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MARIAN ZĂLOAGĂ
THE UNIVERSITY OF THE 21ST CENTURY. CHALLENGES

Andrei Marga

Abstract
The changes in the situation of the university have brought about real “challenges” for this institution. The text briefly addresses such challenges as: the implementation of the Bologna Declaration (1999) in Europe; the globalization; the sustainability and the identity of a university; the autonomy; the quality assurance; the phenomenon of “brain drain”; the issue of multiculturalism, of leadership; the climate change; the overcoming of relativism; the recuperation of a vision based on knowledge. I will express my personal points of view, containing what has been formulated in my previous research (on the theory of comprehensive reform, the delimiting of the types of actual reform, the idea of multicultural organization).

Second to the Church, the University is the oldest European institution, and one that has enjoyed a striking continuity. Despite numerous changes, a cluster of constants connects the initiatives taken at the end of the 12th century AD, those at Bologna, Paris and Montpellier, later those at Oxford, Salamanca, Halle or Crakow, to the university of our times: the focus on higher education, the recruitment of top specialists as professors, a cultivation of the quest for truth, the awarding of the highest qualifications, and so forth. In Histoire des universités françaises et étrangères des origines à nos jours (1933), Stephen d’Irsay evokes these fertile initiatives as “the model of all analogous efforts”.

It is only in the 19th century that a veritable new threshold in the evolution of the University is reached. If in the Middle Ages, universities were legally legitimated initially by the Holy See, and consequently by the

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ecclesiastical authorities in general\(^2\); in the 19th century it is the State that confers legitimacy. Universities are parts of the national cultural projects promoted primarily through the institutions of the State. Each of the three major European initiatives – “the Humboldtian university”, the “Napoleonic university”, and the “civic universities” – brought significant changes: the link between education and research, the connection of education to the needs of the administration, and the connection of education to industry\(^3\), respectively. Equally important changes were afoot in “the American university”, which succeeded in producing a synthesis between the tradition of the English colleges and Humboldt’s ideas, which effectively turned the universities into engines of modernization\(^4\). The European universities entered the 20th century with the legacy of their Medieval traditions, after having undergone the four innovations, and committed to the front of rationalizations brought about by modernization.

The 20th century recorded several experiences that mark our reflection upon the university to this day. Among these we could mention: the expansion of positive knowledge and the emergence of the relation between knowledge and meaning as a themes of reflection; the undermining of the university’s autonomy and its ideological instrumentation; the dissolution of the unity of sciences and the rise of relativism; the globalization of knowledge, communication, economy and the involvement of universities in a market competition. We are nowadays moving in the environment created by these changes\(^5\).

At the beginning of the 21st century, several more changes have occurred. Some of them are long-lasting, such as the “global warming”, which has come about earlier than predicted, and with deeper effects than initially thought; “the migration of populations” towards developed countries, which has taken on a new dimension; “the spreading of terrorism” as a major danger to civilization; “the erosion of

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multiculturalism”, which has sometimes been reduced to the co-existence of insular cultures; the increasingly tougher “competition of universities” in the context of globalization; “the demise of the metanarratives of the world” under the pressure of the need for valuing commodities on the global market; “the cultural turn”, according to which “culture” become the predominant factor (as opposed to others such as geography, economy, or politics) that shapes the performance of people.6

All these changes brought about real “challenges” for the university. In my present keynote, I will briefly address such challenges as: the implementation of the Bologna Declaration (1999) in Europe; the globalization; the sustainability and the identity of a university; the autonomy; the quality assurance; the phenomenon of “brain drain”; the issue of multiculturalism, of leadership; the climate change; the overcoming of relativism; the recuperation of a vision based on knowledge. I will express my personal points of view, containing what has been formulated in my previous research (on the theory of comprehensive reform, the delimiting of the types of actual reform, the idea of multicultural organization, etc.)7, without treating in detail; I will rather attempt to profile solutions to new problems. My purpose here is thus to identify the new challenges and to sketch possible solvings.

European universities are currently undergoing the “Bologna process”. After the adoption of the Sorbonne Declaration (1998), an ever growing number of countries have signed the Bologna Declaration (1999), which has two major purposes: to create the “Area of European Higher Education”, by dismantling barriers to teacher, researcher, and student exchanges, and to increase the competitiveness of European universities. As there are only two years left in the decade devoted to the implementation of the Bologna Declaration, we are able to draw some conclusions and signal the problems that have occurred.

6 The “cultural” approach of society, advanced by Friedrich H. Tenbruck (Die kulturellen Grundlagen der Gesellschaft. Der Fall der Moderne, Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen, 1990) has been extended.
7 See Andrei Marga, University Reform Today; Andrei Marga, La sortie du relativisme, Limes, Cluj, 2006.
When the **Declaration** was launched, some concerns were also formulated, regarding: the disappearance of differences between the European systems of higher education, that would lead to an invasion of specialists from developed countries; the formation of the European Area of Higher Education would affect the originality of these systems; the restructuring of university studies that lead to a drop in quality of student education. None of these concerns have been confirmed so far. On the contrary, the opportunities for academic mobility increased, as regards teaching and studying in universities from different countries, the differences between centers and peripheries was reduced, the European dimension of universities began to come into focus.\(^8\) The glass of positive changes is at least half-full, but, it must be said, there is also a glass to some extent empty.

In different European countries, one can encounter, to varied extents, issues in the application of the **Bologna Declaration**, as well as issues regarding the situation of universities.

Among the issues in the application of the **Declaration**, there are some issues worth considering at this point: for instance, the market testing of the new structure of studies (bachelor, master, doctoral, etc.) has still not been undertaken; the uniform duration of bachelor studies (which is of six semesters in many countries) affects certain specializations (theology, philology, arts, etc.); the master studies are still not distinctive enough with respect to the labor market; interdisciplinary education, field practice and formative disciplines are sometimes neglected; the content and duration of doctoral programs are not satisfactorily conceived; the existing quality assurance systems runs the risk of creating a new bureaucracy in higher education; hyper-regulation threatens to discourage creative initiatives. Such problems are probably not only encountered in the Bologna system, but it cannot be denied that this system is not problem-free.

Among the problems related to the situation of universities in today’s Europe, I would mention some of the more acute: globalization is perceived

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\(^8\) A presentation of the way in which *The Bologna Declaration* has been implemented is to be found in the documents of the European University Association: *Survey on Master Degrees and Joint Degrees in Europe* (2002); *Quality Assurance: A Reference System for Indicators and Evaluation Procedures* (2003); *The Rise of Knowledge Regions: Emerging Opportunities and Challenges for Universities* (2006).
as a stimulant for uniformity, rather than as an obligation to innovate; the connection between knowledge and wisdom is severed; the opening of national systems to competition is still limited; the connection between research and teaching/learning is too feeble; short term and long term policies are not connected; the response of universities to the requirements of the global knowledge-based market is too slow; the capacity for reforming change in the universities remains modest.

Romania is faced with such problems today. But here, universities also suffer from visible errors in the application of the Bologna Declaration. After initiating the implementation in 2000 (by means of Government ordinances regarding master studies, learning in modern languages, quality assurance, etc.), the Ministry of Education has repealed such measures in 2001. In the year 2003, the same ministry realized that other countries were making good progress in implementing the process, and speedily passed a law concerning the restructuring of studies (Law No. 288/2004), without being publicly debated. The law centralized decisions (the Minister receiving decision powers regarding specializations, instead of autonomous agencies) and contains mechanical applications and faulty solutions (such as the aberrant limiting of all studies to three years, etc.), which weaken university studies, in stead of differentiating and consolidating them. This law is in great need of drastic changes, in order to limit the damage it is creating. A Government regulation (88/2005) has attempted to restructure studies, but it has created more confusion, and has further weakened higher education (the bachelor level is wrongly considered as a non-specialization, double specialization has been dismantled, the “fields” are confuse, etc.). Another Government regulation (567/2005) has gravely affected doctoral studies (reducing the number of available places, introducing aleatory fees, dissolving doctoral preparation to schools, and bureaucratizing studies once again, etc.), and has led to an emigration of top candidates. The master studies, regulated since 2006, are wrongly considered as a mere extension of studies. Romania presents the obvious symptoms of a decline in administrative competence, which in its turn brought about a decline in reform and the decrease in quality of the university system. Secondly, the higher education system is oversized, so that any

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reform is from the very beginning diluted. Finally, an aggressive politicization affects decision, so that even the staff of evaluation agencies (such as the current ARACIS) is made up of persons nominated by the political parties, lacking thus in indispensable independence.

In public debates, globalization is often mistaken for universalization, or internationalization. I think that in order to gain a realist perspective on the current position of the university in society, the phenomenon of globalization is in need of a clarification.

Universalization means, in fact, the action to obtain the validity a certain thing everywhere. Globalization, however, is the phenomenon of market extension, by which a certain commodity is maximally valued, that is, all over the globe. Internationalization is the transfer of a certain thing beyond the borders of a certain nation, that is, to several nations. Globalization has little to do with such a transfer, rather it is primarily the extension of the market to its limit.¹⁰ In the case of universities, the “challenge” of globalization consists of the enlarging all over the globe of the market where scientific research, products of cultural reflection and creation, qualifications, specialized services are transacted. Such an extension breaks the boundaries of national, regional, continental, international markets, on which the universities traditionally operate.

What does globalization ultimately require of a university? Briefly put, in the context of globalization, the university is not measured merely in relation to its own project, or to other universities in the country or the region; a university is inevitably measured, under global conditions, in relation to the most competitive universities. This means that the university is required to produce and present scientific research on a par with the “cutting edge” set by top institutions, graduates that are preferred by corporations for top ranking positions, consultancy capacities in crucial matters of technology, economy, administration, health, the environment, policy, as well as interpretations and visions of major reference in the sphere of culture. The University remains competitive as long as it is organized according to these goals, and succeeds in achieving them.

In recent years, attempts to rank universities have proliferated. It is certain, nonetheless, that with respect to its mission and its multiple

functions (higher teaching, efficient learning, competitive scientific research, specialized services to the community, contribution to the community’s self-enlightening, the promotion of critical thinking)\textsuperscript{11} every ranking is only partial. There exists no comprehensive ranking of universities. Still, rankings are useful as long as they measure the competitiveness of universities on global markets, and stimulate the self-regulation of the respective universities.

What must a university do, in the context of globalization? I believe that today, universities have at their disposal organization patterns, which may ensure that the positioning of the university in global competitions is the result of mature reflection and choice between alternatives.\textsuperscript{12} A university behaves adequately if it prefers self-programming, on a medium and long term basis, to mere adaptation to contexts; if it uses its autonomy and academic freedom as an instrument for self-renewal and innovation, rather than as a basis for exempting itself from outside appraisals; if it pleads for the rationalization of an outmoded system, rather than molding itself according to it; if it chooses its profile lucidly and clearly (be that profile in research, teaching, services, etc.), rather than mixing all these confusingly; if it combines the open, accessible character of admissions with the selective and exigent character of graduations; if it balances, in its study programs and curricula, the transmission of knowledge with discovery, information with formation, knowledge and application, sciences and visions; if it adopts an open and participative governance, and a outcome-focused management; if it ensures an open, argumentative and critical climate, capable of motivating both educators and students.

Over the past four decades, Europe has been undergoing an unrelenting expansion of higher education. Among other things, the number of higher education institutions titling themselves “universities” is constantly growing. National legislations can hardly make the difference anymore between “higher education institution” and “university”. European university organizations have gradually dropped that distinction.


Nevertheless, the question recurs of whether there is no reason any longer for delimiting universities among higher education institutions. Of course, we do not mean mere semantics or purely conceptual distinctions at this point, but we cannot fail to observe the fact that the age of globalization forces us to rank higher education institutions and to observe when one is really dealing with a “university”, and when it is merely an “institution of higher education”.

What is a sustainable University? Nowadays, this question is asked from many directions. In “The Chronicle of Higher Education”\(^\text{13}\), an answer has been tried, starting from the understanding of “sustainability” as the capacity of institutions to satisfy the needs of future generations.

It is somehow easy to say that, for instance, in order to insure its “sustainability”, a fabric must adopt certain reduction measures of carbon emission, of resource waste, of rigorous selection of “leadership”. What does a university have to do for its own sustainability? From the perspective of what is going on in Romania nowadays and, mostly, in the European region where we are situated, I would briefly answer by enumerating the main conditions of a university’s sustainability: a) the presence of professors with competitive qualification, so that every specialization should have at least two consecrated scientific personalities; b) an academic legislation favorable to the ranking, based on scientific performance criteria of higher education institutions; c) academic autonomy connected to accountability before the Board of Trustees; d) curricula favorable to professional elections from students and encouraging to interdisciplinarity and practical training, under the conditions of the tutorial system; e) student education for creative writing, critical thinking and rational argumentation as a precondition of the academic training; f) adopting the entrepreneurial profile; g) organizing its own funding, starting from the outcome (not income), using also as source the private economy, including fees in resources, orienting towards the high qualification levels under the conditions of the financial subsidizing of competitive students (“equity and efficiency must go together”); h) avoiding overregulation and rejecting corruption.

\(^{13}\) See The Chronicle of Higher Education, October, 20, 2006
Perhaps this brief picture represents a dream, but we may say, together with John Lennon: “I’m a dreamer, but I am not the only one.”

Before sustainability, a university has an identity. Which is the identity of the institutions that rightfully call themselves universities?

In the last decades, there has remained tempting, at least in this part of Europe where we are situated, to develop risky analogies with ancient corporations (where autonomy has been understood as autarchy), with trade companies (as a great part of the private education in the Eastern Europe), with companies (in some legislations that do not undertake the paideic dimension of the academic preparation), with civic associations (for some of the civic militants). Certainly, the university has similitudes with all these, but – we must say – there would be enormous losses (and these losses can already be seen) if the university were not conceived as an institution with its own identity. Of course, certain open questions remain: how is the identity of a university built in a “knowledge-based society”? how is it in a “globalized world”?

On the other hand, in what the student consideration is concerned, such analogies are not innocent. For those who take the university seriously, it is clear that students are not an object of education, clients or civic associates of the professors, but much more than that – they are partners in the common “enterprise” of the preparation for performance, and of knowledge and value augmentation. And from this point of view, I believe that the theme of the “true university”, comprised in the *Magna Charta of European Universities* (1988)\(^{14}\), is still of crucial importance for our time.

Not long ago, in Bologna (Italy), I participated in a debate on the question: *is it still possible to have autonomies in today’s societies?* The question has been asked in the case of the oldest European institution (after the Church) – the university. Is the proclaimed academic autonomy – which means the right of academic communities to evaluation and professional self-organization – still effective? Or is it living just as a result of the memory of the concept?

\(^{14}\) *Magna Charta of European Universities*, Bologna, 1988
There are several reasons for asking this question again. For instance, the academic specializations are being selected by a more and more severe market, so that the autonomous decisions of the universities connect to the market requests. The scientific researches that are financed take into consideration these requests, rather than their own. Academic rankings create prestige to some universities and put others under pressure, obliging them to conform to certain programs, rather technocratic. A university that does not become entrepreneurial fails. The long-term policies are rare, and the administration of a university inevitably calculates everything in relation to the given situation, rather than to the autonomy. And the examples could go on.

I think that we do not give a realistic answer to the question about the institutions’ autonomy (the university is not the only one in this situation; the Church is in a quite similar situation, and so are the professional associations etc.) in the current societies, without taking a real fact into consideration: it is not about societies in which there are power relations (the money, the administrative power, sometimes the solidarity and, diffusely, the individual self-projection are the media of our lives), for power relations exist at all times, but about societies which, based on power relations, have constituted power centers. My thesis is that nowadays there are new power centers; in the globalization era, it is all about three types of power centers: economic, political and media-related.

I base my thesis on what Alan Greenspan confessed, referring to the “dangers” nowadays, when he indicated “la nascita di concentrazioni”, that were “una minaccia per l’armonia e la stabilità delle società democratiche”15. Certainly, when we talk about the difficulties of the democracy under the conditions of the power centralization, we do not want to return to Thomas Jefferson’s opinion, who wrote, in Letter to Gallatin (1802), that “the monopoly of a single bank is certainly an evil”. But, once again, we have to take into consideration, following the famous founding father of the U.S.A., the warning regarding the impact of power centers on democracy, as a question of realism, that prestigious intellectuals, from John Dewey to Alan Greenspan, clearly formulated it.

In fact, there are concentrations of the economic power, not where there is a wealth concentration, but where prices on the market and other

15 Alan Greenspan, L’era della turbolenza, Sperling & Kupfer, Milano, 2007, p. 403
conditions of the competition are established by certain companies, where the decisions of public authorities are conditioned by these companies. We have concentrations of political power where political parties are no longer exponents of the interests in society, but they form these interests themselves, where leaders are no longer a result of the elections, but they organize the elections themselves, where parliaments are prisoners of the majority resulted after the elections. There are concentrations of media-related power where mass media do not restore the opinion and the interest diversity, but form the opinions themselves, where the inevitable dependence of the reality on the promotion through the media is used to ignore or to create “realities” through manipulation.

All these concentrations exist, as well as there exist, of course, entrepreneurs that fight with all their forces against the monopolization, politicians who oppose themselves to the politicianism, and journalists who reject manipulation. Anyway, for universities – connected, at least in the tradition of the civilized world, to the need for autonomy, as a necessary condition for performance – the following question is being asked: how will they be able to promote the autonomy in the environment of the concentrations of economic, politic and media-related power from different monopolies, the actual subjects of social life? Two paths are no longer practicable in the society of the late modernity: the proclamation of the political “abstinence”, under the antiquated form of the “intellectuals’ apoliticism”, which is neither realistic, nor true and it deceives the university as a public instance for critical examination; the blind leading to consequences in political contexts which deceive the mission of the university, i.e. to form specialists at the highest level ever attained in knowledge. In other words, nowadays, universities are challenged to find out, through their own reflections, their fertile line, in agreement with their mission and their multiple functions, between the apoliticism and the opportunism.

Not long ago, “The Economist” headlined “Pay or decay” a reflection upon the changes in the European higher education. Certainly, the problem was not only to indicate the tendency to adopt the “American funding model” of the universities, based on fees and public and private contributions on the territory of the continental Europe, characterized, as known, by the tradition of the higher education as a “public good”, with all
the financial implications. The problem was not only to make universities stand up on their own before the State and to ask them to self-administrate and to assume the autonomy – with all that autonomy presupposes in terms of rights and obligations, undoubtedly a crucial problem in Europe, especially in Central and Eastern Europe. *The crucial problem was the abandonment of the “egalitarian thinking” and the renunciation to the politicized opinions, such as “all universities are the same”.* We know that Germany – the country of an academic tradition which has influenced the entire world and which was, before the Second World War, a center of science, philosophy, theology and world art – has complained that is has too many universities insufficiently competitive. We can ask ourselves: which other countries could not complain about their own situation? It is clear that it has become necessary “to avoid a nationalized and uniform system of universities” and to promote “diverse and independent institutions of higher education”, as “it is better to do some things well, rather than everything indifferently”. The attraction of the best students, the recruitment of the most competitive professors, the achievement of the most relevant orders of scientific research from the economy and the administration have already started to become the competition ground between universities. *People are indisputably equal from nature, but universities, being institution devoted to high intellectual performance, cannot be treated equally without great losses for the society.*

In the United States of America, the report *The Future of Higher Education* (2006), organized around the formulas of *accessibility, affordability, accountability*, has been debated from different points of view. But it remains a reference document for the universities led responsibly from everywhere. For objectives such as the “research intensification”, “maintaining technological competitiveness”, the “effectiveness of higher education”, “combining social justice with a knowledge society”, the “non-regulatory self-criticism” remain crucial for the university that has truly passed into the 21st century.

From this perspective, it has been kept intact the orientative value of the option from the London conference (2007) of the European governments’ representatives for “*strong institutions (universities NM), which are diverse, adequately founded, autonomous and accountable*,” focused on “stimulating research and innovation”. And China’s device, from the
document *Education 2020*, “strong country with human resources” is worth being evoked and taken into consideration with all its profoundness.

Nowadays, Europe is confronting with several development indicators of the academic and funding system, which cannot be ignored in a reflection upon the university of the 21st century. For instance, in 2005, the U.S.A. engrossed in the higher education over 80% of a cohort, while the united Europe a little more than 55%. During the first years of this century, the united Europe invested in the higher education 1.5% of the GDP (Gross Domestic Product) and the U.S.A. 2.3%; while the U.S.A. worked with 83% of the scientific researchers in the business sector, Europe has only 50%; today Europe has a lack of 5 million students, and in order for it to be competitive with the U.S.A., Europe should invest at least €10,000 per student annually.

I believe the document *The Future of Higher Education. White Papers* (2003), adopted by the United Kingdom, has found a right way, when it has set for the universities the following five problems: „it needs to be able to expand even further and to provide the education people need when and where they need it”; „it needs to attract more young people from lower-income families”; „it needs to be able to attract the best academics, both as teachers and as researchers”; „it needs to be able to invest in cutting-edge research”; „it needs to be able to offer the best facilities to staff and students”.

“The skills, creativity, and research developed through higher education are a major factor in our success creating jobs and our prosperity... But we will not compromise on quality” – it is said in *The Future of Higher Education. White Papers* (2003). Quality assurance is a very spread device nowadays, and an entire arsenal of procedures begins to take form. I shall not insist herein upon these – even though it is worth discussing the benchmarks of the evaluation, which remain essential. I would like to briefly make three remarks, originated in the experience of the countries in the region.

The first is that the actual independence of the agencies for academic license, evaluation, accreditation and their professionalism are indispensable. Any compromise in their organization and operation costs.
The second refers to the realistic approach of the universities’ conditions of performance. No matter how much we underline the importance of organizations, the crucial importance of professors and of their caliber will not be dissolved. As a consequence, against the current tendency that, on behalf of the promoting quality, a new bureaucracy is created, the bureaucracy of the so-called “quality experts”, I emphasize the fact that, through their caliber, the professors create the university and its quality.

The third concerns the major importance of pedagogy and methodology in higher education in quality assurance. A new development of pedagogy and methodology has become indispensable, and today quality depends on it.

Globalization has brought about a veritable battle for brains among universities, between universities and other institutions, among economies and societies. As with any battle, the winners are those who recruit the brain drain, and the losers those from whom brain is being drained. Today, this battle is not perhaps all that obvious, but the outcomes are impressive. In certain fields, companies attract great minds to a greater extent, and we are confronted with a real migration towards scientific, financial and economic centers of the world. What is the extent of brain-drain? What are its consequences? How can it be approached? How can it be rationalized? What is in store for us?

At the end of the 90s, The World Bank drew attention to the fact that the proportion of hi-tech commodities had increased, over twenty years, from 30% to 54%. OECD signaled that the rate of economic growth depended on the development of the knowledge base. In this context, international reports showed that the interest of developed countries for the recruitment of well-qualified youth, just as well as migration towards those developed countries, was increasing. Recent statistics showed that in the year 2000, 34% of migrants were educated at the tertiary level (an increase of 5% over ten years), whereas the percentage of such graduates in the global workforce was 11%. It can be inferred that the tendency of educated and qualified people to migrate towards developed countries is continuing. The volume edited by Çaglar Özden and Maurice Schiff,

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International Migration, Remittances & the Brain Drain (A common publication of the World Bank and Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) documents this tendency, and argues that it can be stated that „clearly, the international mobility of skilled workers is a crucial issue for middle- and low-income countries, mainly because their share of tertiary educated workers remains low compared with high-income countries... The low-income countries have been strongly affected by recent brain drain” 17. The most affected are the smaller countries. Migrants represent about 25% of the workforce in countries such as Australia, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Canada, New Zealand, while migration has minor effects in Mexico, Turkey, Greece, Japan and South Korea. Migrants are highly educated in the USA, Canada, Australia, and the UK, and of basic education in Austria, Spain, and the Czech Republic. Migrants are more qualified than the native population in many countries.

What is the situation in Romania, then? The most recent research (Anna Ferro, A Picture of the Highly Skilled Labour Emigrations from Romania, 2004) shows that among migrants, BA graduates are about 31%, the rest of 69% having a Master’s or a PhD. The number of migrants with this level of education has increased, in the decade 1990-2000, to 36.117, from 34.410 in the previous decade. In the last decade, the proportion of engineers, architects, and economists has increased, and the „feminine gendering” of intellectual emigration is apparent 18. More than 57% of migrants from the past decade are aged between 26 and 40. The preferred destinations for emigration of the highly educated in the 1990-2000 decade are Germany (13.482), the US (4.132), Canada (3.133), Italy (2.481), Austria (2.253), Israel (708). In 2001, engineers, architects, physicians and economists made up 27.7% of Romanian migrants. Romania does not only face emigration, but also immigration (with 69.216 migrants in 2000, most of whom from Moldova, or part of the Romanian emigration being given back their former possessions). The conclusion of recent analyses is the following: “the comparison between brain-gain and brain-loss is indicating the predominance of the losses” 19.

19 Ibidem.
The consequences of the brain drain are being nowadays reworked according to three interpretations: the “brain drain mean heavy losses for the countries of origin”; “better brain drain than brain waste”, and “brain drain is also brain gain”. In the 90s the prevalent interpretation was that brain drain affected the emigration countries and favored the immigration countries. *Constructive Knowledge Societies* (2002), the well-known document of the World Bank, works with this premise and looks for remedies. “Better brain than brain waste” is generally the interpretation disseminated by migrants themselves, which takes into account the positive effects of emigration on the migrants. As the percentage of high education migrants increases, a new interpretation is gaining ground, which can be synthesized in a few theses: a) the brain gain is less for the receiving countries than initially thought, and the brain drain is less for the source countries, as the links between education, the use of education, performance, and so forth are anyway complicated and not linear; b) there are multiple “sources of uncertainty” affecting brain drain and gain; c) the impact of brain gain on welfare and growth is not univocal. Not even the “new literature” (Schiff) contests the effects of brain drain on the source countries, which are, of course, complex. Wikramarekara speaks of “negative effects” for these countries (net decrease in human capital stock, reduced grow and productivity, fiscal loss of heavy investments, reduced quality of essential services), as well as of „positive effects” (opportunities to educate not available at home, inflow of remittances, induced stimulus to investment in domestic education, return of skilled personas, circulation of brains, benefit from the Diaspora).21

The causes of brain drain affecting developing countries are intensely discussed. In 1990, a British analysis indicated the following as causes for brain drain: „inequitable pay scales an tax structures; new opportunities for career advancement; relative increased prestige of the field; more public and private support for research; better research facilities and technical support; better quality of life; filling gaps in technological expertise; preference for different political systems; following leaders or

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20 Çağlar Özden, Maurice Schiff, op. cit., p. 203-214.
colleagues”22. In 1994, a Polish analysis stated that „émigrés in Western countries are attracted by higher salaries, better working conditions, stabilizations and political freedoms, as well as the possibility of educating children in the best universities”23. The same analysis includes as causes of brain drain in the 90s, the following: „ethnic wars, lack of political stabilization in many countries”, and “the rapid expansion of research and development”, which generate good opportunities for employment. The Constructing Knowledge Societies report of 2002 insists on the circumstance that „the richer countries strive to attract and retain the world’s best trained minds in many ways”, and considers as „pull factors” the „effective policies that stimulate Research and Development activities and increase direct investment; offer attractive postgraduate training and research opportunities; recruit younger graduates and professionals”24.

All analyses consider that brain drain affects emigration countries to a certain extent, reducing their capacity for development. Some researchers recommend measures for fighting brain drain. The Constructing Knowledge Societies report envisions the following set of measures: a) clear rules of conduct among donor agencies in order to facilitate the return of professionals trained overseas with external funding; b) increased reliance on joint degrees; c) inclusion in donor-funded scholarships of allocations for purchasing minimum equipment and materials needed by returning scholars and for travel to update knowledge; d) a preference for sending grantees to top quality training institutions in other developing countries that posses an oversupply of skilled labor, such as India; e) creation of a favorable local work environment for national researchers and specialists25.

It can be seen that these measures are based on the analysis of the causes of brain drain, which is usually contextual. On the other hand, brain drain is often approached as a phenomenon historically limited to recent decades. In fact, according to the information we have, brain drain is a social

25 Ibidem, p. XVI.
phenomenon of considerable spatial and temporal magnitude, requiring the systematic analysis of causes and the subsequent prescription of remedies.\textsuperscript{26} Considering its magnitude, whose superior limit has not yet been reached, brain drain requires a deeper insight not only into the living conditions of specialists, but also into the economic and scientific research systems in the countries of origin, and, basically, not merely into these, but also into the systems of professional formations, and further, into the political systems and the evolutions that these allow us to perceive.

That is why a true method of approaching brain drain should be complex and at least sketched out. I envision a method structured as follows: a) an approach to brain drain which includes the recognition of the unalienable rights and liberties of the person and the recognition of the principle of open competition and continuous market development, as well as grasping its unfavorable effects in the affected countries; b) brain drain is the result of a combination of push and pull factors, which should be researched adequately; c) a comprehensive approach to professional, economic, political motivation is necessary, as well as grasping the nature of perspectives for the country in question, and for the emigration of its specialists; d) scientific research and higher education require minimum levels of budget financing, but it would be unhealthy to not foster competition for extra-budget resources; e) only satisfactorily reformed systems of professional formation can be competitive and can motivate specialists; f) the need for reducing backwardness must be acknowledged, not only as regards infrastructure and laboratory equipment, but also as concerns the organization and legislation of countries affected by brain drain.

Simply stated, brain drain should be controlled without impinging on the liberties of people, and in the context of market development and international cooperation. The pull factors play a prominent role here, but the phenomenon cannot be limited without eradicating the push factors. Specialists often emigrate not merely for bigger paychecks, but also because they cannot see promising perspectives in their own country for the foreseeable future. It should be noted that, emigration is also their choice because competition is difficult on the uncertain markets in the countries of origin,

\textsuperscript{26} Andrei Marga, Brain Drain and Professional Development, in \textit{Attracting Young Scientists – Strategies Against Brain Drain}, DAAD, HRK and Bulgarian Ministry of Education, Sofia, 2002, pp. 26-57.
or because universities cannot reform themselves, or because the backwardness of universities in their countries of origin persists indefinitely.

Existing analyses of brain drain often mention economic causes (small paychecks, limited financial resources for universities and research, lower living standards), and social causes (the lack of opportunities for the desired career, unstable legislation). Political causes are sometimes mentioned (the paralysis of the university system and of research, the absence of development policies, the delay in reforms). All these causes should be taken into account. As regards universities, an old premise must be considered, which has remained valid in certain countries over many decades. It states that universities will not be in order as long as their productivity is low, as long as penury persists, as long as the administration is corrupt, and the motivation for change is insufficient in society.

Universities bear a responsibility for the state of their societies, a responsibility which cannot be delegated. It is also true that the state of society has run and still runs through the environment of political decision. This aspect should be considered when discussing brain drain rigorously, and we note that young professionals leave their countries not merely for bigger salaries and better equipped labs, but mainly because they cannot find in the countries of origin opportunities for a normal life as regards political perspectives relevant to their lives. It is obvious that a decision with so many implications as the decision to emigrate is not taken only in relation to unmediated economic circumstances, but also in relation to perspectives – which inevitably depend on democratization and the political evolution of the respective country. It has long been observed that a pluralist democracy, which allows frequent alliances in the government, is to a larger extent prone to reassure and stimulate a young professional to remain in his own country than a populist democracy, in which the same government reticent to reforms merely exhibits different stages of the same play of stagnation and corruption. Beyond the propaganda exaltations of governments, in the context of an open society and of international cooperation, brain drain is a profound indicator of the value of a certain policy.

Brain drain is ultimately explained – as we have shown – by an interaction between pull and push factors. Consequently, brain drain can only be limited under the conditions of a sustained international cooperation, which needs to be shaped according to new forms. I am thinking of such
things as: franchise campuses of top universities in the countries affected by brain drain, liberalizing the recruitment procedures for professors from abroad, effective mobility of academic managers, creating joint research units in cooperation with Western universities; extending the investment of developed countries by collaborations between companies and universities with respect to professional formation, scientific research and specialized expertise. In the framework of the *Bologna Declaration*, joint cooperation (joint masters, joint doctorates, etc) will be extended to the European area. *I believe that these forms already indicate the way forward, which we should tackle courageously and with new ideas.*

After World War II, the understanding of “culture” has constantly changed, as the term has increasingly incorporated not only concepts, theories, representations, rules, but also institutions, competences, skills, capacities for action, behaviors. Thus understood, culture was recognized as a true engine of political and economic development. More than geography, or political economy, which nonetheless retain their importance, all developments hinge on culture, including institutional and technological developments.

“The cultural turn”27 is nowadays simultaneous to the greatest market enlargement – *globalization*, which confronts institutions and leaders with new situations, characterized by the meeting of multiple cultures, and by the need of *intercultural understanding*. An ever growing number of citizens are also confronted with new situations, as a result of the same continuous opening of new markets, including the traditional indigenous market. Succinctly put, everyone meets new cultures, and is required to develop new attitudes and intellectual skills.

*Multiculturalism* is the frequent diagnosis given to what we are living nowadays, a phenomenon which is not easily understood. A situation is considered *multicultural* “when it results from a certain cultural diversity, from the pluralism characterizing any industrial society”28. We should add, in order to make the concept operational, that diversity refers

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to lifestyles, technological acquisitions, concepts, value representations, behaviors and institutions, explanations, interpretations, value rankings and traditions. Cultural diversity is not a superficial aspect, but an ascertained reality of today’s society.

To understand multiculturalism – and implicitly the circumstance that each of us comes in contact with diverse cultures – we need to distinguish between three sources and, respectively, three forms of it. The first would be “historical multiculturalism”, that is, the situation in which, on the same territory and as a consequence of history, the different cultures of different ethnic or religious communities coexist, the second a “multiculturalism of migration”, the situation in which, on the same territory and as a consequence of immigration, different cultures with different origins meet, and the third, a “multiculturalism of restructurings”, the situation in which, in the area covered by an institution or a leader, in the sphere of life, the different cultures, relative to different professions, generations, genders, etc., meet. Each of these three forms is encountered in the context of globalization.

Because multiculturalism becomes more and more an everyday experience for people, we cannot satisfy the immanent need for intercultural orientation without clearly elucidating what culture means. This is not at all a simple task, due not only to the various possible definitions of the concept (it is, after all, a basic obligation to acknowledge the meaning of a concept, if we want to employ it successfully), as to the multiple ramifications of culture in people’s lives. There are characterization of culture which pass for definitions – such as “a community or population sufficiently large enough to be self-sustaining”, “a process of social transmission of thoughts and behaviors in the family and schools over the course of generations” etc. But what we really always need are effective definitions. One can understand by culture the “totality of that group’s thoughts, experiences, and patterns of behavior and its concepts, values and assumptions about life that guide behavior and how those evolve with contact with other cultures”.[29] I believe that a culture consists of values, practices, interpretations, and the awareness of one’s identity.

The attitudes of people when they meet others from a different
culture span a large range of possibilities running from “culture shock” to
“cultural integration”, going through “cultural conformity”. Cultural
conformity is represented by the respect for a certain culture in a given
context, without sharing that culture or acknowledging it as one’s own.
Cultural integration, on the other hand, means the acknowledgement of a
culture as one’s own, by people belonging to another culture. The relation
between “cultural shock”, “cultural conformity”, and “cultural integration”
allows us today to describe with accuracy what happens in the meeting of
cultures inside the very life of people.

Each of these attitudes presupposes a “cultural understanding”. If
by understanding – as distinct from “description” or “explanation” – we mean
the operation of acquiring the meaning or the sense of a phenomenon
Together with the data about its genesis, then cultural understanding means
more than describing or knowing a culture, it means the availability of
placing ourselves, even if only hypothetically, in the role of somebody who
has embraced that culture. The operation of understanding, as compared to
the operations of knowledge, always includes this practical availability. As
an excellent anthology states, „‘understanding’ is not simply an individual
cognitive faculty but a multidimensional category denoting an existential
or ‘experimental form of common-sense knowledge of human affairs’. As
well as an ‘epistemological problem’ and a ‘method peculiar to the
sciences’.” 30 Consequently, when we speak of cultural understanding we do
not only mean a cognitive operation, but also a practical attitude. That is
why, current research into “understanding culture” distinguishes between
“learning about a culture” and “understanding a culture”, assigning to the
latter a commitment to the coherence of a culture, to the circumstance that
“the culture is learned”, that it represents “the view of a group of people”,
that it brings with itself “hierarchies”, that it provides “attitudes” and
orients “behavior” 31.

From the “contact” with another culture or between cultures, to its
“understanding” and then to an effective “intercultural understanding” there

30 Fred R. Dallmayr, Thomas A. McCarthy (eds.), Understanding and Social Inquiry, University
31 Iris Varner, Linda Beamer, International Communication in the Global Workplace, McGraw-
Hill, Ievin, 2005, pp. 2-12.
are steps to be taken. Those steps lead one from the “coexistence of cultures” to “interculturality” which is supposed to be based on communication. If by “communication” one understands not merely a system of fast and unaltered transmission of information, but an operation that has as a purpose, the understanding of the other, if the other is considered not an object to manipulate, but a participant in the interaction, if participants see each other as partners in finding solutions to problems, if partners are ready to address and discuss the rules of their interaction, then we realize how complex “intercultural communication” and “interculturality” really are. “Intercultural communication” does not lend itself to be confined to the transmission of information from one culture to another, or to the simple living together in an informational universe, but it means, before anything else, a motivating interaction in order to find solutions to common problems.

Even if handbooks have barely started to conceive not only the informational dimension, but also the interaction of intercultural communication, the emphasis on interaction is indispensable and timely, since “culture serves as the ‘safety net’ in which individuals seek to satisfy their needs for identity, boundary regulation, adaptation, and communication coordination. Culture facilitates and enhances the individual’s adoption processes in their natural cultural habitats. Communication, in its essence, serves as the major means of linking these diverse needs together.” “Intercultural abilities” (or “cross-cultural competences”) are truly delineated only in terms of interaction: understanding the political, cultural and business environments from a global perspective; developing multiple cultural perspectives and approaches; acquiring skills for working with people from various cultures; as well as the adaptability to work and the live in different cultures; learning to interact as equals with people belonging to various cultures.

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34 Ibidem.
Although in today’s approach to communication, its reduction to the transmission of “messages” remains influential, as, for instance, in Ruben and Stewart’s celebrated study, Communication and Human Behavior (1998), which states that: “human communication is the process through which individuals – in relationship with groups, organizations, and societies – respond to and create messages to adapt to the environment and to one another” – a crucial step is achieved by recognizing the indispensability of communication for “cultural understanding”, and by conceiving it in the direction of the interaction. Communication is characterized as a “dynamic process”, as a “production of symbols”, as a “system”, as a “process of making inferences”, as a self-reflexive process, as an action with consequences in the individuals’ life, and as a “complex process” (“Communication becomes even more complex when cultural dimensions are added”).

Nowadays, many aspects of “intercultural communication” are being discussed. I will mention here only two of these: identity in intercultural communication, and religion and the worldview in intercultural communication.

Culture brings identity into discussion, since “members of a culture share similar thoughts and experiences. One’s culture is part of one’s identity, and it is taught to one’s children. Culture also includes all the things that guide a group of people through life, such as myths, language and gestures, ways of communicating, economic systems, what kind of things to eat, and how to dress. People identify with being a member of a group”. The already existing long debate on personal and group identity can be synthesized in three important results: that identity is multiple (professional, ethnical, religious, national etc.), so that multiple identity has to be taken into consideration anytime the identity of a group or of an individual is debated; that identity is generated, not born; and that globalization affects the identity constitution process. Thus, communication is intercultural as long as its participants assume the diversity of the cultural identities from the very beginning of their interaction.

Many people are ready to enter intercultural communication as long as it is about technology, traditions for working the land, institutions, family life, literature etc., but they become reluctant when religion and philosophy are brought into discussion. These are considered to be “explosive”. Nevertheless religion and philosophy often give a culture a special trait, and they are reflected in almost all manifestations of those who profess them. One’s religion inevitably leaves a mark on the researcher. The impact of religion and philosophy on culture and their impact on people’s actions can be described in detail. “Communication” taken to its end becomes “discourse”, and knows no thematic taboos. On the other hand, religion is considered too delicate (implicating profound beliefs, being lived privately by people) to be accessible to “intercultural communication.” In this situation, the solution is to promote a non-simplified concept of the religion, to continue the communication, and to prevent from the very start the situation in which „people can find it threatening to feel that this aspect of their cultural identity might be under interrogation”. 38

Such considerations are no longer part of an esoteric philosophy of culture, but of the premises for action and interaction between people. In the context of globalization, almost everyone experiences multiculturalism and inter-cultural meeting, and especially those who take on leadership roles. Thus, leadership increasingly becomes “intercultural leadership”.

In recent years, the systematic knowledge of the role of a leader and of successful leadership has been developed. Many assumptions of traditional political philosophy are being reconsidered. It is thus rightfully considered that leadership is a process by which a person determines others to accomplish objectives and directs a organization in a way that makes it more efficient and coherent, while leaders are persons who carry out this process by applying procedures, personal decisions, values, knowledge and skills.39

Our current language – especially when it is not connected to the evolution of specialized research – tends to mix bosses, managers and leaders, as if they were the same thing. Even Dicționarul explicativ al limbii

38 Ibidem, p. 29-30.
române (1998) is not exempt from confusions. Here, the word “boss” means “a person that leads”, “manager” is the one who exercises “the activity and the art to lead”, and “leader” means “chief”. Obviously, the distinctions, resulted from the new organizational culture, are getting away from linguists. The fact that the English language makes a distinction between “boss”, “manager” and “leader” is of course not an excuse, and it is not mandatory to adopt definitions from a certain language, but it is a cultural duty to share the semantic delimitations, since these compress knowledge.

If we accept Aristotle’s argument that the presence of “reasoning spirit” (nous) allows an organization to reach its goal (and it is impossible not to accept it today, when organizations that let themselves be dissolved in the chaotic movement of components are not competitive), then the distinction between bosses, managers and leaders is worth employing. It is not a mere verbal distinction; on the contrary, this distinction allows us to shed light on the critical situations within institutions, companies, corporations, where there are bosses and infighting between those who aspire to become bosses, but where there are no managers, and where leaders have not yet arrived.

Today, in the research on organization, the leader is considered to be different from a boss. The “boss” is at the top of an organization, and the actions of his/her staff depend on his/her decisions, his/her power depending on the position, whereas the “leader” also has authority, but authority granted by the ability to understand the organization within a context, to orient it according to new directions, and to make these convincing for everyone else. The “manager”, in his/her turn, is something else. As compared to the boss, the “manager” has the advantage of having enough knowledge on the functioning of the organization and on competences, and as compared to the “leader”, the “manager” works in a given frame of strategic options. Only the “leader” can take the responsibility for changing major options.

Is there a need for leaders in organizations, companies, corporations? It is a fact that “bosses” there are aplenty, and that the fight for becoming a boss is a given, as soon as there is an open possibility. “Managers” are fewer, because the creation of a real decisive manager involves strenuous effort to learn and acquire the necessary abilities. With
“leaders”, an organization is not only efficient, but also long-lasting, not just existent, but also competitive, not only conspicuous, but relevant as well. Especially in the context of globalization, in which, as Robert Reich argues\(^{40}\), success on the markets depends not on the “high volume” of the product, but on its “high value”. Therefore, the intelligence incorporated in the product, and in its productions implies qualified managers and valuable leaders (who do not lead only physically, but who are “leaders in ideas, in actions”).

The immediate question regards the leaders’ selection. “Bosses” are the result of one’s access to a position; but neither the “manager” nor the “leader” is created because they have leading positions. Actually, many “bosses” are lousy managers, and they will never get to be leaders. On the other hand, the passage from “boss” to “manager” or “leader” is not made through the simple effort of the person in question (“positions do not create leaders”); the wise saying “May God spare you of the ungifted hardworking person” is here a warning.

So how are leaders produced? Starting from recent research, we have to make three connected observations. The first refers to the fact that the leader is not self-proclaimed, but that he/she is acknowledged, and that leadership is not primarily ceremonial, but a position of hard work. The traditional work of Cartwright and Zander (Group Dynamics: Research and Theory, 1968) rightfully considered leadership as consisting of actions of “setting group goals, moving the group toward its goal, improving the quality of interactions among the members, building cohesiveness of the group, and making resources available to the group”. The second observation is that the leader is made, not born. Miraculous endowments for leadership, a type of mysterious predestination, exist only for the naïve. The leader is the result of a learning process in at least three dimensions: knowledge that can be used from the technical point of view, interaction abilities, and self-reflexivity. The third observation is that we move in the environment of deep changes regarding the image of the leader. The leader “is made” through “continuous work and study”, and he/she does not rely on the success obtained (“Talent needs to be nurtured”). Both the traditional theory of the leader (“chieftain”, “prince” etc.), as a result of

special “traits” (“the trait theory”), and the modern theory of the leader, as a product of exceptional circumstances (“the great events theory”), have lost their attractiveness when compared to the conception of the leader as a result of continuous learning (“the transformational theory”).

Recent American research provides us with a true “Leadership Decalogue”, which deserves to be mentioned: to be technically proficient; seek responsibility and responsibility for your actions; make sound and timely decisions; set the example; know your people and look out for their well-being; keep your workers informed; develop a sense of responsibility in your workers; ensure that tasks are understood, supervised and accomplished; train as a team; use the full capabilities of your organization. These commandments condense an entire vision on man and the world, which is person-oriented, democratic and pragmatic.

It must be observed that leadership is inseparable from values. Any decision or action of a leader has inevitable ethical consequences so that – as the mission statement of the Harvard Business School says – „the teaching of ethics has to be here explicit, not implicit, and the community values of mutual respect, honesty and integrity, and personal accountability support the learning environment”.

The need for leaders in the institutions operating in our complex environment has been felt for several decades. Today, this problem should be solved by taking into account the context of globalization and that of its inherent multiculturalism. On the agenda of formation we find today in some universities “global leadership”, and, of course, “intercultural leadership”, which cannot be left out of the university programs. I would like to provide four remarks concerning these two themes, from the point of view of university formation.

The first remark refers to the need to accommodate an increasing number of universities with the situation of globalization and multiculturalism, taking into consideration the fact that new generations of graduates will be operating inside this situation, and that universities themselves are successful if they approach their own performance globally.

The second remark refers to conceiving organizations run by competitive leaders. The metaphor of the organization as a “machine” that can be projected, measured, directed, obviously a modern metaphor relegitimated by cybernetics, is no longer working. It needs to be replaces
by the metaphor of the organism, which is more capable of acknowledging the circumstance that efficient organizations are nowadays networks, communities, knowledge and learning systems. Leadership includes, as the Blackwell Encyclopedia of Management (2007) shows, questions such as: what needs to be done? What can and should I do to make a difference? Which are the performances and results? What can and should I do for stimulating diversity of approaches? How can I strengthen the role and the responsibility of the followers? Am I the most proficient in my position? It is nowadays true that „change and global leadership are inextricably linked. The key change challenges which face global leaders are linked to the changes that are occurring as organizations move from being bureaucratic machines to being knowledge-based networks. Specifically, leaders must guide their organizations to produce results today, even as they push for transformation which will positively impact the future”.41

The third remark is that global leadership today deals with cultural, ethnical, political representations, which are larger than those with which we have been accustomed, and that formation for intercultural leadership becomes part of university curricula. It is no longer sufficient to accept cultural differences, it is necessary to know and understand them. That is why, if we accept that universities form “competences” – which means „the knowledge, general and technical skills required for superior performance” – then the formation of “global competences” and, at the same time, of “intercultural competences” should become part of university programs. The Global Competence Development Program and the Intercultural Competence Development Program become indispensable for a competitive university.

The fourth remark is that today we have available factual research devoted to establishing “intercultural leadership competences”, which is informative as to what needs to be done in the university. We should distinguish, nevertheless, between “intrapersonal competences” (self-awareness, flexibility, curiosity, patience, imagination etc.), „interpersonal competences” („perspective taking”, „nonjudgmental”) „intercultural competences” („effective communication”, „appreciation of difference”, „local-global perspective”, „understanding of how leadership is

conceptualized in other cultures”). The one who acquires “intercultural leadership competences” is required to perform specific tasks: to clarify his own notion of culture, which has to be well formed; to be able to apply it; to understand its own cultural background; to be able to analyze and evaluate intercultural situations, to be able to negotiate in these situations, and to take decisions in a multicultural environment; to motivate participants in these situations; to form intercultural teams; and to exert intercultural leadership.

Data on the Earth’s climate which does not fit at all with routine of the indicators has been recently made available. The planet is currently undergoing the severest climate change in the last 10,000 years. The 20th century has brought about a real mutation regarding the relationship of humankind to its natural environment: in fact, everything has changed completely. Since 1760, the growth of the population, which had been constant for centuries, has started to accelerate. Economic activity has accelerated as well, leading mankind to the usage of “animated energies”. During the last century, world population has increased four times, the economy fourteen times, the energy consumption sixteen times, the industrial production forty times, the emission of carbon dioxide thirteen times, and used water nine times.

These growths have brought changes to the spheres in which human life is lived, changes that have to be sternly taken into consideration. The lithosphere (the rocks which form the surface of the Earth, with a thickness of several kilometers) does not raise any severe problems yet, but the pedosphere (the membrane between the lithosphere and the atmosphere that actually sustains the lives of plants and organisms) is altered by hundreds of millions of tons of artificial fertilizers that leave their mark on the composition of water and food, and that ultimately find their way into our bodies. “Soil erosion” already affects one third of the agricultural surface of the Earth, while food quantity for every inhabitant is today bigger than at any other time in history. The

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atmosphere is affected by “pollution”, and it also being “cleaned” of the microorganisms which ensured the emergence of life. “Climate change” and, finally, “global warming” come as consequences to the increase of atmospheric carbon dioxide emissions, methane and ozone, but the exact causes are subject to dispute. Agriculture, human health, and even the existence of our species will be affected more and more. The hydrosphere is already so polluted that “the change of the hydrologic cycle” has occurred, and the supplying of drinking water becomes ever more difficult. The biosphere suffers the consequences of the anti-microbial offensive, which has annihilated certain diseases, but also of the re-emergence of old diseases, considered to be extinguished, and of the appearance of new diseases. On the other hand, the “agricultural system” already has a lot of problems.

The importance of the full magnitude of the human intervention in the environment has been correctly underlined by John McNeil, in *Something New under the Sun*. This approach inevitably interferes with the trends we already know. For instance, McNeil implicitly disproves Heidegger’s a priori skeptical diagnosis, from *Die Frage nach der Technik* (1955), motivating that the technical and economic development has saved humankind from worldwide hunger. When he admits that the “gamble” of humanity, which dominated the last century, does not justify the ideology of the progress inherited from the previous centuries, but that it demands a deep meditation, the American historian actually prolongs the warnings of Jose Marti and H.G. Wells who, as everyone knows, were the first to ask themselves if the great development of human activities was possible without “degrading” the environment. But, compared to Heidegger, Jose Marti and H.G. Wells, John McNeil salutary brings the answer of a far-reaching historian (even though his world prestige is only growing now!). Evidently, the theorems of philosophy always need a historical check.

But, the “collision” apparent in the ecologic indicators from *Something New under the Sun* is even more important. In his argument, McNeill adopts Pythagoras’ idea about the “harmony of the spheres” as an explicit “paradigm” of his analysis. In a very ingenious way, he emphasizes a brilliant intuition, assuming the necessity of harmony among the lithosphere, the pedosphere, the hydrosphere, the atmosphere, the biosphere, and mankind’s activities and initiatives powered by interest and
values. In the 20th century, humanity reached a profound disturbance of the correlation between the above-mentioned spheres, and today’s problems and those of tomorrow are mostly its outcomes. These problems are not old and unimportant, since “in the 20th century, humanity has rearranged the atoms and has altered the chemistry of the stratosphere”. The connection between the “spheres” has been affected in a risky way, and thus individuals have become for the first time “significant ecological agents”.4

Punctual action is encouraged today as a solution. But, as the 2006 State of the Future declaration concludes, humankind has the resources to approach the global challenges it gives rise to, but, unfortunately, it is not yet clear how much vision, goodwill and intelligence will have to be concentrated on these challenges. And such persistent vagueness affects not only humankind’s relationship with the environment, but also the relationships within humankind itself. For instance, not even today can the international community give proper solutions, answers that could change the situation significantly, to recurrent conflicts, recidivist aggressors, or stable poverty. For now, one may draw a conclusion which is obviously not the solution: “There is a growing hunger around the world to do what is necessary for our common future, but there is a lack of an efficient leadership, with details for the actions. We have a competition between the growing proliferation of dangers and our growing ability to improve human condition”. Which one of these two growths will be bigger? It remains an open question, without a certain answer.

One who would try to build an opinion about our current intellectual life is faced with two facts: on the one hand, globalization, the spreading of communication, connect people from all around the world, from different cultures, and also internationalize solutions, and, on the other hand, when people take reference points of evaluation and behavior, they relate, first of all, to their own culture. Thus, despite the pressure of creating a global identity, a lot of people come up with particular identities (ethnic, religious, of gender etc.). In Philosophy as Cultural Politics (2007), Richard Rorty expresses, in a very coherent philosophical manner, the individual’s contextual anchorage (to their own, particular, cultural standards), and the rejection of the universal reference points. Rorty makes

44 Ibidem, p. 21.
our entire reality dependent on our own cultural arsenal. We have become, he says quite contentedly, “commonsensical finitists”\textsuperscript{45}, and the only thing we have left is to promote a “tolerant conversability”\textsuperscript{46}, without assuming any other intrinsic nature of the reality. Thus, contextual relativism is inevitable.

Even granting this intelligent philosophy the merit of expressing, better than any other one in the Modern Era, the possibility of the different conceptualization having a series of facts as its object, we cannot shun a deeper insight into the unacceptable consequences of relativism. The spokesmen of great trends, thinkers with different platforms, from Karl Popper\textsuperscript{47} to Habermas\textsuperscript{48} and to Joseph Ratzinger\textsuperscript{49}, have evoked them convincingly. Relativism is quickly converted into a dogma that contradicts its principle (“all is relative”), and stimulates the destruction of the unity of humankind, with all the implications that result from it. Relativism does not adequately take into consideration the human process of learning, which does not reduce itself to information, but which means the change of thinking frames or “boxes”.\textsuperscript{50} Relativism, by its own principle, does not take into consideration the natural telos of conversation, of speaking in general – that of obtaining the understanding between different rival points of view.\textsuperscript{51}

Today, Relativism may be overcome if it is faced not only with arguments brought against it, but also with alternative conceptions. We have at our disposal several proposals to date: such as to re-establish the motto “unity in diversity”, to weigh in a “view from nowhere”, to exploit the new continent of “communication”, to articulate a “fallible absolutism”, to consider the unavoidable consequences of Relativism.\textsuperscript{52} I believe that

\textsuperscript{46} Ibidem, p. 103.
\textsuperscript{48} Jürgen Habermas, \textit{Nachmetaphysisches Denken}, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 1988.
\textsuperscript{51} Jürgen Habermas, op. cit., p. 179.
Relativism cannot be overcome without accepting two assumptions. The first represents the passage from the classical “universalism of norms”, which is challenged by the cultural diversification, to a “universalism of generative structures” – a universalism of those conditions that make a certain performance possible. The second assumption acknowledges the need to move from descriptions, poems, oral expression, dialogue, essay, journal, aphorism, epistle, to mathematic exposures to theories, knowledge systems and comprehensive visions.\(^{53}\) Nowadays we need not only knowledge, in its general meaning – which, of course, remains indispensable – but also visions capable of realizing what is the meaning of the actions, of the institutions, of life, of society, of the world, and what is the meaning of knowledge inside them.

Recently, a remarkable physicist reminded us that, due to several factors – the competition in research, the pressure from the society to transfer scientific knowledge, the search for funds, the unstable work situation – the new generations engage in more factual research, finding solutions for problems on short term, without committing themselves to far-reaching projects. We may add that this is the situation not only in the field of scientific research, but it is connected to a more comprehensive orientation of culture towards facts, immediate, customs, and to the predisposition towards what lies at the origin of the fact, of the immediate, of the custom, which implies a reduction of the appetite for theory, system, project. In the 80s, Habermas identified as one of the consequences of this orientation the apparent “exhaustion of the Utopian energies (Erschöpfung der utopischen Energien)”\(^{54}\). The dominant direction in today’s culture is that of exploiting what is given, rather than asking what is possible. Moreover, a “negative futurism” is developed: “let’s leave things the way they are, because it may be not so good”.

Anyway, the physicist I have quoted, Paolo Blasi, after having analyzed the application, salutary of course, of the Bologna Declaration


\(^{54}\) Jürgen Habermas, *Die Krise des Wohlfahrtsstaates und die Erschöpfung utopischer Energien*, in Jürgen Habermas, *Die neue Unübersichtlichkeit*, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 1988.
(1999), draws this conclusion: “the challenge of the European society today is to go beyond ‘the knowledge society’, and to evolve into what could be called a ‘wisdom society’. Knowledge is a conscious use of information; ‘wisdom’ means choosing one’s behavior based on knowledge and shared values, in order to enhance the well-being of all, and the awareness that personal actions have social consequences”\textsuperscript{55}.

Indeed, this is an effective and pressing problem. Let us put in motion a wisdom capable of enlightening people about their own responsibility. I believe that Blasi, a refined physicist, is too optimistic when he speaks about the “restoration of some medieval values – the quest for truth, the unity of knowledge, the openness to the unknown and to other cultures”, as simple “restoration” has grown improbable for reasons of the new situation’s complexity. Still, Paolo Blasi is right when he considers that today’s universities have the responsibility of setting a larger and greater goal than producing and transmitting knowledge, in the projection of a “developed and peaceful world”.

A. C. CUZA, ETAIT-T-IL UN RACISTE ?

Lucian Butaru*

Abstract
This article analyses the “contribution to the racial thinking” of the notorious Romanian anti-Semitic A. C. Cuza (1857-1947) who was considered by the historians as the exponent of the racial anti-Semitism in Romania. I analyzed his scientific, political, literary and propaganda writings. The research result was that A. C. Cuza was not a racist, even if he tried to be.

Les malentendus sur le racisme de Cuza, dont l’ambiguïté de Cuza a une grande contribution, ont apparu dans la littérature de spécialité à la suite d’une brochure de Cuza, publiée en 1928 : La doctrine nationaliste chrétienne. Introduction. Le cuzisme. Définition, Thèses, Antithèses, La synthèse. Plus exactement, l’ambiguïté a été générée par le mot « synthèse ». Car, dans l’acceptation de Cuza, la « synthèse » ne renvoie pas au dépassement dialectique des thèses et des antithèses, parce que les thèses respectives sont des axiomes pour Cuza, les antithèses ont seulement le rôle de paraître absurdes en soutenant ainsi les thèses, tandis que la synthèse est une occasion pour la reprise des thèses, probablement dans le but d’une meilleure mémorisation de celles-ci. On a donc à faire avec une autre sorte de synthèse : la synthèse de tous les écrits de Cuza jusqu’à 1928 relatif à la question de l’antisémitisme ; il faut faire référence surtout à Despre poporație (Sur la population) et aux trois éditions de Naționalitatea în artă (La nationalité dans l’art).

Car, sans une telle remarque, il y a le risque de faire équivalence entre le cuzisme et les idéologies xénophobes déjà connues. Or, pour une telle approche, il n’y a pas besoin de faire la lecture de ses livres et brochures ennuyeuses, il est suffisant de voir le svastika de la couverture

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de ses livres et d’en raconter aux autres. Je donnerai un exemple, qui est très illustratif pour la perpétuation du malentendu en ce qui concerne le discours de Cuza, qui est perçu par la grande majorité des historiens comme raciste, l’interprétation donnée par Gh. T. Pop étant reprise dans la plupart des écrits historiques au sujet des mouvements antisémites roumains. Ainsi, Gh. T. Pop saisit « une influence évidente du fascisme italien et aussi du nazisme allemand » sur les thèses de Cuza, il en exemplifiant avec la « thèse » suivante1 :

« La nationalité est la totalité des individus qui ont le même sang, en constituant des personalités collectives, animées par le pouvoir naturel de la nation et en travaillant chacun sur une certaine terre, en tant que des organismes vivants dont les organes sont les trois classes avec leurs sous-divisions résultées par la loi naturelle de la division du travail [...] ».

Gh. T. Pop interprète la première partie de la thèse comme une influence du nazisme et la deuxième partie comme une influence du corporatisme. Son interprétation semble plausible, parce que Cuza a la même bibliographie que ses collègues européens. Mais il a lu différemment et plus tôt cette bibliographie : Darwin, Dühring, Chamberlain, Gobineau, Haeckel, Huxley, Lapouge, List, Malthus etc. La perception de la part de Gh. T. Pop d’une influence du nazisme sur la thèse d’ A. C. Cuza est résultée par le fait que Pop a consulté seulement l’édition de 1927 de la Nationalité dans l’art, tandis que cette conception est de plus longue date dans l’œuvre de Cuza, en apparaissant dès l’édition de 1915 de ce livre. En ce qui concerne le corporatisme italien, l’histoire est même plus vieille, l’idée du corporatisme en apparaissant avant 1900, dans le travail Despre poporație (Sur la population) de Cuza. Si on voulait nécessairement établir une filiation pour les idées organicistes de travaux de Cuza, on pourrait dire que l’auteur les a appropriées à la suite de la lecture de Carl Menger2.

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2 A. C. Cuza, Obiectul economiei politice și însemnătatea ei. Lețion de deschidere a cursului de economie politică de la Facultatea de Drept din Iași, 12 februarie 1901, Tipografia Națională, Strada Alexandri No. 11, Iași, 1901, p. 29.
Que nous occupions donc de la question de la race dans les travaux d’A. C. Cuza, « théorie qui mérite toute l’attention »1 que, pourtant, Cuza lui n’a pas accordée, en l’expédiant souvent au chapitre « [...] et à toutes autres causes, aptes à produire le même effet, parmi lesquelles pourrait être le métissage aussi, avec la restriction des dolichoides »2.

Premièrement, il y a une formulation (la thèse 5, de la brochure citée) qui est incontestablement raciste : « La religion de la nation Juive : c’est le produit de cette race bâtardise et dégénérée [...] »5. C’est une affirmation claire, qui dit que le facteur biologique (la race) détermine la culture (la religion). Par conséquent, tout représentant (individu ou group) de la race respective produira, inévitablement, des œuvres avec le même caractère (dans le cas où il se hasardera à produire), que soient les conditions sociales, économiques, politiques ou culturelles.

Pour cette thèse il y a une antithèse. Nous ne nous référerons pas à « l’antithèse » qui suit à la thèse respective dans la même brochure et qui dit que le Juif « n’est pas le produit de cette thèse [...] », mais à une formulation de l’année 1904, confirmée aussi dans les années 1908, 1915 et 1927 : « les Juifs sont le produit du Talmud »7. C’est une affirmation aussi claire que la précédente, qui dit, cette fois-ci, que le facteur culturel (la religion) détermine le « caractère » d’un group (les Juifs) ; donc, inévitablement, est Juif tout représentant (individu ou group) de ceux qui croient et sont déterminés par l’esprit ou par la culture juive (dans ce cas, par le Talmud). Pourtant, on doit faire la distinction entre celles-ci, car les thèses ont une nature radicalement différente. Ce n’est qu’en cette optique (culturaliste) que l’analogie cuziste entre « les Juifs parasites » et « les Juifs co-parasites »8 a du sens.

6 Naționalitatea în artă a apparu pour la première fois dans quelques nombres de la revue d’Emil Garleanu, Făt Frumoas [Le Prince Charmant], de Bârlad, dès le 15 Mars 1904.
8 Cuza, Doctrina naționalistă creștină ..., p. 23.
Qui est donc « le vrai » Cusa ? Celui qui croit dans le déterminisme biologique ? Ou celui qui croit plutôt dans le déterminisme culturel ? Pour le moment, prenions en considération le « deuxième » Cusa, qui donne l’explication suivante au « sang » ou à la race :

« Le sang – cette qualité mystérieuse, incompréhensible, mais qui peut être vue de la matière vivante, ce qui s’appelle „race”, ce qui est dans la plupart des cas le produit d’un métissage déterminé, limité, arrivé à une unité absolue, après des siècles de croisements continus, entre les mêmes éléments, proches, protégés de toute immixtion étrançère, dans les mêmes circonstances, naturelles et sociales, sur la même terre. Il n’y a pas de races pures dans le cas des animaux aussi que, dans ce sens-là, il n’y a pas de nations pures dans le cas des gens. [...] Tout croisement libre, continu, dans le cas des animaux aussi que dans le cas des gens, produit la bâtardise, le mélange chaotique, dont la malédiction est la stérilité. Par exemple : le lévrier est une race à des certaines caractéristiques, le chien de bergerie à d’autres : un attrape des lièvres, l’autre annonce et protège la bergerie. Mais, si on croise le lévrier avec le chien de bergerie, on obtiendra un produit qui n’aura un caractère clair et, en général, aucune qualité positive, utile, par conséquent, il ne sera ni chien ni lévrier, comment dit-il le Roumain, mais seulement un birulard stérile, qui n’apportera ni le lévrier, ni la protection de la bergerie et ça ne l’empêchera pas de manger comme tous les autres, même avec une voracité plus grande que celle dont sont dotés les animaux d’où ils sont nés, faute de tout autre instinct plus noble que celui égoïste de l’espèce. »

9 Idem, Naționalitatea în artă. Expunere a Doctrinei Naționaliste. Principii, Fapte, Concluzii, Institutul de Arte Grafice și Editură „Minerva”, București, 1915, p. 182. « Sângere – acea însuşire tăinică, de neînțeles, dar văzută a materiei însuflețită, aceea ce se numește „rasa”, care este în cele mai multe cazuri productul unui amestec determinat, mărginit, ajuns la unitate depină, după veacuri de încrucișări continue, între aceleași elemente, apropiate, ferite de orice amestec străin, în aceleași împrejurări, naturale și sociale, pe acelaș pămînt. Rase pure, la animale, nu există, precum nici la oameni, în acest înțeles, națiuni pure. [...] Orice încrucișare nedeterminată, continuă, la animale ca și la oameni, produce corcirea, amestecul haotic, al cărui blestem este sterilitatea. De pildă: ogarul e o rasă cu anumite caractere, cîine de stînă cu altele: unul prinde ieșiri, celălalt dă de șire și apără turma. Dacă însă vom încrucișa ogarul, cu cîine de stînă, vom obține un product care nu va avea un caracter hotărît și în genere nici o însuşire pozitivă, utilă, așadar, nu va fi nici cine, nici ogar, cum zice romînul, ci numai o corcitură sterilă cu care nu vei avea nici epure, nici turmă păzită, ceea ce nu îl va împiedica să mânîce ca alții, ba încă să fie de o lăcomie înca și mai mare decît aceea cu care sînt înzestrat animalele, din care se va fi născut, în lipsaoricărui alt instinct mai înalt decît acel egoist al speciei. »
La longueur du passage cité ci-dessus est justifiée par le fait que celui-ci représente l’espace le plus large accordé à la question du sang dans l’œuvre de Cuza. On y a à faire, à l’exception d’un paragraphe qui reprenait les idées de celui présentée antérieurement, avec la perspective la plus complexe et la plus élaborée de Cuza sur la question de la race.


Pareillement, on peut voir que Cuza ne précise pas le moment où le mélange devient bâtardise. Le caractère fortuit des arguments racistes de Cuza est démontré par les autres arguments antisémites qui sont plus vieux et qui se trouvent en contradiction avec ce que nous avons présenté jusqu’à ce moment. Ainsi, relatif à la bâtardise :

« La race, leur sang spécial fait les Juifs tendre vers une préservation instinctive, aussi qu’il fait les autres peuples refuser se mêler avec ceux-ci [...]. Les Juifs aussi auraient pu se mêler – avec des éléments voisins avec eux – s’ils n’avaient pas été restreints par leur religion ».14

10 En reste il y a seulement des allusions contingentes, mais présentes dans la plupart des œuvres de Cuza, même dans le volume de (Poésies, épigrammes et pensées en prose) Poezii, epigrame și cugetări în proză, Ediția a III-a, adâogiță, Editura „Bucovina” I. E. Torouțiu, București, 1939, p. 240 : « La mort d’une nation se résume en deux mots : la bâtardise et la dégénération. Physique ou culturelle. »
11 Idem, Naționalitatea în artă ..., [Ed. 1908], p. 157.
13 Idem, Despre poporație, p. 597.
14 Idem, Naționalitatea în artă [Ed. 1915], p. 232. « Rasa, sângele lor deosebit îi face pe jidani să tindă a se păstra din instinct, precum și pe celelalte popoare de a refuza să se amestece cu
Dans un discours devant le Parlement, en Juillet 1918, Cuza reprend l’argument des conditionnements religieux:

« […] ils ne s’assimilent pas. Parce que leur religion, avec le dogme fondamentale de „peuple élu”, est en principe la religion de la non assimilation »15

Donc, il n’en est pas question de « bâtardise », parce les Juifs même pas se mêlent – soit pour des raisons biologiques, de l’instinct, soit pour des raisons culturelles, la religion de la non assimilation. Même plus, Cuza donne une interprétation culturelle même à l’antisémitisme de ses collègues européens:

« […] les soi-disant mouvements „antisémites”, en Autriche, en Allemagne, en France, en Angleterre, se dirigent exactement contre les Juifs „assimilés” et qui, comme on peut voir, ne sont pas „assimilés”. »16

La distinction fine que Cuza fait entre assimilation (asimilare) et asimilare est donnée par le fait que tandis que la première est une « vraie » assimilation organique, la deuxième est une vraie fraude :

« En vain tu as donné la peine
D’être baptisé, messire,
Car l’eau passe,
Mais le Juif reste. »17

Dans ce sens-là doivent être comprises les conclusions catégoriques en ce
dânșii [...]. Și s’ar fi putut amesteca și jidanii – cu elemente înrudite cu dânșii – dacă nu ar fi fost îngrădiți de religia lor ».

16 Idem, Naționalitatea în artă... [Ed. 1915], p. 231.
17 Idem, Poezii, epigrame și cugetări în proză, p. 164. « Zadarnic te-ai mai ostenit/ Să te botezi, jupâne,/ Căci apa-i trecătoare/ Dar Jidovul rămâne. » Pour ne pas laisser l’impression que la poésie de Cuza traite seulement des obsessions, je precise que les vers cités représentent, approximativement, l’entier penchant poétique de Cuza vers l’antisémitisme. À la différence de ces vers d’haine, les autres vers de Cuza sont d’amour ; tristes vers la fin du XIXème siècle.
Juifs, a affirmé que la population roumaine.

« En ne se mêlant pas avec nous – et ils ne doivent se mêler – ils ne peuvent pas vivre sur notre terre que s’ils nous éloignent. L’affirmation de leur existence est la négation de notre existence. »

A. C. Cuza se trouve, catégoriquement, loin du racisme, les discussions d’après le Congrès du Berlin (1878) sont encore vivantes dans son âme. On peut dire que la législation et le discours politique roumain, qui ont fait presque tout ce qui était possible contre la naturalisation des Juifs, ont eu aussi comme effet secondaire le retardement du racisme roumain. Au moins les écrits de Cuza représentent un tel retardement. Pourtant, Cuza offre des prémisses pour un futur racisme.

« Les changements de religion étant peu nombreux, intéressent de plus la statistique ecclésiastique [que la politique]. Pourtant, quand la religion et la race forment l’une et la même chose, comme dans le cas des Juifs, les changements de religion pourraient avoir une très grande influence sur la population s’ils augmentaient. Ainsi, par exemple, quelque désirable qu’il soit que notre population absorbe le plus grand nombre possible d’éléments juifs, ça n’engendrerait pas le renforcement de notre nationalité, comme vigueur et comme qualités, mais l’affaiblissement de celle-ci, sans écarter avec rien le danger de notre remplacement par les Juifs. »

Un autre terme, avec une forte sonorité, emprunté à l’inventaire raciste, fait référence à la « dégénération ». Dans la littérature raciste, le


19 Idem, Despre poporație, p. 109. « Schimbările de religie fiind puține la număr, interesează mai mult statistica bisericească [decât politică]. Totuși, când religiunea și rasa formeează unul și același lucru, ca la jidani, schimbările de religie pot să aibă o înrăurire foarte mare asupra poporației dacă ele s-ar înmulți. Așa, de exemplu, oricât ar fi de dorit ca poporația noastră să absoarbă pe cât se poate mai multe elemente, totuși, în specie, absorbirea, prin încrucișare a unui prea mare număr de elemente evreiești, nu ar fi de natură a întări naționalitatea noastră, ca vigoară și ca însușiri, ci de a o slăbi, fără de a înlătura într-un nimic primejdia înlocuirei noastre de către jidani. »
terme dégénération est fortement relié avec celui d’eugénisme. La
dégénération est, dans cette optique, une perturbation du processus de
sélection naturelle, perturbation apparaît à la suite de l’intervention du
facteur culturel-moral, qui, par assistance, fait possible l’existence des
disgraciés de la nature20, qui n’est pas seulement parasitaire, mais aussi
dangereuse pour l’espèce.

L’interprétation de Cuza a, de nouveau, à la base, un déterminisme
culturel-économique : la dégénération est « l’épuisement à cause du
manque des moyens d’existence »21. Ainsi, Cuza se trouve extrêmement
loin par rapport au racisme, en apportant même une des critiques les plus
sévères et les plus pertinentes qui peuvent être apportées à cette doctrine. Il
emploie, dans ce sens-là, une thèse d’un traité d’économie politique de 1878
qui appartenait à A. Blanqui :

« Petit à petit, dans l’Angleterre s’est établie cette curieuse maxime,
conformément à laquelle toute pauvreté est l’œuvre de celui qui souffre et
qu’on doit poursuivre les victimes au lieu de poursuivre les causes de
celles-ci [...] »22.

Il est difficile d’établir le degré dont cette critique a été internalisé par
Cuza ; mais il est certain que Blanqui a été cité par Cuza au moins avec le
même respect que Vacher de Lapouge. Même plus, Cuza revient sur la
thèse de Blanqui, après 354 de pages (mais cette fois-ci, il se sert de ses
propres mots). Le recours à cette thèse est occasionné par la critique sévère
que Cuza apporte à la solution malthusienne (la réserve morale du
prolétariat envers la reproduction), qu’il considère « aussi fausse, aussi
injuste, aussi inutile »23, parce que « sur eux [les ouvriers] tombait toute la
responsabilité pour la misère dont ils étaient les victimes »24.

Là où les racistes voient des beaux gènes, Cuza voit des privilèges
 cachés et du pseudo-darwinisme :

20 Clémence Royer (préface d’Ipe Darwin, en édition française, 1862) apud André Pichot, La
21 Cuza, Poesii, epigrame și cugetări în proză, p. 290.
22 A. Blanqui apud Cuza, Despre poporație, p. 37.
23 Cuza, Despre poporație, p. 381.
24 Ibidem.
« Grâce à la propriété [...] un esprit positif et étroit, une conscience moins scrupuleuse et un âme de corsaire servent mieux que les qualités les plus rares. Le fils d’un banquier rachitique triomphera devant le jeune le plus vigoureux et le plus intelligent s’il est né par des parents pauvres. »

J’incline à croire que Cuza se situe du côté des « déclassés », car sur cette position se trouvaient, selon les statistiques citées, les paysans de Moldavie. La dégénération a, pour Cuza, seulement des causes culturel-matérielles et, d’aucune façon, biologiques. Si dans la ville, la dégénération est causée surtout par le stress, c’est-à-dire par « l’oppression sur le système nerveux »26, à la campagne (en Moldavie), la dégénération est causée par « les conditions géographiques infortunées »27, par la sous-alimentation et surtout par l’alcoolisme – « la cause principale de l’épuisement des forces physiques et morales de la population »28 et « une des causes les plus fortes pour la dégénération de population, car il attaque aussi le pouvoir de production et le pouvoir de reproduction de celle-ci [...] »29. Dans ce sens-là, Cuza luttera longtemps contre « l’indifférence publique »30 et le manque d’implication de l’État31, en contribuant, à côté d’ A. D. Xenopol, à la création, en 1895, de la « Ligue contre l’Alcoolisme ». Dans cette lutte, « le mauvais diable »32 est l’eau-de-vie de grains, qui est apparue à la suite de la maladie d’*oïdium* qui a attaqué la vigne en 185033:

« [...] autrefois, l’ivresse avait un caractère en quelque sorte plus joyeux et plus innocent. L’ivresse sombre, dangereuse, abrutissante, avec des conséquences si graves pour l’État et pour la société, est un produit spécifique de la civilisation de la fin du XIXème siècle. »34

25 *Ibidem*, p. 263.
26 *Ibidem*, p. 448.
28 *Ibidem*, p. 503.
32 Idem, *Victimele alcoolului*, Tipografia Națională, Strada Alexandri No. 11, Iassy, 1899, p. VII.
33 Idem, *Lupta contra alcoolismului...*, p. 11.
34 *Ibidem*, p. 9.
Une autre thèse, reprise de l’instrumentaire raciste et « dénaturée » par Cuza est « le caractère constant des peuples » 35. Cuza est partiellement d’accord avec cette thèse, en la reproduisant avec ses propres mots et exemples. À la différence qu’il accepte cette thèse seulement quand il fait des références à des périodes de temps plus courtes (particulièrement, à présent) et aux différences raciales les plus visibles (particulièrement, à la couleur de la peau) :

« Dans toutes les régions, dans tous les climats, l’Anglo-saxon et l’Allemand gardent leur qualités et le Noir ne modifie pas sa nature par le fait qu’il change [l’espace] d’habitation, ou qu’il modifie ses institutions »36.

Mais, quand on parle de « milliers d’années », Cuza devient sceptique, peut-être sans le vouloir, et il donne l’exemple suivant : « [...] sur la même terre s’est développée la civilisation éblouissante des Hellènes et végètent aujourd’hui le peuple grecque »37.

La raison est, comme on peut déjà s’attendre, une de nature culturelle, la culture en jouant pourtant « un rôle important, en contrecarrant quelques tendances nocives et en développant d’autres utiles »38. Autrement, comment pourrait-on justifier le rôle des « coryphées » si tout marchait spontanément, par l’intermède du sang.

Conclusion

On peut voir, que même si Cuza reprend des termes et des questions spécifiques pour le racisme, la manière dont il emploie tels instruments neutralise les conclusions auxquelles on s’attendrait qu’il arrive.

La conclusion qui pourrait être tirée probablement aurait attiré A. C. Cuza : dans ses travaux, le racisme apparaît comme une forme sans fond. Pourtant, la raison, qui pourrait expliquer la marginalité du critère racial dans le cadre du cuzisme, est plus profond et plus bizarre : A. C. Cuza ne s’appuie pas sur des arguments de type racial, justement parce qu’il est

35 Idem, Despre poporanțe, p. 495
36 Ibidem, p. 495.
37 Ibidem, 495.
38 Ibidem, p. 497.
antisémite. Et, être antisémite signifie beaucoup plus qu’être cohérent avec une doctrine; ça signifie qu’on lutte sur tous les plans, en utilisant tout moyen possible et, finalement, qu’on essaie être cohérent, dans la mesure du possible, pour ne pas être « pris » par les adversaires. Il est intéressant le fait qu’un nationaliste comme A. C. Cuza critique les excès nationalistes de textes nationalistes de ses prédécesseurs. Par exemple, le latinisme de Petru Maior qui « a falsifié la philologie » 39. Cuza justifie même sa position par la thèse conformément à laquelle ces retouches sont nuisibles pour la cause nationale même. Je cite un tel exemple du texte :

« [...] cet état des choses ne pourrait plus durer si on ne voulait pas compromettre la cause de notre nationalité [...] Il fallait revenir sur notre activité du passé et la soumettre à la critique [...] surtout parce que derrière le nationalisme commençaient s’abriter la médiocrité et la charlatanerie [...] » 40.

Mais, Cuza emploie des arguments antiracistes pour soutenir le plus scientifiquement que possible son antisémitisme. Sa position s’appuie sur le déterminisme culturel-économique, comme nous avons déjà mentionné :

[En ce qui concerne] « leur supériorité [de Juifs] économique, notamment, dans le domaine commercial » attribuée « à une qualité de la race » « [...] à mon avis, la vraie explication scientifique, pour la question des Juifs et de leur action, dans la vie économique : [est] la religion » 41.

En analysant les ressorts intimes de l’option de Cuza, on peut dire que le succès de l’ennemi ne mérite pas être expliqué en partant de « qualités de la race » de celui-ci – parce que ainsi on ne pourrait plus lui le reprendre... Pourtant, il ne faut pas considérer Cuza si conscient de la valeur politique de ses arguments que ma description antérieure (même si correcte) laisse s’entendre. L’enjeu politique des arguments scientifiques n’est pas toujours conscientisé. Dans le cas ci-présent, on peut supposer qu’il était suffisant

40 Ibidem, p. 41.
41 Cuza, Despre Poporație, pp. 659-661.
que l’intérêt de l’antisémite soit suscité en entendant telles thèses, parce que celles-ci lui étaient favorables. Les affirmations qui apportent des explications utiles semblent toujours plus évidentes et sont plus facilement internalisées.

Plus chargée d’enjeux politiques est une autre question dans laquelle Cuza a été impliqué, en luttant contre le racisme – pour lutter contre les Juifs. La question respective est une question démographique. Dans la deuxième moitié du XIXème siècle, la tendance générale était de remplacer les « obstacles répressifs avec des obstacles préventifs » 42. Dans ce contexte, quand la statistique et la démographie commencent gagner une position importante – en entrant dans le viseur de la politique –, en Moldavie on s’alarmait sur l’accroissement démographique faible des ethniques roumains.

Il est difficile à dire si par la problématisation de cette « [déviation] par rapport au cours normal des choses, on peut dire une monstruosité démographique [...] » 43 on suivait attirer l’attention sur la question juive ou inversement. Peut-être un peu de tous les deux.

« Des l’année 1841, un statisticien anonyme, en faisant la statistique de la population de la Moldavie, nous prédit que „l’accroissement démographique des juifs dans les villes dépassera, à l’avenir, celui des chrétiens” » 44

A. C. Cuza approche sérieusement le débat, occasion à laquelle prend naissance cette étude volumineuse, Despre poporatie, et quelques brochures. Et le débat a continué, en gardant le même registre, même après l’accroissement démographique a été devenu positivement – les cours donnés à Valenii de munte de 1909 démontrent ce fait. Ce qui nous intéresse est que la position antisémite de Cuza s’appuie toujours sur des arguments antiracistes, en partant du même déterminisme culturel-économique :

« [...] leur reproduction [des Juifs] extraordinaire qui peut être observée par comparaison à la reproduction faible de la population chrétienne, ainsi

42 H. Baudrillart apud Cuza, Despre poporatie, p. 263.
43 Cuza, op. cit., p. 549.
44 Ibidem, p. 3. «Încă de prin anul 1841, un statistician anonym, făcând statistica poporatiei Moldovei, ne proroceşte că „împoporarea jidovească a politiilor va întrece în viitorime pe acea a creştinilor” ».
qu’on observe dans les villes de la Roumanie, n’est pas du à des qualités de race, mais seulement aux circonstances sociales et économiques »

« La proliférice de la population juive [...] [:] a été considérée par les uns comme une qualité de la race : ce qui, en fait, ne résout pas le problème [...]. On a été prouvé pourtant que la proliférice des Juifs diminue elle aussi en certaines conditions – par la capillarité sociale, par exemple, dans le cas des Juifs riches [...] Comment on peut voir, cette explication est une nouvelle confirmation pour la loi de la population, ainsi que ma formule le précise ».

On voit de nouveau la même prédisposition vers des confirmations. Le concept de capillarité sociale est emprunté à Arsené Dumont et développé par Cuza pour « culturaliser » les contraintes biologiques de la théorie de Malthus. Cuza soutient que Malthus a raison seulement en fond, la forme de la théorie étant fausse et par conséquent les résultats dont Malthus est arrivé sont erronés :

« [...] la théorie économique fausse dont est arrivé Malthus à cause de la forme fausse dans laquelle il a exprimé sa pensée et qui a fallu l’apporter fatalement aux conclusions pratiques erronées dont il est arrivé ».

Dans le cas des gens non pas les « facteurs physiques : la faim et l’amour » déterminent la limite de la reproduction de la population, mais les facteurs culturels-économiques : « les moyens dont elle est habituée à vivre » 50. La faim et l’amour conditionnent seulement les animaux et, parfois, les

45 Ibidem, p. 89. « [...] înmulțirea lor [evreilor] extraordinară, pe unde se poate observă în comparație cu reprodcurea începută a populației creștine, așa precum se observă în orașele din România, nu se datorește unor însușiri ale rasei, ci numai împrejurărilor sociale și economice ».

46 Ibidem, p. 659. « prolifercitatea poporației jidânești [...] [] a fost considerată de unii ca o însușire a rasei: ceea ce de altfel nu rezolvă problema [...]. S’a dovedit însă că prolifercitatea Jidânelor scade și ea în anumite condiții – prin capilăritatea socială, de pildă, la jidâni bogați [...] Cum se vede, această explicație e o nouă confirmare a legii poporației, așa cum o precizează formula mea [...] ».

47 Ibidem, p. 263.
49 Ibidem, p. 175.
50 Ibidem, p. 428.
ouvriers – quand ils sont obligés à accepter le salaire naturel (le coût du produit travail) problématisé par David Ricardo.
LA REPRÉSENTATION POLITIQUE DES FEMMES EN ROUMANIE.
ESQUISSE D’ÉTUDE À PARTIR DES MODÈLES FRANCOPHONES,
LA FRANCE ET LA BELGIQUE

Alexandra Petrescu*

Abstract
The article analyses two francophone models, France and Belgium, which represented during the last two centuries sources of inspiration for the electoral and constitutional framework of Romania. The author is questioning the possibility if the parity or the quotas which are applied in France and Belgium, can become in the future a source of inspiration for the political representation of women in Romania.

Notre étude se propose de prendre en compte la situation de la représentation politique des femmes en Roumanie, en tenant compte des modèles belges et français que notre pays a eu au cours du temps. Le but de cette étude est de savoir si la France et la Belgique, deux modèles de la Roumanie pendant le XIXe siècle et la première moitié du XXe siècle, peuvent redevenir à présent des modèles en ce qui concerne la participation des femmes à la vie politique. En Roumanie on discute actuellement sur l’introduction du vote uninominal, mais ce débat ne prend pas en compte l’impact d’un nouveau système électoral sur la représentation des femmes au niveau national. Le système proportionnel favorise les femmes candidates, tandis que le système majoritaire les défavorise. Est-ce qu’on peut envisager pour l’avenir des lois électorales comme la parité ou les quotas, qui s’appliquent actuellement en France, respectivement en Belgique ? Pour que l’égalité de genre soit respectée et assurée dans le champ politique, de telles mesures sont nécessaires.

La discussion portera sur le passé de la Roumanie où la France et la Belgique ont constitué des modèles constitutionnels ou électoraux. On va analyser ensuite les imaginaires politiques en Roumanie, France et Belgique pendant la période de l’entre-deux-guerres, période marquée par le début

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de l’émancipation politique des femmes. Cette analyse est nécessaire pour comprendre l’évolution de la place des femmes dans l’imaginaire politique, ce qui présuppose des différences et des ressemblances entre les trois pays. Ensuite on va passer à notre question principale : la France et la Belgique peuvent reconstituer des modèles pour la Roumanie en ce qui concerne la promotion des femmes en politique ? Cette question repose sur une analyse de l’application des lois sur la parité en France et des quotas en Belgique pour voir l’impact de ces mesures sur les rapports de genre en politique. On va découvrir les limites et les défauts de ces lois. Une autre question secondaire est liée à cette question principale : on se demande si le système électoral peut changer la place de la femme dans l’imaginaire politique, en transformant la « femme mère » en « femme politique ». Une brève comparaison avec les pays de l’Europe du Nord va nous montrer que quel que soit le système électoral, qu’on applique la parité ou les quotas, ce qui est important est l’ouverture des mentalités vers les femmes « professionnelles de la politique ». Dans un pays où les femmes ont obtenu les droits politiques au début du siècle, en 1906, comme c’est le cas de la Finlande1, la parité en politique est chose normale, même si on applique un système proportionnel.

**La France et la Belgique : les anciens modèles de la Roumanie**

La France a constitué un modèle pour la Roumanie pendant la période 1830-1848, Lucian Boia considérant qu’au moment où on se réfère aux modèles occidentaux, on doit penser premièrement à la France et ensuite aux autres pays de l’Ouest2. Quant à la Belgique, elle a constitué le deuxième modèle pour la Roumanie, le petit pays « francophone, monarchique, neutre, démocratique et prospère »3 étant un modèle plus adapté à la Roumanie. Notre pays se dote en 1866 d’une Constitution qui s’inspire de la Constitution belge de 1831, la Roumanie étant appelée la

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2 Boia, Lucian (2005), *Istorie și mit în conștiința românească*, București: Humanitas, ediția a 4-a, 262.
3 Idem.
« Belgique de l’Orient » pendant la deuxième moitié du XIXe siècle. Nous allons insister dans cette section de l’article sur le modèle belge.

La Constitution belge de 1831 est inspirée, à son tour, de la Constitution française et met les bases d’un État unitaire et centralisé. En ce qui concerne l’égalité politique entre les femmes et les hommes, le vote censitaire introduit une citoyenneté limitée à laquelle ont accès seulement les hommes qui peuvent payer le cens. L’exclusion du suffrage est sexuée et sociale pendant le XIXe siècle et l’inégalité sociale devient une composante de la société belge. Le cens est fixé entre 20 et 100 florins, étant différent pour les villes et les campagnes. Dans ces conditions, seulement 1% de la population a le droit de vote. En 1848 le gouvernement belge réduit le cens à 20 florins en redoutant les répercussions de la Révolution française sur la petite bourgeoisie qui était privée du droit de vote. Suite à ce changement le pourcentage des électeurs va augmenter à 2%. En 1888 une loi reconnaît le vote capacitaire masculin pour les élections provinciales et communales et en 1893 l’article 47 de la Constitution est révisé, le suffrage censitaire est aboli et remplacé par un système hybride, le vote plural. Conformément à cette révision, chaque homme âgé de plus de 25 ans dispose d’une voix, et une voix ou plusieurs sont attribués à certaines catégories de citoyens, en fonction de leur statut familial, de leur propriété immobilière et de leur profession. En Belgique le vote est une fonction et pas un droit, le citoyen étant l’homme qui détient une propriété. En 1893 une réforme électorale

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7 Cette chronologie du droit de vote est disponible en Gubin, Éliane ; Jacques Catherine ; Marissal, Claudine (1998), « Une citoyenneté différée ? Le suffrage féminin en Belgique 1830-1940 », in Cohen, Yolande ; Thébaud, Françoise (sous la direction), Féminismes et identités nationales. Le processus d’intégration des femmes au politique : Lyon, Programme Rhône-Alpes de recherche en Sciences Humaines, 90.
introduit le vote obligatoire et la Belgique devient la première démocratie qui utilise ce type de vote.

En 1866 la Roumanie s’inspire du modèle belge pour sa Constitution qui introduit le vote censitaire pour les hommes qui peuvent payer le cens. La Constitution roumaine garde, quand même, son originalité⁸. La Constitution roumaine de 1866 introduit quatre collèges électoraux pour l’Assemblée des députés, réduits à trois par la loi de 1884. Le premier collège pour l’Assemblée des députés réunissait tous les citoyens ayant un revenu de minimum 1200 lei. Du deuxième collège faisaient parti les citoyens qui habitaient dans les villes et payaient une imposition annuelle directe de minimum 20 lei. Le troisième collège rassemblait ceux qui payaient une imposition dont le niveau ne comptait pas⁹. L’âge des électeurs est établi à 25 ans jusqu’en 1866 et ensuite elle diminue à 21, tandis que les candidats devaient avoir au moins 30 ans avant 1866 et 25 ans après. Pour le Sénat le niveau du cens est plus grand : pour se retrouver sur les listes du premier collège le revenu annuel devait être de minimum 2000 lei et pour le deuxième collège un revenu entre 800 et 2000 lei. La condition d’âge limite le nombre des inscrits sur les listes: les électeurs et les candidats doivent avoir au moins 40 ans. Pour se faire élire, les candidats pour le Sénat doivent avoir un revenu d’au moins 9400 lei, condition qui limite leur nombre.

Après la Première Guerre Mondiale on applique des système électoraux différents dans le Royaume, Bucovine et Transylvanie : dans le Royaume on appliquait le système proportionnel, en Transylvanie et Bucovine le système majoritaire. Ce système majoritaire détermine la domination d’un seul parti¹⁰ et oblige les hommes politiques à adopter le système proportionnel pour tout le pays à partir de 1926.

La loi électorale de 1926 ne va pas apporter l’égalité politique entre les hommes et les femmes : après 1926 le vote est un droit réservé aux hommes¹¹. Pendant la période 1918-1922 on applique un « système de la

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⁸ Cristian Preda observe que le terme « privé » n’existe pas dans le texte roumain, Preda, Cristian (1998), Modernitatea politică și romanismul, București : Nemira, 160-176.
¹¹ Ibidem, 32.
réforme » qui combine la législation électorale belge qui utilisait le scrutin majoritaire, avec les traditions locales représentées par le scrutin proportionnel. Ce système électoral produit le régionalisme et en 1926 il est remplacé par le « système de la révolution »12 qui s’inspire du modèle mussolinien : la Roumanie empreint de l’Italie la prime électorale qui proclame comme gagnants des scrutins les partis qui obtiennent 40% des voix. La nouvelle loi électorale de 1926 est appliquée jusqu’en 1937 et donne naissance à la « danse électorale » dont parle Matei Dogan13. Carol II met fin à cette danse électorale en 1938, au moment où il dissout le Parlement et met les bases du régime autoritaire.

L’entrée des femmes en politique se produit en 1929 quand une nouvelle loi électorale accorde à certaines catégories de femmes le droit d’élire et d’être élue au niveau communal14. Cette ouverture de la politique vers les femmes se positionne en continuation de l’attitude égalitaire adoptée à l’occasion de l’Assemblée Nationale d’Alba Iulia qui avait décidé que le vote devait être direct, secret et pour les deux sexes15.

12 Preda, Cristian (2002), România postcomunistă și România interbelică, București: Meridiane, 91-112
14 Les femmes qui peuvent élire et être élues doivent remplir une des conditions suivantes : être veuve de guerre, être fonctionnaire au niveau de la commune, du département ou de l’État, être décorée pour les services rendus pendant la guerre, être titulaire d’un diplôme du cours élémentaire professionnel, normal ou secondaire, faire partie du comité de direction d’une association à but social reconnu comme personne juridique.
Les femmes dans l’imaginaire politique : quelques « repères »

Dans la première moitié du XXe siècle en Roumanie, autant qu’en France et Belgique, les femmes représentaient dans l’imaginaire de la citoyenneté la « nation », tandis que les hommes représentaient « l’État ». En vertu de leur appartenance au corps de la nation, les femmes étaient censées de rester à la maison pour élever les enfants et en tant que mères, elles ne bénéficiaient pas des droits politiques. La nation était du genre féminin, et l’État du genre masculin. L’entrée des femmes dans l’État s’est fait au moment de l’octroi des droits politiques partiels pour les femmes.

Une fois entrées dans la politique, les Roumaines se construisent des imaginaires politiques différents, en fonction de leur appartenance à des groupes féministes modérés ou radicaux. Nous identifions deux imaginaires politiques féminins, un imaginaire appartenant à l’Union des Femmes Roumaines (UFR) créée en 1918, un groupe féministe modéré présidé par Maria Baiulescu, et un autre imaginaire appartenant au Groupe National des Femmes Roumaines (GNFR) créé en 1929 et présidé par Alexandrina Cantacuzino. Les féministes marquantes de l’UFR vont adhérer aux Parti National Paysan et au Parti National Libéral après l’obtention des droits politiques partiels en 1929, tandis que les féministes groupées autour d’Alexandrina Cantacuzino vont créer un parti politique féminin qui se propose de collaborer avec les hommes politiques seulement

si les points de vue des féministes seront acceptés\textsuperscript{19}. Si les féministes membres de l’UFR veulent devenir des collaboratrices loyales des partis politiques, les féministes du GNFR veulent se séparer des partis pour garder leur indépendance politique. L’UFR condamne la position du GNFR qui veut rompre la liaison entre les mères, époux, fils ou frères et refuse d’adhérer au Groupe créé par Cantacuzino.


En Belgique l’octroi des droits politiques partiels pour les femmes en 1921 permet la pénétration dans le champ politique, mais cette entrée n’est pas spectaculaire parce que les partis politiques et principalement le Parti Catholique, contribuent à la pétrification de l’imaginaire politique dans lequel les femmes sont les bonnes ménagères. De leur côté, les femmes membres du Parti Catholique, contribuent aussi à la perpétuation de cet imaginaire politique, en considérant que leur place est à la maison. En 1933 Louise van den Plas, la représentante de l’organisation féminine du Parti Catholique, insiste sur l’inégalité fonctionnelle des sexes, parce que l’homme possède «la première place dans l’ordre de l’autorité […] et la femme la première place dans l’ordre du respect»\textsuperscript{21}.

Nous observons la différence entre les actions des féministes roumaines et belges dans les années ’30 : si les Roumaines demandent l’introduction des quotas, les Belges insistent sur la différence entre les femmes et les hommes.

\textsuperscript{19} Grouparea Națională a Femeilor Române. Statut, Tipografia Lupta, București,1929, pp. 3-15. Le texte fait partie de l’anthologie des textes recueillis par Mihăiescu, Ștefania (2002), 
\textsuperscript{20} Cosma, Ghizela (2002), 
\textsuperscript{21} Plas van den, Louise (1933), in 
\textit{Le Féminisme chrétien}, janvier, 2.
Quant à l’évolution des droits politiques des femmes en France, ils sont octroyés en 1944. L’explication pour ce retard consiste dans la place que les Françaises occupent dans l’imaginaire de la citoyenneté : elles ne sont que les mères appelées à éduquer les futures citoyens. Même si pendant la période de l’entre-deux-guerres les féministes adressent des pétitions au Sénat pour la reconnaissance de leurs droits politiques, leurs demandes restent sans réponse. La fin de la Première Guerre Mondiale semble propice pour la demande de ces droits parce que les femmes avaient prouvé leurs capacités à remplacer les hommes partis sur le front. En vertu de cette image du « citoyen-soldat », des États comme la Grande Bretagne accordent les droits politiques aux femmes. Mais ce n’est pas le cas pour France, qui va prolonger ce moment jusqu’après la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale. Une autre explication pour le retard français consiste dans la perspective universaliste « à la française » dont parle Pierre Rosanvallon : on refuse aux femmes les droits politiques à cause de leur spécificité, tandis que l’universalisme « à l’anglaise » accorde les droits politiques aux femmes grâce à cette spécificité. Les féministes françaises essayaient d’échapper à cet imaginaire politique créé par les hommes et où elles remplissent seulement le rôle des mères, en se créant un imaginaire où elles dépassent les limites du foyer pour agir dans l’espace politique : dans le journal La Française par exemple, la féministe Cécile Brunsvig va présenter pendant toute la période de l’entre-deux-guerres les revendications politiques des femmes françaises.

En analysant brièvement l’évolution de la participation des femmes à la vie politique en Roumanie, Belgique et France, nous pouvons conclure sur les spécificités nationales, mais aussi sur les ressemblances qui rapprochent ces pays du point de vue de la place des femmes dans les imaginaires politiques.

23 Marques-Pereira, Bérengère (2003), La citoyenneté politique des femmes, cit., 54-55.
24 Ibidem, 66.
Il est important de mentionner que la Roumanie était vue en Belgique, en 1930, comme le pays le plus avancé du point de vue de la situation politique de la femme, par rapport aux autres pays de l’espace balkanique (la Bulgarie, la Yougoslavie, la Grèce) et même par rapport à la Belgique. La libérale belge Georgette Ciselet note en 1930 qu’en Roumanie « les femmes jouissent des droits politiques importants » et que « le mouvement d’émancipation des femmes roumaines ne s’est point limité à la vie politique, il ébranle l’édifice même du Droit civil […] cette fois encore les femmes furent plus heureuses en Roumanie que chez nous »27. Dans les années ’30 la Roumanie est donc un modèle pour l’émancipation féminine des pays occidentaux.

**Quotas et parité : des nouveaux modèles électoraux pour la Roumanie ?**

Le débat actuel sur l’introduction du vote uninominal n’a pas pris en compte l’impact d’un tel type de vote sur la représentation politique des femmes. Le système électoral adopté peut avantager ou désavantager les femmes candidates. Comme observe Garcia Munoz, Carrey ou Rule, dans les pays où on applique le système proportionnel le nombre des mandats qui reviennent aux femmes est plus grand que dans les pays où on applique le système majoritaire28. Petra Meier analyse l’impact des systèmes électoraux sur les rapports de genre et constate qu’en 1999 19,8% des membres des Parlements nationaux dans 53 pays étaient des femmes où on appliquait le système proportionnel, 15,1% où on appliquait les systèmes mixtes ou semi proportionnels, tandis quand dans les pays où on appliquait le système majoritaires, seulement 10,8% étaient des femmes29.

27 *Ibidem*, 146.
29 *Idem*. 
Le système proportionnel est un garant de la promotion des femmes en politique et une éventuelle introduction d’un système majoritaire peut produire un déséquilibre dans la représentation politique des hommes et des femmes. En Roumanie le système proportionnel a garanti la représentation des femmes en Parlement, le nombre des femmes s’est triplé en 2000 par rapport à 199230. Après les élections de 2004 ce pourcentage s’élève à 11,4% pour la Chambre des Députés, ce qui place la Roumanie sur la 25-ème place dans le classement des pays de l’Union Européenne31. La France occupe la 24-ème place, même si on y applique la parité : après les élections de 2002 les femmes représentent 13% de l’Assemblée Nationale. Quant à la Belgique, elle occupe la 5-ème place : après les élections de 2003 pour la Chambre les femmes représentent 35,33%.

Petra Meier observe que le scrutin de liste dans le système proportionnel assure l’égalité entre les sexes et l’auteur donne aussi quelques explications : dans les systèmes proportionnels on peut proposer plusieurs candidats et il y a donc la possibilité de proposer de nouveaux candidats32. De l’autre côté, dans un système proportionnel, plusieurs candidats représentent diverses sections de la société, tandis que dans le système majoritaire il y a un seul candidat qui doit représenter toute la société. Ce candidat unique est presque toujours un homme. Un autre élément qui différencie le système proportionnel et le système majoritaire est « l’effet de contamination », ce qui présume qu’un parti qui propose des femmes candidates va être imité par les autres partis, chose qui ne passe rarement dans le système majoritaire. Un dernier élément identifié par Petra Meier est la centralisation des procédures de sélection des candidats dans les systèmes proportionnels, ce qui facilite la défense des intérêts qui dépassent la circonscription individuelle33. La conclusion est que les femmes candidates sont plus avantagées dans les systèmes proportionnels que dans les systèmes majoritaires. Pour assurer l’égalité de genre en Roumanie on pourrait maintenir le système proportionnel.

30 Ghebrea, Georgeta; Tătărăm, Marina Elena; Crețoiu, Ioana (2005), Politici de gen în România. Două studii de caz, București: Nemira, 21.
33 Idem.
Mais il y a la possibilité de choisir d’autres modèles électoraux, comme la parité ou les quotas. La présentation de ces deux possibilités électORALES va nous montrer leurs limites et défauts.

On va commencer avec le cas français : la loi de la parité a été promulguée en 2000 et elle oblige les partis à présenter des listes dans lesquelles les femmes représentent 50% du nombre des candidats, les partis qui ne respectent pas cette condition étant amendés. L’application stricte de la loi sur la parité a conduit à des résultats favorables pour les femmes : après les élections locales de 2001, elles représentent 47,5% dans les conseils locaux, après les élections régionales de 2004, elles sont en nombre de 47,6% et après les élections pour le Parlement européen de 2004, elles représentent 43,6% des élus34. En ce qui concerne les élections où la parité n’a pas été appliquée, les résultats sont négatifs pour les femmes. Janine Mossuz-Lavau observe que le plus grand problème reste les élections pour l’Assemblée Nationale : même si en 2002 la loi sur la parité était en vigueur, les femmes élues vont représenter 12,3%35 : les grands partis comme l’UMP et le Parti Socialiste, ont préféré recevoir des amendes au lieu de respecter la loi sur la parité. On doit observer en même temps que là où on applique le système majoritaire (le cas des élections pour le Sénat français), le nombre des femmes a été le même après les élections de 2002 : deux femmes sénateurs. On peut dire que la loi sur la parité peut assurer la promotion des femmes en politique, à condition que cette loi ait un effet contraignant sur les partis, et pas seulement un effet incitatif, comme ce fut le cas aux élections législatives de 2002. Une autre conclusion est que l’application du système majoritaire produit « la pétrification » de la représentation des femmes en politique.

En Belgique la loi sur les quotas est votée en 2002 et appliquée à l’occasion des élections de 2003 et 2004. Cette loi prévoit un nombre égal d’hommes et de femmes sur les listes et des candidats de sexe différent pour les trois premières places. La voie vers l’égalité de genre dans la politique belge est ouverte par la loi Smet-Tobback de 1994 qui imposait 2/3

34 Mossuz-Lavau, Janine (2005), „Genre et science politique en France“, in Marques-Pereira, Bérégère; Meier, Petra (eds), Genre et politique en Belgique et en francophonie, Louvain-La-Neuve: Academia Bruylant, 134.
candidats du même sexe. A partir de 2003 on applique les nouvelles quotas qui prévoient qu’une femme doit occuper la troisième place sur une liste : aux élections législatives de 2003 les partis on fait plus que respecter cette loi : 63% des listes présentaient des femmes candidates pour les deux premières places et seulement 31% des listes avaient une candidate sur la troisième place.\footnote{Meier, Petra (2005), « Le système électoral belge et les rapports de genre », cit., 31.}

Petra Meier considère que l’impact des quotas sur la représentation des femmes dans la politique belge a été grand : lors des élections de 2003 et 2004 le nombre des femmes élues a augmenté pour les différentes assemblées. Meier constate que si le nombre des places éligibles sur les listes est réduit, les hommes sont plus avantagés que les femmes. Quand un seul candidat a été élu sur une liste en 2004, dans 84% des cas c’était un homme, quand les deux premiers candidats ont été élus, dans 44% des cas c’étaient un homme et une femme et jamais deux femmes, et quand les trois premiers candidats ont été élus, dans 71% des cas c’étaient une seule femme parmi eux.\footnote{Ibidem, 32.} Meier considère que les places éligibles sur les listes doivent être plus de six pour que le nombre des femmes élues augmente.

**Le système électoral : quel influence sur l’imaginaire politique ?**

Au début de notre étude on précisait que les femmes représentaient « la nation » dans l’imaginaire politique des hommes : elle était censée à s’occuper des tâches ménagères, à être la mère et l’épouses parfaites. La question qu’on se pose est si le système électoral, les lois sur les quotas ou la parité peuvent changer la perception de la femme. La brève analyse sur les résultats de l’application de la parité en France a prouvé que les femmes ne sont pas arrivées à représenter 50% dans les conseils municipaux, régionaux ou dans l’Assemblée Nationale. La conclusion serait qu’on a besoin de plus d’une loi électorale pour assurer l’égalité de genre en politique. Le premier pas serait le changement des mentalités. En Suède, où on applique le système proportionnel, les femmes représentent 52,15% du Parlement et avec ce pourcentage la Suède occupe la première place dans le...
classement des pays de l’UE en ce qui concerne le nombre des femmes parlementaires. Il n’est pas nécessaire d’appliquer la parité pour que les femmes arrivent à représenter 50% du Parlement. En Suède la parité a été même dépassée et l’explication consiste dans la tradition de regarder la femme comme l’égale de l’homme dans la politique : la Suède a accordé les droits politiques aux femmes en 1919, en Roumanie et en France les droits politiques complets ont été octroyé en 1944 et en Belgique en 1948\textsuperscript{38}.

Les citoyens des pays de l’Europe du Nord sont habitués à voir en femmes une « professionnelle » de la politique et les hommes politiques n’ont pas besoin de la parité pour promouvoir les femmes. Dans l’imaginaire politique des hommes du Nord les femmes ne représentent pas seulement la nation, mais elles font partie aussi de l’État. Même si on applique le système proportionnel, les femmes réussissent à représenter plus de la moitié du Parlement suédois. La conclusion est qu’on pourrait maintenir le système proportionnel en Roumanie et avoir les femmes en nombre égal avec les hommes dans les assemblées législatives, mais la condition est « l’ouverture » des mentalités vers la participation accrue des femmes en politique\textsuperscript{39}.

Parce qu’en Roumanie la tradition de l’égalité de genre en politique n’existe pas, les mesures électorales comme la parité ou les quotas sont nécessaires pour assurer la représentation égale des femmes et des hommes en Parlement. Le premier pas est « l’introduction des quotas de représentation et d’autres mesures de discrimination positive […] premièrement au niveau bas - par exemple une quotas de 30% pour le Parlement et les conseils locaux, avant de passer au système paritaire »\textsuperscript{40}.


\textsuperscript{39} Ghebrea, Georgeta; Tătărăm, Marina Elena; Crețoiu, Ioana (2005), \textit{Politici de gen în România. Două studii de caz}, cit., 89.

\textsuperscript{40} Ibidem, 90.
En guise de conclusion

La parité et les quotas peuvent constituer des solutions pour assurer l'égalité de genre dans la politique roumaine. Mais pour arriver à l'adoption des ces mesures électorales la population doit voir dans les femmes des « politiques » avant de voir en elles des mères et des épouses. Conformément au Baromètre de l’Opinion publique d’octobre 2005, réalisé par Gallup, une moitié de la population roumaine considère que les hommes sont des leaders politiques meilleurs que les femmes et 40% des femmes ont la même opinion, tandis que 31% des Roumains considèrent qu’une épouse qui ne travaille pas est accomplie dans la même mesure qu’une épouse qui travaille41. Dans ces conditions où les mentalités restent figées, il est difficile d’envisager momentanément un débat public sur les quotas et la parité.

ANSICHTSPUNKTE IN DIE REGIONALENTWICKLUNG

Radu Barna

Abstract
In this paper I have done an analysis of the regional development under multiple aspects: economical, political, social, cultural etc. I have chosen not to limit myself to one of this aspects, first because of the novelty of this topic in Romania, and second, because I was convinced, and it is one of the points I want to demonstrate, that the development of only one of these domains is not sufficient in terms of an efficient use of the regional resources, and also not optimal in terms of satisfaction of an evolved population like the European one. It is the reason why this paper has an interdisciplinary approach, linked to the numerous aspects of the regional development in Europe.


Die regionale Entwicklung ist Teil der umfangreicheren Studien über die europäische Integration, die eine wichtigere Rolle hat „auch weil diese, sich als Territorialstudien zwischen den Prioritäten der geschichtlichen, politischen oder internationalen Beziehungen positionieren und bringen in erster Reihe die Notwendigkeit der interdisziplinären Studien“ . Auf Grund dessen trägt sich das vorgeschlagene Thema, neben Anderen des rumänischen

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akademischen Bildes in eine breite Reihe von Interessen ein, die auch auf europäischem Niveau von grosser Bedeutung sind.


Im letzten Jahrhundert hat Europa einige Umwandlungen durchgemacht, die die Wirtschaft, Politik und Gesellschaft im Ganzen beeinflusst hat. Einige dieser Umwandlungen drückten sich auf territorialem Niveau aus, durch Integrations-, andere durch Dezentralisations- und andere durch Desintegrationstendenzen. All diese Transformationen sind durch die Steigerung der Bedeutung der Regionen Europas hervorgehoben. N. Paun erklärt das steigende Interesse durch die Relevanz der regionalen Faktoren, die die Entwicklung beeinflussen, und gleichzeitig das Konzept des europäischen Raumes modellieren. Doch die Vielfalt und die Dezentralisierung waren von Anfang an Komponente des europäischen Aufbaus: „In Europa, ein Prinzip, eine Klasse oder eine Gruppe hatte nie gänzlich dominiert. Die Freiheit und der Pluralismus waren immer Charakteristikas seiner Spiritualität“.

Die regionale Entwicklung hatte an Bedeutung gewonnen, dadurch, dass die Region die Elemente für die Zukunft und Demokratie vorstellt. Was wir in unserer Arbeit in Betracht ziehen werden, ist, dass die regionale Entwicklung ohne die Vertiefung der Demokratie nicht möglich sei. Eine echte Demokratie erlaubt das kollektive Lernen, die das Sozialkapital erweitert und auch die Entwicklung lokaler Ressourcen zulässt. Das kollektive Interesse ist ein sozialer Konstrukt, der nur von den ganzen

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Mitglieder einer Gesellschaft zusammen realisiert werden kann. Daher werden die Kultur und die gemeinsamen Normen prioritäre Gebiete für die regionalen Investitionen sein.


**Definitionen und Eingrenzung der Begriffe**


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8 A. Bailly et al., *op. cit.*, p. 142.
werden können. Diese historische Perspektive hat das Konzept der „Kulturelle Regionen“ gegründet. Das Konzept wurde von C. Saurer definiert als „eine kulturelle Verbreitungfläche auf dessen Grundlage sich die territorialen Solidaritäten entwickeln“.


13 H. Nonn *op. cit.,* T. Wiedmann, *op.cit.,* P. Schmitt-Egner, *op. cit.,* etc.
Die Regionen in der Europäischen Union

In der EU zeigen die Mitgliedsstaaten eine breite Palette ihrer Territorialstrukturen auf. Das gilt auch für die Regionalformen als auch für die Einteilung der Kompetenzen auf verschiedenen Autoritätsniveaus. Diese Situation existiert aufgrund „der Vielfalt lokaler und regionaler Regierungen, die sich auf der Basis von nationalen Eigenschaften und aufgrund der politischen Interaktionen auf nationalem und regionalem Niveau entwickelt haben“\(^{14}\). Um diese Situation verbessern zu können, verlangt die Charta der Regionalisierung\(^{15}\) die politische Institutionalisierung dieser Regionen, mit dem Einverständnis der Bevölkerung\(^{16}\). Aufgrund dessen müssten die Regionen ihre eigenen Institutionen mit eigenen Kompetenzen aufbauen um dadurch an den Entscheidungsprozessen der Staaten und der EU teilnehmen zu können\(^{17}\). Die Funktionen, die Macht und die institutionelle Struktur kann von Region zu Region sehr unterschiedlich sein. „Der höchste Status einer Region wäre die konstitutionelle Anerkennung als Einheit in einem Föderalstaat“\(^{18}\). Diese Anerkennung schliesst das Recht zur Existenz ein, was bedeutet das Recht eigenständige Grenzen zu haben, außerdem noch das Recht zur Legislative und zur administrativen Autonomie und das Recht an den Staatsentscheidungen teilzunehmen\(^{19}\).

Die europäischen Institutionen weisen eine wichtige Rolle für die harmonische Regionalentwicklung auf, wovon auch die finanziellen Massnahmen für die Strukturpolitik wichtig sind. Um die Pläne für die


\(^{16}\) Ibidem, Titel 5, paragraf 23.

\(^{17}\) Ibidem.


\(^{19}\) Ibidem.
regionale Hilfe durchzuführen, hatte die EU die NUTS regionen abgegrenzt\textsuperscript{20}.

**Regionalismus**

Der Regionalismus existiert wenn der Aktionsraum von den regionalen Akteuren selbst gebildet wird. Als Ziel dieser Bildung sind nach P. Schmitt-Egner die Erfüllung eines Regionalplans und die Konstruktion eines kollektiven Akteurs genannt\textsuperscript{21}. Der Regionalismus bedeutet im Allgemein die Dezentralisierung der politischen Macht und der Transfer von Kompetenzen zu einem niedrigerem Niveau. Man muss aber zwischen top-down und bottom-up Regionalismus unterscheiden. Der erste Begriff beschreibt die Dezentralisierung einiger Kompetenzen oder die Gründung von Institutionen der vom Staat hervorgeht, während man mit dem zweiten Begriff die Anträge, die von Innen der Region kommen, meint. H. G. Wehling bemerkte, dass das Konzept „Regionalismus“ ursprünglich von den Technokraten ausging, die einen neuen Weg zur Effizienz bereits untersucht haben\textsuperscript{22}. Man kann diese Idee auch in der EU finden, da hier der Regionalismus eher als ein politischen und wirtschaftlichen Zusammenhang gesehen wird und weniger als eine Bewegung in Richtung mehr Autonomie\textsuperscript{23}. Der Regionalismus wird durch seine Funktion auch als eine Form der staatlichen Organisation definiert.

**Dezentralisierung und Regionalisierung**

„Die Dezentralisierung existiert dann wenn einige Aufgaben des Staates von Agenten ausserhalb der zentralen Regierung verwirklicht werden“\textsuperscript{24}. Durch die Dezentralisierung steigt die Möglichkeit der Bürger an den Entscheidungsprozessen teilzunehmen. In den siebzig Jahren haben die

\textsuperscript{20} The Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics http://europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat/ramon/nuts/introduction_regions_de.html
\textsuperscript{21} P. Schmitt-Egner, op. cit., p. 136.
\textsuperscript{23} T. Wiedmann, op. cit., p. 76.
westlichen Staaten mit diesem Prozess angefangen und somit ein Teil der Verantwortungen auf niedrigerem Niveau verschoben.

Die Devolution bedeutet eben so wie die Dezentralisierung ein Transfer von einigen Kompetenzen, doch aufgrund von quantitativen Unterschieden kann man sie nicht als gleich definieren. Die Devolution kann in einen Zentralstaat existieren und bezieht sich in dem Fall nicht auf einem Transfer von Souveranität. Die Mächte und die Kompetenzen können jederzeit von der Zentralmacht zurückgezogen werden.


I. Subsidiarität und Föderalismus

Die Konstruktion des Nationalstaates hängt von der Struktur des Staates ab, die sich im Laufe der Geschichte entwickelt hat. Auf Grund des historischen Erbes und der traditionellen Territorialorganisation sind die Regionalkompetenzen variabel. Obwohl, sich in der letzten Periode die Entwicklung dieser Kompetenzen überall in Europa im Rahmen des Regionalisierungsprozesses klassifizieren lässt. Der Vergleich der europäischen Staaten zeigt eine breite Palette von Regionen auf, deren

27 Ibidem.
juristischer Statut sehr unterschiedlich sein kann. Die Folgen dieses Aspekts sind die ungleichen Kompetenzen, über die die Regionen verfügen.


Der Föderalismus und die Subsidiarität sind zu den meist besprochenen Konzepte im Bereich der europäischen Integrationspolitik geworden. Einerseits, werden sie als Gegensatz zum Staatszentralismus verwendet, andererseits, werden sie als eine neue Möglichkeit der Stärkung der EU gesehen. Hinter diesen Begriffen versteckt sich die organisatorische Einteilung der Kompetenzen und der Autonomie zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten, sowie die Wiederspiegelung der internen Struktur der Staaten.

**Die Region, vom Territorium zum Entwicklungsraum**

Das Territorium war schon immer ein grundlegendes Element für das soziale, politische sowie für das wirtschaftliche Leben30. Das Territorium ist nicht nur für die Entwicklung der Kultur, für das Stimulieren von Innovationen und Bildung wichtig, sondern es stellt die Basis für die individuelle Identität und einer kollektiven Repräsentation dar31.

Im Allgemeinen, waren die Regionalentwicklungspolitiken der 50-60er Jahre zentralisiert und galten als Bestandteil der Nationalpolitiken und auch als Teil der Konsolidierungsmechanismen des Nationalstaates. Ihr Ziel war die harmonische Entwicklung verschiedener Regionen im Rahmen des Nationalstaates. In dieser Periode hat die soziale Fairness an

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31 *Ibidem*. 

Bedeutung gewonnen. Diese Regionalismusform förderte die Aktivitäten in den unterentwickelten Regionen und orientierte die Investitionen in die angemessene Richtung.

Mit der Zeit wurden die Regionalpolitiken komplexer und somit wurde die Kooperation mit den lokalen Partner immer notwendiger. In die 70er Jahren wurde die Industrialisierung als Mittel der Entwicklung wegen einiger territorialen Probleme, die sich herausstellten, kritisiert. Die Dezentralisierung wurde als eine Möglichkeit für eine steigende Effizienz und eine sinkende soziale Verantwortung der Zentralregierung gesehen. Das Territorium hat seit den 80er Jahren aufgrund des funktionalistischen Drucks eine neue wirtschaftliche und soziale Bedeutung bekommen, dass als Folge den Verlust der Entwicklungskompetenzen des Staates mit sich zog.

In einer einfachen Analyse des wirtschaftlichen Prozesses sind die Produktionsfaktoren die Arbeit, das Kapital und die Humanressourcen. Je grösser die Qualität, desto höher die Produktion. Im Vergleich zu den klassischen Theorien ist in unserer Zeit die Art und Weise ihrer Benutzung ein wichtiger Faktor. Die optimale Verwendung dieser Faktoren hat neue Theorien der Regionalentwicklung geschaffen, die den Akzent auf die Innovationskapazitäten legen, und die auf die Spezialisierung der Basisfunktionen der Produktion orientiert sind. Die Entwicklungschancen der Regionen hängen daher von den Kooperationskapazitäten der regionalen Akteure und deren Bildung ab. H. Bratl und M. Trippl behaupten „die Region soll global werden“.

Die Koordinierungskapazität verschiedener Akteure ist eine Entwicklungssource, die die territoriale Konfiguration des Sozialkapitals gestaltet. Die Funktionalität der Märkte und Institutionen ist durch das Sozialkapital verbessert worden. Die Vertragskosten werden geringer, das Vertrauen grösser und die Kooperation verstärkt. Das Sozialkapital gewinnt seine Quellen aus der Entwicklung von Sozialinteraktionsnetzwerken und aus wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen. M. Zürn und N. Lange bemerken, dass die Regionen, sowie die Nationalstaaten, dem sozio-demographischen Druck unterworfen sind. Das ist ein Grund dafür, dass die Regionen auch ausserhalb Netzwerke

33 *Ibidem*. 
benötigen\textsuperscript{34}. Die Regionalisierung kann daher die Wohlfahrt sichern, doch dies geschieht nur unter bestimmten Konditionen.

M. Keating zeigt, dass das Territorium auf mehreren Wegen das politische Leben strukturieren kann. Erstens, liefert die Region ein Wertesystem, das in das Territorium verankert ist\textsuperscript{35}. Zweitens, vervielfältigt das Territorium diese Werte. Drittens, gliedert das Territorium neue Elemente ein und restrukturiert das Wertesystem. Am Ende, definiert das Territorium die Grenzen zwischen den öffentlichen und privaten Gebiete, die die Macht konditionieren. In diesem Kontext profiliert sich eine Reterritorialisierung der Politik und das Auftauchen von neuen politischen Räumen.

Die Effizienz der institutionellen Struktur repräsentiert ebenso einen sehr wichtigen Faktor der Regionalentwicklung. Der institutionelle Rahmen der Regionen, der aus der öffentlichen Verwaltung und dem Sozialkapital zusammengesetzt ist, repräsentieren den institutionellen Rahmen der Entwicklungspolitiken.

Das steigende Interesse für Tradition und Sprache in den Regionen führen auf eine sinkende Identifikation zurück. „Die Leute möchten wissen woher sie kommen und wohin sie gehen. Sie suchen Identitäten die Sicherheit bringen und die sich nicht mit der Mode und der Zeit verändern“\textsuperscript{36}. Die regionale Identität ist ebenso eine Ressource für Wirtschaft und Politik, da sie neue Aktionsräume für Leute, Firmen und Organisationen schafft. Die Vergangenheit ist ein wichtiger Punkt für die regionale Kultur. Die nationale Kultur, die in den letzten Jahrhunderte als beherrschende und vorgesetzte Kultur promoviert wurde, lässt heute Platz für die lokale und regionale Kultur. Der europäische Integrationsprozess führte dazu, dass die Regionen Europas auf dem freien Markt im Wettbewerb gebracht wurden. Die Regionalkultur müsste sich aufdrängen um überleben zu können\textsuperscript{37}. Die Gewinner dieses Wettbewerbes bauen oft Kulturzentren auf, die auch als Wirtschaftszentren funktionieren. Diese unterstützen sich


\textsuperscript{36} Ibidem, p. 20.

\textsuperscript{37} Ibidem.

**Die Region, Raum für wirtschaftliche Entwicklung**


Es ist bekannt, dass das Entwicklungspotential eines Landes je nach Region variieren kann. Die Unterschiede zeigen sich meist an dem Lebensstandard und durch die technischen, humanen und natürlichen Ressourcen. Von diesen Elementen hängt die Art und Weise der Entwicklung ab. In der Literatur der Regionalwissenschaft finden wir mehrere Theorien, die die Art und Weise einer Entwicklung erklären. Diese könnte durch endogene oder exogene Einwirkungen beeinflusst werden. Im Bereich der Entwicklung, und besonders in der Regionalentwicklung gibt es keine allgemeine gültige Theorie, die die Wirtschaftsprozesse erklären könnten. Um die Regionalentwicklung erklären zu können, 

nicht informellen unterentwickelten politischem basiert einzige

benötigt man die Anwendung mehrere Theorien, die aber meist widersprüchlich sind45.

Die Theorien der exogenen Entwicklung


Die endogene Entwicklungstheorie

Für die endogene Entwicklungstheorie gilt der Raum als ein Element, welches die Summe seiner Komponente übersteigt, diese wären: die gemeinsamen Werte, die Möglichkeiten der Interaktion erschaffen den Effekt der Synergie, humane Ressourcen, etc. Die endogene Dynamik schafft eine integrierte Entwicklung, damit ist die lokale Kontrolle über die Wirtschaft gemeint, die im kulturellen, technischem, sozialen und politischem Leben integriert sind. Dieser Entwicklungstypus basiert sich nicht auf die grossen Konzerne, sondern auf die Kleinen und sogar auf den informellen Sektor.

„New Economic Geography“

Die Begriffe „New economic geography“ (NEG) wurde in der spezialisierten Literatur von P. Krugman eingeführt, der eine einfachere Erklärung für die Verbreitung der wirtschaftlichen Aktivitäten im Raum

45 R. Scharff, Regionalpolitik und regionale Entwicklungspotentiale, Ed. Lang, Frankfurt am Main, 1993, p. 76.
und die Agglomerationsphänomene wünschte. “Das Hauptobjektio des NEG ist die Erklärung für die Entstehung einer breiten Palette von wirtschaftlichen Ballungsräumen in einem geographischen Raum”44.

**Die Regulationstheorie**


**Die Region als “kommerzielles Produkt”**


Die Beziehung zwischen den verschiedenen regionalen Akteuren und Netzwerken sind konstitutive Elemente der Umwandlung der Region

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in einem Aktionsraum, ebenso gelten sie als Faktoren der Mobilisierung des endogenen Potenzials. Durch die Setzung unserer Analyse in einer historischen Perspektive schaffen wir es die teoretischen Transformationen in einem langen Zeitraum wahrzunehmen und zu beweisen, dass unsere praktische Anwendungen auf die folgenden Entwicklungstheorien zurückgehen:

- die Förderung von Industrieparks;
- die Umorientierung zur Ausfuhr von Produkten mit großem Mehrwert;
- die Schaffung von Zentren;
- Entwicklungsimpulse für Wachstumspole geben;
- Die Transfervereinfachung vom Pol zur Peripherie.

Das Verstehen der Konditionen, in welchem das endogene Wachstum realisiert werden kann, hat uns erlaubt diese Qualitäten für die regionalen Akteure zu gewährleisten und die Möglichkeit geboten optimal an dem Regionalplan teilnehmen zu können. Zwischen all diesen Konditionen empfinden wir die Autonomie (finanzielle, politische, kulturelle etc.) als sehr wichtig.

**Vom “Europa der Nationen” zum “Europa der Regionen”**

Die Regionalisierung des europäischen Raumes kann als eine Herausbildung eines “Europas der Regionen” gesehen werden. Unter das Europa der Regionen versteht man hauptsächlich die institutionellen Bindungen in Europa sowie das Entscheidungsprozess der Europäischen Union, die als Folge die Reformen der Strukturpolitiken und das Statut gewisser Organisationen hatten.

Obwohl sich die regionale Aktivität auf der europäischen Bühne in den letzten Jahren verstärkt hat, existierten die Regionen schon seit Jahrzehnten als mehr oder weniger unabhängige Akteure. Dank ihrer starken Aktivität der letzten Periode konnten die Regionen ihren Standpunkt deutlicher machen, und sich als aktive Kräfte in die europäische Integration einbinden. “Im europäischen Kontext ist die Aktivität
der Regionen als politische Akteure variabel und unter dem Konzept des Europa der Regionen definiert“47.


Am Ende der 70er Jahren fängt die territoriale Differenzierung der nationalen Räume an. So wurde den Regionen eine neue Möglichkeit der Partizipation am öffentlichen Leben geboten und eine neue Perspektive zur

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50 Es handelt sich um Regionen die legislative Kompetenzen haben.
europäische Integration geöffnet. R. Hrbek zeigt uns, dass das Konzept “Europa der Regionen” aus drei Richtungen gesehen werden kann:
- die Ersetzung der Staaten durch die Regionen in dem Prozess des europäischen Aufbaus;
- die regionale Kooperation;
- Die Kreation eines dreistufigen Entscheidungsprozesses.

Die Representation der Regionen: ein Traum oder Altraum?

Die europäische Integration und der Regionalismus repräsentieren Kräfte, die eine neue politische Arena kriieren. Die regionalen Interessen haben so die Oportunität gehabt neue Influenzkanäle zu schaffen, während die EU für die Verfolgung seiner Objekte die Regionen genutzt hat. In dieser neuen politischen Arena sind die Regionen wahre Akteure geworden, die den regionalen Aktionsplan zu verwirklichen versuchen.

Vertretung durch die Staaten:
Der Professor R. Meyers von der Westphälischen-Wilhelms- Universität Münster behauptet, dass die wichtigsten Kanäle die nationalen Regierungen sind, durch die die Regionen an den europäischen Entscheidungen teilnehmen können. Auf diese Weise, je besser das Regionalinteresse in dem nationalen Entscheidungssystem integriert ist, desto besser können sie in Brüssel berücksichtigt werden.

Lobbying die EU Institutionen:
Die grüne Charta der EU Kommission bezeichnet die Lobbyaktivitäten als “alle Aktivitäten, die die Ausarbeitung von Entscheidungen und den Entscheidungsprozess zu beeinflussen weiterverfolgen”. Die Regionalbüros in Brüssel besorgen Informationen von und in Richtung der Regionen. Sie besitzen keinen offiziellen Statut, aber die EU erkennt sie als

52 Ein privates Gespräch mit Prof. Dr. Dr. h. c. Reinhard Meyers, mit der Gelegenheit meines Forschungsaufenthaltes an der Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster.

Der Ausschuss der Regionen und andere institutionelle Wege der regionalen Vertretung:

Die regionale Ebene wird in Zukunft eine wichtigere Rolle spielen, da die lokalen Verwaltungen sich als EU Akteure auf der lokalen Ebene zu behaupten versuchen. Daher haben die Regionen transnationale Organisationen gegründet, die die gemeinsamen Interessen der Regionen repräsentieren. Einige der wichtigsten Organisationen sind:

- Council of European Municipalities and Regions
- Assembly of European Regions
- The Congress Local and Regional Authorities
- Der Ausschuss der Regionen

Regionale Disparitäten in Europa

Die EU ist global gesehen einer der reichsten Regionen der Welt. Trotz allem, besitzen die Regionen Europas nicht das selbe wirtschaftliche, soziale und politische Entwicklungs niveau und auch nicht die selben Wettbewerbsfähigkeiten. Wenn man die neuen zehn Mitglieder und zusätzlich Bulgarien und Rumänien mit einbezieht, sind die Disparitäten grösser. So wird die Attraktivität einiger Länder verstärkt, jedoch anderer Länder aufgrund des Transfers zugunsten ärmerer Länder geschwächt.
Die europäische Regionalpolitik


Die europäische Regionalpolitik hat als Ziel die Verstärkung der wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Kohäsion und die direkte Förderung des endogenen Potentials der unterentwickelten Regionen. Die EU Regionalpolitik verfolgt durch die Strukturfonds die Modernisierung der Struktur der Regionen, entsprechend der Kriterien der Lissaboner Strategie.

Entwicklung durch die regionale Kooperation


Im Globalisierungskontext erscheinen die Euroregionen als optimale Formen für eine effiziente Implementierung einiger europäischer Politiken. Die Euroregionen sind legitime Partner der EU Kommission geworden.

Europa hat die Möglichkeit durch die Verteilung der Kompetenzen leistungsfähiger zu werden. Die Regionen sollen ihren richtigen Platz in der neuen Architektur Europas finden was auch die Berücksichtigung der


**Schlussfolgerung**


Die Faktoren (regionale, nationale, europäische und globale), die die Regionalentwicklung beeinflussen, wurden in unserem Studium hervorgehoben. Dabei erkannten wir, dass der Entwicklungsrahmen mehr oder weniger auch aufgedrängt sein kann. Die Ausgangspunkte wären die Investitionen in das Human- und Materialkapital oder Innovationen durch Forschung. Ein weiterer wichtiger Punkt ist die Art und Weise der Organisierung und Koordinierung der wirtschaftlichen Akteure. Neben relevanten Informationen ist es wichtig und nötig, dass die Institutionen korrekte und effiziente Dienstbringer sind. Wenn die organisatorische Wissenschaft sich in einem lehrenden Prozess befindet, sind die Regionen auf einem guten Weg zur wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Entwicklung.

In den 70-80er Jahren klingen die Möglichkeiten der Realisierung eines “Europa der Regionen” ab, das obwohl die Globalisierung die territoriale Mobilisierung verstärkt und wie P. Le Gales und C. Lequesne

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erwähnen eigentlich eine Verstärkung des regionalen politischen Prozesses bedeuten sollte⁶⁰.


Durch den Transfer der Kompetenzen zugunsten der Regionen, verringerte der Staat seine Ausschlagsrolle. Das geschah aber auch, da dieser nicht genug Ressourcen zur Verfügung hatte. In diesem Kontext bemerkt man, dass die Dezentralisierung zur Optimierung führt, da die wirtschaftliche Effizienz die Ressourcen für die sozialen Massnahmen sichert. Ein Argument dies bezüglich sind die europäischen Strukturfonds,


Der Nationalstaat hat seine Zentralposition in vielen Bereichen verloren, aber nicht seine Relevanz. Unser Studium hat dieses Aspekt berücksichtigt. Die Transformation der europäischen Staaten und ihre institutionelle Vielfalt sind definitorische Elemente des europäischen

62 N. Päun et al., op. cit., p. 174.
64 Ibidem.
65 P. Le Gales, C. Lequesne, op. cit., p. 264.
Aufbau. Auch für die Regionalentwicklung spielt die Globalisierung und die wirtschaftliche Reorganisation eine wichtige Rolle.


WOMEN’S MIGRATION FROM AN EASTERN EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE. THE CASE OF ROMANIAN WOMEN MIGRANTS IN NORTHERN (THE NETHERLANDS, DENMARK), AND SOUTHERN COUNTRIES (GREECE, SPAIN)

Maria Birsan with Romana Cramarenco
Wilfred Campbell with Monica Savulescu-Voudouri∗

Abstract
Our paper has started from what the statistics clearly show – the high share of women migrants in the total number of migrants. The phenomenon is often call “feminisation” of migration, suggesting that it is a new tendency. It is accepted that this phenomenon is not a new one, but the researches started to focus on this issue only in the 80’s and have become a widespread topic in the more recent years. The interest for women migration is high not only because of the size and share in the international migration flow, but also because of its specificity concerning migration reasons, strategies, and impact on women’s professional and personal life. Romanian migration, which is one of the most important among the Eastern European countries, also registers a high share of women in the total flow. Based on empirical micro research, our paper presents the main typologies of Romanian women migrants in two Northern countries (Denmark and the Netherlands) and in two Southern countries (Spain and Greece).

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Introduction

All statistics on the women migration issue refer to about 50% share of women migrants in total international migration\(^1\). It obviously places the women migration flow on equal footing with men’s migration flow. This also explains the specific vocabulary that refers to “female”, “women” or “feminine” migration, and to “feminisation of migration”\(^2\).

As far as the so-called “feminisation” of migration is concerned, it is not a recent phenomenon, and we agree with Jolly and Reeves\(^3\) that one cannot consider it as a new tendency. However, the most quoted migration studies\(^4\) have explained the general context of migrant flows only, without special reference to gender features dimension. Explanations for the lack of gender approach, as provided by various studies, refer mainly to the fact that, statistics had not been classified by

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\(^3\) Jolly and Reeves (2005) - Gender and Migration”, Bridge Foundation [http://www.bridge.ids.ac.uk/reports/CEP-Mig-OR.pdf];

gender from the very beginning. They also refer to the fact that the migration of women was perceived only as refugees’ flow (forced migration) or as a “shadow” flow of the men’s one, migrating for family reunification (voluntary, but not always). Another explanation was given because women were perceived only as dependant on men, and not as active participants on the labour market and as decision maker and “breadwinner” in the family.

In reality, there were estimations of migration flows by sex starting with 1960, but the women migration was either ignored or considered not important to be approached distinctly. Therefore, the approach consisted of “adding” women to the analysis and not of using an integrated gender approach.

The interest for women migration has gradually increased, many researches are conducted on various aspects concerning specificity of migration flows or of migrant women, and specialised publications are oriented on this issue.

Several developments were identified concerning the evolution in women migration studies.

In the early 90’s, only a few researches included women migration issue into their field of interest, and they also referred to a few and rather limited aspects, such as the changes in women’s behaviour as resulted from modernisation. The situation has changed during the last decade,


and researches on migration have started to focus on women migration issue *per se*.

Firstly, this happened because the impressive flow of women migration could not be ignored any more. Therefore, the women migration flow started to be registered distinctly, and the high share of this flow in total migration flow became obvious.

Secondly, more researchers became aware of particularities of women migration concerning reasons, strategies, ways of migration, behaviour, types of employment, the role undertaken by women as migrants, and of the outcomes resulting from it.

Thirdly, international migration has started to be seen as a global issue (United Nations set up a Global Commission on International Migration in Dec. 2003), and statistics and research papers, including the ones on women migration issue, are published under GICM umbrella.

All the above mentioned favoured the development of researches on women migration. Still, we might notice how the women migration studies overstressed the women particularities, ignoring, more or less, the approach based on comparison with men, and furthermore a gender approach. Along with the development in gender studies, with the theoretical and factual support brought by them, the interest for the aspects connected to women migration was better fuelled, and the women migration has been placed in a more appropriate reality⁹. This latest approach is more complex, since it ceased perceiving women, including migrant women, only as constantly depending on men, or only as a vulnerable group.¹⁰ This new perception might also be explained by the development in women’s independence attitude concerning the decision

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to migrate, based on new reasons and opportunities for women migration, and supported by better professional background, as well.

Our paper is structured as follows: the first part is a short presentation of the context in which the Romanian migration flow has been developing after 1989. The second part makes a description of the general aspects of the Romanian women migration, followed by a case study concerning the Romanian women migrants in two Northern EU countries - the Netherlands and Denmark, and in two Southern countries - Spain and Greece. The final part concludes.

1. Romania as Migration Sending Country

During more than 15 years of transition, Romanian people faced many difficulties of adaptation to the new economic, social and political conditions. Dramatic changes occurred concerning the economic and employment structure, which also affected their economic, social and personal life. Entire zones, which before 1990 seemed prosperous or privileged from the economic point of view, became “dead areas” 11. Because of a too slow privatisation and economic reform, many state companies collapsed, and massive job destructions occurred. In spite of important foreign direct investments and of relatively high growth rate during last 5 years, Romania did not reach the “stage” of net job creation yet. Migration from urban to rural areas and to subsistence agriculture increased. In addition, the share of population in the rural area increased to about 45%. At the same time, the share of labour force working in agriculture sector increased to 35% out of the total active population, meaning very low productivity and very low income coming from this source. Obviously, there is an extra labour force (hidden unemployment) in the rural area, estimated to about 2 million people. Overall, this underemployed population in the rural areas became one of main source for migration from Romania. There are villages where every family “sent” at least one person to work outside the country. Additionally, the slow job creation in the other sectors and the difficulties faced by many young graduates or medium skilled persons in finding income sources might lead

11 see mining and metallurgy oriented areas, but also many other areas
to a quite convincing explanation for general “push” migration conditions. The “pull” factors such as: mismatches between labour force demand and supply on the labour market in several EU countries (shortage of low skilled labour in agriculture, building, seasonal work in tourism; shortage of highly skilled labour like IT, doctors, engineers etc.), and demographic changes (ageing population, which asks for new jobs for health care at home) also exist. Therefore, “push and pull explanation” fits entirely the Romanian migration as any other external migration.

After 1989, the emigration from Romania increased and became one of the most controversial and debated phenomenon among Romanian politicians, media, but less among academics: from blaming it as a kind of country “treacherous”, in the early 90’s, and by ignoring any desirable and possible agreements with the receiving countries, to the present changed into the better situation. Romanian authorities concluded bilateral agreements with the main receiving countries, which should offer legal protection for Romanian emigrants, but it should also ensure control of illegal migration. Moreover, the attitude of several Western European countries has also changed (we refer to the recognition of the important economic role of immigrants, including Romanian ones, for certain sectors and as taxpayers, too). Since the high number of immigrants in certain areas cannot be ignored as future voters in the local elections, certain countries (e.g. Spain) decided to take into consideration the special educational needs for the Romanian immigrants’ children. It is a sign of enlarged Europe, not only by transferring the EU rules to the new members, but also by enriching the cultural diversity inside the “old” Europe.

Estimations of migration flow dimensions include Romania as one of the most important sending country in the area\textsuperscript{12}.

\textsuperscript{12} see the recent legalised status for many Romanian immigrants in Spain, and the attention given by Spanish politicians to Romanian immigrants in certain areas, because they got the vote right in the local communities

Our comments are based only on the “official statistics”, which refer to legal permanent emigration, as declared by migrants when crossing the Romanian border. At the same time, it is accepted that the real figures are much higher than the ones recorded in the statistics.

We may notice that, after 1990, which is a peak year in Romanian emigration, the evolution is fluctuating. Still, the dimension is very important as number, as share in the total population, and it is important due to its impact on domestic labour market (already identified shortages in several sectors), and on balance of payment (remittances), too.

Romanian migration topic was examined in the following three approaches:

- As part of wide researches on several sequential issues, such as human trafficking and circulatory migration\(^\text{14}\)
- In the context of Eastern enlargement and migration\(^\text{15}\)


Distinct external migration flow investigated under several aspects like: general view on Romanian external migration focusing on post 1990 migration\textsuperscript{16}, circulatory migration\textsuperscript{17}, irregular migration \textsuperscript{18} or "brain drain" phenomenon\textsuperscript{19}.


Researches and studies carried out on the women or/and gender dimension of Romanian migration are still missing, in spite of obvious high visibility of this flow. Based on the above mentioned, our micro study intends to draw attention to the importance of going further with the analysis of the Romanian women migration specificity, and even with gender perspective on the phenomenon.

2. Romanian Women Migration – General Aspects

The evolution of the number of the Romanian women migrants is presented in the following graph:

![Graph](image_url)

Graph nr. 2  Evolution of Romanian migrants by gender

The graph reveals a chronic outnumbering of women compared to men, except for one single year. We can certainly talk about “feminisation” of Romanian migration, as it is the case in the global flow. Connected to it, several questions would be important for in-depth investigation, by doing empirical researches: main reasons for women migration (are they different from those “pushing and pulling” men to migrate or not?), and the clustering according to these reasons; ways of emigration (do women use networks? if yes, how can these be identified? Do they opt for women networks?); which are women’s preference for migration duration: (“back and forth”, temporary vs. permanent); changes in women’s status after migration, and impact on their family back home, especially on children; changes in family reunification paradigm; how can we evaluate the impact of women migration on the labour market? (new jobs, new professions, new types of employment agreements); can we talk about specific behaviour in maintaining family ties at home (social and financial...
remittances?); how does the women’s integration take place in host country etc.; how can we explain the large number of women victims of trafficking and how can we control this phenomenon?

Obviously, answers to so many questions would imply both a multidisciplinary and an interdisciplinary approach, the only one capable of analysing such a complex socio-economic undertaking. We are aware of the difficulties and complexity of this approach and of the limits of our research. We intend to find out with our micro-case study research the main features of Romanian women migrants in the Northern countries vs. the Southern countries. In other words, we try to draw attention on different typologies of Romanian women migrants connected to the geographic areas and to the country they have migrated to. We assume that the typologies of women migrants might be different mainly because of the existing conditions in the receiving countries (economic structure by sector, economic conjuncture, and opportunities of finding jobs, regulations concerning the immigration etc.), but also according to cultural environment (language, the attitude of native people against immigrants, the multicultural or mono-cultural society and the meaning of cohesion in this new context, ways of integration into the host society, while keeping the identity etc.).

3. Case Study - Romanian Women Migrants in Northern and Southern Europe

Before 1990, the Romanian women used to be employed in almost all sectors, sometimes even in poor and dangerous working conditions, in order to demonstrate the “equality” with men. Neither the political system, nor the traditions prohibited women to be employed. We would say that the system placed Romanian women in the professional schemes, and the tradition placed them as provider of extra-work at home. The collapse of many enterprises after 1989 put the employees, including women, in the situation of looking for jobs elsewhere, meaning emigrate. We assume that the Romanian women migrants decided to move, firstly because of the above mentioned reasons, which are loss of jobs, low
income, but also because women often found jobs more easily than their men.

In order to assess the profile of Romanian women immigrant in Southern Europe (Spain and Greece) and in Northern Europe (Denmark and The Netherlands), we made an empirical research based on questionnaire; the interviewed persons in the mentioned countries were randomly selected. Given the reduced size of the sample (80 total persons, out of whom 48 are women, in the case of Spain; 50 total persons, out of whom 11 are women, in Greece; 50 persons, out of whom 37 women, in The Netherlands; 30 total persons, out of whom 17 are women, in the case of Denmark), we are not in the position of generalising the conclusions based on the findings. Still, the answers are rather accurate and allow us to consider the information as reliable. The processed information provided by questionnaires is in the Appendix. We tried to formulate characteristics, which should be important by their shares in total respondents.

Our main findings based on data processing were included in a kind of matrix that allowed us to reveal certain dominant characteristics of the persons in the respective groups.

Table 1: Main features as resulted from the study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Greece</th>
<th>The Netherlands</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 40</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority single</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority married</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children in country of immigration (&gt;20% of respondents)</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children in Romanian (&gt;20% of respondents)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority of no children</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority High school</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduate (more than 40% of respondents)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority of answers</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
about reasons, other than economic reasons (family reunification, marriage, cultural interest etc.)

| Economic reason (unemployment and low salary: >40% of respondents) | x | | x |
| Intention to stay longer | x | x | x | x |
| Working under qualification (40% of respondents) | x | | x |
| Own qualification (>30% of respondents) | x | | x |
| Other qualification (>50% of respondents) | | | x |
| Majority performing legal work | x | x | x |
| Majority finding a job in the host country | x | x | x |
| High satisfaction with habitat conditions, professional and private relations | x | x | x | x |
| Money as reason of satisfaction (>50%) | x | x | | x |
| Living in modern civilised society (>35%) | x | x | x | x |
| Highest dissatisfaction reason: missing friends, family | x | x | x | x |
| Maintaining contacts with family members, relatives, and friends in the host country | x | x | | |
Personal data

Age and Gender
- Around 90% out of total women immigrants are young and very young (under 40), regardless of the country.

Marital status and children
- The highest percentage of single women is found in The Netherlands, closely followed by Greece and Spain;
- The highest percentages of women having their children with them in the country of immigration are in Spain and Greece. At the same time, the women in Greece registered an important percentage of children left in Romania (shorter distance, language barriers, difficulties in integration etc. might explain this choice).

Level of education
- The largest group of women immigrants graduated at least high school. The situation is different from Northern to Southern countries. In the Netherlands and Denmark, one might find an important percentage of graduate and postgraduate immigrant women.

Reasons for emigration from Romania
- In our supposition, we considered the unemployment and low salary as the most important reasons for Romanian women emigration. Our research contradicts this assumption. The majority of the Romanian migrant women placed family reunification on the first position, as reason. This seems to confirm, but only partly, the reason for traditional women migration flow as dependent on men migration (Spain) or having marriage as reason (Denmark). We say “confirmed only partly” because of the high percentage of single women who migrated on their
own. They migrated either because they could not find any job at home (Spain), or/and because they were very low paid and they looked for career development. (in Denmark and in The Netherlands)

Work and qualification

- Working under previous qualification or in another qualification, which might also be under her level of education and qualification, is a rather general feature. There is a mismatch between their previous qualification and the demand on the labour market in the place they opted/happened to live. This leads to a loss of skills and human capital already acquired, and put the women in a vulnerable position.
- We may also talk about a kind of “gender divisions of labour” meaning that from the very beginning, the society in the host country, even a developed one, attributes a certain role, position, chances to women migrants in the receiving countries. Jolly and Reeves use the concept of “sex-segregated labour market” (the gender division of labour consists of the socially determined ideas and practices that define what roles and activities are deemed appropriate for women and men. This in turn can lead to a sex-segregated labour market where men are recruited into certain types of jobs and women into others).

Legal status

- In the case of Denmark and the Netherlands, we may notice a high percentage of the ones performing legal work (they might be explained by the restrictive system existing in the two countries). Recently, in Spain, the massive legalisation increased the share of documented migrants. In opposition, Greece still lags behind with more than half of the respondents working illegally.

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21 Jolly and Reeves (2005) – “Gender and Migration”, Bridge Foundation [http://www.bridge.ids.ac.uk/reports/CEP-Mig-OR.pdf];
Ways of finding a job

- Concerning the way of finding a job, a very high percentage of respondents found work in host countries (we may think that they preferred not to use Romanian agencies, who intermediate labour contracts; or they used a network of co-national persons - relatives, friends, neighbours from the same villages), except for Denmark.

Satisfaction with habitat, professional relations and personal relations

- Migrant women seem to be satisfied with the habitat, professional and personal relations, regardless of the country of immigration.

Reasons for satisfaction with life in the country of immigration

- As far as the main reasons for being satisfied are concerned, the answers highlighted the attractiveness factors, which are money, but also the chance of living in modern civilised society and possibility of having family reunified.

Reason for dissatisfaction with life in the country of immigration

- The Romanian immigrants perceive the loss of friends and family as the main dissatisfaction reason.

Contact with Romanians in the host countries

- Generally, the women immigrants maintain more contacts with Romanians, especially with persons who came from the same family, more obvious in the case of Spain and Greece.

Nature of settlement

- The high percentage of respondents intends to stay longer. This might be seen as either an option for a long stay followed by return to Romania, clearly expressed by women in Greece, or an option for circulatory, “back and forth” migration, or even option for permanent migration.

Reunification with members of the family in the host country

- Concerning the reunification with other family members in the future, we notice the high number of no answers in Spain and Denmark, meaning that either the family is already there (Spain), or the country of immigration’s system hamper the reunification of the family (especially in the case of Denmark). Since they face difficulties in integrating into host country, they would like to have a family member with them (Greece and the Netherlands).
Identity

- Keeping the Romanian identity by the use of contacts with Romanian Community, Romanian Church and Romanian Embassy is quite a difficult problem. The percentage of no answers is impressively high, meaning that the chance to preserve Romanian identity lies mostly on the individual, partly on Romanian community in itself, and not on the Romanian institutions present in the host countries. The immigrants do not rely so much on the “official” representatives and, as far as the Romanian church is concerned, we find more women considering the church “as the only possibility to keep their faith and to meet other Romanians”.

In today’s Europe, keeping identity has to be put in connection with living in a multiethnic and multicultural environment. The immigrants’ behaviour has to adapt to this new situation, id est to try to integrate into the host society, but also to practice “cohesion” with other immigrants in the same situation. Research reports realised in the frame of Studia Interethnica Research, The Netherlands (regarding Turks, Moroccans, Indonesians and Surinam women) revealed that women represent a very mobile and active factor of cohesion. They are plural and complexly integrated into host countries by their role in the families - sometimes-mixed - at all social levels. While the men are living in smaller social groups (at their work, at home, eventually at the coffee or tee house and at the church), the women are bringing the children to schools - mostly multicultural ones -, where they come in contact with mothers from other cultures, all having to share the same interest (the good results of their children). The women are doing the daily shopping in big multicultural malls; they are sometimes organised in ethnic or even multiethnic women organisations, where they work together, persons from different nationalities and different races, they make friendships and live their free, leisure hours together. In this way, their contribution to a society characterised by cohesion is a substantial one.

The interviews conducted in the Netherlands (which is an officially recognised as a multicultural “country of immigration”, with a very diverse ethnic and racial structure), and Greece (which is mostly a mono-cultural country, national and traditional, but which has been confronted with the
The phenomenon of receiving immigrants only in the last decade, and has not yet the conscience of its multiculturalism) on a very small sample - 10 interviewed women in Greece and 10 in the Netherlands - only showed how the issue of living in a multicultural society might become a new research on migration dimension.

Taking into consideration the results of our research in these two countries, a first image of our “Western versus Eastern model study” is obvious. Our micro research has showed few features regarding the position of the target group vis-à-vis the social cohesion in the host countries. This position is identical in both studied fields. Thus, the first feature of the studied groups is: the Romanian women have no nationalistic, antiracist or chauvinistic approach towards other ethnic or racial groups from the host countries. This position is a positive and advanced one, which results probably from their socialist and internationalist education in Romania. On the other hand, we noticed the tendency of our target groups in both studied countries to adjust themselves, at all costs, only to the dominant cultures of the host countries (respectively to the Dutch and the Greek culture).

This behaviour might be explained by the fact that the Romanian Constitution declared Romania a national state. The Romanian individual does not have the practice of multiculturalism as cohesion of egalitarian cultures. The image, the official discourses and the daily practice have recognised always in Romania two cultures: the national culture and the cultures of the minorities. Therefore, the multiculturalism in its modern Western meaning has not yet become a fact of consciousness for our target group. Neither are our respondents aware of the complexity and the long-term process of social cohesion in their host countries. Therefore, their interest for other immigrants’ culture from their host countries is limited, if not totally absent.

**Conclusions**

Romanian women migration is developing fast, and more research is certainly needed.
In a comparative approach (see the results in Table 1), our micro-case study revealed several common features, but also differences between Romanian women migrants in the four countries.

A. Common features:
   - High percentage of young and very young women
   - High percentage of them working under their qualifications, or in another qualification
   - Still, intention to stay longer
   - Generally, satisfied with habitat, professional and personal life
   - Dissatisfaction: loss of friends and family
   - Other reasons than the economic ones pushing them to migrate
   - Main way of keeping identity is provided by the church

B. Specificity according to area and countries:
   - Higher level of education in Northern countries than in Southern ones
   - Closer contact with family member in Southern countries
   - Children with them in country of immigration (Spain and Greece)

C. Trans-countries features:
   - Economic reasons for migration come closely on the second place in the case of Spain and Denmark
   - Intention for family reunification in case of Greece and the Netherlands

The above findings show that the common features prevail. Therefore, it would be not correct to talk about typologies in terms of geographic areas. There are specificities, but according to development level, to the social and legal environment in the host country, which induce a certain women migrant flow orientation.
Appendix

**Romanian women immigrants** (80 total persons, out of whom 48 are women, in the case of Spain; 50 total persons, out of whom 11 are women, in Greece; 50 persons, out of whom 37 women, in The Netherlands; 30 total persons, out of whom 17 are women, in the case of Denmark)

1. Personal data
1.1 Age and Gender

Table 1 Percentage of women at different age levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Greece</th>
<th>The Netherlands</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 20</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 – 29</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>62.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 – 40</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>31.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 – 54</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 and older</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.2 Marital status and children

Table 2 Marital status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marital Status</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Greece</th>
<th>The Netherlands</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>78.4</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not married, but living together with partner</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorced</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3 Children of Romanian women workers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Children</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Greece</th>
<th>The Netherlands</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Children in country of immigration</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>17.64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. Immigration

2.1 Reason for emigration from Romania

Table 4 Level of education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of immigration</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Greece</th>
<th>The Netherlands</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary school</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>4.34</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gymnasium</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>35.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>41.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduate</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>5.88</td>
<td>5.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational training /</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>5.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>schooling for a particular profession</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>11.76</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5 Reason for emigration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Country of immigration</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Greece</th>
<th>The Netherlands</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td></td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low salary</td>
<td></td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td></td>
<td>41.17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>50 (family reunification, scholarship)</td>
<td>81.8 (cultural interest)</td>
<td>81.9 (marriage)</td>
<td>58.82 (marriage, adventure, tourism)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6 Desire to stay longer in country of immigration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Desire to stay longer</th>
<th>Country of immigration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>27.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Working in the country of immigration

3.1 Work and qualification

Table 7 Working according to own qualification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Qualification</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Greece</th>
<th>The Netherlands</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Own qualification</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>29.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower than own qualification</td>
<td>56.52</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>41.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other qualification</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>5.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t work yet</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>11.76</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.2 Legal status

Table 8 Legitimacy of work

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legitimacy of work</th>
<th>Country of immigration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal work</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Legal</td>
<td>36.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not working yet /legal staying</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.3. Finding a job
Table 9 Ways of finding a job

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ways of finding a job</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Greece</th>
<th>The Netherlands</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Formal/Informal in Romania</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>88.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal/Informal in host country</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>59.5</td>
<td>11.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not working</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Satisfaction
4.1 Satisfaction with habitat, professional relations and personal relations
Table 10. Satisfaction with habitat

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Habitat</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Greece</th>
<th>The Netherlands</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>91.3</td>
<td>90.9</td>
<td>86.5</td>
<td>82.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>17.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11 Satisfaction with professional relations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Professional relations</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Greece</th>
<th>The Netherlands</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>78.2</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>75.7</td>
<td>82.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>17.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 12 Satisfaction with private relations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Private relations</th>
<th>Country of immigration</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Greece</th>
<th>The Netherlands</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>82.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>17.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 13 Reason for satisfaction with life in the country of immigration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason for satisfaction</th>
<th>Country of immigration</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Greece</th>
<th>The Netherlands</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The money</td>
<td></td>
<td>52.17</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>64.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living in modern civilized society</td>
<td></td>
<td>36.95</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>38.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possibility of a family</td>
<td></td>
<td>28.26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom, change</td>
<td></td>
<td>8.69</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>5.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No satisfaction</td>
<td></td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 14 Reason for dissatisfaction with life in the country of immigration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason for dissatisfaction</th>
<th>Country of immigration</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Greece</th>
<th>The Netherlands</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Life in host country</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing/loosing friends, family</td>
<td></td>
<td>95.6</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>78.4</td>
<td>88.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response/other (no dissatisfaction)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. Contact with Romanians or with Romania

5.1 Contact with Romanians in the country of immigration

Table 15 Contact with Romanians

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of contact</th>
<th>Country of immigration</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Greece</th>
<th>The Netherlands</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes with a member/ with members of the nuclear family</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>67.39</td>
<td>90.9</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>41.17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes with a member/ with members of the extended family</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>65.2</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>29.41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes with a person/ with people from the same city/place in Romania</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>82.6</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No contact</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.34</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.2 Nature of settlement

Table 16 Remain in country of immigration, return to Romania or move to another country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of settlement</th>
<th>Country of immigration</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Greece</th>
<th>The Netherlands</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes, remain in country of immigration</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>76</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>76.47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, return to Romania</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>17.64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, move to another country</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. Reunification with members of the family

Table 17 Reunification with wife/husband, parents, brother/sister and children in the country of immigration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reunification with a family member</th>
<th>Country of immigration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, with family members</td>
<td>28.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wife/husband, parents, brothers/sisters; children</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>71.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. Identity

Table 18 Keeping Romanian identity by contact with Romanian Community, Romanian Church, and Romanian Embassy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of contact</th>
<th>Country of immigration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, with Romanian community</td>
<td>23.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, with Romanian church</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, with Romanian embassy</td>
<td>6.52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
L’INTEGRAZIONE E L’EUROPEIZZAZIONE DELLA ROMANIA.
STUDIO DI CASO: IL PARTENERIATO ITALIANO-RUMENO

Anca Stângaciu

Abstract
The main purpose of this study is to present some of the most important aspects of the process of Europeanization of Romania and its integration in the European Union structures. We take into consideration the first positive effects of the integration process, but also the possible elements of a destructive Europeanization. The study case focuses upon the economic relationship established between Romania and Italy in what regards the presence of the Italian capital in Romania. Italy is the first commercial partner of Romania, while Romania represents the 16th commercial partner of Italy after the great states of the world. We should also add that the Italian firms hold the first place in numbers representing the majority in what the foreign capital investments are concerned, fact that motivates Italy to offer our country its model of managerial, administrative and institutional organization. The creation of development micro-regions on the model of the Italian Small-size and Medium-size Enterprises is already a real and actual phenomenon in the post-integration Romania. In present there is a more frequent tendency towards the enlargement at a bigger scale of such phenomenon.

Introduzione

Questo saggio vuole evidenziare i cambiamenti che si sono verificati in Romania dopo l’ingresso nell’Unione Europea, ed anche gli effetti dell’integrazione: il miglioramento del quadro legislativo e istituzionale, la riforma del sistema giuridico rumeno e la lotta contro la corruzione, ma anche i possibili effetti negativi di questo fenomeno, a partire dall’esperienza degli stati ex comunisti, entrati nell’UE nel 2004. Il parteneriato strategico, ma anche economico ed imprenditoriale, con l’Italia, rappresenta l’oggetto dello studio di caso di questo saggio perché le

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relazioni economiche tra questi due paesi sono molto strette, in più, dopo l’ingresso nelle strutture comunitarie, la dimanica di questi rapporti economici si è ampliata. Così, l’idea di creare delle micro regioni di sviluppo economico dopo il modello della Piccola e Media Impresa italiane (PMI), a preso la più evidente forma di concretezza in Romania, in zone come Timisoara, Arad, Cluj. Dal punto di vista istituzionale, la Romania ripresenta ancora un paese d’interesse per l’Italia, nonostante le pressioni della crescita salariale, una delle modalità per trovare una soluzione a questo problema essendo l’iniziativa degli investitori italiani di introdurre la forza di lavoro cinese nelle fabbriche rumene. La collaborazione tra le aziende e le università italiane e le università rumene rafforza l’idea dell’importanza del dialogo italiano-rumeno.

1. L’integrazione ed europeizzazione della Romania

L’ingresso della Romania nell’Unione Europea e in un contesto più ampio l’integrazione europea apre la strada della modernizzazione e dell’europeizzazione di questo paese. Questo sviluppo all’interno dell’Unione Europea, uno spazio economico e sociale prospero, potrebbe fornire alla Romania, quel Big Push così necessario per superare il ritardo economico e sociale di tipo balcanico, e quindi ridurre gli sfasamenti essintenti tra essa e gli stati industrializzati dell’Unione Europea (il cosidetto catching up)\(^1\). Poi, l’Unione Europea si constituisce per la Romania in un modello organizzativo politico ed istituzionale adeguato per una veritabile democrazia.

La Romania si trova nel processo di sviluppo dell’economia di mercato e delle strutture democratiche, cioè in un processo di modernizzazione della società e dell’economia. Purtroppo, non possiamo dire ancora che Romania sia un paese performante da questo punto di vista. Esistono ancora molti limiti nello sviluppo dell’area economica, strutturale e anche istituzionale, causati dalla sua cultura politica, dal modo abbastanza storto di capire e di mettere in funzione la democrazia, dalla mentalità della gente e dall’attitudine civica non molto sviluppata.

Nel rapporto della Comissione Europea di giugno 2007, riferitore alle misure d’accompagniere riguardante i fondi agricoli, la sicurezza

alimentaria e la riforma del sistema giuridico si mostra che: “in sei mesi dall’ingresso, la Romania a continuato fare dei progressi per rimediare gli indebolimenti quali possono impedire l’applicazione efficace della legislazione, delle politiche e dei programmi europei”\(^2\). Pero, si apreza che e necessario molto tempo che i progressi legislativi sia messi in prattica in settori –chiavi, come la giustizia, la corruzione al alto livello ecc\(^3\).

A termine lungo e medio, l’ europeizzazione, intensa come effetto del fenomeno dell’integrazione nell’economia e nella società\(^4\), generava dei profondi cambiamenti, nel senso della modernizzazione e della occidentalizzazione della Romania: un’efficace economia del mercato, un quadro istituzionale funzionale, un vero sistema democratico, una reale cultura politica e pubblica, una società prospera. Però, se prendiamo in considerazione la precarietà della struttura economica risultata in seguito alla ricostruzione dell’economia di mercato della Romania, allo stesso modo come nel caso degli altri paesi ex-comunisti, la postintegrazione può determinare anche effetti del tipo della “europeizzazione distruttiva”\(^5\). Un esempio in questo senso può costituirlo il fatto che il rispetto degli accordi per l’ammissione conduca a nuove disposizioni di attività produttive (ad esempio in agricoltura) che potranno produrre ulteriore disoccupazione, mentre l’eventuale entrata nell’euro potrebbe indurre altre rigidità nelle economie dei paesi dell’est ed una perdita di competitività che avrebbe come immediato risultato un nuovo aumento della disoccupazione anche alla luce dei problemi di gestione del bilancio comunitario che sembrano escludere rilevanti flussi di fondi strutturali ad est per sostenere e riformare i disoccupati\(^6\). La persistenza di alti livelli di disoccupazione potrebbe avere conseguenze elettorali pesanti, sia sui partiti al governo, che sulle ancor fragili strutture politiche delle nuove democracie e soprattutto sul rapporto tra paesi dell’Est ed l’Unione Europea. In altre parole c’è un fondato rischio che il processo di adeguamento istituzionale precedente e successivo


\(^{3}\) Ibidem

\(^{4}\) Ana Maria Dobre, Ramona Coman, România și integrarea europeană, Iași, Institutul european, 2005, p. 16.

\(^{5}\) Roberto Di Quirico, La scelta dell’allargamento e il problema dell’integrazione monetaria dei paesi ex-comunisti, Analele Universitatii din Oradea, Oradea, saggio sotto la stampa.

\(^{6}\) Ibidem.
all’entrata nell’Unione europea comporti per i paesi dell’est forme di europeizzazione capaci di mettere in difficoltà i governi che maggiormente hanno sostenuto in patria l’adesione all’Unione Europea. Inoltre tali forme di europeizzazione distruttiva potrebbero intaccare irrimediabilmente gli ancor fragili sistemi di potere che garantiscono la stabilità ed il consenso delle giovani democrazie est-europee.\footnote{Ibidem.}

Esiste poi il rischio che i nuovi paesi membri dopo esser entrati nell’euro non saranno in grado di rimanerci o comunque di rispettare il patto di stabilità e crescita. Infatti, nel periodo 2002-2006 nessuno dei nuovi paesi membri eccezione fatta forse per la Lituania, è riuscito a mantenersi sempre nei parametri del patto di stabilità. Addirittura, alcuni dei paesi più grandi quali Polonia, Ungheria e in minor misura la Repubblica Ceca, ci sono riusciti raramente.\footnote{Ibidem.}

La situazione politica in cui si trova la Romania a qualche mese dopo l’integrazione nell’Unione Europea, mostra in una maniera chiara, i limiti dello sviluppo dell’area politica e istituzionale, causati dalla precarietà della cultura politica, dal modo abbastanza storto di capire e di mettere in funzione la democrazia, di una classe politica immatura e anche dall’attitudine civica non molto sviluppata. Gli sforzi per la riforma non sono ancora sufficienti per molti settori dell’economia e della società rumena. Per esempio, se nel periodo entro il 1 gennaio 2007, la Romania riusciva a mettere in pratica, anche se parzialmente, una strategia di preintegrazione, qualche mese dopo l’integrazione non è riuscita a adottare, e certamente neanche implementare una strategia di postintegrazione, richiesta anche dall’UE. Con riferimento all’immaturità della classe politica romena, la dichiarazione del vice-presidente del Bundestag del febbraio 2007, è molto rilevante, perché esso considerava che “le lotte all’intero della coalizione governamentale sono molto nocive e che gli uomini politici romeni approfittano del contesto integrativo per ottenere dei vantaggi personali”\footnote{www.euractiv.ro/uniunea-europeana/articles, DW: La vicepresidentessa del Parlamento tedesco: azioni come la mozione anti-Macovei potrebbe attivare le clausole di salvaguardia, data di accesso 6 maggio 2007.}. 

\footnote{7 Ibidem.}
\footnote{8 Ibidem.}
\footnote{9 www.euractiv.ro/uniunea-europeana/articles, DW: La vicepresidentessa del Parlamento tedesco: azioni come la mozione anti-Macovei potrebbe attivare le clausole di salvaguardia, data di accesso 6 maggio 2007.}
La giustizia romena è un altro esempio di difficile riforma, nelle condizioni in cui la Legge dell’Agenzia Nazionale Anticorruzione (ANI), per esempio, ha generato così tante controversie fra gli specialisti e gli uomini politici. La legge, nella sua forma iniziale, promuove l’idea dell’indipendenza di quest’istituzione nel confronto delle altre istituzioni dello stato romeno (l’istituzione presidenziale, il parlamento ecc) e precisava la possibilità di proseguimento penale per gli ufficiali oppure per gli uomini politici corrotti. Nelle condizioni in cui in Romania manca la cultura dell’interesse pubblico, un’iniziativa legislativa di questo tipo, apre il cammino per la riforma della classe politica rumena. Tuttavia, anche se sono messe in pratica delle misure anticorruzione, come il sequestro dei beni degli uomini politici corrotti, la lotta anticorruzione e il funzionamento delle istituzioni specializzate, il processo ci risulta e lento e molto difficile. Per esempio, negli ultimi mesi sono stati messi sotto accusa alcuni parlamentari, capi di partiti politici o altri ufficiali (ministri ecc); tuttavia fino adesso nessuno di loro è stato condannato.

Un altro elemento che potrebbe contribuire alla riforma del sistema giuridico rumeno potrebbe essere l’evitare quelle cosiddette Leggi con destinazione, cioè le leggi adottate nei confronti di un gruppo d’interesse, una misura che potrebbe portare all’eliminazione delle sorgenti di corruzione. Tra le leggi con destinazione, che dovrebbero essere eliminate per facilitare la riforma della giustizia si possono nominare: la Legge dell’aiuto ricevuto dallo stato, la Legge degli negozi di tipo duty free, vere sorgenti di contrabbando, la Legge riguardante la mancanza della responsabilità per gli amministratori di società commerciali ecc.

La riforma della giustizia, un campo molto fortemente controllato nel periodo di preintegrazione, rimane in continuazione all’attenzione degli ufficiali europei. Infatti, Leonard Orban, il Commissario Europeo per il multilinguismo, dichiarava alla conferenza "Le elezioni europee tra le politiche interne e quelle europee" organizzata dal Centro Rumeno per gli Studi Globali che "se non ci saranno dei progressi nella giustizia rumena, ci sarà il rischio dell’attivazione della clausola di salvaguardia"10. Gli altri settori vitali dell’economia rumena, come l’Agricoltura, la Salute, oppure l’Insegnamento rumeno devono essere ristrutturati in profondità, dato che

l’avvicinamento di queste strutture a quelle simili dell’Unione Europea è stato fatto parzialmente e con molta incoerenza.

Gli Servizi oppure il Turismo sembrano conoscere uno dei più dinamici sviluppi nel periodo di postintegrazione. Dopo l’integrazione la Romania è diventata il più attraente paese per gli affari immobiliari dell’Europa Centrale-Orientale. La Romania, ed il suo turismo conosce uno dei più forti sviluppi dell’Europa, avendo la possibilità di ripresentare quasi il 7 % del PIL. La costruzione di quello brand del paese e le multiple possibilità di promozione potrebbero fare dal turismo rumeno, un punto di riferimento il turismo europeo, nel senso di una “Europa in miniatura”. La situazione politica precaria e l’esistenza delle istituzioni con un funzionamento deficitario aumentano delle differenze di sviluppo tra la Romania e l’Unione Europea. I principali elementi che hanno determinato la bassa produttività in Romania, sono principalmente l’agricoltura nonperformante, il settore pubblico e il numero grande dei pensionati, quello che significa che il paese potrebbe arrivare al livello medio della produttività dell’Unione Europea in 25-30 anni, cioè un po’ di più da come sono fatte le stimazioni nel periodo preintegrazione (10-15 anni).

2. Le relazioni economiche tra la Romana e l’Italia nel periodo attuale

Il presente studio di caso propone una breve analisi delle relazioni economiche tra la Romania e l’Italia ed una presentazione degli investimenti da parte delle aziende italiane in Romania. La dimensione economica delle confluenze romeno-italiane si verifica come estremamente rilevante dal punto di vista dell’intensità e della primordialità dei rapporti economici che se ne stabiliscono: l’Italia detiene il primo posto come partner commerciale della Romania, mentre la Romania è presente nella gerarchia dei rapporti commerciali con l’Italia come il suo 16 partner dopo grandi stati del mondo (come gli Stati dell’Unione Europea, Gli Stati Uniti

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11 Ibidem, Turismul romanesc are toate sansele sa cunoasca una dintre cele mai dinamice evolutii din intreaga Europa, dat di acceso 6 mai 2007.
12 Ibidem.
d’America, paesi asiatici) ed è il primo partner che Italia ha nei paesi Centrale ed Est Europei. È un fatto già noto che la Romania usufruisce degli investimenti più ampli da parte delle aziende italiane al rispetto degli altri partner italiani dell’Europa Centrale e di Est. Possiamo accennare qui anche agli effetti benefici che la forza di lavoro rumena porta all’Italia grazie al fatto che i rumeni costituiscono la più sostanziale comunità straniera in Italia.


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\textsuperscript{16} Ibidem.
L’integrazione e l’europeizzazione della Romania … 125

Grafic 1. L’evoluzione degli scambi commerciali della Romania con l’Italia (periodo 1992-2005)\(^{17}\)

A partire di 1997, l’Italia diventa il primo partner commerciale per la Romania, seguita della Germania, Inghilterra, Olanda e Austria. I principali prodotti esportati dall’Italia verso la Romania sono stati prodotti tessili, pelli grezze conciate, calzature, macchine agricole ed industriale, prodotti chimici e derivati, macchine, apparecchi e attrezzature elettroniche, metalli comuni e articoli in metalli comuni. Le principale merci esportate dalla Romania verso l’Italia sono state abbigliamento e maglieria, cuoio e calzature, minerali ferrosi e non ferrosi, prodotti chimici, legno e mobili di legno, materie plastiche.

L’analisi comparatistica dei rapporti economici rumeno-italiani ci permette di evidenziare la loro importanza nella struttura del commercio estero rumeno: la permanente dinamica economica ascendente, il flusso ed il grande valore degli scambi bilaterali, i gruppi di prodotti tradizionali per l’esporto, e l’importo di beni intensamente prelucrati e finissati.

\(^{17}\) Ibidem.
La ricerca intrappesa in relazione all’attività delle aziende italiane in Romania ci porta alla conclusione che in comparazione con altri stati dell’Europa Central-Orientale, l’interesse degli investitori italiani per la Romania negli anni ’90 e specialmente dopo 2000 è stato maggiore. Il fatto che la Romania è diventata negli ultimi anni un paese di interesse centrale per gli investimenti italiani è accentuato dall’elaborazione di strategie da parte dello stato italiano che desidera stimolare la formazione di PMI italiane nello spazio rumeno e in un contesto più largo nell’aria balcanica. Ad oggi ci sono quasi 19.000 ditte italiane in Romania, usufruendo di un capitale sociale di oltre 753 milioni di euro, proveniente soprattutto dall’Italia Settentrionale, ma anche dalle zone centrali o di sud

La maggior parte delle aziende italiane presenti in Romania sono società piccole e medie, che sviluppano forme di attività internazionali basati su delocalizzazione e decentralizzazione produttiva, e che hanno come oggetto di attività la produzione e la commercializzazione dei prodotti, o in alcuni casi, solo attività di importo-esporto.

Le ragioni che determinano gli uomini d’affari italiani a fare investimenti in Romania sono correlati alla potenzialità economica del nostro paese (crescita economica progressiva, ecc), alle risorse di lavoro (la forza di lavoro qualificato a prezzi abbastanza bassi), e ai vantaggi che porta la Romania come nuovo stato comunitario.

Vista la complementarietà tra l’economia italiana e quella rumena, le ditte italiane presenti in Romania svolgono le loro attività nei settori industriali tradizionali (l’industria dei tessili, delle confezioni, del legno e dei mobili, l’industria costruttrice di autoveicoli). Anche il settore agricolo, commerciale, dei servizi, dei trasporti e del turismo gode di grande interesse per l’investimento italiano. Le strategie industriali utilizzate dagli investitori italiani in Romania sono basati sul sistema Lohn, Traffico di perfezionamento passivo, sistema buy-back, e se si parla del settore bancario, la strategia più nota è di tipo Mutuo senza frontiere.

Il contributo del capitale italiano in Romania è costituito da un sostanziale apporto di capitale, tecnologia, know-how e modelli manageriali. Le ditte italiane sviluppano in Romania vere forme distrettuali

19 Ibidem, p. 102-103.
sul modello degli PMI italiane in macro zone come Timișoara, Cluj, Alba ecc. Le società aventi capitale italiano possono costituire un esempio positivo ed efficiente anche nel settore del management dell’amministrazione locale, nella relazione investitori-amministrazione locale, nella collaborazione tra università e ditte o istituzioni pubbliche locali.

Il recente ingresso della Romania nelle strutture dell’Unione Europea può significare una garanzia che manterrà costante l’interesse degli uomini d’affari italiani per l’ambiente degli affari rumeno. I motivi più importanti che possono essere individuati in ciò sono: le prospettive dello sviluppo economico del paese, la potenzialità di un mercato aperto e di richiesta di mercato sempre più ampia, la possibilità di utilizzare la Romania come basi di esportazione per altri stati vicini. I costi bassi della manodopera rimane un fattore attraente per gli investitori italiani, e ovviamente, per ancora qualche anno, anche le risorse naturali e le affinità cultural-linguistiche si verificheranno come costanti di attrazione di capitale.

**Conclusioni**

La Romania si trova in un irreversibile processo di integrazione ed europeizzazione, e la collaborazione stretta con l’Italia, tanto dal punto di vista degli scambi commerciali oppure degli investimenti, che dal punto di vista istituzionale, amministrativo oppure accademico, riflette il fatto che l’Italia può avere un contributo importante nel processo della modernizzazione e della europeizzazione della Romania.

I rapporti privilegiati tra la Romania e l’Italia si costituiscono perciò in intensi scambi commerciali o numerose azioni investimentarie delle aziende italiane nello spazio rumeno. Ciò porterà anche alla possibilità che l’Italia, così vicina alla Romania per tradizione e cultura, possa offrire al nostro paese modelli di sviluppo nel senso della modernizzazione e della europeizzazione. Il modello di sviluppo economico delle PMI italiane è il più rilevante esempio in Romania, però l’esperienza italiana può costituire un modello anche nel campo dell’amministrazione pubbica locale, del dialogo imprese-università, dell’efficacia universitaria.
PHILOSOPHY AND (GAY) SCIENCE. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE

Ciprian C. Bogdan

Abstract
This text attempts to describe the relationship between philosophy and science in Nietzsche’s works. The cultural background sustaining this attempt is based on the ambiguous understanding of the concept of science, an ambiguity caused by the mixing of the Greek and modern meanings of this concept. Philosophy is simultaneously the fundamental science in the hierarchy of disciplines (we sense here the Greek legacy), but also the science that criticizes tradition by adopting the methodological standards introduced by natural sciences (modern legacy). Our hypothesis is that this tensed relationship that philosophy establishes with the meaning of science can also be traced in the case of a radical philosopher like Nietzsche. We propose, therefore, a typology trying to make sense of this relation: (A) science is considered as some kind of parasitic existence on the behalf of our instincts; (B) science is viewed more as a factor of contagion that destroys any kind of hierarchy; (C) finally, science resembles more an instrument that helps a philosopher criticizing traditional prejudices. In order to conclude, Nietzsche maintains the vision of a philosophy being the center of all disciplines by emphasizing, against metaphysical ideals, our biological nature, but he uses, in the same time, functionalist or pragmatic arguments provided by modern science in attacking traditional thinking.

Introduction. The Ambiguity of Science

The philosophers have a rather ambiguous relationship with science. This ambiguity can be already traced in the concept of science which seems to cover, due to some major historical events, two relatively distinct understandings1.

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1 Ciprian C. Bogdan, Ph.D. student at the Faculty of Europen Studies, Babeș-Bolyai University Cluj.

1 We follow the idea of Hans Georg Gadamer who analyzes the relationship between philosophy and the two understandings of science, namely, the Greek and the modern (Gadamer, 1998, Elogiu teoriei. Moștenirea Europei, Iași: Polirom).
The first one is originated in ancient Greece, the land that gave birth to philosophy. As we are all acquainted, on its birth certificate is written: philosophy is aspiration for knowledge. But this seemingly innocent definition carries a more biased meaning: philosophy is science but a special one, a science that, as the very source of knowledge, engulfs all other (particular) disciplines such as astronomy, biology, physics, poetry etc. We must not forget the almost implausible (for us, moderns, living in a highly complex world) and yet fascinating image of Aristotle exercising his intelligence not only in the field of metaphysics but also in areas that today we would find inaccessible for a reasonable philosopher: he is preoccupied by the configuration of the stars, he makes observations on animals and plants or he gives (classical) definitions on poetry etc.

The second understanding comes in the 17th century as a result of the spectacular emergence of modern science. The break caused by the experimental method, classically designed by Galileo Galilei, is a major one due to the fact that it deeply affects the narcissist image of philosophy: from now on philosophy must face a serious competitor that brings not groundless speculations (sic) but universal laws of nature based on empirical facts. Husserl believes that Galileo Galilei is the prototype of the new understanding of science as matematization of reality.

The concept of science owes, therefore, its ambiguity on the two founding events mentioned above: on one hand, the Greek philosophy that grounds itself on rational standards that allows it to replace theology but also to minimize other disciplines and, on the other hand, the modern science that overthrows this hierarchical structure introducing new (more rigorous) methodological standards. Considering this historical legacy, philosophy must (unrealistically) fight both for maintaining its status as the queen of sciences and also for incorporating the mathematical rigor brought by natural sciences.

The philosophical tradition gives a large number of examples containing this tension between the two understandings. The famous Descartes, for example, builds his vision having as background the ideal of ‘clear and distinct’ representations imported, more or less explicit, from the

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2 Liiceanu, Gabriel (1992), Cearta cu filozofia, București: Humanitas, 68.
standards of modern science, philosophy must become, according to Descartes, a perfectly accurate method of purifying ourselves from the errors of tradition offering, in the same time, the basis for a universally secured thinking⁴. But this Cartesian break from tradition is compensated by the effort to keep envisioning philosophy, following this time the Greek legacy, as the supreme science. Descartes throws himself, as Aristotle did much earlier, in extra-philosophical areas such as physics, modern astronomy, mathematics etc. as a heroic attempt of the philosopher to cover the entire knowledge. Later on, another great philosophical figure faces, basically, the same problem. Immanuel Kant writes his famous book *The Critique of Pure Reason* as a response to the great challenge posed by Newton’s physics: philosophy must demonstrate, according to Kant, the validity of a priori synthetic judgments that define physics. But the underlying assumption of his attempt is not hard to guess, that is, natural science (in this case, physics) must be grounded in a philosophical system⁵. If Kant still has great consideration for modern science trying to secure, by imitating modern scientific standards, philosophy against speculations, Hegel, on the other hand, seems less respectful towards it: modern science is nothing but a moment in the historical journey of the Absolute Spirit. Science is not able, because of its timeless presuppositions, to grasp the truth of this extremely mobile spirit. This lack of respect explains, if we want to be ironical, the less appreciated early work (containing some basic physical and mathematical errors) that Hegel wrote on the orbits of planets⁶. In 20th century there is another great example of this tension between the Greek and modern legacy of philosophy. Edmund Husserl, as a witness of the expansion of scientific positivism, responds emphatically by designing his phenomenology as the absolute science, the only one capable of solving the crisis of rationality brought (mainly) by the blind objectivism of modern science. Only phenomenology can grasp the real source of reason: the ‘life-world’ and the ‘transcendental subjectivity’⁷. The

⁴ *Ibidem*, 75-83. Husserl notices that Descartes, in spite of his philosophical radicalism (turning, as no one before, towards the human consciousness), remains caught up in the scientific model founded by Galilei that objectifies nature and, even more dangerously, human consciousness.


⁷ Husserl, *op. cit.*, 297-299.
hierarchy of sciences follows, we can say, because of Husserl’s refined effort, the tree of sciences dreamt by Descartes, having its roots in philosophy (phenomenology) from which then grow, in a more and more differentiated ramification, the branches of those less important disciplines.

**Nietzsche: the Conservative Anarchist**

In this context, we believe that (19th century philosopher) Nietzsche, despite his rebel image, also reproduces some of the traditional assumptions regarding the relationship between philosophy and science. The concept of science remains ambiguous covering both the Greek and modern meaning. Nietzsche traces, (not) surprisingly, the origin of the crisis of European culture in no one else than the famous Socrates. The story is well known: Socrates is the symbolic father of Plato and through him the founding-father of philosophy. But Nietzsche is not convinced about this narrative believing, instead, that Socrates is less a glorious beginning and more a catastrophic one. Nietzsche’s attack is based on the assumption that Socrates is at the source of the rationalization of the tragic Greek vision manifested in a strange appearance of what Nietzsche calls ‘theoretical optimism’ defining from now on European culture. The modern sciences are nothing but a late product of this ‘tragic’ moment. Therefore, as we proceed in analyzing the way Nietzsche describes the relationships between philosophy and science, we have to bear in mind that these are closely intertwined. The critique of science represents, (in)directly, a critique of a philosophical tradition that emphasized reason or intellect against the instincts inhabiting our body.

We can already conclude that Nietzsche tends to see in philosophy, despite his harsh critique against it, the central discipline ordering the other less important ones. But this philosophical ego is loosened by Nietzsche’s refusal to adopt the rigor we usually attach to the concept of science, whether philosophy or natural sciences. Nietzsche wants to deconstruct, through his radical perspectivism, any kind of absolute knowledge. By now

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9 Nietzsche, Friedrich (1998), „Nașterea tragediei” in Nietzsche, Opere complete 2, Timișoara: Hestia, 64-68.
we can evoke the central tension underlying Nietzsche’s thinking: on one hand, he overemphasizes the importance of our instincts, or later on, ‘will to power’ that allows him to put, as we shall see, philosophy in the center of all sciences and, on the other hand, he rejects the fictions of philosophy, grounded in some absolute truth, by using functionalist arguments, natural sciences being in this context a valuable instrument in fighting old philosophical prejudices. Lyotard points out this tension haunting Nietzsche’s vision, that between a world of perspectives and one metaphysically governed by the will to power.10

Having all these in mind we believe that there are three ways Nietzsche wants to express the contact between philosophy and science: (A) Nietzsche seems to show the symptoms of, what we would like to call, a conservative anarchist. His conservative attitude comes out when criticizing the lack of hierarchy in modern world: the philosophical consequence of this attitude can be found in Nietzsche’s persistence about the idea of some kind of aristocratic purity. The hierarchy Nietzsche wants to save from the total disintegration in the chaotic flow of modern leveling means to value a center imagined as the source of activity and force and in the same time to devalue the periphery because of its parasitic existence on the behalf of the center.11 The Socratic philosophy and then modern science place consciousness and intellect, in sharp contrast to the tragic vision of the Greeks praising our creative instincts, in the very center of our cultural interests.

(B) Nietzsche, in the same time, reacts, on the basis of the same need for purity, against the ambiguity of modern world. Science becomes, because of its grey objectivity, the expression of an instinct of weakness and, later on, of a nihilistic will to power. If in the first case mentioned above Nietzsche describes consciousness and intellect (the faculties science is based on) as some kind of parasite on the behalf of our instincts, in the second attitude, he indicates towards, what we would like to call (by consciously staying in the same biological terminology), the image of a virus: the center (our instincts) disintegrates in the contagious contact between

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11 Nietzsche talks about the strong spirits that are able to carry, as expression of their vitality, as many parasites as possible (Nietzsche, 2000, Așa grăit-a Zarathustra, București : Humanitas, 246-255).
different elements\textsuperscript{12}. Paradoxically, the virus, or contagion, as metaphors we use in order to better describe Nietzsche’s vision, negatively resembles his own anarchic attitude best exemplified by his all time hero: Dionysos, the god that joyfully destroys any hierarchical order.

(C) But Nietzsche also adopts a relatively neutral attitude towards science defining it functionally as an instrument that, in addition, must leave out the requirements of some absolute truth (that science usually believes in) in order to serve a more honest and humble purpose, to clean up the mess created by the religious and metaphysical prejudices. (We recognize here, in order to speculate, both the conservative that cautiously cools down things and also the anarchist rejecting any kind of absolute reference). Science continues to be an instinct (conscience and reason are intimately connected to our body and not cut off as some kind of autonomous entities), but an instinct less burdened by emotions: knowledge, in this sense, does not have a parasitic existence on our body, or does not contagiously undermines the sharpness of our instincts, rather is an instrument that cools down the Romantic explosion of our emotions.

The typology we offer in order to have access to Nietzsche’s writings must be rightly understood: there is no way we can radically distinguish between the three types mentioned above, these are sometimes intimately related, moreover the difficulty grows larger because of the lack of systematic writing that Nietzsche explicitly assumes as a specific trait of his thinking. His fragments or aphorisms often clash in their content. In order to reasonably reduce this apparent ‘chaos’ we can also use (with some reserves) the classical distinction made by Charles Adler in Nietzsche’s writings. According to him we can detect three creative periods in Nietzsche’s intellectual biography: the first period is dominated by ‘aesthetic pessimism’ because of the tragic vision discovered in ancient Greece, the central piece of this moment is The Birth of Tragedy; the second period can be rather described as ‘intellectualism’ because of the scientifically inspired critique against religion or metaphysics, Human All-Too-Human is the best example of this period; finally, the third one can

\textsuperscript{12} Nietzsche believes that the future men will be capable of developing a selective attitude only after experiencing (we could say in the form of an intoxication) everything, whether good or bad (Nietzsche, 2001, „Aurora”, in Nietzsche, Opere complete 4, Timișoara: Hestia, 47).
mostly be defined as ‘Dionysian’ and goes hand in hand with the radical affirmation of life by assuming the ‘will to power’ as the underlying principle of existence. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* expresses most emphatically this turn in Nietzsche’s thoughts.\(^\text{13}\)

**The Parasitic Science**

The twenty eight years old Friedrich Nietzsche boldly enters, with his book *The Birth of Tragedy*, in the intellectual arena. In the background of this early writing can easily be sensed the impact of Arthur Schopenhauer’s pessimistic works and Richard Wagner’s bombastic music. No wonder, therefore, that the young Nietzsche, in analyzing the ancient Greek vision about existence, enthusiastically values the *will* hiding behind the Dionysian impulse and the power of *music* transcending natural or social boundaries. According to Nietzsche’s account, the modern world lost contact, under the spell of Socrates, with the tragic pessimism of ancient Greece defined by the creative tension between Apollo and Dionysos\(^\text{14}\), ancient gods covering, if we accept Nietzsche’s speculative story, two creative impulses that justify existence in the context of a pessimistic vision based on the fundamental lack of *harmony* and *meaning* regarding human existence.\(^\text{15}\) In facing the *abyss* the Greeks return whether to Apollo who offers them serenity and individual contemplation of human life, or to Dionysos who gives them, instead, the promise of a lost unity with the world beyond any kind of social or natural boundaries, but there is, according to Nietzsche, a third alternative: the Greek tragedy which comes in as a bold synthesis between Apollo and Dionysos\(^\text{16}\). But this tragic vision is undermined by Socrates who skillfully manages to turn things upside down: the instinct, as a specific trait of an aristocratic world and also of the Greek tragedy, is replaced by the faculty of reason which, according to Nietzsche, is an expression of an incipient mass culture. Normally the instinct is creative and the consciousness is critical, at Socrates things are

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\(^{14}\) Nietzsche, „Nașterea tragediei”, 20.

\(^{15}\) *Ibidem*, 28-29.

\(^{16}\) *Ibidem*, 51.
backwards, the instinct is critical and the consciousness is creative\textsuperscript{17}. According to Nietzsche this abnormal situation is made possible by the overemphasis of a peripheral organ (reason) on behalf of the central ones (instincts)\textsuperscript{18}. The unhappy result is the ‘theoretical man’ who believes that thinking is capable not only to fully understand our world but also, in an overly optimistic account, to correct it according to some rational standards\textsuperscript{19}. 

Later on, Nietzsche finds the source of this calculating consciousness in \textit{socialization}: people are pressed to communicate, in order to face together outside dangers, by developing a structure capable of memorizing signs and of efficiently evaluating means and purposes, the original animal instinct is supplemented, therefore, by a relatively artificial structure (consciousness) that becomes, during the most part of the human cultural evolution, envisioned as an entity cut off from our instincts defining (religiously and metaphysically) the essence of man\textsuperscript{20}.

Nietzsche believes that we need to reestablish the right order of our faculties: our body, as the reservoir of our instincts, must be accepted as the center of our human nature, meanwhile our consciousness must be understood rather as a late grow of this organic unity. Even though consciousness has a parasitic existence, Nietzsche is careful enough to mention that this anemic faculty is the product of our instincts, therefore, the laws of science are not universal (as usually considered) but dependent on our individual biological needs to transform our environment\textsuperscript{21}.

The metaphor of the parasite is intended to capture a certain ambiguity implicitly revealing itself in the lines mentioned above, that is, the ambiguity between \textit{internal} and \textit{external}: the parasite, by definition, is partly internal (because is glued to the organism in order to survive, it is in a way a part of its host) and partly external (because it also represents something that can harm the host on the ground that this new entity cannot be harmoniously integrated in the body). This ambiguity remains persistent.

\textsuperscript{17} Ibidem, 60-61.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibidem, 61.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibidem, 66.
even when Nietzsche’s writings radically change their tonality. For example, in *Ecce Homo* (one of his last books) Nietzsche remains haunted by the idea of a synthesis (unrealistically) embracing philosophy, science and art, a synthesis that seems to be cleared from the shadows of some parasitic existence.

**Science and Contagion**

Nietzsche slowly removes himself from the Romantic vision present in his first book *The Birth of Tragedy* by adopting a more critical and functionalist discourse without giving up, in the same time, his previous intention to place the body in the center of our human essence. But, as we shall see, there are some up and downs. Anyway, Nietzsche also describes science in a different sense: it becomes the space of expression of a contagious proliferation of different elements putting in danger modern culture’s immune system.

If in *The Birth of Tragedy* the Socratic reason is a firm and active one (designed to correct our existence according to its standards), in *Untimely Meditations*, on the contrary, reason becomes the symptom of a dangerous tolerance, of a weakness unselectively swallowing any kind of historical information. Modernity is the late product of the Socratic moment by overvaluing reason on the behalf of our vital forces, but a reason that meantime has become a shadow of its earlier form. Nietzsche, when talking about science, still mixes indistinctly history, philology, or natural sciences. Now his purpose is mainly a frontal critique of ‘*Geisteswissenschaften*’ (in order to talk like Dilthey22): history and philology that, according to Nietzsche, destroyed, through their so called objectivity, our creative instincts. In this sense, history resembles not a collection of neutral data, as the historian or the philologist naively believes, but more the creative act of an artist shaping the content of history. Modernity defined by tolerance,

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22 Dilthey, Wilhelm (2002), *Esența filosofiei*, București: Humanitas. Dilthey’s famous distinction between ‘*Geisteswissenschaften*’ (‘spiritual sciences’) and ‘*Naturwissenschaften*’ (‘natural sciences’) is made after Nietzsche wrote his works. Therefore, we tried to cover both meanings because, according to Nietzsche’s account, history, philology, but also natural sciences are all affected (of course, in different degrees) by the rationalization of European culture that started with Socrates.
hibridity, or erudition (all these meaning the lack of a creative selective principle) is menaced, under the pressure of its own ‘obesity’, by the prospect of self-destruction. The scholar is the purest reflection of this macro-situation being defined by Nietzsche as a mix of different impulses and stimuli, the scholar, therefore, resembles an ‘impure metal’\(^\text{23}\). Moreover, the scholar lacks any kind of creativity nurturing, in the same time, resentments against those who are creative\(^\text{24}\). In this context, Nietzsche believes that in the relationship between life and knowledge the last one has become, because of its contagious spread, a menace for its own basic source, that is, the life\(^\text{25}\).

Nietzsche maintains his early basic portrayal of science as some kind of contagious disease destroying the healthy constitution of modern man but he introduces, in the same time, some readjustments mirroring the changes occurred in Nietzsche’s philosophy. The concepts of instinct and life, abundantly present in early and middle works, are, in a way, shadowed in the late ones by a philosophy centered more and more on the will to power, now the fundamental principle explaining the explosive creativity of life. In this reading history represents the battlefield for two distinct forces: those who deny life through a nihilistic will to power and those who affirm life by assuming the amoral essence of life\(^\text{26}\). In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* Nietzsche explicitly resembles science with resentment\(^\text{27}\). The scientist expresses his weakness because of his desperate attempts to find a point of certitude in order to secure himself from speculations, he looks for some ground or base honestly recognizing, in the same time, that Zarathustra was right when once said that truth is nothing but the ‘instinct of truth’\(^\text{28}\). Zarathustra talks as someone who cured himself from the illusion of a false certitude promised by science and realized that this hides, in fact, the resentment towards the radical affirmation of life and, therefore, the will of power underlying it.

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24 Ibidem, 265.
In *On the Genealogy of Morals* Nietzsche becomes even more radical regarding his attitude towards science, a science that now is considered as the latest and, in the same time, the noblest form of ascetic ideal. Asceticism is originated, according to Nietzsche, in a weak instinct that tries to overcome its weakness, expressed as a fear of nothingness, by projecting a purpose: the ascetic man prefers wanting the nothingness than wanting nothing. Nietzsche speculates here the paradox of weakness that can, in some way, become an advantage: the violence and the pain brought by existence, stripped from any kind of moral constraint, can be accepted only by the strong spirits; meantime, the weak ones (as the ascetic men) try, in a desperate attempt to conserve themselves, to project transcendent goals securing them against the tensions of real life. This projection, despite its capacity to avoid total self-destruction, ends up, in the same time, in denying more subtly the real existence and its amoral essence expressed as will to power. Nietzsche goes on in revealing what he views as the basic perversity of the ascetic men, more specifically, priests: they claim having the ability to heal our souls but the way they administrate the medicine of faith rather keeps, through guilty conscience, the wound unhealed.

Moreover, Nietzsche believes that the greatest danger for those affirming life are not their equal opponents, but the weak ones, those who can destructively insinuate themselves (we could say, as parasites or viruses) in the person born with strong instincts. We have already seen, science does nothing than to further continue this culture based on resentment because, even though science deconstructs the truth of religion or metaphysics, it still believes in the existence of a truth in itself (Nietzsche revises one more time his ideas canceling, this time, what he already said in *Zarathustra* about the scientist that finally understood, despite his resentment, that truth is in fact an instinct and not something outside ourselves). Science is not yet prepared, according to Nietzsche, for accepting the fact that there is no truth but only will to truth. The art, on the other hand, is more honest with itself because it simply sanctifies the lie, it accepts the will to error as a good conscience fully assuming, in this way, that there is no absolute truth but only perspectives on things, by this

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assumption the art proves to be, as Nietzsche generously concedes, more effective in undermining asceticism.\footnote{Ibidem, 284.}

**Science as Hygienic Instrument**

Nietzsche envisions science, especially in the middle and the last period of his intellectual biography, as a useful instrument in philosophy’s hands. His early books: *The Birth of Tragedy* and *Untimely Meditations* are followed by writings that adopt, more or less explicit, a critical stance towards the Romantic spirit defining his first works. The weapon used in this masochist exercise is, surprisingly, science which before that was held responsible for the intellectualization of modern world. In *Human All-Too-Human* or *The Gay Science* he tries to define the area of science by assuming the radicalization of the project of Enlightenment in deconstructing prejudices and also by renouncing its own metaphysical illusions. After all, truth is, according to Nietzsche, nothing more than an ‘army of metaphors’\footnote{Idem (1998), „Adevăr și minciună în sens extramoral”, in Nietzsche, *Opere complete* 2, Timișoara: Hestia, 560.}. Therefore, science has to undermine the mystical aura around religion or poetry in order to reveal, with arguments and proofs, their lack of consistency. Nietzsche, as a newly self-discovered Aufklärer, goes even deeper in attacking the Romantic myths blurring him and his contemporaries: a genius is an enemy of the truth, says Nietzsche, as long as it is not guided by the cautious and modest spirit of science\footnote{Idem (1998), „Omenesc prea omenesc”, in Nietzsche, *Opere complete* 3, Timișoara: Hestia, 245.}. Science is in fact the perfect mean to cool down Romantic explosions and to assure a state of equilibrium: the unbearable tension, culturally induced by Christianity, poets, philosophers or musicians, has to be compensated by the intervention of a more skeptical and cold attitude best exemplified by a scientist\footnote{Ibidem, 140.}. Using the apparently paradoxical formula of a ‘Gay science’ (science is usually thought as being grey and lacking vitality), Nietzsche attempts to express the necessity to redefine science by leaving out its idealism (and therefore its obsessive focalization on absolute truth that
denies, in this way, real existence) and adopting instead a functionalist attitude that is pragmatically adapted to the concrete needs of human life. In fact, Nietzsche consciously makes a methodological import from science in order to fight both metaphysics and science (the metaphysical core of science). That is the reason why, he often states that he left behind old speculations about human nature using instead the more accurate instruments of psychology. Later on, in *Will to Power* Nietzsche seems to reaffirm, in the context of a more emphatic philosophy centered around the ambiguous formula of will to power, one more time his credo about the proper place of thinking: knowledge works, says Nietzsche in a brief and synthetic manner, as an instrument of power\(^3^4\).

The Synthesis

Nietzsche does not seem very happy with either of the alternatives presented above that try to establish the relationship between a philosophical and scientifical attitude. Therefore, Nietzsche seems concerned with the idea of a synthesis embracing and transforming the ambiguity of a parasitic existence, the contagious capacity of the virus or the neutrality of an instrument. It seems that this (almost impossible) synthesis represents a kind of necessity underlying the very basis of his philosophical vision: *on one hand*, Nietzsche is highly suspicious about the radical leveling caused by democracy and modernity trying to maintain the need for some kind of hierarchy based on the difference between center (the body, host) and periphery (intellect, parasite); *on the other hand*, Nietzsche is also tempted by anarchy and by the destruction of boundaries or hierarchies (an attitude best expressed by Dionysos), contagion is nothing but the negative expression of a fundamental need for mobility and overcoming boundaries that define a truly free spirit; *finally*, he is also aware that these attitudes always need the assistance of a cold rational control in order to avoid the unbearable parasitism or the lack of selection brought by contagion.

Regarding his attempts towards a synthesis, we can trace them back to his first writing *The Birth of Tragedy* in which Nietzsche expresses his hope of a regained unity between knowledge and art as a modern replica of

\(^{3^4}\) Idem, *Voința de putere*, 316.
that between the ancient Apollo and Dionysos. In Human All-Too-Human Nietzsche portrays a unity in which science could harmoniously, as an individualized entity, coexist with art and philosophy as two principles (the cold and the warm) equally important for the life’s equilibrium\textsuperscript{35}. This need for a, what we could call, differential unity represents, according to Nietzsche’s confession in Ecce homo, the most fundamental pursuit of his instinct: in other words, he always wanted to make sure of the possibility of hierarchically ordering his capacities, still, without creating hostilities between them, or without mixing them indistinctly; in other words, a huge multiplicity radically different from chaos\textsuperscript{36}.

Conclusion

The way Nietzsche understands the relationship philosophy has with science remains connected to specific vocabularies defining in fact the internal tensions of his own thinking: on one hand, it is about a biological discourse structured around the metaphors of ‘purity’/‘impurity’, a discourse that is justified, in Nietzsche’s view, by his attempt to revalue, against metaphysics, the central place of our body; on the other hand, Nietzsche unleashes a powerful attack, based on functionalist arguments, against the traditional way of thinking that looks to secure itself through essences (soul, reason, God etc.) lying beyond existence, but in this way Nietzsche, ironically, turns his pragmatic approach against his own biologist discourse biased, we think, by the assumption of some deeper reality expressed in our instincts. It seems obvious, therefore, that the relationship based on parasitism or contagion belong mostly to a biologist vocabulary that Nietzsche adopted, meanwhile the instrumental relationship is related mostly to his functionalist or pragmatic vocabulary. Still, as we have already said, these three types cannot be understood separated from each other. Nietzsche consciously wants to unify them in order to overcome tradition without, we believe, totally succeeding in his attempt. Science continues to be portrayed, as in the case of the majority of the philosophers, as a secondary discipline relating it to the overall dominance of philosophy. For (the late) Nietzsche only philosophy, or more specifically only a new

\textsuperscript{35}Idem, „Omenesc prea omenesc”, 143.

\textsuperscript{36}Idem (1994), Ecce homo, Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, 46.
type of philosophy (his own), can be the expression of the will to power in his affirmative side. In all the three alternatives described above science remains dependent on instinct, life or will to power, even though, Nietzsche admits its fundamental importance in deconstructing metaphysical prejudices. Therefore, Nietzsche is almost perfectly adapted to the traditional relationships that philosophy has with science, in the sense that philosophy is placed, despite the attacks against philosophical reflection, in the center of disciplines justified by the Greek tradition and that, in the same time, there is an obvious import of method from modern science that is used to attack classical thinking.
MORAL OBJECTIVITY AND MORAL REALISM

Bogdan A. Dicher

Abstract
In these papers, I present three major trends in contemporary moral philosophy: non-cognitivism, subjective cognitivism and naturalistic realism. The analysis main focus lies in revealing the sort of objectivity that each of this theories can claim for moral statements. I suggest that both cognitive subjectivism and naturalistic realism fail to give an acceptable reconstruction of moral objectivity. Non-cognitivism, although it performs better, has extremely modest claims, and we need an argument to the extent that we can live with such modesty. Part I sets the stage for the entire inquiry, by analysing the conceptual resources adequate for it.

1. I suppose British officers or public service employees in the 19th century in the overseas colonies had a rather clear conception of the purposes of their mission there. Being in the service of the crown meant, among other things, that they had a duty to introduce, at least by the force of the example, the British (generally, the European) way of life to the natives. They named this aspect of their task that of showing the ‘savages’ what ‘civilisation’ is and what its benefits are. Every native ‘oddity’, irrespective whether in gastronomy, law or morality, was explainable by the fact that the natives were ‘uncivilised’. Somehow, I suspect that for all these servants of the European ‘Cultural’ Empire this mission was quite natural and meaningful – hardly was anything happening to shake their certainty and trust in the goodness of their actions.

However, sometimes during the 20th century, all this changed massively; space was made for the idea that civilising ‘savages’ was a meaningless endeavour, on at least two counts. Firstly, what was of salient importance for these non-European civilisations was acknowledged as having some value, on the count of diversity: being peculiar was no longer taken to mean ‘valueless’. Secondly, the idea developed that those civilisations may simply be just as good as the European one. Otherwise said, the idea emerged that no civilisation was closer to truth than others,

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that different life styles and different claims about what makes life worth living were equally good.

The way these ideas – presumably representing the primary insight on which relativism subsequently developed – have expanded is frightening: not so much because they have spread everywhere, but because they appear to be internal consequences of our worldview: Insofar as our society became one based on respect, tolerance, (if not care then) understanding for the other, and insofar as there seems to be no stronger idea at the basis of our ‘world’ than that of the individual as bearer of fundamental rights, we have, as it were, been forced to grant this status to every human being. Nevertheless, there seems to be no point in doing this while at the same time denying that the worldview of ‘the other’ makes sense or has any value. This would go against what one could call the principle of cultural reasonability: one cannot respect somebody and at the same time believe he is a savage. Equal dignity must be granted to every specific way of evaluating and living a human life.

Now this fact obviously puts a tremendous pressure on traditional accounts of ethics. Kantian autonomy, self-legalisation and universality of moral judgement seemed to have lost contact with the human life, for what sort of universal moral judgement would allow somebody to feed on fellow villagers and what sort of universality is that which amounts to uniformity? The various forms of utilitarianism performed no better, for the ideas of the pursuit of good or of happiness have always received meaning on a Europe-centred conception of the good-life. This is the situation moral philosophy had to cope with against the background of major philosophical changes.

Given all this, my aim in the next sections of the paper will be to present critically the development of ethical theory, following the major answers proposed to the metaphysical questions underlying the whole field of inquiry in the attempt to cope with the above mentioned pressure.

2. Before actually plunging into these waters, it may be appropriate to attempt a pro domo plea, for the current situation in moral philosophy (especially as performed within the analytic tradition) seems able to deter almost everybody from paying attention to such issues.

Our daily lives present us with a multitude of moral or ethical problems, varying from the rather casual (and of restricted interest) private
dilemma of whether one should give away one’s seat in the bus to some aged person, to the ‘public’ dilemma concerning abortion, warfare, and the like. Faced with these issues – and if we care about them – we all expect philosophy to provide determinate answers to them. So, the layman thinks that it is the task of philosophy to explain away his doubts concerning, say, the justifiability of invading a foreign country based on some pre-emptive or prophylactic defence ideology by saying whether an action so justified is right or wrong. And, indeed, the layman’s expectations are quite correct: if there is to be any profit from the business of moral philosophy, it must come in some determinate answers to questions of this sort. Yet most work in moral philosophy seems to be devoted to such issues as: Is there any point in qualifying a moral statement as true or false? Do ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ refer to something? Is the reference of moral terms irreducible part of our (minimal) ontology? So what is the layman to make out of these sophisticated topics? There seems to be no more fantastic dream than the dream that providing answers to such philosophical questions would also solve the layman’s problems1.

Nonetheless, this fantastic dream is the only dream worthy of being dreamed. It is not that the layman is making a mistake: rather, he wants answers to questions that we are only now beginning to understand. We surely need answers to our everyday moral questions and in most cases we can even provide such answers, but this does not mean that we have the clearest possible idea of what the question actually was. This is the reason why sometimes we have moral dilemmas. Philosophers should probably take a step forward and be honest to the layman: philosophical progress is slow and painstaking. It is unlikely that Socrates would obtain from any of us a better answer than those given by Euthyphro (and I take this to hold irrespective of the topic). Nevertheless, abandoning the quest is the worst thing we can do. It follows that when the layman is complaining that philosophy provides no answers to his moral problems, although this might be right, he should refrain himself from understanding this complaint as a reproach to the philosopher’s lack of interest in substantive moral problems. Rather, he should be aware of the fact that the philosopher is in pretty much the same position as he is as far as substantive moral problems.

1 To be sure, we all are non-professionals when faced with these problems as our own problems.
issues are concerned: philosophy is only in the preliminary phase of trying to make sense of the question as such, of determining the (possible) shape of the answer. Only after solving this propaedeutic phase of the quest can we embark on the subsequent task of providing substantive moral theories.

3. What is the meaning of objectivity? Or, more important, what is the meaning of objectivity within the moral realm?

Well, we should better ask this question somehow differently. When two persons, each of which we think to be morally respectable persons, disagree on whether a given moral statement is true, how should we best describe their disagreement? To take this one step further, how can we, in such circumstances, decide who is right and who is wrong? Both these questions seem sensible enough and also limpid, and yet they have the power of carrying us deep into the realm of tough moral questions.

For one thing, those committed to the relativistic insights outlined in §1 would doubt that the moral problems have right or wrong answers. Or, at least, they will doubt this when ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ are construed as we usually construe them.

Secondly, some may believe that the phenomenon of moral disagreement is not at all alike other sorts of disagreement. We can disagree about whether the hydrogen atom contains one or more electrons. Obviously, there is a correct answer to this. Likewise, we can disagree about whether a chess move is correct (that is, it is permissible according to the rules of the game) or not. Moral disagreement seems to resemble more to ‘chess-disagreement’ than to ‘chemical-disagreement’. However, the analogy with chess is not so all encompassing, as one may believe. This is because disagreement concerning conformity to a chess rule is, generally, a straightforwardly settling matter. There are books we can appeal to to see whether we got it right or wrong. Moreover, we know – as a consequence of knowing both what ‘chess’ means and what chess is – that any chess move can be either correct or wrong; no middle way is possible. But this is somehow to idyllic an image when applied to the case of morality. Here, we have a feeling that the disagreement goes much deeper, that no simple answer is possible. Furthermore, most of the times, the idea of moral correctness concerns the correctness of the rule, rather than that of an action according to the rule.
Nevertheless, the clearest idea that we can make about the meaning of objectivity as predicated of moral terms or judgements is via the claim that to every (or at least most) substantial moral questions presented to us, there is a definite correct answer.

This way of setting the question has the advantage of connecting objectivity with truth in a highly intuitive way. Rather than speaking about objectivity in terms of mind independence, which would severely limit the class of objective solutions, reference to truth will be more liberal and perhaps more useful.

4. I have argued in the second paragraph that, although the most important task which ethical inquiry may embark on is that of providing substantive viable ethical theories, this task lacks any chance of success unless preceded by a metaphysical analysis of the main issues peculiar to the moral realm.

Our daily life – even more than our philosophical life – is the field of most moral problems and battles. Say we walk on the street and we see a gang of hoodlums burning a cat for entertainment. Unless there is something really wrong going on in our heads we shall say that what they are doing is morally wrong: burning cats for fun is not a morally good thing. (To be sure, one can hardly take this action to be morally good even if it were performed with some other, more refined or useful purpose.) The problem now is to determine how we (usually) think of such statements.

Let us begin by considering a somehow larger set of statements, and ask the same question about all of them. Let the statements be:

S1: Burning cats is wrong.
S2: I have a terrible headache.
S3: The rock is limestone.
S4: The rock is granite hard.
S5: Some cats are vicious.

Consider S3, which exemplifies the type of statements that we are most accustomed to, i.e. statements about macroscopic aspects of the reality. By uttering S3 we usually identify a given fragment of rock as belonging to a certain class of rocks; to put it somehow differently, we ascribe a given property (or a given set of properties) to a specific item. In our case, we say that the rock consists mainly of calcium carbonate, has a

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2 Credit for this horrifying example goes to Gilbert Harman, *The Nature of Morality*. 
whitish (or yellowish) colour, is rather soft etc. It is reasonable to see all the properties in this list as being the notes of a certain predicate: of being limestone. What about the truth of S3? Well, any non-professional (about logical matters) knows this much. Namely, that it is justifiable to assert S3 just in case S3 is true. In turn, its being true amounts to the fact that the relevant state of that part of reality that is of interest corresponds to the actual content of S3 (and the other way round). This idea of correspondence provides the terms in which we usually think of the truth-value of such statements. In fact, we can readily introduce here Tarski’s material adequacy condition or the T-schema: 3

(T) ‘The rock is limestone’ is true if and only if the rock is limestone.

Now this understanding of S3’s truth can work only if some more detailed conditions are fulfilled. Particularly, it must be the case that both ‘rock’ and ‘limestone’ are genuinely referential terms. To see that this is so, consider the following classical example:

S*: The present king of France is bald.

Since the locution ‘present king of France’ has no reference we can either say that S* is false, that is, there is nothing of the sort of the present king of France belonging to the extension of bald, or we can say that S* is neither true nor false because the locution ‘the present king of France’ fails to be referential. In both cases, S* fails to be true.

The same holds for S5, which ascribes some character trait, namely viciousness to some cats (presumably on the grounds of their behaviour). But here we must wonder what exactly viciousness means and how do we arrive at ascriptions of such traits. Presumably, this can be done only after an analysis of the behaviour of the cat. So, if we know of one particular cat – say, Themistocles – that it hunts birds and eats fishes from the fish tank and scratches children, than we would presumably be justified in asserting ‘Cat Themistocles is vicious’ and, therefore, ‘Some cats are vicious’. But what if our feline Themistocles is so lazy that it sleeps most of the day, so that its entire behaviour reduces to eating and sleeping? How can we still say that Themistocles (Themy for short) is vicious? Since we are talking about a trait of character, we must bypass all reference to its behaviour in order to ascribe viciousness to it and this can be justified only if we are

3 See Tarski, ‘The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages’.
committed to realism about character traits. There are two important
issues here. First, we should notice that nobody would ever ‘gladly’ assert
that Themy is lazy without being in possession of relevant empirical
information about Themy’s behaviour. So if we were asked whether we
think that Themy, the laziest cat in the world, is vicious, most of us would
say that we cannot answer this question simply because we lack the
relevant information. Some of us would really deny that the question, as
formulated, has any meaning at all – and by this, I understand that no
determinate answer is possible. This is because we have to accept that it
would be illegitimate to give a yes-no answer to the question, since its truth
depends on the obtaining (or failure to obtain) of a state of affairs to which
we have no access. Specifically, if Themy’s behaviour is so severely reduced
as I have hypothesised, then the obtaining or not of Themy’s psychological
condition of being vicious transcends our possibility of recognition.
Therefore we are not entitled to assert ‘Themy is vicious’ or ‘Themy is not
vicious’, and, moreover, we are not even entitled to assert the disjunction
of these two statements, i.e. ‘either Themy is vicious or Themy is not vicious.’
Those that take this line of thought are committed to some form of non-
realism in respect to character traits. Nevertheless, it should be observed
that the first step towards this position is already made by the layman’s
refusal to give a straightforward answer to the question.

Leaving these issues relating to S5 aside, we can focus now on S4.
Apparently, the analysis of S4 can be exactly parallel to that of S3, so that
we would have no problem in asserting the corresponding T-equivalence.
However, suppose we are talking to a physicist so deeply immersed into
physical theory that he would deny that a predicate like ‘hard’ makes any
literal sense. This is because atoms constitute matter and aggregates of
atoms (rocks in particular) are not solid: in fact – if you like, contrary to all
appearance – they are hollow. (To be sure, it appears to most of us that
solidity is a salient ingredient of hardness.) So is S4 true or false? Moreover,

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4 Compare this with Dummett’s analysis of the parallel situation of ascribing bravery to
someone that never had the opportunity to exhibit such a trait, i.e., to behave bravely. See
Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, essay ‘Realism’. In this paper, Dummett holds that the
logical principle at stake is tertium non-datur, but, as he has come to realise, this is a mistake,
as it does not go deep enough in locating the problem. This actually lies at the deeper level
of the principle of bivalence.
can we accommodate its truth or falsity within that understanding of truth that goes with Tarski’s schema? Well, what we would say today (following, in fact, Locke’s insight) is that hardness is a secondary quality or property, that is, that although physical objects have no immediate property of that type, in relation to us (i.e., to any observer having perceptual abilities similar to those of human beings) things may appear hard or soft. The same goes for colour concepts, probably for sounds and for a lot many other properties. Therefore, it would appear that S4 is indeed true. The second question is much more difficult, but, from the layman’s perspective, no doubt the T-schema is quite compatible the way we think of its truth. At least, this is so insofar as generally (on a daily basis) we are realists about secondary qualities.

Let us see now what happens when someone utters S2: ‘I have a terrible headache.’ Presumably, when I utter S2 I report something about my present health condition. Now reporting actually means that I am conveying (to somebody) a piece of information about something. It follows that I can either tell the truth or lie about my present health condition and so that S2 is a genuine statement, capable of being appraised as true or false. Therefore, prima facie at least, the T-schema seems to work without any problems in this case. However, some philosophers, following Wittgenstein5 have held that sentences of this type do not make genuine statements. In fact, they do report something about the way I, i.e. the one that utters S2, feel, but this is not done via an authentic transfer of cognitive content, of knowledge, but rather in the same way ‘Ouch!’ reports something. On this analysis, it would follow that ‘I have a terrible headache’ is not a genuine statement, capable of being true or false, but rather some sort of signal that I am experiencing some discomfort. Therefore, we cannot legitimately speak of S2’s truth or falsity.

5 We arrive thus at the statement that really concerns us: Burning cats is wrong. How can we speak of its truth-value and what problems do we encounter in its analysis?

5 See Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*. How faithful to Wittgenstein’s actual views would this link be, is a matter of interpretation. For reasons to believe it is, see Blackburn, ‘Wittgenstein, Wright, Rorty and Minimalism’, pp. 161-164. Crispin Wright firmly opposes the idea; see his *Truth and Objectivity*, p. 202 sequitur.
It seems quite clear that our ordinary utterances of such statements are made in full confidence that S1 does not differ from S3. That is, ordinary utterances of S1-type statements are made in full confidence that:

(i) uttering them we are expressing genuine statements;
(ii) the statement is true (or can be true);
(iii) the (ontological) commitments implied by (i) and (ii) are met.

Now, the above listed items specify the salient ingredients of a realistic orientation in moral philosophy. Unfortunately, not even this much can pass without qualification.

We need to observe the fact that (i)-(ii) on a side, and (iii) on the other side, stand in no connection as clear as we have assumed so far. We have tried to make sense of the idea of the ontological commitments that would be required by endorsing a statement as true by way of S* (of §4). It was intuitively clear there that failure to fulfil them meant that S* fails to be true (by either being false or else by lacking a truth-value). However, this clarity was achieved only under a determinate conception of how truth should be construed (in this case, as correspondence between the statement and the reality to which it refers).

One can wonder what would happen were one to endorse a different construal of truth. Consider, the intuitionist (more generally, constructivist) account of truth. On this account, truth is to be identified with (or perhaps reduced to) warranted assertability. That is, intuitionists believed that we could speak of a statement being true only when we have sufficient information to establish this effectively. In slogans: truth does not transcend evidence. Whereas when thinking of truth as correspondence, it is always the case that ‘p or not-p’, on the intuitionistic construal of truth, this does not hold, for it would mean either that we have enough information to assert p, or that we have enough information to assert non-p. Notoriously, this is not always the case. Well, what happens when the language we are

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6 I am, of course, setting the issue in terms that are somehow broader than the original ones. Intuitionism being concerned mostly with mathematics, the main term was ‘proof’, but, of course, ‘warranted assertability’ is the best we can come up with when discussing outside the mathematical realm. There is a common philosophical danger lurking here: this is the tag or the label danger. ‘Constructivism’ is the name shared by doctrines in both moral philosophy and mathematical philosophy; in each domain it stands for different things, which we could hardly bring together. This calls for a ‘contextual’ reading of the labels and the reader should be prevented of this fact; otherwise, great confusions may arise.
concerned with is moral language? Would the adoption of an intuitionistic account of truth for moral language amount to a (significant) departure from realism, as it is the case with mathematical language?

What we are actually questioning is whether there can be (or if we can make any sense of the idea of) moral truths not within our reach. If we allow that there can be such truths, then an intuitionistic account of moral language would imply a departure from realism. What is clear is that the only reason to admit this would be acknowledgement that there are some moral judgements of which we cannot say that they are true or false; this would amount to admitting the possibility of indecidable moral judgements. It follows that there are moral statements such that we have no ‘effective procedure’ for determining whether they are true or false. At this point, it may appear that we are walking on a terribly wrong path. Firstly, because we can wonder what sense can the concept of ‘effective procedure’ make in respect to moral language? When presented with a moral statement we are not applying an algorithm to check whether the statement if true or fails to be so. Endorsement of the statement (or rejection of it) seems to involve nothing of this kind. Most often, we do not even apply such weak an algorithm as checking to see whether the statement fits those moral statements we have already endorsed. Secondly, we almost never decide that it is undecided whether a given moral statement is true or false. Moral statements are both evaluative and normative. It is disputable whether we can make sense of undecided evaluative aspects of them. What seems clear is that we can never allow for normative undecidability. A moral statement either requires us to act in a specific way or it does not.\footnote{Of course, this does not imply that whenever presented with a moral statement we are sure of the right way to act, according to it. However, this not because the statement cannot be judged either to require an action or not. Rather, the case may arise that we do not know which particular action would amount to compliance with the requirements of the given moral statement.}

Another important point upon which the connection between (i)-(ii) and, respectively, (iii) depends is the way we decide to make sense of the idea of complying with the ontological commitments. In the strong sense, this would require that whatever ontological aspects the truth-value of the statement depends upon be met as such. (Or, to be more specific, that they are met as the face-value construal of the statement requires.) For instance,
when presented with a moral statement ascribing ‘fairness’ to something or somebody, the moral commitments implied would be met just in case there would be, in our ontology, a moral property of being fair. This reading obviously excludes any sort of reductionism from the picture, one cannot consistently say to comply to the ontological exigencies the face value construal of the statement imposes while believing that moral properties should be reduced to, e.g., natural properties. On the contrary, a more ontological modest reading of (iii) would grant that it is compatible with a specific sort of reductionism. Under this reading, the ontological requirements imposed by the truth of ‘X is fair’ would be met even if fairness should be understood in a naturalistic and reductionist fashion, rather than simply admitting fairness into our ontology.

A final word about the setting of the dispute is called for and I will try to answer it in the next paragraph.

6. It appears that the proper way of understanding the issues we are concerned here is the metaphysical one: into this sometimes-bitter exchange between realists and non-realists, we should see a fight for the correct mapping of the reality. Therefore, the question of moral realism is, in fact, the question whether we should dedicate – in the folder of existing things – a file for moral properties (and various other items that appear to be part of our moral ontology). In that I fully agree with Michael Devitt, who never grows tired of making this point. Opposing (prima facie, that is) to this is the conception Michael Dummett puts forward, according to which both realism and the various species of antirealism are, in the end, semantic theses, i.e., theses concerning the correct model of meaning for statements of the relevant class (here, for moral statements). According to Dummett, the metaphysical setting in which the debate is sometimes cast (and in favour of which Devitt argues) is nothing but a metaphor, which, although distinct from the semantic issue, brings nothing extra into discussion (with the possible exception of some further, unnecessary complications). In substance, Dummett’s view is that realism can be equated with a full acceptance of the principle of bivalence, i.e. the principle that every statement (of the disputed class) is determinately either

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8 See his ‘Moral Realism: A Naturalistic Perspective’ and ‘Dummett’s Antirealism’.

9 This is in fact the main point of Dummett’s philosophy, everywhere stated. My personal favourite statement can be found in the ’Introduction’ to The Logical Basis of Metaphysics.
true or false, while antirealism consists (mainly) in the rejection of the principle.\textsuperscript{10,11}

Devitt’s own choice in setting up the problem of moral realism obviously favours condition three above, as he states that moral realism amounts to:

\textbf{MR1:} There are objective moral facts.\textsuperscript{12}

\textbf{In turn, this can be paraphrased as}

\textbf{MR2:} There are people and acts that are objectively morally good, bad, honest, deceitful, kind, unkind etc (virtues and vices); acts that one objectively ought and ought not to perform (duties); people who are objectively morally entitled to privacy, to a say in their lives, etc. (rights).\textsuperscript{13}

Now the point of rephrasing MR1 is that MR2 is invulnerable to any objection rooted in the dubious status of facts.

The trait of the characterisations that makes Devitt especially proud of it is that it does not involve any \textit{semantic thesis}. And this happens although MR1 can be stated in semantic terms, i.e. as the claim that moral statements have objective truth-values. Moreover, he allows that employing semantics can be useful in order to obtain some evidence for the

\textsuperscript{10} Some detail points that Dummett makes motivate the use of ‘mainly’ here. For instance, traditional disputes over realism (like the medieval one) do not seem to concern the truth of some statements, but rather the reference of some terms. What opposed nominalists to realists in the Middle Age was not some disagreement over the proper way of understanding the truth of statements concerning universals, but rather the disagreement of the way in which one should account for the reference of these terms; that is, it is not only the fact that statements have determinate truth-values that is at stake, but the debate concerns also the way in which we should account for their obtaining a determinate truth-value. Therefore, alongside with the unrestricted endorsement of the principle of bivalence, we should add, as a characteristic of realism, a certain conception of the way in which these truth-values are determinate. According to Dummett, the conception peculiar to realism is that underlying the classical two valued semantics. See Dummett, ‘Realism’, esp. pp. 56-57.

\textsuperscript{11} Even this much is somehow controversial, for Dummett, while characterising realism and anti-realism as semantic doctrines also allows that they are metaphysical theses (see, e.g., \textit{ibid.}, p. 106). He probably believes more than just that the whole content of these doctrines can be adequately set up in semantic terms. However, as unclear as these issues may be, what matters for Dummett is the semantic aspect of the problem.

\textsuperscript{12} ‘Moral Realism: A Naturalistic Perspective’, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{13} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 3.
metaphysical – genuine – debate (while informing us that he is quite bored of this kind of arguments).\textsuperscript{14}

Devitt’s pride and joy in his alleged non-semantical characterisation of (moral) realism is stunting. For as soon as we shall ask what we gain by setting the issues the way he wants us to, everything around us seems to become foggy.\textsuperscript{15} Let us take MR\textsuperscript{1} for granted. What does it mean that there are ‘objective moral facts’? While we need no account of what it means to say ‘It is a fact that the socialists have won the elections’, this does not seem to be the case for ‘It is a fact that burning cats is morally wrong’. In the first case we are reporting something that happened, that’s for sure; moreover, we also express our commitment to the truth of that statement or the trust that it is correct to utter the statement. But what exactly are we doing in the second case? Now the point here is not so much to answer to this question, but rather to acknowledge that the question itself is pressing. We usually do not feel any need for receiving an explanation of why it is a fact that the socialists have won the elections, or to ask what saying that means. Clearly this is not the same when we are speaking of moral facts.

First of all, when uttering a moral statement of the kind exemplified above we are not just simply reporting a happening; we are also saying that \textit{we} would never burn a cat, or that we dislike burning cats or the like. But this is not the same in the case of the former statement: if one utters ‘It is fact that the socialists have won the elections’ you may never know whether one is thrilled by that fact, or on the contrary, one dislikes it. Again, the point is not so much that we need an account of what it means that something is a moral fact. Rather, I am trying to say that this way of approaching the problem is in great need of further elaboration.

So far, I find Devitt’s work highly uninformative in this respect. But generally, it is doubtful whether we can fully explain what it is for something to be a fact without jumping over the fence from the metaphysical field into the semantic garden. For consider what it is that an elucidation of ‘facts’ would consist in. It seems rather obvious that we are

\textsuperscript{14} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{15} To a certain extent, this is the least problem that confronts Devitt’s account; this is because it is, most likely, the simplest and most unsophisticated counter argument possible. Yet, if we think enough about him, we shall find it to be powerful enough to cast some serious doubts about Devitt’s stance.
interested to know what is it that allows us to describe facts, how can we
describe facts, what are the criteria for recognising something as a fact and
so on. All these features are so that – at least up to now – our best way of
tackling them is via semantic considerations.

However, fairness commands us to see what changes are brought
into our picture by recasting moral realism in the terms of MR2. Obviously,
our main concern lies in expressions such as ‘objectively morally...’ and in
what is it that ascriptions of ‘moral objectivity’ amount to. Consider again
the statement ‘Burning cats is objectively wrong’; this makes no reference to
moral facts; it refers to human actions. And there is nothing problematic in
the ontology of human actions. Yet, we still need to make some sense of
what we mean by qualifying an action in that way. This does not seem to
be the case when we say ‘Atoms exist objectively’: here we simply know
what we mean by this. The problem with a moral statement is that, besides
being – or appearing to be – informative, it has also an evaluative
dimension. It is with this dimension that an ascription of objectivity to
moral statements seems to be connected.

When talking about the objective wrongness of the action of
burning cats we do not mean to say that something is independent of us,
rather, we mean that there can be no debate about the correct way of
qualifying such an action. Otherwise putting it, we mean to say that the
statement ‘Burning cats is objectively wrong’ can be asserted in any
circumstance in which a cat is set on fire, irrespective of the purposes of the
arsonist. We are saying something about the proper way to use such a
statement, namely, that it can be used whenever somebody sets a cat on
fire. Usually, the correctness of assertions is always a function of both the
way the world is and of the meaning of the asserted statement. Any
assertion of ‘Atoms exist objectively’ depends on both the things that are
the ultimate constituents of reality and on the meanings of ‘atom’, ‘exist’,
and ‘objectively’.

But in the moral case, the way the world really is seems to be quite
unimportant. Suppose we live in a world in which there are no cats, where
any cat would have the same status as unicorns have in our actual world.
Would we then say no more that burning cats is objectively wrong?
Obviously, we would not, for this would imply that if some creatures like
the cats were to evolve in this counterfactual world, it would be all right for
us to torture them. On the other hand, we still have to consider the case of ‘wrong’. Say we live in a world in which there is no such think as ‘wrong’. But what does this mean? Many of us think that our ontology should not be burdened with such bizarre objects as moral values. Devitt himself is committed to this view (because he is a naturalist). All these remarks are meant to show that we need some rather special account of what we mean by ‘moral objectivity’. No doubt, such an account can be given, but it will be made in terms of semantics because this is what we need in order to explain how it can be that ‘Burning cats is wrong’ can be asserted irrespective of the way the world is.\(^\text{16}\)

Yet, I have said earlier that I agree with Devitt’s contention that what interests us in the realist-antirealist debate is the ontological, or generally, metaphysical aspect. But I can quite consistently believe this while at the same time believing that the only way to solve this kind of issues is by a laborious work in the ‘undergrounds’ of metaphysics, that is, in the field of the theory of meaning.

\(^{16}\) This is something like an overstatement, for it can be taken to mean that it is analytical that ‘Burning cats is true’ and this view is one that nobody would want to hold. However, it may be that truth – moral truth – depends on what we think about something, not necessarily about the world, so that ‘Burning cats is objectively wrong’ can still be non-analytical (if true at all).
LA MODERNITÉ ET LES ETATS POSTCOMMunistes

Maria Gyemant*

Abstract
European identity is strictly related to modernity and its specific approach, rationalism. Becoming part of Europe, the post-communist states must assume this identity and, in doing so, deal with whatever crisis it implies. Following Edmund Husserl’s and Jürgen Habermas’ reflections we will try to explain what the rationality crisis means and what are its causes. Thus, defining modernity by its qualities and its dangers we will be able to draw a picture of the world in which the post-communist states must enter once their socio-political alternative collapsed. Their play in the resolution of the modernity crisis is, in our opinion, of great consequence.

L’année 1989 constitue un moment essentiel dans l’histoire de l’Europe contemporaine, notamment le moment où le modèle occidental gagne face au socialisme qui se désintègre. Paradoxalement, cette victoire, à la place de fortifier et justifier le modèle capitaliste, ouvre une série de questions difficiles concernant les crises que celui-ci engendre et sur la possibilité des alternatives. L’origine de cette situation paradoxale peut être identifiée dans le collapse du communisme même : celui-ci n’a pas été renversé par une révolution installant un régime plus efficace, mais il a implosé à cause de son propre manque de viabilité, laissant les anciens pays communistes avec la seule alternative du modèle occidental. Ainsi, ce modèle a été embrassé par ces pays par manque d’alternative et non à partir d’arguments raisonnables fournis par une véritable pensée politique. Nous essayerons, dans les pages suivantes, d’engager une discussion sur le vrai sens de la modernité en tant que caractéristique des sociétés occidentales. En analysant les valeurs qui constituent la base de la modernité nous montrerons pourquoi celle-ci est aujourd’hui la meilleure

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forme d’organisation social-politique, quelles sont ses avantages et les dangers qu’elle implique et quelle est la position des États postcommunistes en rapport avec la modernité. L’enjeu d’un tel approche sera premièrement d’éveiller une véritable conscience politique dans des pays comme la Roumanie, où le modèle moderne est repris sans une réflexion authentique sur lui, où les valeurs modernes (la démocratie, la paix et surtout le bienêtre) loin de fonder la démarche, devient un but en soi en vue duquel la société entière devrait être transformée. Le cours de notre réflexion sur la modernité sera décidé par quelques questions concernant le chemin que les pays postcommunistes doivent suivre et les dangers qu’elles doivent éviter. Une première question concerne l’Europe, son histoire qui l’a amenée où elle est aujourd’hui, l’essence du processus par lequel les sociétés occidentales ont mis en place le modèle de la modernité qui aujourd’hui ne laisse pas de place pour aucune alternative. Cette question amorce naturellement la question corollative : comment peuvent les pays postcommunistes acquérir la modernité, quelle a été la cause de leur retard et si, dans le processus inévitable de modernisation elles peuvent éviter les crises de la modernité qui constituent le thème de réflexion pour un important nombre de penseurs contemporains.

Pour répondre à nos questions nous commencerons par l’exposition de deux des plus importantes théories de la crise de la modernité. Il s’agit, d’un part, de celle qui constitue le leitmotiv des derniers écrits d’Edmund Husserl, d’autre part de la conception de la crise de légitimation et de la crise de motivation, les deux étant les effets d’une crise encore plus profonde, cette fois d’essence philosophique, notamment la crise de la rationalité telle qu’elle est présentée par Jürgen Habermas au début des années ’70. Pour la conception husserlienne nous partirons du texte d’une conférence qu’il a donné à Vienne le 10 mai 1935 sous le titre La crise de l’humanité européenne et la philosophie. Pour rendre compte de la vision de Habermas nous utiliserons la traduction anglaise du chapitre 6, "Teorems

of Legitimation Crisis” du volume Legitimation Crisis2 ainsi que son ouvrage Le discours philosophique de la modernité3. A la suite d’une explication de ces deux conceptions nous tâcherons d’offrir une image synthétique de ce que signifie la modernité comme essence de l’Europe contemporaine. Ainsi, les avantages, mais aussi les dangers de ce modèle deviendront plus claires et cela nous permettra de passer à la deuxième partie de notre essai. Cette partie contiendra des réflexions sur le statut des pays postcommunistes que nous exprimerons à partir de l’ouvrage de Andrei Marga intitulé Cotitura culturală (Le tournant culturel)4. Les crises propres au système communiste, leurs conséquences qui persistent même aujourd’hui au niveau politique, économique, culturel et personnel, le véritable sens de la transition dans laquelle se trouvent ces pays, ce vers quoi elles se dirigent et les étapes qu’elles doivent parcourir constitueront les problèmes dont traitera notre deuxième partie. Nous pourrons tirer, à la suite de cette analyse, une série de conclusions concernant ce qui est moderne, prémoderne et postmoderne dans l’Etat de développement des pays postcommunistes, quelles sont les alternatives au modèle moderne et si elles sont véritablement à prendre en considération. Autrement dit, nous poserons la question de savoir ce que nous attend au bout de la transition, qui, pour anticiper, est dans notre opinion la traversée même de la modernité.

La question de la crise prend dans la dernière philosophie d’Edmund Husserl la forme de ce qu’il appelle « la crise des sciences européennes ». Il s’agit d’une crise de fond avec les racines dans le rationalisme des Lumières et concerne moins le statut des sciences effectives que l’attitude de l’homme moderne face au monde et à sa connaissance. En mai 1935, dans sa conférence de Vienne, Husserl annonce une « maladie de l’Europe » pour laquelle son texte cherche un remède. Comme dans le cas de toutes les maladies, le chemin vers la solution passe par l’investigation de la nature du corps malade, des causes immédiates de

3 Jürgen Habermas, Discursul filosofic al modernităţii, trad. Gilbert V. Lepadatu, I. Zamfir, M., Statu, Bucureşti, All, 2000
4 Andrei Marga, Cotitura culturală, Cluj University Press, 2004
la maladie et la façon dont le corps peut vaincre la maladie en détruisant où neutralisant les causes. Celui-là est aussi le chemin choisi par Husserl. Il part de l’identification d’une essence de l’Europe au-delà des arguments géographiques et historiques, une essence spirituelle commune qui unifie les citoyens de l’Europe dans un projet commun orienté vers l’avenir et indépendant de tout conflit ponctuel entre des pays. « Quelle est l’image spirituelle de l’Europe ? » demande Husserl dans *La crise de l’humanité européenne et la philosophie*. « Elle est le déploiement de l’idée philosophique de l’Europe spirituelle, idée immanente à l’histoire de l’Europe. Autrement dit, elle est sa téléologie immanente qui se manifeste au niveau de l’humanité en général sous la forme d’une nouvelle époque qui naît et commence son déploiement. C’est l’époque d’une humanité qui, depuis maintenant forgera librement son propre être et sa propre histoire par des idées rationnelles et des tâches infinies »5 L’esprit de l’Europe se définit, par conséquent, par le projet commun de la connaissance qui embrasse toutes les sciences et projette un horizon infini engageant tous les individus et toutes les nations dans une mission unique. Nous pouvons remonter dans son histoire jusqu’au moment de sa naissance dans la philosophie dans la Grèce antique. Nous retrouvons ici l’étonnement produit par le monde environnant et qui est la condition essentielle de l’attitude contemplative qui caractérise l’aube de la philosophie et qui se définit en opposition avec l’attitude orientée vers des solutions pratiques propre aux autres philosophies de l’époque (par exemple celle de l’Extrême Orient). En effet, le propre de la philosophie grecque est l’orientation des questions vers une connaissance pure théorique qui doit résoudre des problèmes d’essence. Pour simplifier, le moteur de la connaissance consiste dans un changement de nuance qui remplace la question de savoir « pour quel but » avec « pourquoi ». En se posant la question de savoir pourquoi le monde est tel qu’il est, la philosophie promeut une connaissance qui constitue son propre but et ouvre un horizon infini dans lequel peuvent s’inscrire des nouvelles questions, car ce qui est à connaître ne s’épuise jamais. Les sciences dans

leur multiplicité naissent du perfectionnement et de la spécialisation des questions, de la façon dont elles structurent ce qui est à connaître en domaines de recherche. En effet, elles constituent, d’après Husserl, autant de branches de la philosophie. La philosophie reçoit ainsi le statut de science des sciences. Les sciences se justifient par le fait que leurs objets sont idéaux, autrement dit des vérités universellement valables, et nullement des intérêts pratiques qui sont relatives et étroitement liés aux contextes. Ce trésor de vérités universelles constitue pour Husserl le spécifique de la pensée européenne et réunit génération après génération dans une tâche commune. Mais, avec la spécialisation des sciences, l’attitude théorique arrive à influencer aussi le domaine pratique des décisions de la vie concrète. « En vertu de l’exigence qui consiste à soumettre l’empirisme tout entier à des normes idéales, à savoir celles de la vérité inconditionnelle, il s’ensuit aussitôt une ample transformation de toutes les activités pratiques, c’est-à-dire de toute la vie culturelle ; elle ne doit plus être normée par l’empirisme naïf de tous les jours et par la tradition, mais par la vérité objective […] Dès lors que l’idée générale de la vérité en soi devient norme universelle de toutes les réalités et vérités qui se présentent dans la vie humaine, cela concerne aussi toutes les normes traditionnelles, celles du droit, de la beauté, de la finalité, des valeurs humaines régnantes, des valeurs de caractère personnel »6. Si donc, à l’origine, l’attitude théorique propre de la philosophie se définissait par opposition à l’attitude naturelle centrée sur des objectifs pratiques, avec la spécialisation des sciences et le recouvrement par celles-ci de tous les domaines de la vie, la philosophie se retourne sur la vie pratique et la redéfinit par des termes et des critères propres.

A la fin de la première partie de sa conférence Husserl résume clairement cette idée ainsi : « Un nouvel esprit tirant son origine de la philosophie et des sciences particulières, un esprit de libre examen et produisant ses normes à l’aune des tâches infinies parcourt l’humanité, créé des idéaux nouveaux et infinis. Certains sont pour des hommes isolés dans leurs nations, d’autres pour les nations elles-mêmes. Mais ce sont aussi en définitive des idéaux infinis pour la synthèse des nations, en extension incessante, par laquelle chacune des nations, du fait même qu’elle renonce à ses propres idéaux, aspire en esprit à l’infini, offre ce qu’elle a de

6 Nathalie Depraz, "La crise de l’humanité européenne et la philosophie", op. cit., p. 76
meilleur aux nations réunies. Le tout supranational constitué de toutes ses sociétés étagées sort élevé de ce mouvement de don réciproque, nourri de l'esprit d'une tâche infinie divisée à profusion en une infinité multiple et pourtant unique. La philosophie conserve elle-même une fonction dirigeante et une tâche particulière infinie dans cette société totale idéalement orientée. Elle conserve la fonction d'un retour théorique sur soi-même, libre et universel, qui englobe aussi tous les idéaux et l'idéal total, c'est-à-dire l'universel des normes. Dans l'humanité européenne, la philosophie doit exercer de manière constante sa fonction d'archonte de l'humanité entière >. En effet, la philosophie en tant qu'unité de tous les idéaux des sciences particulières, est aussi la clé de voute de l'identité européenne.

La crise européenne identifiée par Husserl est la conséquence directe du développement de l'esprit critique moderne qui entraîne un écart entre les sciences et la philosophie. Il ne s'agit pas d'une simple compétition entre des domaines parallèles mais d'une transformation de l'attitude de l'homme européen face à son monde (Lebenswelt). Cette transformation découle du développement du rationalisme et des succès surprenants des sciences. Pour comprendre ce changement nous devons revenir au moment de la naissance de la philosophie et regarder de plus près la différence entre le monde qui engendre l'étonnement philosophique et le monde qui, à la fin du parcours philosophique de l'humanité, devient l'objet des sciences exactes. L'objectivisme propre à la modernité constitue d'après Husserl la cause principale de la maladie dont souffre l'Europe. En effet, la philosophie grecque nait des questions que les hommes adressent à la nature. Mais il s'agit d'une nature subjective qui est effectivement vécue et de l'intérieur de laquelle partent les questions. Cet aspect subjectif est complètement occulté dans les sciences modernes de la nature dont une condition minimale est l'objectivité. Cette exigence d'objectivité situe le scientifique au dehors et en face du monde qui devient son objet. Ce que Husserl voudrait mettre en évidence ici est le fait que les sciences, tout en objectivant le monde, en le purgent de toute mythologie naïve, se retrouve dans une position de naïveté encore plus grave parce que ignorée. Ce qui échappe aux sciences est le fait que, tandis que leurs lois postulent des vérités absolues, celui qui formule ces lois n'est pas un observateur

7 Ibid., pp. 79-80
Dejà en 1935 Husserl constate une crise de la rationalité moderne. Cette crise restera actuelle en touchant des nouveaux domaines appartenant à la science, et cela constituera le thème des écrits des années '70 de Jürgen Habermas. En prenant comme thèse le fait que tout système social-politique est susceptible d’engendrer une crise, l’analyse du capitalisme tardive peut constituer un bon point de départ pour l’étude de la crise de la modernité. Nous pouvons identifier dans le capitalisme tardif quatre systèmes relativement indépendantes : le système économique, le système administratif, le système légitimateur et le système socioculturel. Si nous essayons de suivre la logique de la crise nous observons une certaine circularité qui entraine dans son mouvement les quatre systèmes. Pour éviter la crise économique, l’État adopte une politique d’intervention, en prenant le rôle de garant de la stabilité économique. Pourtant, cette politique ne peut être mise en place que par la reconsideration du rôle des institutions et de l’apparat administratif. « Dans ce contexte » affirme Habermas dans *Legitimation Crisis* « des questions culturelles acceptée sans

extérieure mais une partie intégrante du monde, étant ainsi dépendant du contexte de son découverte. Le partage du monde en deux sphères séparées, celle de l’objectif et celle du subjectif, en privilégiant l’objectif comme unique source de connaissance, constitue un danger significatif, car il lui manque très peu pour transformer même l’être humain en un simple objet en le réduisant à son corps. Husserl critique l’absurdité de cette approche dualiste en proposant comme solution le retour à une philosophie centrée sur la relation entre l’homme et son monde de vie. Cette philosophie est la phénoménologie transcendantale.

Le dernier paragraphe du texte husserlien clarifie la position du philosophe par rapport à la crise européenne. Si une telle crise existe, elle n’est pas la conséquence du rationalisme dans son essence, car le rationalisme est l’essence même de la philosophie en tant que propre de l’esprit européen. La crise est simplement l’effet d’un détournement du rationalisme vers un objectivisme et un naturalisme scientifique qui fait violence à la nature humaine et affaiblit la disposition naturelle de l’homme vers la philosophie. La solution à la crise n’est, ainsi, pour Husserl rien d’autre que le retour à la philosophie.

Mais, à regarder de plus prés, cette crise est simplement un effet d’une crise plus profonde, la crise de la rationalité qui est propre à la modernité. Dans Le discours philosophique de la modernité Habermas thématise cette crise en définissant sa propre position par rapport à la modernité comme une critique modérée. Selon Habermas, la faute de la

8 Jürgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, op. cit. La traduction des citations nous appartient.
9 Andrei Marga, Filosofia lui Habermas, Iași, Polirom, 2006, p. 128. La traduction des citations nous appartient.
10 “There is no administrative production of meaning”, Jürgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, op. cit.
11 Ibid.
modernité, plus précisément des Lumières, est une autoréférentialité généralisée. Cela étant dit, Habermas s’engage néanmoins dans une critique détaillée des plus connues critiques de la modernité, celle de Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault et Derrida et du refus absolu de la subjectivité qui leur est caractéristique. Concernant ce refus, Habermas affirme : « avec ce principe de la modernité sont rejetées non seulement les conséquences nuisibles de l’autoréférence objectalisante, mais aussi les autres connotations, que la subjectivité portait avec soi comme une promesse inachevée : la perspective d’une praxis conscient de soi dans lequel l’autodétermination solidaire de tous devrait s’accorder avec l’accomplissement de chaque individu »12. Il y a, selon Habermas, un danger de la modernité dans le fait que la raison devient la seule force légitimatrice et le seul système de référence auquel peut se rapporter l’être humain. Cette réflexivité générée par la nouvelle conception du sujet a des conséquences sur les autres sphères de l’organisation humaine. Le sujet est fort individualisé, il est le seul responsable pour les normes et les valeurs qui dirigent sa conduite. Dès lors, la critique généralisée comme seul modèle de pensée relativise ce qu’autrefois constituait un repère fixe. « La subjectivité en tant que principe de la modernité devait déterminer le contenu normatif de celle-ci ; simultanément, la raison centrée dans le sujet conduisait à des abstractions qui divisaient la totalité éthique ; néanmoins, seule l’autoréflexion naît de la subjectivité, mais se projetant au-delà des limites de celle-ci, devait rester pouvoir de la conciliation »13. Comme Husserl, Habermas considère que la modernité et le rationalisme qui lui est caractéristique n’ont pas encore dit leur dernier mot. Loin d’avoir échoué dans son projet, la modernité a été simplement abandonnée en faveur d’un nombre de théories qui, à la limite, se contredisent eux-mêmes. Ainsi, sa promesse devrait être ressuscitée et ramenée plus loin. Afin de reprendre ce projet, Habermas propose le passage du paradigme subjectif au paradigme intersubjectif de l’entendement dans le cadre d’un discours concret et d’une praxis. Il s’agit de ce qu’il nomme le paradigme de la communication, probablement le thème le plus connu de la philosophie de Habermas. Le contexte du dialogue transforme la dualité sujet-objet dans une expérience

12 Jürgen Habermas, *Discursul filosofic al modernității*, op. cit., p. 317. La traduction des citations nous appartient.
13 Ibid., p. 32.
complètement nouvelle dans laquelle le monde n’est plus un simple objet en face du sujet mais est donné latéralement, comme endroit nonthématique de la rencontre et prétexte pour la communication intersubjective. Les règles de cette communication concernent la validité de ce qui est dit et des intentions des locuteurs, de même que le succès du meilleur argument et la légitimation du discours au moyen du consensus.

A la suite de nos explications nous pouvons maintenant montrer les traits caractéristiques de la modernité. Une première remarque serait que les Lumières et la modernité sont étroitement liées dans la mesure où la modernité remplit le projet des Lumières. En effet, les traits de la société moderne sont son fondement dans l’État de droit, les libertés individuelles, la dissémination de la culture par l’éducation. Le rationalisme philosophique qui accompagne la pensée moderne, le succès des sciences, la responsabilité politique exprimée par des élections libres ont comme corrélat le développement économique spectaculaire et l’industrialisation, le marché libre, la propriété privée et le principe de la concurrence. En ce qui concerne l’éthique, la justice rationnelle et les systèmes de lois égales pour tous remplacent la morale de type religieux. Ces aspects positifs ont cependant aussi une contrepartie négative. Si nous devrions réunir tous les effets négatifs de la modernité en un seul aspect, celui-ci serait probablement le formalisme exagéré présent non seulement dans les sciences mais aussi dans l’organisation de la société, formalisme qui isole l’individu dans la sphère de ses intérêts immédiats et l’empêchent de participer effectivement à la vie de la société. Il nous reste, ainsi, d’analyser la situation des États de l’Europe Centrale et de l’Est en considérant les causes de la chute du communisme et le parcours de la transition vers des sociétés modernes.

La modernité a proposé deux modèles concurrents : le libéralisme et le socialisme. En 1989 le libéralisme est sorti gagnant. Dans ce qui suit nous analyserons les causes de cette victoire et ses conséquences.

La chute du socialisme a eu comme amorces les multiples crises que le système même engendre. La principale cause de ces crises a été la subordination du rationalisme à une idéologie sans arguments et le sacrifice sans limites de la société pour maintenir le pouvoir dans les mains
d’un Etat autoritaire. Nous allons nous appuyer dans l’explicitation de ces crises sur l’excellente analyse qu’Andrei Marga en fait dans son livre *Le tournant culturel*\(^\text{14}\). Par opposition au modèle occidental qui génère périodiquement des crises, le socialisme des pays de l’est a cette particularité qu’il perpétue une crise généralisée présente dans tous les aspects de la société et qui s’aggrave constamment en se nourrissant d’elle-même. Le noyau de cette crise, comme d’ailleurs de tout totalitarisme, est l’obsession pour le maintien du pouvoir et du contrôle absolu sur l’État et sur la société. Cette idée fixe qui dirige toutes les actions de l’État sans regard au prix à payer entraîne la série de crises déjà mentionnées. La crise administrative apparaît à cause de la subordination des institutions par rapport à l’État, de la pression continue que celui-ci exerce et de la centralisation qui donne place à une bureaucratie surdéveloppée qui arrive avec le temps à bloquer les institutions entièrement. Une autre conséquence du totalitarisme est la crise économique qui naît d’une crise de rationalité.

A la suite de la disparition de la propriété privée, l’intérêt des citoyens par rapport à la vie économique diminue considérablement entraînant une production faible et nondiversifiée qui n’arrive pas à satisfaire les besoins les plus basiques de la société. Il faudrait aussi mentionner un retard technique et culturel significatif qui découle du contrôle idéologique et de la censure. Enfin, une acute crise de légitimation apparaît au moment où les méthanarrations promues idéologiquement, par exemple celle de la « mission historique » où du « spécifique national » ne réussissent plus à convaincre personne. Toutes ces crises ont des effets profonds sur la population qui ne trouve plus aucune raison pour s’impliquer dans la vie politique, économique où culturelle de la société. Une passivité caractéristique en découle, un mépris de soi-même et des autres. Cette dernière crise est aussi la plus grave, car ses effets sont encore visibles longtemps après la chute du communisme. La destruction du moral et de la moralité des citoyens, la déstabilisation permanente du respect de soi, le désespoir et la misère généralisées qui amènent à une parfaite indifférence par rapport aux autres sont des effets de longue durée du régime et dont la disparition marquera la véritable fin de la transition. Les crises multiples, prix à payer pour le maintien du pouvoir socialiste, ont amené finalement à l’érosion de l’État.

\(^\text{14}\) Andrei Marga, *Cotitura culturală*, op. cit., pp. 412-414
Cependant, il faudrait reconnaître l’efficacité du socialisme à prévenir les révolutions. « C’est la raison pour laquelle la fin du système n’est pas advenu par une révolution mais par une simple chute (breakdown) »15. En effet, une révolution présuppose une certaine conscience civique des citoyens, l’élaboration d’un système rationnel meilleur proposé pour remplacer l’ancien. Or, l’esprit civique dans les sociétés socialistes est presque inexistant. En vérité, le collapse du socialisme n’a pas été tant le résultat de l’action politique des citoyens que la conséquence du retard économique. Nous pouvons faire ici une comparaison avec le capitalisme tardif qui, de même que le socialisme, quoique pour d’autres raisons, ne laisse pas la place pour une révolution. Si nous reprenons le propos de Habermas dans *Le discours philosophique de la modernité*, dans le capitalisme tardif « le monde de la vie s’est décomposé en systèmes partiels spécialisés de point de vue fonctionnel, tels que l’économie, l’Etat, l’éducation, la science etc. Ces monades systémiques qui ont substitué les relations intersubjectives épuisées par des rapports fonctionnels, ont un rapport systémique les uns par rapport aux autres sans que leur équilibre précaire puisse être réglé au niveau macrosocial »16. Due à l’autonomisation des diverses sphères de la société, ainsi que à la spécialisation de chaque domaine, la société ne peut plus se connaître dans sa totalité, aucun mouvement n’a l’expertise pour reformer tous les domaines dans une unité cohérente. Par conséquent, une révolution totale remplaçant un système avec un autre, une société qui se comprend et se refonde de manière rationnelle est dans le cadre de la modernité tardive pratiquement impossible. « Sans un macrosujet autoréférent » affirme Habermas, « quelque chose de la sorte d’une connaissance autoréflexive de la totalité sociale est aussi peu concevable que l’action de la société sur elle-même. Du moment où les intersubjectivités supérieures des processus publiques qui forment l’opinion et la volonté remplacent le sujet supérieur de l’ensemble de la société, ces rapports à soi-même perdent leur sens. Nous pouvons poser la question si cela a encore un sens, après le changement des prémisses, de parler de “l’action de la société sur elle-même” »17.

15 Ibid., p. 416
16 Jürgen Habermas, *Discursul filosofic al modernității*, op. cit., p. 335
17 Ibid., loc. Cit.
A partir de ces réflexions nous pouvons dire qu’un des grands projets que la modernité a réussi d’accomplir a été de trouver un système intrinsèquement stable et immun aux révolutions. De ce point de vue, le socialisme est aussi efficace que le libéralisme. Nous avons donc, face à face, d’un part un système qui élimine la résistance de la population par censure et contrôle et d’autre part un système qui évite la révolution, et donc son renversement, par une spécialisation et une formalisation profondes des domaines, une autonomisation associée avec le choix libre politique et économique, plus ou moins illusoire, plus ou moins manipulée par les médias. Une dérésponsabilisation de chaque domaine par rapport au tout de la société s’associe avec une grande responsabilisation de l’individu en ce qui concerne sa moralité et ses choix. La conséquence est grave au niveau de l’individu. Celui-ci est mis dans la situation de donner son opinion et d’en être responsable dans des domaines dont la grande spécialisation lui ôte le véritable accès. D’ici jusqu’une paranoïa acute n’est qu’un seul pas, car l’individu est toujours dans la position d’entrevoir et de se prononcer sur une vérité sans vraiment saisir son sens et toujours dans le doute qu’il y en a plus à savoir, à voir que quelqu’un aurait l’intérêt de lui cacher des choses. Entre le socialisme qui réduit au minimum le poids de la décision de l’individu et l’infestation de choix du libéralisme où le sujet se trouve dépassé par la situation, la véritable pensée politique créatrice ne peut plus surgir et ainsi, la révolution devient impossible. Si nous voulons simplifier, nous pourrions dire que ce qui se trouve ici face à face sont les modèles des deux grandes antitopies que la littérature nous fournit, celle d’Orwell et celle de Huxley. De ces deux modèles le gagnant a été, sans un trop grand effort, celui qui, à coté de la stabilité, offre aussi le bienêtre et une liberté sinon véritable, de moins illusoire ; celui dans lequel la figure du leader tient dans ses mains tout le pouvoir s’efface et le pouvoir se disperse dans des systèmes autonomes dont personne n’est plus entièrement responsable.

Le modèle capitaliste a gagné naturellement, étant le seul debout. Les anciens Etats communistes se sont dépêchées de parcourir les étapes de la modernisation dans une transition au bout de laquelle elles ont été acceptés comme faisant partie de l’Europe, comme étant dignes de l’aligner
au spécifique européen que Husserl retraçait jusqu’à son origine dans la philosophie grecque. La transition, telle qu’elle est expliquée dans Le tournant culturel, présuppose trois étapes : la modernisation récupératrice, la modernisation synchronisatrice et l’adaptation à la globalisation. La première étape implique le fait de récupérer le modèle démocratique de l’État de droit, l’adoption d’une constitution qui assure les libertés des citoyens, autrement dit la création d’un cadre politique adapté au développement d’un Etat moderne. La modernisation synchronisatrice suppose l’alignement du système administratif et économique aux normes occidentales et constitue, selon Andrei Marga, l’étape la plus significative de la modernisation. Enfin, l’adaptation à la globalisation constitue une troisième étape que ces États doivent franchir. Ainsi, la transition présuppose un parcours rapide des étapes de la modernisation de la sorte qu’elle constitue un véritable laboratoire pour tester les théories sur lesquelles se fonde les États occidentaux. La transition est par conséquent rien d’autre que la modernité de ces pays.

Il faut pourtant se demander qu’est-ce qui attend au bout de cette transition. Est-ce que cela constitue un bon objectif, d’attendre que les problèmes avec lesquelles se confrontent les pays occidentaux deviennent aussi leurs propres problèmes ? Est-il plausible que ces pays se fassent un titre de gloire du fait d’avoir atteint un tel niveau de développement que maintenant elles peuvent assumer les « honorables » problèmes de la modernité ? Regardons de plus près la situation de la modernité tardive. Sa fin a été proclamée par un certain nombre de philosophes. Il est clair que la modernité d’aujourd’hui n’est plus la même chose que les Lumières. Il est aussi clair que, tant que l’on parle de la fin de la modernité, nous ne pouvons pas ignorer le fait qu’il y a une crise. Néanmoins, en regardant de plus près des alternatives, la modernité résiste comme le meilleur modèle existant. Les nouvelles alternatives, laissant du coté le socialisme, sont le néolibéralisme, le postmodernisme et le traditionalisme. Le traditionalisme est une variante fréquente plutôt dans les pays de l’Europe Centrale et de l’Est après l’intégration européenne. Il prend souvent la forme du nationalisme et ses bases sont la plupart du temps des fausses traditions. De son coté, le postmodernisme avance une critique virulente de la modernité sans pourtant s’efforcer d’offrir une alternative positive. En s’opposant frontalement à la modernité, le postmodernisme se trouve dans
la posture de critiquer le rationalisme qui lui est propre, laissant se déduire
un privilège de l’irrationnel qui, au niveau politique, ne peut engendrer
qu’une anarchie. De plus, un discours théorique à la fois irrationnel et
cohérent étant impossible, le postmodernisme est forcé à s’inscrire lui-
même parmi les discours de la modernité qu’il critique. Enfin, le
néolibéralisme serait moins une alternative à la modernité qu’une variante
accentuée de celle-ci qui privilégie le marché libre et la société civile et
ayant comme conséquence une décentralisation encore plus prononcée.
Nous ne voyons pas, cependant, comment le néolibéralisme serait une
solution aux crises de la modernité.

Par comparaison avec le régime socialiste, la modernité est
evidemment préférable. Ainsi, les États postcommunistes n’ont pas
d’alternative que de parcourir pour leur compte cette modernité. Ce qui fait
que la modernité résiste à toute alternative, étant à l’abri de toute
opposition frontale, est son essence fondamentalement rationnelle. L’irrationnel
ne sera jamais préférable à la raison car l’organisation d’une société ne peut
se faire que de manière rationnelle, soient les raisons justifiées ou non,
efficaces ou non. La modernité n’est, en effet, pas gagnante seulement dans
la lutte avec le passé, mais aussi avec des projections dans l’avenir de
modèles alternatives. Dès lors, les crises qui lui sont propres ne peuvent
être dépassées que par une reformulation de la modernité de l’intérieur de
celle-ci. Un nouvel type de modernité, toujours rationnel et pourtant
différent en certains aspects pourrait être la bonne solution à ces questions.
Habermas fournit un modèle possible, celui de la communication. Ce
modèle suppose pourtant la bonne foi des interlocuteurs et celle-ci ne peut
pas être garantie là où se confrontent des intérêts contradictoires. Une autre
solution possible serait la fondation éthique de la société de son extérieur,
par la récupération de Dieu comme autorité absolue. Mais cela contredirait
l’origine même de la raison moderne qui naît avec les Lumières pour
s’opposer à l’autorité morale religieuse considérée dogmatique.

Dans notre opinion, l’importance des États postcommunistes dans
cet problème est décisive. Dans leur cas, des aspects de la modernité se
combinent avec l’héritage malheureux du régime antérieur dont les aspects
les plus résistantes sont ceux de mentalité, et avec des autocritiques
postmodernes. Tout est donné dans un amalgame incohérent dans ces États
en transition. Bien que toutes les crises mentionnées y soient présentes ou
latentes, un énorme potentiel de pensée politique d’importance universelle s’en dégage. Si une nouvelle interprétation de la modernité est susceptible de surgir aujourd’hui, il est fort probable que cela arrive dans une de ces sociétés ni encore modernes, ni entièrement postmodernes, dans lesquelles toute l’histoire récente de l’Europe est donnée simultanément. Ce qui manque encore dans ces pays est le complément d’une véritable pensée politique, une renaissance de l’attitude philosophique, un dépassement de la bêtise de l’immédiat et de la passivité avec laquelle un modèle formel mal compris est repris et appliqué formellement en vue de l’exposition d’un résultat superficiel et formel. Seule une compréhension responsable du monde de notre vie peut nous sauver du formel qui engloutit tous les aspects de notre vie. Il n’y a pas de choses qui « nous arrivent », il faudrait que nous sommes conscients que ces choses sont le résultat de nos actions, que nous devons les maîtriser et les analyser par une autoréflexion sérieuse à nous-mêmes et à nos actions. Vu le grand potentiel que l’histoire a stocké dans ces pays, nous considérons crucial de récupérer notre dignité intellectuelle et de participer activement à la vie de notre société. Cela pourrait faire surgir au bout du compte la solution à tous les problèmes que le monde moderne doit dépasser.
THE JUDEO-CHRISTIAN DIALOGUE

Monica Meruţiu

Abstract

For nineteen centuries the relationship between Judaism and Christianity has been tensioned, delicate and changing. We are witnessing an unprecedented relationship between Christianity and Judaism, a time of historical reconciliation of the two faiths. „The Jewish problem” was in fact a European problem, because „the Jews were not only object and victim, they were also the ones through which to Europe it was presented a mirror-twisted and filled with passion in which the Europeans saw reflected their own identity problems. (Y. Yovel, Hegel, Nietzsche şi evreii. O enigmă întunecată).

The Early Church left a series of dialogues between Christians and Jews. The most famous is considered to be the one between Justin the Martyr and Trypho the Jew1 to whom Justin tries to prove that Jesus is the Messiah mentioned in the Old Testament. The dominant feature of this dialogue is the accusation of the Jews of having sacrificed the One without sin, accusation that Origen will come to express in even tougher terms: the blood of Jesus should fall not only above the Jews of his time but all times, until the end of this world. Dialogues between Christians and Jews took place during Middle Ages as well, generally characterized by mutual respect. However, prejudices concerning the Jews continue during Middle Ages in the Church mass or illustrated in the simple attitude that Christians have towards Jews, things that will make Erasmus of Rotterdam exclaim that if the task of a good

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Christian is to hate the Jews then we are all good Christians. It took time and numerous tragedies to start giving up this attitude the Jews were confronted with and only in the XVIII-th century a first change takes place. The factors determining this new approach were both theological and historical: the walls of the Ghetto fall down, thus making possible an „encounter” between Jews and Christians, also the Jews of Europe and then those of America will be given citizenship. But a first decessive step was made only in 1934 when The Conflict of the Church and the Synagogue: A Study in the Origins of Anti-Semitism by James Parker and Jésus et Israël by French historian Jules Isaac are published. Jules Isaac’s diagnose was identifying anti-semitism as the long term effect and consequence of the Church’s accusation towards the Jewish people as being guilty of the death of Jesus of Nazareth. Jules Isaac was also the author of the program of the Conference of Seelisberg taken place in 1947 whose goal was to eradicate the Christian anti-semitism and whose direct outcome was the publishing of The Ten Points of Seelisberg which underlined the fact that God speaks to us through the Old and New Testament; that Jesus was born of a Jewish mother; the first disciples, apostles and martyrs were Jews; the Christian commandements regarding the love for God and humans, already proclaimed in the Old Testament and confirmed by Jesus constitute a bond for Jews and Christians in a common human relationship. Other important points of this conference referred to the need of avoiding the distortion of Biblical or post Biblical Judaism in the use of praising Christianity, to avoide the use of the term „Jew” to express the „enemies” of Jesus, to avoide presenting the Passion of Jesus in a way that would induce the idea of a Jewish responsibility for his death, avoiding promoting the superstition that the Jewish people is condemned, damned, or destined to sufferance.

Aware of the importance of the dialogue between these two faiths in the atmosphere after the Second World War, Leo Baeck was writing that of course, there is a time for silence and a time for talking. But now, it seems like there is a season for talking. Upon us, it looks like there is given the solemn obligation for the Judaic and Christian religions to openly meet- and truly the faiths, not only groups, writers or orators. There is the possibility that someday the sin of omission
shall appear if by negligence or timidity these religions hold themselves from asking or answering the right questions.  

Baeck got once more closer to Christianity and Judaism in his essay Romantik Religion, where he characterized Christianity as a romantic religion and Judaism as a classical religion. What the German rabbi wanted to express through the concept of romantic religion was the absolute importance that the feeling has inside Christianity and Baeck ended his argument adding that what we call the victory of Christianity was in fact a romantic victory. Says Baeck:

before Christianity followed its own course and finally becoming Christianity, or differently said, becoming what is non-Jewish, it has already become strong enough to be recognized as a world religion, as a new piety that was uniting the nations. The person whose name is related to this victory, Paul, has been, like all romantics, not as much a creator of ideas, as much as a connector of ideas.

Preoccupied for the reconciliation between the two religions Baeck’s research focused not as much on the past, but mostly on the future, and his hope for reconciliation was revealed in another essay he wrote Some Questions to the Christian Church from the Jewish Point of View.

In 1960 after the audience between Pope John XXIII and Jules Isaac, a comission for the study of the Christian teachings about Jews is created. Two years later, the Ecumenic Council of Churches gave the New Delhi Declaration which asked for

the historical circumstantiation of what was taken for eighteen centuries by Christians as a reason for blaming the Jews. In the Christian teachings the historical events that have led to the crucification mustn’t be presented as if they were the Jewish people’s responsibility, when in fact they belong to the entire humanity and not to one community only. The Jews are the first

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3 Ibidem.
ones to have accepted Jesus, and they are not the only ones to not recognize Jesus.  

The essential event that marked a crucial shift in the Jewish-Christian relationship was Vatican II Council (1962-1965). This aggiornamento within Catholicism was initiated by the Catholic School of Tübingen through its major representatives Karl Rahner and Hans Urs von Balthasar. The need for a dialogue with the non-Christian religions was felt, and at that point it had become clear that the anti-semitism promoted by the national-socialism would have been impossible without the Christian Church’s anti-Judaism. Pacem in terris, John XXIII’s social encilcal promulgated shortly before his death is the first one in which a Roman Pontiff addresses to all believers not only to Catholics, declaring that “everyone has the right to worship God following their own conscience and to practice religion in the private and public life.”

Nostra Aetate meant the surpassing of great historical difficulties underlying clearly that the Jewish people can not be made responsible for Jesus’ death.

Ten years later, the Vatican publishes a guide for the relationship with the Jews: Guidelines and Suggestions for Implementing the Conciliar Declaration Nostra Aetate, focused on the common points between the two faiths: Jesus and his disciples were Jews, the same God speaks to both Jews and Christians, the history of Judaism continued after the fall of the Second Temple, and with regard to the trial and death of Jesus, the Council recalled that “what happened in his passion cannot be blamed upon all the Jews then living, without distinction, nor upon the Jews of today”. Regarding the dialogue that should exist between the two

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6 As the sacred synod searches into the mystery of the Church, it remembers the bond that spiritually ties the people of the New Covenant to Abraham’s stock. Thus the Church of Christ acknowledges that, according to God’s saving design, the beginnings of her faith and her election are found already among the Patriarchs, Moses and the prophets. She professes that all who believe in Christ-Abraham’s sons according to faith are included in the same Patriarch’s call, and likewise that the salvation of the Church is mysteriously foreshadowed by the chosen people’s exodus from the land of bondage. (Nostra Aetate)
religions it was made clear that it had to be continued, for if in the past these relations were only at the level of a monologue, the future should witness a real dialogue; and the concept of dialogue supposes that both sides want to know and understand each other in mutual respect.

In 1985, Notes on the Correct Way to Present the Jews and Judaism in Preaching and Catechesis in the Roman Catholic Church were published, reiterating the most important points of the document published ten years earlier: the fundamental conditions of a dialogue: respect for the other's individuality, knowledge of the basic constituents of Judaism's tradition, the essential features through which the Jews define themselves in the light of their own religious experience, then in 1998 was issued a document regarding the Holocaust, having a suggestive title We remember. This preoccupation for the relationship with Judaism gets a new dimension with Karol Wojtyla's election as Pope in 1978, this moment proving to be crucial for the Judeo-Christian dialogue. Shortly after his investiture the message for the two faiths speaks about the deepness and richness of their common heritage. This message represented a firm step on the way of the dialogue that culminated in 1986 with John Paul II's visit to the synagogue of Rome, once again proclaiming through the words of the well-known Nostra Aetate that the Church "deplores the hatred, persecutions and displays of anti-Semitism directed against the Jews at any time and by anyone." Then, once again he expressed his "abhorrence for the genocide decreed against the Jewish people during the last War, which led to the Holocaust of millions of innocent victims." John Paul II saw his visit as a decisive contribution to the consolidation of the good relations between the two communities, in order to overcome old prejudices and to reach the recognition of the bond and the common spiritual patrimony that exists between Jews and Christians. The Pope made clear that on these convictions rested the dialogue between the two faiths, and the meaning of his visit to the Synagogue was their reaffirming in their perennial value. His declarations focused on the common heritage of both faiths, on the love and respect that should bond them, on the common goal toward salvation, proved care and interest for the relations with Judaism, so tensed along the years. Therefore, addressing

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7 John Paul II's address at the Great Synagogue of Rome, April 13, 1986.
8 Ibidem.
himself to the Viena community in 1988, half a century after their synagogue has been destroyed by the Nazi regime, John Paul II said:

You (Jews) and we (Christians) are still weighed down by memories of the Shoah, the murder of millions of Jews in camps of destruction . . . An adequate consideration of the suffering and martyrdom of the Jewish people is impossible without relating it in its deepest dimension to the experience of faith that has characterized Jewish history, from the faith of Abraham to the Exodus to the covenant on Mount Sinai. It is a constant progression in faith and obedience in response to the loving call of God. As I said last year before representatives of the Jewish community in Warsaw, from these cruel sufferings may arise even deeper hope, a warning call to all of humanity that may serve to save us all. Remembering Shoah means hoping that it will never happen again, and working to ensure that it does not.⁹

When referring to the Jewish people, John Paul II has always reiterated the idea of the chosen people of God, considering that the clichés speaking about a damned people must be left aside, because God’s Alliance with the Jews has never been revoked.

Hans Küng remains one of the few contemporary theologians that beyond realizing a complex analyse of the relationships between the two monotheistic faiths, clearly affirmed that the Church must take responsibility for the guilt of the centuries of antisemitism that culminated with the Auschwitz events. In the same time, Hans Küng reminded how without Judaism there would have been no Christianity, advancing in the same time a solution:

one thing is of use right now, a radical metanoia, repentance and rethinking; we need to begin on a new road, to stop getting away from the Jews, but to get closer to them, in an alive dialogue, whose purpose is not capitulation, but the pure understanding of each

side, toward mutual help, which is part of no mission, toward a meeting in a truly brotherly way.  

In Judaism, complex and complete analyse of this faith, the German theologian created a profound historical and theological presentation of the personalities belonging to Judaism, starting with Abraham and ending with the postmodern Jewish thinkers.

Arthur Cohen is one of the voices belonging to Judaism, who though expressing some reserves when refering to a Judeo-Christian tradition, is aware of the necessity of a dialogue:

This is a time when people must speak out of their difference and beyond the abyss that separates them. This doesn’t mean that Christians should suspend their faith in order to learn how to speak to the Jews well and full of knowledge, or that the Jews should ban their excentric singularity in order to better identify themselves with the Christians. This means that Christians should learn to speak through Christ towards everything that is not transformed and not saved, and the Jews should speak inspired by Torah, with sagacity and mercy, which bring the world closer to perfection. There is a new communication- not one of artificial traditions and hypotetical concords, but a communion of friendship in the holy spirit that is love born from faith...”

Two faiths, therefore, that have things to learn from eachother’s experiences, but most of all two faiths that share something essential: the Old Alliance. This common heritage makes Christianity a chosen religion, too. Karl Barth very well expressed this, saying that „the Jews are unquestionable the chosen people of God until today, in the same way they were even from the beginning, according to the Old and New Testament. They have God’s promiss...”

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12 Barth, K., „Die Judenfrage und ihre christliche Beantwortung”, apud. Eva Fleischner, op.cit., p. 121.
The dialogue between Pinchas Lapide and Karl Rahner remains relevant for the way this matter should be approached in a constructive way, focusing both on the contrasts, but also the harmony between the two religions, dialogue placed under the belief that after a time of divergences a time for common points has come. The starting point was the Nostra Aetate declaration, a passage that Lapide considers to be too little mentioned: 

*Nevertheless, God holds the Jews most dear for the sake of their Fathers; He does not repent of the gifts He makes or of the calls He issues-such is the witness of the Apostle,* considering it more important than any other declarations on condemning the anti-semitism, capable of *rising the Judeo-Christian dialogue to a dialogue between equals.* Pinchas Lapide appreciated that the religious divergences must be taken so seriously that „nobody should give up their theological view. Many times, the dialogue doesn’t imply faith only, but the angle of the vision, the way of seeing things, the way it’s being articulated. In all these options, John XXIII’s motto comes to my mind: *veritas in caritate. We owe each other the truth, but in love.*”

Another constructive dialogue was the one between Pinchas Lapide and Ulrich Luz, published under the title Jesus in Two Perspectives. A Jewish-Christian Dialog. Insisting upon the misunderstandings and prejudices that existed between the two religions, upon admitting the mistakes that existed on both sides, Pinchas Lapide expressed his hopes for a reconciliation, also mentioning the famous words belonging to Hans Küng in which he underlines that

> the mass killing of Jews by the Nazis was the act of criminals without God, but without the almost 2000 years of Christian anti-Judaism it would have been impossible...none of the anti-Judaic measures the Nazis took: marking the clothes, the ban from certain professions, forbidding mixed marriages, the loss of their lands, expulsion, the concentration camps, the killing and the incineration were not new. All these were already part of the Medieval Christianity.

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Even though Bernard de Clairvaux has asked the leaders of the first crusades to protect the grave of Christ, without hurting the sons of Israel, the ultimatum they will get is baptism or death, and in case of fidelity to their faith, they were being killed in the name of Jesus Christ. In the hands of Christians the crucifix became once more the instrument of death... as if, Lapide was noticing, the love for Jesus can’t be complete without hating and persecuting the Jews.

Schalom Ben-Chorin has best shown the divergences between the two faiths when it comes to the center of Christianity, Jesus, saying that „the faith of Jesus unites us, but the faith in Jesus separates us.” It has become clear that when it comes to Jesus the dialogue should begin from low, and not from high. What this means is that in order to find out about Jesus we must go back to the background of his life, the Judaic space where he developed his teachings, to the persons that knew him and interacted with him, to his disciples. In a dialogue with rabbi Pinchas Lapide, Hans Küng emphasized that we can follow together the thirty years of Jesus’ earthly life. „What actually separates us are the 48 hours after the Holy Friday. These are almost two days, but crucial days that are the base of all the Christology!”

Another delicate aspect of this dialogue is the so called „Judenmission”, perceived by the Jews as an arrogance of Christianity; Karl Barth once asked „how can Christians morally justify the right to initiate the proselytism towards Jews, people that represent a pure religion, when Christianity is seen in the eyes of the Jews as a compromise between Jews and Gentiles? “ Barth’s answer shows a vision in which both Israel and the Christian community are conceived as united:

in and through Christ they are both members of the same people: Israel goes toward Christ, while the Christian Church takes its origins from him, coming from him. Israel doesn’t perceive this

unity between the two, but from a Christian perspective, being a Christian means being a true Jew. Because the entire Old Testament is oriented towards one moment— the accomplishment in Christ. Any mission to Christianize the Jews is, or should be, out of the question, because the Jews must get alone to the vision that the Old and the New Testament belong together.\textsuperscript{18}

Hans Küng’s position in this matter is also radical; he draws the attention that there must be a clear distinction between the Christian mission to Jews and the one to other nations:

The Church can’t take seriously the task to missionize the Jews. The Scripture can’t be presented to the Jews as something foreign and exterior to them. The Jews were never guilty of a false faith; before the Church existed they believed in the One True God and before the Church existed, not only through Church, The Scripture was preached to them.”\textsuperscript{19} A comment that can me made here is that Christianity is by its nature a missionary religion, and as J. Oesterreicher\textsuperscript{20} was saying „even when it’s not preaching, it still holds with it this proof, by its simple presence….“\textsuperscript{21} This point of view found adherents even at Jewish representatives-Leo Baeck claimed that „the fact that a pious Christian waits the day in which Judaism will find its way to Christianity is not a separation; true hope never separates, it leads to understanding.“\textsuperscript{22}

The Judeo-Christian dialogue invites both faiths to meditate on their mission, on the indestructible connection between them, on what constitutes their bond, without losing sight of what separates them, in order to be able to reconcile. „The Jewish problem” was in fact a

\textsuperscript{18} Ibidem, p. 98.
\textsuperscript{19} Kung, Hans, The Church, p.142.
\textsuperscript{20} John Oesterreicher is one of the Christian thinkers that even before the Holocaust was preoccupied of the Christianity’s relation with Judaism. Besides him, there were other personalities like Jacques Maritain or Henri de Lubac.
\textsuperscript{21} Oesterreicher, J., „Rediscovery of Judaism”, apud. Eva Fleischner, op.cit, p.114.
\textsuperscript{22} Baeck, Leo, Das Judentum auf alten und neuen Wegen”, apud. Eva Fleischner, op.cit., p. 114.
European problem, because "the Jews were not only object and victim, they were also the ones through which to Europe was presented a mirror-twisted and filled with passion in which Europeans saw reflected their own identity problems."\textsuperscript{23}

G.H.M. GRELLMANN AND THE ENLIGHTENMENT’S DISCOVERY OF THE ROMA

Cristian Suciu*

Abstract
This article presents the evolution of the most influential academic images and stereotypes of Roma in western academic tradition. The birth and reproduction of the scientific stereotypes on Roma was a long process that started with the first mentions and descriptions of Roma in medieval documents and chronicles. With the Enlightenment, the body of knowledge about Roma coagulates and traditional images and stereotypes gained momentum and legitimacy precisely due to the scientific approach of the Enlightenment scholars. The starting point of this article is the quest for the sources of the work of H. M. G. Grellmann (1753-1804), considered the father of modern research on Roma. Then I present the peculiar evolution and the impact of Grellmann’s work on later researchers throughout Romanticism. The reason for doing so is that the archetype sketched by Grellmann became the standard according to which the Roma were described, classified, or researched until the 20th century. Furthermore, I discuss on the reasons why the scientific negative stereotypes changed so little throughout very late in the 20th century.

For most of those trying to complete a history of Roma studies, the first obvious remark would be that, the mainstream perspective remained unchanged until the end of the 20th century. Only recently, a few researchers came to challenge a longstanding tradition. Its roots go back to the Enlightenment’s stance on imperative social and political action to liberate and support ‘these unfortunate and miserable creatures’ as Transylvanian ethnographer Von Wlislocki defined its Roma subjects. Romanticism created the image of a people heroically resisting the conformities of the contemporary society. Later ethnographers and their scientific obsessive quest of the ‘true Gypsy’ completed this gallery of contradictory approaches and respective attitudes.

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The birth and reproduction of the scholarly stereotypes on Roma was a long process that started before the Enlightenment but it gained momentum and legitimacy precisely due to the scientific approach of the Enlightenment scholars. My intention is to depict what was scientific about the work of such scholars particularly that of the German Heinrich Moritz Gottlieb Grellmann (1756-1804) considered the father of modern research on Roma. The starting point is the quest for the sources of his book *Dissertation on the Gipsies, being an historical enquiry, concerning the manner of life, oeconomy, customs, and conditions of these people in Europe, and their origin* (1783). The reason for doing so is that his theories about Roma’s origin, language, habits, traditions, and livelihood ended up as general truths for later scholars in many cases without additional research.

**Contextualizing Grellmann’s book**

One of the first and most accurate bibliographies on the Roma, the one of G. F. Black¹ (1914) mentions over 4000 titles. The number itself should give an image of exceptional interest and enormous effort. However, as Lucassen, Willems and Cottaar notice, the occurrence of phrases like ‘based on (or derived from) Grellmann’ is striking². It is as if the whole knowledge of the subject derived solely from the work of one man. Almost every historical or ethnographic work on Roma considers Grellmann as a reliable source. The whole scope of his work and his structure is still (partly) copied by researchers of Roma. Angus Fraser gave an answer to why Grellmann’s book was given so much credit and was so rarely challenged: he restored the ethnic identity of the Gypsy by revealing their common origin through the means of examining their language³. To understand why such a conclusion became a revelation for later generations of researchers the most reasonable thing to do is to depict the scholarly image of Roma (if any) before Grellmann and to observe briefly his methods.

In 1782, European journals published the news of a terrible act: a group of 133 Gypsies living in the Hapsburg Empire stood trial for practicing cannibalism. The fact allegedly happened in the Hungarian Hont

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County. During the investigation, 53 men, and 31 women admitted the allegations (under torture). Of these, 41 people were finally executed. By the end of the trial, the comments in the journals reached grotesque proportions, exaggerating both facts and the penalty that such barbarians deserved. In 1783, Heinrich Moritz Gottlieb Grellmann had his book *Die Zigeuner, ein historischer Versuch über die Lebensart und Verfassung, Sitten und Schicksale dieses Volks in Europa, nebst ihrem Ursprunge* published in Göttingen. The book will bring him not only fame but also the title of university professor.

The same year the Hapsburg authorities unveiled the fact that apparently nobody had been reported missing in the Hungarian county or the surrounding areas around the time of the alleged cannibal act. The fact that 41 individuals were executed for a crime that they had not committed is outrageous *per se*, but that was not an exceptional fact for the end of the 18th century. What is exceptional is the imagined crime for which they were convicted. This would not have been possible if the Gypsy had not been constructed as capable of committing such a crime. Moreover, that was exactly the type of Gypsy that Grellmann would turn into an ethnic group.

Obviously, the canibalism trial in Hungary triggered the interest of public and scholars across Europe and Grellmann was merely responding to the need of reliable scientific data. However, Grellmann approaches the subject of cannibalism in the chapter: *On their food and beverages*. He confesses that he felt compelled to discuss on such matters vividly debated by journalists in order to alert governments about this ‘hideous trait’ of Gypsy character. Apparently, the ‘habit’ was common practice among various tribes in Gypsies’ country of origin. His explanation for the lack of previous cannibalism allegations against Gypsies is just as reasonable: Gypsies have a closed and nomadic society and as long as they had been eating each other, authorities could not be aware about such events.

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4 *idem*, p. 182.
6 Heinrich Moritz Gottlieb Grellmann, *Dissertation on the Gipsies, being an historical enquiry, concerning the manner of life, economy, customs and conditions of these people in Europe, and their origin*, Goettingen, 1783, p.14.
Grellmann’s warning about cannibalism is not his only ‘political’ statement. Not coincidentally, the last chapters of his book are for the reading of state officials (Chapter XIII: Character and capacities of the Gypsies; whether they are an advantage or detriment to the state, Chapter XIV: Concerning their being tolerated by a state, Chapter XV: Essay on their improvement). His didactic remarks match the peculiar situation of Roma in the Hapsburg Empire. Under Maria Theresa (1740-1780), a series of decrees tried to force the Roma to sedentarize, removed rights to horse and wagon ownership (1754), renamed them as ‘New Citizens’ or ‘New Hungarians’ and forced Roma boys into military service if they had no trade (1761), forced them to register with the local authorities (1767), and prohibited marriage between Roma (1773). Her successor Josef II prohibited the wearing of traditional Romany clothing and the use of the Romany language, punishable by flogging7.

Grellmann witnessed the failure of these exceptionally aggressive attempts of assimilation and was ready to offer his expertise in tackling the issue. But, we do not need to read his last chapters in order to depict his reasoning on the emancipation of Gypsies. Discussing on The properties of their bodies, Grellmann remarks the dark skin of the Gypsies. The ‘cause’ is not natural pigmentation but Gypsies’ seldom interest in washing or other modes of cleaning. To prove this he gives the example of Gypsies in the Hapsburg imperial army: compelled to wash, their skin becomes fair, almost white8. In Grellmann’s eyes, character, just like appearance could be whitened.

In this respect, he was following the line of enlightened intellectuals across Europe whose ideology mitigated for the emancipation of backward people. It is the time when more and more European powers extended their control over new territories. Unlike before, this time, in the light of the new ideology, Europeans desired more than merely subduing the ‘savages’ they encountered, they wanted to civilize them. However, it is worth noting that the Hapsburg monarchy, the most powerful entity within the Holy Roman-German Empire did not posses territories outside Europe. For the Austrian and German intellectuals Roma became the ‘exotic within’, the ‘savages’ that scholars elsewhere had to search at the end of the earth. As

7 Ian Hancock, The Pariah Syndrome, Ann Arbor, Karoma, 1987, p. 34.
8 H. M. G. Grellmann, op.cit., p. 31.
Grellmann suggests, the most amazing thing about Roma is that ‘neither
time, climate, *nor example*, have, in general, hitherto, made any alteration’ to
their way of life9. That made them even more suitable for science.

In spite of Roma’s geographical proximity Grellmann did not recur
to direct observation in documenting his book. Nevertheless his sources of
information seem to be very diverse. Judging by the authors that he cited it
is clear that he had consulted almost all the known historical documents
about Roma. Still, the legitimate question is whether these documents are
relevant for any serious study. In general, medieval chronicles mention the
Roma very rarely, usually to mark the arriving and passing of the
wandering ‘brownish hordes’. Sometimes the author’s interest is
sufficiently aroused as to describe in vivid colours their odd way of life. We
find them in legal or administrative documents and archives, treaties,
edicts, dissertations or cosmographies. Some archives record briefly the
moments and the consequences of the contact between the local community
and the passing Roma, but the transparent interest is on the way the host
community spent its finances on the occasion. Many chronicles date long
after the events to which they refer. Some authors copy each other, adding
new details to the sparse fragments of stories that reached them, without
the slightest care for accuracy. Donald Kenrick points out that, out of the 62
records of Roma from the 15th century only 4 such documents describe
events that the authors actually witnessed10. However, by the 18th century,
Roma had already acquired the infamous image of criminal parasites
among scholars across Europe. Still, it would be unfair to blame Grellmann
for giving the proper weight of his epoch to those sources. The striking fact
is that authors that are more recent have taken literally the accounts in
these early sources instead of interpreting them in the broader context of
the attitudes of settled European societies towards nomadic and itinerant
groups.

Apparently, Grellmann was also aware of the very recent
developments in the study of various Romany dialects. As early as 1753,

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9 *Idem*, p. 16.
10 Donald Kenrick, ‘The Origins of Anti-Gypsism. The Outsiders’ View of Romanies In
Western Europe in the Fifteenth Century” in Nicholas Saul and Susan Tebbit, *The Role of the
Romanies. Images and Counter-Images of ‘Gypsies’/Romanies in European Cultures*, Liverpool
Hungarian minister, István Váli compiled a glossary of over a thousand words in Singhalese. He had met students from Ceylon while in Leiden (Holland). After returning home, he read the words to a group of Gypsies who apparently were able to understand most of them. In 1776, Jacob Bryant collected a few hundreds of Romany words and noticed the analogy to Indo-Iranian languages. Finally, in 1782, a year before Grellmann, linguist Johann Rüdiger published an essay in which he suggests the northern Indian origin of Romany\(^{11}\).

However, Grellmann gathered undoubtedly most of his information from a series of over 40 articles about Hungarian and Transylvanian Roma submitted between 1775 and 1776 to the Viennese journal *Wiener Azeigen*. The author remained anonymous for over two centuries. Wim Willems has recently identified him as Lutheran minister Samuel Augustini ab Hortis of Upper Hungary (Slovakia)\(^{12}\). Besides the need of turning the Roma into human beings and good Christians, the Hungarian minister asserts the Indian origin of Romany language. Willems could not tell whether the minister derived his expertise from direct observation but in any case, his theory was extrapolated by Grellmann to apply to all groups of Roma\(^{13}\). Grellmann’s interpretation pointed to an ancestral common language and, consequently, to an ethnic group speaking that language. Furthermore, as Willems underlines, Grellmann had no idea to what extent the groups of people whom he called ‘Gypsies’ had a command of Romany language\(^{14}\).

The theory of a single people had been suggested before, but its origin was misplaced by interpreting mere legends or biblical accounts. This is why Grellmann’s linguistic analysis led to a fundamental shift in the scholarly conceptualisation of the origin issue. Based mainly on a superficial language comparison, he pointed to Northern India, claiming that Gypsies had moved away from there four centuries earlier. Furthermore, he analysed traits that he found to be characteristic of contemporary Indians (making use of travellers’ accounts) and observed their occurrence in contemporary Gypsies. In the end these highly speculative and associative argumentations lead him to identify Gypsies as

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\(^{11}\) Angus Fraser, *[op.cit.]*, p. 194.

\(^{12}\) Wim Willems, *[op.cit.]*, p. 61.

\(^{13}\) *idem*, p. 21.

\(^{14}\) *ibidem*. 

descendants of the lowest class of Indians, the Sudras or of the pariahs. These Gypsies/Sudras supposedly had fled their homeland during the war of conquest waged in 1408-1409 by Timur. What happened to the Sudras afterwards, remained unclear. The most likely route seemed to him to pass through Arabia, Egypt and Turkey, but because there was no factual evidence, another pattern of emigration was, for him, every bit as possible15. Once the theory was formulated, his followers would make an obsession of unveiling details to support it.

The details of the migration and the place of origin were not the only aspects for which Grellmann’s book was vital. As an Enlightened scholar, he was a determined supporter of the assimilation policies of Roma. Nevertheless, accurate measures required precise criteria, and most of all an answer to the question: who needs to be civilized? Grellmann offered an unequivocal answer: the ‘true’ Gypsies, the nomadic ones, brutal creatures that live like animals in caves and tents and follow the laws of nature despising instinctively any influence from civilized society. In his view, sedentary Gypsies were on the good path that would ultimately lead them to forget about their origin, thus becoming useful citizens16.

As for the peculiar habits, traditions, morals and livelihood of the Roma, Grellmann succeeded in giving a scientific aura to stereotypes and prejudices he found in his sources. Later authors tried to merely confirm and bring further evidence that Roma were work shy, driven by instincts criminals, and cruel. However, like Grellmann, his followers found that the only aspects to appreciate about Roma are their musical talent and their fine physical appearance.

‘Casting the spell’ on future researchers
In a very short period Grellmann’s book was translated in several languages (English, French and Dutch). After the public interest about Roma faded away, his book remained influential only for very few eccentric historians and ethnographers or linguists interested in Indian dialects. In any case, he has set the tone for the next two centuries. All

through this period scholars predominantly continued the research on the 
Indian link, and, subsequently the ethnicity and the authentic Gypsiness 
issue.

Grellmann had suggested Northern India, but not a precise location. At 
the beginning of the 19th century linguists like Schlegel, Bopp and Jülg took 
a marginal interest in trying to link more precisely Grellman’s Romany 
glossary to Northern Indian languages.17 Later on, linguists Anton 
Fuchmayer (Români chib: das ist, Grammatik und Wörterbuch der Zigeuner 
Sprach, 1821), Ferdinand Bischoff (Deutsch-Zigeunerisches, 1827), Alfred 
Graffunder (Über die Sprache der Zigeuner: eine grammatische Schizze, 1835) 
and Carl von Heister (Ethnographische und geschichtliche Notizen über die 
Zigeuner, 1842) dedicated more serious studies to various Romany dialects 
spoken in German states.18 In 1844, Augustus Pott published in Halle the 
first scientific study that approaches historically the Romany dialects: Die 
Zigeuner in Europa und Asien. The conclusion of Pott’s work is that the 
various Romany dialects originated in Punjab region in northern India. For 
that, he is considered the father of Romany linguistics, although he very 
profoundly declared that he had written his book without having had any 
contact whatsoever with any speaker of the language he studied.19

While linguists were striving to find the origins, historians were 
concerned with the routes of migration and the moment of departure, 
especially since Grellmann’s indications had not been very precise. One of 
the first attempts to clarify the matter was that of the Romanian Mihail 
Kogălniceanu. In 1837 his book Esquisse sur l’histoire, les moeurs et la langue 
des cigains connus en France sous le nom de Bohémiens was published in Berlin. 
By that time, quite a few mainstream historians were still unaware of 
Grellmann’s book. This is the only explanation for Kogălniceanu’s effort to 
reject contemporary theories that considered Egyptians, Nubians or Moors 
the ancestors of Roma. Kogălniceanu endorsed Grellmann’s theory on the 
origin, but he considered that Roma reached Europe passing by the 
Principality of Moldavia during the 13th century.20 Others, like Paul 
Bataillard claimed that Gypsies arrived in Europe sometimes during the

17 Ian Hancock, op. cit., pag. 79. 
18 Ibidem. 
19 Ibidem. 
Bronze Age and they were the ones to introduce bronze metallurgy in Europe (De l’apparition des Bohémiens en Europe, 1843).21

These early contradicting theories reflect in fact the scarcity of historical documents about the migration period. Nevertheless, in the end, the one to answer most of the historians’ questions was a linguist: Franz Miklosich. His etymologic and dialectological study Ueber die Mundarten und die Wanderungen der Zigeuner Europa’s (1881) fixed the route that is considered standard even today: India-Persia-Armenia-the Byzantine Empire-The Balkans.22 Nevertheless, no matter how impressive his book is, Miklosich’s method is not beyond doubt. Ian Hancock points out that Miklosich based at least some of his assumptions on vocabulary that does not exist in any Romany dialect just as Pott had done earlier in his study on the origin of Romany.23 Actually, Hancock blames directly the English writer George Borrow for circulating ‘fake’ Romany words.24 George Borrow was not by any means a linguist or an ethnographer, nor did he claim to be one. However, that did not deter scholars like Miklosich and Pott to dissert extremely seriously on his rather amateur research on Romany. This is yet another argument for what seems to be a pattern in the development of knowledge on Roma: building upon superficially verified data.

It is very unlikely that this is what Borrow himself had intended. One could actually assert that his writings marked a turn in conceptualising the relationship with Roma as subjects It is mainly because his books Romano lavo-lil. Word-book of the Romany, or, English Gypsy language: with many pieces in Gypsy, illustrative of the way of speaking and thinking of the English Gypsies: with specimens of their poetry, The Zincali (1841), Lavengro (1851) and The Romany Rye (1857) are the result of direct contact and extended periods of living together with British or Spanish Roma.

Apparently, this approach would have had the most welcomed outcome of leaving behind the stereotype sketched by Grellmann. Indeed, the novelty that such an approach claimed matched the classical

21 idem, p. 37.
22 Angus Fraser, op.cit., p. 201.
24 idem, pp.94-95.
anthropological method of participant observation. However, Borrow’s living among the Roma proved to be of a greater benefit for literature than for ethnography. Actually, his romantic need for exotic drove him to exaggerate some of the popular myths about Roma, especially in pointing out their mysterious and close to nature way of life. Furthermore, Borrow as well as other romantic writers, like Heinrich von Wlislocki gave a new interpretation to the old insistence on the ‘true gypsy’. As ‘children of nature’, nomadic, ‘free’ Gypsy represented the last group resisting the conformism of the surrounding society.

At the end of the 19th century, the newly created Gypsy Lore Society continued to build further on the idea of tracing boundaries between Roma and Gadze as well as within the Roma community itself. Although the Gypsy Lore Society’s merits in promoting the study of Roma are today unanimously recognized, some contemporary authors believe that it only created new stereotypes. David Mayall considers that the Society’s activists embraced the romantic imagery on Roma and combined it with the anthropological theoretical framework. The result was an overwhelmingly racist approach that focused on the ‘purity of blood’. According to this new view, the genetic purity of the Roma was threatened and so was their culture.

Recent criticism of Grellmann’s legacy
Clearly, Grellmann’s sources as well as his methods show very little reliable empirical information. Most of the ideas for which his work is considered revolutionary are in fact reformulations of previous scholars. As Willems puts it, the early researchers of Roma conferred an incredible amount of authority on texts in which from the 15th to the 18th centuries, Roma-like groups were mentioned, an authority that these texts might perhaps never have enjoyed had not Grellmann and several of his predecessors compiled them and put them in order.

Some of the ‘new wave’ researchers as Leo Lucassen, Wim Willems, Annemarie Cottaar, Michael Stewart, and Judith Okely consider that due to

25 idem, pp 101-103.
26 Leo Lucassen, Wim Willems and Annemarie Cottaar, op. cit., p. 25.
the marginality of Roma population the studies about them evolved in a ‘splendid isolation’\textsuperscript{28}. This might be one of the reasons why the history of populations labelled as Roma/Gypsy has never been at the core of interests of ‘respectable’ historians. Grellmann himself admitted that while researching the Roma he felt the repulsion of a biologist that had to study a disgusting and crawling creature in the interest of science. Such a confession would have given him the necessary protection against unwanted comments about his endeavour. However, the marginality of Roma studies should also be related to its inner evolution.

Annemarie Cottaar, for instance, points out that for decades researchers, mostly Gypsylorists were busy to record and recover disappearing traditions or dialects. She also criticizes the authors that focused almost exclusively on the anti-Roma persecutions and forced assimilation policies. Such approaches that emphasize a victimised identity leave aside aspects like the constant cultural contact and exchange between Roma and non-Roma.\textsuperscript{29}

Willems and Lucassen reveal yet another reason for the marginality of Roma studies. Ever since Grellmann ascribed an ethnicity to the various groups labelled as Gypsy, scholars have insisted in proving him right, thus narrowing the line of research. For Willems and Lucassen the ethnicity obsession is a ‘death trap’ since there is very few evidence to prove that there is such an ethnic group. Linguistic evidence might say something about the origin and the evolution of the Romany dialects but it would be hazardous to extrapolate this conclusion to the origin and the evolution of the people speaking them. Moreover, as the Dutch researchers remark, ethnographers, and historians embraced linguist analysis as an all-encompassing method.\textsuperscript{30}

An alternative model to the standard one could only make its way after the work of some social historians (Zemon Davis, Hufton, Beier, Geremek, Danker and Schubert) became popular among the historians, anthropologist, and sociologist involved in Roma studies. The shortcoming of the ethnicity approach became more and more obvious: it fails to differentiate the subject according to the historical moment or the location,

\textsuperscript{28} Leo Lucassen, Wim Willems and Annemarie Cottaar, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 33.
\textsuperscript{29} \textit{idem}, p.34.
\textsuperscript{30} \textit{idem} pp. 27-41.
thus creating an image of a people with a unique history and fate superficially conditioned by time and space, which is precisely the enduring idea of Grellmann.  

This new sociological vision relates the history of Roma to the evolution of western attitudes towards poverty and vagrancy.  Recent works on itinerant professions showed that the groups that practiced them were integrated to a greater degree both socially and economically than previously supposed. Unfortunately, there are very few anthropological approaches to the phenomenon of intercultural change in the case of groups labelled as Roma/Gypsy.

In addition, Grellmann’s interpretation of the Gypsies’ history in diaspora terms was highly successful, not in the least, because it fitted perfectly in the emerging discourse on ethnicity of the time. As far as we know, nobody has ever specifically checked (or ever found evidence) if Roma myths, legends, or other oral traditions might suggest the distant Indian homeland. Moreover, there are no written sources which offer solutions. This, however, did not prevent Gypsies and their representatives to use this Indian paradigm as part of their ethno-national identity discourse. In this light, it is not surprising that some very prominent Roma authors from Romania would write on Roma history citing copiously from *Ramayana* and *Mahabharata*. However, the claims and aspirations of self proclaimed Gypsy leaders have not reached down to the ones they represent. In his anthropological study on Vlach-Gypsies in Hungary, Michael Stewart stated that the Gypsies he studied did not have a homeland to dream of, nor an original territory to reclaim. He subscribes to the earlier findings of the English anthropologist Judith Okely on English Gypsy-Travellers that the idea of Indian origins unnecessarily exoticizes the Gypsies and ignores their own view of themselves.

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31 Leo Lucassen and Wim Willems, *op. cit.*, p. 293.
32 ibidem
33 idem p. 299.
**BOOK REVIEW**

***, *Restitutio in integrum*, (2005), Budapest, Magyarok Világszövetsége (World Federation of Hungarians)

Artur Lakatos

In the year 2004, on the 4th of December a plebiscite was organized in Hungary, in which the citizens were asked to express their opinion regarding some important matters, by answering two questions with yes or no. The first question referred to a purely internal problem, the privatization of the public health institutions. The second one created much more conflicts and quarrels, as it regarded the citizenship of the Hungarians living outside of Hungary.

The first question was if the voter supported the initiative to stop the privatization of the public health institutions; the second one wanted to find out whether the voter supports the idea that those ethnic Hungarians who live outside of Hungary receive the Hungarian citizenship in a simplified way. In both cases the number of votes for “yes” exceeded that of the votes for “no”, but the plebiscite was still unsuccessful, because a minimum of 2 million “yes” votes were needed (which represents 25% of the citizens who have the right to vote in Hungary).

The plebiscite divided the Hungarian public opinion, both sides having the feeling of victory and defeat in the same time. The question is far from being solved and the disputes continue with for and against arguments. One of the propaganda-materials for the Hungarian citizenship of those Hungarians who live outside of Hungary – in a more simplified way: the double citizenship- is the following book, edited by the organization which started the referendum, the Hungarian’s World Organization.

The volume entitled “Restitutio in integrum” is not so thick. What is so special about it is the fact that it was edited in February 2005, only three months after the referendum and it contains studies and projects concerning the problem of the double citizenship. It has no foreword, but three introductory texts: the letter of Sándor Rácz (the honorific president
of the Organization) to the Hungarian congressmen, the final statement of the Congress “Restitutio in integrum” and a short essay written by Miklós Patrubány, the president of the organization, who in fact had the initiative of the whole plebiscite. The essay has the title “Restitutio in integrum” and it contains several thoughts concerning the practice of the double citizenship and the need for it.

The volume is structured in three different parts, according to its materials: the first part is dedicated to those studies which analyze the problem of the double citizenship from general perspectives. This part contains mainly studies which refer to the legal background of the double citizenship, but also two studies regarding the moments of the struggle for the double citizenship. Among the lawyers the name of Imre Borbély and that of a much respected Hungarian jurist: Dr. Tamás Gaudí-Nagy can be found. The two studies are the most important from the first part. Imre Borbély is known in Romania as a former member of the Hungarian Democratic Alliance from Romania, a former candidate for the presidency of this organization running against Béla Markó and one of the most radical partisans of the autonomy of the Szekler land. His study analyzes the possibility of the national integration in the present day context by presenting different perspectives for it. He enumerates 4 different perspectives, out of which he finds the fourth possibility to be the best- and the only good choice-, which is somewhere in irreconcilable opposition with the first three options. The four possible options- in Borbély’s opinion—are the following:

The so-called “solution zero”, means the total lack of care in the attitude of the leading politicians of Hungary toward those parts of the ethnic nation, which live outside the Hungarian borders. Naturally, this attitude contains the acceptance of the existing situation without any reservations. Many foreign politicians are the adepts of this solution, but from a moral point of view, this is unacceptable.

The other possible solution is exactly the opposite: the revision of the existing borders. This was the policy of the Hungary lead by Horthy during the interwar period. The possible success of such kind of politics is almost zero and it would lead to a lot of trouble with the neighbors.

The third is a policy which has never been yet experienced by Hungary, only by other nations: the “salvation” of the Hungarian
communities from the neighboring countries, by moving them on the territory of Hungary. This could cause a demographic and economic explosion in Hungary, the powers of which would grow and it would reduce substantially the possibility for quarrels in the region. But this kind of solution would have its problems, too.

The fourth solution for Borbély represents the national unification without the tendency of changing the existing borders. Here the author concentrates mostly on one single solution: the Hungarian citizenship for those Hungarians who live outside of Hungary.

As a politician, Borbély analyzes different possible perspectives; instead of this, Gaudi-Nagy, the well-known jurist presents the possible juristic background of the double citizenship from the pure point of view of the existing laws. In his study the jurist analyzes the meaning and problematic of the concept of “citizenship”, with its main characteristics, mainly from a Hungarian point of view. He analyzes the possibility of obtaining the double citizenship and he also makes a small incursion in history, by presenting the process, which lead to the loss of the Hungarian citizenship of those Hungarians who lived in the countries of the Soviet bloc, in other countries than Hungary.

More important from political and social point of view is the second part, which contains studies written by well-known figures of the Hungarian communities from the neighboring countries of Hungary. The authors are mostly politicians: Mária Pozsonec, deputy in the Parliament of Slovenia, András Ágoston, former deputy in the Parliament of Yugoslavia, president of a Hungarian party from Voivodina, Sándor Kónya-Hamar, deputy in the Romanian Parliament, László Zúbanics, an important journalist from Ukraine, and Gyula Popély from Slovakia, a historian, former deputy in the Parliament and university teacher. These studies are dealing with different situations, but generally they all have some common characteristics: each of them analyzes the situation of the Hungarian community in the respective country, the symbolic and moral significance of the possible Hungarian citizenship and the possible reactions of their home country or of the majoritary nation from it. For all the five authors, the double citizenship means something good, especially from moral point of view. Maybe the best formulation of its significance is given by Mária Pozsonec:
“... it hurt very much; we felt a great shame because the mother nation refused us. It hurt that the Hungarian citizens were threatened with the lie that we want to take away their goods from them.

We, the Hungarians from Slovenia didn’t expect any economic advantage from the double citizenship. As the citizens of a country which is member of the EU we don’t even need a passport. We voted for the double citizenship out of solidarity with other Hungarian communities. And for the memory of our ancestors who defended Hungary near the Isonzo or near the Don. Through their sacrifices we also have the right for the double citizenship...”

The third and the last part contains a few documents: the letter written by deputy Attila Körömi addressed to the president of Hungary, the law project of the same parliamentary concerning the double citizenship and the law that refers to Hungarian citizenship.

Generally, it can be said about the book that it would have been an effective propaganda-material for the cause of the double citizenship, if it had been edited before the referendum. The volume does not treat all the aspects and problems related to this question. The cause of this could be that it hasn’t enough space for it. It is a good initiative to gather the studies of different authors regarding the same problem, but analyzed from different aspects. At this moment, the book is not a bestseller, and it probably never will be, but it can be a valuable source of documents for the researchers in History and Political Studies in the future.

Marian Zăloagă

After a pause of some decades from the publication of his first book on Gypsy travelers, professor Mayall comes back with a provocative book, explicitly dedicated to the outer and inner construction of the Gypsies identities. Specialist in modern European history at the University of Sheffield, professor Mayall’s present book can be seen as a continuation of some thesis first promoted in his first book on Gypsy and Travelers in 19th century England published in the 80’s. The regulative relation between authorities and Gypsies/Roma and Travelers is omnipresent in both studies framing the power policies implemented during the centuries towards these groups, with certain effects towards their multiple identitarian outcomes.

By no means is this new project even more valuable because it overcomes strict temporal borders, following a multi-slides phenomenon that took shape over centuries. Moreover, benefiting of the latest interdisciplinary studies, in turn, critically approached, this book can from the very beginning be considered a reference book in the field of Gypsy/Roma studies.

It’s been a while since a historian approached so complexly a theme like this. Many historians did for a long period of time reproduced a stereotypical discourse, or did nothing else but a chronology of the persecutions. Given the implicit references of the traditional sources which so often recapitulated the schema advanced by Michael H.M. Grellmann already at the end of the 18th Century and which strived to establish an external, though pretzendly accurate profile of the Gypsies, the reader of this book may expect to nothing else but a synthesis of what has been written for several centuries up to the present times. Beneficiary of an interdisciplinary research perspective, so much fitted to the study of this
people, David Mayall not only that does not repeats the mistakes of the predecessors, on the contrary he carried out a research which even though concentrates to the English case, succeeds to reveal the reasons and prejudices of the majorities towards this minority. Such a critical perspective reveals an over present influence of a range of theoretical scientific literature dedicated to the ethnic relations, racial and minorities studies. Thus, professor Mayall cares more about the outer milieu, the frame within which majorities (as the most important Gypsy identity discourse promoter) strived to establish Gypsies’ identities.

If we admit that the Western European states promoted exclusionary policies which came to be more and more aggressive with the progress of centralization and other leveling processes, we understand the institutionalized tendency to negatively label every group that did not assimilate and lived out of the “establishments”. In such circumstances, the negative labeling of the Gypsy groups was supposed to legitimize aggressive policies that pointed towards assimilation and/or in some particular cases and moments towards annihilation.

Following the example given by the book of Wim Willems and of some studies carried out by other Netherlander poststructuralists like Leo Lucassen, Anne Marie Cottar, Mayall’s undertaking regards the matter in its long historical sequence of ideological paradigms that influenced and consecrated certain tropes of discourse. As compared to the aforementioned specialist, he goes even further taking into account not only larger chronological frames but implicitly some diverse representations of the Gypsies in different media: chronics, legends, rouge literature, travel accounts, police reports, (post) modern times statistics and newspaper. In an effort to be as holist as possible, when dealing with the sources, Mayall also introduces some iconography and cartoons but he usually does not go into analyzing them in depth. Rather than analyzing the iconography Mayall’s study remains an invitation to a future undertaking of that kind. Generally speaking, when referring to this book’ sources we discover a special care given by the author to explaining the specificities of each type of records, along with the discourse it promoted. All had been critically referred to and highly contextualized.

Primarily, learning about others is learning about oneself and it always reveals a power relationship. As Davis Mayall shows all sorts of
determinants, organicist or social – cultural like origins, lifestyle and work ethics, recognized as fundamental marks in the process of the self-representation of the majorities, were imperialistically applied to the study of this minority, thus, supplementary contributing to a confusing but invariably negative construction of Gypsies’ identity. It remained as such because of the hegemony of the discourse of the majority which have been not coherently responded or “fought back” until the second half of the 20th century.

As expected, for a long time, the definition of the Gypsies/”Gypsies” identity(ies) was a one way process within which what really matter was the outer perceptive and categorizing discourse. This characterized a long chronological frame which can be equated with their history in Europe.

Analyzing the case of the Gypsies in England, David Mayall tackled the matter within the frames of the state’s policy toward the peripatetics, vagabonds, beggars or any people on the move in general. In this respect, he concentrates upon the content of some regulations or Poor Law Acts, which from early modernity on, promoted discourses which lead to the criminalization of such way of life. Unfortunately, by not making a clear distinction between “nomadic underclass” (62) and the Gypsies this type of official sources are not able to say more than, that from the point of view of the authorities, the ethnicity of the Gypsies remained a nebulous during the early modern and even modern times. Only afterwards, and especially in post modernity, under the impact of different agencies and along with the paradigms promoted by some anthropologists (Judith Okley), their lifestyle turned to represent a distinctive ethnical marker.

Alongside official records, other source traditionally exploited by the researchers interested in the history of the Gypsy in England was the rouge literature. As Mayall proves, despite their subjective and purely imaginative style, some of them represent the first attempts to separate, on linguistic criteria, the “Egyptians” from the rest of the underworld actors involved in the plot of such literary productions. But what is really essential is the fact that in what regards the Gypsies, this works succeeded in establishing the internal difference within the group of travelers, thus “constructing a particular group identity” which will be later on reaffirmed. The special attention paid to the discourse of such sources
led Mayall to the conclusion that the negative image of the Gypsies was generated by the taking over of the information about the Gypsies from the sources referring to wider vagrant populations (73-75). As demonstrated the (hetero-) designation “Egyptians”, in use during the early modernity, had inaugurated a discourse about otherness that came to be more and more ethicized.

Even though precedents did not miss, the representation of the Gypsies from England in ethic terms became standardized up with the philologists’ works of the “lorists”. But before that a fundamental attention is paid to the reception of Michael Grellmann’s *Historische Versuch über die Zigeuner*, work which soon after its first publication saw a rapid English translation. The novelty brought was that India replaced Egypt as place of origin, which later met with the Indian “obsession” of the Indo-Europeanist.

Though interested in preserving as much information as possible about an “endangered” group, the members of the Gypsy Lore Society could not have been above the dominant ideological paradigms of the times in which they articulated their studies. As all over the classic modern Europe, among the categorizing and research (cognitive) instruments the concept of “race” had played a prevalent role.

Interested in the deconstruction of the discourse and in its turns toward several centuries, therefore in understanding of different labels Gypsies had to bear, in his research, David Mayall tries to clarify the way in which the concept of “race” should be understood in the discourse developed by the “lorists”. Aware of its pluralist and at times ambiguous valence, beforehand David Mayall insists upon the meaning of race in the scientific and non scientific language of the 18th and 20th century. Understood in cultural or/and simultaneously biologic terms, there is no doubt that the concept was to establish subjective and legitimizing hierarchies and borders. Too much embedded in the time’s ideology, despite of incipiently positive intents, stated in a program article published the Journal for Gypsy Lore Society, the “lorists” embraced a discourse which came near to Romanization of the “true” Gypsy or the “real” Romany. Though so obviously discriminatory, their discourse did not collide with their scientific and sometimes philanthropic intent.

The major problem of the David Mayall’s book is to distinguish
between the “real Romany” while analyzing the eternally constructed racial identity of the “true Gypsy”. Such a challenging undertaking is moreover a refinement David Mayall brings to the approach brought in discussion by Wim Willems in his book entitled *In Search of the True Gypsy: From Enlightenment to Final Solution*. Admitting the difficulty of explicitly distinguishing between one from the two major “scientific” designative trends as reflected by the writings of a myriad of essayists - in their turn strongly influenced by the writings of both Heinrich Grellmann and George Borrow -, Mayall synthetically refers to the creation of a hybrid “Romany Gypsy race”(118).

Surely, the ambivalent references (cultural and biologist) made in the “scientific” discourse of the 19th and 20th centuries dedicated to the matter of language in general (regarded as an instrument in establishing a foreign descent, as well as in preserving a pure race) legitimizes such hybrid approach. The same double referential and difficult (in long term view) to split up designation that dominated two centuries may be also explained through the intents of the reflective agents. As we came to distinguish, the Gypsologist are those scientifically supporting the attempts of the authorities to make this groups sedentary, while “Romany Rais” were a category of middle class people intending to preserve the Roma people’s way of life, or at least what has survived of what they called “the last romance left in the world”(168). But generally speaking, in a way or another, the representatives of one or another group are discursively determined by the purist racialized paradigms of their time. The fact that such discourses coexisted, that a beginning or an end of a particular approach is impossible to establish -rather we see them sometimes intermingling- strengthens the functionality of a mixed designation as that proposed by David Mayall.

As well – known, the hierarchical establishment and mainly the aggressive manifestations and terrible effects of the racist paradigm had been for several decades replaced by an ethnicist approach. The effects of the Second World War legitimized the abandonment of the racial definition with its hereditary stigmatic implications. The new and apparently old designation process based on the mobility factor, this time regarded as a cultural identity marker, is the expression of emergence of some internal representatives, of some agencies capable of claiming human and civil
rights and of eradicating discriminatory practice towards minority groups.

On the one hand racial classification that dominated the assimilationist or idealistic discourses was the result of external and often prejudiced categorization. On the other hand, ethnic designation is an internal projected self-constructed and promoted identity of the present. Among the paths followed one can also mention the efforts of academically including of the Gypsy matter into the wider frames of the scientific discourse. The new postwar political setting worked in favor of the theories of Ruth Benedict and other former anthropologist. From the positions of cultural relativists, the new paradigms rejected the purity principle altogether with the concept of race. Their institutionalization by UNESCO contributed to a radical turnover in the understanding of difference from the biology to the cultural arguments. It also had a positive effect with regard to the official predicament that there exist no small cultures or big cultures, thus eliminating the hierarchies and allowing until that time “exotic objects” to become serious subjects of research. In this regard Gypsy studies profited and came out of the “splendid isolation” that characterized them before the Second World War. The application of some strongly ideologized paradigms like antiziganismus (with its correspondences with the anti-Semitism), or those proved productive in postcolonial and cultural studies refreshed them and consequently brought them on the political agendas. The goal was for this community to be recognized as an ethnic group and therefore to benefit of the treatment guaranteed to them in international law regulations.

Aware of the diverse problems this process arises, David Mayall refers to the difficulty of this process and discusses the Gypsy’s ethnicity with its in-group multiple identities which often combines with a national referential identity. Also, he argues over the advantages or disadvantages of self-identification which have their variable and insufficient effects over the coherence of the Gypsy politics both at international and national scale. Despite an effort to delimit one’s discourse from the preceding one, many of the ethnic identity references remain those attributed in the previous racial and parasitic classifications, only the nuances differ. Therefore we assist to a persisting overlap of some racial and ethnicity concepts. The arguments like language, ancestry, kinship, taboos, nomadism, patterns of morality, economic organization, etc. are brought to establish a particular
ethnic identity, even though, in some cases, things have slightly changed since the previous era.

If culture and ethnicity are so diverse and depend on the national frames where different groups reside, thus emerging what Mayall calls a “dual nationalism” (240) hard to reconcile in its terms, what is really unitary and poignant is the statement of a victimized aggrieved identity. The argument of centuries’ long persecution along with the efforts of claiming reparations, naturally resulting from the eugenic policies that culminated with the Nazi’s concentrational experience, works positively - though scantily - in favor of the invention of a transnational ethnic identity of a still “kaleidoscopic” entity. In any case, this is the project and in part the achievement of some elite individuals involved in the process of engineering a nation. What is much difficult to attain is the self-identification as members of a bigger inclusive group, thus, overcoming such an enormous diversity. The success has its stakes that is gaining recognition as a minority group that will also bring the so much needed civil rights. This process could be furthermore facilitated by the institutionalization of the "Gypsy studies", which recently came to be a more or less accepted academic field, progressively integrated within the “hard core” of a border scientific discourse. The overwhelming of all sorts of symbolic or real borders can guarantee the emergence of a coherent self-aware discourse capable of influencing the policies of different states.

After going through such a diverse identitarian hetero-representation (usually criminalized or romanticized, but intermittently anomic) and also dealing with the efforts of self-representation, what else may be added except the truism that par excellence Gypsies’ identity has always been multiple. In the contemporary interplay between hetero and self-identification, what really matters is the manner in which a self-assumed/constructed uniform identity may be spread to and shared by a large number of people. As the book suggest, the answer to David Mayall first and at the same time final question: “So, who are the Gypsies?”, resides in politics, which in our opinion involves a dialogue, with both sides acting as subjects and not as usually treating Gypsies as objects of variable ideologized discriminatory policies and praxis.