethnic community at a moment when religious issues are tabu.

Key-words: integration, immigration, intussusception, mimo-dramatism, fieldwork

« Il n'y a aucune différence entre Juif et Grec, car le Même est le Dieu de tous, qui protège tous ceux qui appellent Son nom »¹

« L'orthodoxie n'est pas Grecque, Roumaine, Française - c'est l'orthodoxie ! Point final. »²

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¹ Epître de l'Apôtre Paul aux Romains, chapitre 10, verset 12.

² Extrait d'un entretien avec Anca N., 29 ans, Roumaine.

« *L'ethnophylétisme³ est une hérésie* »⁴

Des éléments unificateurs et intégrateurs

Une définition possible de la religion affirmerait qu'il s'agit d'un phénomène social qui implique des croyances, des rites et une communauté (Houziaux, 2003). Pour que celle-ci existe, il doit y avoir des liens, des inter-relations, des éléments communs de participation et référence. Pour plus de précision, nous avons fait le choix de distinguer entre les termes *unificateur* et *intégrateur*, ainsi que: **unificateur** c'est ce qui relie, qui serre ensemble, une référence commune, une pratique commune, un sentiment personnel et commun en même temps, tandis qu' **intégrateur** signifierait englobant, couvrant, ce qui enveloppe une communauté, sans forcément que cela soit produit par les membres eux-mêmes - l'orthodoxie, ses dogmes, ses rites et cérémonies.

Le premier terme fait référence à un impulse qui surgit des individus vers l'extérieur, pendant que le deuxième désigne exactement l'inverse. D'où le fait que certains phénomènes peuvent facilement observés, comme, par la plupart ceux qui relèvent de l'intégration, tandis que les autres transpercent plutôt les paroles des personnes.

Parmi les **éléments unificateurs** que nous avons pu observer:

- **Monseigneur⁵** - comme référence commune, parfois comme liant. Tous mes informateurs l'ont mentionné, avec beaucoup d'admiration; ce qui n'empêche pas les gens de percevoir aussi sa dimension humaine lors des petits événements quotidiens, hors de l'église. Cependant, sa forte présence, comme porteur d'une autorité charismatique et traditionnelle, comme médiateur, comme conseiller personnel avec lequel on établit un lien personnel à travers la confession fait de lui une sorte de noeud du réseau humaine communautaire de Saint Joseph.
- à mi-chemin entre unificateur et intégrateur se situent les moments de partage et convivialité: les agapes, le café après la liturgie et, le plus

³ Lier' l'orthodoxie à un certain pays, considéré hérésie et condamnée par les synodes.

⁴ Entretien avec Monseigneur Marc, l'évêque auxiliaire.

⁵ L'évêque auxiliaire de la paroisse, Mgr. Marc, Français d'origine, qui a quitté son ancienne vie pour passer une dizaine d'années en Roumanie, à Sihăstria et puis a suivi la Faculté de Théologie Orthodoxe à Iași. De retour en France, il est le père spirituel des communautés de Bordeaux et Saintes et évêque de la Métropole Orthodoxe de l'Europe Centrale et Occidentale.

important instant de partage: la *Sainte Eucharistie*. C'est un moment complexe à analyser: selon Y. Beaupérin il s'agirait d'un *mimodrame style chosal* - la pratique et revivement d'un rituel (y compris d'un sacrifice, celui du Christ) à l'aide d'une 'chose' (ici, le pain et le vin qui se transforment). Mais il y a encore la profondeur du partage: dans une religion comme le christianisme les gens sont reliés entre eux parce qu'ils sont tous reliés à Dieu. Ce qui les relie, c'est qu'ils communient dans la Même foi; ainsi, le vrai contenu du lien social est la communion. En tant que communauté, aucune société ne peut se passer de la communion. C'est la communion qui crée la communauté, et pas l'inverse [...] "Ma définition: communier, c'est partager sans diviser. On ne peut pas communier en un gâteau, par exemple, car la seule façon de le partager c'est de le diviser. En revanche, on peut communier dans le plaisir qu'il y a à manger un très bon gâteau! Par contre, le plaisir va s'accroître avec le nombre de personnes qui partagent."⁶. C'est ce qui traverse les récits des gens: « c'est le Christ qui nous unit, le respect pour le Christ », « le lien de la communauté? L'Eucharistie », « la liaison entre les gens, c'est le Christ! », « le fait de communier du même Calice nous fait une communauté ». La dimension symbolique apparaît assez clairement: le Christ est, à la fois, l'Homme-Dieu qui s'est fait chair pour nous et est mort pour nos péchés et la présence dans l'Eucharistie - c'est ce que Dodd appelle l'unité intrinsèque du symbole et de la réalité symbolisée, du « mimène » à l'« analogème » (le symbole, ayant comme fonction de rendre présent l'invisible, ici et maintenant, comme rencontre, comme outil d'exploration du monde d'En Haut).⁷

Dans cet espace intersticiel de l'unificateur à l'intégrateur il y a aussi les *fêtes*, comme dimensions symboliques et allégories de participation. Occasions de rassemblement, de célébration, les fêtes ont une forte connotation communautaire: on ne peut fêter qu'ensemble. On revit des moments importants de l'histoire de l'orthodoxie ou du christianisme; on participe en plus grand nombre et on rejoint autres communautés et groupes ethniques; on prolonge la célébration religieuse, symbolique, par une fête laïque, non moins symbolique. Ainsi, la communauté se crée, se maintient, se renouvelle. Le contexte festif comme expérience symbolique

⁶ Yves Beaupérin, *Anthropologie du geste symbolique*, Paris: L' Harmattan, 2002, p. 54

⁷ *Ibidem*.

se constitue donc comme dimension permettant de reconstruire le monde - elle est l'occasion de ritualiser l'organisation culturelle du réel, à travers le recours au mythe et au rite (Massenzio, 1999). *La fête relie l'intégrateur, l'élément mythique et rituel, la mise en scène, la recette dogmatique de l'évènement, le contexte, à l'unificateur - la participation matérielle et symbolique des gens qui font la fête.* Elle structure aussi l'identité, participant au processus de construction de soi sur deux axes:

- la mémoire des expériences subjectives passées (mémoire de soi-même ou auto-identité)
- le sens de la réalité comme synthèse des expériences objectives.

Par la genèse des images symboliques se forme une identité collective qui peut engendrer des symboles éthico-politiques. (Massenzio, 1999)

Le passage se fait ainsi vers *l'orthodoxie* comme **élément intégrateur**, comme repère commun - « *on a des langues différentes, mais le même langage* », comme code culturel qui fait que les individus se comprennent facilement, malgré leurs traditions différentes. Le fait de communiquer plus aisément et sans beaucoup de difficulté, même pour ceux qui ne maîtrisent pas parfaitement la langue, avec ceux qui sont de la même religion, qui ont les mêmes pratiques- « *essaie de parler du Carême avec les catholiques...c'est pas du tout la même chose* » (Michel C. 39 ans, Français, auparavant catholique) - de se retrouver recourir à la même rhétorique à connotation religieuse même dans un contexte laïc, tout cela structure et relève une identité collective forte. Les règles sociales, transfigurées en valeurs et intériorisées en tant que symboles, agissent déjà par leur propre force pour déterminer les comportements collectifs.⁸

Du coup, la manifestation la plus concrète de l'orthodoxie, *la liturgie* peut être analysée comme rituel qui structure et consolide la communauté, de surcroît parce qu'elle appelle à la participation "tripartite" de la personne: âme, corps et esprit.⁹ Comme instrument de communication solennelle, rejeu mimo-dramatique communautaire de l'Homme Dieu, la *leitourgias* (du grec *leitōs*=public et *ergos*=oeuvre) est étymologiquement l'action du peuple, c'est à dire action mimodramatique

⁸ Marcello Massenzio, *Frontières et ordre du monde*, Cahiers de l'Homme, Paris: Éditions de l'École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, 1999.

⁹ Beaupérin, *op. cit.*

du Corps mystique de l'Homme Dieu, chosale et/ou corporelle- manuelle et laryngo-buccale.

L'efficacité de la liturgie, selon le même auteur, réside dans le fait de la garder comme une pédagogie totale et globale, ainsi :

- totale: dans la synergie de tous ses éléments (la célébration des sacrements qui ponctue les grands moments de la vie chrétienne, l'année liturgique qui ponctue le rythme annuel des mystères de l'homme Dieu, la célébration eucharistique qui ponctue le rythme hebdomadaire, voire quotidien, de la vie chrétienne, la célébration des Heures qui sanctifie le temps de la journée) ;
- globale: parce que s'adresse à la globalité de l'homme (sa participation dans les rites par les mouvements, la gestuelle, les chants, les prières et la communion).¹⁰

Par l'intermédiaire des *choses* comme les icônes, des *mimènes* comme le signe de la croix et les "metaneios"¹¹, des *activités laryngo-buccales* comme les chants, les "kyrie eleison" et les "amen", on assiste au phénomène que M. Jousse appelle *intussusception* (du latin intus = à l'intérieur et suscipere = amasser, cueillir) - l'homme se nourrit intellectuellement et spirituellement par le *mimisme*, en recevant en lui, par les gestes de tout son corps, les interactions de l'univers qui l'entoure (Beaupérin). Du même registre font partie les autres pratiques rituelles communes, publiques ou privées, occasionnelles – le vénération des icônes le Dimanche de l'orthodoxie, demander pardon chacun à tous, par une métanie et en embrassant la personne - ou générales, ordinaires, lors de tout service religieux. Quelques-uns ont témoigné avoir senti justement cela : « *je sens que la participation est plus forte quand on fait tous la même chose; quand on chante, on monte à la source éternelle* », « *quand on prononce tous le 'Notre père', ça nous inscrit dans un rapport de filiation à Dieu, nous sommes tous des frères et soeurs* » (Danielle P., 42 ans, Française, auparavant catholique).

Néanmoins, il faut tenir compte de la particularité organisationnelle de l'Église Orthodoxe, qui est auto-céphale pour chaque pays où elle se

¹⁰ C'est intéressant d'observer qu'il y a eu une histoire de conversion liée précisément à la lecture d'un livre nommé *Le symbolisme du corps humain*, dont l'auteur donnait des conférences, qui, à la fin ont mené à la conversion de la personne en cause.

¹¹ Métanie: outre son sens de conversion et de repentir, le mot grec métanoia désigne les prosternations que les fidèles orthodoxes font en diverses circonstances.

trouve à l'Est et en Occident, sous l'autorité de la Métropole Orthodoxe de l'Europe Occidentale et Méridionale. Les comportements collectives, lorsque celles-ci s'intègrent activement dans la configuration complexe de l'ethnos, elles interagissent avec les autres pour accroître la valeur de l'*Erlebnis ethnique*.¹²

Olivier Clément observe que l'Église Orthodoxe est une église qui est étroitement liée au destin des peuples qu'elles a été amenée à évangéliser. *“Dans les pays orthodoxes, l'orthodoxie donne un sentiment d'appartenance, même si vous n'êtes pas croyant: on se réfère à elle. Être Russe, ou Serbe, par exemple, c'est être orthodoxe; pour certains pays, on peut comparer cela au sentiment d'appartenance des juifs qui, même s'ils ne pratiquent pas pour plus de 80%, ont ce sentiment d'appartenance au judaïsme. Cela fait partie de leur histoire nationale. Avec la fin du communisme les peuples font leur retour vers leur passé et ils ne peuvent donc exclure leur appartenance à la religion orthodoxe, à son patrimoine spirituel immense; on ne peut pas penser ces pays sans l'Église Orthodoxe”*.

Ceci attire donc aux éléments qui sont, à la fois intégrateurs et séparateurs, que nous traiterons en ce qui suit.

Un élément très important qui doit être pris en compte c'est *le contexte, l'Etat laïc*. Max Weber (dans *L'éthique protestante et l'esprit du capitalisme*) a étudié la condition des minorités religieuses et sociales et leurs stratégies afin de compenser le statut de minorité. Dans notre cas, le contexte de la laïcité de l'état français, parfois méconnue ou mal-interprétée, modifie l'attitude individuelle et communautaire de diverses manières: « *par le statut d'association culturelle l'état ne protège en quelque sorte* » (Michel C.), « *pour les uns, le rapport à la foi, à l'orthodoxie a changé après l'arrivée en France, pour d'autres non* » (Anca N., 29 ans, Roumaine, mariée à un Français), « *on est obligé à s'organiser - c'est la loi de 1901* » (Michel C.). Cela implique une participation soit extensive soit intensive, un attachement accru, une plus grande responsabilité: « *chez nous, c'était quelque chose d'ordinaire, on ne faisait pas beaucoup d'attention* » (Anca N.), tandis qu'ici l'église ne peut pas exister sans sa petite communauté, sans que chacun accomplisse son rôle. C'est aussi l'occasion de témoigner sa foi autrement: « *oui, je crois, je vais à l'église* » (Anca N.), « *la déchristianisation est mauvaise de point de vue culturel* » (Michel C.). Si dans les pays de tradition

¹² Massenzio, *op. cit.*

orthodoxe la communauté est un peu floue, répandue, éparpillée, présente, ancrée, mais l'intensité des liens varie, ici il semble que la laïcité, contrairement à ce qu'on pourrait croire, a renforcé la communauté par les contraintes imposées.

On observe également que l'église prend ainsi en charge la fonction que l'état souvent faille à accomplir - l'intégration des individus. Il s'agit non pas d'une intégration politique ou administrative, mais d'une *intégration culturelle*, par appel à des traits à la fois personnels et culturels, qui, étant communes, créent l'effet de communauté.

L'organisation matérielle et spirituelle rend présente la communauté des gens, les implique, les valorise, leurs offre des moments de communion, de partage, de soulagement, de « thérapie de groupe ». Elle répond ainsi aux besoins personnels:

- contrairement à ce qu'on aurait la tendance à croire, le message éthique est secondaire et le fait qu'une religion apporterait le bonheur par réassurance peut être vrai, mais pas forcément;
- par contre, le fait indéniable est qu'elle permet l'accès à une communauté/communion¹³: les religions qui retiennent la plus grand nombre de fidèles sont celles qui les fédèrent autour d'une identité communautaire forte, en imprégnant toute l'existence. La conclusion de l'auteur est qu'il y a des besoins auxquels la religion peut répondre: un langage qui permette d'exprimer notre aspiration vers l'infini, la transcendance, le mystère, le divin, l'au-delà, de dire l'indicible, pour dire la culpabilité, l'espérance, le sentiment d'être exilé dans ce monde, d'aimer et d'être aimé, de nous sentir 'maternés' plutôt que heureux, mais d'autant plus, d'appartenir à une communauté qui structure une identité collective forte, qui satisfait une nécessité d'exprimer des émotions et de communier dans ces émotions. Toutes les émotions ne sont pas religieuses, bien entendu, mais il y a des émotions que seules les célébrations religieuses permettent d'exprimer: le besoin de fraternité devant les épreuves et les souffrances, de continuer à espérer, la prière, les grands rassemblements qui donnent naissance à une émotion collective.

¹³ André Comte-Sponville, „Un athée fidèle”, in Alain Houziaux (ed.), *A-t-on encore besoin d'une religion?*, Paris: Les Éditions de l'atelier/ Les Éditions ouvrières, 2003.

En ce qui concerne les **éléments de séparation et différenciation**, ceux-ci peuvent s'inscrire sous des divers registres.

D'abord, *les traditions d'origine*, les particularités de l'orthodoxie dans leurs pays d'origine, le fait que quelques-uns se sont convertis, donc ils ont un passé religieux catholique ou autre. Parfois on évoque tout cela:

« *vous, vous êtes orthodoxes depuis la naissance, vous avez l'habitude, la tradition* » (Emmanuel N, 32 ans, Français, marié à une Roumaine); « *chez moi, on n'agenouille pas* » (Georgi S., 23 ans, Bulgare), « *en Syrie, l'église était plus vivante, plus active, il y avait beaucoup d'associations* » (Marwan, 26 ans, Syrien), « *en Roumanie, vous avez gardé la tradition* » (Emmanuel N).

Ceux qui se sont convertis mentionnent les raisons et les différences d'attitude de l'orthodoxie envers des problématiques - une attitude qualifiée comme « plus profonde », « plus traditionnelle », « *je préfère le mystère [...] l'infaillibilité du Pape: si cela existait, on l'aurait su jusqu'à aujourd'hui; l'histoire l'aurait prouvé* » (Michel C.).

La personnalité de chacun, ses sensibilités, son passé avec toutes les expériences vécues, qui l'ont rapproché ou éloigné de l'église, la vie privée avec ses problèmes inhérents, la condition d'étranger ou d'immigré ressentie plus ou moins fortement, les raisons de venir à l'église, tous ceux-ci sont individualisés et nuancés.

« *je me sens bien, tranquille, parler avec Jésus* » (Georgi S.), « *je suis devenue plus pratiquante depuis que je suis ici* » (Madalina P, 23 ans, Roumaine), « *je viens pour être pardonné, pour prier aussi, parfois je vais, j'allume une cièrge, je pars, je me sens mieux* » (Georgi S.).

Pour d'autres, la question des raisons ne se pose pas: c'est une habitude, une tradition, une chose qu'on n'explique pas; il y a aussi ceux qui cherchent l'église Roumaine ou Grecque pour y trouver des conationaux, des amis.

La manifestation de la nationalité, marqueur identitaire assez fort se manifeste aussi par les traditions que par les usages des autres - les stéréotypies de caractère: « *les Français sont plus froids* » (Mădălina P.), « *les Roumains semblent plus croyants* » (Nicole L., 67 ans, Française), « *nos Roumains ont aussi leurs petites affaires à eux, je les connais, c'est comme chez nous* » (Mădălina P.), « *ils nous associent à des tziganes, mais pas ici, à l'église, ici, on se connaît* » (Mădălina P.), « *en Roumanie, vous avez gardé les traditions, les gens des villages sont plus nobles, ceux des viles semblent plus vulgaires, et ils*

le montrent, tandis qu'en France, ça existe aussi, mais on ne le montre pas » (Emmanuel N.), « peut être y-a-t-il des obstacles quant à l'acceptation de l'autre, je n'ai pas senti, mais j'ai entendu parler » (Imelda, 45 ans, Togolaise).

Une autre *question sensible* est celle de *la langue* avec toutes les sensibilités et nuances qui en découlent.

Une autre encore serait *l'origine, l'appartenance ou la 'nationalité' de l'église*: « église orthodoxe », « église franco-roumaine », « église Saint Joseph » - tout cela revêt des subtilités pas négligeables qui peuvent froisser: « ce n'est pas l'église roumaine, mais 'de Roumanie' » (Emmanuel N.), « je n'aime pas quand les gens disent ça », « c'est plutôt l'église franco-roumaine » (Emmanuel N.), « on l'appelle église Roumaine pour la différencier de celle Grecque » (Nadja S, 30 ans, Russe), « c'est Roumaine, parce qu'il y a beaucoup de Roumains là » (Mădălina P.), « elle dépend de la Métropole Orthodoxe Roumaine, mais c'est 'Franco-Roumaine' » (Michel C.) « si une personne dit ça, elle parle pour elle-même, ça ne me gêne pas, moi, j'entends à ma façon; c'est un stéréotype, il ne faut pas le juger » (Imelda). La paternité de l'église surgit au moment où il faut retracer l'histoire de l'église et sa transformation dans "l'église orthodoxe Saint Joseph": selon les uns, ce sont les Roumains qui se sont mobilisés pour louer l'espace, parce qu'ils voulaient avoir un lieu de culte, selon les autres, c'étaient les Français qui auraient fait toutes les démarches. Curieusement, sur les cartes où sont marqués les monuments historiques, il apparaît écrit « Église Grecque », « Église Orthodoxe Russe », mais « Église Orthodoxe Saint Joseph ». Pour l'histoire attestée du bâtiment, voir les annexes.

Les manières de vivre, les traditions, y compris culinaires, les différentes façons d'être, de vivre la foi, l'expérience à l'étranger, comme immigrant ou établi, l'impacte que les décisions nationales et internationales touchant au politique, social, économique, ont sur chacun, tout cela mène à des divers rapports aux autres et à l'église. L'identité se construira différemment, les relations et les interactions fluctuent, les liens communautaires sont plus ou moins serrés. La relation de chacun avec le Christ diffère également, cependant, c'est Lui le centre de gravitation et attraction, sous la forme des Saintes Mystères, aussi que dans des formes plus insaisissables (des paroles, des expériences personnelles).

La conséquence la plus paradoxale c'est que la perception d'un acte peut se révéler un couteau à deux lames: par le fait de reconnaître toutes les

nationalités, de les respecter en leur donnant la juste place, on commet une sorte de *discrimination positive*, on les met en évidence, minant ainsi une unité supposée. Cette unité ne peut toutefois subsister que dans sa diversité.

« *La religion, une patrie portative* » (Heinrich Heine)

« *Tout comme dans une église il n'y a pas une partie de l'Orthodoxie, mais l'Orthodoxie tout entière, c'est du même avec la communauté* »¹⁴

« *On peut être un bon Roumain sans être un bon chrétien et aussi l'inverse* »¹⁵

Il est difficile de parler de *l'identité*, puisque c'est une des réalités qui n'existent pas telles quelles, elle est ressentie, exprimée, elle ne peut pas persister sans un être porteur; on est obligé à l'objectiver quand on en parle, mais elle est l'un des aspects les plus subjectifs de l'existence. A plusieurs échelles, accordée, revendiquée, rejetée, stigmatisée ou objet de louange et prestige, apparemment figée mais en pleine et perpétuelle reconstruction, sujet tabou pour certains mais, surtout aujourd'hui, au coeur des débats.

Le fait d'enquêter sur la question de l'identité - démarche fascinante, mais difficile - m'a conduit à découvrir les imbrications des souvenirs, des faits actuels, des réalités vécues, des paroles et des sentiments pour former ce qui, justement, constitue ce tissu alambiqué qui est l'identité.

Tout comme une tunique de peau sur les individus, sur leurs existences et leurs personnalités, le seul risque pour moi était de ne pas voir la forêt à cause des arbres. D'où la méthodologie de mon enquête et le choix de présenter à l'écrit un début plutôt ethnographique, une continuation ethnologique et, pour ce qui reste, les conclusions anthropologiques dans une enquête plus approfondie. Les entretiens et les discussions avec les gens ont suivi le même cheminement - on commence par un récit de vie ou des questions générales, des impressions sur l'église et la communauté, la liturgie - la question identitaire n'est pas mise à l'index qu'avec le risque de se voir délivrer un discours abstrait, tout fait.

Cependant, l'identité ressurgissait toujours: les gens se parlaient eux-mêmes; tout, non seulement les paroles, parle sur eux: les gestes, les

¹⁴ Extrait de l'entretien avec Monseigneur Marc.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*.

hésitations, les expressions tout-faites, le silence. Je regrette ne pas avoir eu le temps et l'espace nécessaires pour citer aussi le contexte du parler. A travers tout cela, des fils se nouent pour tisser la tunique: l'identité est, était, est perdue, retrouvée, s'exprime, transperce, change ... au début, tout est personnel: des histoires de conversion, des événements qui ont marqué la vie, des quêtes personnelles. Étant individuel, personnel, tout est différent - le hasard ou la Providence qui y ont amené les gens, les différentes raisons de venir, pour soi-même ou pour d'autres: « *ainsi, je me sens mieux; je ne crois pas que, s'il y a d'autres Bulgares, j'y aille plus* » (Georgi S.), « *tu viens si tu es appelé par le Christ, le reste, on le fait dehors* » (Imelda), « *oui, tu as envie d'écouter le roumain, de voir des frères de chez toi, mais on ne vient pas juste pour ça* » (Anca N.), « *non, je ne crois pas qu'ils viennent seulement pour voir des gens de la même nationalité...si tu cherchais des pots, des amis, tu le ferais en dehors de l'église* » (Georgi S.).

En quelque sorte, pour certains, le fait d'être loin de chez eux, de leur pays d'origine, les a poussé à chercher refuge à l'église, en l'orthodoxie - seul trait commun avec le 'chez moi': « *oui, j'ai ressenti plus fort le besoin d'aller à l'église parce que j'étais loin de chez moi, je sens le besoin de prier plus; la première fois ici, j'ai pleuré, j'étais ému, je devais passer 5 ans ici* » (Marwan N.), « *quand je suis venu, tout a changé, j'ai senti le besoin d'aller de plus en plus à l'église* » (Nicolas Z., 25 ans, Libanais), « *je crois que je vais moins ici, c'est plus loin, il y a aussi d'autres difficultés* » (Nadja S.).

De ce fait, on assiste à un déplacement de centre d'intérêt, à une attraction vers l'église et l'orthodoxie pour les orthodoxes, soit comme connexion avec ou souvenir du "chez moi". Pour ceux qui se sont convertis, les raisons personnelles dominant - une quête de la profondeur, du mystère.

Pour ce qui est du pôle identitaire national, celui-ci est ressenti toujours par contraste, lors de l'interaction: *par rapport à, à l'opposé de*: « *la première fois j'ai senti que j'étais Syrien en France, mais il y a peu d'importance de la nationalité à l'église* » (Marwan N.). Quand la question du balancement entre une appartenance religieuse et une nationale se pose, les réponses sont d'une diversité merveilleuse: « *je me sens Roumano-Français* » (il rit, c'est le mari d'une Roumaine; Emmanuel N.), « *de ma part, quand je viens à l'église, je me sens dans le désir de me convertir davantage, je ne me sens pas Française* » (Danielle P.), « *on appartient à l'orthodoxie, si la Providence a fait*

que je naisse dans un pays de tradition orthodoxe...je dis avec joie que je suis Roumaine, avec amour que je suis orthodoxe » (Anca N.), « je suis fille du Christ, ici, je me sens plus proche de lui qu'ailleurs » (Imelda), « en Syrie, je me sentais plutôt orthodoxe, ici... Syrien-orthodoxe ou orthodoxe-Syrien » (Marwan N.), « le rôle de la religion dans la construction de l'identité? C'est assez important, mais ça dépend beaucoup des actions des gens, des actions des autres, de ce que fait l'Islam » (Nadja S.).

Les deux volets d'identité s'entremêlent à la fin et constituent l'identité de la personne en cause. La nationalité ou l'orthodoxie surgissent à des moments différents comme résultat d'un facteur extérieur: c'est évident que quelqu'un va se sentir étranger si une décision politique ou économique sera prise contre lui et géorgien, par exemple, si s'il est prié de dire la prière à haute voix dans sa langue maternelle.

Le plus intéressant me semble cependant le fait que la nationalité se fonde dans la religion, qui brise ainsi les barrières fort ressenties auparavant. Quoiqu' une tradition orthodoxe puisse manquer, pour les Français convertis, par exemple, cela ne fait qu'enrichir et revitaliser l'émotion et le fait de vivre une religion. La découverte assez récente d'une nouvelle spiritualité vivifie une habitude, une coutume, qui, en même temps donne l'apport de la tradition et de l'expérience. Tout est ainsi valorisé et on assiste au renouveau d'une des plus traditionalistes et conservatoires religions.

De surcroît, l'identité est aussi créée par des aspects plus objectives - les éléments intégrateurs et unificateurs mentionnés dans le chapitre précédent: les pratiques et repères communs, les représentations symboliques communes. D'ici résulte une communauté de langage, non seulement au sens propre, mais aussi *au sens de l'orthodoxie comme langue - utilisant non pas forcément les mêmes mots, mais les mêmes normes*. Le dogme rejoint les pratiques et les habitudes du corps - le Carême et les autres jeûnes, les métanoïa, les chants et prières, la participation plénière de l'être humain, déconspirée parfois par les fidèles: *« les sens sont saisis à accéder aux mystères divins, à contempler le divino-humain [...] le corps est complètement participant, à la différence des catholiques; on est dans un hors-espace et hors-temps qui permettent de lever l'âme; pour les catholiques, le corps signifie rigidité et conformisme, dissociation âme/corps; le corps est taxé de péché, mais nous*

sommes appelés à la transfiguration, à l'union, sur le chemin de sanctification et glorification de l'âme et du corps » (Danielle P.).

En guise de conclusion, je me limiterai à rappeler les mots de Monseigneur: « *on peut être un bon Roumain sans être un bon orthodoxe et l'inverse est autant vrai* » et le fait que, par rapport à eux mêmes, les gens ne hiérarchisent pas, dans la plupart des cas, leurs possibilités identitaires. L'identité est *une*, bien qu'elle puisse sembler brisée dans plusieurs aspects et options. Ma question de départ, *s'il y a une identité qui prévaut*, ne s'est pas retrouvée dans les préoccupations de mes interlocuteurs: ils sont simplement tous orthodoxes, ils vont à l'église, à la même église, ils forment une communauté où ils occupent de différentes places et remplissent différentes fonctions. Ce qui est cependant spécifique c'est la manière de construire cette identité, de la former, de l'exprimer dans et par l'église, de l'investir dans une communauté, où l'un devient multiple, tout comme le Christ est décrit dans la liturgie: *celui qui se partage, mais reste entier*. De cette forte participation vient aussi la capacité de délivrer des discours, à la fois mystiques et pratiques, tout comme l'identité se révèle dans les symboles et dans les actions.

Conclusions

A vrai dire, je ne sais pas si j'ai répondu à mes questions de départ; loin de me sentir coupable, je sens que le doute a la fonction d'un impulse et qu'il empêche de tomber dans des certitudes dangereuses. L'approche que j'ai choisie, de séparer la description de l'analyse, n'est pas au hasard: mon désir est d'introduire le lecteur au fur et à mesure dans le micro-monde décrit et étudié, de lui faciliter, par la grande quantité de citations, ses propres réflexions et interprétations. Car mon propos n'était guère d'offrir une version déjà faite ou la clé pour déchiffrer un univers, mais de mettre en avant des interrogations, de proposer peut-être une perspective un peu différente, dans le cadre d'un sujet qui peut sembler épuisé.

Le chemin de la description vers l'explication touche aux besoins, aux significations, aux fonctions, mais reste ouvert quant à l'interprétation. Le regard est croisé: de l'intérieur viennent les paroles des gens et l'autorité religieuse, de l'extérieur mon propre avis, en tant que chercheur et, de nouveau, les paroles des gens. J'ai été surprise à ne pas identifier chez eux

les mêmes points d'interrogation que chez moi; dans la plupart des cas, mes questions semblaient porter sur des aspects auxquels les personnes ne portaient pas beaucoup d'attention ou qu'ils ne dramatisaient pas. Ils les prenaient tels quels. J'ai eu peur à de tels moments de ne pas réveiller des froissements oubliés ou de soulever des aspects problématiques qui n'avaient pas été jusque là présents dans le champ perceptif des paroissiens.

A cet égard, je suis consciente du fait du fait que le discours aurait pu m'être délivré, c'est pour cela que j'ai choisi de citer beaucoup. Le plus important me semble donc le fait d'avoir enregistré le discours tel quel et de l'avoir restitué de la même manière, avec la mention personnelle que, bien que délivré, les gens m'ont paru vraiment croire en leur discours.

Le jeu de langage symbolique *communauté/communion, apparence/ réalité, paroisse/communauté* reste significatif et digne d'une approche plus approfondie, car c'est ici que se jouent les significations et les implications, c'est ici que se fait la transition de l'individu à la communauté et, encore plus loin, son appartenance à la société. L'enjeu de l'intégration trouve ici une de ses plus difficiles épreuves. Les deux niveaux de ce phénomène, décrits par Jean-Pierre Obin, renvoient au modèle objectif de la participation et à celui subjectif de l'appartenance. La communauté de sens, la communauté linguistique, la formation de l'identité psycho-sociale qui relie les deux niveaux restent hors du champ des préoccupations et actions de l'Etat. C'est donc le rôle des autres institutions, voire l'église, d'assumer une transition douce et, par une sorte de transivité de l'appartenance (appartenance à l'église, qui est au cadre réglé par l'état, donc appartenance à l'état).

Pour le moment ce ne sont que des pistes, des questionnements possibles, des approches du vaste processus qui est la construction identitaire.

Ma démarche s'arrête pour l'instant ici, avec l'espoir de pouvoir continuer la recherche sur un de ces chemins. Je remercie tous ceux qui m'ont amenée et dirigée au cadre de cette recherche et qui ont fait possibles tant d'expériences enrichissantes.

Ceci dit, le sentiment que j'éprouve à la fin de mon enquête est que, après avoir vécu parmi et avec les gens assez longtemps, après avoir eu les mêmes craints, épreuves et désirs, vraiment, *chacun est l'ombre de tous*.

ANNEXES

ANNEXE 1

HISTORIQUE DE L'EGLISE SAINT JOSEPH

Témoin non-négligeable de l'architecture religieuse bordelaise, la chapelle Saint Joseph s'inscrit dans un puissant mouvement caritatif né au XVII^e-ème siècle. En 1616, sous le haut patronage de Marie de l'Estang, des dames créent une société destinée à secourir les orphelins. Cette société devient, le 16 juin 1638, la Société des Soeurs de Saint Joseph, par la décision de Henri de Sourdie, frère cadet du cardinal François de Sourdie. Amiral et vainqueur sur mer à Guétaria et à Leucate, il s'était pris d'amitié pour la congrégation à qui il avait confié sa fille avant de partir au combat. En plein essor, les Soeurs de Saint Joseph ne se confinent pas seulement à Bordeaux; une maison fut érigée à Paris, point de départ de l'oeuvre dans la France entière.

En 1663, l'archevêque Henri de Béthunes approuve leur projet de construction d'une église à la seule condition que le plan lui soit préalablement soumis. Mais le 2 juin 1666, les vicaires généraux interdisent la poursuite des travaux, cette condition n'ayant pas été respectée. Malgré tout, l'archevêque s'obstine à garder la jeune congrégation sous sa protection.

L'église est achevée en 1671 mais de nombreux travaux annexes sont exécutés jusqu'en 1682: en 1674, les bâtiments conventuels sont construits, puis en 1678 et 1679, la congrégation fait édifier une sacristie en arc de clôture.

C'est le maître-maçon Julien Foucré dit 'l'Espérance', qui conçoit et réalise l'oeuvre. Il est à l'origine de plusieurs édifices religieux à Bordeaux. La congrégation se dissout contrainte et forcée en 1790, la chapelle et ses locaux alentours sont affectés à la détention des prêtres réfractaires. Ce n'est qu'au moment du Concordat que les soeurs reprennent leurs actions, mais la chapelle ne leur est plus affectée. Les « soupes économiques » ont pris possession des lieux.

Cette chapelle fut occupée jusqu'à la fin des années 1970 par les Filles de la Charité.

Restauration et réutilisation

Après avoir échappé à une destruction injustifiée en 1972, la chapelle est classée monument historique en 1978. Elle devient propriété de la ville de Bordeaux en 1990. Cette dernière ne peut que constater la dégradation générale de l'édifice.

En mai 1995, la mise hors d'eau est décidée. Sur les 415000 F(à l'époque) nécessaires à la réalisation des travaux, l'Etat participe à raison de 40% du budget voté, le Département à raison de 15% et la ville le reste de 45%. en 1996 et 1997, toujours dans le cadre d'une stricte conservation, sont réalisés les travaux de réparation de la voûte et de la toiture, pour un coût de 1.8mil F, répartis dans les mêmes proportions.

D'autres travaux de restauration sont préconisés d'ici 2007. Ainsi, la Ville de Bordeaux, en collaboration avec les Monuments Historiques, a permis à cet édifice peu connu des bordelais de reprendre figure et vie aussi, notamment en ayant confié ce lieu, depuis l'automne 1999, à l'église Orthodoxe placée sous la juridiction du Patriarcat de Roumanie.

ANNEXE 2

Glossaire

- analogème = chose ou geste du Monde d'en Bas employé(e) pour exprimer une réalité du Monde d'en Haut avec laquelle elle correspond analogiquement
- intussusception = du latin intus- à l'intérieur et suscipere- amasser, cueillir; du bio.: l'homme se nourrit intellectuellement et spirituellement, par le mimisme, en recevant en lui, par les gestes de tout son corps, les interactions de l'univers qui l'entoure
- métanie = outre son sens de conversion et de repentir, le mot grec « métanoia » désigne les prosternations que font les fidèles orthodoxes en divers circonstances
- mimage = combinaison entre langage et mode de connaissance et d'expression

- mimène = geste formé dans le sujet connaissant par l'objet qu'il perçoit et qui, revêtant ce sujet d'une certaine ressemblance avec cet objet, lui permet de le connaître et de l'exprimer en le jouant (semblable à une image mentale)
- mimodramatisme = dans l'exemple du sacrement (mimodramatisme chosal), c'est une expression globale où registre corporel- manuel et registre laryngo-buccal sont indissociables dans l'utilisation d'une matière; la signification et l'efficacité restent dans l'union complémentaire
- mystères = les réalités spirituelles que l'esprit humain ne peut saisir par lui-même et qui sont révélés par Dieu. Mais ce mot, dans la vie de l'Église orthodoxe, désigne aussi d'une façon plus concrète les saints mystères célébrés par l'Église en mémoire de l'Economie du salut et sur le commandement du Sauveur, et principalement le saint mystère de l'Eucharistie et celui de la Nouvelle Naissance: Baptême et Chrismation.

Sources: Yves Beupérin, *Anthropologie du geste symbolique*, Paris: L'Harmattan, 2002. (Note: le lexique appartient à Marcel Jousse).
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BOOK REVIEW

John McCain, Mark Salter, *Faith of My Fathers. A Family Memoir*, Harper Perennial, New York, 2008, 359 pp., (first edition: Random House, New York, 1999)

Lucian Bogdan*

The book recounts the lifeline story of U.S. Senator John S. McCain (R, AZ) and of his two most prominent forbears and namesakes, emphasis being put not inasmuch on sheer biographical (and, of course) autobiographical details, which are present solely to the extent of fitting the characters into the context, but on those elements defining the image of the Navy hero, an inspirational model for military cadres and civilians alike.

It is revealing in this respect that the first part of the book, comprising no less than seven chapters and 96 pages, dedicated to the Senator's grandfather, John Sidney McCain and to the former's father, John Sidney "Jack" McCain¹, constitutes basically a walkthrough the history of the ascension of the U.S. as a great sea power, highlighting the way the major events of this roughly half-a-century period reflected themselves in the personalities of the aforementioned protagonists and how, in turn, they had literally put their imprint on the flow of history.

While there was a several-centuries long tradition of joining the military amongst the McCains' line of ancestry, the first to distinguish himself being John Young, captain of the Augusta County militia, victor over the Native Americans in 1764 (p. 19) and William Alexander McCain, Sr. being a reputed Civil War hero, the Senator's grandfather would be the first to join the Navy, at a time it went through steep, momentous developments.

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¹ For preserving the accuracy of the text, let us refer onto them as, respectively, McCain I, II, nowadays' Senator and presidential candidate being John S. McCain III.

The authors put a great emphasis on the moment McCain I was commissioned as an ensign on the USS Connecticut, the flagship of Theodore Roosevelt's Great White Fleet (p. 24), which, by its tour around the world, was meant to mark the ascension of the U.S. to great-power status. Not only was the tour laden with symbolism; so was its mentioning in the book: the life of the would-be distinguished admiral, victorious against the Japanese some four decades later, would be intimately linked to the existence and thriving of the U.S. Navy; his achievements would all come while serving his country's cause, just as it was the mission of the Navy to safeguard the national interest all over the globe. To synthesize it, McCain I was, to be quoting his obituary, "an outstanding example of manhood at sea" (p. 45); his gallantry in service would be paid one of the highest military homage, the christening of a destroyer and of a training airfield by his name.

The titles of the following chapters, dealing with McCain II are self-explanatory: following [the] exclusive tradition in the family, a "small man with the big heart" would ascend to be known as "Mr. Seapower", commander of an important battle group commissioned to the shores of postwar Europe: gifted and ambitious, he would distinguish himself incrementally throughout his career. However willing to assume a high-ranking position, a dignified, principled officer, McCain II would not accept being commissioned by trampling even his arch-rival, Hyman Rickover; therefore, he would not accept promotion to admiralty until the latter would be commissioned as rear-admiral (p. 59).

This episode was mentioned, undoubtedly, to pay homage not solely to McCain II as an embodiment of virtue, but to virtue itself, to the idea of abiding principles and gallantry, aspects which are meant to emphasize traits which, when his turn would come, McCain III would adopt as his own, as well.

It is noteworthy that, in spite of the overall heroic, almost mythical aura shrouding Senator McCain's forbears, or perhaps precisely because of having insisted significantly upon it, the authors also try humanizing the "characters": thus, McCain II is also depicted with his very human vices, of which the most striking for someone in the military establishment was the disregarding of petty, every day's rules.

Far from deriving from an “unmilitary conduct” (p. 56), these were, according to McCain III, nothing but an expression of indomitableness and resolve, for disregarding the minor, yet time-consuming chores of barracks life, were done all at the same time with holding firm to the true, loftier principles of a would-be successful officer.

However, it is noteworthy that this image of rebelliousness that would characterize McCain II and III alike, would all but vanish once they would reach maturity, when they would turn out as fine officers, with a sense of duty and dedication to a cause greater than themselves (to be using the phrase coined by McCain III during his ongoing presidential campaign) that would make anyone under arms proud.

Besides, permanent comparison with and constant reference to the qualities and achievements of his forbears constitute the key element of the book and, indirectly, the way devised by Senator McCain and his long-time staffer, Mark Salter, for highlighting the former’s personal qualities: they are not mentioned directly but on sparse occasions; instead, evoking them as praiseworthy traits of McCain I and II, to which their offspring adheres unreservedly, taking his father and grandfather as *the* reference model, and the way McCain III constantly brings them about in his thoughts, represent, basically, a profession of faith from his behalf.

Having come this far, we may utter several considerations regarding the title of the book, admittedly inspired by the homonymous hymn² of British theologian Frederick William Faber: it is not necessarily faith in the religious sense that Senator McCain evokes, contrary to what one may suppose when getting a first glimpse at the title and associating it with some of the Republicans’ staunchest supporters, the religious right.

While evocations of religion and God are present, they are pretty scarce and their importance for the economy of the text is strikingly low. It is another dimension of faith that Senator McCain has in mind: the faith that righteousness will prevail, that doing the proper thing and abiding by your principles – honor, strength, patriotism³ - constitutes something more important than achieving an immediate payoff and, even more importantly, that these constitute virtues that should be passed on to the

² Of which a stave is quoted as motto of Part I of the book.

³ Cf. Tim Pawlenty, in John McCain: *Courageous Service, Experienced Leadership*, [<http://www.johnmccain.com/BVID/>], February 7th, 2008.

following generations who, in turn, should observe them with appropriate awe.

Another virtue, which Senator McCain does not mention explicitly, but, by adhering to it, is modesty: throughout the entire Chapter 14, “The Forrestal Fire” (pp. 177-181), he does not mention anything regarding his own self-sacrificial attitude, but only of that of his fellow crewmen: “Men sacrificed their lives for one another and for their ship [...] They fought the inferno [...] all day and into the next and they saved the [U.S.S.] Forrestal” (p. 179).

It is noteworthy, however, what other survivors recollect of that fateful day⁴: being one of the first to suffer severe burns and rushed to the sick bay, McCain, far from panicking, proved not to care inasmuch about his own medical status and his chances of recovery, as of his fellow crewmen, of which he kept inquiring, being eager for news regarding their condition.

Afterwards, as McCain recollects, he would have no other desire but returning to active duty, which he would soon do aboard the USS Oriskany, the carrier that wound up suffering the highest level of casualties amongst pilots throughout the entire Vietnam war – mounting to one-third of its entire combat personnel, not because of lack of competence, but, on the contrary, because of the audacity of its fighter pilots – nicknamed “the Saints”, who engaged in highly dangerous missions.

While not evoking personal “hunting exploits”, preferring more discrete a stance, McCain, however, does not hesitate to include himself amongst the best pilots of his squadron, by using, when talking of them, the first person plural pronoun “we”: “We had a reputation for aggressiveness, and for success” (p. 182).

However, everything was about to change: October 26th, 1967, on his twenty-third sortie above North Vietnam, John McCain’s A-4 bomber was shot down by a surface-to-air missile, so he was forced to eject. Severely injured in the process, both of his arms and a leg suffering fractures, he had nothing but his teeth to pull the cord of his inflatable jacket when hitting the water of Truc Bach Lake. Under these circumstances, “[any] escape attempt would have been challenging” (p. 189), or not to say worse, virtually impossible. Thus literally began a grim

⁴ Cf. Lt. Orson Swindle, in John McCain: *Courageous Service, Experienced Leadership*, *loc. cit.*

chapter in McCain's life, who would endure nearly six harsh years of captivity.

The whole rest of the book – eleven chapters, comprising a consistent 161 pages – is dedicated to John McCain's experience as a prisoner of war. It is interesting to remark, however, that the main emphasis is not put inasmuch onto the traumatic experiences he had to live through as onto preserving his inner strength and verticality, seen as moral victories over his captors.

Thus, given the different end aim of the book – not recounts of prisonerhood in themselves, but captivity serving as an occasion for McCain's strength of character to be put to the test – he prefers giving only brief accounts of his ordeals: "I was occasionally beaten when I declined to give any more information" (p. 194), or "If I refused [the chief interrogator's] demands, he would order the guards to knock me around until I at least stopped trading insults with him" (p. 224).

Though recurrent – as, unfortunately, it actually happened during McCain's detention – the passages describing the abuse he was submitted to are reduced to the briefest length compatible with maintaining the accuracy of the description. The end aim is not to shock the reader, but, as we have seen, to identify an opportunity for talking about resilience and inner strength – all this, even more remarkably, in spite of the fact he once was stabbed by bayonet and, on another occasion, suffered a cheekbone fracture because of the beatings.

It is noteworthy that McCain does not dramatize his condition – "I also suspected that my treatment was less harsh than might be accorded other prisoners" (p. 194), he argues, thus proving able to maintain his reasoning in proper condition and, just as during the episode of the Forrestal fire, to think not merely of himself, but of his fellow prisoners, as well.

Besides, it is due to constant (and clandestine) communication among one another they all succeeded in preserving their sanity during the periods of solitary confinement; it was not mere personal strength that mattered, but bearing the burden together with one's fellow prisoners, thus "drawing strength from the others". Or, in McCain's words, "We were told to have faith in God, country and one another. Most of us did. But the last

of these, faith in one another, was our final defense, the ramparts our enemy could not cross" (p. 256).

Probably the last full measure of devotion⁵ John McCain III could give to his fellow prisoners was not to betray them by accepting a highly tempting payoff, early release. It was obvious the Viet Cong had no interest of releasing him because of his poor medical condition, as they had pretended (p. 234), but for communist propaganda reasons: the regular wartime procedure is that prisoners of war have to be released in the exact order of their capture; by releasing McCain III, the son of a reputed admiral, earlier, they wanted to suggest that there was one rule for ordinary people and another one for the "capitalist" elite.

Moreover, American prisoners of war had to abide by a strict code of conduct, supposing (amongst others) they were not to accept under any circumstances to be released earlier than those captured before them. This was meant to prevent any attempts from behalf of the enemy to cause disunity among them and to reduce the incentives for any treacherous behavior from the prisoners' behalf.

Thus, had McCain III accepted the offer, the North Vietnamese would have achieved a threefold goal: launch successful diatribes against capitalist society, embarrass Admiral McCain II and break down the morale of the other Americans interned at the "Hanoi Hilton", as the detention camp was ironically referred to by the POWs.

We thus arrive to the climatic point of the narrative: it became a matter of honor for McCain III to resist any offers, however tempting, even if this meant a significant prolongation of his detention (he could not have known it then, but since July 4th, 1968, when his captors tempted him with early release until he finally made it home, some more five years would pass).

Mounting this fierce resistance would not have been possible, the authors argue, hadn't it been for McCain III's summum of inherited traits and his constant reference to his glorious ancestors. It was their inspiring image, along with their teachings, that kept his resilience powered up during the hardships of detention.

⁵ To be using an expression coined by President Lincoln in his *Gettysburg Address*; the same expression would later give title to the anthem played every Memorial Day to honor the fallen American soldiers and marines .

Or, in John McCain III's own words: "This is the truth of war, of honor and courage, that my father and grandfather had passed on to me. [...] here are greater pursuits than self-seeking. Glory is not a conceit. It is not a decoration for valor. [...] Glory belongs to the act of being constant to something greater than yourself, to a cause, to your principles, to the people on whom you rely, and who rely on you in return. [...] *This* [our emphasis] is the faith that my commanders affirmed, that my brothers-in-arms encouraged my allegiance to. [...] It was my father's and grandfather's faith. A filthy, crippled, broken man, all I had left of dignity was the faith of my fathers. It was enough" (p. 257).

We deem the aforementioned passage as self-explanatory and synthesizing the gist of the entire book; moreover, it is relevant for Senator John McCain's 2008 campaign motto, "A cause greater than self".

It is also interesting to remark that the book has been initially published in 1999, that is, at a time slightly before the debut of the primaries for the 2000 election⁶ and practically all the self-characterizing elements evoked back then can be identified with ease in today's presidential campaign.

We could interpret this both as constancy and commitment to principles and values (which is actually what the authors want to express) and, in more pragmatic a manner, a fine knowledge of the elements the Republican – and, to a somewhat lesser extent, the entire American – electorate puts higher praise on, which, thus, have to be addressed primarily by the candidate.

Under these conditions, we could deem *Faith of My Fathers. A Family Memoir* as an essential reading for anyone interested in John McCain's personality, in understanding the groundwork his presidential campaign rests on and, at more general a level, as constituting an excellent insight of seven decades of American naval history, seen through the eyes of three generations of fine officers.

While the scholar will appreciate the wealth of historical details and the accuracy of depictions, the general public may find it as an easily-readable work, with a riveting narrative, being thus definitely worth reading.

⁶ When John McCain had unsuccessfully campaigned for the Republican nomination against George Walker Bush.

