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# Gods and Caesars. The Role of Churches in the Breakdown of Communist Regimes of Central and Eastern Europe

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În acest articol, analizez modurile prin care bisericile din centrul şi estul Europei s-au opus regimurilor comuniste, conducând, în final, la înlăturarea lor. Literatura existentă pe acest subiect se încadrează în sfera abordărilor structuraliste, ce neglijează o parte a informaţiei existente. Din acest motiv propun o abordare constructivită a problemei, în care bisericile reprezintă în acelaşi timp şi structuri şi agenţi de mobilizare. Analiza cuprinde şase cazuri: Polonia, Germania de Est, Ungaria, Cehoslovacia, România şi Ungaria.

*In fact, the Revolution of 1989 was an embodiment of the final revolution. And the final revolution is the human turn to the good, to the truly human – and, ultimately, to God, who alone can make all things new* (Weigel, 1992:3)

December of 1989 meant freedom for many people in Central and Eastern Europe previously enslaved by totalitarian communist regimes. It also meant a new setting for everyday life and a time of choice. It meant the end of the Cold War and of an enduring bipolar representation of the world. It meant a chance for freedom for citizens crushed by their state and a chance for freedom for nationals of countries that denied their nationhood. Across borders and ages, societal roles and gender, it meant a return of God into the house, the school and everyday life. The focus of this paper is to examine the role of religion in influencing the breakdown of communist regimes of Central and Eastern Europe.

I assert that the "classical" explanations, formulated for the demise of communist regimes, focus on structural factors that allowed for the mass uprisings, but underspecify the role of the masses. Specifically, there is a lack of understanding as to how people interpret the changes within communism, how they decide to participate and how they are mobilized. I analyze the importance of institutionalized religion in channeling opposition against communism. I try to explain the gap between churches against communism and churches within communism. I employ a constructivist approach that allows me to portray the church as both an agent and a structure. I believe that agency and structure mutually constitute each other, and so the church's position in the process of undermining the communist regimes of Central and Eastern Europe is determined by its position towards the regime itself and the people that it represents. I conclude that there are two kinds of factors that affect

the strategy of churches in opposing or supporting the communist regimes: structural and identity-factors. First, transnational churches and a homogenous religious space allow churches to efficiently build opposition to the regime. Second, the church has to find an identity that it can attach to the groups that it represents that both undermines the communist regime and does not endanger symbols of nationhood. I analyze six cases: Poland, East Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Bulgaria.

First, a critical account of the "classical" explanations for the demise of communist regimes is offered. Second, I introduce constructivism as a useful frame for understanding the breakdown of communist regimes, with focus on agency. Third, I discuss the role of churches in opposing the breakdown of the regimes, by examining the six case studies. Fourth, I am analyzing the case studies from a constructivist point of view. Fifth, I draw the conclusions and suggest avenues for further research.

## Theories of the breakdown of communist regimes of Central and Eastern Europe

"Classical" explanations for the revolutions of 1989 are mainly structuralist. Ekiert (1996) examines the shortcomings of these explanations: the lack of comparative character and a tendency to oversimplify reality, by constructing functionalist, modernization-led models. Even when comparative strategies were chosen "many works designed to be comparative in nature were nothing more than chronologically structured narrative accounts of political and economic developments" (Ekiert, 1996)

I identify five categories of explanations that account for the demise of communism. Every explanation will be briefly presented and subsequently criticized.

Kenney (2002) and Bunce (1999) suggest that the coming of Mikhail Gorbatchev into power is the ultimate factor in "freeing" Eastern Europe. The former author holds the "Gorbatchev factor" responsible in two ways, both as an encouragement for dissidents and as a disincentive for hard-liners to rely on Soviet tanks. Bunce (1999) agrees and adds that the peaceful character of uprisings in 1989 is also a direct consequence of the absence of Soviet military threat.

Several shortcomings affect the explanatory power of this explanation. First, Gorbatchev intended to reform communism, based on *glasnost* and *perestroika* and not to give up all together.  His intentions became known to the public at a time when, in some countries, revolts were already underway: "not until a plenum party in January 1987 did Gorbatchev and his allies emphasize glasnost – by which time […] social movements in Central Europe have already pushed openness farther than Gorbatchev ever

would" (Kenney, 2002: 8). Second, the lack of Soviet military threat in Central and Eastern Europe presents different degrees of saliency depending on the situation of every individual country in relationship to the Soviet Union. While Poland, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria are under the heavy hand of Soviet communism, Romania and Yugoslavia distanced themselves from the Soviet empire and developed independently. Hence, the "Gorbatchev factor" influences differently the demise of communism in Soviet-controlled or Soviet-free countries. Third, the "Gorbatchev factor" does not account for the peaceful character of the revolutions, since indigenous communist regimes still preserved a high repressive ability (e.g. Poland) (Ekiert, 1996).

The second explanation for the breakdown of communist regimes is the "Reagan" effect. Weigel (1992) believes that the Reagan administration sent a signal to the dissidents of Central and Eastern Europe expressing the US' willingness to support their efforts. Reagan's rhetoric (the construction of the "evil empire"), the creation of the National Endowment for Democracy and of the Strategic Defense Initiative contributed to the idea that The Soviet Union lost in the technological competition with the United States. Again, Ronald Reagan's actions while in office probably meant something for the oppressed people of Central and Eastern Europe, but what exactly did it mean in each individual case?

Favorable signals from Moscow and Washington are sent, but what do people in Central and Eastern Europe make of them? Indeed, problems arise when social scientists do not ask themselves how information is perceived, decodified and interpreted. In fact, an attempt has been made to transform this information argument into a primary cause of the breakdown of communist regimes under the label "contagion effects" (Giles et al., 2001). This explanation builds not only on favorable messages sent from the top, but also on collateral information exchanges: the revolutions of 1989 unfold one after another, as information circulates from country to country, from person to person. However, the question of interpretation and filtering remains.

The third category of explanations is essentially institutionalist. Valerie Bunce (1999) believes that the grain of destruction resides in socialism itself. Institutional commonalities divided the party, empowered the society and undercut economic growth. Succession struggle ensued, as well as struggles for reform. Corruption can be added to this list. Bunce's argument is strong, and institutions do matter. Nonetheless, not all countries suffer institutional crises at the same time, and people's interpretation of these crises are doomed to be different, according to political culture and degree of repression of a particular regime.

The fourth explanation focuses on the role of economic stagnation or regress. Variation across countries in Central and Eastern Europe in economic terms again diminishes the explanatory power of this factor. Additionally, as Kenney (2002) mentions, economic slogans have not been echoed in the streets during the 1989 manifestations, and attempts to join the international market and enter in the sphere of action of the IMF had already been undertaken (Ekiert, 1996). Furthermore, economic policies were not similar in the Eastern bloc, with Hungary and Yugoslavia being more capitalist oriented than other countries.

Finally, the fifth explanation places erosion of legitimacy at the causal core of the breakdown of communist regimes. It is believed that the communist regimes enjoyed less and less legitimacy as the economic and political crises generalized. While this explanation seems accurate, it is only so from a "Western" perspective. Di Palma (1991) asserts that legitimacy of communist regimes is of a different kind than that of democratic regimes. In democracies people lend support to the regime, and, if dissatisfied, they have the option of changing it (basically the government). In totalitarian communist regimes, legitimacy is within the ruling class: the cadres legitimize the leaders, with people taking a rather passive insignificant role. The cadres have the means of changing the regime if they so desire, while the people are powerless. This explanation concurs with Bunce's argument regarding splits within the elite.

This explanation assumes constantly decreasing levels of legitimacy in communist countries. In contrast, Tarifa (1997) shows that legitimacy is not eroding at the same level or pace in every country, and that some countries, especially those in which communism has been "homegrown", people are satisfied with the performance of the regime. The fact that intellectuals lead the 1989 revolution in some cases is not random; the working class is content with the progress that communism brought to their kind.

The five explanations detailed above delineate the theoretical spectrum used in explaining the revolutions of 1989. They have a predominant structuralist character. The role played by the agency is underdetermined. A brief account of social movements literature will illustrate what roles people can play in an uprising. Subsequently, those potential roles will be examined in the context of the year 1989.

There are three major schools of thought within social movement literature. The classical model focuses on the importance of grievances: a strain either at the system level or at any individual/group level, this strain results in a social movement, by a variety of mechanisms, from alienation and anxiety to cognitive dissonance, and normative ambiguity (McAdam, 1982). The people play the most

important role in this approach, albeit the only role. The pitfall of this theory is thus its ignorance of the context. If, in general, explanations of the demise of communism in Central and Eastern Europe emphasize the importance of the structure, the grievances model focuses solely on agency.

The second model is the resource mobilization approach. Conceptualized by McCarthy and Zald, but widely used in an elite approach to politics, the approach stresses the importance of resources that groups can secure, as opposed to a more or less constant present amount of grievances. The difference between this and the previous model resides in the fact that the resource mobilization approach connects grievances to the context by introducing resources in the equation. Agency thus enters in contact with structure. The major deficiency though resides in the inability of making a distinction between social movements and mere interest groups. In the context of the 1989 revolutions, what can constitute a resource, and are those resources available at the same time in every country?

Finally, the third approach is the political opportunities model that stresses the importance of openings at the power structure. According to Tarrow (1998), political opportunities are "consistent – but not necessarily formal, permanent or national – dimensions of the political struggle that encourage people to engage in contentious politics" (19-20). Donatella Della Porta adds that the political opportunity structure is "the set of environmental opportunities and constraints available to social movements" (Della Porta, 1995:10). In the Eastern European context, Oberschall (1996) uses this approach to explain the non-violent character of the uprisings of 1989.

Every explanation of the five listed above falls into one of the three models of social movement formation literature. The predominance of structure is obvious: external things happened that triggered the mobilization of agency. Grievances exist and so do resources and opportunities, but what is the bridge that unites these three units? How do people interpret grievances, what constitute resources and how are they used? How are political opportunities interpreted?

These questions suggest a need in shifting the focus from either agency or structure, to both of them, to their mutual constitution. Constructivism is the approach that brings valuable insight in this project.

### Constructivism and the structure/agency nexus

Constructivism appeared as a reaction to the failures of positivism. It disagrees with the methodological similarity between social science and natural sciences, and it rejects the assumption of the neutral/objective observer. According to Finnemore and Sikkink (2001), constructivism holds that: " (a) human interaction is shaped primarily by ideational factors, not simply material ones; (b) the most

important ideational factors are widely shared or "intersubjective"beliefs, which are not reducible to individuals; and (c) these shared beliefs construct the interests and identities of purposive actors" (cf. to Adler 1997, Price and Reus-Smit 1998, Ruggie 1998, Wendt 1999). The three main keywords in the constructivist research agenda are: intersubjectivity, co-constitution and contextuality (Lynch and Klotz, manuscript). Intersubjectivity refers to those shared understanding that raise above individual level and that constitute sources of identity and interests. Co-constitution in general asserts the permanent interaction between agency and structure: "agents and structures are mutually constituted in ways that explain why the political world is so but not otherwise" (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001: 3). Contextuality emphasizes the placement of every research unit in a particular social, political and cultural setting, that explains its shape and function at any time, that influences it, and that is being influenced in turn.

Constructivism is not a substantive theory, but rather a "social theory that makes claims about the nature of social life and social change" (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001: 3). Before performing a constructivist analysis then, the actors, their identities and their interests have to be specified.

Why is constructivism useful in explaining the revolutions of 1989? First, structuralist theories fail to specify the role of agency. Why did people march in the streets of Prague, Budapest and Warsaw at roughly the same time, contesting the communist regimes? What created solidarity among people and what were the meanings that they attached to their action? Constructivism's intersubjectivity is highly helpful in analyzing shared meanings that people attached to political opportunities or their own dissident actions. Second, the actors of the 1989 revolutions have been different in Central and Eastern Europe. From playwrights to intellectuals to workers to priests and soldiers, the revolutions saw various alliances between groups. How can one account for this diverse membership in the "dissident camp"? Contextuality can provide the answer by looking in the history of every particular country. Also, constructivism pays attention to the formation of identities that played a role in creating these alliances.

Ekiert (1996) offers a quasi-constructivist account of the revolutions of 1989. His strategy is a macro-historical comparative approach that leads him to believe that critical junctures in history determined the breakdown of communism. Budapest in 1956, Prague in 1968, and Poland in the early 80's are arenas of dissidence that transform both the regime and the people and prepare them for the events of 1989, and perhaps for the phase of transition. The author groups the five classical explanations into one overarching constructivist approach and tries to make sense of them. Legitimacy and economics together with international political opportunities influence each other and concur in preparing the

field for the final revolutions. However, his account fails to specify the creation of dissidence as groups at either moments in time, and he ignores the issue of identity.

I will consider the church as a potential creator of identity. The church has been considered by many authors (Chadwick 1992, Weigel 1992, Nielsen 1991, Nielsen JR. 1994) as one of the key actors in undermining the authority of the communist regimes, and in their demisal. However, the nature, degree and direction of church activities in the breakdown of communist regimes varies. The Polish Catholic Church is at the dissident pole, while the Romanian Orthodox Church is at the collaborationist pole. What can explain the differences in church behavior?

## Church and the breakdown of communism. Six case studies

Communism regarded religion through a Marxist lens as "opium for the people". In the broader totalitarian context of denying free assembly rights, "religion was to be limited to worship and the sanctuary […] Christianity was regarded as a foreign body that governments must seek to subvert and in the end destroy" (Nielsen, 1991: 5). Albeit communism never managed to exclude religion completely from people's lives, but it went at great lengths. In some cases like Russia, East Germany and some of the Baltic republics, the regimes replaced religious forms of celebrating nodal moments in one's life by a secularized similar procedure. The Palace of Marriages in St. Petersburg and a civil version of confirmation in Estonia are worth mentioning, Even so, people continued to look for religious blessings and advice in important moments.

According to Mary L. Gautier (1997, 1998) churches in Central and Eastern Europe responded to the communist regimes by opposition or collaboration. Poland and East Germany are clear examples of dissidence, while Romania, Bulgaria and Russia are clear examples of collaboration. I suggest that dissidence and collaboration were the two limits of a spectrum along which churches could situate themselves. In between Romania and Poland there is Czechoslovakia and Hungary for example, in which dissidence manifestations are present, but they do not lead the opposition.

One specification is necessary. In every single country one can find both dissident and collaborationist positions. The main response of churches as institutions is the focus of this research. I analyze organized opposition to the communist regimes from the part of the church. I am examining the role of churches as representatives of a dissatisfied public.

In a constructivist fashion, the church is in the same time agent and structure. Dissident churches are agents when they oppose the communist regime, and structures when they channel people's opposition

towards the regime. They structure the dissident input. Accordingly, collaborationist churches are agents when they support state policies and by so doing influence them, and structures when they promote the regime's propaganda, and pacify people's dissent.

*Poland and East Germany – fostering civil society, channeling and promoting opposition*

East Germany as a country is a creation of the Second World War. Mainly protestant, it has a tradition of providing educational and social services through the church. The repressive regime in East Germany was among the most strict, and the efficiency of the Secret Police, the *Stasi*, likewise (Ekiert, 1996, East 1992). Protestant churches were primarily independent from the state, at least in what the nomination of the priests was concerned. The church supported some of the state actions in order to be allowed to exist. According to Nielsen (1991) cooperation with the regime was also sometimes accepted because it signified a distancing from Nazi-ism, whose spectrum was still prevalent. The situation of the church was essentially freer than in other countries and protestant priests seized the advantage. Some churches became base groups, centers of resistance. Participation in base groups (like the one led by Dr. Neubert) was influenced by people's dissatisfaction with communism, and they started off as intellectual forums, in which concepts like feminism and environmentalism were discussed (Nielsen, 1991). However, in time, the church sponsored more and more such Christian groups, that eventually gathered atheist members. In 1989, the churches were arenas for prayers and dissent. The idea of peaceful processions against communism originated in the churches. The marches in Berlin and Leipzig, thousands of people holding candles, atheists and Christians alike, gave the German uprising the name of the *revolution of light*. Nielsen (1991) believes that without the contribution of the protestant churches, the revolution of 1989 would not have been peaceful.

Poland is uniformly Catholic. The figure of cardinal Wysinski and more so of the Polish Pope John Paul the 2nd remain in history. In Poland the church was a true alternative arena opposing the regime. The church mobilized resistance efficiently because of the appeal it had to people. Poland was not as secularized as East Germany, and "there was growing popular participation in worship and church life" (Nielsen, 2001: 83). Poland had a turbulent history and the church is the symbol of Polish nationhood. The strategy of the church in Poland changed according to the demands of the regime, but the Catholic Church never collaborated. When the Solidarity movement called for a strike, the church calmed the public down, without betraying the dissident cause. The church was supportive of every action of the dissidence, and, in many cases, was the initiator of opposition manifestations.

The two examples share several fundamental commonalities. First, both East Germany and Poland have one clearly majoritarian denomination. Second, both churches have been active in opposing the

regime, and both strategized with the communist regime, so that their survival is ensured. Third, in both cases the church is part of a transnational larger church that supports their dissident efforts.

Two important differences also exist. East Germany is highly secularized in comparison to Poland. The second difference resides in the functions of the church: in Poland the church is a symbol of nationhood, position not shared by the Protestant church in East Germany.

*Hungary and Czechoslovakia - collaboration and dissidence*

In Hungary religion did not offer a viable alternative arena for gathering civil society. People increasingly distrusted the clerics, since they proved willing to collaborate with the communist regime. The country is split between Catholics and Protestants, but the government had power over both by nominating their leaders. For two reasons, Hungary is not a clear case of collaborationist church. First, Cardinal Midszenty is still a widely recognized figure in his opposition to communism. He had to find refugee at the US Embassy in Budapest in order not to be prosecuted by the communist authorities. However, his stance was more rigid than his counterparts in Poland and East Germany, by refusing any sort of compromise. Second, one can see the same group bases of dissidents, like in the East German case, but the Hungarian Catholic Church does not grant them any legitimacy and their efforts do not result in the church's involvement in the breakdown of the communist regime.

Czechoslovakia presents a similar story in that the revolution was not led by the church. The country is split into Catholics and Protestants, with the former living predominantly in the Czech territories and the latter in the Slovak parts. Religion was highly controlled by the regime and the church had to develop an underground activity. The revolution in Czechoslovakia was led by intellectuals and artists, that also formed the secrete constituencies of the underground churches (Nielsen, 2001). Because of their underground activity, the church never managed to lead the revolution. The repressive promise of the regime made people refrain from practicing religion, and so churchmen won the revolution in 1989 for a small group of people that were also at the forefront of dissidence. Ecumenical efforts have been witnessed, given that Cardinal Tomasek was looked upon as a leader by both major denominations.

The two cases have in common a partial role played by the church in the breakdown of communism. Collaboration occurred in Hungary, while isolation of church occurred in Czechoslovakia. However, the church was not one of the most important players in the 1989 revolution. Additionally, both countries have mixed denominational populations and in both countries secularization is higher than in Poland or Romania.

In Bulgaria the religious issue was not very salient to begin with. The state controlled much of the church, and the church did not engage in any sort of dissidence. Moreover, the legitimacy of the communist regime was higher in Bulgaria given the degree of backwardness with which the country began its communist phase. Orthodoxy is majoritarian, with a Muslim minority. The regime isolated and persecuted the Muslim minority, up to the level of denying any freedom of expression, while the Orthodox religion was allowed to survive. According to Nielsen (1991) the Bulgarian Orthodox Church is a symbol of nationhood, still very salient given centuries of Turkish domination.

In Romania the situation is similar. The Romanian Orthodox Church is majoritarian, but a significant minority of Catholic Uniates populates the North-Western parts of the country. The Orthodox Church actively supported the communist regime, mainly as a trade off for forbidding any other form of religion. The Romanian Orthodox Church was the only tolerated one, and it enjoyed a privileged status in relationship to any other denomination. Like in Bulgaria, after 1989, the Orthodox Church pledged allegiance to the new government, by a "swift, sudden" change in views. Romanian Orthodoxy is a symbol of nationhood, because of the presence of expansionist empires at its borders during history: Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, Russian.

The two countries share the same situation from the perspective adopted in this paper. Both Romanian and Bulgarian Orthodox Churches have been collaborationist. They did not take any part in the breakdown of the communist regime, and were content to preserve a status of predominance within their countries' religious space. Additionally, the Orthodox Church is national, meaning that there is no supranational highest authority.

**Explaining differences**

It is obvious that there are several factors that can account for the differences in the roles played by churches in opposing communism.

First, the position of the regime towards religion, its repressive ability and willingness, can influence the decision of the church to collaborate or oppose. However, examples show that in countries with similar degrees of repressiveness (Czechoslovakia and Romania) the church played different roles.

Second, the degree of secularization affects the extent to which the church can be a relevant arena for dissidence. If secularization is high, the appeal that the church will have to people will probably be low. In response to this, Poland and East Germany have different degrees of secularization and yet in both countries the church led the revolution.

Third, religiously homogenous countries give the church the advantage of addressing a unified mass, at least in religious terms. Religious homogeneity guarantees a wide circulation of the church's messages. The church can also be a unifying factor of the opposition that otherwise could be split. However, in Romania and Bulgaria the religious space is fairly homogenous, and the church chose not to oppose the regime.

Fourth, transnational churches have more resources, and their existence does not depend solely on the support from the communist state. Transnational churches can take more risks in leading the opposition, since they have the support from outside. This argument stands in East Germany and Poland, but does not explain low involvement of the church in Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

It seems that the simultaneous presence of a homogenous space and of a transnational church would explain the various outcomes. Homogenous religious space together with resources from outside guarantees a broad appeal of church to the people, and grants it leverage against the state. Transnational churches that are not dominant in a particular country encounter the problem of competition from other denominations, and so the appeal that they have to people is limited. Bulgaria is the definite example of homogenous religious space and national church and the amount of dissidence from the part of the church is the smallest. Additionally, the degree of religious repression is probably influenced by the attitude of the church towards the regime, that in turn affects the church. Homogenous religious space and transnational churches both increase the church's chances to appeal to people as an alternative credible arena for civil society, and limit the effect of repression from the government.

The homogenous/transnational duo that I find to be important in explaining the decision of the church in opposing communism, or leading the opposition, is critical, but it only creates a space of "the possible". In other words, the church has more means to be dissident when there is a transnational network that it can count on, and when it has broad appeal to people. This conjunction of factors might not be sufficient. The church also has to be able to create an identity for its followers that would differentiate them from the regime and that would grant legitimacy to their actions.

Constructivism's emphasis on identity is critical at this point. The identity formation of the "dissident camp" by means of church can be a whole essay in and of itself, but here I will just offer a simplified sketch.

Said's *Orientalism* became popular for a good reason: it showed how the hegemonic West makes sense of the powerless, irrational, aggressive East. In broader lines, the issue is the construction of "the other" in order to create an identity for oneself. In this case, the church had to be able to build an identity for its followers that would differentiate them from others. The church had to construct an "other" against which to fight. It is obvious that the other was the communist regime, but fighting against the communist regime may sometimes mean fighting against one's own country. Fighting your own country does not seem like a good idea in Central and Eastern Europe, where the majority of countries have fairly short histories as independent.

For Central and Eastern Europe "the other" is obviously the Soviet Union. Nielsen (1991) explains that the Catholic Church in Poland has been preoccupied with reasserting symbols of Polish nationhood against Sovietization. According to Neumann, all Central European countries construct Russia as "the other". So the church can help building a Polish nation outside of the Polish regime, because that regime is a mere extension of the Soviet dominance. The same could be argued for Hungary and Czechoslovakia. These countries did not have home grown communism and they all witnessed the invasion of Soviet troops at different points in time. The church can then safely construct the Soviet Union as the "evil"other against which dissidence is formed, without endangering national symbols. The church opposition has been weaker in Hungary and Czechoslovakia because of heterogeneous religious space. However they still witnessed different degrees of dissidence, and the Soviet Union could still be the safe "other".

In Romania and Bulgaria the church was the most collaborationist. The construction of the other is difficult here. Bulgaria cannot construct an evil Soviet Empire because of linguistic and cultural pan-Slavic ties, and because communism made Bulgaria progress substantially, compared to the backward levels that it had during the Ottoman Empire. In Romania, Ceausescu distanced itself from the Soviet, withdrew from the Warsaw pact, and developed his own version of communism. Not only the legitimacy of the regime is higher in Romania and Bulgaria, but also the church cannot offer a valid identity to the dissidents that would not endanger the very existence of the two nations. Russia is the guarantee of a Bulgarian nation, while in Romania communism plays the same part. Furthermore, Nielsen (1991) observes that in both Romania and Bulgaria xenophobia is high, and the church represents the very essence of nationhood. For these reasons, building a nation outside the communist regimes was not possible in Romania and Bulgaria. Additionally, Neumann (1998) discusses the identity of Eastern Europe. Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary identify Russia as the other, as opposed to their regional European self. It is not random that the main migration processes (going West via East) and contagion effects took place within Central Europe, and not further East.

# Conclusion

In this paper I argued that the existing explanations for the breakdown of communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe underspecify the role played by the people. Structuralist explanations talk about grievances, legitimacy, resources, economic crises and political opportunities that contributed to the upheavals. However, the question remains: how do people understand the process of opening of political opportunities? How do they construct their own participation? How do they attach meanings to their actions, that result in their motivation?

In other words, the structure was overemphasized in the explanations of the revolutions of 1989, while agency's role and mechanisms was left aside. I suggest that constructivism is an appropriate approach to analyze the interaction between agency and structure. I chose the example of the churches and the role they played in the upheavals, to illustrate the mutual constitution between agency and structure, the church playing simultaneously both roles.

I analyzed the role played by churches in six Central and Eastern European countries. The church represented a promoter of dissidence in Poland and East Germany, and actively participated, in various degrees in Hungary and Czech Republic. In Romania and Bulgaria the church collaborated with the communist regime and did not play any role in the breakdown of communist regimes. I attempted to explain the gap between the church as a collaborator and the church as a dissident. It seems that the transnational character of the church together with a homogenous religious space would guarantee the church the best chance in leading opposition. National churches depend exclusively on the support received from the state and the option to oppose might simply not be available. Similarly, heterogeneous religious spaces create a competition effect between churches, and there is no one single church that could cross-groups mobilize people. Finally, in addition to these facilitating structural factors, the church has to be able to create an identity for the dissident group, and in so doing, it has to find an "other" that can be used in efforts to build its own identity by opposition and still not endanger the existence of one particular nation. Since in Romania and Bulgaria the church represents the symbol of the nation and communism is either homegrown or ties with the Russian other are very strong, the church cannot effectively build a dissident identity for dissidence.

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# Deconstructing a Revolution. The Case of Romania - 1989

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Referindu-se la căderea comunismului în Europa Centrală şi de Est, atât unii autori cât şi simpli cetăţeni, descriu modalitatea efectivă de transfer a puterii utilizând sintagma de „revoluţie”. Dar teoriile acţiunii colective consideră revoluţiile ca fiind tipuri specifice de acţiune colectivă, diferenţiându-le, astfel, de rebeliuni, revolte, mişcări socile ori lovituri de stat. Pentru a fi considerată o revoluţie, o acţiune, nu numai că trebuie să producă unele schimbări esenţiale ale sistemului <u>dar</u> trebuie să prezinte şi unele caracteristici structurale specifice. În absenţa acestor caracteristici, oricât de semnificativă ar fi schimbarea, acţiunea al cărui rezltat este (schimbarea n.n.) nu poate fi considerată o revoluţie.  Pentru a ilustra aceasta utilizare uneori problematică a conceptului de „revoluţie”, lucrarea de faţă prezintă concluziile unei analize extensive realizate asupra evenimentelor din decembrie 1989 din Romania. Studiul demonstrează că, în concordanţă cu teoriile acţiunii colective, evenimentele din Romania nu pot fi numite „revoluţie” fiind absent unul dintre criteriile structurale majore: existenţa mişcărilor de opoziţie deschise şi organizate. Astfel ramâne deschisă doar posibilitatea unei rebeliuni interconectate cu o lovitură de stat. Analiza a fost fundamentată pe un cadru conceptual descris de teoriile propuse de: Theda Skocpol, Charles Tilly, Ted Gurr, Michael Kimmel, Bruce Ackerman,  Sammuel Huntigton, Jack Goldstone, Leslie Homes, Daniel Chirot, Alfred Linz şi Juan Stepan şi alţii.

The year 1989 will probably be recorded in universal history as one of the corner-stones of the 20th century. It is my opinion that through its grandeur it can be considered as a rupture in the course of history, but a type of rupture which allowed for one hundred and eighty degrees turn in the history of Eastern Europe. This change (more or less sudden) can be transposed in the realm of reality in the shape of the downfall of the communist regimes from this area of the globe.

For the states involved, the eradication of communism meant, an open road for the implementation of democratic values reflected in the institutional design and civic culture. But it is important to emphasize that not all states started the transition to democracy from the same basis. These differences could be attributed first off all to the dominating culture within the state, the type of the prior non-democratic regime and not least to the type of the actual process of transfer of power.

Referring to the actual process of transfer of power, certain authors and laymen alike often use the term "revolutions" to describe the events which led or caused the downfall of communism in Eastern Europe. This is somewhat justifiable as throughout major historical events the concept of revolutions was used to explain how changes occurred in the social, political or cultural fields or in the structure of the state.

But it is the aim of this paper to show that the use of this concept in some of the situations mentioned above can be seen as at least problematic[1]. To prove this point I will be undertaking an analysis of the case of Romania[2], using the configurative (Peters 1998: 5-7, 212) or the qualitative (O'Neill 2004: 25) type of analysis within the comparative method.

Thus, this paper is aimed at presenting the conclusions of the analysis I carried out, on the particular case of such an anti-communist "revolution"[3] in the instance of Romania. I aim to demonstrate that a revolution did not occur in Romania and to present as a potential explanation of the events of 1989 the thesis of a popular rebellion interlinked with a *coup d'etat*.

The analysis was carried out by examining events, facts and personal accounts on the revolution in a theoretical framework represented by a wide range of theories concerning revolutions: the structural-historic, aggregate-psychological, system-value consensus perspective and political conflict perspectives on revolutions presented by Theda Skocpol, Ted Gurr and Charles Tilly. Also the theories of Samuel Huntington, Michael Kimmel, Leslie Nelson, Daniel Chirot, and Jack Goldstone were examined, along with other approaches on the "revolutions" of 1989.

The paper at hand must be considered as an enlarged abstract of the original analysis, in which I will be presenting the general lines of analysis and conclusions, while content regarding the factual descriptions will not be inserted due to its length and to the fact that it is highly documented and readily available[4]. Thus as follows I will be restrained to present only the underlying reasons for selecting Romania (the Romanian exceptionalism), the theoretical framework and its relevance to the case of Romania.

## The Exceptionalism[5] of Romania

In the light of the changes in the structure of state and regime in Eastern Europe through the fall of communism we can speak of the exceptionalism of the Romanian case. The exceptional character is provided by the following:

(a) The type of the prior regime. Romania was the last and only hardcore communist regime which still used a Stalinist view of socialism (we can even speak of an anti-soviet Stalinism). Further more Romania was the only state in which we can find a sultanistic regime. Of course this gives course

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[1] The use of this concept might, and can be seen at times as a distortion of its true meaning, as sometimes it is used as a tool to shed a glamorous light on an event which cannot be considered as such, or plainly to hide the truth.
[2] The choice of Romania will be discussed further on.
[3] When using the term revolution in reference to the Romanian events I will use it between quotation marks as this is the general name given to the events. The aim of this paper is to establish this fact.
[4] Nonetheless the references section will include all materials used.
[5] The term "exceptionalism" is used based on its meaning presented by Linz and Stepan (1996: 344-347)

for several more special characteristics like the lack of the opposition[6] and the lack of the dissidents within the governing elite (Linz, Stepan 1996).

(b) The second issue adding to the exceptionalism of the Romanian case is that the events in Romania were the most violent in nature (with 1033 reported deaths).

(c) The swiftness of the development of events (only ten days from the first outbreak in Timisoara to the execution of the dictatorial couple) makes the Romanian experience unique in the context.

Due to these elements, both the regime type and the structural characteristics of the events themselves, we can speak of the exceptional character of Romania in relation with the other East European sister-states.

## Theoretical Framework

In the following paragraphs I will be outlining the theoretical framework on the basis of which the analysis was carried out.

I will begin with the four main perspectives on revolutions as presented by Theda Skocpol in *Social Revolutions in the Modern World.* I will, then, examine the theory of revolutions from a sociological and then a liberal point of view. Towards the end I will be focusing on more specific theories designed to explain revolutions in dictatorships, then a general theory formulated by Daniel Chirot on the Eastern European events of 1989. A specific part is dedicated to the analysis of the type of transition to democracy from the view of sultanism, as outlined by Linz and Stepan. Finally, I will present other theories or better yet pseudo-theories or thoughts on the events of December '89 in Romania.

A revolution "is a rapid, basic transformation of a society's state and class structures; and they (revolutions n.n.) are carried out by class based structures from below" is a definition given by Theda Skocpol, from a structuralist-historic perspective (Skocpol 1979). Further on Skocpol underlines the fact that revolutions can only occur when societal structural change coincides with class upheaval and at the same time political transformation coincides with social transformation. The events of a revolution develop in five stages:

(a) Changes in the social system;

(b) Increasing grievances, discontent and disorientation of the masses;

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[6] A report issued by Radio Free Europe (cited by Linz, Stepan 1996: 352) shows that there were only two opposition organizations in Romania (in 1989) and their leaders were not known publicly, while in Poland there were 60 such organizations.

(c) Coagulation of interests into group interests (this is seen as a potential for collective mobilization and implies that revolutions are carried out by ideological, organized mass-based movements);

(d) Withdrawal of popular support for the government (this signifies the revolution itself);

(e) The establishment of a new order.

The aggregate – psychological theories, best represented by Ted Gurr, sustain that revolutions occur when people become discontent because of discrepancies between their own values and the fact that these values, due to cultural and practical conditions, cannot be reached (Gurr cited by Skocpol 1979). In order for a revolution to occur this deprivation needs to extend and affect a large number of people from the masses and form the elites. The relative deprivation theory put forward by Gurr offers four stages in the development of a revolutionary movement:

(a) Development of discontent;

(b) Politicization of discontent;

(c) Materialization into violence;

(d) The revolution itself.

Further on, the system / value consensus approach again requires a value motivated ideological movement to use violence to change the core value system of a state.

Within the political-conflict approach, Charles Tilly, offers his own definition of revolutions. "A revolution is a forcible transfer of power over controlling the state in which at least two groups, blocs are in competition by making incompatible claims over the state" (Tilly 1994). The population will sustain one or the other of the claims (or both if the population is split on the issue). An important point is that Tilly (as Skocpol) makes a distinction between revolutions and other kinds of collective action, such as rebellions, coups and what he calls "top down transformation", even thought they are closely related to the concept of revolution.

Further on Tilly will make a clear distinction between a "revolutionary situation" and a "revolutionary outcome". The first concept can very well be characterized by the definition of revolutions offered previously. But in order for a revolutionary situation to occur the following causes need to coincide:

(a) The consolidation of contenders who will make claims over power and the state or some segment of it;

(b) Commitment to those claims from a large segment of the population;

(c) The incapacity or unwillingness of rulers to suppress the contenders and / or commitment to their claims.

The convergence of these three ideas is considered the cause of a revolution, but Tilly offers another idea which is viewed as a "strongly facilitating condition", that is the formation of alliances between members of the polity and the contenders.

Given all this I also must make one correction: a revolutionary situation might not lead to revolution. In order for us to characterize a collective action as a revolution, we need to fulfill the requirement of "revolutionary outcomes". A revolutionary outcome can be seen when there is "a transfer of state power from those who held it before, the start of multiple sovereignty to a new ruling coalition – which may include some elements of the old ruling coalition" (Tilly 1994). He states four conditions for a revolutionary outcome: defections of polity members, acquisition of forces by the revolutionary forces, neutrality or defection of the armed forces, control of the state apparatus by the members of the revolutionary coalition. It is stressed out the a revolutionary situation can turn into a revolutionary outcome if the crucial condition of the defection of polity members occurs in large numbers linked with the role of the armed forces which could, in turn, guard, be neutral or defect form the old regime. Paradoxically, Tilly argues, that there can be a revolutionary outcome without a revolutionary situation, as this is the case of the "top-down transformations", but these are not to be characterized as revolutions.

According to Samuel Huntington a revolution "involves the rapid and violent destruction of existing political institutions, the mobilization of new groups into politics, and the creation of new political institutions" (Huntington 1994). According to this theory a revolution occurs when social and economic development occurs before political development and thus there is no sustainable basis which can engulf this development. Revolutions can also be explained as "rapid and violent expansions of political participation outside the existing structure of political institutions" (Huntington 1994).

Michael Kimmel offers a definition of revolutions from a sociological point of view. A revolution "is an attempt by subordinate groups to transform the social foundations of political power" (Kimmel, 1990). Kimmel makes a clear distinction between such a collective action and a rebellion or a *coup d'etat*. What I consider to be relevant from the theory presented by Kimmel is the distinction between the temporal moments of a revolution. He talks about preconditions, precipitants and triggers. The preconditions are the "structural shifts in the casual foundations of a society", and they are seen as of long-run. The precipitants are the so-called shorter–run elements which force the existing preconditions to surface in current social conciseness. Triggers, the closest historical events to the event at hand are the ones that set in motion the entire revolutionary process. An analysis of an event cannot be built if any of these conditions are missing.

Further, on, I will concentrate on Bruce Ackerman's theory on the future of liberal revolutions and on liberal revolutions in general. In his view, a revolution is a "successful effort to transform the governing principles and practices of a basic aspect of life through an act of collective and self-conscious mobilization" (Ackerman, 1992). I have retained only one aspect of his theory: as opposed to collective truth, individual freedom is the aim of a revolution. Individual freedom is described as the freedom to assert ones ideas and moral values even if someone else considers them fundamentally wrong. As there is an equal freedom for everyone to search their own individual truths, it will be their right to contest the truth of the government.

Another interesting theory developed to explain revolutions is that of Jack Goldstone. His theory is designed to explain revolutions that take place in dictatorships. Goldstone defines dictatorships as being neopatrimonial states. A neopatrimonial state is a partially modernized state in which there is a bureaucratic apparatus and a party based government, even though the state is run by a single and powerful leader. In such a system the masses are depoliticized while the elites are highly politicized (Goldstone, 1994). He further identifies the vulnerabilities of such a state: the elites play a major role in upholding such a state; the alienation of elites could prove fatal to the dictator (this could happen if the elites are dissatisfied with what they receive from the system). The second set of vulnerabilities can be seen in the form of the balance of elites: if the elites are divided, the leader needs to act in such a way that will preserve the alliance of the elites. Thirdly, the depoliticization can cause movements within the masses that seek to place new forces in the political arena. Given all this, a deduction can be made: if the elites are alienated, they will defect and will incite the masses to rebel against the regime or ruler. This will leave the remaining forces in government with only one solution of so-called defense, that of the armed force. But as Goldstone points it out, in this situation the loyalty of the armed forces is questionable. He further goes to identify situations that could lead to a breakdown of the system. Such points in his view refer to the economic and moral state of the masses (whether they can fulfill their primary needs), urbanization and the growth of the industry, the expansion of the beaurocracy and the temptation of the regime to monopolize resources. A specific role is given to the superpower's influence, as well as to the policies of this superpower regarding the state in question, and the reliance of this state on foreign support.

Although the theory offered by Goldstone is a very interesting one, it does not shed clear light on the actual process, stages of a revolution; it merely speaks of elements that could cause it.

Trying to explain the anti-communist revolutions of 1989 Leslie Holmes reiterates the theory of rising expectations, in the view of which revolutions do not occur only due to the oppressive characteristic of a certain regime, they will happen instead when a certain reforming government raises expectations but

it has not been able or willing to deliver what citizens believed it had promised (Holmes 1997). She also sustains the idea that over time coercitive regimes will become weak if they misuse the economy. From this, we can deduct that in her view economy played a great role in the fall of communism. Other elements were the reformative attitude of Gorbachev (perestroika and the glasnost reforms), the western media, and the opposition to the regime in the form of dissidence.

In another theory which aims to explain the Romanian events of '89, Daniel Chirot states that the fall of the communist regimes of Eastern Europe were mainly caused by economic and moral – political reasons. In his view, revolutions happen when people lose trust in the system and feel that there is a loss of legitimacy within the system, but the crucial aspect is that along with people, factions of elites must experience the same aspects and abandon the system (Chirot 1994).

To explain the downfall of Ceausescu he offers there main categories of causes. First, he speaks about the still Stalinist view on communism used by Ceausescu in the age of communist reformation in that geographic setting. This is also linked with the stagnation of the Romanian economy and the ever-increasing gap between the social, political and international realities of the moment and the ideology employed by the ruler. Second, even though Romania was seen by the West as one of the most progressive communist states from the Warsaw Pact Organization in the '70s[7], in 1989 Romania had even fallen behind the USSR when it came to reforms. To this is linked the impact of the foreign public opinion and the influence of foreign radio stations (such as Radio Free Europe, BBC, etc). The final fact was the conception of the ruler that he could legitimize his regime by the constant reliance on the fear of a Soviet invasion.

Further, Chirot identifies the same structural causes of the events as the ones seen in Goldstones' theory regarding the alienations of elites, the high-ranking cadres in Chirots case. For a better understanding of what happened in East Europe in '89, Chirot offers a combination of Marx's notion of class and the theory of justice developed by Rawls: as the middle class became larger during communism because of economic modernization and was poorer than its Western counterpart, but there were social changes. This is seen a crucial prerequisite of the events.

In the view of Linz and Stepan sultanism is a far better explanation of the events that led to the transition to democracy than the occurrence of revolutions or *coup d'etats*. In the case of transition from sultanism to democracy, organized democratic forces are weak and thus non-democratic forces that get the credit for the sultans' destruction can get the power and claim revolutionary responsibility. As it is shown, a transition to democracy, in sultanism, cannot occur by way of a military coup or based on opposition forces (as they cannot mobilize) so only one aspect remains, that is the violent perspective

[7] Ceausescu publicly set the Romanian foreign policy against the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

(influenced by external forces rather then internal ones). In this case the contenders for power are factions within the polity who assume the revolutionary claim and credit by destroying the "monster" that was responsible for all that had gone bad in the state. This way the leader, the "sultan" is demonized and bares the whole blame, and the regime itself, communism, is saved. Thus the success of the supposed revolution is the fall of the sultan and not the fall of the regime.

Linz and Stepan show that, the trial and "judicial murder" (Linz, Stepan 1996) of the dictating couple and the ease with which the power was secured in the hands of neo-communists can be considered proofs of their theory. Thus, in Romania we can speak of a fall of Ceausescu but not a fall of communism.

The French author Claude Karnoouh, in an effort to define communism and post-communism, considers that there was no revolution in Romania but a strategic reorganization carried out by the USSR. Further on, in characterizing the Romania, he offers an anecdote: "The communist power is dead! Long live the mass parliamentary democracy!" (Karnoouh 2000: 16). He explains that, even though the system was abolished, the cadres / activists were not, and, as long as they are still in power, we cannot speak of a revolution in the Romanian society. He also sustains the fact that the events in Eastern Europe were not revolutions but prearranged events that the people were manipulated in believing as revolutions by the powers of the West and East alike.

Vladimir Tismaneanu presents a less elaborate but, nonetheless, similar idea. Thus he speaks about the process of salvaging communism through the demonization of the leader, and so we can speak about a continuation in power even after the "fall of communism" (Tismaneanu 1993).

From a more general perspective, there are large a number of less academic theories or statements which aim to explain or to affirm an opinion or another on the events of December 1989. There are ideas like a revolution followed by a restoration, a combination of a base-up and top-down revolutions. And, of course, there are voices that say that there was a revolution in conjuncture with a *coup d'etat*.

As a conclusion of this section I would like to present the definition of the Romanian "revolution" given by Ion Iliescu: "a revolution is judged, primarily, through its program: how profound, how radical it is, what its motivation is and in what dynamics and perspective does it belong to." (Cesereanu 2004: 79).

**Analyzing the "Revolution"**

As I have shown, the Romanian case, through its characteristics, is singular in the European context at the end of the 8ᵗʰ decade. Thus, a general theory on the events of East Europe may not adequately explain the downfall of communism in Romania, even if this downfall integrates in the general trend. A particular and singular explanation needs to be developed, based on theory and facts alike.

Even up to this point in time, it is still highly debated if in Romania a revolution actually took place. The most fervent sustainers of the revolutionary theory are the ex-members of the NSF[8] and the revolutionary associations, both of which claim the merit of toppling the regime.

Several Romanian authors, cited by Ruxandra Cesereanu try to explain these events in the view of a continuous development of different types of collective action such as the sequence of meeting – rebellion – insurrection in Bucharest and public unrest – rebellion – insurrection – revolution in Timisoara (Cesereanu 2004).

In the following paragraphs I propose an analysis of the thesis of the revolution.

Taking into account the theory presented by Theda Skocpol we can affirm that there was no revolution. The structural change of society, one of the basic requirements of Skocpols theory, is not present in Romania. Indeed a societal structural change took place in Romania, but that was caused by the communist revolution itself over a half of century ago. At this stage in time, there was no structural change in progress. Secondly, in this case we cannot speak of "class upheaval" as the mass movements present were not class related. The upheaval that indeed took place engulfed all classes. Thus, the argument of class cannot be sustained by the facts. Carrying on, we also cannot speak of a social transformation or a political change ante-"revolution". Thirdly, the events of December '89 do not follow the five stages proposed by Skocpol. There was no remarkable sudden change in the social system, even though, the last decade of communist rule has had an effect form this point of view. The third stage (the consolidation of interest groups) is maybe the most problematic to the thesis of revolution, as it did not exist, and it could not exist due to the characteristics of the regime. Even Skocpol admits that it is impossible for opposition movements to exist in a totalitarian state (Skocpol 1994: 111). Given this it is for us to dismiss the possibility of a revolution from the aggregate-psychological perspective as well.

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[8] National Salvation Front – the provisional government that assumed power in December 1989. It later was transformed into a political party and won the elections of 1990.

Much like in the case of Skocpol the inconsistency between Ted Gurrs theory and the facts can be outlined by the requirement of politicization of the individual discontent. There was no link between the development of discontent at an individual level and the materialization into violence at a collective level. This, again, because there were no organized opposition forces to the regime. The politicization phase actually took place during and even after the stage of the materialization in violence.

Regarding the system / value consensus model I can only state the same idea: no opposition or democratic movements can be traced.

Turning back to Skocpols theory, in Romania, a rebellion could have taken place. The differences, pointed out by the author, between a revolution and a rebellion are that, in a rebellion the element of social structure change does not coincide with class upheaval. Yet again the problem with this idea is that the Romanian phenomenon is not class related.

An interesting theory is that proposed by Charles Tilly. Applying the events to this theory we can see that there was no revolutionary situation because no matter how discontent people might have been they could not have engaged in political actions, unless they were part of at least a minimally organized group and have some access at least to limited resources (Tilly cited by Skocpol 1979). As we have shown this is absent in Romania.

On the other hand what we can witness is a revolutionary outcome. The presence of a revolutionary outcome and the absence of a revolutionary situation signify the lack of a revolution and the presence of a "top-down transformation", as Tilly names it. Adrian Marino, also sustains the idea of a top-down "revolution".

Having analyzed the four perspectives on revolutions presented by Skocpol we can affirm that anyone of them will lead us to the conclusion that the events were not a revolution and thus they have to be some another form of collective action.

Using Huntington's theory it is easy to deduct that no revolutions can occur in a communist regime, as the author himself states it, because the political participation is assured by the massive politicization carried out by the regime.

In light of Kimmels findings it is hard to characterize the events in Romania as a revolution because it is the subordinate groups that need to make the transition to transform political power. The facts show that the power remained concentrated in the hands of the elites and no such groups were embodied in

the process of transformation, aside, of course, from the mass protests. In view of the three conditions that need to be filled, in order for a revolution to happen, the triggers were not acts of the regime but potential manipulations of the elites, which in my opinion does not constitute a valid set of triggers in the sense described by Kimmel.

The liberal perspective on revolutions might be the only one that could justify the naming of the events as "revolution". In light of this wider perspective, between the libertarian characteristic of a revolution and the actual events and their character a correlation can be made. But the theory is not concerned that much with the actual structural development of a revolution, but more the philosophical aim of a collective action.

Revolutions in dictatorships, in the view of Goldstone, can very well offer the explanation that the Romanian events were a revolution as the causes, all the factors, which the theory requires for a revolution to happen, are sustained by the facts. However there are some deficiencies in the theory provided. First, it does not shed clear light on the actual process, stages of a revolution, it merely speaks of elements that could have caused it and does not clearly state who will assume power, the elites who mobilize the masses or the representatives of the masses who were mobilized by the elites. On the other hand he does not offer a clear distinction between revolutions and *coup d'etats*. The fact that elites defect against the system could more likely be seen as a coup rather then the start of a revolution.

The presented objections to Goldstones theory can easily be applied to describe the theory proposed by Daniel Chirot that in general lines suffers from the same deficiencies. All in all these theories are much too general to be able to explain a revolution; they join several types of collective action in one category generically called "revolution". Consequentially we cannot base our arguments on either of the theories.

The approach provided by Holmes does not offer any suitable explanations as to the events of '89 and in particular to Romania. We need to see clearly that the government and Ceausescu in particular had no intention of implementing any reforms, the problem is the exact opposite – he did not want to abandon his Stalinist view of communism and this is one of the reasons that led to his fall. Based on this theory, a revolution should have happened in the years following '89, in particular 1992 and 1993, when the exact thing that the theory describes as the main cause of revolutions happened in Romania (I will not discus further this point, it is of no relevance to our discussion). Clearly, based on this theory, a revolution did not take place in Romania.

In relation to the sultanistic perspective of Linz and Stepan, there is one major problem: it does not stand on its own. Sultanism itself cannot substitute the notions of collective action such as "revolutions" or "*coup d'etat*". In my view sultanism can be a viewed as a potential explanation of the causes of the events, and of their development (to some extent), or it can be viewed as an underlying factor, but it cannot substitute the theories of collective action[9].  Nevertheless, by analyzing this perspective we can see that Linz and Stepan are much more inclined to consider the events from Romania as a coup rather then a revolution.

At this point, I think that it is safe to state, that if we consider their structure, the events of December 1989 from Romania were not a revolution.

### The Hypothesis of the Rebellion and Coup

According to Skocpol we can infer that events were a rebellion, and according to Tilly a "top-down transformation". It is the combination of the two elements that I think can validly characterize these events.

Ruxandra Cesereanu offers a distinction between two stages of the events. The first stage lasts from the 15th of December until the 22nd of December 1989. It includes the protests and manifestations both from Timisoara and Bucharest. The second stage begins on the 22nd of December and last until 25th of December, the day of the triumphant "revolution" (Cesereanu, 2004).

The first stage is, in my view, the phase coinciding with the rebellion. The possible causes of it are less important then the fact itself. Indeed the rebellions were based on the precondition of high levels of individual discontent. Even though it may not have started on its own, but after it did, the rebellion took a life on its own, it developed through itself.  This phase is characterized by street revolts of the population, but has no direct political outcomes. The revolts are not unanimously led. There are some voices who state that the events of Timisoara, developed by themselves into a sort of local revolution, as revolutionary organisms were established and a manifesto was read. But, it is my opinion that this is not the case as these events, by themselves, could not have made any changes to the political system. Thus, they were not a revolution, but merely a rebellion.

The second stage is the stage of the politicization of activities and the creation of new governing bodies. This is the phase of the coup.

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[9] I cannot say that in Romania there was neither a revolution, nor was there a coup but what really happened was "sultanism at work". Sultanism is a regime type, and indeed regime types can have a substantial influence on the effective methods of power transfer (transition) (for further information: Linz, Stepan 1996: 55-65), but at the end, they are just that: regime types and not forms of collective action.

A *coup d'etat* is a type of collective action through which the government of a state is ousted by elements of the elite in order for them to assume power. A coup does not aim to change the system. Nevertheless, in Romania, even if we speak of a coup, the transformation of the system should not be overlooked. This, in turn, brings us back to the idea of top-down transformation presented by Tilly.

Even though following the development of the coup its elements are not only present in this stage, it is now that they becomes obvious.

Taking into account the nature of the events it is my view that a prior well put together plan with both external and internal influences was enacted. The plan was for Ceausescu to fall, but the regime to remain.

It is unclear still how the rebellion and the coup exactly intertwined, but a possible explanation is that the rebellions ("sparked" by the conspirators) went further then the conspirators expected, and thus they needed to actually voice out a change of the system and thus try to legitimize themselves. The months following presented a clear image that the system changed only by name.

## Conclusion

It is my hope that the present paper offers some understanding of the nature of the events that took place and it explains to some extent the intricacies of the theory of revolution applied on Romania. This paper by no means, offers generally valid explanations of revolutions or collective action in the process of the fall of communism in East Europe, its findings are only valid in the particular case of Romania. Even more, the views affirmed about Romania could be flawed as the events are of a too recent nature, the main actors are still actively present on the political scene, and the files of the political police are still kept secret.

But the term revolution could be used if we are to define a revolution in a more general way, not using a theory of collective action but a theory of societal change (as for instance Radulescu-Motru considers it). It is my opinion that in this case, in order to be coherent we need to appropriately define and specify the use of the term when applying it to describe events of an uncertain character. Thus the events in Romania, if we define revolution as a type of collective action different from a rebellion or a coup, were not a revolution. However if we define a revolution as being a grand societal change I have to say the events from Romania were in fact a revolution.

In closing I would like, again, to stress the fact that the scope of this paper was to interpret the events from a theoretical perspective and it should be read as such.

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# A Game Theoretical Perspective on Common Pool Resources: The Problem of Central Heating System In Romania

**Ioana MUREŞAN**

Cu toate că la nivel teoretic decizia indivizilor de a-şi achiziţiona centrale termice individuale este o alegere raţională, problema acestei decizii este mult mai complexă. Această lucrare modelează şi analizează la nivel empiric, din perspectiva teoriei jocului şi a decizie raţionale, distincţia dintre acţiunea individuală şi cea colectiva şi modul în care prima este cauza eşecului celei de a doua. Indivizii au ales să achizioneze centrale termice de apartament fără a lua în considerare faptul că o soluţie mai eficientă ar fi investiţia în modernizarea centralelor de cartier. Aceştia au ales să nu coopereze la nivel social şi să-şi satisfacă propriile interese. Cu toate acestea, în afară de faptul că această alegere implică o investiţie ridicată de bani şi de timp, presupune externalităţi negative, cum ar fi poluarea. Astfel că, problema pe care lucrarea de faţă o analizează este măsura în care autorităţile publice pot contribui la crearea de stimulente pentru a transpune raţionalitatea individuală la nivel social.

## Introduction

This paper aims to develop a game theoretical model, which deals with the utility loss considering two institutional set-ups, i.e. central versus individual heating system. The general question we seek to address in this study is *to what extent choosing one or the other alternative induces a more effective management of common pool resources and provides greater social benefits.*

Over the last few years, there has been a steady increase in the number of individual purchase of heating system. People have decided to give up the old and inefficient system and get independent from the point of view of warmth, water and gas consume. As the next table shows, the number of households connected to the centralized heating system decreases almost constantly every year, the exception being year 2003.

Table no.1 – The number of households connected to the centralized heating system

| Year | The number of households connected to the centralized heating system, at the end of the year |
|------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 2000 | 2.696.360 |
| 2001 | 2.485.295 |
| 2002 | 2.090.799 |
| 2003 | 2.115.186 |

*Source: The Romanian Government, Ministry of Administration and Interior*

At the individual level, the acquisition of household heating systems has been a good choice and the return on investment has been high. Nevertheless, at the community level, the utility is lower than the expected one. First, there is the problem of money and time invested in the individual heating

systems. Second, there are the problems with keeping them operating – more than 1500 of individual heating systems caused arson in 2005 (TVR1 News, 2006). Finally, the by-products they cause are very nocive in time.

At the national level, the total number of households in towns is 4.259.574 (Census Report, 2002). Thus, if every case considered in the above-mentioned circumstances, then the problem of heating system becomes socially significant from a welfare perspective. More than that, the table below shows that even in villages, the households connected to an individual heating system represent almost 10% of all units.

**Table no.2 – The number of households connected to centralized and individual heating system**

|  | Centralized heating system | Individual heating system |
|---|---|---|
| Total | 2 485 295 | 462 858 |
| Towns | 2 464 898 | 416 093 |
| Villages | 20 397 | 46 765 |

*Source: The Census Report 2002*

Taking into consideration that the average net income is a fix budget, 828 RON (National Institute for Statistics), equivalent of 233 Euro, the amount of money paid for the acquisition and maintenance of an individual heating system matter. Let us consider the conditions in which the State owns the tools to enhance the extent at which common pool resources, such as gas, and water, are managed effectively.

Thus, the presupposition of the paper is that giving up the centralized system is the less benefic alternative and the decision to choose individual management probably going to produce a set of unwilling costs. However, taking into consideration that the individuals are making a rational choice, the rules of the game set the sub-optimality of outcomes. Individuals are taking individually rational and socially sub-optimal decisions because they happened to live in a peculiar context. Therefore, in the context of the existence of an institutional structure inducing effective collective choice, the individual and social rationality are expected to be in line.

From the perspective of a game theory approach, this problem can be defined as follows. Every single individual who seeks better living conditions has two options: *cooperation* with the others in modernizing the old area power stations or, *non-cooperation,* which means self-management of the individual heating system. However, at a closer inspection it becomes clear that payoffs of the cooperation and non-cooperation strategies set a Pareto sub-optimal equilibrium. This puts individual rationality in contrast with social rationality.

The theoretical issue at hand builds on two different but connected aspects. The first one relates to preference aggregation, to the way this problem can or can not be solved. The second one has to do with the extent to which institutions can create incentives to induce rational behavior at the individual level, in such a way that these are in direct contrast with social welfare. In the context of this paper, we can consider that the community is the one who manages the common resources, while the State only sets incentives in order to establish the proper means for self-management. Individuals are requested to find solutions for themselves, the State being the helping institution. Although people are poor in social capital, not being able to provide community communication, state does not have the capabilities to interfere and to manage in a proper manner the human resource. Therefore, the question that appears is what the State could have done in order to induce a common decision. This research builds on these particular theoretical issues and relates to a social choice problem: common pool resources, specifically central heating system problem.

In the case of the inability to choose between the cooperation or non-cooperation approach, this paper approaches the problem of the extent to which heating provision produces Pareto efficiency. Put it in another way, the paper is concerned with the possibility of people acting together in order to improve their own conditions and those of the others. This question might be considered in the context of a learning approach: although individuals are not used to act together, the decentralization process of the heating system is an opportunity for them to learn that better conditions are desirable. Thus, the technical hypothesis of the paper is the following: *if individuals had chosen to cooperate in the game of modernizing the old area power station, their costs would have been lower and their benefits would have been higher than the case of individual heating system.*

The relevance of the paper is based on two general assumptions. First, the study is related to political science by dealing with the role of institutions, especially State, within the social process of managing social capital. Although at the individual level, the choices are rational, at the society level, they are not anymore; individual rationality is not necessarily a pre-condition of social rationality. Thus, the State is a major actor within this game that can induce a certain behavior, by guiding the individuals towards benefic actions for them and for society as a whole. Second, the economic perspective must be taken into consideration. With an average fix monthly budget, individuals are not indifferent to the price they pay for common pool resources. They logically prefer a minimum cost for a maximum amount of utility.

**Game theory background**

Game theoretical analysis refers to the assessment of interactions among different actors within the decision-making process, actors who are intentionally rational players and who have preferences in

order to derive certain utilities and outcomes. Thus, a game theoretical perspective, related to any kind of problem, has to deal with three main factors: the number of actors, the strategies available (alternatives), and the actors' preferences, as represented in the table below.

**Table no.3 – The graphical model of a game**

| Player 2 | | Player 1 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | *Alternative1* | *Alternative 2* |
| | *Alternative 1* | x1, y1 | x2, y1 |
| | *Alternative 2* | x1, y2 | x2, y2 |

The **context of the game** refers to those external elements that can influence the outcome of the game, the alternatives available, and costs and benefits for each of the actors. Considering that the main goal of the paper is to find evidence that a better coordination of collective choice would decrease individual costs in the problem of central heating systems, the context can be described as follows.

A significant percentage of people have individually decided to give up the old and inefficient centralized system and buy an individual heating system. On the first look, this is not a problem; it is a perspective of rational choice theory: every individual has calculated his own benefit from the two alternatives he has (remaining connected to the central system or buying an individual heating system), and, from the point of view of economic benefits, he has tended to chose the second one. A very large part of the population has done so without measuring the long-term implications and the negative externalities for him/her and for the others.

At the same time, the context of the game implies more than a single Nash equilibrium, although individuals will rightfully tend to choose the Pareto sub-optimality. In these conditions, the state could provide incentives to enhance the outcomes of the game. The main solution in this process is related to the institutional capacity to manage resources in a legal way, by prohibiting a certain kind of behavior and by removing the less efficient system. If we consider the centralized and the individual heating systems, we may claim that one is superior to the other from a social welfare perspective, and the differences between the two are inducing sub-optimality. The social utility depends on how individuals manage to assume responsibilities in a context where the sum of the payouts is not null and everything lost by one individual is a loss of the entire community.

The context implies externalities, too. Thus, the financial and non-financial dangers emerging from individual heating systems are multiple. First, we can talk about an uncompetitive market unable to offer the best quality. The problem is the existence of non-authorized firms that sell individual heating systems at second hand, without having the knowledge required for their installation. This induces a

very risky negative externality: the danger of explosions. Second, besides that, even if the individual heating systems are properly installed, they produce pollution.

The literature underlines the fact that there are two types of pollution stemming from the use of individual heating system: interior pollution and exterior pollution (Fowler, 2005). The former refers to the usage of methane gas. By burning, the air is polluted with carbon dioxide, carbon oxide, natrium oxide and hundreds of others substances. The latter type of pollution is related to the positioning and the dimensions of smokestacks. Due to the placement of these smokestacks horizontally, the air currents facilitate the circulation of polluted substances in neighborhood, creating an overlaying of polluted air. Authors also claim that the increasing use of individual heating system on medium term will raise the global warming effect

On the other hand, individual heating systems are more comfortable and the taxes paying for the consumption are lower than in a centralized system. For example, a family with a central heating system has paid in 2003 9.3 millions lei for water and heat consumption, while families connected to the centralized system have paid 17 millions for the same consumption (Evenimentul Zilei, 15 July 2004).

Considering the *actors of the game*, within the game theory, there must be at least two players in order to create the interdependence or isolation situations. However, the number of actors may be a problem in the context of collaboration, cooperation or collective action. It is not said that there is an ideal number of players, but when it comes to decide it is easier to deal with two individuals, small groups, than with an entire community. On the contrary, if there is non-cooperative game, the number of players does not count that much and does not generally change the strategic structure of the game (Holzinger, 2003:18).

In this paper, the actors are the *State* or any institution that can provide a legal system, the entrepreneurs (the invisible hand that regulates the market after the state failure), and the individuals who must choose between different types of costs and benefits. The relation between these three actors is a linked one: the state creates the legal framework in order to regulate the entrepreneurial activity, which, on its turn, provides services for the individual.

However, the state is not capable, in terms of information and persuasion, to create incentives to induce a rational behavior at the social level. In this context, the private market is the one that comes to adjust the situation by providing an alternative to the State. However, being a competitive market, by formulating opportunities for those who can or want to invest, the private market does not seem to solve the problem; there is equilibrium, but not Pareto optimality. More than that, the state withdrawal

leads to incapacity of self-regulation. The households associations do not have the institutional capacity to fill the space dedicated to State intervention in order to create a proper resource allocation. Thus, the problem to investigate is to what extend individual optimization can provide a social one.

The *alternatives of a game* refer to solutions that rational players choose in order to satisfy their needs or expectations. Thus, a rational solution corresponds to a set of strategies that the players have no reasons to regret choosing. Alternatives are about the best reply an individual may give in a certain situation.

Regarding the number of strategies, it is not necessary to have only two, as in the classical matrix games. However, when there are a larger number of strategies, the strategic structure of the game may be changed, because more strategies imply an increasing number of outcomes (Holzinger, 2003:17). Besides that, the game theory literature talks about mixed, pure and dominant strategies; and all these types of strategies can be reached within multiple level games. The pure strategy refers to the outcomes a player receives by selecting the same single alternative during all the games. The mixed strategy is referring to the probability with which each of the pure strategies is going to be selected. Finally, a strategy is dominant if it guarantees the highest outcomes against all possible strategies of the opposition.

Related to the strategies is the cooperation level between the two players. Within game theory, games have been divided into cooperative and non-cooperative games. This division is related to the manner the choice of strategy is made (Coddington, 1967). Thus, in a cooperative game, players are able to communicate with one another, to make joint agreements. On the other side, in non-cooperative games, players do not have the right to communicate prior to the game. John Nash was the first to have introduced the distinction between cooperative and non-cooperative game concepts. He claims that cooperative games are those in which players can make enforceable contracts and also can make irrevocable threats to other players; non-cooperative games are games in which self-commitment is not possible (Kuhn *et al.*, 1994:165).

Information is another variable that must be considered, and there are two directions in which we can debate this problem: first, imperfect information, and second, informational asymmetry. Imperfect information means that the players do not have full knowledge about payoffs and/or the type of actors they play (Holzinger, 2003:19). Informational asymmetry is related to the fact that different individuals have different access to the information, and, because of that, different knowledge about the context of the game.

Otto H. Swank and Phongtorn Wrasai , have come to the result that, when there is no direct cost of communication, and communication can only convince uninformed or wrongly informed actors of the truth, more communication may reduce the probability that a correct decision is made (Swank and Wrasai: 15). They have found a reason for this, that communication may aggravate the free-rider problem associated with collective information. Cheap and good information reduces the incentives to collect it, but expensive information increases the probability of good decision-making.

Choosing one or the other alternative, players of the game contribute to the inducement of a certain estate that can be, or not, equivalent with Pareto optimality. *Pareto optimality* refers to an accepted solution for every single member of the game. Put in other words: "no part of a Pareto optimal solution can be improved without making some other part worse" (Petrie *et al.*, 1995).

Another important game theoretical concept is equilibrium, which means a stable point in which none of the players has rational reasons to change the chosen strategy (King, 2005:125). Nash equilibrium is a concept that is especially used for non-cooperative games and it is also called equilibrium point. This point is defined as a strategy combination with the property that every player's strategy is a best reply to the other players' strategies (Kuhn, 1994:165).

### Centralized Heating System *versus* Individual Heating System

This paper seeks to make general assumptions about the coordination of heating system issues by analyzing individual cases, and by generalizing the conclusion. Besides that, we consider that there are three types of players: those with low budget and cannot afford to invest, those who can be placed on the financial average scale, and those who can afford to pay as much as it is requested in order to satisfy the individual needs. These types of actors have only two alternatives: to remain in the centralized system or to invest in an individual heating system. Furthermore, we might consider that, whether they have the money or not, there are individuals who prefer to invest in an individual heating system and those who are not.

Until 2004 a quarter of the urban population (640.000 families) has given up the centralized system, more than half of the households choosing an individual heating system (National Authority for Regulating Natural Gas Activities, 2003). More than that, in 2003 the number of legally imported individual heating systems was 286.000, with more 80.000 than those imported in 2002 (Evenimentul Zilei, 19 March 2004). Whereas, the evolution of the number of centralized system's consumers tended to increase during the last period, especially between 2000 and 2003 (http://www.distrigaznord.ro/sediu/activitate_2000_2003.php?hi=0). However, the increase in the

number of people connected to the centralized system is not necessarily a significant one, and the presupposition is that this is an increase determined exclusively by the building of new apartment-houses and not by any reconnection to the centralized system.

*A comparative calculus for individual and centralized heating systems*

This part of the paper aims to realize a general comparison between individual and centralized heating systems, from the point of view of costs and benefits.

In the actual social and economical context, an individual has two alternatives regarding the heating system he/she chooses to use. Thus, the first alternative is the *centralized system*. This means that every household must pay bills based on the size of the apartment and not on the household consumption rate. Being an egalitarian alternative, it does not take into account the income and number of the household members. Besides that, it is not focused on physical characteristics (house temperature needs), personal characteristics (income), and inner needs (comfort, efficiency). In mathematical terms, this may be translated as follows:

$$CCHS = m_1^3 + \zeta_1$$

(Where: CCHS = the cost of being linked to a central heating system; $m_1^3$ = the quantity of resource (gas) used by the centralized heating system for every household; $\zeta_1$ = the effective power of a centralized heating system.)

The second alternative is the *individual heating system*. In this case, the issue regards the marginal propensity of consume, meaning that everybody pays the amount of energy he/she uses. In a formal way, this is expressed as:

$$CIHS = I + m_2^3 + \zeta_2$$

(Where: CIHS = the cost of having an individual heating system; I = the individual heating system investment cost; $m_2^3$ = the quantity of resource (gas) used/household; $\zeta_2$ = the effective power of an individual heating system.)

If there is equality between the investment rates in a central heating system and an individual one, then $\zeta_1$ and $\zeta_2$ make the difference. If $\zeta_1 > \zeta_2$ then keeping the centralized system is the most benefic situation. Whether $\zeta_1 < \zeta_2$, the individual system is the best solution.

The results are going to establish which system is more benefic from the point of view of costs. They are calculated based on the average of rooms per apartment, which are three. Thus, the general annual cost for an individual heating system is around 19,9 millions lei, meaning an average of *1.658.333* lei

per month (Boston Consulting Group). At an exchange rate of 35686 lei to one Euro on 30 of June at the BNR course, it means that 1.658.333 lei equalls 46,47 Euro. The general cost includes the cost of individual heating system acquisition, the cost for installation materials, gas consumption, cold water consumption, individual connection (permits), technical verification. On the other side, in a centralized system, the monthly cost for an apartment with three rooms is around two million lei during the winter and around three hundred thousand lei during summer (Regia Autonoma de Termoficare, Cluj, 2006). It means that the average is around *1,65* millions lei. The costs are almost equal, because in the centralized case the energy is subsidized by the state, while in the individual case the maintenance costs and the damping process are not taken into account. Along with these costs, there are non-financial costs for both systems related to some of the disadvantages, as it can be noted in the table below:

Table no. 4 – **The advantages and disadvantages of centralized and individual heating systems** (Boston Consulting Group)

|  | **Centralized heating system** | **Individual heating system** |
|---|---|---|
| **Advantages** | - investment in modernization implies there are no disadvantages of the individual and central heating systems; <br> - the lack of technical problems; | - independency from the rest of consumers, <br> - the control over the own consumption, <br> - interior comfort, <br> - the avoidance of losses, optimal interior comfort, <br> - direct proportionality between the consumption and the costs |
| **Disadvantages** | - the client depends on the quality of services, <br> - the low rentability: annual revisions, accidental breaking off, <br> - physical wear of an old system, <br> - dependency on the neighborhood budget <br> - the losses in the system | - initial investment, <br> - need for periodical technical verification (once every two years), <br> - repairing costs, pollution, <br> - in some cases, improper installation of the system |

As it can be seen from the calculus, the average costs for the both heating systems are almost the same. Thus, from the point of view of monthly financial expenses, none of the heating systems is more desirable than the other. However, the differences are due to several financial and non-financial costs on medium and long term that cannot be calculated within mathematical context. Furthermore, if we consider that individual heating systems produce pollution and have a permanent negative effect on the neighborhood, then this system might be considered as the inferior one.

The transition from a centralized heating system to an individual one implies at least three relevant aspects to be taken into account. First, there is the *system investment,* which means the net price of the heating system. Second, there is the *level of interdependence* which sustains that if there is a certain number of household who are using or aim to use individual heating systems, all must choose this kind of system whether if they want it or not. Finally, *expectations from the system* implie that an individual heating system is better than a centralized one in terms of technology, efficiency and comfort. Thus, there are

four possible situations for a household: having a centralized system, having both centralized and individual systems, having the individual system or having none of them.

*A parallel between the present systems and the modernization alternative*

However, beside the two alternatives that mentioned above, this paper's hypothesis claims that there might be a third and better alternative: the modernization of the old centralized heating systems. This would imply a major investment in the centralized heating system in order to improve the technological quality. Besides that it might have long term financial and non-financial benefits. However, the transition to this kind of system, whether from an old centralized system, whether from an individual system, depends on the quantity of money invested by every single individual, on the desirability for collective action, and on the expectations regarding its efficiency. Thus, the modernization process can be transposed into mathematical terms as follows:

$$\text{MCHS} = \frac{IN}{N} + m_3^3 + \zeta_3$$

(Where: MCHS = the cost of modernizing the old central heating system; IN = the number of persons who invest in the modernization of centralized heating system; N = the total number of those who could invest in the modernization; $m_3^3$ = the quantity of resource (gas) used/household; $\zeta_3$ = the efficiency, the effective power of the modernized system.). The figure below summarizes the problem and tries to underline the relevant aspects in every case.

**Figure no.1 - The alternatives for heating system**



Having formulated the problem and its alternatives, discussion is necessary in order to understand the model rationally.

In the *centralized system case*, the costs for the heat depend on the dimensions of the house and not on personal characteristics such as income and comfort needs. Thus, there are households where the level of warmth is higher than needed. In this respect, many people have to pay for a good they do not need. The problem is even more welfare sensitive in the case of low-income families. They may usually give up on other goods (e.g. food) in order to pay something they do not need or they would prefer not paying at all. This is a case of a Pareto under-optimality. In case they want to choose the individual heating system, they might not have the money to invest; even tough they would have been able to recover the investment in time. Thus, they seem to have the minimum benefit possible – no income and no comfort. Concluding, within a centralized heating system, the power efficiency is decreasing,

the distribution system is inefficient because of the wastages, and there is a impossibility to choose the proper quantity of resource you want to consume.

On the other side but on the same system framework, there are individuals who like not having the control and the responsibilities over the system, and who like the way it works. In this case the benefit is higher than the above one, although the individuals do not seem to have financial benefit.

In the *individual heating system case*, in which the state is the one that allows for the individual heating systems market, there are no well-established costs besides the investment in the system itself. Unlike the above case, here, individuals have a decision model, they have the possibility to make a choice under the pressure of the individual characteristics. In this case, we must refer to those forced to give up the centralized system because of the interdependence issue. Some of them are going to invest in individual systems, but some are not going to have the necessary resources. Many of the individuals will try to recover the investment by consuming the minimum needed - by using the minimum quantity of gas or by warming the minimum space used - ; again, this is a case of Pareto under-optimality. However, the payment difference seems to depend mainly on personal characteristics – there is a consumption diversification in accordance with income. Thus, in an individual system case, although there is the investment cost, the effective power raise, the individuals may choose the energy quantity they want to consume, and there are no systems wastes. However, the fact that not everybody affords to invest must be considered.

In the *coexistence case* of both of the heating systems within the same building, we have a monopolistic situation that leads to competition. The question is if the total benefit in the centralized system is lower, equal, or higher than in an individual heating system. This might be the decision base. This relation depends on the heterogeneity level of individuals, on the optimality level for every household.

Finally, a *modernized heating system* is thought to imply a superior effective power and higher benefit on the long term. In this case, we have a differentiation between those still connected to an old centralized heating system and those who have individual systems. In the former case, the persuasion process in order to invest in the modernization seems to be easier than in the latter case. However, this situation implies a discussion too. First, the individuals who are part of the old centralized system or of none and do not have the financial resources in order to invest in the modernization process, are probably going to be the outliers. They are likely not to pay any costs, but they are going to have the maximum benefit from the others investment. Second, those who own individual heating systems are the least likely to give them up in order to make another investment even though the long-term benefits might be higher. Thus, the question is if this new investment (even for those who benefit from the old

centralized heating system) is a viable one from the point of view of financial and non-financial costs and benefits and how it can be realized.

Within a hypothetical modernized central heating system, we can consider two cases. First, it is the situation present before people's purchase of individual heating systems. Second, it is the real situation, when only those still connected to a centralized system are probable to invest in its modernization, considering that the costs of modernization are entirely supported by the providing institution (Regia Autonoma de Termoficare, Cluj). In both cases, we will consider the case of Cluj County as a general case and base our calculus on an average of three persons per apartment. The data used is provided by the Cluj-Napoca water and heating company and by the Census 2002 (http://www.insse.ro/rpl2002rezgen/rg2002.htm):

- the cost for modernization of the old centralized heating system =750.000 €/ system;
- in Cluj county, the number of centralized/area heating systems is 107;
- Cluj County has a population of 702755, which means that at an average of three persons per household, there are 234251 households;
- at the national level, almost 12% of the population is connected to a building or individual heating system, more than half of the population (57%) using stoves with solid fuel (Boston Consulting Group);
- we supposed that the same ratio (12%) of people owning an individual heating system is true for Cluj, meaning that from the total number of households, there are 28110 households that own an authorized individual heating system;
- in Cluj, there are 600 economic agents and 1700 associations equivalent of 50 000 apartments connected to the centralized system;
- the total number of those connected to the centralized system and to the individual system is 78110 households.

Thus, in the first case, the amount of money that a family would have needed to pay for the modernization process of the old centralized system is almost *1 €* per household. In the second case, the owners of the individual heating systems are not taken into consideration anymore, because, in rational conditions, they are not going to give up this kind of system in order to assume the risk of going back to an inefficient system. Thus, the costs per household are *15 €*. Besides this cost, there is the monthly cost per household related to consumption that should also be taken into consideration.

This part of the paper aims to transpose the above finding in a game theory context by using the mathematical approach of Antonio Nicita developed in the paper "*Incomplete Contracts and the Commons: Valuing the Strategic Role of Exit Costs*". From the game theory perspective, Nicita uses two games – Prisoners Dilemma and Chicken Game – and he places the benefits for every alternative chosen in a certain way:

**Table no.5 – Prisoners Dilemma perspective**

|           |           | Player 2  |          |
|-----------|-----------|-----------|----------|
|           |           | *Cooperate* | *Exploit* |
| **Player 1** | *Cooperate* | b1, b2 | d1, a2 |
|           | *Exploit* | a1, d2 | c1, c2 |

**Table no.6 – Chicken Game perspective**

|           |           | Player 2  |          |
|-----------|-----------|-----------|----------|
|           |           | *Cooperate* | *Exploit* |
| **Player 1** | *Cooperate* | b1, b2 | c1, a2 |
|           | *Exploit* | a1, c2 | d1, d2 |

where $\pi_i = (a,b,c,d)$ and $a_i \rangle b_i \rangle c_i \rangle d_i \ \forall$ i= (1,2) (Nicita, 1999:4).

In order to calculate payoffs, Nicita uses a set of mathematical formulas (Nicita, 1999:7-8):

(1) $\pi^j(u^j, i^j) = u^j - c^j(i^j)$, where $\pi$ is the payoff regarding the benefit and the investment, u is the benefit and c is the cost associated with the investment;

(2) $S = f(I) - \sum_j c^j(i^j)$, where S is the net joint surplus, I is the investment and c is the cost;

(3) $u^j = \dfrac{S}{2}$, where u is the benefit and S the surplus.

This case is adopted and adapted for the heating system perspective. I calculate two payoffs, one according to the individual heating system and one according to the centralized heating system.

- **Individual heating system**

$\sum_j c^j(i^j) = 1.658.333$ lei (the average cost)

$f(I) = 20.000.000$ lei (the average cost for an individual heating system)

S = 20.000.000 - 1.658.333 = 18.341.667

$u^j = \dfrac{18.341.667}{2} = 9.170.833,5$

$$\pi^j(u^j, i^j) = 9.170.833,5 - 20.000.000 = \textbf{-10.829.167 lei} \approx \textbf{- 1082 RON}$$

Thus, the payoffs in an individual heating system context are around -10.829.167 lei.

- **Centralized heating system**

$$\sum_j c^j(i^j) = 1.650.000 \text{ lei (the average cost)}$$

$f(I) = 15 \text{ € } = 535.290 \text{ lei (at the exchange rate of 35686 lei to one Euro on 30 of June at the BNR course)}$

$S = 535.290 - 1.650.000 = - 1.114.710$

$$u^j = \frac{-1.114.710}{2} = - 557.355$$

$$\pi^j(u^j, i^j) = - 557.355 - 535.290 = \textbf{- 1.092.645 lei} \approx \textbf{-109 RON}$$

Thus, the average payoff in a centralized system is - 1.092.645 lei, almost ten times lower than in the individual system case. At the same time, in the centralized case, the hypothetical context implies the need to calculate the payoffs for the case in which those who now connected to an individual system would have still been connected to the centralized one. In this case, as it was calculated before, the cost of investment in modernization would have been an average of 1 € for every household. In this context the results are:

$$\sum_j c^j(i^j) = 1.650.000 \text{ lei (the average cost)}$$

$f(I) = 1 \text{ € } = 35686 \text{ lei (on 30 of June at the BNR course)}$

$S = 35686 - 1.650.000 = - 1.614.314$

$$u^j = \frac{-1.614.314}{2} = - 807.157$$

$$\pi^j(u^j, i^j) = - 807.157 - 35686 = \textbf{- 842.843 lei} \approx \textbf{- 84 RON}$$

A logical conclusion that can be drawn from the last set of calculus is that the higher is the number of individuals connected to the centralized system, the higher is the payoff after the costs of investment and monthly expenses are subtracted.

The figure below shows that the most benefic situation would be the one in which every individual would have chosen to invest in the modernization of heating system, the less benefic one being the individual heating system alternative.

**Figure no.2 – A comparative approach on heating systems' payoffs**



Supposing that the society we are analyzing is composed of two players with only two game alternatives, the data calculated above can be transposed into the game theory perspective, based on Nicita's approach, as follows:

**Table no.7 – Prisoners Dilemma outcomes**

|  |  | Player 2 | |
|---|---|---|---|
|  |  | *Individual system* | *Centralized system* |
| **Player 1** | *Individual system* | -1082; -1082 | -1082; -109 |
|  | *Centralized system* | -109, -1082 | -84; -84 |

**Table no.8 – Chicken Game outcomes**

|  |  | Player 2 | |
|---|---|---|---|
|  |  | *Individual system* | *Centralized system* |
| **Player 1** | *Individual system* | -1082; -1082 | -84; -109 |
|  | *Centralized system* | -109; -84 | -1082; -1082 |

Within both games, the utilities for any alternative are, in fact equivalent with a lower level of costs. The reason for this is that the investment in one or another heating system and the monthly costs are expenses. We may consider that the lower the cost, the higher the utility.

The two games within a dual society are transposed in a multistage game, where the actors have the opportunity to make different choices by opting for different alternatives. However, the presupposition in this case is that, once chosen an alternative, the players will constantly make the same choice. The first stage is supposed to be the one when every household is connected to the centralized system. Thus, the two game designs described above are transformed in a long-term game with five stages.

The reason for this elaboration is to estimate, in a comparative perspective, the social and individual utility within a certain case.

As it can be noticed, the two game perspectives are different and the utilities within one context vary from one another. Thus, within Prisoners Dilemma game, the highest social utility could be realized when there is in the general centralized system, with no free riders. However, this case is a hypothetical one, taking into consideration that, nowadays, the present situation is impossible to accomplish. Once the process of individual heating system acquisition is started turning back is an improbable alternative. More than that, the initial situation, when every household was connected to the centralized system is very hard to re-achieve.

**Table no.9 - Prisoners Dilemma – repeated games' outcomes at the individual and social levels**

|          | S1   | S2    | S3    | S4    | S5    | TOTAL |
|----------|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| **A-II** | **-168** | **-2164** | **-2164** | **-2164** | **-2164** | **-8824** |
| P1       | -84  | -1082 | -1082 | -1082 | -1082 | -4412 |
| P2       | -84  | -1082 | -1082 | -1082 | -1082 | -4412 |
|          |      |       |       |       |       |       |
| **B-IC** | **-168** | **-1191** | **-1191** | **-1191** | **-1191** | **-4932** |
| P1       | -84  | -1082 | -1082 | -1082 | -1082 | -4412 |
| P2       | -84  | -109  | -109  | -109  | -109  | -520  |
|          |      |       |       |       |       |       |
| **C-CI** | **-168** | **-1191** | **-1191** | **-1191** | **-1191** | **-4932** |
| P1       | -84  | -109  | -109  | -109  | -109  | -520  |
| P2       | -84  | -1082 | -1082 | -1082 | -1082 | -4412 |
|          |      |       |       |       |       |       |
| **D-CC** | **-168** | **-168** | **-168** | **-168** | **-168** | **-840** |
| P1       | -84  | -84   | -84   | -84   | -84   | **-420** |
| P2       | -84  | -84   | -84   | -84   | -84   | **-420** |

The situation when the best alternative, which actually provides Nash equilibrium, Pareto optimality, and the highest individual and social utility at the same time, is not a possible one. Taking into consideration the status quo, at least two other alternatives remains to be analyzed. In the case when every household is endowed with its own heating system, the social utility and the individual one are the lowest. As it can be concluded, this situation is not a desirable one. At the individual level this alternative provides the highest degree of benefit. However, the costs of acquisition and maintenance for an individual heating system are higher than expected and are the highest costs within the game's alternatives. Although, taking into consideration that the evolution of individual heating system acquisition is at least on a stagnation level with ascendancy shades, it seems possible this case to be reached unless the State intervenes. This case shows that rationality at the individual level might mean irrationality at the social one. Thus, the role of institution is to induce incentives to transform the individual rationality into a social desirable situation.

The other case is that in which some of the players choose the individual heating system, while the others prefer to invest in the modernization of the old centralized system. This might be considered a desirable situation, having in mind the fact that the most desirable one is not possible anymore. As it can be noted, the social utility is higher than in the above-mentioned case. However, at the individual level, the utility in a centralized system perspective is superior to the individual approach. The conclusion that can be drawn in this case is that the higher the number of households connected to the centralized system, the higher the social utility is and the individual ones for those joining the centralized heating system.

If we compare the two games, it can be seen that, when the general connection to the centralized system is not possible any more, the Chicken's Game is the one people should play in order to have the maximum benefit possible.

**Table no.10 -** Chicken's Game - repeated games' outcomes at the individual and social levels

|  | S1 | S2 | S3 | S4 | S5 | TOTAL |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **A-II** | **-168** | **-2164** | **-2164** | **-2164** | **-2164** | **-8824** |
| P1 | -84 | -1082 | -1082 | -1082 | -1082 | -4412 |
| P2 | -84 | -1082 | -1082 | -1082 | -1082 | -4412 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **B-IC** | **-168** | **-193** | **-193** | **-193** | **-193** | **-940** |
| P1 | -84 | -84 | -84 | -84 | -84 | -420 |
| P2 | -84 | -109 | -109 | -109 | -109 | -520 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **C-CI** | **-168** | **-193** | **-193** | **-193** | **-193** | **-940** |
| P1 | -84 | -109 | -109 | -109 | -109 | -520 |
| P2 | -84 | -84 | -84 | -84 | -84 | -420 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **D-CC** | **-168** | **-2164** | **-2164** | **-2164** | **-2164** | **-8824** |
| P1 | -84 | -1082 | -1082 | -1082 | -1082 | -4412 |
| P2 | -84 | -1082 | -1082 | -1082 | -1082 | -4412 |

Contrary to Prisoners Dilemma, this situation has two Nash equilibriums. However, these are Pareto sub-optimal, because they do not provide the maximum expected utility. In this case, the situation when all the individuals own a heating system and the situation when all are connected to the centralized one, have the same undesirable utility. More than that, in the other two cases, the utility accomplished is the one expected in these conditions. Thus, the social utility and the individual one (for those connected to the centralized system) are highest when maximum possible number of households are connected to the centralized system. This conclusion is equal to the case of Prisoners Dilemma, with the difference that the social and individual utility is higher in the Chicken Game. Besides, the maximum utility possible in this case is attainable.

In nowadays conditions it is expected that more and more people will give up the centralized system and buy individual heating system. However, this individual rationality, as it was proved by using the data within a game theory approach, does not produce social rationality. Besides the fact that it must provide incentives to stop the increasing number of individual system acquisitions, the State must also transform the game from the Prisoners Dilemma into Chicken Game.

This game theory foray wants to show that there are differences related to the social and individual benefits in Prisoners' Dilemma and Chicken's Game. In the first one, the social possible benefit obtained is much lower than the expected maximum social benefit. Moreover, in the second game, the expected social benefit is equal to the social benefit obtained.

## Conclusions and Research Perspectives

The paper aimed to describe and analyze the heating system problem in terms of welfare and efficiency. Specifically, we dealt with the State and the individual capacity to provide a good management for the common pool resources from the point of view of game theory. From the methodological perspective, the analysis was based on a formal analysis developed by Antonio Nicita. The model that has been transposed in a multistage game.

At the individual level, people have at least three possibilities regarding the heating system to choose: the central heating system, the individual heating system and the modernized central heating system. The last alternative is a viable one mostly for those still connected to the centralized system, because the individuals who had already invested in an individual system are probably not going back to the old risks.

We argued that individuals take intentionally rational decisions and that the rules of the game are the ones that determine a sub-optimality at the social level. The cooperation alternative, in order to direct the individuals' choices towards the investment in the modernization of old central heating system, is not an inner decision, but a decision linked with the game's system. Thus, in the case in which people have a fix monthly budget, the State may intervene in order to lower the costs for heating provisions till the minimum level.

Based on the data provided by authorized institutions, the individual and social benefits of the possible alternatives were calculated. The general conclusion is that in case of investing in the modernization of the centralized system the costs, in long term, are lower than in the case of individual systems investments. It is important to emphasize the fact that all the calculus was done based on financial

costs. However, there are also the non-financial costs, that, in the case of centralized system, are equivalent to the system losses and the discomfort created by the impossibility to control the consumption and, in the case of the individual heating system, they are equivalent to a high level of pollution.

Within the multi-stage game theoretical perspective two games were employed– Prisoners Dilemma and Chicken Game – to underline the fact that there is a difference between the ways alternatives are considered. More than that, it has been displayed that the individual and social utilities are different. In the Prisoners Dilemma case, the maximum utility that could be attained is an impossible situation, since a situation where all households connected to the centralized heating system, is not possible to be reached. In the case of Chicken Game, the maximum utility is the expected utility. More than that, the social and individual utilities are higher in the second case. Thus, if individuals make rational decisions and the rules of the game are the ones held accountable, State's intervention by creating incentives might be a proper solution. Specifically, State has the means to create a game context and, more than that, it has the possibility of transforming the Prisoners Dilemma into a Chicken Game by restricting certain decisions.

In conclusion, one needs to consider the common pool resources management and the heating system problem jointly. The individuals and the State make decisions within an imperfect context. Supposing that there is individual rationality at the level of decision-making, we expect the State to change the rules of game in order to induce social rationality. Analyzing this rationality in a game theoretical context, the results indicate that investment in the modernization of centralized heating system would be a socially benefic alternative, even in the actual state when more and more people are buying individual systems.

Future research perspectives may focus on the importance of possibility to change the rules of the game in order to reduce the costs of heating provision and to improve the quality of life for the society as a whole. Another research perspective could focus on a comparative study. The majority of world's population is apartment dwellers, all of them dealing with the problem of a benefic management of common pool resources. Once we have a statistical proof of the system's bad management, the lobby at the level of specialized institutions that can create incentives opens the opportunity to solve the problem.

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# Bringing Religion Back in International Relations

**Natalia VLAS**

Începând cu Tratatul de la Westfalia şi pe parcursul ultimelor două secole, cercetătorii au acordat o atenţie minimă religiei în cadrul teoriei Relaţiilor Internaţionale. Normele fundamentale cuprinse în Tratatul de la Westfalia presupuneau secularizarea relaţiilor internaţionale şi, în consecinţă, toate teoriile au sublicitat rolul şi influenţa religiei în cadrul acestui domeniu. Conform tezei secularizării, religia, fiind considerată un semn al înapoierii sociale, avea să cunoască un declin iminent, o retragere în sfera privată şi în cele din urmă chiar dispariţia, pe măsură ce societatea va deveni tot mai modernă, iar raţiunea seculară va substitui rolul îndeplinit anterior de religie. Evoluţiile din sfera religioasă însă, au contestat tot mai mult supremaţia tezei secularizării în ştiinţele sociale. Articolul de faţă argumentează în favoarea introducerii variabilei religioase în cadrul RI, prin prisma rolurilor pe care religia le îndeplineşte în societate şi a influenţei tot mai mari pe care aceasta o exercită asupra actorilor din sistemul internaţional. Ideea de bază a acestui articol este că disciplina RI nu îşi mai poate permite în acest moment să facă abstracţie de această variabilă extrem de semnificativă – în cuvintele lui Peter Berger (Berger, 1999): „cei care neglijează religia în analiza problemelor contemporane o fac cu un mare risc." (p.18).

## The secularization thesis under review

For more than two centuries social sciences, deeply rooted in the positivism of the Enlightenment and its myth of progress, predicted the privatization, decline, and eventually the demise of religion, especially in the public sphere (Seidman 2001). It was thought that modernization will necessarily lead to religious decline both in society and in the minds of individuals (Berger, 1996, p.3). Thinkers like John Stuart Mill, Max Weber, Karl Marx, Auguste Comte, Sigmund Freud and Émile Durkheim, argued that religion would cease to play a relevant role in society and politics. Actually, some authors noted that "the secularization theory may be the only theory which was able to attain a truly paradigmatic status within the modern social sciences."(Casanova, 1994, p.17). According to secularization theory, religion's role in society would be replaced by reason and science. The legitimacy of the states would rely on secular ground and the morality of the society would be formulated in terms of a combination between mental health sciences and secular laws. The religious institutions and functions would be replaced by secular ones and science would usurp the role of religion to interpret the physical universe (Wilson, 1982). As a result, we would increasingly live in a "secular city" (Harvey Cox, 1965). There were but few exceptions from this theory, such as Rene Girard's work on the relation between religion and societal violence, or Robert Bellah's work on sociology of religion. For most other scholars, "secularization was expected to be a universal phenomenon that would be replicated in other areas of the world." (Sahliyeh, 1990, p.3).

The hegemony of secularization theory hindered scholars of international relations from predicting and understanding accurately events like the Iranian Revolution in 1978, for instance, because a resurgence of religion "was not supposed to happen in a developing country participating so thoroughly in modernization and westernization". So, intelligence experts ignored the challenge posed by Islamic fundamentalism and dismissed Khomeini as a "Ghandi-like" figure, unimportant for the future of Iran, forgetting the important role that Ghandi had played in his opposition to British imperialism, using the "social and political ethic of nonviolence to force Britain to leave India" (Thomas, 2005, p.2.).

In the 1980s, the tendency was to consider the United States as the "exception" to the secularization thesis, because according to most indicators religion was doing just fine in America – actually, America was one of the most religious country and no one could deny it was in the same time one of the most modern nations. However, in the 1990s the whole secularization thesis came under review.[1] A growing set of empirical data revealed a vigorous return of "public religions" – a "de-privatization" of religion (Casanova, 1994) throughout the world. Not just America, but Africa, Asia, Latin America – all experienced a resurgence of religion, an "explosion of passionate religious movements" (Berger, 2005). The trans-nationalization of Catholicism, Pentecostalism, fundamentalist movements of all kind, challenged the assumptions of the secularization thesis. In the era of globalization, all the world religions are globalizing. So does pluralism and the imminent problems associated with it. The global resurgence of religion is revealed also by the rise of new religious movements, like Falun Gong in China, the Hindu movement Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, Aum Shinrikyo in Japan, Gush Emunim in Israel and many others.

The public face of religion becomes increasingly apparent all around the world and this fact made prominent sociologists like Harvey Cox, David Martin and Peter Berger, who in the 1950s were in the forefront of the secularization theory, to convert in face of the evidence and affirm that "the assumption we live in a secularized world is false [because] the world today is as furiously religious as it ever was" (Berger, 1999, p.2).

The "exception" to this trend appears to be at this time Western Europe, whose culture is sometimes called "Eurosecularity". Western and Central Europe is the most secularized area of the world (Berger, 2005). Eastern Europe's religiosity is different – there are signs of a massive revival of Christianity here, especially of orthodox type, but there is a great chance that it too will sign on to this

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[1] There has to be made a distinction between different understandings of secularization – secularization as differentiation of secular spheres from religious ones, secularization as decline of religious practice and beliefs and secularization as a privatization of religion (Casanova, 1994, p. 211). If secularization was defined only by the first of these propositions, there would be nothing to argue about, because it is evident that religious institutions has less political power than they once possessed and public life is no longer suffused with religious symbols, rhetoric or ritual (Stark, 1999) – the differentiation of the two spheres, on the other hand is an undeniable reality.

Eurosecularity, to the degree by which countries here are integrated in EU. (The only possible exception to this trend might be Russia, where "a remarkable revival of Ortodox Christianity is underway." (Berger, 2005)).

However, other sociologists argued that the situation in Europe is more complex than that. According to some data, religious indicators in Western Europe suggest that even here religious belief remained strong, although participation in religious institutions declined (*Religion II, International Social Survey Program*, 1998). Inglehart & Norris argued that although church attendance is declining, more broadly defined spiritual concerns are not, and a growing share of the population is spending time thinking about the meaning and purpose of life (2003, 2004). This led some scholars to describe the European religious situation as "believing without belonging" (Davie, 1999). The inverted formula, "belonging without believing" – or, "vicarious religion" as Davie called this situation, where religion is available just in case -, also typifies the attitude of Europeans toward religion. "This attitude entails a distant shared memory, which does not necessitate shared belief, but which – even from a distance – still governs collective reflexes in terms of identity." (Hervieu-Léger, 2006, p.47). An example can be that of Danish citizens (the most secularized Europeans), who don't believe in God and don't go to the church, but still pay taxes that go to the Lutheran church, just to see the church buildings properly maintained, or that of French citizens who, despite never going to church, are nostalgic for the church services of their childhood and complain about mosques that are build throughout France (Hervieu-Léger, 2006, p.47).

Davie (1999) argued that it is not so much that there is less religion in Europe, but that European religion is now expressed differently from how it used to be expressed; hence, Europe is less "secular" than it is "unchurched." And even though traditional disciplines of the Christian churches are breaking down, this movement is not in favour of the secular, but towards new expressions of Christianity and some hybrids of it, towards Islam, New Age or some Oriental religions.

It is worthy to note that the secularization thesis developed within a European framework. Modernists believed that, with the differentiation of societal institutions through modernization, religion would be removed from the public sphere. Indeed, for some periods of European religious development, the secularization argument and empirical data fitted. As Europe's economic and political life developed, it became evident that the public significance of religion diminished. Lastly, however, as Davie (2000) pointed out, "the thesis rather than the data began to dominate the agenda. The "fit" became axiomatic, theoretically necessary, rather than empirically founded -- so much so that Europe's religious life was considered a prototype of global religiosity (what Europe did today everyone else would do tomorrow).

But this was not the case. The empirical data suggests that throughout the world there has been a revival of religion in spite of the modernization of society. Berger suggests that the problem lies in the assumptions of the Enlightenment. According to some scholars, there is not one, but at least three forms of Enlightenment: French, British and American (Himmelfarb, 2005, pp.3-22.). While the anti-clerical French Enlightenment disavowed religion for the cult of reason, the British Enlightenment thinkers emphasized "social virtues" and the American ones emphasized "political liberty", and, within these two latter forms of Enlightenment, religion was rather an ally to Enlightenment than an enemy. The fact that social scientists relied just on French Enlightenment made them argue that religion and modernity are not compatible.

From all that has been said a conclusion can be drawn: the relation between modernity and secularization is more complex than it was thought. Clearly, the secularization thesis cannot be taken for granted any more. This leaves space for other two theories, according to Davie (2006): *rational choice theory* and *multiple modernities theory.* The first of these, which for Americans is what the secularization thesis was for Europeans, backs up the idea that being religious is part of the human condition, so the "demand" for religion remains constant in any society and individuals "choose" their religion after weighing the costs and benefits. According to this theory, secularization in Europe is due to religious monopolies, to the deficiency in supply, not in demand, as opposed to America's case, where the "market of religions" supply the religious needs of people. The multiple modernities theory, formulated originally by S.N. Eisenstadt (1999, 2000) and ulterior articulated by Charles Taylor, David Martin, Peter Wagner and others, is one of the promising options for scholars in the context of the resurgence of religion. This theory separates the concept of modernity from its Western sense, allowing the possibility of other modernities, of different programs of modernity. That is, modernity and its features can be received and developed in different ways in different parts of the world and by different social groups within a society. Even the religious fundamentalisms of the late twentieth century are representing an alternative modernity, according to Eisenstadt (1999, p.19). So, it is possible for different societies to be modern and not secular in the same time, as the secularization theory asserted. This theory also has its critics, but there is no space here for discussing this issue. The main idea is that secularization theory is not the only game in town right now and it has important rivals, as it cannot be taken for granted any more.

### Secularization thesis vs. resurgence of religion in IR

This state of affairs has broad implications for the Field of International Relations (IR), which traditionally was based on the secularization theory. As opposed to other fields, which began to

reevaluate the importance of religion earlier, IR continued to ignore religion until recently. An analysis of four major journals of international relations during 1980-1999[2] revealed that out of 1600 articles published, only 6 mentioned the important potential of religion (Philpott, 2002). It seemed like the rejection of religion was "inscribed in the genetic code of the discipline of IR." (Petito & Hatzopoulos, 2003, p.1). According to Scott M. Thomas (2005), the appearance of the international system of states after the European religious wars and the understanding of these wars by the liberal political theorists, gave birth to a political myth that is crucial for the way culture and religion are interpreted in IR today. According to this myth, as soon as religion enters "the domestic or international public life - when it is politicized or de-privatized as a type of political theology or political religion, it inherently causes war, intolerance, devastation, political upheaval and maybe even the collapse of the international order." Therefore, the liberal or secular state was needed "to save people from the cruel and violent consequences of religion" (p.22). From this point of view, the state emerged in order to save individuals from the church. So, religion was "exiled" from International Relations, and the great Leviathan took the place of God – religion was privatized, nationalism became the new religion of the state, replacing Christianity (Hayes, 1926), and the principle of the *cuius regio, eius religio,* pluralism and non-intervention became the new sacred principles of the emergent Westphalian order (Petito & Hatzopoulos, 2003, p.1). Hence, none of the major theories of IR considered religion among the significant variables.

The first encouraging sign that indicated sort of a change in this approach of international relations was "the clash of civilizations" thesis, of Samuel Huntington (1993). His thesis was criticized from many points of view, but almost all his critics agree that the main contribution of this thesis is that it brought religion back into international politics, even if Huntington "did not call it by its real name" (Fox & Sandler, 2004, p. 133). Another author that argued, though from a different perspective, that in the future the ideological conflicts of the Cold War would be replaced by religious confrontations, was Mark Juergensmeyer (1994). Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson (1994) also tried to reveal that religion can play an important peace-making role in the conflicts around the world. Anyway, these authors were rather exceptions - religion was still left out of much of international relations literature.

However 9/11 initiated a new era for the relationship between religion and international relations. 9/11 was the first serious challenge to secularism in IR (Philpott, 2002). Since then it became increasingly clear that scholars have to acknowledge that the secularization paradigm is no longer appropriate - religion continues to have a tremendous influence on a large spectrum of social and political issues – and they should find new ways of incorporating religion in IR theories. But how does religion impinge on international relations?

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[2] The analyzed journals were *International Organization, International Studies Quarterly, World Politics* and *International Security.*

**What role does religion play in international relations?**

As it has been said, the secularization thesis and its assumption that religion would decline in the life of individuals and states is critically challenged by the contemporary religious dynamic. Obviously, religion has gained increased importance in international affairs. Conflicts in many parts of the world – Sri Lanka, Tibet and China, India, Israel, Nigeria, Lebanon, Northern Ireland, Sudan - have a significant religious component. Religious principles and beliefs have an important impact on the relationships between different actors of the international system. Their influence on international relations is carried out in many ways.

First of all, religion is a major source of identity, defining what people are and what they live for. The *religio* function of religion, of holding together man and divinity, on one hand, and man with others in a community, on the other hand, explains the link between religion and identity. This aspect becomes extremely problematic when the identity of some individuals or states is created in opposition to the identity of the others. Connected with religious identity, and very significant for international relations field are nationalism and ethnicity. The latter are similar to religion in that they provide a common identity for different populations, represent sources of legitimacy, and influence the worldviews of the decision-makers and their constituents. Often religion and nationalism coalesce, because they have similar properties: both include concepts of election – "being the chosen people", both include sacred or sacred-like myths and histories and concepts of individual sacrifice for the group (Fox & Sandler, 2005, p.171). Sometimes religious myths and national ones merge and inspire strong national identities.

This is the case of Sri Lanka, for example. Although nationalism is a new invention here, it draws on traditional religion. As David Little pointed out (1993), Sinhala Buddhist revivalists of the late 19th and 20th century manipulated ancient legends about Buddha's associations with Sri Lanka island as a way to mobilize support for Sinhala nationalism, among the laity as well as among the monks, and to provide sacred authority to the nationalist movement. Religious revivalism in Sri Lanka - as well as in Sudan, for instance, has contributed to the mobilization of a strong form of nationalism that generated intolerance and discrimination based on religion (Little 1993).

The Yugoslav crisis in 1990s also illustrates the bond between religious identity, nationalism and political stances. Greece, a NATO ally, surprised everyone by its pro-Serbian stance and the resentments revealed by the demonstrations against the Americans in 1999, during Bill Clinton's visit in Greece "surpassed by far the violence seen in any recent anti-American demonstration anywhere else in the world - with the possible exception of demonstrations in Tehran during the Ayatollah Khomeini

era." (Michas, 2002, p.77). Takis Michas noted that the major reason for demonstrations was the ethno-religious nationalism in Greece and its connection with the Serbian people. The bombing of Belgrade by Americans was understood as a betrayal of Christendom and a Western alliance against the Orthodox, by supporting Islam. The author argued that the roots of this ethno-religious nationalism lies in the politicization of the Church of Greece - there is a strong neo-Orthodox movement in Greece that contributed to the rise of ethno-religious nationalism, antagonistic to the western world. This influential movement, which comprises some important neo-orthodox thinkers, underlined the old antagonisms between Orthodox East and Latin West in order to promote an anti-Western climate in the Orthodox Church of Greece. These thinkers recast the old traditional antagonisms in the contemporary idiom of world politics and in virtue of them, advocated foreign policy stances aimed at completely separating Greece from the West (p.137). Greece is a relevant case in the discussion about the connection between religion and identity – here this identity is under attack by the Islamic influence, from the East, on the one hand, and from the globalizing, secular forces from the West, on the other hand.

Russia is another good example for this point. Here, after the breakdown of Communism, the identification with orthodoxy (*pravoslavnyi*) became a mean of identifying with Russian ethnicity (*russkii*), as opposed to Russian citizenship (*rossiianin*) – every Russian in the Commonwealth identifies with the latter, regardless of his/her ethnicity. The orthodox identity replaced the anterior Soviet identity (*sovetskii chelovek*), that contributed to the loss of a distinct ethnical identity by the Russian ethnics, filling an ideological void left after USSR disintegration (Dunlop, 1996). The implications of these developments are very important. On the one hand, wherever the Orthodox Church is strong and active, it applies the screws to local governments to formulate policies that restrain the religious activities of minority groups, or to grant special advantages to the Orthodox Church (Marsh & Froese, 2004, p.144). On the other hand, the increase in religiosity and in ethnical consciousness apply also to Muslim republics in the Russian Commonwealth – so, there is a great chance of violent confrontations, given the recent data that suggests an increase in xenophobia and anti-Semitism along with the stated above developments. The so-called "war against terrorism" in Chechnya, also complicates the situation in Russian Commonwealth, as it generated a politicization of Islam, a rediscovery of Islamic identity as an arm against injustice and as an ideology of protest, leading to a radicalization of terrorist acts in response to the Russian state's policy (Warhola, 2006). This case illustrates the danger of an identity build on religion against the identity of "the other" and the effects of merging this identity and nationalism in state's policy. When religion is mixed with nationalism - and the case of the Serbian Orthodox Church is another good example -, the policy of the state can legitimate many abuses, even ethnic cleansing (K.R. Dark, 2000, p.3).

Religious identity of international system's actors is very significant for IR analysis because it determines the way these actors behave, their interests, the norms by which actors operate. Faith offers actors the courage and the reason to act according to their religious view – or the will of God. Radical Islamists for example, believe they have the religious duty, given by Allah, to resist *jahiliyya*, the rebellion of the modern world against Allah's sovereignty on earth, in order to save the soul of the humankind. The concept of "cosmic war" (Juergensmeyer, 2003) helped them mobilize their efforts, often violently. But suicide bombers of Al Qaeda or Hezbollah are not the only ones that justify their actions by appeal to the divine. Even the American led "war on terror", as formulated by the president Bush "is itself defined by a fervent Manichaeanism that divides the world between good and evil" (James Carroll, 2003, p. 9).

Religion also shapes the worldviews of the decision-makers and their constituents, and it also shapes the environment in which decision-makers act ( Fox, 2001, pp.53-73). In some cases even the foreign policy of the state is driven by religious interests, due to the religious vision of decision-makers, as in Iran, or the religious vision of their constituencies, as in Israel, where the political leaders' choices are strictly limited by the population religious view – any leader that would take into account the possibility of the cession of the Temple Mount area for instance, would be removed from office (Fox & Sandler, 2004, pp.163-164). As Carroll (2003) pointed out, "God bless America", "a formerly innocuous patriotic piety, has taken on the character of a truth-claim, an open assertion of the long dormant exceptionalism that assumes a national anointing, a sacred destiny that elevates America above other nations."
Consequently, America's religious self-understanding informs its "new imperial impulse, explicitly articulated in the Bush administration's 2002 "National Security Strategy." (p.9).

Religion represents, then, a source of legitimacy for political decisions and actions. If the policy of a given state is religiously inspired, then it has to be automatically religiously legitimized for those who share the respective religion. So, the religious legitimacy and religious worldviews intertwine (Fox & Sandler, p.164).

Religion can also have a great influence on international relations due to the fact that it crosses borders in many ways. Sometimes domestic conflicts can have international implications – as in the international interventions in ethnic conflicts. Fox and Sandler argued that international interventions are more likely to occur in the religious conflicts, and that the interveners are more prone to intervene on behalf of the groups that share the same religion as theirs. In the 90's Iran supported the Shiites in Iraq and Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan supported the Sunnis in Afghanistan; the Hindu Tamils were supported by Hindus from India, and the Muslims in Chechnya were supported by

Muslims from many Islamic countries (pp.63-82), although there were some exceptions (see Yugoslavian crisis).

Religious terrorism and violent fundamentalisms of all kinds have become significant transnational issues, and the foreign policies of theocratic states guided by religious ideologies pose a great danger of destabilizing many states or entire regions.

Equally significant for the international relations field are the new religious movements, like Falun Gong, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, Aum Shinrikyo, and others. To the degree these and other movements would be discriminated by the religious policies of the state, their violent potential would increase.

Actually, potential conflict stages can appear anywhere. Contrary to the taken-for granted opinion that Islam is growing in the global South, Jenkins (2002) argued that Christianity's epicenter is also moving in the southern hemisphere and the rising religious fervor here is coinciding with declining autonomy of nation-states. So, people here increasingly define their political, social and personal identities in terms of religious loyalties. Across the global South, religious leaders, cardinals, and bishops, have become national moral leaders and there is a great chance that, along with this, Christianity will also provide a political ideology for states. In 1991 Zambia declared itself a Christian nation and there were similar attempts in Zimbabwe, Liberia and Kenya. The question of tolerance and diversity, the proper treatment of minorities become stringent here, especially because Islam is gaining ground in the same areas as Christianity. The potential for violent confrontations between religions in global South is constantly increasing – Nigeria might be a good example of a society toil-worn by the war between *jihad* and crusade (Jenkins, 2002). Other nations involved in conflicts between Muslims and Christians would include Indonesia, Philippine, Sudan or some African nations. Also, Christians are persecuted by Hindu extremists in India. In the southern hemisphere the competing ideologies are explicitly religious, according to Jenkins, and these ideologies promise to their followers a literal kingdom of God, rather than a metaphorical one.

The severity of religious conflicts[3] lies in the fact that they are more intractable than non-religious conflicts, because they exclude "almost by the way the conflict is defined, the possibility of compromise, coexistence or the finding of common ground to resolve disputes. Ideas, unlike territorial disputes and economic conflicts over trade, money and natural resources, cannot be divided" (K.R.

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[3] Some authors make a distinction between religious conflicts – conflicts among religions or religious believers – and religious-based conflicts, which may have been originally based on religious differences among religions or among believers, but over time has taken a life of their own, involving a number of other differences (political, ethnic, economic or cultural). The active hotspots of religious-based conflicts in the world averaged about 15 for most of the last century, according to some authors (Trowbridge, 2004).

Dark, 2000, p.2). The possession of weapons of mass destruction or nuclear power by some of these states means further complications.

Anyway, we should avoid the trap of considering religion only as a source of violence and conflict, or solely as the cause of the "clash of civilizations." The "ambivalence of the sacred" (Appleby, 2000) has to be acknowledged in order to accurately identify the influence of religion on IR. Religion can be used to legitimize not just war, but peace as well. Religious actors may have an important positive contribution in conflicts and many times they are the leaders in the struggle for reconciliation among people that are living within areas of conflict or potential conflict.

Given the significant positive potential that religion has, Johnston (2003) introduced a new concept – *faith-based diplomacy* – which means incorporating religious concerns in the IR practice, and acknowledging that the most qualified actors for this kind of diplomacy are religious leaders and institutions, especially religious non-governmental organizations that fill the gaps left by the decline of political state-centric organizations. These religious bodies can be most efficient in conflict prevention and peace-building. Beside the motivation that religion gives to religious peacemakers, these are the actors that know the local problems best and can serve best as mediators. Religious leaders are especially concerned with justice – the most prominent figures that worked successfully for justice are Ghandi, Martin Luther King Jr., Nelson Mandela, but there are many others. The pursuit for justice is seen by the religious leaders as a sacred obligation. These "religious militants" as Appleby (2000) called them, are willing to risk their lives for the cause of reconciliation and service of the poor and oppressed. Prayers and rituals also have an important power to heal and reconcile and religious leaders have a unique capacity of reconciling the belligerent groups (Thomas 2005). Faith-based diplomacy is successful especially in the situations that involve the religious identity of one or of the both parties in conflict (Kashmir, for instance). There are situations when the mediation of conflict does not have religious dimensions and religious actors can still be very efficient (ex. St. Egidio's contribution to the end of conflict in Mozambique). Faith-based diplomacy can be successful when it is able to mobilize the religious leaders of both parties in conflict – that is what the International Center for Religion and Diplomacy did in Sudan, for instance (Johnston, 2005).

Faith-based diplomacy has the ability to realize two things. On one hand, it can lead to the transformation of the attitude of local leaders and of the civil society – a lasting peace depends on this, as history witnessed many cases when civil society inspired political movements drawn upon religious reasons, like the movement for civil rights in America, the movement for independence in India, the movement against authoritarianism in Poland, Philippines etc. On the other hand this type of

diplomacy can lead to the building of a network of leaders of the civil society, devoted to a common cause, that is the creation of a lasting peace (Philpott & Smock, 2006).

Consequently, it can be stated that faith-based diplomacy means actually to make religion part of the solution rather than part of the problem. Certainly, such a potential has to be considered by government officials, who has to give up their prejudice regarding religion.

## Conclusion

The conclusion of all that has been stated above is that the more prominent religion became, either in its peaceful and reconciling form, or as a source of conflict and violence, the more important is its impact on international relations. Religion can be part of the problem as well as part of the solution. So, if wanted to make religion part of the solution rather than part of the problem, the positive potential of religion has to be used and encouraged. Religious actors have to be involved in peace-making and peace-building, in reconciling the warring parties and even more, in conflict prevention. All these mean that political leaders, decision-makers and diplomats have to pay more attention than they did until now to religion, at least as much attention as they pay to other geo-political elements. Until now, it was almost impossible to do that, because no IR theory included religion among the important variables to be studied, due to the hegemony of the secularization thesis. The end of this hegemony however, leaves space now for considering this element in a new and responsible way in IR. Realizing the importance of religion in IR, a growing number of scholars are trying to find a way to include this variable in the IR theories. These initiatives will be discussed, probably, within the framework of another article.

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# The Politics of Media Law in Romania. From Authoritarian to Non-Authoritarian[1]

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**Cristina STĂNUŞ**

Lucrarea abordează problema instrumentalizării / controlului asupra mass media în cazul României, concentrându-se pe legislaţie şi puterea de a legifera ca metodă de control. Punctul de plecare este ideea potrivit căreia există două tipuri de control politic asupra mass media, autoritar şi non-autoritar, care se diferenţiază din perspectiva instrumentelor / metodelor folosite. Analiza se bazează pe legislaţia referitoare la instituţiile de presă, dar şi analiza unor cazuri de presiuni asupra jurnaliştilor semnalate de organizaţiile neguvernamentale cu activitate în domeniu, în rapoarte privind libertatea de expresie în România. Analiza evidenţiază pentru perioada 1990-2004 o trecere graduală de la folosirea unor instrumente legale explicite, caracteristice sistemului autoritar de control, la instrumente economice şi structurale, caracteristice mai degrabă sistemelor non-autoritare de control.

This paper approaches the issue of the instrumentalization/control of the news media in a post-communist country focusing on the use of legislative power as a mean in a system-level battle over who controls the political news. After placing this discussion within the literature regarding the relationship between media and politics, I review the methods used for media instrumentalization/control, as documented by research on a variety of media systems, and link the usage of one or other method with the type of control system (as defined by Graber, 1997). In the final part of the paper, I attempt to place Romania within the control system typology, primarily but not exclusively by analyzing the regulation of media between 1990 and 2004.

## Media, Politics, and Control. A theoretical perspective

The *political importance of the mass media* derives from several aspects that are important to the political system. The way in which news media reflect political actors, issues, and decisions models citizen perception providing them with shared political experience (Graber 1997:3). Also, the mass media inform the public about any wrongdoings of the government (Graber 1997:3). In this model journalists have two functions: surveillance of the political process and information of the citizens regarding this process (see Keane 2000, O'Neill 1998). The problem posed is whether media should represent or not the interests of diverse social groups or political organizations, or even the interests of their owners. Some authors seem to believe that the mass media have parted from their watchdog role, choosing to tightly connect themselves with political elites and thus limiting the degree of critical analysis within the

news (O'Neill 1998:2). At least this is the normative perspective on this issue. Less normative views emphasize the inevitability of media representing one interest or another and even discuss issues such as the political parallelism characterizing a media system (see Hallin and Mancini 2004).

There are a few conditions that need to be met in order to allow the media to play its credited part in a democracy, and the first of them is guaranteeing freedom of expression and media freedom. *Freedom of expression and media freedom are considered a characteristic of formal or procedural democracy* (Johnson 1998:112) and are obviously subject of government regulation / policy. The issue of media regulation is highly disputed and discussed. In societies that are naturally suspicious of their governments, it is hard to imagine what entity should guide the communication process and what rules should this entity propose, but eventually each political system creates its own system of rules and norms (Bennet 1998:204). But when it comes to media regulation there are two aspects considered important in a variety of political systems: regulations should not be intrusive, they should never specifically refer to media content; and regulation should be based upon a structural rather than behavioral approach to the issue (Geller 1990). Any regulation of the media system that fails to serve these purposes is nothing but government intrusion (Geller 1990:293), and sometimes an attempt to exert political control upon media institutions.

The context within which media operate has an increased potential of conflict and pressure, determined by the necessity to maintain permanent relationships with a number of actors (McQuail and Windahl 2001:137). Among these actors we mention political actors (parties, politicians, politicians in office), representing for journalists, in the same time, both sources and "enemies", due to the watchdog function performed by the media. The media-political actors relationship is twofold, even if we look at it from the political perspective. For political actors mass media is a necessity (they need to transmit messages to the public) as well as an opponent (since media can expose them when they are breaking the rules). The evolution of this relationship is different from one type of political regime to another.

Before we detail the role of the media in different types of political regimes, *a conceptual clarification* is needed. In describing this type of relationships between media and political actors, the literature in this field uses different terms such as control, instrumentalization, manipulation or influence. Political control is exercised by the political power, using diverse instruments, but especially legislative and administrative ones (Pop 2001:129); while terms such as „influence" and „manipulation" are used to describe situations in which both political and non-political actors somehow pressure journalists and media institutions. Political actors that are interested in controlling media might use not only means available to the government. A politician or a political group that owns a media outlet may decide to

use the prerogatives derived from ownership to control editorial policy, in order to follow their political agenda. The most obvious example of such a situation is that of Silvio Berlusconi, Italian prime minister, who successfully used the Mediaset group during his electoral campaign. Because of these reasons, I will refer to the political control/instrumentalization of mass media taking into account the following aspects:

- Political control implies an explicit or implicit attempt to orient the editorial line and the information provided by a media outlet in order to support the political goals of a political actor;
- The instruments used to politically control media outlets may be instruments available to the government or instruments deriving from the operation of a free market;
- A political party, a politician, the government or any other institution whose leadership is political can exercise political control.

The answer to the *Who controls the news?* question is obviously complex. Parenti identifies four categories of actors in this process: owners, managers and top leadership; advertising firms (advertising clients usually see the influence they exercise upon media content as a right); editors and producers who are usually obedient and not resistant to censorship exercised by media owners; and reporters who censor themselves and act as conditionally independent agents (Parenti 1994: 140-5). However, this is an inside view, that is missing the influence of political external factors, such as the government (that can exercise direct control), political parties and politicians (that can exercise control through the owners) etc.


Political control is present in all societies, differences being given by the scope, nature, and goals of the control attempts (Graber 1997:19). Because of this, the macro-level approach of the media-politics relationship differentiates between authoritarian and democratic regimes (Gunther and Mughan 2000, Graber 1997). Graber distinguishes between *authoritarian and non-authoritarian control systems*. Within the first category she differentiates between authoritarian ideological systems (control is motivated by a radical ideology aiming at radically transforming the polity) and authoritarian non-ideological systems (control is motivated by the incumbents' desire to maintain political power and achieve a certain degree of legitimacy). Within the second category, we differentiate between libertarian systems (journalists are free to approach any subject corresponding to the audience taste) and systems based on the idea of social responsibility (through their work journalists must contribute to the improvement of society) (Graber 1997:19).

A few elements are characteristic to the relationship with the media of every type of political regime. Thus, in the case of authoritarian systems we assume that the government knows and respects the public interest; the media should not attack the government and its policies; news should contribute to creating support for major public policies; and the selection criteria for news and entertainment should be their social value (Graber 1997:21). The media system is affected by a strict censorship, repression

of journalistic freedom and efforts to structure a highly selective information flow (Gunther and Mughan 2000:4). In the case of non-authoritarian regimes governments are submitted to error and often corrupt; the media should attack the government when either politicians or policies are affected by corruption; news should stimulate critical thinking vis-à-vis major public policy; and news and entertainment should be selected based on their appeal to the audience (Graber 1997:21). This situation implies the fact that the media are protected from the abusive use of government power.

However this separation works mainly on the theoretical level, in fact we can not say whether there is an authoritarian regime in which the government controls all aspects of the media system or a non-authoritarian regime in which there is no control over the media (see Gunther and Mughan 2000).

The literature in the field distinguishes between *several types of control methods*, which appear in different combinations from one type of regime to another. The main four types of control methods are the legal, normative, structural, and economic methods (Graber 1997:25).

*Legal methods* imply direct censorship, restrictions regarding the creation of media outlets, limiting access to broadcasting frequencies, laws regarding treason, insult, and slender, as well as ways of regulating public service broadcasting, where it exists. *Normative methods* refer to the communicational behavior imposed to the media by dominant social norms. *Structural methods* derive from the structure and operation of media outlets – aspects related to broadcast, printing, distribution, manipulating/restraining the access to information and favor certain media outlets in disseminating information. *Economic methods* are best represented by direct and indirect government subsidies, procedures for privatization and concession, government control over imports and exports of raw materials such as paper and typographic inks.

Accepting the fact that there is no such thing as a political system with no control over the media system, the problem of differentiating between authoritarian and non-authoritarian regimes is transferred in the field of the control methods that are used. Legal methods are obviously characteristic to authoritarian control systems, while a closer look at structural and economic methods points to the fact that they are used where legal methods are not (can not) be used, that is in non-authoritarian control systems. Normative control works in all political systems, but the extent to which it favors pluralism and freedom of speech versus unconditional support for the present political regime is dependent on the political culture of a given society. The way in which the norms and values of a given society "control" the media is the reason for considering the expression "normative control methods" as somehow inappropriate. Obviously authoritarian control systems do not hold a monopoly of legal methods and usually are associated with a mix of methods. This is also true for non-authoritarian control systems.

Next, I approach the case of Romania and try to assess the extent to which, after 1989, media regulation constituted a political tool for controlling the media.

## The Case of Romania

Assessing the extent to which media regulation constituted a political tool in the struggle over news content requires a closer look at several aspects. What kind of regulation regarding media operation was enacted? To what extent this regulation was different from what is considered normal in a democratic political system? Some related research questions stem from the theoretical framework presented above. Does the media policy enacted by Romanian governments after 1989 allow us to assess the degree to which the control system is authoritarian or non-authoritarian? And, if it does, how can we characterize Romania, from the perspective of the control system typology? Each of these questions will be answered separately in the following sub-sections.

*The Romanian Media System before 1989 – Media Serving the Regime*
Any analysis of the Romanian media system after 1989 and any assessment of the degree of control over news media should be made having in mind the main characteristics of Romanian media before 1989. In analyzing possible explanations for different paths towards democratization in Eastern Europe, Kitschelt indicates to the existence of a link between the characteristics of the antecedent regime and the pattern of democratization. We can transpose this link to a lower level of the political system, in our discussion of the relationship between political actors and the mass media. Therefore, we assume that the characteristics of the antecedent regime (the Romanian communist media system) are important in explaining and understanding the characteristics of the current regime (the Romanian post-communist media system).

The Romanian communist media system was highly regulated and, because of this, an instrument serving the interest of the regime. Thus, law no. 3 from March 28, 1974 is approaching the following aspects of the system: the socio-political functions of the media, the organization and leadership of media institutions, the distribution of media products, the rights and obligations of the journalists, selection procedures for the position of journalist, the media – state – social organizations – citizens relationship, aspects related to the protection of societal and individual rights against abuses by the media. The law is comprehensive and regulates everything from journalist ethics to the price of a publication. Control is exercised through the Committee for press and print, the main censorship institution. The law is exponential of a concept of media as an instrument to disseminate official ideas and ideology, to support public policy and "socialist ethics and equity". The chapter addressing the socio-political functions of the media states the principle of freedom of expression but also forbids

expressing any ideas contrary to the official ideology, as well as criticism directed against the Communist Party and its leaders. Media are compelled to form public opinion in the spirit of socialism and communism. Creating and organizing media institutions is strictly a prerogative of the state. As for the journalists, the obligation to contribute to the fulfillment of the socio-political functions mentioned above is clearly stated, along with strict selection and training procedures. Using a very ambiguous formulation, the law forbids the communication of alarmist information or commentary affecting the peace and state security (article 67), creating the conditions for the censuring of all speech directed against the regime. The law regulates also the activity of foreign journalists. The changes brought to this law in 1977 made political control over news media even more explicit by placing party activists in the management structures of media institutions. The law was abrogated only in year 2000[2].

The comprehensiveness of this law indicates the existence of an *authoritarian control system,* aimed at offering legitimacy for the regime and its official ideology. In this system, the use of other types of control methods is not necessary due to harsh enforcement of this law. To this picture we must add some pertinent characteristics of the media system, determined by the regime's view on media role in society and by the actual implementation of this law, characteristics we believe influence its evolution after the breakdown of the communist regime. We must note:

(a) The separation between the media production and the printing and distribution processes in the case of the print media. This separation is important since it maintained itself for some time after 1989 and created a window of opportunity for regulation that would control media.

(b) Highly restrictive journalist selection and training.

(c) The institutionalization of censorship and its gradual conversion into self-censorship.

*The Romanian Post-communist Media System – The Policy*

Two research questions will guide this presentation of the media policy of Romanian governments between 1989 and 2004. First, what kind of regulation regarding media operation was enacted? And second, to what extent this regulation was different from what is considered normal in a democratic political system?

After 1989 regulations approached the media system on three different levels: general regulation of media operation and activity, regulation regarding broadcasting, and regulation regarding public service radio and television. The general level of regulation comprises laws, decisions and regulatory proposals regarding codes of ethics, free access to information, slander and libel, as well as other general aspects related to media operation and activity. One very special category of regulations is characterized by

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[2] According to a Constitutional Court Decision, no. 179 from September 26, 200, published in the Official Bulletin no. 629 from December 5, 2000. This late abrogation of the law is accidental and has produced no direct effects, since the law was not applied after 1989.

apparent lack of direct link with the media system and it includes economic regulation, such as VAT for print or import-export of paper and other typographic material. From the process point of view one interesting element are the proposal that were never transformed into laws. These proposals opposed two categories of actors – political actors (incumbents, political parties, and politicians) and actors from within the media system (especially professional organizations of journalists and organizations of owners).

The legal framework developed for the media in post-communist Romania is an eloquent example of the centrality of media for political conflict. This is true not only due to the content of the laws enacted, but also due to the characteristics of the policy-making process, from which these regulations resulted. As stated above, two categories of actors are involved in this *policy-making process*; however, their influence is different.

Professional associations of journalists made several attempts during the 1990s to obtain different regulations of the sector. In 1990 a professional association drafted a Charter of media freedom, stipulating that all media regulation should be based on two principles, media freedom and information pluralism, while ethical aspects should be left for regulation by the professional associations. This project was however abandoned. In December 1992, the Union of Professional Journalists drafted a law proposal regarding the practice of journalism, containing a code of ethics as well. This project was abandoned in 1994, then retrieved and improved based upon a Council of Europe recommendation regarding media freedom. Several other proposals made by groups of journalists or professional associations appeared in the following years, while several codes of ethics were drafted, approved, and then annulled by professional associations. Between 1990 and 1999 12 proposals for a law of the press appeared, 6 of these belonging to professional associations, 2 to government authorities, and 4 to political parties or individual politicians. After 1999, the journalists' interest for a law of the press seems to have disappeared or diminished, while only 3 media institutions adopted their own codes of ethics.[3]

In 1992 a proposal for a law of the press, drafted by senators Plătică and Moș, stated that no publication should appear without the approval of the police. In the same category we put a law proposal elaborated by the Ministry of Justice in 1990. A 1995 proposal of the Democrat Party was more preocuppied with the economic context in which media institutions operate. This project contained several proposal perceived as positive by representatives of the emerging media industry. A 1999 project by PNȚCD and PSDR included a code of ethics for the media and regulations offering to politicians and political parties some control over media institutions. All these proposals never passed by the Juridical Committees of the two chambers of the Romanian Parliament.

This entire process reveals the existence of two categories of actors, interested in the issue, involved in policy-making, but talking passed each other. While political actors propose regulations that would

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[3] *Tineretul liber,* a daily that ceased its apparition in 1995, and the public service television and radio.

favor their position in the power relationship between media and government, professional associations struggle for what they see as democratic regulation / media policy. In the process, political actors ignore one important element of successful policy-making, consultation of the groups interested in the issue / policy. While interest groups play an indispensable part in policy-making by creating a feasible agenda or by voicing the interests of the citizen, they can also create serious problems (Lindblom and Woodhouse 2003: Ch. 7). Romanian political actors perceived the professional associations only as a group of interest that could cause problems and needed to be controlled, and, consequently, formulated regulation proposals without consulting this group. On the other side, the professional associations promoting proposals, failed to see political actors as a must, since media policy was, in the end, a matter of political decision-making. One important element must be added; after 1999, while both political actors and professional associations lost interest in imposing a certain type of regulations, the policy-making process in this field became more and more open and marked by interaction.

The *general regulation regarding media operation and activity* approached some issues, such as freedom of information and slander and libel, and avoided some other issues such as the protection of sources.
The freedom of information access act from 2001 and the law of classified information provide on one hand access to information for representatives of media organizations and regular citizens, and on the other hand a very non-transparent procedure for classifying and de-classifying information. The draft of a law regarding reply, first presented in 2002, and still under discussion in the Romanian parliament in 2005, is yet another attempt to create mechanisms that would allow for an increased political control over Romanian media. The draft limits the decision-making powers of the courts in such issues by stating that a court is only allowed to pronounce itself on the technical aspects (whether a reply was published or not), and not allowed to rule on the issue (whether the publishing of the reply is justified or not). The same draft allows an individual who considers himself/herself affected by a media product to sue for material compensation, even if the media organization published the reply. .
Criminal law was always the most effective means of legal control over media organizations, due to the manner in which it regulated libel and slander, as well as defamation of the state or offenses to national symbols. Romania was for a long time on a list of states where libel and slander were punishable with imprisonment. In 2002, changes to the Penal Code excluded imprisonment and introduced good faith as a sufficient condition for absolving a journalist of all charges. In 2005, the Romanian Parliament eliminated slander and libel from the Penal Code, leaving all legal action in this field to be taken within the limits of the Civil Code[4]. The effects of these legal provisions are presented below.

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[4] In January 2007, while this article was being prepared for print a ruling of the Constitutional Court (no. 62 of January 18, 2007), reintroduced slander and libel in the Penal Code, based a motivation claiming that an article of the Constitution (refering to the protection of a person's dignity) is violated.

The legal provisions contained in articles 205, 206, 207 and 236 from the Penal Code allowed political and economic actors to exercise pressure over journalists and media institutions. We have analyzed this aspect of the media – politics relationship based on the cases of pressures signaled by the reports issued between 1999 and 2003 by the Media Monitoring Agency – Academia Caţavencu. This is the only available source at this time for such information, and it is analyzed taking into consideration the fact that the above-mentioned reports are, to some extent, subjective, given their author (an NGO active in the field of media freedom). Between 1999 and 2002, most cases in which journalists or media outlets were brought to court were based on articles 205 and 206 from the Penal Code (libel and slander)[5]. One aspect that needs to be noticed is the fact that even though journalists and media institutions were often convicted for slander or libel, no punishment involving imprisonment were given. From this analysis, few aspects need to be pointed out. First, cases involving pressures over journalists and media organizations are dominant in local media (22 out of 29 cases between 1999 and 2000). Second, these cases are concentrated in the Eastern part of Romania and in urban centers with a high concentration of media organizations (Cluj, Timişoara, Braşov, Oradea, and Sibiu). Third, the introduction in 2001 of law no. 244 (FOIA) documents a new type of control mechanism over journalists: denying access to information, withdrawing access permits.

One aspect which was not regulated, and, surprisingly, was not raised by the journalists was the issue of source protection, which is a key element in media regulation through-out most of the democratic world. Another obviously missing regulation is a law of the press. However, both political actors and professional associations seemed to have lost interest in such a regulation (Gross 1999). In time

The *regulation of broadcasting* was highly disputed. The first proposal in this direction was brought into discussion in December 1990. At the respective time both journalists and representatives of the opposition feared that the passing of this law will lead to the disappearance of independent radio and television stations, due to provisions stating rigid licensing procedures as well as equipment confiscation for all TV and radio stations airing without license. We must note the fact Romania was the first state from the former Eastern block that had independent radio and TV stations, in spite of the lack of regulation in the field (the first national television license was officially granted in 1995). The broadcasting law was approved by the Parliament in May 2002, a few months before the September elections. The law stipulates the attributions of the National Broadcasting Council: licensing, content regulation (balanced coverage, advertising, right-of-reply) and regulating electoral programming. However, the procedures enacted for the selection of the NBC members put this body under political control since from its 11 members, two are nominated by the president, three by the Senate, three by the Chamber of Deputies, and three by the Government. The law also allows the above mentioned authorities to revoke NBC members if *there is suspicion* they broke the Law of

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[5] Data from the Ministry of Justice, according to the MMA reports, say that, until 2002, in 400 cases suits were filed against journalists based on the provisions of the Penal Code.

Broadcasting. One highly disputed provision is the one referring to the continuation of activity by radio and television stations, other than national, that existed prior to the enactment of this law. The respective article of the law (no. 43) was modified twice, once in 1992 and once in 1993. Each time an extension of the right of these radio and TV stations to broadcast without a definitive authorization was granted. Finally, the decision was postponed until the drafting of a law regarding public service radio and television. Ulterior modifications to this law did not bring major change concerning the procedures for granting licenses or the procedures for the nominalization of NBC members. The manner in which the NBC itself is abiding the Law of Broadcasting was put into discussion in 2002 when the license of the OTV television station was withdrawn for one offense and without issuing an official motivation in the Official Bulletin. The OTV case attracted attention over one specific provision of the Law of Broadcasting, allowing to the NBC to control, if wishes to do so, media institutions due to its discretionary power of withdrawing licenses for one time offenders of the Law or NBC regulations.

The *regulation of public service radio and television* was equally disputed, starting with the first days after the demise of the Ceauşescu regime, due to the fact that for some time after 1989 national radio and television stations were the only broadcast mass communication means available.

A decree issued on May 11, 1990 asserts the subordination of the, then, Romanian Radiotelevision to the newly instated authorities. We must note that this decree preceded only by 9 days the first elections organized after the 1989. The same document states that the media mentioned above should be protected from the intervention of state authorities, political parties, and pressure groups. The law regarding the organization of public service radio and television stations was adopted by the Parliament in June 1994. The document states the condition of public services of national interest of the two, as well as the fact that they operate under parliamentary control. Article 1, stating editorial independence, conflicts with article 16, that compels the two institutions to promote Romania's image abroad, as well as the viewpoints of Romanian authorities on internal and international events. How independent are the two institutions allowed to become is obvious when we examine the criteria for the nominalization of the members of the boards. Out of the 13 memberships, three are open to nominalization by the representatives of the employees in the two institutions, and the rest are at the latitude of the Parliament, Presidency, and Government. Article 21 from the law allows for the revoking of the members of the board, if their activity is not "appropriate" – expression that leads to interpretation. The law was modified in 1998, the most interesting addition being article 14: "the confidentiality of all information sources is guaranteed by law". Unfortunately, this only applies to the information sources of the journalists employed by the public service radio and television. Currently, the regulation of public service radio and television is in discussion, due to the obvious vulnerability of the two institutions to government control.

One special category of *regulation indirectly affects the media, since it is economic in nature.*

In 1990 the print media practically exploded; an impossibly to estimate number of publications appeared. Faced with this, the government attempted to control them by restricting access to printing facilities and paper for newspapers. Two decrees issued at the beginning of 1990 create local bodies meant to "administer" the media and the Free Press Publishing House, intended to play a part in limiting the publishing of print media opposing the government.

One other important element was the fact that for a long time after 1989 the government kept under control (by delaying privatization) the main company distributing print media in the country[6]. Especially in the first half of the 1990s, Rodipet frequently proved to be an instrument of controlling distribution of independent print media. This was possible because Romanian post-communist media inherited from the communist media a separation of the editorial, printing, and distribution activity.

In *assessing the extent to which Romanian media law can be categorized as normal for a democratic political system* we use the criteria for evaluation of the legal environment for media freedom used by the Freedom House in its annual survey of media freedom around the world. These criteria are:

(a) legal and constitutional guarantees for freedom of expression;

(b) the potentially negative aspects of security legislation,

(c) the penal code and other criminal statutes; penalties for libel and defamation;

(d) the existence of and ability to use freedom of information legislation;

(e) the independence of the judiciary and of official media regulatory bodies;

(f) registration requirements for both media outlets and journalists;

(g) and the ability of journalists' groups to operate freely (Freedom of the Press, 2004).

Assessing Romanian media law based on these criteria must take into account the time factor. In we apply these criteria to Romanian media law in the first half of the 1990s we discover several shortcomings: the provisions of the penal code, the lack of freedom of information legislation, issues related to the independence of the media regulatory bodies (National Broadcasting Council, especially because it also regulates content), economic regulation that hinders freedom of expression. If we apply these criteria in 2002, the list of shortcomings becomes much shorter: issues related to NBC are somehow diminished and libel and slander are no longer punishable with imprisonment. Therefore, we can state that for some time after 1989 media regulation in Romania has included some provisions considered out of the ordinary for a democratic (or claiming to be democratic) political system. We must also note the fact that, in time, these provisions tend to disappear, or, if they reappear, it is because of an administrative decision (a Constitutional Court ruling) not a political one.

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[6] In 2006, after an unsuccessful privatization, the Romanian government was forced to regain control over this company. The history of the company was marked by arbitrary distribution of the print media and frequent conflicts with media outlets even while under private ownership.

One other question that needs to be answered refers to the *impact of these legal provisions on the media system*. The statistics from the Ministry of Justice mentioned above, as well as data from the Media Monitoring Agency reports, suggest a strong impact of such regulation especially when it comes to criminal law. Any educated reader of Romanian media is aware of the sometimes strong instrumentalization of public service radio and television by the government (no matter the political color of it), this while some decisions of the National Broadcasting Council have cast some serious doubts over its neutrality. However, this paper is not trying to assess in detail the impact of legal provisions regarding media, but merely to point to the most problematic provisions, from a media instrumentalization / control perspective. More importantly, these provisions are approached as a means of identifying political views on the media – politics relationship in Romania.

Two other questions that need to be answered *link the case of Romania with mainstream theory and research in this field*. So far, we have used media law as a means of identifying political as well as media / journalists' views on the media – political actors power relationship. Is this enough ground for assessing whether the control system in post-communist Romania is authoritarian or non-authoritarian? My answer to this question is yes. I build this statement on one argument that is linking the theory and practice of the media – politics relationship. In the first section of this paper, I discussed the link between possible methods and control and the type of control system. The point here is the fact that the use of three out of four methods (legal, structural, and economic) can be documented by analyzing law, as long as we do not stop at analyzing law that refers strictly to media operation and activity. This paper has attempted to do just that. Of course, such an analysis allows us to place a country in one or other category of control system, but a deeper analysis, focusing on the implementation of the legal provisions, is needed if we want to document how the control system works. Next, I will review the findings and conclude over the type of control system in post-communist Romania, thus answering the final research question.

-        **Conclusion**

The presentation of the Romanian communist media system made above leads us to obviously placing it in the category of authoritarian ideological control systems, since the control is motivated by a radical ideology aiming at transforming the polity.
In legislation and legislative proposals during the 1990s we find reminiscence of the view that media needs to be controlled and strictly regulated, and in service of the political power. However the ideological component is diminished and the policy-making process is a struggle between two categories of actors trying to impose legislation that will favor them. Control is motivated by the need

of the incumbents to dominate the public discourse and gain votes, in order to hold on to polical power. Attacks on the government are not acceptable, so legislation regarding libel and slander is enacted. The use of legal control methods is obvious and dominant. Therefore we can place Romania in the 1990s in the category of autoritarian non-ideologial control systems.

After year 2000 a switch from the use of direct and legal control methods to structural and economic methods is obvious in the legislation. Attacking the government or exposing corruption is no longer anti-system, so the legislation regarding libel and slander becomes more flexible. Information becomes available and legislation regarding freedom of access to information is enacted. All these changes at the level of legislation, and consequently at the level of control methods, point to a change of the control system from an authoritarian to a non-authoriarian one.

We will not discuss whether the Romanian system is fitting within one or other subdivision of the non-authoritarian control system, since such a distinction it is based on a criterium that implies journalists' opinions on the issue rather than the views of the political actors, as expressed by media law.

Such transformation of the legal framework in which media institutions operate is representative for a period of political transition, and the result is usually a stabilization of the system with its own rules, norms, and behaviors. Recent events (especially the ruling of the Constitutional Court reintroducing libel and slander in the Penal Code) do not allow us to say whether or not, from a legal / policy point of view, the Romanian system is stable. But obviously we must point to the fact that this transformation of the control system can be equalled to one more step forward in the process of democratization and, possibly, to the initiation of a process of democratic consolidation.

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Decret nr. 102 din 7 februarie 1990 privind înfiinţarea administraţiilor locale pentru presă

Decret-lege nr.136 din 11 mai 1990 privind unele măsuri referitoare la Televiziunea Română

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Lege nr. 109 din 3 octombrie 1992 privind modificarea art. 43 alin. (1) din legea audiovizualului

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Lege nr. 62 din 22 septembrie 1993 pentru modificarea art. 43 din legea audiovizualului

Lege nr. 41 din 17 iunie 1994 privind organizarea şi funcţionarea Societăţii Române de Radiodifuziune şi Societăţii Române de Televiziune

Hotărâre nr. 560 din 19 august 1994 privind organizarea şi funcţionarea Agenţiei Naţionale de Presă Rompres

Lege nr. 124 din 22 iunie 1998 pentru modificarea şi completarea legii 41/1994

Hotărâre nr. 960 din 23 decembrie 1998 privind organizarea şi funcţionarea Agenţiei Naţionale de Presă Rompres

Lege nr. 19 din 14 ianuarie 1999 privind modificarea şi completarea legii audiovizualului 48/1992

# Impactul educaţiei electorale în comunităţi multietnice din România

Gabriel BĂDESCU

This article investigates the effects of an electoral education program conducted in 30 Romanian multi-ethnic villages during the 2004 local elections. Based on survey data, a series of semi-structured interviews and official electoral data, the study aims to assess to what extent quality of information, propensity to vote and incidence of correct voting (i.e. avoiding unintentional null votes) can be increased by intentional means. The research finds support for a significant increase of political information among the voters, but less clear evidence regarding the influence on correct voting and turnout.

## Participare politică şi democraţie

Democratizare înseamnă atât schimbarea în instituţii, norme şi reguli, adică în aspecte ale realităţii sociale de nivel supra-individual, cât şi schimbarea de atitudini şi comportamente individuale. Astfel, este general acceptat faptul că o schimbare în direcţia democratizării în cazul ţărilor foste comuniste presupune o creştere a nivelului de participare, de interes şi de informare politică[1]. Prin *participare politică* sunt înţelese acele activităţi ale cetăţenilor care au ca obiectiv, mai mult sau mai puţin direct, să influenţeze selecţia celor care sunt implicaţi în guvernare şi/sau acţiunile luate de aceştia[2]. Participarea politică este un mijloc prin care cetăţenii îşi fac cunoscute dorinţele celor care îi guvernează şi îi motivează pe aceştia să le ia în considerare. Participarea are şi o valoare în sine, nu doar una instrumentală. J.S.Mill spunea că este o metodă educaţională prin care sunt învăţate virtuţile civice: "*printre beneficiile cele mai remarcabile ale unui guvernământ liber este acela al educării inteligenţei şi a sentimentelor oamenilor,incluzându-i şi pe cei care au rangul cel mai de jos, prin aceea că sunt chemaţi să ia parte la actele care au privesc interesele ţării.*

Acestea sunt câteva dintre motivele de ordin general pentru care un nivel ridicat al participării politice este dezirabil într-o ţară cum este România. Nu este însă important doar nivelul de ansamblu al participării ci şi cine sunt cei activi--din punctul de vedere al caracteristicilor socio-demografice precum şi al atitudinilor şi preferinţelor socio-politice--, şi în ce mod participă.

Pornind de la aceste considerente, Centrul de Resurse pentru Comunităţile de Romi (CRCR) a realizat un proiect complex pentru stimularea participării la vot, şi pentru creşterea calităţii informării în mai multe comunităţi multietnice din România, în alegerile locale şi generale din 2004. Voi descrie în continuare, pe scurt, modul în care nivelul de participare, felul participării, caraterísticile celor care participă influenţează calitatea democraţiei. Voi argumenta apoi importanţa pe care o are abordarea

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[1] Gabriel Bădescu. 2001. *Participare politică şi capital social*. Cluj-Napoca: Editura Accent. p. 223.
[2] Verba, S. şi N.H.Nie. 1972. *Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality*. NY: Harper & Row. p. 2

aleasă de către Centrul de Resurse pentru Comunităţile de Romi pentru a creşte calitatea participării în alegerile din 2004 şi voi prezenta rezultatele evaluării acestui proiect.

Persoanele care iau decizii de interes public sunt mai adesea conştiente de nevoile şi preferinţele cetăţenilor care sunt activi şi tind să le acorde o atenţie sporită. De aceea, măsura în care persoanele care participă sunt reprezentative pentru restul populaţiei este o problemă relevantă în raport cu principiul democratic al egalităţii. De aici şi importanţa aflării unui răspuns la întrebarea "Cine sunt cei care participă?". Problema inegalităţii în reprezentare presupune mai mult decât determinarea diferenţelor de structură dintre populaţia celor care activează şi restul populaţiei. Asta, deoarece diferenţele din perspectiva unor caracteristici socio-demografice nu implică în mod necesar şi diferenţe în preferinţele de natură politică[3]. Pe de altă parte, argumentează Verba et al.[4], atunci când un grup care este activ are trăsături care pot fi identificate de către cei care iau decizii de interes public, atunci nevoile grupului sunt deduse pornind de la caracteristicile vizibile ale grupului şi nu doar de la nevoile exprimate de către membrii săi. Astfel, contează nu doar cum diferă opiniile participanţilor faţă de cele ale non-participanţilor (de ex. dacă vor ajutoare sociale mai mari sau mai mici, dacă au preferinţe clare în ceea ce priveşte învăţământul în limbile minorităţilor, etc.) ci şi cine sunt cei care participă.

Participarea la vot este activitatea participativă cel mai mult studiată şi, adesea, pentru publicul larg, este singurul mijloc important prin care cetăţenii pot influenţa deciziile celor care guvernează. Într-adevăr, existenţa unor alegeri libere constituie o condiţie necesară pentru ca un regim să fie considerat democratic. În plus, atât existenţa alegerilor libere cât şi participarea la vot sunt fenomene vizibile, uşor de observat şi de evaluat. Este adevărat că implicarea cetăţenilor în politică nu se limitează doar la actul votării, iar votarea nu constituie întotdeauna mijlocul cel mai eficient de influenţare a proceselor politice. În acelaşi timp însă, cercetările asupra participării au arătat că persoanele care votează tind să devină mai interesate, mai informate şi mai active în politică. Cu alte cuvinte, un proiect prin care se urmăreşte creşterea nivelului de participare la vot are potenţialul de a creşte şi gradul informării şi cel al implicării politice prin alte forme de participare decât votul. În plus, a fost arătat faptul că şansa ca o persoană să voteze la un moment de timp este în mare măsură explicată de votul său la momente anterioare, şi chiar de către votul părinţilor săi. Din acest motiv, o creştere a participării la vot în 2004 este probabil să aibă un efect care se transmite şi asupra votului din alegerile care urmează.

Care sunt consecinţele posibile ale activităţilor proiectului CRCR, realizate în 30 de localităţi rurale care au o proporţie ridicată de persoane de etnie romă? Această lucrare va evalua mai multe tipuri de efecte, punând accentul asupra eventualelor schimbări ale *nivelului participării la vot în rândul persoanelor de etnie romă, al participării la vot în rândul tuturor locuitorilor din satele cuprinse în proiect, şi al calităţii informării cu privire la alegeri.*

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[3] Ex. Rosenstone, S.J., şi J.M.Hansen. 1993. *Mobilization, Participation and Democracy in America*. NY: Macmillan.
[4] Verba, S., N.H.Nie şi J-O. Kim. 1978. Participation and Political Equality: A Seven Nation Comparison. Cambridge University Press.

*De ce un program cu acest public țintă - oamenii din localități rurale cu o proporție ridicată de romi?* Pentru a da un răspuns, trebuie observat mai întâi că nivelul de participare la vot în România se află între limitele obişnuite pentru ţările foste comuniste din Europa, și la un nivel uşor sub cel al ţărilor cu o democraţie consolidată[5]. Activităţile care au în vedere participarea la vot sunt însă importante din următoarele motive:

- *calitatea* participării (nivelul de informare) este cel puţin la fel de importantă ca și *cantitatea* de participare (proporţia celor care votează), iar în România, și în special în mediul rural nivelul calităţii este relativ scăzut.

- chiar dacă participarea la vot în România este între limite obişnuite, se poate observa un trend descendent semnificativ.

- România are un nivel scăzut al celorlalte forme de participare politică. Pentru cea mai mare parte dintre cetăţeni, participarea la vot este singura activitate prin care aceştia îşi fac preferinţele cunoscute și au o influenţă asupra sistemului politic.

- participarea la vot este distribuită destul de uniform în funcţie de tipul de localitate şi regiune, precum și din punctul de vedere al atributelor socio-demografice ale subiecţilor. Însă, în afara participării la vot, gradul de implicare şi influenţă politică al cetăţenilor este foarte diferit în funcţie de caracteristicile amintite. În particular, preferinţele oamenilor care trăiesc în mediul rural, care au un status socio-economic scăzut, și, în special al celor de etnie romă, sunt disproporţionat de puţin reprezentate. Din acest motiv, creşterea participării la vot în rândul lor este unul din mijloacele prin care această subreprezentare poate fi diminuată.

Cetăţenii de etnie romă, care conform celor mai multe dintre estimări reprezintă 5-9% din populaţia ţării, au avut, de fiecare dată, un rol disproporţionat de mic în alegerile locale. Unul dintre motive este acela că formaţiunile politice care prin denumire şi prin program se adresează membrilor acestei etnii reuşesc să îşi atragă susţinerea doar a unei proporţii reduse dintre romi--în raport cu proporţiile similare care corespund altor partide etnice--, iar aceste proporţii au scăzut în mod continuu între 1992 şi 2000, cunoscând o uşoară creştere în 2004 (Tabelul 1.)[6]. Pe de altă parte, gradul de dispersare al romilor este mai mare decât al celorlalte etnii, fapt care în cazul alegerilor locale face ca transformarea voturilor în locuri de consilieri sau în locuri de primari să fie mai dificilă decât în cazul altor etnii mai puţin dispersate. Astfel, în 1996 au fost necesare aproape de două ori mai multe voturi pentru un loc de consilier din partea partidului Partida Romilor faţă de situaţia medie (0.6% / 0.34%) şi de douăzeci de ori mai mulţi pentru obţinerea unui loc de primar. În 2000 şi 2004 formaţiunile de romi nu au obţinut nici un loc de primar (în 1992 partidele de romi au avut 10 mandate de primari), iar pentru prima dată, în 2004, nu au obţinut nici un loc de consilier judeţean[7] (în 2000 au avut 4 mandate).

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[5] De exemplu, http://www.idea.int/voter_turnout/voter_turnout2.html
[6] Creşterea este și mai mică dacă includem în comparaţia între 2000 şi 2004 toate formaţiunile de romi, nu doar PRSD (PR până în 2003).
[7] Partida Romilor Social Democrată a avut 62175 de voturi pentru consiliul judeţean, cu care nu a obţinut nici un mandat, în timp ce Forumul Democrat al Germanilor a obţinut 11 mandate cu un număr apropiat de voturi (76843).

**Tabelul 1. Rezultate ale alegerilor locale din 1992, 1996 şi 2000 pentru Uniunea Democrată a Maghiarilor din România, pentru Partida Romilor (Social Democraţi din România, în 2004) şi pentru Forumul Democrat al Germanilor din România.**

| Numele partidului | 1992 | | 1996 | | | 2000 | | | 2004 | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | % mandate cons. loc. | % mandate primar | % voturi totale | % mandate cons. loc. | % mandate primar | % voturi totale | % mandate cons.loc. | % mandate primar | % voturile totale | % mandate cons. loc. | % mandate primar |
| UDMR | 7.7 | 16 | 4.18 | 6.14 | 4.71 | 3.05 | 6.17 | 4.75 | 5.18 | 6.20 | 5.93 |
| PRSDR (PR) | 1.5 | 0.34 | 0.60 | 0.34 | 0.03 | 0.30 | 0.40 | 0.00 | 0.63 | 0.47 | 0.00 |
| FRDG | - | - | 0.26 | 0.22 | 0.17 | 0.66 | 0.20 | 0.29 | 0.78 | 0.24 | 0.29 |

Proiectul CRCR a avut o importanţă practică remarcabilă, întrucât a încercat rezolvarea unor probleme semnificative ale modului în care funcţionează democraţia în România. Are însă şi o importanţă teoretică deosebită, pentru că evaluarea sa poate oferi răspunsuri unor întrebări de ordin general, aplicabile nu doar cetăţenilor din 30 de sate din România, ci şi altor tipuri de programe şi altui public ţintă. *Este posibil să fie influenţată calitatea de bun cetăţean prin măsuri intenţionate? Ce tipuri de atitudini, comportamente, relevante pentru bunul mers al democraţiei, pot fi influenţate prin activităţile unor organizaţii neguvernamentale, şi care sunt factorii care influenţează eficienţa acestor activităţi?*

În secţiunea care urmează sunt descrise activităţile proiectului CRCR. Secţiunea a treia prezintă metodologia de cercetare care structurează evaluarea. Secţiunile 4-6 prezintă rezultatele fiecăreia dintre cele trei componente principale ale evaluării, iar ultima parte cuprinde concluziile de ansamblu.

## Descrierea proiectului

Proiectul "Campanii de educaţie electorală în comunităţi interetnice" a fost implementat de Centrul de Resurse pentru Comunitatile de Romi în colaborare cu Asociaţia Pro Democraţia – Filiala Cluj, în perioada martie 2004 – februarie 2005. Proiectul a beneficiat de finanţare din partea Agenţiei Canadiene de Dezvoltare Internationala prin Programul de Sprijin al Bunei Guvernări si din partea Fundaţiei pentru o Societate Deschisă România. Scopul proiectului a fost să contribuie la consolidarea proceselor şi practicilor democratice la alegerile locale, parlamentare şi prezidenţiale din 30 de comunităţi rurale multietnice din România, în 2004.

Grupul ţintă selectat în 2004 pentru derularea proiectului "Campanii de educaţie electorală în comunităţi interetnice" a fost reprezentat de 30 de comunităţi interetnice rurale din România, în care CRCR a derulat în perioada 2002-2004 programul de facilitare şi dezvoltare comunitară. Aceste localităţi, în care prin proiectul de dezvoltare comunitară au fost create grupuri de iniţiativă sau asociaţii comunitare, sunt: Bazna, Valea Viilor, Nemşa, Biertan (*Sibiu*), Uila, Goreni, Deaj, Tonciu, Sânpaul (*Mureş*), Baţa (*Bistriţa Năsăud*), Comloşu Mic, Maşloc, Măguri (*Timiş*), Agrij, Popeni, Pusta Vale (*Sălaj*),

Nireş, Finişel, Gligoreşti (*Cluj*), Unirea, Decea (*Alba*), Jugureanu, Drogu (*Brăila*), Vărbilău, Lipăneşti (*Prahova*), Slobozia (*Iaşi*), Culciu Mare, Stâna, Terebeşti şi Craidorolţ (*Satu-Mare*).

Campaniile au fost pregătite şi realizate de către 15 tineri romi care au participat la sesiuni de instruire şi la întâlniri de raportare şi evaluare (conduse de Asociaţia Pro Democraţia – Filiala Cluj şi CRCR). În cadrul campaniilor au avut loc întâlniri de instruire şi cooptare a liderilor comunitari, ai membrilor asociaţiilor/grupurilor de iniţiativă, în planificarea şi derularea sesiunilor de informare, educare şi stimulare a participării la vot. Întâlnirile şi sesiunile de informare au fost monitorizate de o echipă din cadrul CRCR şi APD – Filiala Cluj.

În timpul acestor campanii au fost distribuite peste 9500 broşuri bilingve şi 10000 de fluturaşi de educaţie electorală. De asemenea, în cadrul proiectului au fost elaborate două materiale video: un clip de stimulare a participării la alegerile din 2004 şi un film (de 12 minute) de educaţie electorală, care au fost difuzate de posturile naţionale TVR2 şi TVR1 şi de posturile regionale Cluj, Timişoara, Craiova. Filmul şi spotul au fost difuzate şi în 10 comunităţi în timpul campaniilor desfăşurate înaintea alegerilor parlamentare şi prezidenţiale din 2004.

Campaniile s-au adresat cu precădere comunităţilor de romi, iar evaluarea impactului campaniilor de educaţie electorală s-a făcut prin aplicarea de chestionare şi organizarea de focus grupuri cu femei şi focus grupuri cu bărbaţi romi.

## Structura evaluării

Studiul de evaluare este structurat de trei tipuri de abordări:

1. un sondaj, realizat în 20 de localităţi, împărţite în două categorii -10 localităţi în care a avut loc proiectul şi 10 localităţi de control, alese încât să formeze perechi cât mai asemănătoare cu localităţile din prima categorie (alegerea s-a făcut din aceeaşi comună, iar asemănarea a vizat şi compoziţia etnică). Au fost intervievaţi 367 subiecţi, aleşi aleator (cu metoda pasului statistic), astfel încât să fie reprezentativi pentru populaţia de etnie romă, precum şi pentru cea ne-romă dar care locuieşte în zonele cu romi.

2. două interviuri focalizate de grup şi şase interviuri aprofundate individuale. Persoanele alese sunt de etnie romă şi au fost active în acţiunile proiectului CRCR, sau sunt lideri comunitari.

3. o analiză a datelor oficiale din alegerile generale din 2000, alegerile locale şi cele generale din 2004. Datele sunt la nivel de secţie de vot.

## Rezultatele evaluării prin aplicarea de chestionare standardizate

Datele sondajului permit o evaluare a legăturii dintre participarea la vot şi prezenţa programului CRCR. În cazul în care activităţile proiectului au condus la o rată de participare la vot mai ridicată,

datele ar trebui să indice o proporţie mai ridicată a respondenţilor care declară că au votat în alegerile locale din 2004 şi care locuiesc în localităţile cuprinse în proiect, decât proporţia similară a celor care locuiesc în localităţi neincluse în proiect (grupul de control). Tabelul 2. indică existenţa unei astfel de diferenţe: sunt 9,6% cei care declară că nu au votat dintre cei care locuiesc în satele din proiect, faţă de 20,5% cei care nu au votat dintre membrii grupului de control. Tabelul 3. prezintă rezultate foarte asemănătoare în ceea ce priveşte votul în turul 2. În ambele cazuri, prezenţa proiectului pare să fi contribuit la înjumătăţirea proporţiei celor care nu au votat în alegerile locale.

**Tabelul 2. Relaţia dintre votul în turul 1 al alegerile locale din 2004 şi rezidenţa în satele cuprinse în proiect (CONTROL "nu"), respectiv cele neincluse în proiect (CONTROL "da").**

|         |     | Vot tur 1 |        | Total  |
|---------|-----|-----------|--------|--------|
|         |     | Da        | Nu     |        |
| Control | Da  | 124 79,5% | 32 20,5% | 156 100 % |
|         | Nu  | 188 90,4% | 20 9,6% | 208 100% |
| Total   |     | 312 85,7% | 52 14,3/ | 364 100% |

**Tabelul 3. Relaţia dintre votul în turul 2 al alegerile locale din 2004 şi rezidenţa în satele cuprinse în proiect (CONTROL "nu"), respectiv cele neincluse în proiect (CONTROL "da").**

|         |     | Vot tur 2 |        | Total  |
|---------|-----|-----------|--------|--------|
|         |     | Da        | Nu     |        |
| Control | Da  | 92 79,3%  | 24 20,7% | 116 100 % |
|         | Nu  | 161 91,5% | 15 8,5% | 176 100% |
| Total   |     | 253 86,6% | 39 13,4/ | 292 100% |

Desigur, răspunsurile subiecţilor privind participarea la vot nu trebuie confundate cu participarea efectivă. Fenomenul *dezirabilităţii sociale*, care descrie tendinţa ca unele dintre persoanele intervievate să încerce să ofere răspunsuri care le pun într-o lumină bună, pe care le consideră a fi dezirabile--de către cel sau cea care îi intervievează, în raport cu instituţia pentru care are loc studiul, ori în raport cu o instanţă morală abstractă (binele comunităţii, al societăţii etc.)--, pare să fie prezent şi în răspunsurile privind participarea la vot. În fapt, tendinţa ca o parte dintre subiecţi să declare în mod eronat că au participat la vot este o regulă binecunoscută în studiul comportamentului electoral din România şi din alte ţări. Conform datelor oficiale privind participarea la vot în alegerile locale din 2004 în cele 21 de localităţi incluse în acest sondaj, rata de participarea a fost, în medie, de 62%, adică mult sub valoarea de 85%, care reprezintă proporţia celor din eşantion care au declarat că au votat. În aceste condiţii, mai poate fi interpretată diferenţa dintre localităţile din proiect şi cele de control drept un indiciu al creşterii participării, sau suntem în situaţia în care diferenţa ar putea fi exclusiv urmarea dezirabilităţii sociale mai crescute în rândul locuitorilor satelor din proiect?

Răspunsul este afirmativ, dacă admitem că efectul de *exagerare a particiării la vot* de către respondenți are, în medie, aproximativ aceeași intensitate atunci când este vorba despre alegerile locale din 2004 și atunci când este vorba despre alegerile locale din 2000, în cadrul fiecăreia dintre cele două categorii de subiecți (din proiect, din grupul de control). Urmarea acestei asumpții este că dacă participarea la vot declarată mai mare în 2004 în localitățile aflate în proiect decât în cele de control se datorează exclusiv efectului de exagerare, atunci ar fi de așteptat să observăm o diferență similară și pentru alegerile locale din 2000. În cazul în care participarea la vot declarată pentru alegerile locale din 2000 este aproximativ egală în localitățile incluse în proiect și cele de control, avem motive să credem că diferența de participare la vot în favoarea localităților din proiect se datorează, cel puțin în parte, activităților din proiect, și nu exclusiv dorinței respondenților, mai pronunțate în localitățile din proiect, de a oferi răspunsuri dezirabile. Tabelul 4. indică faptul că prezența la vot declarată în alegerile locale din 2000 nu îi diferențiază în mod semnificativ (p > 0,1) pe subiecții din cele două categorii de localități--sunt 16,2% cei care declară că nu au votat dintre cei incluși în proiect, față de 12,9% proporția echivalentă dintre cei din grupul de control[8]. Tabelul 5. aduce un argument în plus în favoarea că proiectul a avut un efect semnificativ, arătând cum proporția celor care nu au votat în 2000 dar au votat în 2004 este mai mare în localitățile din proiect, respectiv proporția celor care au votat în 2000 dar nu au votat în 2004 este mai mare în localitățile de control[9].

**Tabelul 4. Relația dintre votul în alegerile locale din 2000 și rezidența în satele cuprinse în proiect (CONTROL "nu"), respectiv cele neincluse în proiect (CONTROL "da").**

|         |     | Vot in 2000 | | Total |
|---------|-----|------|------|-------|
|         |     | **Da** | **Nu** |       |
| **Control** | **Da** | 128<br>87,1% | 19<br>12,9% | 147<br>100 % |
|         | **Nu** | 160<br>83,8% | 31<br>16,2% | 191<br>100% |
| **Total** |     | 288<br>85,2% | 50<br>14,8/ | 338<br>100% |

**Tabelul 5. Relația dintre diferența de participare în alegerile locale între 2000 și 2004 ("-1" - cei care au participat în 2000 dar nu și în 2004, "0" cei care nu și-au modificat comportamentul, "1" pentru cei care nu au participat în 2000 dar au participat în 2004) și rezidența în satele cuprinse în proiect (CONTROL "nu"), respectiv cele neincluse în proiect (CONTROL "da").**

|         |     | Evoluția votului 1 | | | Total |
|---------|-----|--------|------|--------|-------|
|         |     | **-1.00** | .00 | **1.00** |       |
| **Control** | **Da** | 9<br>6,1% | 134<br>90,5% | 5<br>3,4% | 148<br>100% |
|         | **Nu** | 4<br>2,1% | 176<br>91,7% | 12<br>6,3% | 192<br>100% |
| **Total** |     | 13 | 310 | 17 | 340 |

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[8] Nu avem la dispoziție datele oficiale din alegerile locale din 2000. Așa cum se va vedea într-o secțiune ulterioară a studiului, datele din alegerile generale din 2000, din alegerile locale și cele generale din 2004 indică faptul că localitățile incluse în proiect au, în mod sistematic rate de participare mai mici decât cele ale localităților de control. Diferențele sunt apropiate de cele observate în cazul sondajului de opinie.

[9] Analiza din acest tabel îi include doar pe cei care aveau drept de vot și în 2000, limitându-se la cei care aveau 22 de ani la momentul sondajului.

| | 3,8% | 91,2% | 5,0% | 100% |
|---|---|---|---|---|

Rezultatele prezentate până aici ne dau o imagine asupra creșterii cantitative a participării la vot. Care este însă impactul proiectului asupra unor variabile care pot fi puse în relație cu calitatea implicării politice a subiecților? Vom evalua acest impact din punctul de vedere al următoarelor variabile:

- frecvența discuțiilor cu candidații pentru consiliul local sau pentru primărie

- măsura în care subiecții se consideră informați cu privire la promisiunile din campanie ale candidaților

- măsura în care subiecții își amintesc numele unor candidați romi, în cazurile în care au fost astfel de candidați în comuna lor.

Datele sondajului indică faptul că respondenții din localitățile cuprinse în proiect au avut mai frecvent discuții cu candidații pentru consiliul local sau pentru postul de primar decât (54.4% față de 47.5%) cei din localitățile de control. Nu sunt diferențe semnificative în privința gradului de informare subiectivă (măsura în care subiectul se consideră informat) privind promisiunile din campanie ale candidaților pentru posturile de primar, și nici pentru cele ale consilierilor.

Există însă o diferență foarte clară în ceea ce privește capacitatea de a numi corect consilieri romi, în comunele în care sunt astfel de consilieri, între cei care provin din satele în care a fost aplicat proiectul și cei care sunt din satele de control (Tabelul 6.). Diferența are loc atât în rândul respondenților români--însă este redusă, în marja de eroare statistică (pentru p = 0,05)--, cât, mai ales în rândul respondenților de etnie romă. Între aceștia, raportul între cei care știu un nume de consilier rom și cei care nu știu este aproximativ 4 : 1 în satele cu proiect, față de aproximativ 3 : 2 în satele de control.

**Tabelul 6. Relația dintre răspunsul corect la întrebarea "numiți un candidat rom în alegerile locale", tipul de localitate (în proiect, de control) și etnia respondentului (rom, ne-rom).**

| etnia | | | control | proiect | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ne-rom | stie candidati romi | stie | 34 | 30 | 64 |
| | | | 40.5% | 55.6% | 46.4% |
| | | nu stie | 50 | 24 | 74 |
| | | | 59.5% | 44.4% | 53.6% |
| | Total | | 84 | 54 | 138 |
| | | | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| rom | stie candidati romi | stie | 29 | 89 | 118 |
| | | | 58.0% | 80.9% | 73.8% |
| | | nu stie | 21 | 21 | 42 |
| | | | 42.0% | 19.1% | 26.3% |
| | Total | | 50 | 110 | 160 |
| | | | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |

Un alt mod de evaluare a impactului constă în chestionarea subiecților din localitățile incluse în proiect cu privire la gradul de expunere la activitățile CRCR în campanie și cu privire la aprecierile lor despre eficiența acestor activități. Respondenții au fost întrebați dacă au participat la întâlnirile

organizate de CRCR pe durata campaniei din alegerile locale, dacă au văzut pliante sau broşuri distribuite de către organizatorii acelor întâlniri, şi, în cazul în care au participat la întâlniri, dacă le consideră folositoare sau nu. În plus, cei care au televizor, au fost întrebaţi dacă au văzut spotul publicitar de incurajarea a cetatenilor de etnie romă sa participe la vot difuzat pe un post naţional în timpul campaniei din alegerile locale. Rezultatele acestor întrebări sunt reprezentate în Figurile 1. - 4. Peste jumătate dintre respondenţii din satele în care au avut loc întâlniri organizate în campanie declară că au participat la acestea. Dintre cei care au fost la întâlniri 89% declară că au văzut broşurile privind campania electorală şi votul. Deasemnea, 86% declară că întâlnirile au fost foarte folositoare (26%) sau folositoare (60%). Merită remarcat gradul ridicat de vizibilitate al spotului de incurajarea a cetatenilor de etnie romă să participe la vot: peste o treime dintre cei cuprinşi în eşantion şi care au televizor. Chiar şi între respondenţii ne-romi şi care nu sunt în localităţile cuprinse în proiect, proporţia celor care îşi amintesc de spot este 20% (faţă de aproximativ 43% între romii din grupul de control, 45% romii din proiect, 43% ne-romii din proiect). Se poate deci presupune că în aria de difuzare a spotului, proporţia persoanelor din rural care l-au văzut şi îşi amintesc acest lucru este de peste 20%.

**Figura 1. Distribuţia răspunsurilor la întrebarea "Ati participat la o intalnire [pe teme de alegeri, în luna mai] sau la discutii organizate de catre organizaţiile din Cluj?".**



**Figura 2. Distribuţia răspunsurilor la întrebarea "Ati avut prilejul sa va uitati la pliantele sau brosurile distribuite de catre organizatorii intalnirilor?"**

**Figura 3. Distribuţia răspunsurilor la întrebarea "Considerati ca intalnirea (sau intalnirile) organizate de catre cei de la Cluj au fost de folos sau considerati ca nu au fost de folos?"**



Evaluarea intalnirilor

**Figura 4. Distribuţia răspunsurilor la întrebarea "Înainte de alegeri, pe postul national de televiziune s-au difuzat spoturi/mesaje publicitare de incurajarea a cetatenilor de etnie roma sa participe la vot. Ati vazut aceste spoturi/mesaje publicitare?"**



Expunere la spoturile TV ale CRCR

Concluzia de ansamblu a evaluării prin sondajul de opinie realizat în localităţile din proiect şi într-o serie de localităţi similare (de control) este că proiectul a avut un efect atât asupra *cantităţii* cât şi asupra *calităţii* participării la vot în alegerile locale din 2004.

## Rezultatele evaluării prin aplicarea de interviuri semistructurate

Atât interviurile de grup cât şi interviurile individuale au vizat următoarele patru teme:

- Care sunt motivele pentru care respondenţii au votat, sau nu au votat.

- Care sunt informaţiile pe care oamenii le consideră relevante atunci când decid dacă votează şi, dacă e cazul, cu cine votează. Cum sunt culese aceste informaţii, din ce surse.

- Dacă subiecţii sunt informaţi cu privire la rezulatul alegerilor în comuna în care locuiesc: cine sunt cei aleşi, cine sunt cei care au candidat, dacă sunt persoane de etnie romă printre aleşi.

- Dacă au auzit despre întâlnirile organizate de către CRCR şi APD, dacă au participat la aceste întâlniri. Daca da, ce părere au despre modul în care au fost organizate şi care sunt eventualele schimbări pe care le consideră necesare în cazul unor activităţi de acest gen.

*Motivația participării sau non-participării la vot.*

Aproape toți subiecții intervievați au afirmat că au votat. Cei care nu au votat, invocă drept motiv faptul că se aflau în altă localitate în ziua votului (de ex. la servici). Dar care sunt motivele pentru care subiecții au decis să meargă la vot? Cel mai frecvent apar menționate *nevoia de schimbare*, ("m-am dus pentru o schimbare, o schimbare in statul asta român. Pentru o schimbare in mai bine, nu numai pentru mine. Sa fie schimbare sa fie pentru toti cetatenii. Ăsta a fost motivul principal pentru care m-am dus."; "Fiecare viseaza sa trăiască mai bine in lumea aceasta, sa mearga lucrurile mai bine pentru asta am mers la vot."; "Am fost la vot, am participat si cu votul meu ….In speranta ca se vor face niste schimbari ca sa traim un trai mai decent cat si pentru țara noastră. Era nevoie pentru o schimbare era nevoie pentru. așa ceva, luând in considerare ca din 90 pana acuma la alegerile care au fost ultimele s-au vazut schimbari, s-au vazut mai multe dar nu asa cum ar fi trebuit sa fie facute inseamna ca in viitor va fi un lucru bun."). Deasemenea, este des invocată datoria de cetățean de a vota în mod informat ("datoria fiecarui cetatean este sa voteze si ar trebui sa voteze si ar trebui sa stie cu cine sa voteze", "M-am dus de placere, adica m-am dus pentru țară nu m-am dus pentru mine"; "A merge la vot este un drept cetatenesc, suntem mandri ca avem acest drept dezvoltat in tara noastra").

Un alt motiv care poate influența decizia de a vota sau nu este diferența percepută între candidați. Dacă imaginile lor sunt asemănătoare, datorită lipsei de informare, a impreciziei campaniilor sau a asemănărilor reale în politicile propuse, atunci motivația votului este mai puțin intensă ("Daca eram nehotarită pe cine să aleg probabil nu mergeam").

Este de remarcat faptul că percepția subiecților privind rata de participare a cetățenilor de etnie romă din satele în care locuiesc pare să indice o imagine mai pozitivă decât cea a cifrelor oficiale din alegeri. Iată ce declară un locuitor din Nemșa, membru al unei asociații locale cu care CRCR si APD au cooperat în mod repetat: "Am participat si sunt mândru de chestia asta. Cum să insuflăm si altora prin care noi, asociația am contribuit. Am umblat din casă în casă si am spus oamenilor că au acest drept sa meargă la vot. La alegerile din 2000 știu din sursa sigură că din satul ăsta au fost 60% din oamenii care aveau dreptul iar acum au votat 92, 93%."

Un alt respondent, din Unirea, afirmă că în timpul alegerilor a discutat cu „o mie de romi" din localitate despre procesul de votare („din ușă în ușă"), încercând astfel să reducă proporția voturilor anulate (a declarat că, la ultimele alegeri, doar 16 voturi ale romilor au fost anulate în comună). Deasemenea, declară că a facilitat obținerea a aproximativ 40 de cărți de identitate și a 60 de certificate de naștere pentru romii care nu aveau acte.

În ansamblu, răspunsurile subiecților susțin ideea unei creșteri a participării locuitorilor romi, precum și o scădere a proporției de voturi anulate, în comparație cu alegerile care au avut loc în 2000. Diferența dintre rezultatele oficiale, la nivelul întregii localități, și cele declarate de subiecți pot avea mai multe explicații, care nu se exclud reciproc:

- rezultatele oficiale îi vizează pe toţi cei cu drept de vot, în timp ce subiecţii descriu în special situaţia cetăţenilor de etnie romă. Este posibil ca romii să fi avut o participare mai ridicată decât ceilalţi locuitori.

- este posibil ca o parte dintre cei care nu au votat să fie plecaţi din localitate pentru mai mult timp (ex. migraţie temporară de muncă în străinătate), iar localnicii să nu îi ia în calcul atunci când estimează rata de participare--în timp ce statistica oficială îi consideră absenţi.

- este destul de probabil şi un efect de dezirabilitate socială, cu atât mai mult cu cât o parte dintre respondenţi au fost implicaţi activ în mobilizarea oamenilor din sat pentru vot.


*Procesul de informare.*

Sursele de informare amintite sunt diverse. Sunt amintite campaniile pe teren iniţiate de partidele aflate în competiţie, televiziunea (publică, singura care are acoperire în localităţile în care au fost realizate interviuri), broşurile, şi, nu în ultimul rând, discuţiile cu prietenii, rudele, colegii de servici.

Cei mai mulţi dintre respondenţi consideră că au avut la dispoziţie suficiente informaţii pentru a lua o decizie în cunoştinţă de cauză: "Aici la noi s-a facut campanie electorală s-au împărţit tot felul afişe, tot felul de broşuri şi fiecare in felul lui  au facut promisiuni şi promisiuni nu ştie nimeni daca se tin de cuvant. "; "mă informez de la televizor. Au facut atatea sondaje de opinie, ceea ce nu fost bine, asata e parerea mea. Au facut atatea povesti care pana la urma cred ca sunt neadevărate. Speranta incă există."
Unele persoane au perceput campaniile din alegeri ca fiind excesiv de insistente ("Oriunde ne-am duce, ori pe cine am întreba, cu cine ne-am întâlni şi pe ăla de 90 de ani şi un copil de 5 ani dacă-l întrebi: Măi, cam ce a fost atuncea? toţi ştiu că au fost alegeri, că au trebuit sa alegem pe domnul  primar, pe domnul preşedinte şi asa mai departe  sau să ne alegem parlamentarii. Eu nu cred că la noi in România nu a fost campanie electorală. Şi la televizor pentru mine a fost cam exagerat. Şi la radio orice program, orice post, alegeri, alegeri alegeri. De aceea şi subscriu că a fost prea… mult), şi scumpe şi oarecum inutile pentru că promisiunile nu au de multe ori acoperire ("multe promit, multe şi fac puţine ….").

Sunt amintite mai frecvent câteva organizaţii, politice şi nepolitice, care au avut un rol activ în informarea cetăţenilor din comunităţile cuprinse în proiect: Partida Romilor ("au avut legatură directă cu noi [PRSDR], am fost informaţi  despre fiecare candidat la primarie, fiecare consilier. Informaţii au fost din partea Partidei Romilor şi [despre] ce a fost bine şi ce nu a fost), CRCR ("am avut din partea CRCR-ului facilitatori care au incercat să ne insufle nouă, asociaţia, să mergem in comunitate să instiintam oamenii că au un drept, ceeea ce oamenii il stiau că au acest drept de a vota"; "Am avut mai multe surse fiind şi membru de partid la Partida Romilor… Înainte am avut de la CRCR niste persoane care ne-au informat ce drepturi avem, cum să informăm şi pe alţii din etnia noastră să mergem la vot, de ce e important votul,  ce semnificaţie are, apoi din campania electorală, din pliantele împărţite şi de

PSD si de PD si de PUR și de mai multe  partide si cântărindu-le am facut o cupolă [tombolă?] și l-am spus pe Dumnezeu să aleagă"), și PSD.

Merită observat faptul că atât informațiile despre candidați cât și decizia de a vota sunt frecvent în legătură cu apartenența la grupuri, informare sau formale. Asociațiile comunitarea par să fi avut un rol important, discuțiile cu colegii la locul de muncă, și chiar asociațiile sportive ("*Eu lucrez în Mediaș și PSD umbla prin oraș cu dinastea. Pe cine votezi? Pe Nastase. Făceam grupuri si discutam. Sunt antrenor la echipa din sat. La ultimul meci am vorbit cu fotbaliștii-- băi, mergem cu Năstase?  Și am hotărât să mergem cu Năstase."*)

Aproape toți cei intervievați sunt foarte bine informați cu privire la alegerile din comuna lor, în privința candidaților și a celor aleși, inclusiv a celor de etnie romă.


*Informații, evaluări despre activitățile CRCR și APD*

Marea majoritate a subiecților interviurilor au luat parte la întâlnirile organizate de către cele două asociații. Aproape toți au văzut broșurile distribuite, și, mai mult de jumătate au văzut filmul difuzat în sat sau spotul de informare difuzat la TVR2. Deși respondenții afirmă, așa cum s-a văzut în secțiunea precedentă, că au avut parte de campanii electorale dense, cu multe informații, activitățile din proiectul CRCR sunt considerate drept extrem de utile ("au fost benefice pentru că  una e când te duci așa și alta e cand vezi. Și ne-am  informat de toate lucrurile acestea si a fost lecție pentru noi. Nu trebuie să mai adaugăm ceva [la proiect], totul a fost asa cum a trebuit. Sperăm cu altă ocazie să ne aducă alte lucrări și alte informații".

Subiecții menționează explicit două tipuri de efecte ale campaniei:
(1) mobilizare în favoarea participării la vot ("După ce s-a distribuit, am venit cam majoritatea, nu chiar toți, dar cam 90% au fost la vot", "Arăta în carte cum trebuie să mergem la vot, ce trebuie să învăţăm de pe urma votului, ce drepturi avem. Multe nu se respectă daca mergi și bați la ușă nu te deschide că esti ţigan, nu ai prioritatile ca orice român, asa ca le putem tot citi ca tot nu ni se acorda prioritatile."), și
(2) informare despre aspectele tehnice ale votării, pentru a reduce numărul de voturi anulate.
Apare în câteva rânduri și o a treia categorie de efecte: campania reprezintă un efort al majorității de a-i ajuta pe romi, fiind văzută ca un gest de bunăvoință și de recunoaștere a faptului că romii ar trebui să își facă vocea auzită mai puternic în politica românească ("Problema e că naţia noastră e marginalizată, pusă de-o parte. Vedem ca la noi in ţară tiganii si tiganii si … tiganii. Ce s-a facut aici a fost anume pentru ei, că sunt multi fara scoala, sunt analfabeti. Sunt batrani si copiii care părintii nu au posibilitatea sa ii dea la scoli. E un lucru bun. Prin filme ei vad mai bine  Ca și acum au fost aici multi care nu au stiut [cum să voteze].  Acolo le-a aratat exact cum trebuie să facă, ce trebuie sa facă.)

Conținutul broșurii a fost apreciat drept util și potrivit de către cei mai mulți dintre subiecți. Chiar și cei care nu au găsit informații în plus față de ceea ce știau consideră că broșura a fost utilă pentru marea majoritate a celor care au citit-o: "Impresia a fost ca ce era acolo eu stiam. Dar nu poti sa stii ca toata lumea stie.  Oamenii multi cunosc legile tarii, procedeele de a merge la vot, de a vota.

Majoritatea stiu cum sa voteze. Era însă important pentru cei tineri care nu au apucat sa voteze, noi vazand si atunci cum se votează am stiut. Acestea [materialele distribuite, broşura] au fost benefice pentru cei ce au stat in cumpănă--să merg la vot sau să nu merg la vot.  Noi le-am explicat că ar trebui sa mearga la vot."

O parte dintre ei, însă, au fost nedumeriţi de includerea unor texte în limba romani, pe care nu o cunosc deloc ("am văzut oameni care s-au bucurat, care le-au citit. Imi părea rău că nu am putut sa le citesc şi pe limba aialaltă"; "Da, am primit, şi ne-o dat că din casă în casă o umblat şi când am văzut , stam tablou si ma uitam acolo... ce-i aici ? Nu mai stiam sa citesc si am zis--adă mă ochelarii că nu mai stiu sa citesc. Nici eu nu inteleg ce-i aicea,  a zis... Pe urmă am întors invers, şi zic, stai că asta-i şi am vazut. E bine pentru cine să ştie să scrie, să citească, nu e un lucru rău, e foarte bun. Cred că majoritatea nu ştiu aici să vorbească limba aia, poate cei veniti mai noi..."; "Noi nu ştim să citim pe limba aia, limba aia nu se vorbeste la noi."). Sunt însă şi câţiva respondenţi care afirmă că înţeleg limba romani ("Le-am citit, in ambele limbi. Erau foarte bune. Nu specifică cu cine sa votezi. Erau bune, speram să fie şi pe viitor altele…"). Pentru unii respondenţi, textul în limba romani le-a sporit interesul pentru această limba şi le-a oferit un motiv în plus să încerce să o înveţe ("Am primit o broşură si vrem să îl punem pe profesor să ne înveţe şi pe noi limba romani.").

Cele două materiale video par să fi avut efecte chiar mai puternice decât materialele tipărite asupra celor care au avut ocazia să le vizioneze ("Eu cred că a fost mai bun ca pliantele. Cand ai vazut un film ti-ai facut o imagine mai clară despre cum să faci rolul tau ca sa mergi la vot, trebuie sa mergi la vot.  Eu am fost informat pentru ca am mai votat, am avut experienta in vot. M-am bucurat ca au fost oameni care le-au văzut, nu ar strica mai multe asemenea actiuni, ca să învăţăm noi din asemenea lucruri.").

Subiecţii au fost rugaţi să indice ce cred că ar trebui schimbat într-o campanie de informare similară celei din satul lor. Marea majoritate a răspunsurilor au fost de tipul "nimic, e important să aibă loc şi în alegerile următoare, să fie în cât mai multe localităţi". Au fost şi câteva comentarii care indică limitele acţiunilor de stimulare a participării, observând că o creştere a implicării politice nu este suficientă pentru a schimba multe lucruri, atât timp cât preferinţele romilor contează mai puţin pentru politicieni decât cele ale românilor. Unul dintre respondenţi a afirmat că activităţile în campanie ar trebui să pună accentul în mai mare măsură asupra modului în care oamenii analizează informaţiile pe care le au şi asupra faptului că ar trebui să decidă singuri, şi nu influenţaţi de grupurile din care fac parte ("Daca se mai fac aceste activităţi înaine de alegeri ar trebui să se discute sa nu mai fie atât de influenţabili. Să încerce să le formeze o gândire a lor proprie.... În localităţile mai mici e un curent de păreri de parcă cineva te-ar îndoctrina.").

## Rezultatele evaluării prin analiza datelor oficiale

Datele oficiale din alegeri la nivel de localitate au permis completarea analizei asupra eficienţei proiectului asupra participării la vot, precum şi asupra proporţiei de voturi anulate, în alegerile locale şi generale din 2004. Pornind de la datele disponibile - rata de participare, proporţia de voturi anulate, pentru alegerile generale din 2000, alegerile locale şi cele generale din 2004[10], localitate inclusă în proiect sau nu înaintea alegerilor locale şi/sau înaintea alegerilor generale -, am estimat efectele datorate proiectului CRCR la nivelul localităţilor incluse în proiect.

Facem o precizare importantă de ordin conceptual şi metodologic. Prin *creştere datorată proiectului (*şi în mod similar pentru *scădere datorată proiectului)* înţelegem diferenţa pozitivă între participarea dintr-o localitate în care a avut loc proiectul şi participarea într-o localitate similară, în care nu a fost aplicat proiectul. Consecinţa acestei definiri este că vom considera *creştere* situaţia în care într-o localitate cuprinsă în proiect participarea la vot a scăzut faţă de alegerile din 2000, în cazul în care scăderea este mai mică decât scăderea medie din localităţi similare; în mod similar, vom considera *scădere* situaţia în care participarea a crescut într-o localitate din proiect, însă sub valoarea medie a creşterii din localităţi similare care nu sunt cuprinse în proiect.

Tabelul 7., precum şi graficele care urmează (figurile 5-7.), ilustrează o serie de rezultate care pot fi pus în evidenţă şi prin analize statistice multivariate[11]: atât diferenţele de participare, cât şi diferenţele în proporţia de voturi anulate, între localităţile care au fost incluse în proiect[12] şi cele care nu au fost incluse, nu sunt semnificative statistic, ori sistematic în favoarea localităţilor din proiect. Astfel, rata participării a scăzut în medie în ambele categorii de localităţi (scăderea de ansamblu a fost de 10%), iar scăderea a avut valori similare--şi nu mai mici, cum ar fi fost poate de aşteptat, în cazul localităţilor din proiect. Fapt îmbucurător, proporţia voturilor anulate a scăzut între 2000 şi 2004 (scăderea de ansamblu a fost de 0,8%), însă şi în acest caz diferenţele între cele două tipuri de localităţi a fost nesemnificativă.

Analiza grafică, precum şi analiza statistică ne-a permis să excludem situaţia în care tendinţele de ansamblu sunt influenţate de un număr mic de localităţi, cu valori extrem de diferite de ale celorlalte (aşa numiţii *outliers*, în limbaj statistic).

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[10] Din păcate, obţinerea de date oficiale, inclusiv a celor din alegeri, continuă să fie un lucru extrem de dificil în România, chiar şi în prezent. Ne-a fost imposibil să obţinem datele oficiale pentru alegerile locale din 2000, la nivel de localitate (secţie de vot). Cea mai mare parte a datelor pe care le-am avut la dispoziţie ne-au fost oferite de către Asociaţia Pro Democraţia, Bucureşti. Le sunt recunoscător, şi în special d-lui Costel Popa.

[11] Am folosit modele de regresie multiplă, însă pentru simplitate, nu le-am inclus în text. De fiecare dată rezultatele acestor modele au fost consistente cu cele care sunt reprezentate grafic.

[12] În grafice, localităţile sunt de două tipuri (variabila *proiect)*: cele în care au avut loc activităţi ale CRCR-APD înainte de alegerile locale şi/sau înainte de alegerile generale. Analiza statistică a folosit mai multe categorii de localităţi, în funcţie de următoarele variabile (şi combinaţiile lor): incluse în proiect înainte de locale, incluse în proiect înainte de generale, incluse într-un proiect de dezvoltare comunitară de către CRCR; deasemenea, au fost distinse şi în funcţie de eficienţa percepută de către coordonatorii facilitatorilor. Întrucât toate rezultatele sunt similare, am prezentat rezultatele doar pentru variabila *proiect.*

**Tabelul 7. Valoarea medie şi valoarea mediană a prezenţei la vot, respectiv a proporţiei voturilor anulate în 2000 şi 2004, în funcţie de tipul de localitate (inclusă, neinclusă în proiect).**

| proiect | | % participare generale 2000 | % voturi anulate generale 2000 | % participare generale 2004 | % voturi anulate generale 2004 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| nu | Media | 73.6 | 6.4 | 63.3 | 5.7 |
| | Mediana | 73.5 | 6.0 | 62.5 | 6.0 |
| da | Media | 67.7 | 7.3 | 58.3 | 6.4 |
| | Mediana | 69.0 | 6.0 | 59.0 | 6.0 |
| Total | Media | 71.8 | 6.7 | 61.8 | 5.9 |
| | Mediana | 72.0 | 6.0 | 61.0 | 6.0 |

**Figura 5. Relaţia dintre rata de participare la vot în alegerile generale din 2000 şi rata de participare la vot în alegerile generale din 2004. Unităţile de analiză sunt toate satele din comunele cuprinse în proiect.**

**Figura 6. Relaţia dintre prorţia de voturi anulate în alegerile generale din 2000 şi proporţia de voturi anulate în alegerile generale din 2004. Unităţile de analiză sunt toate satele din comunele cuprinse în proiect.**



**Figura 7. Relaţia dintre rata de participare la vot în alegerile generale din 2000 şi rata de participare la vot în alegerile locale din 2004. Unităţile de analiză sunt toate satele din comunele cuprinse în proiect.**



## Concluzii

Evaluarea proiectului susţine, cu un grad ridicat de certitudine, existenţa unor efecte pozitive importante asupra participării şi educaţiei electorale. Cele trei tipuri de abordări folosite în cercetare, sondaj, interviuri semi-standardizate şi analiza datelor oficiale, oferă o imagine complexă asupra rezultatelor obţinute în cele 30 de localităţi cuprinse în proiect. Dar mai precis, care sunt efectele puse în evidenţă şi, pentru fiecare, care este publicul ţintă? Cum se pot combina rezultatele a trei abordări diferite, având fiecare atât indicatori cât şi un public ţintă specific? În particular, există o contradicţie

între rezultatele analizei datelor oficiale, care indică absenţa unor efecte semnificative, şi cele ale analizelor pe date de sondaj, respectiv interviuri?

Voi începe cu acest din urmă aspect. Contradicţia este doar aparentă, întrucât fiecare dintre cele trei abordări de cercetare are un public ţintă distinct. Este cel mai larg în cazul analizei din această secţiune, întrucât se referă la toată populaţia cu drept de vot a comunelor în care a avut loc proiectul, atât romi, cât şi ne-romi, atât persoane implicate activ în campaniile de informare, cât şi persoane expuse acestor campanii ori care nu au avut nici o informaţie despre proiect. Prin modul de alegere al eşantionului, sondajul a urmărit reprezentativitatea pentru locuitorii de etnie romă, precum şi pentru locuitorii ne-romi, dar care au mai mulţi vecini romi decât media din satul în care locuiesc. În fine, personalele intervievate individual sau în grup, sunt, în marea majoritate parte a nucleului de persoane cu un nivel ridicat de implicare comunitară din satul lor, şi, cel mai adesea, de etnie romă.

Luate împreună, rezultatele celor trei tipuri de abordări sunt consistente cu următoarele afirmaţii:

1. Campania CRCR a avut un efect semnificativ de informare asupra unui public larg. Datele sondajului indică faptul că aproximativ 20% dintre românii care locuiesc în sate cu romi, în vecinătatea lor, şi care au televizor, au văzut şi îşi amintesc spoturile de informare difuzate la televizor.

2. În cazul unui public mai restrâns, cel al populaţiei eşantionate din satele incluse în proiect, efectele informării au fost mai importante, atât cantitativ cât şi calitativ. Respondenţii au luat parte la mai multe discuţii cu candidaţii pentru consiliul local şi pentru primărie şi îşi amintesc mai frecvent numele unor candidaţi romi.

3. Persoanele din localităţile din proiect şi care sunt de etnie romă, ori locuiesc în zonele cu mulţi romi, au avut o participare la vot mai ridicată la vot în alegerile locale din 2004 ca urmare a proiectului CRCR. În acelaşi timp însă, nu există un efect observabil asupra participării la vot la nivelul întregii populaţii din satele cuprinse în proiect.

4. Nu există un efect observabil asupra şansei de a vota corect (din punct de vedere tehnic, adică de a nu a avea, involuntar, un vot nul) la nivelul întregii populaţii din satele cuprinse în proiect. Datele nu ne permit însă să stabilim dacă în rândul celor de etnie romă această şansă a crescut sau nu ca urmare a proiectului.

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# Discurs politic şi construcţia imaginii candidaţilor în alegerile prezidenţiale din 2000

**Andrei GHEORGHIŢĂ**

This article explores the use of political discourse as a tool for candidate image construction during the 2000 presidential elections in Romania. It investigates the discoursive frames employed by the main contenders, Ion Iliescu and Corneliu Vadim Tudor, in their effort of getting the public to view the electoral competition *their way*. The main focus is on the discourse-induced framing effects in the candidate image formation process and on the compatibleness of the resulting image with the latent cognitive dimensions underlying voters' assessment of the presidential candidates.

## Cadru general

Un punct de vedere larg răspândit în literatura politologică contemporană susţine existenţa unor „teorii implicite" pe care şi le dezvoltă alegătorii în legătură cu personalitatea deţinătorilor diferitelor funcţii politice, teorii reflectate în utilizarea unor tipare evaluative relativ constante în timp.[1] Asemenea tendinţe de circumscriere a unor categorii evaluative coerente au fost identificate şi în cazul alegătorilor români în contextul competiţiei prezidenţiale din noiembrie-decembrie 2000, ocazie cu care s-a vorbit despre trei mari dimensiuni evaluative latente, utilizate în compararea alternativelor de candidaţi: *competenţe/deprinderi manageriale*, *tradiţionalism* şi *competenţă politico-democratică*.[2] Această lucrare îşi propune să aşeze o nouă cărămidă la temelia unui atare demers exploratoriu, analizând gradul de suprapunere între imaginile proiectate discursiv de către principalii candidaţi şi profilurile evaluative latente utilizate de alegători în formularea deciziei politice. Metodologic, opţiunea noastră fermă a mers înspre *analiza cadrelor de referinţă* utilizate de către candidaţi în discursuri pentru a plasa *înţelesurile construite* – în fapt mesajele cu rezonanţă imagistică – în *contexte experienţial-emoţionale favorabile*, în scopul maximizării efectelor de imagine.

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[1] Pentru o tratare comprehensivă a acestui subiect, a se vedea Gheorghiţă & Soreanu 2004.

[2] Analizele au identificat trei piloni pe care se construiesc comparaţiile între liderii-candidaţi, piloni cu o structură complexă şi un grad semnificativ al consistenţei interne. În primul rând este vorba despre suprapunerea cu anumite *standarde ce ţin de competenţe manageriale*. Acest tipar evaluativ vizează îndeosebi demonstrarea unor competenţe organizatorice şi de gestionare a resurselor umane, din perspectiva unui model occidental de succes, consacrat mediatic. Al doilea pilon latent cumulează dimensiunea *tradiţională* şi cea *autoritară*. Este construit în jurul unor indicatori de putere şi stabilitate, fundamentaţi pe competenţe şi afilieri instituţionale specifice societăţii tradiţionale româneşti. Pe scurt, el urmăreşte reprezentarea liderului ca *tată al naţiunii*. Al treilea factor evaluativ identificat circumscrie aria unei reprezentări a ideii de *competenţă politico-democratică generalizată*. La baza acestei viziuni stă încrederea în *cumulul de experienţă* ca resursă fundamentală în gestionarea cu succes a actului decizional. (Pentru detalii, a se vedea Gheorghiţă 2002).

# Construcţia imaginii în campania electorală

De cele mai multe ori, candidaţii pentru o funcţie publică nu se suprapun sau se suprapun doar parţial peste aşteptările populaţiei. În atare condiţii, succesul sau – cel puţin – supravieţuirea lor politică ţine de capacitatea de a adaptare la cerinţele mediului electoral, altfel spus de a-şi ajusta comportamentele pentru a răspunde maximal criteriilor impuse de euristicile evaluative ale electoratului. Mijlocul cel mai la îndemână îl constituie, în mod evident, *construcţia imaginii.*

Pentru o bună înţelegere a mecanismelor de construcţie a imaginii în campania electorală, un rol central trebuie acordat perspectivei dezvoltate de *şcoala interacţionismului simbolic* în conceperea imaginii. Într-o bună măsură, viziunea actuală asupra noţiunii de *imagine* îşi are originea în *teoria percepţiei* dezvoltată de George Herbert Mead. Aşa cum o formulează acesta, teoria percepţiei cunoaşte o încastrare relativă  în spaţiul biologicului, mai exact al adaptării biologice: pentru a supravieţui, indivizii îşi ajustează comportamentele într-un proces de adaptare continuă la mediu. Prin percepţie, aceştia iau în considerare obiectele sau stimulii din mediu care impun o atare adaptare. Odată aceşti stimuli identificaţi, indivizii se vor adapta stimulilor şi vor reacţiona într-o manieră specifică (Mead 1934: 337 apud Nimmo 1995: 52).

Un rol cheie în acest proces adaptativ al percepţiei îi revine *imaginii* şi *imaginarului.* Cel mai adesea, observa Mead, „*imaginea* (subl. ns.) este aceea care îi permite individului să aleagă stimulul potrivit impulsului care îşi caută expresia" (Mead 1934: 338 apud Nimmo 1995: 52). Prin imagine, individul transferă amprenta experienţei anterioare asupra obiectelor din prezent (Nimmo 1995: 52), de vreme ce, pe de-o parte, „orice imagine îşi are originile în experienţă" (Mead 1934: 338 apud Nimmo 1995: 52) şi, de cealaltă parte, stimulul prezent provoacă accesarea respectivei imagini din experienţă. Experienţa mediază contactul individului cu stimulul şi îi induce direcţia de reacţie. Reacţia, la rândul său, induce o adaptare la imperativele stimulilor din mediu, adaptare care, odată reluat lanţul *stimul-reacţie,* va re-media relaţionarea individului – înzestrat acum cu o nouă imagine – cu mediul. Astfel, imaginea „interpretează condiţiile aşa cum predicatul interpretează subiectul" (Mead 1964: 58 apud Nimmo 1995: 52).

Translatând teoria în planul câmpului electoral, biunivocitatea relaţiei devine cu atât mai evidentă. De o parte, experienţa anterioară a fiecărui alegător în legătură cu imaginea candidaţilor contribuie la evaluările prezente ale acestora. De cealaltă parte, candidatul poate recurge la reconstrucţia propriei sale imagini pentru a răspunde stimulilor din rândul electoratului şi, implicit, pentru a remodela experienţa alegătorului.

Transmisia şi reconstrucţia imaginii se realizează prin intermediul *mesajului,* ca instrument al comunicării. Astfel, „variabila *imagine* intervine între mesajele receptate[3] şi mesajele emise" (Boulding 1956: 28 apud Nimmo 1995: 53). Mesajele emise sunt rezultatul imaginii şi nu rezultatul mesajelor

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[3] De către individ.

recepţionate. Mesajele recepţionate influenţează mesajele emise de o manieră exclusiv indirectă, şi anume în măsura în care reuşesc să modifice imaginea. Astfel, deşi „imaginea este construită ca rezultat holistic al experienţei anterioare a posesorului imaginii", de fiecare dată când un mesaj este captat de către acesta, este probabil ca mesajul receptat să inducă o anumită transformare a imaginii. Concluzia nu poate fi decât una singură: „semnificaţia cea mai profundă a mesajului ţine de *schimbarea pe care o produce la nivelul imaginii*." (Boulding 1956: 6-7 apud Nimmo 1995: 53).

În aceste condiţii, *construcţia imaginii* rezidă într-un şir continuu de *inter-influenţe mesaj-imagine*. Astfel, în viziunea adepţilor interacţionismului simbolic, conceptul-cheie în jurul căruia trebuie să se concentreze studiul construcţiei imaginii este cel de *mesaj*.

Boulding identifică patru categorii de consecinţe probabile alte inter-relaţionărilor *mesaj-imagine*. Toate acestea pot dobândi relevanţă în construcţia imaginii într-o campanie electorală. Într-o primă situaţie, „mesajul" transmis de un candidat, în fapt imaginea pe care consultanţii media îl îndeamnă să o „proiecteze", poate induce transformări reduse în *imaginea* potenţialilor alegători *despre candidat*. În atare circumstanţe, mesajul nu are nici un efect asupra imaginii, altfel spus *inter-influenţele mesaj-imagine sunt sensibil apropiate de zero*. Mai mult, observa Dan Nimmo, alegătorii, în condiţiile unui anumit grad de fixitate (justificată experienţial) a percepţiei, pot pune semnul egalităţii între mesaj şi zgomot şi să renunţe a-l mai recepta (Nimmo 1995: 54).

Într-o a doua situaţie, procesul *mesaj-imagine* poate modifica imaginile alegătorilor de o manieră apreciată de Boulding ca *însumare simplă* ('simple addition'). Această transformare este doar una cantitativă, producând evidenţierea, clarificarea unei/unor trăsături, însă nu produce o schimbare de substanţă în imagine.

Într-un al treilea caz, inter-influenţele mesaj-imagine pot produce *transformări revoluţionare* – „demolează credinţe, convertesc atitudini, înlocuiesc percepţii" (Nimmo 1995: 54). În atare situaţii se produc schimbări de substanţă în imaginea alegătorilor despre candidat, în care cuvântul de ordine este *reorganizare totală*. Sunt transformări extreme, care stârnesc reacţii extreme.

Al patrulea tip de consecinţe ating o etapă intermediară între ultimele două. Este vorba despre *reorganizări* de imagine electorală care depăşesc simpla transformare cantitativă, însă nu afectează decât anumite dimensiuni ale imaginii, şi nu imaginea în întreaga sa multidimensionalitate. Imaginile au zone de certitudine sau de incertitudine, de claritate sau de opacitate. În astfel de situaţii, mesajele clarifică imaginile, le induc certitudine (Nimmo 1995: 54).

Există multiple resorturi la care poate apela un om politic pentru a-şi transmite mesajul, după cum există multiple modalităţi în care alegătorii interpretează respectivul mesaj. Imaginile candidaţilor – au conchis cele mai multe studii de imagologie electorală – reprezintă construcţii multidimensionale şi multifaţetate, în sensul că un candidat poate proiecta imagini diferite unor alegători diferiţi, ori un alegător poate recepţiona şi internaliza imagini diferite ale aceluiaşi candidat. Diferenţierea acestor

imagini proiectate sau reflectate prin *mesaj* se produce după dimensiuni cognitive, afective şi conative (Nimmo & Savage 1976).

În contextul tendinţei majore de centrare a politicului pe candidat, deci de personalizare a votului, *imaginea personală* a candidatului devine un element cu atât mai semnificativ. Nu mai este vorba doar despre succesul personal, ci şi despre succesul organizaţional, deoarece imaginea liderului tinde să acapareze tot mai mult imaginea partidului. În aceste condiţii, în plan electoral, imaginea dobândeşte o *funcţie tranzacţională* (Nimmo 1995: 56-57), constând în a oferi ceea ce alegătorii doresc să vadă, ca reţetă a succesului.

Alegătorul – susţin teoreticienii abordărilor cognitiviste ale votului – intră în context electoral cu imagini idealizate ale viitorului preşedinte şi apoi îşi formulează imagini ale candidaţilor (Miller, Wattenberg & Malanchuk 1985; Popkin 1993; Nimmo 1995). El compară imaginile candidaţilor cu idealul şi, cu cât un candidat se potriveşte mai mult idealului, cu atît este mai probabil să îi acorde votul. Astfel funcţionează mecanismul evaluativ în condiţii de control pentru variabilele *afiliere partizană* şi *teme electorale dezvoltate*. Imaginea candidatului implică caracteristici asociate atât cu un rol politic, cât şi cu unul stilistic (Nimmo 1995: 57). *Rolul politic* cumulează acele atribute ale candidatului care îi conferă statutul de personalitate publică (calificări, experienţă etc.) şi cel de membru de partid (*leadership*, reprezentarea intereselor etc.). De cealaltă parte, *rolul stilistic* vizează stilul de comunicare al candidatului (utilizarea mijloacelor de informare în masă, calităţile de orator, teatralitatea) şi atributele personale (vârstă, prezenţă fizică, onestitate, credibilitate etc.).

Într-o epocă de dezvoltare extremă a mijloacelor de informare în masă, alături de *publicitatea electorală*, principala formă de transmitere a mesajului liderilor-candidaţi îl constituie *discursul politic*. Uzând de discurs, liderul politic îşi poate proiecta imaginea dorită cu o libertate maximală, ale cărei unice graniţe sunt cele ale experienţei colective. În cele ce urmează, ne vom opri asupra utilizării resortului discursiv în proiectarea imaginii candidaţilor politici.

## Teme şi cadre de referinţă în construcţia discursului politic

Chiar dacă, în cele mai multe cazuri, comunicarea politică nu reuşeşte să transforme fundamental credinţele receptorilor, ea are succes în influenţarea opiniilor, activând valori, interese, concepţii stocate în substraturile cele mai adânci ale memoriei noastre (Iyengar & Kinder 1988 apud Nelson 2000: 3). Din acest punct de vedere, discursul politic devine un instrument de negociere sau construcţie a realităţii prin mecanisme ideatice (Donati 1992: 139). În atare condiţii, elementul central în acţiunea politică discursivă îl constituie *construcţia de înţeles*, în sensul evocării, activării acelor interpretări care legitimează cursul acţiunii dorit de către emiţător (Edelman 1988 apud Robinson & Powell 1996: 279). În contextul actual, remarca Edelman, competiţia electorală nu mai înseamnă doar „cine obţine ce, când şi cum" (Lasswell 1950), ci şi „cine defineşte ce, când şi cum" (Edelman 1988 apud Robinson &

Powell 1996: 279-280). Într-o epocă a realităților politice larg mediatizate, orchestrarea atentă a mesajului simbolic de către profesioniști ai imaginii devine la fel de importantă în competiția electorală ca și opțiunile de politici, succesele economice, identificarea partinică ș.a.m.d.

Pornind de la o atare observație, Gamson a dezvoltat un model „cu valoare adăugată" (*value-added model*) al proceselor care modelează cultura politică și opiniile populației. În viziunea sa, un astfel de model trebuie să combine în mod necesar trei elemente: *discursurile* concurente, emise de către organizații, instituții sau grupuri politice (discursuri ca acte retorice, comunicate de presă, cărți etc.), *practicile media* care retransmit și – adeseori – transformă aceste *input*-uri și *instrumentele culturale* prin intermediul cărora oamenii răspund acestor *input*-uri și le asimilează. Finalitatea unui astfel de model este, în viziunea sa, examinarea „interacțiunilor dintre *comentariile* care apar în mass media despre o serie de *subiecte* și modalitățile în care oamenii obișnuiți înțeleleg și discută în legătură cu același set de subiecte" (Gamson[4] apud Donati 1992: 139-140) (subl. ns.).

Principalul instrument discursiv la care recurg actorii politici pentru a construi un înțeles favorabil într-un act de comunicare este cel de *cadru* sau *cadru de referință* (a se vedea Iluț 1997: 17). Cadrul funcționează ca un referențial cognitiv ce introduce subiectul comunicării într-un context social-politic familiar receptorului. Mai mult, cel mai adesea este vorba despre un context înzestrat experiențial cu rezonanțe emoționale, favorabile sau defavorabile. Goffman definea *cadrele* ca fiind „scheme de interpretare (…) care permit oamenilor să localizeze, perceapă, identifice și eticheteze «cazurile de apariție a informației»" (Goffman 1974: 55). Astfel, *cadrele de referință* conferă datelor perceptive o structură recognoscibilă și un înțeles.

Aceste cadre prin intermediul cărora indivizii „percep" lumea sunt deja prezente în cultura sau memoria acestora. Extinzând această perspectivă, cogniția nu devine altceva decât recogniție (sau, în situația extremă, restructurare a tiparelor anterioare în altele noi, mai satisfăcătoare) (Donati 1992: 141). În această situație, oamenii acordă semnificații lucrurilor „recunoscându-le" ca elemente ale unei lumi ordonate.

O primă consecință semnificativă ține de faptul că, odată un cadru evocat spre a defini un *input* perceptiv, datele sau elementele care sunt dificil de integrat în model vor fi fie „adaptate", fie ignorate, în timp ce „golurile" vor fi „umplute" adăugând elementele lipsă ce completează tiparul recunoscut. De vreme ce cadrul constituie o structură cunoscută, elementele sale constitutive sunt considerate ca fiind „legate" în mod natural într-un întreg. În consecință, menționarea câtorva elemente – sau, uneori, chiar numai a unuia – este de obicei suficientă pentru a readuce în minte întregul ansamblu (Donati 1992: 141).

O a doua consecință subliniată de Donati este aceea că fiecare „mănunchi" de date perceptive poate să se potrivească unui număr potențial mare de cadre de referință și, în funcție de cadrul ales, diferite caracteristici ale obiectului devin vizibile sau relevante:

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[4] William A. Gamson, „Public Thinking on Political Issues", proiect NSF nepublicat.

„Un meci de fotbal, spre exemplu, poate fi înțeles şi ca o luptă, dar şi ca un act de balet clasic. În fiecare dintre cazuri, sunt selectate şi actualizate anumite caracteristici «potenţiale» ale jocului de fotbal real, care îl «cadrează» de-a lungul unui posibil plan semantic şi permit oamenilor să vadă sau să se aştepte la lucruri diferite. Odată selectat cadrul de referinţă al «luptei», ideea de «a juca bine» va fi cel mai probabil transpusă în termeni de strategie bună sau inteligentă, şi cu greu îi va face pe oameni să se gândească la atingere, mişcare şi stil" (Donati 1992: 141).

Sintetizând, un *cadru* reprezintă o structură generală, standardizată şi predefinită (în sensul că deja aparţine lumii cunoscute de către emiţător) care permite recunoaşterea şi ghidează percepţia (Minski 1981 apud Donati 1992: 139). Aceste cadre sunt selectate din memorie de fiecare dată când individul se confruntă cu o situaţie nouă. Exprimând plastic această idee, Gamson afirma: „dacă ne gândim la temele discursului politic ca la nişte păduri, atunci cadrele sunt hărţile" (Gamson 1992 apud Berinski & Kinder 2000: 3). Sau, într-o altă viziune, cadrele sunt perspective diferite asupra aceleiaşi scene. Cadrele acordă înţelesuri problemelor politice, liderilor, legilor ş.a.m.d.

Pe baza lor, orice subiect politic se cristalizează în două sau mai multe câmpuri definiţionale concurente şi parţial opuse, fiecare dintre ele ieşind la suprafaţă prin metafore, sloganuri şi alte strategii retorice grupate într-un „pachet interpretativ" destinat persuadării publicului şi înzestrat în mai mică sau mai mare măsură cu consistenţă internă. Manevrând discursiv cadrele, politicianul ajunge, la nivel potenţial, în posesia supremului instrument al puterii – aşa cum îl definea Schattschneider –, şi anume posibilitatea de a defini alternativele (Schattschneider 1960 apud Berinski & Kinder 2000: 2).

Efectul cel mai important pe care îl urmăreşte discursul politic în efortul de a „trezi" cadrele aflate în conştiinţa opiniei publice este acela de *categorizare* şi *etichetare* a vieţii politice. Oamenii resimt o nevoie cronică de a li se simplifica bagajul uriaş de informaţie cu care operează în viaţa de zi cu zi şi, cu atât mai mult, în alegerile politice:

„Oamenii vor vedea o problemă într-un mod diferit dacă este încadrată într-o categorie sau în alta. Din acest motiv, cea mai mare parte a luptei pentru definirea problemelor se focalizează asupra categoriilor care vor fi folosite şi asupra modului în care vor fi folosite." (Kingdon 1995: 111)

În cele ce urmează, ne vom concentra asupra discursul politic ca mijloc de construcţie a imaginii. Încercând să producă transformări revoluţionare de imagine sau doar simple reorganizări, discursul electoral speculează maximal efectele de încadrare. Aducând un subiect în cadrul cel mai favorabil, liderul-candidat dispune de un mijloc extrem de flexibil prin care să auto-ataşeze sau să hetero-ataşeze etichete. Competiţia discursivă se poartă în termeni de impunere a propriilor cadre de referinţă, în care un discurs – şi, implicit, o imagine – este imbatabil – respectiv, imbatabilă – în raport cu oricare altul/alta.

Relevanţa electorală a discursului politic este cu atât mai mare în fostele ţări comuniste (deci şi în România), cu cât ponderea alegătorilor volatili este extrem de ridicată. Dacă alegătorii cu un ataşament politic stabil îşi regăsesc identitatea lor politică în şi prin discursul unui anumit candidat, alegătorii volatili au nevoie de alte criterii pentru a ajunge să se identifice cu anumite afirmaţii politice. Richard Anderson consideră că un astfel de criteriu ar putea fi *caracterul rezonabil al unor afirmaţii*, faptul că alegătorii volatili sau cu un ataşament politic slab percep afirmaţiile unui candidat ca fiind *acceptabile* sau *rezonabile* în situaţia dată (Anderson 1996 apud Beciu 2001: 99). Or, *acceptabilul* şi *rezonabilul* sunt esenţialmente un construct social. Un punct de vedere este *acceptabil* sau *rezonabil* în funcţie de cadrul de referinţă în care este înscris actul de comunicare.

## Discurs politic şi efecte de încadrare în campania electorală din 2000

*Analiza efectelor de încadrare* ca strategie predominant calitativă de analiză a documentelor va constitui principalul instrument metodologic în jurul căruia se va construi prezentul parcurs analitic. Este forma cea mai flexibilă de cercetare a inter-relaţionărilor *mesaj-imagine*, pentru simplul fapt că trece dincolo de emiţător, dincolo de cuvintele sale, privind discursul în interacţiune cu aprecierile şi prejudecăţile receptorilor. Este un demers constructivist care încearcă să dea seamă de o imagine construită.

Populaţia cercetării au constituit-o discursurile publice ale candidaţilor exprimate în perioada campaniei electorale din toamna anului 2000. Dat fiind caracterul predominant calitativ al studiului, am optat pentru aşa-numita *eşantionare teoretică* a materialelor discursive incluse în analiză. Această strategie implică alegerea cazurilor în funcţie de reprezentativitatea lor pentru dezvoltarea şi consolidarea sugestiilor teoretice. Potrivit literaturii de specialitate, în cazul acestui tip de eşantionare, deciziile privind selecţia se fac în timpul colectării datelor, fiind vorba de o operaţie deschisă şi flexibilă (Altheide 1996: 30).

Scopul acestui articol este acela de a prezenta şi analiza discursul celor mai puternici doi candidaţi la funcţia prezidenţială în alegerile din 2000, Ion Iliescu şi Corneliu Vadim Tudor. Perspectiva din care vom aborda discursul candidaţilor se bazează pe asumpţia că politicienii încearcă să-şi construiască o imagine cât mai apropiată de ceea ce alegătorii consideră a fi liderul ideal, concept operaţionalizat după cele trei dimensiuni latente relevate în analizele anterioare, şi anume *competenţa/deprinderile manageriale*, *tradiţionalism* şi *competenţa politico-democratică generalizată* (Gheorghiţă 2002).

*A. Discursul candidatului Corneliu Vadim Tudor*

Discursurile lui Corneliu Vadim Tudor sunt dominate de un mesaj emoţional extrem, atât la nivel explicit, cât şi la nivel implicit. Explicit, mesajul exprimat de sloganul său este cu totul diferit de cele ale

contracandidaţilor: „Jos mafia, Sus Patria!”. El pune alături doi vectori atitudinali de impact extrem asupra segmentelor largi ale electoratului, unul negativ şi unul pozitiv, ale căror direcţii de impact se potenţează reciproc. Implicit, sloganul induce două componente acţionale complementare: există un *erou salvator* şi există un *patriot*, ale căror origini umane se contopesc în candidat, într-o vreme în care ţara este condusă de:

> „(…) **un regim putred, ticălos până în măduva oaselor, care de 11 ani şi-a tot bătut joc de ei (de cetăţeni, n. ns.) şi atâta a întins coarda până aceasta a plesnit.**” (Studioul electoral TVR – 2000)

Imaginea este potenţată de *cadrul crizei* prin intermediul căruia este descris contextul social-politic. Este o criză translatată pe multiple planuri – economic, politic, moral:

> „**Oamenii mor de foame.**” (Talkshow, TV România Internaţional, 11 noiembrie 2000)

> „**Şi România se surpă pe noi, şi cade tavanul şcolilor pe capul copiilor şi mamele astupă ferestrele cu ziare sau cârpe, ca să nu vadă pruncii că s-a făcut ziuă afară şi să ceară de mâncare…**” (Studioul electoral TVR – 2000)

> „**România este paralizată de structuri mafiote şi de anarhie.**” (*Eu vreau să fiu preşedinte*, talkshow, ProTV, 27 octombrie 2000)

> „(…) **România a devenit un stat de tip mafiot.**” (Studioul electoral TVR – 2000)

> „**Reţelele mafiei şi ale crimei organizate se întrepătrund cu structurile statului, căruia îi paralizează funcţiile vitale…**” (Studioul electoral TVR – 2000)

Discursul este unul radical, înzestrat cu conotaţii vizuale extreme. Situaţiile limită la care face apel candidatul C. V. Tudor sunt „vizibile” tocmai prin plasticitatea narativă a limbajului asociată unui fundal de socializare filmică post-revoluţionară. Este imaginea caracatiţei care supune, perverteşte şi sugrumă totul.

Odată încadrat contextul general, candidatul oferă şi soluţia, plasată, de această dată, în *cadrul moralei*. Este o morală tradiţională, voit definită autoritar-mesianic. „Adevărata Românie” – România tradiţională, creştină – are nevoie de un adevărat *salvator*, şi acela, implicit şi apoi explicit, nu poate fi decât Corneliu Vadim Tudor:

> „**În urmă cu 7-8 ani, când unii membri şi simpatizanţi ai P.R.M. m-au sfătuit să candidez la preşedinţie, le-am spus ceva care i-a şocat: «N-a ajuns România aşa de rău ca să devin eu preşedintele României !».**” (*Eu vreau să fiu preşedinte*, talkshow, ProTV, 27 octombrie 2000)

Componenta mesianică implică salvare, autoritate:

> **"Am să fiu reformatorul ţării mele…"** (Mesaj către ţară, Studioul electoral TVR – 2000)

> **"(…) Dacă mă va ajuta bunul Dumnezeu să ajung preşedinte şi să-mi salvez ţara de la pieire…"** (Mesaj către ţară, Studioul electoral TVR – 2000)

> **"(…) Tot ceea ce voi face va fi lichidarea mafiei cu legea în mână şi confiscarea marilor averi realizate prin fraudă…"** (Mesaj către ţară, Studioul electoral TVR – 2000)

dar şi iertare şi sacrificiu:

> **"Aceasta este luna iertării, ca să intrăm curaţi la suflet în noul mileniu. Vă iert şi pe voi, prigonitorii mei, care nu puteţi să pricepeţi că un om e altfel decât voi, că e o oaie albă într-o turmă de oi negre, că nu merge la furat cu hoţii, că nu se destrăbălează cu destrăbălaţii, că nu numai că nu ia de la săraci ca toţi bogătaşii de azi, ci, dimpotrivă, îşi dă şi haina de pe el şi nici un om sărman n-a plecat de la uşa lui fără vreun ajutor, oricât de mic. Îi rog, totodată, pe cei pe care i-am mâhnit sau i-am nedreptăţit fără voia mea, într-un fel sau altul, să mă ierte, în această vreme din preajma Crăciunului."** (Mesaj către ţară, Studioul electoral TVR – 2000)

Cel de-al treilea pilon ce domină arhitectura discursivă a lui C. V. Tudor este *cadrul integrării euro-atlantice*. Este un cadru legitimator, intern şi extern, construit, spre deosebire de primele două, predominant defensiv. Viziunea sa, ideile sale, oricât ar fi ele de radicale, sunt poziţionate şi poziţionabile, compatibile şi compatibilizabile în şi cu contextul euro-atlantic. Repetat obsesiv, motivul integrării vine să răspundă acuzelor contracandidaţilor pe multiple paliere: vizual (afişele electorale sunt dominate de însemnele Uniunii Europene), simbolico-discursiv şi tematico-discursiv:

> **"Constituie, în egală măsură, un element de bază al politicii partidului nostru hotărârea de a împărţi acest beneficiu cu toate celelalte naţiuni din cadrul frontierelor geografice, politice, economice, sociale şi multiculturale ale structurilor euro-atlantice şi ale Comunităţii Europene."** (Mesaj al lui Corneliu Vadim Tudor către George W. Bush, 29 noiembrie 2000)

> **"(…) voi respecta cu fermitate angajamentul nostru de integrare a României în structurile euro-atlantice, precum şi toate tratatele şi acordurile internaţionale la care ţara noastră este parte."** (Mesaj către ţară, Studioul electoral TVR – 2000)

Vocabularul la care recurge Corneliu Vadim Tudor este unul simplu, cu accentuate *note arhaice*. Stilistic, el răspunde maximal unor deziderate de plastic şi *spectacular*, recurgând frecvent la metafore, construcţii antitetice, hiperbole. Elementul de concret, pragmatic, programatic este cvasi-invizibil, el lăsând locul apelului la emoţional, construit implicit sau explicit. C. V. Tudor nu are un discurs constructiv, el nu lansează propuneri de politici, ci se foloseşte abundent de un discurs negativ, care critică, dar nu pune nimic în loc.

În plan imagistic, discursul candidatului P.R.M. converge înspre *dimensiunea tradiţională*. El răspunde cvasi-exhaustiv expectanţelor acelui segment al electoratului orientat tradiţional-autoritar. Poziţionându-se într-un spaţiu simbolic arhaic, Corneliu Vadim Tudor acoperă cu succes rolul de *tată al naţiunii*, cu accentuate valenţe mesianice. Acţional el se defineşte prin control, reglementare, forţă.

Suprapunerea liderului P.R.M. cu dimensiunea evaluativă *tradiţională* (a doua în ordinea relevanţei) este aproape perfectă. C. V. Tudor reuşeşte să răspundă cu succes, în plan imagistic, tuturor „dezideratelor" acestui rol. Însă el eşuează în a mobiliza resorturi de imagine suprapuse celorlalte două dimensiuni latente, cea a *competenţei manageriale* şi cea a *competenţei politico-democratice*. Este motivul pentru care plaja sa electorală este constantă şi inevitabil limitată.

*B. Discursul candidatului Ion Iliescu*

Imaginea lui Ion Iliescu este construită în jurul ideii de *echilibru*. Este echilibrul celui care are de partea sa *experienţa*. Mesajul emoţional domină, atât la nivel explicit, cât şi la nivel implicit, însă, în cazul candidatului Ion Iliescu, nu mai este emoţia revoltei, ci *emoţia afilierii*: „Împreună pentru România !". Vectorul atitudinal latent părinte-copii eludează pregnant autoritatea tatălui, înlocuind-o cu *înţelegerea bunicului*. Mesajul lui Ion Iliescu este foarte apropiat de cel al lui François Mitterand, din 1981, acela al „forţei liniştite". Succesiunea cadrelor de referinţă ale discursului susţine aceeaşi idee de *moderaţie*, cu atât mai vizibilă prin antiteză cu discursul principalului său contracandidat, Corneliu Vadim Tudor.

Contextul social-politic este, din nou, definit de *cadrul crizei*: „sărăcie", „disperare", „nesiguranţă":

> **„Ştim că ne va fi foarte greu să îndreptăm consecinţele negative ale eşecului economic şi social al actualei guvernări C.D.R.-P.D.-U.D.M.R. Ştim că aşteptările dumneavoastră sunt mari, că salariile şi pensiile nu vă ajung nici măcar pentru supravieţuirea de pe o zi pe alta, că preţurile au crescut vertiginos şi că viaţa dumneavoastră este tot mai grea. Ştim că vă faceţi griji pentru viitorul familiilor dumneavoastră. Ştim că tot mai mulţi copii abandonează şcoala din lipsă de haine, rechizite şcolare şi bani."** (Mesajul preşedintelui PDSR, Ion Iliescu, prilejuit de începerea oficială a campaniei electorale, 12 octombrie 2002)

> **„Simţim cu toţii efectele sărăcirii, fără precedent, a celor mai mulţi dintre români. Aflăm aproape zilnic noi cazuri în care oamenii se sinucid din disperare sau pentru că nu mai au**

**puterea de a îndura foamea, lipsa medicamentelor, sărăcia extremă.**" (Mesaj către țară, Studioul electoral TVR – 2000).

Însă criza, în plan imagistic, este centrată predominant nu pe ideea de criză a statului, ci pe aceea de criză a individului. Astfel, Ion Iliescu încearcă să maximizeze efectul afiliativ și, întrucâtva, empatic. Grija paternă este întreținută prin accentuare dimensiunii individuale. Chiar dacă încadrează similar cu C. V. Tudor contextul social-politic – firesc, de altfel, din perspectiva unui discurs negativ, de opoziție – prin *criză*, similaritățile se reduc doar la formă. Fondul cadrării este semnificativ diferit, prin finalități, *target* și focalizare.

Odată încadrat contextul, următoarea etapă are în vedere alternativa oferită. Cadrul de referință al schimbării propuse este cel al *reconcilierii*, al *unității*:

> **„M-am angajat să intru în competiția pentru un nou mandat de Președinte al României pentru a contribui la unirea tuturor forțelor și capacităților creatoare ale națiunii dispuse să participe la necesarul efort de recâștigare a demnității noastre, ca oameni și ca națiune.**" (*Aproape de oameni, împreună cu ei !*, discurs rostit cu ocazia lansării oficiale a candidaturii la funcția de Președinte al României, 2000)

> **„Mă angajez solemn să fiu un Președinte al tuturor românilor.**" (*Aproape de oameni, împreună cu ei !*, discurs rostit cu ocazia lansării oficiale a candidaturii la funcția de Președinte al României, 2000)

Universul simbolic construit ține de spațiul evidentului: Ion Iliescu este *reformatorul*, înțelept, consecvent în acțiunea sa, *constructorul consensului* național și al noii Românii.

Reconstrucția propusă are însă nevoie și de un garant. Acesta nu poate fi altul decât Președintele. La acest nivel, mesajul lui Ion Iliescu atinge maxima sa complexitate, recurgând la o *dublă cadrare*, cu efecte cumulative, în ciuda unor ținte opuse. Ofensiv, el recurge la *cadrul responsabilității*, iar defensiv, la cel al *democrației*. Cel mai adesea, Iliescu traduce ideea de responsabilitate prin aceea de *datorie*:

> **„Partidul Democrației Sociale din România și eu personal ne-am angajat în această competiție ferm hotărâți să ne asumăm responsabilitățile guvernării, ale conducerii țării în următorii patru ani.**" (Mesajul președintelui PDSR, Ion Iliescu, prilejuit de începerea oficială a campaniei electorale, 12 octombrie 2002)

> **„M-am angajat în competiția pentru un nou mandat constituțional de șef al statului cu hotărârea fermă de a-mi face cu responsabilitate datoria față de toți cetățenii acestei țări…**" (*Aproape de oameni, împreună cu ei !*, discurs rostit cu ocazia lansării oficiale a candidaturii la funcția de Președinte al României, 2000)

El cunoaşte cel mai bine resorturile funcţiei prezidenţiale şi este hotărât să le folosească de o manieră activă:

> „**Voi cere viitorului guvern… Voi veghea ca… Voi lupta pentru… Voi propune viitorului parlament… Voi milita pentru…**" (*Aproape de oameni, împreună cu ei !*, discurs rostit cu ocazia lansării oficiale a candidaturii la funcţia de Preşedinte al României, 2000)

Întreaga cadrare a responsabilităţii este construită pe un vector implicit, acela al *experienţei*. Experienţa este atu-ul pe care marşează Ion Iliescu – experienţa îi conferă abilităţi, echilibru, cunoaştere, înţelegere. Doar experienţa, implică această cadrare, permite unui om să cunoască şi să folosească întreaga putere a funcţiei prezidenţiale. Iar singurul competitor care această experienţă este Ion Iliescu. Mecanismul persuasiv funcţionează în plan latent: Iliescu ştie să folosească puterea funcţiei prezidenţiale pentru a îmbunătăţi viaţa românilor şi lasă la latitudinea alegătorilor să intuiască cum o va folosi. Un astfel de mesaj acoperă maximal plaja de expectanţe ale alegătorilor.

Dar un garant al democraţiei nu poate fi decât un *democrat*. Aici este punctul slab al lui Ion Iliescu, punct ce trebuie compensat printr-o cadrare defensivă. Cadrul legitimator ales este, evident, cel al *democraţiei*. Mai mult, orientând percepţiile în acest plan, Iliescu îşi poate folosi principalul contracandidat ca referenţial negativ. Pentru Ion Iliescu a fost incredibil de uşor să îşi consolideze imaginea de democrat prin comparaţie cu Corneliu Vadim Tudor, a cărui percepţie publică era departe de a fi accea a unui democrat. Simpla referinţă la negativ[5] i-a permis să compenseze maximal propriul său neajuns:

> „**Din nefericire, am ajuns în situaţia să mă confrunt cu un politician extremist, xenofob şi antisemit, care vă propune revenirea la totalitarism şi la metodele sale. Acest lucru este inacceptabil. Nu ne putem permite astfel de aventuri. Democraţia, drepturile şi libertăţile cetăţeanului, toleranţa, dialogul, protecţia minorităţilor şi dreptul proprietăţii sunt valori pe care contracandidatul meu fie le neagă, fie le ignoră.**" (Mesaj către ţară, Studioul electoral TVR – 2000)

Discursul lui Ion Iliescu este accesibil, simplu, lipsit de valenţe simbolice subtile. Lipsit de valenţe poetice, el ignoră aproape complet figurile de stil. În acest context, rezonanţele vizuale ale discursului său sunt nule, el rezumându-se doar la rezonanţe auditive. Construcţia reprezentărilor de către receptori devine astfel mai dificilă, motiv pentru care Ion Iliescu nu şi-a permis să acopere, în discursurile sale, o arie prea extinsă de subiecte.

Poate şi din acest motiv, imaginea autoconstruită de către candidatul Ion Iliescu este cu mult mai neclară decât cea a lui C. V. Tudor. El nu construieşte o imagine consistentă, ci doar o imagine ca rezultat sumativ al unor fragmente de imagine. Judecând din perspectiva profilelor latente ale

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[5] Pentru utilizarea referenţialului în efectele de încadrare, a se vedea Iluţ 1997: 17.

electoratului identificate anterior (Gheorghiță 2002), prin discurs, Ion Iliescu răspunde comprehensiv doar dimensiunii cu cel mai scăzut potenţial explicativ, şi anume aceea a *competenţei politico-democratice*. Ne-am aştepta ca plaja sa electorală să fie limitată şi redusă. Însă, spre deosebire de Corneliu Vadim Tudor, Ion Iliescu reuşeşte să extragă şi să folosească cumulativ *fragmente din alte profile latente* pentru a-şi supraconstrui profilul asumat.

## Concluzii

Pe parcursul acestui demers analitic, ne-am concentrat asupra imaginii proiectate discursiv de către candidaţii Corneliu Vadim Tudor şi Ion Iliescu pe parcursul campaniei electorale pentru alegerile prezidenţiale din 2000. Pentru fiecare imagine construită am testat suprapunerea sa peste tiparele evaluative latente identificate în analizele anterioare (*competenţa managerială*, dimensiunea *tradiţional-autoritară* şi *competenţa politico-democratică*). Analiza cadrelor de referinţă ale discursului a relevat un grad înalt de compatibilitate între imaginea proiectată de candidatul P.R.M. şi *dimensiunea tradiţional-autoritară*, ca şi între profilul autoconstruit de către Ion Iliescu şi factorul *competenţă politico-democratică generalizată*. Principalele concluzii desprinse în urma acestei analize pot fi rezumate după cum urmează:

(1) *Dimensiunile latente* de evaluare a alternativelor de candidaţi par a fi un instrument viabil, chiar dacă este posibil ca ordonarea lor, din perspectiva varianţei explicate, să nu fie cea corectă. O certitudine în acest sens nu poate fi formulată fără includerea în „ecuaţie" sau controlul riguros al factorilor *afiliere partinică* şi *teme politice vehiculate de candidaţi*.

(2) Un model agregativ (*catch-all*) al imaginii, care să răspundă mai multor dimensiuni latente, pare să fie favorabil succesului electoral, cel puţin în condiţiile în care amplasarea direcţională după o dimensiune nu contravine poziţionării după celelalte dimensiuni.

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Toma Burean

This book faces us with the contributions of the rise and fall of communism to the social theorizing on social change and development and aims at reinvigorating the debates in sociological theory bearing in mind the post-communist phenomenon. It questions the appropriateness of the theoretical frames of references to the new arrangements in economy, society and culture and it concerns itself with the usage of classical concepts to the new globalized social world. The general purpose is to provide a manual on sociological theories and their connection to postcommunism. Thus, it does not test the innovative ideas presented. However, it is highly worthy to reveal the pieces that refer to reflections on communism and postcommunism, since they offer starting points to further research on East Central Europe in a various number of disciplines in social sciences.

The introduction sets the context in which the fall of communism occurred as well as points to the fact that everybody, including sociologists, was taken by surprise. Before the change, predictions about the future of the communist ranged from Mexicanization to convergence theories, that is the normalization i.e. integration of post-Stalinist politics. Theories that tried explaining communism go back to Max Webers' critique of "one-dimensional reductionism". Postmodernism put an end to modernism as a great narrative to which communism as well subscribed. Indirectly, the Frankfurt school with its study on authoritarian power dynamics, Foucault with the concept of "panoptical surveillance", Touraine with the study on "Solidarność" and Bourdieu with the concepts of cultural and symbolic capital provided analytical tools for the study of communist systems

The question the authors raise is whether we can incorporate everything in the theories already formed in Western Europe. Among theories that reveal processes that can be found in Soviet and postcommunist societies we mention contributions of modernization and neo-modernization theory like urban rural balance, ecological policies, Europeanization vs. Latinization, and many theories of convergence between Western and Eastern Europe with the following characteristics: cultural fragmentation, decentralization of the state, post-welfare societies, erosion of public private boundary, social movements, erosion of scientific authority.

The challenges to sociological theory are that "communism has a narrative structure, beginning, middle, and an end", questions of social organization were thrown up by anticommunist revolutions and we notice global effects such as: the fall of communism as a world historical idea, world media spectacles, alternative social models presented by TV". The authors argue, that everything became familiar to the Western patterns, a conclusion that is not surprising since analyzing new democracies meant testing some of the Western models of development. Secondly the new democracies did not have real viable alternatives of development except the Western European model.

The concept of class and its usefulness in postcommunism constitute the theme of chapter two. The model of organized class society recalls the communist environment. The communist and post-communist experience support Max Weber's critique that predicted a sclerotic future for communism Weber). Marxism explains the social antagonisms in post communism. Class politics is not dead in Eastern Europe if we look at managers and professional cadres' more pronounced control. Subjective representations of class structure in relation to social solidarity are still present. Whatever the demoralization and demobilization, there are still many egalitarian attitudes in the former communist countries.

The idea of social solidarity, thus, concerns chapter three. The question is how postcommunist experience and its outcomes affected the idea of solidarity and how society is possible. Welfare and social solidarity are reflected by still present egalitarianism, yet this changes and becomes less and less egalitarian if we look at the GINI index.

People could not represent their society to themselves after the fall, because of sub-national schisms like former Yugoslavia and the Soviet Republics, and the emergence of reunited states. Nationalism was a source of division but also of solidarity (e.g. Baltic Republics). The lessons on solidarity for postcommunism are ambiguous: with the fall of communism we are pushed back to look at elements of social solidarity within capitalist societies.

Following the ideas of Durkheim on social solidarity we are invited to overview the theories of convergence and the inappropriateness of the frameworks developed during communism by Western sociologists. Besides the description of these theories, the authors wonder whether, after the fall, the development of post communist states was a matter of fate or choice. If it was a matter of fate to what are post communist states converging, if we bear in mind that there is no single European social model. Countries of the East converge to West but in very different way to very different aims, the authors conclude.

We are provided with an example of a failed theory of convergence i.e. the theory of modernity. Modernity is viewed as a process of linear social development. The theory is considered dead, and this along with the disenchantment is the main theme of postmodernism. Is postcommunism similar to postmodernism? Yes, if Civic Forum type of politics, politics that is becoming cultural, would have long lasting effects. "Postmodernism and postcommunism are part of a common process that rendered some social arrangements, less viable than others, more decentralized and globally integrated ones." (p.102)

Competing arguments refer to the social system as imposing a premodern patrimonial bureaucracy or the idea that communism fostered modernization without modernity.Coomunism imitated modernity, industrialization yet often the rationally, norm and rule based relations between institutions were ignored to more patriarchal types of relationships. The overall conclusion is, that communist ideology, that followed to its outmost the "linear…stage theory" of development, failed. Thus the focus of research should turn to globalized post-communism. The globalized post communist world is less marked by linear stage like industrial development than by global economic flows.

This leads us to a detailed study of globalization and a part of the book where postcommunism encounters difficulties to find its place. We are presented with the description of the major debates over globalization with communism and postcommunism left aside. Did globalization cause the fall of communism? The answer of course is yes, to a certain extent, through the telecommunication systems. How does postcommunism looks like under a globalized world? The authors refer to an unstable, fluid, multi-polarized society, yet we are not provided with the place of postcommunist systems in this society.

The well-combined course of the chapters is interrupted by chapter seven that is a detailed account on civil society theories (a remake of an older article by Ray 1996). After summarizing the main approaches and theoretical puzzles on civil society, we find out what postcommunism brought new. This is the most elaborated part of the book, maybe because in the realm of civil society, postcommunism was most influential. The novelty of the approach that linked civil society and the state was "…the idea of a fundamental antipathy between state and civil society, in which the former had to be restrained by civil institutions of the latter…" (p.149). Anti-Communist movements brought the renewal of theories on civil society. The Anti-Communist movements were so well organized and incorporated so many dissidents that "the spaces of civil society and the public sphere were often fused in that the private realm of autonomous self organizing groups was to become an authentic public sphere alternative to the state" (p.160).

The ideas from chapters five and six are continued with looking at modernity as collective state-sponsored violence and at how national belonging is constructed. Authors refer to the resurgence of memory. A factor authorizing violence is the availability of languages of rationalization and legitimization, which drew in collective pathos and loss (p.196). In postcommunism the collective memory of trauma, counting the dead and construction of a narrative community with the dead become rituals of unification and remembering. Collective memories tend to legitimate expiatory violence.

Everybody was taken by surprise when communism fell. The themes of recuperation and return (Habermas) came to the forefront. The revolutions were peaceful and Eastern Europe fell in the conventional Western patterns. The EU enlargement is the final chapter of postcommunism transition for Eastern Europe and capitalism became the only game in town.

The authors successfully managed to present the sum of puzzles that social theory faces when confronted with postcommunism. Several new routes to research are proposed in this respect, being much more than a manual for students, as it was modestly claimed. The coherence of the arguments and the somewhat natural links between chapters (except for chapter 7) provide the reader with a highly informative account of the approaches and controversies of postcommunism and social theory.

# NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

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# GUIDELINES FOR CONTRIBUTORS

**Editorial criteria**

Materials should present issues and analysis relevant to the social science community in Romania. We encourage submissions of materials based on quantitative or qualitative analysis. Descriptive material, as well as material discussing methodology, is also accepted, and will be considered for the Data & Methodology section..

Materials submitted to *Studia Politica* should not have been published in other journals or are currently under review at other journals. We make exceptions to this rule for materials published in electronic format or translations of articles already published.

**Manuscript submission**

All materials submitted starting March 1, 2007 should be in English.

Manuscripts should be submitted in electronic format to the executive editor of the journal and should be accompanied by a separate document containing the translation of the title in Romanian, an 150-200 words abstract in Romanian, and a 150 words biographical note in English (containing the position of the author, institutional affiliation, research interests and other publications).

For materials already published elsewhere the author should present documents attesting the permission of the editor / copyright owner. Please note that if your material is published first by *Studia Politica* the journal will hold copyright for your article.

Style requirements: Materials should follow the rules of academic writing as presented in American Psychological Association manual of style, 5th edition.

Manuscripts should be typed with Garamond fonts, font size 12, paragraph spacing 1,5, and should not exceed 25 pages. Tables and figures should be presented on separate sheets of paper at the end of the material. The author should specify where each table and figure must be placed in the text. The references should also be presented on a separate sheet of paper.

**Manuscript processing**

Materials submitted will be presented to the board of the journal, who will decide whether the material is suitable with the general line of *Studia Politica*.

Materials accepted by the board are then sent to two independent reviewers who will make recommendations. Based on their recommendations the material may be accepted for publishing, accepted for publishing if certain modifications are made or rejected. The decision to reject a material is final. The authors of the materials accepted for publishing if certain modifications are made, will then be asked to make changes to the material within 60 days.

We reserve the right to make modifications to the formatting of the article.

# CALL FOR CONTRIBUTIONS
## Issue 1 / 2007


The 2007 issue of *Studia Universitatis Babeş-Bolyai Politica* will address the theme

### Condemning Communism in Post-Communist Romania

The Tismăneanu report and the politically disputed condemnation of Communism by Romanian president Traian Băsescu bring back to social and political science the issue of how Communism is still (or not) impacting the Romanian society. For the 2007 issue of *Studia Politica* we invite contributions dealing both with the impact that Communism still has on Romanian society and politics and with the impact of the Tismăneanu report on Romanian political life. We would welcome contributions that approach these issues in a comparative perspective.

*Contributions for this issue are accepted until May 15, 2007. For more information please see the Guidelines for contributors.*