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PERSPECTIVES ABOUT TRUTH. INTRODUCTION

Paula TOMI*

Truth was always a central notion in philosophy. From an analytical perspective, the classical truth theories aimed to discover the underlying nature of truth. For example, the correspondence theory considers truth to be a relation between truth-bearers and truthmakers, while, the coherence theory of truth takes truth as being coherent with a specific set of beliefs. On the other hand, deflationary theories of truth - in general - tend to argue that there is no substantive nature of truth. According to those, truth can be defined in a trivial manner and its role is – at most – a logical one, the truth predicate being a purely logical device.

It seems that despite the differences between various truth theories, one common point is that they all have to face a common problem: semantic paradoxes. The Liar paradox (L: 'This sentence is false'), there are different solutions for this paradox, but none of them can be generally applied. Some of them are too restrictive (for example Tarski's) and some of them have to face the Revenge of the Liar (as does the Kripkean one).

Usually truth theories face different issues and each of them has its own weak points. For example, minimalism - a deflationary approach - seems to have to embrace dialetheism in order to be able to provide a proper solution to the Liar. Theories based on correspondence have a hard time to provide relevant truthmakers for certain groups of sentences. The coherence theory of truth face the specification and transcendence objections.

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In addition to this, truth is only one of the semantic notions. These notions – as truth, meaning, reference, satisfaction – form a family circle and they are strongly linked and sometimes considered interdefinable. For example, a deflationist about truth has a hard time in explaining meaning, since they cannot use truth to do this – because of circularity. This brief presentation points out that truth is still a central notion in the analytical philosophy and there are many unanswered questions regarding this concept.

The first edition of *Perspectives about Truth* took place fully online from June 20 to June 22 last year. It aimed to provide an opportunity for researchers from different fields of (mostly) philosophy to talk about truth and other related notions. There were different panels from analytic philosophy (*Truth and other semantic notions; Modal truth*) to continental philosophy (*Truth and Metaphysics*), political philosophy (*Post-truth*), ethics (*Truth and Ethics*), philosophy of culture (*Cultural heritage and memory*), anthropology studies (*What do we do with the hard truths? Ethical and theoretical challenges for the anthropology of unpleasant realities; Communication and social studies*).

The four articles published in this special number of *Studia Philosophia UBB* are all somehow related to truth. Most of them focus on the notion from an analytical perspective, while one is based on continental philosophy. The first three of them were also presented during the already mentioned conference, while the last one is a different topic than the one presented to the event¹.

The first two articles were part of the panel entitled *Truth and other semantic notions*, that was focusing on the relation between semantical notions from an analytical perspective. Oprea's article – *Davidson on truth* – as the title suggests, focuses on the Davidsonian perspective of truth. Davidson's approach explains the concept of meaning using the concept of truth. By taking truth primitive, Davidson tried to use the T-schema in natural languages and explained meaning based on truth-conditions. Oprea aimed to critically analyse and counterargue Davidson's perspective. Paradoxes, hypotheses and performatives are some of the weaknesses pointed out by the author. By these, it seems that Davidson's perspective is too narrow to explain all the sentences of a natural language.

Goldberg's article – *Kantian views of empirical truth* – focuses not only on the Kantian perspective, but also on Carnap's, Kuhn's, Davidsonian and Quinean ones. The Kantian view takes the truth of an empirical claim depending on the truth of non-empirical ones. The author provides a critical analysis on the already mentioned views.

¹ Paula Tomi's presentation during the conference has to be sent for publication to another journal.

Bondor's talk was part of the *Cultural heritage and memory* panel. The article focuses on the reconstruction of hermeneutical truth. In modern hermeneutics truth is strongly linked to the authorial intention and might be understood as correctness. The author argues that the authorial intention represents a limit of interpretation which is meant to prevent the risks of arbitrariness and hermeneutical relativism.

The last article – *Logical and rhetorical structure of news* – is a case study that mainly focuses on analytical philosophy and logic. Cotoară, Marouani and Tomi focus on three articles' structures in order to provide an analysis of their objectiveness. Their analysis does not focus exclusively on truth notion, but the notions that represent the aim of their work are strongly linked to the notion of truth. Their main aim was to point out the logical and rhetorical differences between different types of articles, mainly informative and evaluative ones.

DAVIDSON ON TRUTH

Bogdan OPREA*

ABSTRACT. Truth-conditional semantics is by far the best-known philosophical contribution of Donald Davidson. The main idea of this approach is to explain the concept of meaning by appeal to the concept of truth. Accordingly, we understand a sentence *s* of a natural language *L*, if and only if, we know its truth-conditions. Challenging in its nature, this proposal immediately caught the attention of the philosophical community, being equally appreciated and criticized.

The aim of this paper is to argue that Davidson's approach is too optimistic in its goals. In my view, truth-conditional semantics is unlikely to be the best way to shed light on the concept of meaning. By appealing to Tarski's semantic conception of truth and assuming a primitive concept of truth, this perspective leaves too many questions unanswered and thus proves its limits.

Key-words: Donald Davidson, meaning, truth, Truth-Conditional Semantics.

Preliminary remarks

The question "What is meaning?" is one of the central questions of philosophy of language, especially in the field of semantics. Likewise, this was one of the main questions for philosophers such as Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Rudolf Carnap, Willard Van Orman Quine and Donald Davidson. Some of them have tried to clarify the concept of meaning and how the language refers to the world, by focusing either on the principle of compositionality (Frege, 1960) or on definite descriptions (Russell, 1905). Others have tried to do it by focusing either on the analytic-synthetic distinction (Carnap, 1999) or on the way a community is using a language in the so called language games (Wittgenstein, 1958).

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Dissatisfied with the solutions provided by the aforementioned perspectives, in the middle of the XXth century, Quine and Davidson began to distrust the concept of meaning, taking the path of a purely extensional semantics. The first step was taken by Quine, who attempted to dismantle the analytic-synthetic distinction (Quine, 1961). The second and most challenging one was taken by Davidson, who tried to propose what nowadays is known as truth-conditional semantics (Davidson, 1991).

Starting with *Truth and Meaning*, the aim of Donald Davidson was to elucidate the concept of meaning by focusing on the concept of truth and avoiding any involvement of intensional terms. To reach this goal, he developed a philosophical program designed to include the following: the compositional trait of natural languages; the connection between the concept of meaning and the concept of truth; the connection between meaning, beliefs, and desires; the idea that when we want to interpret and understand a speaker whose language is totally unknown, we must assume the rationality and truth of her verbal behaviour – known as the Principle of charity, the driving principle of Davidson's philosophy. Therefore, to address the compositional trait of natural languages and the connection between the concept of meaning and the concept of truth, Davidson appealed to Tarski's semantic conception of truth. To address the connection between meaning, beliefs and desires and to be in accordance with the Principle of charity, he appealed to a unified theory of verbal behaviour interpretation and decision theory. The result was a Primitivist approach to the concept of truth, composed of two parts: the form of truth – inspired by Tarski's semantic conception of truth –, and the content of truth – inspired mainly by decision theory.

In the following sections I will briefly outline the Davidsonian project, and then I will critically analyze it. On the one hand, I will seek to show that extending Tarski's semantic conception of truth to natural languages and adopting a primitive concept of truth does not help too much to elucidate the concept of meaning. On the other hand, I will try to show that truth-conditional semantics fails to account for sentences whose truth-values are assigned by experience and, the most important, for those sentences that do not have truth values.

Davidson on the form of truth

The concept of truth plays a cardinal role in Davidson's philosophy, being extensively discussed in papers such as *Truth and Meaning*, *A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge*, *The Content of the Concept of Truth*, *The Folly of Trying to Define Truth* and *Truth Rehabilitated*. In each of these works, the influence of Gottlob Frege and Alfred Tarski is striking.

To Frege, Davidson owes the idea that understanding a sentence means knowing its truth-conditions: "To know the semantic concept of truth for a language is to know what it is for a sentence – any sentence – to be true, and this amounts, in one good sense we can give to the phrase, to understanding the language." (Davidson, 2001, pp. 50-51) At the same time, he is indebted to Frege for the Principle of compositionality (Davidson, 2001, p. 202). For Davidson, one of the most important traits of a natural language is compositionality, that is, the meaning of complex expressions depends on the meaning of the simple expressions which compose the complex ones. The ability to compose sentences such as "Hannibal crossed the Alps and defeated the Romans at Cannae in 216 BC." or "Hannibal crossed the Alps on elephants.", from a sentence like "Hannibal crossed the Alps." shows us that their meaning is a function of the meaning of their components.

To Tarski, Davidson owes the idea of language stratification, respectively, the Convention T, to which he assigns a pivotal role in the radical interpretation. However, despite the fact that Tarski's schema represents a central point for Davidson's theory, the two perspectives are quite different.

In order to avoid self-reference specific to natural languages and to block the possibility of paradoxes – such as the Liar paradox –, Tarski developed a semantic approach by which he defined truth in terms of denotation and satisfaction, thus providing a formally correct and materially adequate definition. If we take his own example, in the sentence "The sentence "snow is white" is true if, and only if, the snow is white." (Tarski, 1944, p. 343), on the right side of the equivalence we have the sentence itself – *suppositio formalis* –, while on the left side of the equivalence we have the name of the sentence – *suppositio materialis*. The construction of the definition of truth occurs in the metalanguage, whose purpose is to capture the connections between the language expressions and the objects of the world they refer to. Defining truth involves a recursive procedure where we start by specifying the objects that satisfy simple expressions and we continue by specifying the objects that satisfy the complex expressions. Furthermore, a semantic theory of truth for a language *L* must provide for every sentence *s* of that language, an equivalence of the form (T):

“(T) *X* is true, iff *p*.” (Tarski, 1944, p. 344)

It is also worth mentioning that for Tarski, the equivalences of the form (T) and any instances of them are only partial definitions of truth. We would get a general definition of truth only if we were able to put all these partial definitions in a conjunction.

While the semantic conception of truth was designed by Tarski to define truth only for formalized languages, Davidson's proposal was the following: "What I propose is to reverse the direction of explanation: assuming translation, Tarski was able to define truth; the present idea is to take truth as basic and to extract an account of translation or interpretation." (Davidson, 2001, p. 134) But assuming truth and taking it as the starting point of an approach to meaning, he embraced a Primitivist perspective of the concept of truth: "It should be clear that I do not hope to define truth in terms of coherence and belief. Truth is beautifully transparent compared to belief and coherence, and I take it as a primitive concept." (Davidson, 2001, p. 139) The view expressed in the previous quote was manifested throughout his entire philosophical career: "It is a mistake to look for a behavioristic definition, or indeed any other sort of explicit definition or outright reduction of the concept of truth. Truth is one of the clearest and most basic concepts we have, so it is fruitless to dream of eliminating it in favor of something simpler and more fundamental." (Davidson, 2005b, p. 55) He is defending it even in his latest works: "We should apply this obvious observation to the concept of truth: we cannot hope to underpin it with something more transparent or easier to grasp. Truth is as G. E. Moore, Bertrand Russell, and Gottlob Frege maintained, and Alfred Tarski proved, an undefinable concept." (Davidson, 2005a, p. 21)

However, extending the semantic conception of truth to natural languages and taking truth as primitive, we are getting into a new situation for T-sentences:

"(T) 'Es regnet' is true-in-German when spoken by x at time t if and only if it is raining near x at t." (Davidson, 1991, p. 135)

The striking aspect is that unlike Tarski, in the case of Davidson, T-sentences are formulated in two different languages. For Tarski the metalanguage translates the object-language expressions to determine their truth-values. For Davidson the metalanguage translates the object-language expressions to determine their meaning. It does so by assuming the concept of truth as primitive because: "Truth is a single property which attaches, or fails to attach, to utterances, while each utterance has its own interpretation; and truth is more apt to connect with fairly simple attitudes of speakers." (Davidson, 1991, p. 135)

Davidson's appeal to Tarski's semantic conception of truth was not accidental. Firstly, he had to deal with the compositional trait of natural languages and needed to show how we actually understand all the sentences of those languages. Secondly, he wanted to clarify the concept of meaning and to do so in situations like those faced by the field linguist – situations where someone is faced with a

totally alien language that must be grasped from scratch. He chose the Tarskian path because, on the one hand, it shows us how to holistically assign meaning to sentences uttered by a speaker that we want to interpret and understand. On the other hand, it describes the pattern that truth imprints on language and thought, and this was what he was fervently seeking for to develop a theory of meaning for natural languages.

Nevertheless, as long as according to Davidson, Tarski provided us only the form of truth, there must be something more to add to his approach. What must be added is the content of truth, the connection between truth and meaning, and the way of doing it is by showing how we can identify the pattern of truth indicated by Tarski, in the verbal behaviour of people.

Davidson on the content of truth

As we saw in the previous sections, Davidson's aim was to give an insight on the concept of meaning by focusing on the situation we are facing when we want to interpret and understand a speaker whose language is totally unknown – the situation of radical interpretation, in which we have neither dictionaries, nor translation manuals and we have to find a way to grasp the meaning of the utterances.

To understand his view, let's imagine that we are on an expedition in Northern Europe and we arrive into a Finnish speaking community. Having no previous contact with Finnish language and no means of translation at hand, when someone utters "Siellä on karhu!", what is the first step we should take to understand it? For Davidson, the first step of radical interpretation consists in assuming the rationality and truth of the sentences uttered by the speaker (Davidson, 1991, p. 136). In accordance with the Principle of charity, as long as a speaker is a rational agent who is mostly right about her environment and who intends to be interpreted and understood by others, we should be charitable with her and maximize our agreement. Firstly, we should observe her verbal behavior in order to fix the reference of the uttered sentences. Secondly, we should identify those objects and events from her environment to which she accepts to apply the utterance "Siellä on karhu!". Finally, based on her assent and dissent, and producing T-sentences to connect her language to her environment by satisfaction relations, we should arrive to the conclusion that:

(T) "Siellä on karhu!" is true in Finnish if, and only if, there is a bear over there.

Moreover, according to the Principle of charity, if we cannot find a way to interpret and understand the uttered sentences of a speaker as revealing a set of beliefs largely consistent and true, then we have no reasons to count her as being rational or as having beliefs and saying something meaningful. The possibility of considering erroneously a false uttered sentence to be true is blocked by the semantic conception of truth itself, because T-sentences apply only to closed and true sentences of a language and connect utterances with objects and events by satisfaction relations.

However, the error in interpretation is possible, and as long as in Davidson's view the disagreements are intelligible only on a background of massive agreements, he must also give an account on the possibility and intelligibility of the error. To address the problem of error, he developed the model of triangulation: "Triangulation also creates the space needed for error, not by deciding what is true in any particular case, but by making objectivity dependent on intersubjectivity." (Davidson, 2004, p. 143) On triangulation, Davidson says that: "Ostensive learning, whether undertaken by a radical interpreter as a first step into a second language, or undergone by someone acquiring a first language, is an example of triangulation." (Davidson, 2004, p. 144) Hence, we have the speaker, the interpreter, and as the common ground of their interaction, the world they share – the condition of possibility for objectivity and intelligible error. In our example, we have a connecting line between the world and the speaker, another connecting line between the world and the interpreter and another one between the speaker and the interpreter. The point of convergence between the connecting line of the speaker with the world and the connecting line of the interpreter with the world is what reveals to the interpreter the cause of the speaker's utterances, namely the bear. But despite all these elements added by Davidson to his theory of meaning, even at this stage of the interpretation process, we have no clue of the meaning of the speaker's uttered sentences. Therefore, there is still something more to add to the content of truth.

According to Davidson, the meaning of the uttered sentences of a speaker is intertwined with her propositional attitudes such as beliefs, desires and preferences. But since this kind of attitudes are manifested in the actions of the speaker, what must be added is something that takes into consideration the fact that linguistic phenomena are behavioral, biological and physical phenomena described in terms of truth, meaning, reference and so on. In his view, the best way to accomplish this requirement is provided by a unified theory of verbal behavior interpretation and decision theory: "What we must add to decision theory, or incorporate in it, then, is a theory of verbal interpretation, a way of telling what an agent means by his words. Yet this addition must be made in the absence of detailed information about the propositional contents of beliefs, desires, or intentions." (Davidson, 2005b, pp. 60-61)

Assuming that the speaker's beliefs and uttered sentences are largely true – in virtue of the Principle of charity –, we need to look for what determined her to hold them true, why she prefers one belief or sentence to be true over another belief or sentence.

For Davidson, of all the existing decision theories, the most appropriate to help us grasp the meaning in a situation like that of radical interpretation is the one of Richard Jeffrey, and this is because Jeffrey's theory deals with propositions, relative desirabilities, subjective probabilities and leaves us a way to substitute the propositions with uttered sentences (Davidson, 2005b, pp. 67-75). Adopting this framework, we have to create multiple series of choices whose goal is to calculate the degree of beliefs, desires and preferences of the speaker whose uttered sentences we want to interpret and understand, until we reach a common point in interpretation and understanding. Once we have assumed the truth of the speaker's uttered sentences and we have correctly assigned her propositional attitudes, we are in the position to infer the meaning of what she is saying. It is like a chain of dominoes that begins with rationality and truth, continues with actions and propositional attitudes and ends with meaning. Therefore, Davidson added what he considered to be the content of truth, the necessary element to identify the best method of selecting the working hypothesis regarding the meaning of the uttered sentences of a speaker.

Limits of the Davidsonian approach

For some philosophers of language and for some linguists, Davidson's approach might seem very attractive. On the one hand, it shows us how we might holistically assign propositional attitudes to a speaker, in order to extract the meaning of her uttered sentences. On the other hand, it shows us how we might interpret the uttered sentences of a speaker, in a purely extensional manner, avoiding the use of intensional terms such as meaning – given Davidson's conviction that such a term is futile in the act of interpretation.

However, from the very beginning, the Davidsonian perspective faced a number of objections that deserve further attention. Accordingly, in this section I will focus on those aspects that I consider to be the most problematic for Davidson.

Perhaps the most common objection raised against truth-conditional semantics is the one that considers the extension of the Tarskian schema to natural languages. As we already know, given the semantically closed aspect of natural languages, Tarski was distrustful of such an approach. Furthermore, Davidson was

not only adopting the Tarskian schema, but reversing it. The problem here is that, in this context, we might be in the position to provide a definition of truth in a Tarskian manner, but without understanding what the meaning of that truth is. To illustrate how this is possible, I will give an example following the pattern of another example provided by Mircea Dumitru in a paper in which, to a certain extent, he is critical of the Davidsonian semantics (Dumitru, 2004, pp. 140-145).

Let us suppose that George is an English monolingual logician who wants to check whether Davidson's approach really helps in translating from German – and he does so in a homophonic version of it, thanks to its simplicity. He only knows that the German language has a certain logical structure – that consists of names, pronouns, predicates and so on –, and everything he needs to construct a Tarskian definition of truth – the German terms for biconditional, for “German”, for the verb “to be”, for terms such as “denotation”, “satisfaction”, “true” and so on. Then, he asks a German friend to utter a German sentence, for example, “Es regnet!”. What follows from here is that George is able to construct a homophonic definition of truth in the Tarskian manner, like the following:

(T) „Es regnet“ ist im Deutsch wahr dann und nur dann, wenn es regnet.

But despite the fact that he is able to correctly construct a Tarskian definition of truth for a German uttered sentence, he is not able to understand this sentence. He knows that this sentence expresses a truth, but he does not know what truth. Moreover, even if George will construct another definition of truth by which to refer to the truth expressed by the previous uttered sentence, he will be in the same situation. And the regress will continue *ad infinitum*.

This example shows us that giving a definition of truth for an uttered sentence is not the same thing with understanding what that sentence means. By appealing to Tarski's semantic conception of truth we might end up in the situation of being able to correctly manipulate some uttered words and sentences, but not being able to grasp their meaning.

Another possible problem for the Davidsonian approach that is intimately linked with the previous one, might be the problem of paradoxes, such as Pinocchio's paradox and the contingent paradox. On the one hand, as we already know, according to the story of Pinocchio, his nose grows whenever he tells a lie. But if in a possible world, Pinocchio will utter “My nose is growing.”, we will reach an impasse, because we will face a paradox, without being able to determine its truth value: “Pinocchio's nose grows if and only if (iff) what he is stating is false, and Pinocchio says “My nose is growing”. So, Pinocchio's nose is growing iff it is not

growing. It is clearly a version of the Liar.” (Eldridge-Smith, 2010, p. 213) As long as it does not contain semantic predicates, but empirical ones, such as “to grow” – the relation between lying and the growing nose being causal rather than semantic –, and it evades the metalanguage-hierarchy solution provided by Tarski to block paradoxes, this example captures a possible problem for Davidson in the following sense. If, by chance, a speaker we want to interpret and understand would utter a Pinocchio-type paradox, when we will be about to assign truth values and to grasp the meaning of the uttered sentences, we would have to go beyond the Tarskian framework and try another solution. Otherwise, we would be stuck in interpretation forever. On the other hand, as Saul Kripke indicated in several papers in the 1970s, we have also the possibility of a paradox composed of two consecutive sentences, uttered by two different speakers (Kripke, 1975, pp. 695-696). For example, we could have two men, David and John, and when David would utter: “Everything John will say from now on, will be false.”, John would reply: “That is true.” The intractable problem here lies in the fact that it would be impossible for the utterances of John to have the meaning they would appear to have – and this would be contrary to the very idea of truth-conditional semantics. If in the case of Pinocchio’s paradox, we might have an objection from a supporter of Davidson – the possibility of uttering such a paradox would be blocked by the Principle of charity itself –, in the case of the contingent paradox we certainly could not have a similar objection.

However, the problem I find the most difficult for the Davidsonian project is the one of the sentences whose truth values are assigned by experience – such as hypotheses – and the one of the sentences that do not have any truth values at all – such as performatives.

A hypothesis is a sentence usually formulated in a natural language, by which we are trying to explain an event, a phenomenon or a process, and whose truth values are not assumed, but assigned by experience. Sentences such as “If you play chess every day, your game will improve.”, “If the fingerprints on the gun are John’s, then he is the killer.” and “If this solution is alkaline, then the phenolphthalein will turn red.” are examples of hypotheses formulated in daily life, in forensic investigations and in scientific research, that we understand before they are tested to find out whether they are true or false. We may believe them to be true, we may hope them to be true, we may wish them to be true, but I do not see how “all evidence of this kind may be summed up in terms of holding sentences to be true.” – as Davidson suggested in *Radical Interpretation* (Davidson, 1991, p. 135). As sentences that need future tests to receive truth values, I suspect they would pose problems to Davidson’s perspective because if they were uttered

before being tested – assuming that a speaker we want to interpret and understand would utter an untested hypothesis –, they would have no truth values at all. In this context, they would be in a somewhat similar situation of those sentences that exhibit truth value gaps – something like truth value gaps relative to test. If this is the case, then grasping their meaning would consist in anything but the appeal to the concept of truth, and by this, the involvement of truth conditional semantics would become fruitless.

Noting what kind of problems the status of hypotheses can raise for the Davidsonian perspective, let's now turn to the case of performatives. A performative is a sentence formulated in a natural language, usually in the first-person singular or plural, with the main verb in simple present tense, and which is not truth-evaluable. According to John Langshaw Austin, performatives such as “‘I do’ – as uttered in the course of the marriage ceremony.”, “‘I name this ship the *Queen Elizabeth*’ – as uttered when smashing the bottle against the stem.”, “‘I give and bequeath my watch to my brother’ – as occurring in the will.” or “‘I bet you six pence it will rain tomorrow.’”, do not have truth-values (Austin, 1962, pp. 5-6). In his view, this aspect was so obvious that he did not even insist on arguing for it. These sentences have truth-values just as the expression “Damn!” does. For those still unconvinced by his words, one of the best ways¹ to find out if he was right is to focus on examples

¹ Another way of approaching the performatives, which might seem attractive to supporters of Austin, is Michael Dummett's. In several papers published in the 1970s, inspired by Frege, he advanced a theory of meaning consisting of two parts: a theory of sense and reference and a theory of force (Dummett, 1976, p. 74). Furthermore, he proposed a verificationist criterion of meaning, considering that meaning is determined by the verification of a sentence – here, by verifying a sentence is meant what shows a sentence to be true. However, for the present paper I chose not to resort to this approach because it has some problematic aspects. For example, one of the most important of them considers the fact that a verificationistic theory of meaning can be formulated only for some formalized languages. Once we step outside their domain and face situations like that of empirical generalizations, we find ourselves without solutions (Prawitz, 1987, pp. 476-477).

Yet another way of approaching the performatives involves their participation as premises in deductive arguments (Tsohatzidis, 2018, pp. 115-118). As we know, when we seek to evaluate the validity and soundness of a deductive argument, we are looking for the truth or the falsity of its premises and of its conclusion. In any situation, the premises must be truth-evaluable. Hence, it is supposed that if we introduce a performative in a deductive argument form such as *modus ponens* or *modus tollens*, as long as it is an exhortation and do not say anything about the world, we come to find that we cannot take it as a premise. Otherwise, we would be in the position to conclude that classical logic is an improper way of reasoning. However, this time too, I chose not to resort to this approach either, because if performatives are used in such a way, there are still ways to bring them to standard form and to transform them into declarative sentences. In my view, the correct approach is to take performatives exactly as the speaker intended to utter them, without any further intervention or modification.

such as “Drink!”, “Eat!”, “Listen!”, “Look!”, “Pay attention!”, “Run!”, “Do you like this scent?”, “What do you mean?” and so on, sentences that are often uttered by the speakers of an alien language, during the process of learning it. Are these sentences meaningful? Of course, we understand them very well, they express moods, warnings and haziness of the speaker, among others. Can we assign truth values to them? Well, as long as they say nothing about the world and thus, they lack information, I do not think there is any way to approach them from the truth-values perspective, and this is a dangerous consequence for Davidson’s approach.

In my opinion, because for every uttered sentence *s* of a language *L*, truth-conditional semantics involves assuming the concept of truth in order to get the meaning of that sentence, when it comes to sentences without truth values such as performatives, we are thrown into a hopeless situation. In this framework, we are not able to take even a step towards interpreting and understanding a speaker when she utters performatives. Since sentences like these are not intended as assertions, to understand them we would need a theory that explains meaning in terms of the intentions of the speaker rather than in terms of truth conditions. At the same time, that theory should account for the way the speaker was taught by the community to which she belongs, to use the language depending on her communication intentions. Any involvement of the concept of truth where nothing is to be said about the world does nothing but mislead us in our search for a workable theory of meaning for natural languages.

Concluding remarks

The aim of this paper was to briefly outline and analyze critically Davidson’s perspective about truth. We found out that he was interested in the concept of truth because he wanted to elucidate the concept of meaning. By appealing to Tarski’s semantic conception of truth, he suggested the form of truth – he took the concept of truth to be primitive, the necessary condition of any attempt to grasp the meaning of an uttered sentence. By appealing to a unified theory of verbal behavior and decision theory, he suggested the content of truth – he sketched a possible way of assigning propositional attitudes to a speaker we want to understand and of deriving the meaning of her uttered sentences.

Finally, by focusing on the proposal of extending the Tarskian schema to natural languages, and on the approach of paradoxical sentences, hypotheses and performatives from the perspective of truth-conditional semantics, we saw some limits of this view. If Davidson targets only the constative sentences of a natural language, then his view is too narrow. If Davidson targets any kind of sentences of

a natural language, then his view fails to account for sentences such as paradoxical sentences, hypotheses and performatives. In any of these situations, as long as it entertains the idea that we need the concept of truth to clarify the concept of meaning, the Davidsonian project seems to be doomed to failure.

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KANTIAN VIEWS OF EMPIRICAL TRUTH

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ABSTRACT. Let a *Kantian view of empirical truth* be any view according to which the truth of empirical claim depends on the truth of non-empirical claims, because subjects (consciously or not) constitute the empirical when applying the non-empirical to experience. Historically the most important such view is Immanuel Kant's. It is not the only. Rudolf Carnap, Thomas Kuhn, and Donald Davidson held such views. Conversely, Willard van Orman Quine's view was contrastingly instructive. My aim is to briefly sort all this out in search of lessons about the nature of empirical truth generally.

Keywords: anthropocentric; ethnocentric; idiocentric; Kant; Immanuel; logocentric; truth.

Let an *empirical claim* be any semantic object with a truth value that is a function of experience, and let a *non-empirical claim* be anyone with a truth value that is not a function of experience. For present purposes, it does not matter whether such claims are understood as propositions, sentences, contents of beliefs, contents of judgments, or something else. Nor does it matter whether experience is understood as or due to an external world, a state of affairs independent of the subject, or something else. Finally, let a *Kantian view of empirical truth* be any view according to which the truth of empirical claims depends on the truth of non-empirical claims, because subjects (consciously or not) constitute the empirical when applying the non-empirical to experience. Such constitutive dependence, moreover, is both *semantic*, concerning the truth of empirical claims, and *metaphysical*, concerning the nature of those claims themselves.

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Historically the most important Kantian view of empirical truth is Immanuel Kant's. It is not the only. Borrowing from the history of analytic philosophy, I briefly explain that Rudolf Carnap, Thomas Kuhn, and Donald Davidson also held such views, while Willard van Orman Quine held a view contrastingly instructive. Elsewhere (Goldberg 2015, chap. 9) I have examined related themes in detail. My aim here is to briefly sort out the present theme in search of lessons about the nature of empirical truth generally.

1. Kant

Kant's remarks in the *Critique of Pure Reason* about truth are brief but bold:

The old and famous question with which logicians were to be driven into a corner and brought to such a pass that they must either fall into a miserable circle or else confess their ignorance, hence the vanity of their entire art, is this: **"What is truth?"** The nominal definition of truth, namely that it is the agreement of cognition with its object, is here granted and presupposed; but one demands to know what is the universal and certain criterion of the truth of any cognition. (1787/1998, A57–8/B82)

Yet, surprisingly, Kant concedes that nothing beyond the nominal definition can be had.

I can nevertheless say more on Kant's view of the truth of empirical claims, his synthetic *a posteriori* judgments, on his behalf. While synthetic *a posteriori* judgments are empirical, analytic and synthetic *a priori* judgments are not. Synthetic *a priori* judgments particularly are true in virtue of the categories, or fundamental *a priori* concepts, applied to pure intuition, or the *a priori* forms of space and time. Synthetic *a posteriori* judgments result when subjects apply the synthetic *a priori* to experience.

Consider this example relying on one set of synthetic *a priori* judgments: arithmetic truths. Suppose that a subject forms the true synthetic *a posteriori* judgments that they are in an empty room, that five persons enter, and that seven other persons enter and none leaves. If the subject then forms the synthetic *a posteriori* judgement there are twelve persons beside themselves in the room, then that judgment is true. The truth of the empirical claim that twelve persons beside the subject are in the room depends on the truth of the non-empirical claim that five plus seven equal twelve, because the subject constitutes the empirical when applying the non-empirical to experience. Kant holds a Kantian view of empirical truth.

Further, Kant thinks that all human beings with the same experience would agree that there were twelve persons beside the subject in the room. Generally, he writes: “We can accordingly speak of space, extended beings, and so on only from the human standpoint” (1787/1998, A26/B42). For Kant, we, the relevant subjects, are subjects *qua* human. Synthetic *a priori* judgments are in turn anthropocentric or relative to subjects *qua* human.¹ Because the truth of his non-empirical claims is anthropocentric, the nature of empirical truth is *itself* anthropocentric. For Kant, there is no legitimate sense of empirical truth not relative to subjects *qua* human.

2. Carnap and Kuhn

Carnap and Kuhn, conversely, posit non-empirical claims that are ethnocentric, or relative to subjects *qua* community member. Carnap’s are analytic sentences, explicit within linguistic frameworks (1952/1988, suppl. A). Analytic sentences stipulate definitions for a community, which its members use to constitute synthetic sentences, his empirical claims, when applying the analytics to experience. Kuhn’s non-empirical claims are implicit within paradigms (1962/2012; 1970/2012; 1979, essay 12), and lexical taxonomies (2002, essays 1–4, 11). Paradigms, *etc.*, stipulate definitions (and more) for a community, which its members use to constitute observations and predictions, his empirical claims, when applying the paradigms to experience. And Carnap and Kuhn are clear throughout that the relevant community is some but not all human beings. For them, the relevant subjects are subjects *qua* community member. They are not subjects *qua* human.

Consider this example relying on one set of analytic sentences or non-empirical claims implicit in a paradigm: conceptions of heavenly bodies. Ptolemaic astronomers, defining ‘planet’ as any object with a “wandering” geocentric orbit, understand the Moon, the Sun, Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn, but not the Earth, as planets. Copernican astronomers, defining ‘planet’ as any object with a circular heliocentric orbit, understand the Moon as a satellite, the Sun as a star, and the Earth as well as the others are planets. According to both Carnap and Kuhn, the truth of the Ptolemaic empirical claim that Venus is in a particular location in its wandering geocentric orbit depends on the truth of the Ptolemaic non-empirical claim that is its definition of ‘planet’. The truth of the Copernican empirical claim that Venus is in a particular location in its circular heliocentric orbit depends on the

¹ I borrow ‘anthropocentric’ as applied to Kant’s theoretical philosophy from Henry Allison (20042, 34). Philip Pettit, who likens his own view on empirical concepts (2002, 18–20, 50, 90, 96–115) to Kant’s, calls such concepts terms “anthropocentric” (13–17, 53–58).

truth of the Copernican non-empirical claim that is its definition of ‘planet’. For Carnap and Kuhn, because the truth of their non-empirical claims is ethnocentric, the nature of empirical truth is *itself* ethnocentric. There is no legitimate sense of empirical truth not relative to subjects *qua* community member. Indeed, Michael Friedman (2001, part 2, lecture 1) has persuasively argued that Carnap and Kuhn are both neo-Kantian in something like my sense, and Kuhn himself came to see his view as one that “resembles Kant’s a priori when ... taken in ... a relativized sense,” relativized, *i.e.*, “to time, place, and culture,” and therefore to community (2002, 245).²

Further, because Kant thinks that all human beings have the same non-empirical claims, while Carnap and Kuhn think that members of different communities have different ones—and community membership can change—Carnap and Kuhn also say something about such change. Carnap (1952/1988, suppl. A) would maintain that “Do planets have a wandering geocentric orbit?” asked internally to a set of analytic sentences stipulating that they do or do not has a “cognitive” answer and so is true or false. Externally it is a “pragmatic” way of asking whether one set of analytic sentences is more “efficient, fruitful, or simple” at constituting synthetic sentences than another. Likewise, Kuhn (1970/2012) would maintain that “Do planets have a wandering geocentric orbit?” asked relative to a paradigm stipulating what a planet is is a question in “normal science” and so is true or false. Independent of any paradigm it is a “non-rational” way of asking whether one paradigm is “‘neater’, ‘more suitable’, or ‘simpler’ than” (155) another—these are also matters of pragmatism—and is fitting not for normal but for “revolutionary” science.

Hence, for Carnap and Kuhn, an empirical claim is true or false relative to non-empirical ones. Non-empirical claims however are neither true nor false in any independent sense. Rather they are pragmatic or non-rational, even revolutionary, ways of asking about choosing the non-empirical claims *per se*. Carnap’s and Kuhn’s ethnocentric Kantian view of empirical truth is hybridized with pragmatism.

² As Peter Lipton (2003) puts it, Kuhn is “Kant on wheels.” For Kuhn (1962/2012, chaps. 9–11; 1970/2012; 2002, essays 2, 5, 11), the ethnocentric nature of concepts is the chief source of incommensurability between different communities. See Goldberg (2015, 74–8). Friedman (2001) tries to combine insights from both Carnap and Kuhn in his own ethnocentric account of science. See Goldberg (2015, 154–9).

3. Quine

Rather than individual non-empirical and empirical claims, Quine thinks that there are general non-empirical and empirical *sources*: “Taken collectively, science has its double dependence upon language and experience; but this duality is not significantly traceable into the sentences of science taken one by one” (1953/2006, 42). All sentences have non-empirical and empirical sources mixed. Quine explicitly rejects Carnap’s analytic/synthetic distinction. Nonetheless he agrees with Carnap that that distinction supported Carnap’s between cognitivism and pragmatism. Quine just draws the contrapositive inference:

Carnap, Lewis, and others take a pragmatic stand on the question of choosing between language forms, scientific frameworks; but their pragmatism leaves off at the imagined boundary between the analytic and the synthetic. In repudiating such a boundary I espouse a more thorough pragmatism. Each [person] is given a scientific heritage plus a continuing barrage of sensory stimulation; and the considerations which are used by [them] in warping [their] scientific heritage to fit [their] continuing sensory promptings are, where rational, pragmatic. (1953/2006, 46)

Rejecting the non-empirical/empirical claim distinction, Quine collapses cognitivism into pragmatism. Hence, unlike Carnap (or Kuhn), Quine is no hybridist. It is not the case that empirical claims relative to a set of non-empirical claims are true or false, while non-empirical claims are themselves more or less pragmatic. All claims are true or false relative to non-empirical and empirical sources generally *because* subjects can use them more or less efficiently, fruitfully, or simplistically to process experience. The nature of empirical truth is *itself* pragmatic.

This says nothing about how to understand these subjects—anthropocentrically, ethnocentrically, otherwise—and so the scope of empirical truth. Usually appearing ethnocentric, Quine sometimes seems idiocentric, relativizing truth to each subject *qua* individual, as here:

Different persons growing up in the same language are like different bushes trimmed and trained to take the shape of identical elephants. The anatomical details of twigs and branches will fulfill the elephantine form differently from bush to bush, but the outward results are alike. (1964, 8)

“Growing up in a language” is an ethnocentric activity, and Quine is apparently saying that language learning, which operates on subjects *qua* community member, masks differences among subjects *qua* individual. For Quine, the nature of empirical truth is *itself* idiocentric.

4. Davidson

There are three reasons that Davidson should seem unlikely to hold a Kantian view of empirical truth. First, Davidson officially maintains that he simply takes truth as primitive. Second, he officially agrees with Quine in rejecting the analytic/synthetic, and so presumably non-empirical/ empirical claim, distinction. And third, he officially argues against the non-empirical/empirical source distinction.

Consider however what he has to say about truth. Davidson (1984/2001, essay 2) endorses Alfred Tarski's (1944/2008) semantic conception of truth in a language, according to which specifying all the conditions under which any sentence in a language is true defines the concept of truth in that language. Davidson in fact claims that devising such a "theory of truth" for a language provides an interpretation of the language. Concerning truth not in a language but *tout court*, however, Davidson explains: "Truth is beautifully transparent ..., and I take it as a primitive concept" (2002, 139), and: "Any further attempts to explain, define, or explicate the concept will be empty or wrong.... [A]ll such theories either add nothing to our understanding of truth or have obvious counterexamples" (155).

Nonetheless Davidson elsewhere (2005, chap. 3) says that he can describe some of the *content* of the concept. As explained, he links truth in a language to meaning and interpretation in a language. That suggests that truth *tout court* is linked to meaning *tout court*. Consider what he says about meaning in a language:

A theory of meaning ... is an empirical theory, and its ambition is to account for the workings of a natural language. Like any theory, it may be tested by comparing some of its consequences with the facts. (1984/2001, 24)

Those facts concern the speaker's observable behavior and environment. Interpretive claims—*e.g.*, that 'Snow is white' in English means that snow is white—are themselves empirical. They are constituted when the tools of interpretation are applied to the speaker's observable behavior and environment. Chief among those tools is the principle of charity. The interpreter in basic cases, concerning the directly observable, starts by assuming that the speaker believes roughly what they themselves would believe were they in the speaker's spot, and in non-basic cases constructs a theory of meaning and belief based on these basic cases. Davidson is also committed to the view that, relative to these interpretive claims, which are empirical, the principle of charity is not:

[C]harity is not an option, but a condition of having a workable theory [of interpretation].... Charity is forced on us; whether we like it or not, if we want to understand others, we must count them right in most matters. (1984/2001, 197)

That is because, Davidson adds, it “cannot be a factual question” whether the principle of charity applies to speakers—and so, apparently, whether or not it is true. While it is empirically true or false that ‘Snow is white’ in English means that snow is white, the principle of charity simply follows from the “underlying methodology of interpretation.”

Admittedly, all this is truth (and meaning) in a language. Yet Davidson thinks that that underlying methodology holds for all language users. Nor does he limit himself to human languages, instead both mentioning hypothetical non-human languages, “Saturnian” and “Plutonian” (1984/2001, 186), and invoking an omniscient interpreter who *qua* omniscient would not be human but *qua* interpreter would have to appeal to the principle of charity to interpret a speaker’s terms in any language (1984/2001, essay 14; 2002, essay 10). According to Davidson, all interpreters, even omniscient ones, would constitute empirical interpretive claims when applying the principle of charity to a speaker’s observable behavior and environment. Just as Kant maintains that “[w]e cannot **think** any object except through categories” (1787/1998, B165), embedded in his synthetic *a priori* judgments, Davidson maintains that we cannot *interpret* any utterances except through the principle of charity. Truth in *any* language is linked to meaning in *any* language and the principle of charity. And that, I maintain, gives me license to talk about truth *tout court* on Davidson’s behalf.

So Davidson has a non-empirical/empirical claim distinction: the principle of charity/particular interpretive claims. He therefore has a non-empirical/empirical source distinction: underlying methodology of interpreter/speaker’s observable behavior and environment. Further, rather than anthropocentric, ethnocentric, or idiocentric, the principle of charity is *logocentric*, or relative to subjects *qua* language user. It is used to determine meaning in *any* language. “[C]harity is not an option, but a condition of having a workable theory” for any language user, human or non-human, non-omniscient or omniscient. When Davidson continues:

If we can produce a theory that reconciles charity and the formal conditions for a theory, we have done all that could be done to ensure communication [and a fortiori interpretation]. Nothing more is possible, and nothing more is needed[.]

he means that nothing more is possible, and nothing more is needed, for any language user to interpret a speaker’s claims at all. Any language constitutes empirical interpretive claims when applying the principle of charity to a speaker’s observable behavior and environment. The truth of those interpretive claims depends on the truth of the principle of charity in the sense that it is not an option but a condition of interpretation. For Davidson, the nature of empirical truth in

interpretation is *itself* logocentric. There is no legitimate sense of empirical truth in interpretation not relative to subjects *qua* language user.³

Davidson therefore has nothing like Carnap's or Kuhn's hybridism. For Davidson, interpreting is like answering one of Carnap's internal questions or engaging in Kuhn's normal science. It is always relative to the principle of charity. Nor does Davidson have anything like Quine's view that cognitivism collapses into pragmatism. An interpretive claim about what an utterance means is true or false, not because it is more or less pragmatic, but because the claim does or does not follow from an interpreter's theory of meaning for a speaker's language. Though some interpretations are more pragmatic than others in the pedestrian sense of being simpler, *etc.*, the truth of an interpretation remains distinct.

5. Lessons

What lessons does this all-too brief historical tale, from Kant to Davidson, tell? First, according to a Kantian view of empirical truth, because subjects (consciously or not) constitute empirical claims when applying non-empirical claims to experience—and they can be subjects *qua* individual, community member, human, or language user—empirical truth is itself idiocentric, ethnocentric, anthropocentric, or logocentric, respectively. Second, if there are different non-empirical claims for subjects to choose between, then doing so is not cognitive or normal but instead pragmatic or revolutionary. Such a view would be hybrid. In the limiting case in which a Kantian view of empirical truth is logocentric, such as Davidson's, there can be only one set of non-empirical claims. So a logocentric Kantian view of empirical truth cannot be hybrid. And third, though not itself a Kantian view of empirical truth, any view that rejects the non-empirical/empirical claim, but retains the non-empirical/empirical source, distinction, rejects the cognitivism/pragmatism distinction.

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³ See Goldberg (2015, 228–31).

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HERMENEUTICAL TRUTH AND AUTHORIAL INTENTION: MODERN PROJECTS*

George BONDOR**

ABSTRACT. The aim of this text is to reconstruct the meanings of the concept of hermeneutical truth, as it has been defined and explained in the main projects of modern hermeneutics (Dannhauer, Chladenius, Meier, Schleiermacher, Fr. Schlegel). I will explore the epistemological side of this concept, different from its meaning in hermeneutic ontology. Understood as correctness by modern hermeneutics, truth has been related to the authorial intention. The thesis I am arguing is that the meanings of hermeneutical truth and, related to them, the modern theories of authorial intention differ according to the metaphysical presuppositions that define the thought paradigms of modernity (Cartesianism, Kantianism, Romanticism and German Idealism): the centrality and activism of the self, the rationality of the self, the dependence of knowledge on the ideal of method, the discovery of the unconscious. Some modern hermeneutical theories express the tensions between these philosophical paradigms. However, I will argue that the authorial intention remains a limit of interpretation that prevents the risks of arbitrariness and hermeneutic relativism.

Keywords: hermeneutical truth, authorial intention, interpretation, understanding, hermeneutics of suspicion, Modern metaphysics.

The concept of hermeneutical truth is rarely used in this form. However, it is widely accepted that the way in which the notion of truth is present in human sciences differs from the way in which truth appears in natural sciences. The appearance of truth in debates of ideas is precisely related to the distinction between these two types of sciences. Since hermeneutics was regarded, especially

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by Dilthey, as the method present in all *Geisteswissenschaften*, the truth claim of statements in these sciences can be fulfilled through the concept of hermeneutical truth. Obviously, hermeneutics has multiple meanings, and its designation as a method of all the human sciences is a generalization that seems to bring together heterogeneous methodological principles, techniques and procedures. In its modern history, hermeneutics has dealt both with the practice of interpreting obscure places and with the theory of interpretation, but also with the theory of understanding, and with its transformations due to phenomenology, it has become an ontology of understanding. If the first three situations designate the theoretical hypostases of truth – as we speak of truth in the case of the understanding and interpretation of texts, artistic phenomena or historical facts – the latter refers to more than mere methodology, it describes the human being in its essence, insofar as this essence is identified with understanding itself. This pre-theoretical hypostasis that phenomenology highlights starts from the central thesis of intentionality, but describes the orientation of the self towards the world as comprehensive. Thus, the four hypostases that define the history of hermeneutics actually refer to two philosophical paradigms: one epistemological and the other ontological. In both, truth has a methodological meaning, but the idea of method is signified differently: as a set of rules and steps to be followed in the first, or as the achievement of access to phenomena in the second. In the first case, we are dealing with predicative, propositional truth, while the second case deals with ante-predicative truth, as this distinction appears in phenomenology. The present analysis will be limited to the first case of hermeneutical truth, investigating the formulations given to it in several modern projects and evaluating both how some of them can still be supported today and how they have influenced later projects of hermeneutics.

Truth as correctness of interpretation

The concept of hermeneutical truth can be found in the search for a method of interpreting texts that would lead to results as rigorous as those in the natural sciences, which derived from the application of a method considered to be universal. Following Schleiermacher's sketch of the history of hermeneutics, Dilthey considered that in the Enlightenment there was only a *hermeneutica sacra*, aimed at identifying the necessary method for the correct interpretation of biblical texts. The thesis was far from accurate. The idea of a general hermeneutics already appears in Joseph Conrad Dannhauer, in his 1630 book *Idea boni interpretis*. In pietistic¹ circles,

¹ Cf. Douglas H. Shantz (ed.), *A Companion to German Pietism, 1660-1800*, Leiden, Brill Academic Publishers, 2014.

the author was more often cited with his work *Hermeneutica sacra*, which did not appear until 1654. The chronological distance between the two works shows that the principles and method of general hermeneutics are formulated independently of sacred hermeneutics, the latter applying the former to the special case of the Bible. The aim of general hermeneutics, which Dannhauer considers to be a part of philosophy closely connected with logic, and even included in it, is to identify those rules which will lead to the correct interpretation of any kind of text, not just religious ones, as were the rules of biblical hermeneutics. Obviously, the matter of the correctness of interpretation involves the idea of truth. But hermeneutics cannot pronounce itself on the truth or falsity of the author's propositions, and even less so in the case of the Bible. More precisely, the interpreter will not evaluate the truth value of the ideational content, but will seek to capture the authorial intention. A good interpreter is therefore the one who succeeds to correctly identify the author's intention.

Thus formulated, this issue will have a complicated history. How can this intention be identified? Does the text tell us enough about the authorial intention? Or does it constantly betray it? And in what way? Does the text say less than the author? Or more? Or, perhaps, does it generally say something other than the author intended? In other words, can *intentio auctoris* and *intentio lectoris* coincide, or are they fundamentally different?

Returning to modern hermeneutics, we must recall that for Dannhauer, from whom the discussion of hermeneutical truth originated, the stake of hermeneutics is to analyze the obscure places of texts, which can be clarified by elucidating the logical form of statements. Hermeneutics thus becomes a kind of therapeutics, aiming to identify the pathologies of the text and to cure them.² The relation of hermeneutics with logic, seen as a research on the linguistic structure of texts, is most likely the effect of the revival of Aristotle's *On Interpretation*, a text of logic and hermeneutics at the same time. For Dannhauer, if we succeed in making unclear passages intelligible, we will distinguish between their true and false meaning. But the true meaning is not located at the level of the statement as such, it does not derive from its content. It is therefore not equivalent to the factual truth of the statement, but to the meaning intended by the author and placed by him into the text. Obviously, obscure passages must be clarified by relating them to clear ones, but this comparative operation must be carried out within the horizon of the author's intention. For Dannhauer, the "true meaning" (or "truth of meaning") can only be found by identifying what exactly the author meant.

² Matthias Jung, *Hermeneutik zur Einführung*, Hamburg, Junius Verlag, 2001, p. 47.

But how exactly can we precisely know the author's intended meaning? To this question, the subsequent history of hermeneutics has given some answers that have clarified the question, but without providing the expected answer about the univocity of meaning. If there is only one meaning intended by the author, it means that of all the interpretations, only one will be correct. However, the practice of interpretation has always disproved this claim. No matter how closed a text may be (if we adopt Eco's distinction here between closed and open texts³), there is always a plurality of interpretations. Even the assumption that the authorial intention is identical to the literal meaning of the text does not find favor with interpreters. On the contrary, the emphasis that modern hermeneutics has placed on discovering the authorial intention has favored the search for this intention beyond the literal meaning. The reason for this is that the text does not fully and perfectly contain the authorial intention. This intention is present in the text, while also remaining, like an indeterminate remainder, in the interstices of the text and beyond it.

From correctness to perspectivism

The thesis that there is only one correct interpretation could not be unanimously accepted, as it uses a concept of truth that is far too restrictive to be applied to the situation of interpretation. In modern hermeneutics, a different thesis was advanced by Johann Martin Chladenius, who proposed the so-called theory of the „point of view“ in his *Einleitung zur richtigen Auslegung vernünftiger Reden und Schriften* (1742). By arguing that understanding is perspectivist in nature, this theory opposes the idea that there is only one correct interpretation⁴ for every state of affairs. For example, Chladenius points out, there is no single correct (and therefore true) description of a battle, since the descriptions of the participants in the event differ depending on their particular perspectives on the facts, the very different space-time circumstances in which they find themselves, and at the same time the subjective expectations that each of them has. For Chladenius, “the viewpoint consists of those *circumstances of our soul, body and whole person* that are the *cause* that we see something so and no other way.”⁵ If there is a plurality of points of view, then we must accept that there is a plurality of

³ Umberto Eco, *Lector in fabula. Le rôle du lecteur*, transl. Myriem Bouzaher, Paris, Le Livre de Poche, 1993.

⁴ Johann Martin Chladenius, „Von Auslegung Historischer Nachrichten und Bücher“, in *Einleitung zur richtigen Auslegung vernünftiger Reden und Schriften*, § 308. In Hans-Georg Gadamer, Gottfried Boehm (Hg.), *Seminar: Philosophische Hermeneutik*, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1976, p. 71.

⁵ *Ibidem*, § 309, p. 72.

interpretations. Apparently, this theory affects the claim to truth that hermeneutics raised with Dannhauer's theory. However, if we apply a Kantian (or phenomenological) grid to this difficulty, we might see here the presence of the distinction between things as such and the access to them (i.e. phenomena). Thus, the idea of hermeneutic truth not only endures,⁶ but is given a very modern reformulation.

In order to adequately grasp the place of this hermeneutical theory in modern thought, we must bear in mind that the texts that can become the object of interpretation are, according to Chladenius, only the rational ones. This limitation of the field of hermeneutics to rational texts belongs, in fact, to the Cartesian paradigm of modern philosophy. The origin of the methodological project to which this description of the field of hermeneutics belongs is the same as that which Descartes prescribed for all knowledge. More precisely, the condition of possibility of knowledge resides in a certain type of arrangement of reality before the subject, so that reality becomes orderable, measurable and calculable. Only in this way does the world become knowable, that is, it becomes an object-type phenomenon. Such an understanding of Cartesianism, which has its origins in Heidegger's interpretations and in Marion's continuations, can also be found in hermeneutics. This is why the restriction regarding the rationality of texts is supplemented by the idea, also of Cartesian origin, according to which the correct interpretation can only be found by knowing the authorial intention (or even *mens auctoris*), which is the only way to constitute an *organon* of interpretation as rigorous as the method of natural knowledge.

Hermeneutics and semiotics

Cartesianism continues to be a determining factor for hermeneutics in the project of Georg Friedrich Meier, whose main work, a handbook on correct interpretation, is titled *Versuch einer allgemeinen Auslegungskunst* (1757). The universality of hermeneutics takes the form of a general art of interpretation, considered to be a purely rational activity. Thus, the principle of rationality extends from texts to the interpretive activity itself, whose principles must be rational in order to be applied to the interpretation of any kind of text. Discovering and ordering these general principles is the main purpose of Meier's hermeneutics. The most important of these is that of "hermeneutic equity", which finds an interesting contemporary continuation in the "principle of charity", discussed by authors such as Quine, Davidson, and Wilson.

⁶ Matthias Jung, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

Meier defines the art of interpretation as „the science of the rules according to which meanings can be known from their signs“. The concept of sign is defined in such a way that everything can be conceived as a world of signs. Thus, the sign is not exclusively linguistic. According to Meier, “the sign (signum, character) is a means whereby the reality of something else can be known”.⁷ Therefore, hermeneutics is concerned with reality in its entirety. The universality of Meier’s hermeneutics is therefore semiotic. According to him, there are two types of signs: arbitrary and natural. Since every sign must have an author, it means that the author of arbitrary signs is man, and the author of natural signs is God himself. The world is a whole of signs precisely because its author is God. For this reason, it is perfectly legible and comprehensible down to the smallest detail.

This thesis leads Meier to continue, in his own way, the project of author-centered hermeneutics. The true meaning lies in the authorial intention, Meier points out, whether he is the human author or the divine creator. It is achieved when the interpreter thinks exactly the same thing as the author of the signs.⁸ There is a fundamental difference between the divine and the human author, but Meier draws more than an analogy between the two author figures. Viewed as a whole of signs, the world has not only multiple punctual truths, created by human authors, but also a true global meaning, the one that God intended during its creation.⁹ The Cartesianism of modern hermeneutics is yet again visible: God is the ultimate guarantor of all truths, the ultimate justification of the intelligibility of the whole world. A Cartesianism, we might say, combined with Leibnizianism, if we think of the thesis of the pre-established harmony that exists between all the parts that make up the whole world (even in its semiotic variant).

Despite the distinction between the two types of signs, as well as the difference between hermeneutic and factual truth, Meier defends the thesis of the continuity between divine and human creation. So, we do not yet have a split between natural and cultural reality. The argument is obvious: both types of signs have God as their direct or only indirect author. The idea of the discontinuity between nature and culture only appears in the 19th century, and is emphasized by the distinction between the natural sciences and those of the spirit. Dilthey, Rickert, Windelband, and others make a decisive contribution to the construction of a logic of the human sciences, which is entirely different from the method of the natural sciences, but the presupposition of this logic is precisely that of the discontinuity of

⁷ Georg Friedrich Meier, *Versuch einer allgemeinen Auslegungskunst*, hg. von Axel Bühler & Luigi Cataldi Madonna, Hamburg, Felix Meiner Verlag, 1996, § 7, p. 7.

⁸ Matthias Jung, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 51.

reality. In other words, despite the Kantianism of these philosophers, or perhaps precisely because of it, the distinction between the two types of science derives not only from two types of phenomenality completely different from each other, but also from the postulation of the dogmatic distinction between natural and cultural objects. If we explain this distinction starting from the hermeneutics of the Enlightenment, we can argue that the split between the natural and spiritual sciences originates in the elimination of the theory of semiotic harmony (due to Leibnizianism), according to which God is the creator of all the signs in the world and also of their order.

Returning to the question of the authorial intention, we must emphasize the subtlety with which Meier discusses the question of true meaning and false meaning of the statements we interpret. The idea he supports completes, from new positions, the limitation of Dannhauer's hermeneutics to correctly interpreting the author's statements, but without knowing whether they are true or false. However, Meier argues that only true statements, or those that the author does not know could be false, should be interpreted. His reasoning starts, of course, from the idea that all signs ultimately have a divine author. While natural signs, created by God, can only produce true statements, artificial signs can, however, also produce false statements, given the fallibility of their human author. The divine guarantee of truth does not therefore eliminate the possibility of falsehood. In the practice of interpretation, the hermeneuticist cannot know all the things to which the author refers. In order not to violate the desideratum of rationality, which requires that an interpretation be made only of true statements, Meier proposes a hermeneutical principle that is extremely relevant in that context, called the principle of hermeneutical equity. According to it, our interpretation must be made as if the author were always right. Or, in the terms of his time, we must behave hermeneutically as if hermeneutical truth and factual truth coincided, at least as long as no evidence emerges to disprove this charitable assumption. To today's reader, who has gone through the school of suspicion, this principle may seem overly neutral, even devoid of any commitment to the actual search for truth, or even downright foreign to the critical spirit that must define philosophical activity. However, if we consider, for example, fictional or autobiographical texts, in which subjective experience is irreducible to the experiences of others, we realize the validity and usefulness of this principle. Obviously, its universal adoption is not desirable. The principle of charity of the reading public can easily be exploited by authors interested in imposing their own ideologies, falsifying reality through discourse, and manipulating others.

Authorial intention, more complex than the author himself

In his lectures on hermeneutics in the early 19th century, F.D.E. Schleiermacher shows that the purpose of hermeneutics is understanding, defined as the reconstruction (*Nachkonstruieren*) of the thought from which the discourse arose. To achieve this goal, of course, methodical interpretation is necessary, but the new emphasis on the problem of understanding will pave the way for hermeneutical projects with a much deeper philosophical tone than the previous ones, which were limited to the ordering of a set of rules of interpretation. Discourse, Schleiermacher points out, presupposes both a prior thought and an already formed language, without which thought would not exist and could not be communicated. Thus, any discourse relates both to the totality of the language in which the author writes and to the totality of the author's thought.¹⁰ For this reason, there must also be two sides to interpretation. According to Schleiermacher, grammatical interpretation aims to reconstruct both the objective (grammatical) side of a given language and the way in which the author transforms the already constituted language, which is a whole of possibilities, into an individualized discourse;¹¹ psychological (or technical) interpretation, on the other hand, presupposes understanding a foreign life in its entirety by transposing into the interiority of the other (divination, empathy) and by comparison to this interiority, which is necessary to reconstruct the unique moment of creation. The part-whole circularity is defining here. In both language and thought, the author transforms the infinity of possibilities into something finite, limited, determined. The interpreter has to retrace this path, but in the opposite direction: starting from something determined, he has to reconstruct the whole of the language and the whole of the thought from which the author's discourse arose.

Let us first note that Schleiermacher does not thematize the text as such, considering it to be a mere translation of the spoken discourse. Next, it is worth pointing out that reconstructing the two wholes of possibility is an infinite task. At the same time, the invocation of the circularity of understanding is closely linked to several presuppositions of the era. Conceived as a transition from an indeterminate whole to a determinate discourse, creation is similar to the way philosophers such as Fichte, Schelling, or Hegel described the manifestation of the self in the form of the world. At the same time, the idea that the part is evil if it is separated from the whole, that it has meaning only because the whole gives it meaning, is widespread

¹⁰ F.D.E. Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutik und Kritik*, herausgegeben und eingeleitet von Manfred Frank, 6. Aufl., Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp Verlag, 1995, pp. 77, 93.

¹¹ Cf. Jean Grondin, *L'universalité de l'herméneutique*, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1993, pp. 89-90.

in German Romanticism (Franz von Baader, Hölderlin, Hamann, Oken, Novalis)¹², but also in speculative mysticism (Meister Eckhart) and even in other hermeneutical projects of the time (Friedrich Ast, Friedrich Schlegel).

Because of Dilthey's sketch of the history of hermeneutics, Schleiermacher's main contribution has been considered to be the psychological side of interpretation, which involves understanding the other by a transposition into his interiority, achievable through empathy. This reception was taken up by Gadamer and Jean Grondin,¹³ but was criticized by historians of hermeneutics such as Manfred Frank and Matthias Jung, for whom empathy is closely linked to grammatical interpretation,¹⁴ and is only useful for understanding the author's style in comparison with other styles and with the main trends of the language.¹⁵

Because Romanticism discovers that the individual carries within himself the spirit of the time, the concept of authorial intention is expanded by Schleiermacher to include both the conscious side of the author's thought and the elements that remained unconscious to him, but without which his creation cannot be understood. The psychological interpretation therefore consists of understanding the creative act through the understanding of the historical context in which the author lived, using the personal histories (biographies and autobiographies), an idea which historicism has raised to the rank of a hermeneutic principle (August Boeckh, Johann Gustav Droysen, Wilhelm Dilthey, etc.). The interpreter must thus first aim to understand the author as well as he understood himself, in order to then understand him better than he understood himself.¹⁶ The discovery of the unconscious at that time must have played a decisive role in defining understanding as *besser Verstehen*. There is, however, an obvious inequality between the two tasks of interpretation (that of interpreting language and that of interpreting the psyche). The understanding of language has a real chance of success, whereas the complete understanding of the psyche is in principle unattainable. Moreover, there is an incongruity between the aim of elaborating a *Kunstlehre*, i.e. a set of rules of interpretation, a project which transfers the Cartesian-Kantian ideal of philosophy into hermeneutics, and the attempt to reconstruct the author's will to meaning, which remains largely unconscious even to him, a desire specific to Romanticism. Schleiermacher seems undecided about this dilemma. We can discover clear and

¹² Cf. Albert Beguin, *L'âme romantique et le rêve. Essai sur le romantisme allemand et la poésie française*, Paris, Le Livre de Poche, 1993.

¹³ Jean Grondin, *op. cit.*, pp. 95-97.

¹⁴ Matthias Jung, *op. cit.*, pp. 63-64.

¹⁵ Manfred Frank, „Einleitung“, in F.D.E. Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutik und Kritik*, ed. cit., pp. 52-53.

¹⁶ F.D.E. Schleiermacher, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

distinct rules for understanding language, but understanding the other requires rather an aesthetic capacity, an art defined by empathy and hermeneutic talent.

If for Schleiermacher the author must first be understood as he understood himself, and only later better than he understood himself, Fr. Schlegel spectacularly reverses this relationship. According to him, understanding the author better than he understood himself is more easily achievable, while understanding the author as he understood himself remains in fact unachievable. True understanding occurs when we identify the reasons why the author has understood himself only partially or not at all, and for this we must catch the errors and confusions he makes.¹⁷ For Fr. Schlegel, misunderstanding is present in all understanding, since there is no absolute understanding and no absolute truth.

Disappearances of the author: Some radical positions

The entry of the problem of the unconscious into hermeneutics opens up several possible theories that the histories of this discipline record under various names. One of them is the so-called hermeneutics of suspicion. In analyzing it, Foucault refers to Nietzsche, Freud, and Marx, authors that Paul Ricoeur also considers in a similar approach. Mircea Eliade, in his turn, also includes Freud, Marx and the structuralism in this interpretative practice.¹⁸ What these authors have in common is the presupposition – derived from the Romantic discovery of the unconscious and its first uses in hermeneutics – that the interpreter has access to the structure from which the author's thought and discourse originate, a structure that remains completely unknown to him. A double suspicion settles in this type of hermeneutics, as Foucault pointed out. First, the signs are no longer credible, their supposed fixity proving to be illusory. We must therefore investigate their origins, the interpretative process from which they arose, which includes distortions, concealments, errors. The interpretation of signs is, in this case, an unmasking of these falsifications, of the lies that man has come to consider truths (Nietzsche). For example, the fact that reason is nothing but an instinct which became stronger, as Nietzsche points out. By presenting itself as something other than what it really is, reason conceals the corporeality to which it actually belongs. Rational ideas

¹⁷ Cf. Ernst Behler, „Friedrich Schlegels Theorie des Verstehens: Hermeneutik oder Dekonstruktion?“, in Ernst Behler, Joche Hörisch (Hg.), *Die Aktualität der Frühromantik*, Paderborn, München, Wien, Zürich, Ferdinand Schöningh, 1987, pp. 148 sq.

¹⁸ Mircea Eliade, *L'Épreuve du labyrinthe. Entretiens avec Claude-Henri Rocquet*, Paris, Pierre Belfond, 1978, p. 155.

conceal an economic infrastructure (Marx) or a drive infrastructure (Freud). The virtues of this type of interpretation lie in the awareness of the illusions of the self, a necessary step towards self-understanding,¹⁹ but also in opening the subject to the multiple experiments that he makes on himself.²⁰ After Foucault, hermeneutics is only now detaching itself from semiotics.²¹ The consequence is that hermeneutic truth is no longer equivalent to the correctness of interpretation and adequate understanding, but is combined with the phenomenon of power. Interpretation is achieved when the interpreter identifies the field of power in which the author is situated, one constituted by discourses, texts and signifying practices. From this point of view, the author himself is formed within such a field. His autonomy and centrality are mere illusions derived from modern individualism, reason enough to announce the “death of the author” (Barthes). The author is nothing more than a random knot of a vast network of meanings, quotations, discourses, but also of bodily elements deformed by the interference of values, especially nihilistic ones (Nietzsche). The disappearance of the author in contemporary discourses has been compared to the thesis of the death of God, but also to that of the end of man. Instead of being explained by features such as the originality and authenticity of the author, all discourses “would then develop in the anonymity of a murmur.”²² The old questions about the authorial intention no longer make sense. “And behind all these questions, we would hear hardly anything but the stirring of an indifference: What difference does it make who is speaking?”²³

If exercised indiscriminately, the hermeneutics of suspicion can lead to an uncontrolled proliferation of interpretations, in which case limits must be imposed. Returning to the authorial intention can then be a saving solution. At the same time, we may witness the emergence of exaggerations of those ideological interpretations that use texts conveniently instead of interpreting them. The meaning can then be completely turned upside down with the purpose of manipulating the audience, the consequence of which can be the “colonization of the public sphere.”²⁴ By

¹⁹ Paul Ricoeur, *Du texte à l'action. Essais d'herméneutique II*, Paris, Éditions du Seuil, 1986, pp. 147-148.

²⁰ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future*, transl. by R.J. Hollingdale, London, Penguin Books, 2003, § 39.

²¹ Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Freud, Marx,” transl. by Jon Anderson and Gary Hentzi, in *Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology* (Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, Volume Two), ed. by James D. Faubion, transl. by Robert Hurley and others, New York, The New Press, 1998, pp. 269-278.

²² Michel Foucault, “What is an Author?,” in Paul Rabinow (editor), *Foucault Reader*, New York, Pantheon Books, 1984, p. 119.

²³ *Ibidem*, p. 120.

²⁴ Jürgen Habermas, *Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy*, transl. by William Rehg, Cambridge, Massachusetts, The MIT Press, 1996.

giving the impression that he knows much better than the author what the main function of speech is and what the structures are from which the speech originates, the interpreter ends up simply having a condescending attitude. This happens exactly as in the critical approach of historiography, when the past is judged only from the point of view of the present (Nietzsche). At other times, the interpreter adopts a detective attitude, simultaneously assuming the role of accuser, judge and committed observer. Last but not least, there is the situation where texts are seen as mere tools for a better self-description, and can be cut up and mixed according to the interests of the interpreter, as is the case with neopragmatism (Rorty). These interests, however, still represent the point of view of the present, the texts of the past being recontextualized according to the problems and solutions of our time, the authors themselves being able to be reeducated, metaphorically speaking, so that their ideas can be expressed in the language of our current theories.²⁵

In the late history of this theme, the presence of *intentio lectoris* is therefore increasingly felt. In relinquishing the hermeneutic modesty which characterized him in the earlier history, the interpreter shows an ever-increasing willingness to participate in the making of meaning, whether it is simply a matter of filling in the gaps of the text or of the construction of meaning itself, when the interpreter has the ambition to aggressively impose his own meaning. A moderate position is the dialogical one, similar to Socratic maieutics, when the interpreter, going beyond the author's statements, "will push through to what [the author] implicitly had to have in mind".²⁶ The unsaid of the text, that which the author intended to say but failed to say because of the prejudices of the time or his inability to think it through, must be brought out by using a tempered interpretive violence, one "animated and guided by the power of an illuminative idea" and through which the interpreter manages to connect to "the secret élan of a work".²⁷ In this hermeneutic scenario, the author and the interpreter are both equally finite, while sharing in the finitude of the text. The boundary that separates moderate interpretations, which are guided by an enlightening idea, from arbitrary or aberrant interpretations is difficult to specify. From a pragmatic point of view, both can have beneficial effects on the interpreter. And correctness has proven to be a good criterion in theory, but impossible to put into practice. The reason is illustrated by the previous historical sketch: the

²⁵ Richard Rorty, "Texts and lumps," in *Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth (Philosophical Papers, Volume 1)*, Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 78-92.

²⁶ Martin Heidegger, *Logic: the question of truth*, transl. by Thomas Sheehan, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2010, § 24, p. 257.

²⁷ Martin Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, transl. by James S. Churchill, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1965, § 35, p. 207.

authorial intention is not an exact idea, but a limiting idea whose meaning differs from one era to another and from one paradigm to another, depending on the guiding philosophical theses, metaphysical par excellence, which decisively mark every era and every paradigm of thought. Despite its various meanings, this limit-idea should have a regulative meaning, to use Kant's terms. Regardless of the function that the author's name may still have today, his will to express a meaning must remain a model for what is meant by the circulation of meanings and ideas in the public sphere, as well as a limit that the interpreter has no right to overcome in his seemingly increasingly aggressive desire to impose his own meaning.

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LOGICAL AND RHETORICAL STRUCTURE OF NEWS. CASE STUDY

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ABSTRACT. Usually, we read news to form opinions and expand our knowledge. However, especially in the past years, more and more publications are moving apart from being objective. Therefore, we get biased¹ knowledge. In this article, we aim to observe the way information is passed from a logical and rhetorical point of view in different publications. By this, we do not aim to evaluate the morality of the publications or journalists in questions, our aim is purely theoretical (i.e. logical and rhetorical). In order to be able to provide such an analysis, we picked different pieces of news with the same topic from various publications².

The chosen topic³ is irrelevant to the theoretical content, therefore we do not aim to focus on its political or social implications. The decision was made in order to have sufficient material to provide a proper theoretical analysis. It should also be added that any evaluative terms that are going to be used in this article (e.g. 'biased', 'subjective', 'not objective', 'one-sided', etc.) are strictly directed to a theoretical perspective, not a moral, social or political one. As already mentioned, our aim is as theoretical as possible: we are interested in the logical and rhetorical structure of a piece of information.

Keywords: logical fallacies, manipulation, rhetoric, arguments.

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¹ The term is not used with a derogatory connotation.

² Due to the fact that our common spoken language is English, we had to narrow the publications to those written in English.

³ It should be added that by no means we are supporting abortion bans by pointing out some fallacies used in supporting the other party. Our focus is on the logical structure of the articles, not on the political or sociological side the author is supporting.



I. The topic of the articles

On June 24, 2022 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled against a constitutional right to abortion. As a result, these days, at least 13 states banned abortion (McCann&all, 'Tracking the States Where Abortion is Now Banned'). The review was mostly heavily criticised and raised a support that has 'never been higher' (Tolentino, 'We're not going back to the time before Roe. We're going somewhere worse'). As one can imagine, the media jumped on the topic and it was heavily debated both nationally and internationally. Therefore, there are multiple sources for the same piece of information and this perfectly shows how the 'tone' of a piece of what should have been - at least in the beginning - an objective knowledge, quickly turned - as it was expected - into biased and subjective information.

We are mainly going to focus on three different articles:

- (1) 'We're not going back to the time before Roe. We're going somewhere worse' by Jia Tolentino, in *The New Yorker*, June 24, 2022.
- (2) 'What's happening with abortion legislation in States across the country' by Sophie Kasakove, *The New York Times*, June 28, 2022.
- (3) 'US supreme court overturns abortion rights, upending Roe v Wade', by Jessica Glenza, Martin Pengelly and Sam Levin, *The Guardian*, June 24, 2022.

II. The logical structure of news

Usually news articles are informative and argumentative. (2) and (3) are mostly informative. At most, it can be said that they aim to persuade the reader of the truthfulness of their information. (1), on the other hand, is persuasive (or manipulative, it depends on the used arguments).

Informative articles usually present the information in an objective manner, without having the author interfering. The author is present through their writing style or through the picked sources, but usually they do not want to make their presence sensed and alter the objectivity of their article. Some of the informative articles are simply descriptive. By descriptive we mean that they are focusing on presenting the situation, without trying to convince of any thesis. Such articles simply aim to convince the reader that what they read is true. Other informative articles have a secondary aim of convincing the reader of a specific thesis.

Argumentative essays or articles have different aims. They focus on convincing the reader of a specific thesis; usually, this thesis is different from a factual one - as

in the case of informative articles. Mostly the thesis is evaluative or action based. In order to properly support such a thesis, similar premises should be used. Meaning that from factual premises, those two kind of conclusions do not follow.

An argumentative essay can either follow a structure of an analytical essay (presenting both alternatives with strong and weak points of each side), or they can focus only on their thesis and try to persuade the reader into believing it.

There is a huge difference between persuasion and manipulation. While persuasion uses sound arguments and focuses on rationally convincing the reader, manipulation focuses on emotions and most of the time uses fallacious arguments. In this article we are going to focus on informal fallacies.

Therefore, the aim of this paper is to observe the differences between the three articles both in their logical and rhetorical structure, and if they are moving towards persuasion or manipulation in their try to convince the reader.

III. A short rhetorical analysis of the articles in question

Usually when a rhetorical analysis is made, some aspects have to be taken into account: purpose, audience, topic, the author(s) and the context. In this short overview on the rhetorical aspects of the articles in question, we are not going to analyse the authors, but we are going to take into consideration the other four.

When it comes to the **purpose** of an article, usually, the main focus is on the persuasive aspect; namely, convincing the reader. Two of the articles we are going to analyse in this case study - (2) and (3) - aim to convince about the truthfulness of the information presented. We called them informative, based on the fact that their main aim is to convince the reader of the truthfulness of the presented information. (1) aims to convince the reader that the decision regarding abortion is immoral and regressive. (1) is the only article that has an evaluative thesis; the other two papers have a factual one. Despite the fact that all the articles have a common ground - they focus on the same **topic** - their approach is different because of their purpose and the thesis they aim to argue for. While (2) and (3) aim to convince their readers that the presented information is truth, (1) has an evaluative thesis that goes beyond the events and their truthfulness.

Solely based on the fact that (2) and (3) are informative, we can assume that their **audience** might be a bit larger than (1)'s. However, (1) is the only article that has an audio support for the text; in this situation, its audience exceeds the limits of the other two articles' audiences, including people that might not have access to the others. (3) includes some video clips. Some of them are excerpts from

news that present short moments mainly with protesters or from protests break outs because of the decisions related to abortions. Another one is longer and it contains Biden's reaction to the news. These different types of evidence (both written and audio-video) allow the reader to have a more complete understanding of the discussed topic. Taking this into account, (3) might be said to have a larger audience than (2). However, based on their purpose, (2) and (3) should have a larger target audience than (1).

There are different ways in which a reader can get a more complete overview of the discussed subject. For example, (1) uses a piece of art by Chloe Cushman that is meant to grab the attention of the reader and support the main evaluative thesis argued throughout the article. It should be noted, that any form of emotional argument is in the manipulation's field. Persuasion is based on rational arguments, not emotional ones. Therefore, using art in order to support a specific thesis cannot be considered persuasion. We do not try to argue that manipulation is always negative, nor that it is the darker side of persuasion. Our conclusions and claims are not coming from a moral perspective. Both manipulation and persuasion are ways of convincing others of a specific thesis. Strictly from a logical point of view, the main difference between the two is solely their method: persuasion is rationally based, while manipulation is emotionally focused. Taking into account (1) is the only article that aims to support an evaluative claim, it is obvious it might move towards emotion slightly more than others - especially taking into account the topic of the articles.

Both (2) and (3) use at least one picture. However, none of them uses art. The pictures they used are either images of political figures or images of protesters. Any picture has an emotional impact on a viewer. A well-known political figure can have an impact on the reader. For example, a reader can accept something more easily if an authority figure is linked to a specific claim. On the other hand, they can reject a claim based on the fact that they do not agree with the person that is linked to that specific claim. Of course, such links are far from being causal ones; they are merely based on emotions and reactions to those emotions. Therefore, pictures have a stronger impact on a reader than just written words. On the other hand, one can say those pictures were meant to simply inform the readers. This can be the case, but we should keep in mind that a well-picked picture can also send some subliminal messages. For example, one of the pictures used in (3) shows a protester holding a sign that has written on it "Abort the Supreme Court". On one hand, the picture is meant just to inform the people about the ongoing events on that date. On the other hand, the quote from the sign the protester holds might be considered a subliminal message: that the author agrees with the protester, rather than they

agree with the Supreme Court's decision regarding the abortions. To conclude this, until further proven facts, we should consider pictures from an informative article as simple presentations of the events and give the authors the benefit of the doubt.

When it comes to the **context**, all articles were written as a reaction to the changes regarding abortions in the US from June 24, 2022. Two of the articles (1) and (3) were written on that exact same date; while (2) was published on June 28, 2022. The fact that (2) has some extra days since the events it is shown in the multitude of the external sources presented in the article as support to the claims made. However, both (1) and (3) have such external sources as well; but (2) abounds in them.

Therefore, the three articles have both common and different points when it comes to their rhetorical aspect. (1) stood out from the other two based not only on its purpose and thesis, but also based on audience (it includes an alternative for readers that are unable to access the written word) and different ways of convincing the audience (it uses art in order to provoke emotions in the readers).

IV. The logical analysis of the articles in question

Among the already mentioned articles, maybe the most objective and clear one - from a logical perspective - is (2). It was published on June 28, meaning the author had few days to prepare the information and make sure to have support for their claims. The article aims to be an objective one and sticks to presenting the situation in an unbiased manner. There is a slight tone of disapproval in the article, however, it cannot be considered biased or unjustified. There are few evaluative terms and those that occur are not moral ones, they are mostly used to express the gravity of the situation. The article is packed with information. Most of it is supported with links to other informational articles, both from the same journal and different ones. The majority of the sentences are simple declarative ones, objective and without the author interfering. From a logical perspective, there is not so much to analyse. The arguments are simple and most often based on previous information that is provided to the reader through the already mentioned links to external articles. There are few names mentioned, but they cannot be considered arguments based on authority, taking into account there is no underline on those specific parts and the mentioned persons are authorities in their domain.

To conclude, article (2) has a simple logical structure, being based on arguments with mostly factual conclusions. Taking into account the article focuses on presenting the facts, the author does not interfere in the information, thus, the reader has access to unbiased information, presented in a clear and correct manner.

When it comes to objectivity and logical correctness, (3) seems to be in between. It should be mentioned that the article was published in the day the decision was made, therefore is an informational one; its main aim is to provide an overview on the decision and its consequences. The journalist focuses on presenting the information, without interfering. Phrases are mainly used at past tense, to show no intrusion in any way with the piece of information presented; despite the fact that the article was written as soon as the decision was made, so everything was quite new at that point. The situation is characterised as ‘a tragic error’, or that it ‘had pointed America down “an extreme and dangerous path”’ (Levin&Glenza, ‘US supreme court overturns abortion rights, upending Roe v Wade’) and many others, but they are all quoted, they do not represent the authors’ own words. This might be a form of argument of authority. However, taking into account that the persons that were quoted are indeed authorities in the domain⁴, at most, it can be said that such quotes might have an emotional impact on the reader⁵.

The first paragraph of the article includes a sentence that contains two terms with negative connotation: ‘*reversal* of a long-settled law that will *fracture* reproductive rights in America’. Both ‘*reversal*’ and ‘*fracture*’ might be considered terms that have a negative implicature. In this situation, they might not be considered objective. However, taking into account the tone of the article - and the inserted quotes - it rather looks like the authors are trying to follow the common sense’s path, not necessarily interfering in the provided information. In such situations, one can gain and keep their benefit of the doubt as long as there is not an abundance of such situations. In the case of this article, the occurrence of authors’ own evaluative terms are quite rare. In the first half of the article, the authors are focusing on presenting the main politicians’ reactions to the news, while in the second half, consequences and reactions to the decision are brought to attention. It should also be added that some evaluative terms that are used, are supported by evidence - mostly appealing to authority.

⁴ It should be noted that we did not go in depth with checking the truthfulness of the quotes used in the discussed articles. Because our discussion is merely theoretical, we do not aim to present an adequate history of the subject. We will simply assume the truthfulness of the information written in these articles.

⁵ Argumentum ad verecundiam implies that an influential person is used as an authority in a domain that persons has no competency in. Such an argument is meant to have an emotional impact on the person that is used on, but it usually presents conclusions that are poorly supported - because of the fact the picked authority has no expertise in that domain. As examples, one can take any commercial that includes a star (e.g. A movie star that recommends a toothpaste).

There is one example of an obvious argument of authority - despite the fact that, once again, the quoted person is indeed an authority in the domain. The decision is considered:

‘one of the most consequential in generations⁶. It will have profound, immediate and enduring consequences for tens of millions of women and other people who can become pregnant. Ripple effects could play out over decades.’ (Levin&Glenza, ‘US supreme court overturns abortion rights, upending Roe v Wade’)

In order to support such a strong claim, a visiting professor of constitutional law is quoted. However, the quotes are not relevant premises to support such an evaluative claim. At most, the quotes can be considered a reaction to the news, not premises to support the idea that the decision is one of the most consequential in generations. The first sentence of the paragraph (i.e. one of the most consequential in generations) might be supported from an economic and social point of view by the following paragraphs - where, once again, arguments of authority are used.

A form of the argumentum ad hominem is presented to explain Thomas’ decision to not mention interracial marriage. Such arguments are not really relevant or helpful in order to support their conclusion.

The final part of the paper mainly consists in quotes, therefore we are not going in depth with its analysis. To conclude, this article aims to provide an objective overview of the situation. The authors rely mostly on quotes and studies. Multiple cases of argumentum ad verecundiam are used in the article. Despite the fact that each time the quoted influential person represents an authority in the domain, the abundance of the already mentioned fallacy might raise some questions; especially taking into account there was a situation when this fallacy was combined with an erroneous case of supporting an evaluative premise. The only occurrence of argumentum ad hominem is not necessarily intended against the mentioned person, but rather tries to explain his actions.

(1) was also written on the day the decision was made - June 24, 2022. However, this article is quite different from the other two⁷, starting with the title. Both (2) and (3) had quite objective headlines: (2) was focusing on the main

⁶ A slight form of hasty generalisation can be sensed here.

⁷ Taking into account the journal where it was published - *The New Yorker* - usually publishes essays, it should be noted that the mention is not an evaluative one, is simply a declarative one. By it we do not aim to consider this article lower or upper than the others, we picked it because it is different from the others two and we wanted to underline how its logical structure varies from the informative articles that were already discussed.

question that was answered in the article, while (3) simply stated what was going on. (1), on the other hand, has as a title an evaluative sentence. Starting with the title, (1) wants to point out this article does not want to simply inform people, it wants to convince people to adopt a specific position and attitude regarding the situation.

Because this article has a different aim than the other two, we are not going to focus on that, we are rather interested in its logical structure and the way it uses arguments and their soundness. At first sight, there are some evaluative statements that are not supported by premises. For example: "(...) this is plainly an era of repression and regression, in which abortion rights are not the only rights disappearing" (Tolentino, *'We're not going back to the time before Roe. We're going somewhere worse'*). However, if we take a closer look, this statement is supported by four external links that are meant to provide arguments for it.

The author is also quite careful with the used information: even though there are some phrases meant to catch the attention, they are explained afterwards and the information is correctly presented. Let us take for example the following paragraph:

"Support for abortion has never been higher (*authors' note: here is an external link to support this claim*), with more than two-thirds of Americans in favor of retaining Roe, and fifty-seven per cent affirming a woman's right to abortion for any reason." (Tolentino, *'We're not going back to the time before Roe. We're going somewhere worse'*)

The catchy part is that 'two-thirds of Americans' are in favor of abortion, but without any other explanation, this would have been a misleading sentence, since it is plainly false. The fact that the author added not only a direct source to the statement, but also some details to explain it further, changed that status of the sentence. It does not work solely as a catchy phrase, it rather becomes an informative one.

However, the article contains some logical fallacies. We are going to mention few of them. There are forms of argumentum ad baculum⁸, as:

⁸ There are more instances of this kind of arguments. For example: "(...)state-level anti-abortion crusades have already turned pregnancy into punishment", "Search histories, browsing histories, text messages, location data, payment data, information from period-tracking apps - prosecutors can examine all of it if they believe that the loss of a pregnancy may have been deliberate", "Some of the women who will die from abortion bans are pregnant right now" and many others. We are not going to point out a complete list, since it is not the aim of this article. We are going to point out the main fallacies used with at least one example, in order to fulfil the main interest of this paper.

“Anyone who can get pregnant **must now face the reality** that half of the country is in the **hands of legislators** who believe that your personhood and autonomy are conditional—who believe that, if you are impregnated by another person, under any circumstance, you have a legal and moral duty to undergo pregnancy, delivery, and, in all likelihood, **two decades or more of caregiving, no matter the permanent and potentially devastating consequences for your body, your heart, your mind, your family, your ability to put food on the table, your plans, your aspirations, your life.**” (Tolentino, *‘We’re not going back to the time before Roe. We’re going somewhere worse’*) (*authors’ bold*)

There are at least two fallacies in this paragraph. The first one was already mentioned: argumentum ad baculum. This argument appeals to emotions and tries to inspire fear in the reader. The bolded parts are the ones we consider to fulfil this aim. However, the second part of the argument may be considered a form of slippery slope. Slippery slope argument presents a chain reaction resulting in an undesirable end for a specific action. Such an argument implies that the succession of events has no direct evidence to the starting point (i.e. in this case, the fact that abortion becomes illegal). A slight form of false dilemma is also used in the paragraph. Women are presented with two choices: either they have the right of abortion or they are going to support ‘devastating consequences’.

The article also contains some not so obvious forms of argumentum ad hominem. There are some situations where evaluative terms towards a specific group, that are not necessarily required to support a claim are added. For example: “this approach has been steadily tested, **on low-income minorities in particular**, for the past four decades” (Tolentino, *‘We’re not going back to the time before Roe. We’re going somewhere worse’*) (*our bold*) The bolded part might be taken as an argumentum ad hominem. However, it might have been added to restrict the generality of the claim and in that situation, it is not fallacious.

It seems that the whole article presents just the negative consequences of the legal decision. Usually when such a legal (political or social) change is faced, an article (especially one that has the form of an essay) has a structure of an analytical essay: it presents both sides, while obviously supporting one of them. Such a structure provides the reader the freedom of choice and is more likely to be characterised as unbiased or even objective. It is obvious what Tolentino aimed in this article, but the author’s choice of structuring and supporting the thesis of the article, moved it towards the manipulation side, rather than keeping it in the persuasion’s field. It should also be added that because of this structure, one could consider that the author created a straw man by just pointing out the extreme negative consequences of abortion bans.

To conclude, (1) has a different form and aim from the other two articles. This one is an essay that wants to convince people that abortion bans represent a huge step backwards, meaning it aims to support an evaluative statement. The statement is mostly supported by factual examples that are insufficient in order to argue for an evaluative claim. However, the article abounds in evaluative terms: some of them are argued for and explained, while some of them lack such an explanation and are simply mentioned. This article is the most powerful one from the three mentioned. By powerful we are referring to its capacity of convincing people. It should also be noted that part of this power might come from the fact that the essay aims to convince through the appeal to emotions, which is closely linked to manipulation. Despite the fact that it abounds in fallacies and its logical structure is far from being perfect, it does its job: not only it presents the situation, but it also manages to underline the dark possible consequences of abortion bans and convince people.

To sum up, the aim of this article was to focus on the logical structure of three different articles. In order to do so, we picked articles with different aims: two of them were informative, while one aimed to convince of an evaluative thesis. We noticed that one of the informative ones had a clear and sound logical structure and managed to fulfil its aim. The other one had some instances of informal fallacies - mainly argumentum ad verecundiam. Both of them provided information that was unbiased by the authors' perspective, their authors did not directly interfere in presenting the data. The other discussed article had a different aim and structure than the two already mentioned. (1) is an essay that underlined the negative consequences of abortion bans and tries to convince the reader that the decision was far from being the best one. Because the thesis that the author aims to argue for is an evaluative one, this article abounds in evaluative terms - while (2), for example, lacked in such terms. Some of these terms are supported, while some are not backed. The main consequence entailed by these differences consists in the fact that (1) - mainly because it appeals to emotion in order to convince - can be considered quite manipulative, while (3) is between persuasive and manipulative and (2) is simply descriptive - based on persuasion.

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EINFÜHLUNG – INTERPRETATION – EINVERSTEHENDE APPERZEPTION. VERSUCH EINER KRITISCHEN ERKLÄRUNG DER ERSTEN AUSARBEITUNG EINER FREMDWAHRNEHMUNGSTHEORIE EDMUND HUSSERLS*

Paul Gabriel SANDU**

ABSTRACT. *Empathy – Interpretation – (Interpreting) Apperception. Attempts to Explain Husserl's First Steps Towards a Theory of Intersubjectivity.* The aim of this paper is to investigate Husserl's first steps towards a theory of intersubjectivity and his early attempts to solve the intricate questions pertaining to the constitution of alter ego. The starting point of this investigation is Husserl's critical examination of the concept of empathy theorized by Th. Lipps and his contention that empathy cannot be a passive and rather quasi-instinctive activity of the ego, but must be grounded in a kind of analogy between my own body and that of the other. This first attempt to explain in phenomenological terms how an ego can be aware of and perceive other things as egos is marred by difficulties that force Husserl to constantly rethink the question of the constitution of the alter ego and propose new ways of conceiving the special kind of apperception that opens up the possibility of perceiving the others as alter egos.

Keywords: pure ego, alter ego, empathy, embodiment, interpretation, apperception.

Einleitende Bemerkungen

Lange bevor die Aufgabe der Abfassung einer Theorie der Intersubjektivität ins Zentrum des Denkens Husserls rückte und zu einer der dringlichsten und überaus herausfordernden Aufgaben seiner transzendentalen Phänomenologie

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wurde, gab es immer wieder Ansätze und Versuche, über verschiedene Aspekte der Fremderfahrung Rechenschaft zu geben. Man macht sich sicherlich keiner Simplifikation schuldig, wenn man behauptet, dass Husserls Auseinandersetzung mit Lipps und seiner Theorie der Einfühlung – die 1905 ihren Anfang nahm und von Iso Kern ausführlich erörtert wurde¹ – ihm den entscheidenden Anstoß gab, sich mit diesem Problemfeld intensiv zu beschäftigen. Die von Lipps erhaltenen Impulse haben Husserl letztendlich dazu geführt, eine komplexe Theorie der Einfühlung zu entwickeln, die seinem Versuch, den ihm vorgeworfenen Solipsismus zu überwinden, viel besser dienen könnten. Die verschiedenen Gestalten dieser ersten Einfühlungstheorie Husserls werden in ihrer problemgeschichtlichen Entwicklung im Laufe dieser Arbeit zur Diskussion gebracht. Dabei ist jedoch nicht zu übersehen – wie Iso Kern schon überzeugend gezeigt hat² –, dass Husserls erster Kontakt mit der Thematik der Intersubjektivität bereits 1901 im Rahmen seiner Überlegungen zu Ausdruck und Zeichen (bzw. Anzeige) und ihrer Funktion in der kommunikativen Rede stattfand.³ Hier werden zwar das *alter ego* und die Fremdwahrnehmung nicht selbst zum Thema gemacht, sondern eher holzschnittartig behandelt, aber Husserls grobe Umrisse dieses Problemkreises bleiben in gewissen Hinsichten paradigmatisch für seine späteren Analysen zu diesem Thema.⁴

Was im Rahmen dieser vorläufigen Diskussionen zum Thema Fremdwahrnehmung nicht geklärt wird (oder gar werden kann) ist wie die Auffassung eines anderen als Person (also die Fremdwahrnehmung als solche) überhaupt möglich ist. Denn eine Sukzession von Lauten kann, so Husserl, nur dann als kundgebender Ausdruck verstanden werden, wenn der Hörende „die Intention des Redenden versteht“⁵. Anders gesagt, der Hörende ist nur dann imstande, den Ausdruck als Kundgebung psychischer Erlebnisse oder Akte – die dem Redenden vom Hörenden,

¹ Vgl. Kern, „Einleitung des Herausgebers“, in: E. Husserl, *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass*. Erster Teil. 1905–1920, hrsg. von Iso Kern, Den Haag, Martinus Nijhoff, 1973 (Hua XIII), XXVI.

² Ebd., XXIIff.

³ E. Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*. Zweiter Band. Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis (Hua XIX/1), hrsg. von Ursula Panzer, Den Haag, Martinus Nijhoff, 1984, 30 ff.

⁴ Folgte man zum Beispiel der Auffassung Derridas, so wäre man verpflichtet zuzugeben, dass Husserls Überlegungen zum Problem von Zeichen und Bedeutung, die im Rahmen der *Logischen Untersuchungen* angestellt werden, eine sogar maßgebende Rolle für die spätere Entwicklung seiner transzendentalen Phänomenologie gespielt haben (vgl. J. Derrida, *La voix et le phénomène. Introduction au problème du signe dans la phénoménologie de Husserl*, Paris, PUF, 2005, 1: „[...] une lecture patiente ferait apparaître dans les *Recherches* la structure germinale de toute la pensée husserlienne. A chaque page se laisse lire la nécessité – ou la pratique implicite – des réductions eidétiques et phénoménologiques, la présence repérable de tout ce à quoi elles donneront accès.“)

⁵ Hua XIX/1, 39.

so Husserl, „eingelegt werden“ – zu verstehen, insofern er den Sprechenden als „eine Person auffasst, die nicht bloße Laute hervorbringt, sondern zu ihm spricht, die also mit den Lauten zugleich gewisse sinnverleihende Akte vollzieht, welche sie ihm kundtun bzw. deren Sinn sie ihm mitteilen will“⁶. Aber auch wenn in diesen Texten das umfangreiche Problemfeld der Intersubjektivität und Fremdwahrnehmung nicht einmal erahnt wird, wird trotzdem eine Grundthese entwickelt, der Husserl immer treu bleiben und die er immer präziser umformulieren und ausdrücken wird, nämlich die These, dass die Erlebnisse und Bewusstseinsakte der anderen mir nicht originär oder unmittelbar, sondern immer nur indirekt gegeben sind. Dieser Unterschied der Gegebenheitsweisen, diese Differenz zwischen dem Urpräsenten und dem Appräsentierten wird „das Fundament der Intersubjektivitätstheorie“⁷ Husserls sein.

1. Der Begriff der Einfühlung – eine erste Umgrenzung. Husserls kritische Auseinandersetzung mit der Terminologie von Theodor Lipps

In einem der ersten Texte, der sich mit der Frage der Fremdwahrnehmung beschäftigt, nimmt Husserl die eben dargestellte These auf, um sie genauer zu formulieren: „Von Wahrnehmungen ausgehend führt mich das Denken zur Annahme eines empirischen Seins, das nicht wahrgenommen ist und nie wahrgenommen werden kann.“⁸ In diesen sogenannten Seefelder Manuskripten zieht Husserl zum ersten Mal eine Parallele zwischen den empirischen Eigenschaften der Dinge, die nie wahrgenommen werden können, und der spezifischen Gegebenheitsweise des anderen Subjekts, stellt aber gleich fest, dass „die Sachlage bei fremden psychischen Phänomenen, bei fremden Erscheinungen [...] doch eine wesentlich andere“⁹ sei. Um diese indirekte Weise des Gegebenseins des anderen angemessen fassen zu können, wird Husserl später Ausdrücke wie Apperzeption oder Kompräsenz einführen, obwohl es weiterhin problematisch bleibt, wie diese Termini genau zu verstehen sind, wenn es um das fremde Bewusstseinsleben geht.

Die für das Thema der Fremdwahrnehmung zentrale Frage wird in aller Deutlichkeit erst in einem Text vor 1909 formuliert, der nur in einer späteren Ausarbeitung Husserls erhalten ist; sie lautet: „Wie kann in einem reinen Bewusstseinsstrom in Gestalt irgendeines seiner Erlebnisse eine Erfahrung, und

⁶ Ebd., 39f.

⁷ Vgl. Theunissen, *Der Andere. Studien zur Sozialontologie der Gegenwart*, Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1965, 47.

⁸ Hua XIII, Text Nr. 1 (1905), 2.

⁹ Ebd., 3.

somit ein Erfahrungswissen, auftreten von einem anderen Bewusstseinsstrom, bzw. von Erlebnissen und Erlebnissubjekten, die fremde sind?“¹⁰ Diese „Erfahrung von einem anderen Bewusstseinsstrom“ kann offenbar keineswegs von der Wahrnehmung vermittelt, bestätigt oder zu einer Wahrnehmung zurückgeführt werden kann, wie beispielsweise im Falle der Wahrnehmung eines räumlichen Dinges. Denn es besteht immer die Möglichkeit, ein Ding aus anderen Perspektiven anzuschauen und das, was zunächst nur mitgegeben und indirekt wahrgenommen ist, unmittelbar wahrzunehmen; oder, um mit Husserl zu sprechen, „die Dinge ihrem Sein und Wesen nach haben kein Geheimnis, [...] keine Mysterien; sie sind nur nicht völlig bekannt“¹¹. Die anderen aber, im Gegenteil, haben wohl ein „Geheimnis“, d.i. eine phänomenologisch nicht direkt aufzuschließende Dimension. Dennoch aber „sehe“ ich immer die anderen, setze das Sein des anderen immer voraus. Wie ist das überhaupt möglich, wenn Persönlichkeit kein „phänomenologisch vorfindliches Datum ist, [sondern ein] nicht phänomenologisches Moment“¹²? Die Schwierigkeit, die Husserl jetzt zu lösen versucht, kann folgendermaßen umformuliert werden: Wie kann ein non-phänomenologisches Moment *par excellence* doch phänomenologisch einholbar sein, wie kann das Bewusstsein (der Bewusstseinsstrom) des anderen zur Gegebenheit gebracht werden?

Den Ausgangspunkt für die Suche nach einer Antwort auf diese Frage bildet der Begriff der Einfühlung, den Husserl zunächst gewissermaßen unkritisch von Theodor Lipps übernimmt, und den er ganz neutral und allgemein als Wahrsetzung (im Gegensatz zur Wahrnehmung) versteht. Die Idee dahinter ist, dass die Erscheinung anderer Körper oder Leiber (die Begriffe werden zuerst fast synonym angewendet) „auf psychische Erlebnisse hin[weisen], die nicht Einheiten meiner Erscheinungen in demselben Sinn, so wie auch meine vergangenen psychischen Erlebnisse nicht bloß Einheiten [...] dinglicher Art sind“¹³, sondern die mir nur durch Einfühlung zugänglich sind. Die Erklärung Husserls scheint *prima facie* nichts anderes zu sein als *obscurum per obscurius* zu erklären. Denn man muss sich gleich fragen, wie Einfühlung (als Wahrsetzung) konkret zu verstehen ist, ob sie für das Verstehen der Fremdwahrnehmung tatsächlich etwas Neues bringt oder nicht, und wie ich eigentlich zur Wahrnehmung anderer Dinge als Leiber komme, die für eine solche Einfühlung Anlass sind. Es ist ziemlich klar, dass der Begriff der Einfühlung in diesem Kontext ganz allgemein als eine Art formale Anzeige für die Fremderfahrung

¹⁰ Ebd., 29.

¹¹ Ebd.10.

¹² Ebd., 20.

¹³ Ebd., 6.

als solche benutzt wird und nur analog, durch die Parallelisierung mit Erinnerung¹⁴ oder Erwartung ansatzweise erklärt wird. Was aber die Möglichkeit der Apperzeption anderer Dinge als Leiber angeht, die übrigens als notwendige Bedingung jeder Einfühlung fungiert¹⁵, so ist Husserls Erklärung plausibler und bildet den Keim seiner späteren Versuche, dieses Problem zu klären. Auch wenn mir andere Leiber anschaulich nicht gegeben wären, hätte ich laut Husserl trotzdem die Möglichkeit, mir analog „eine Vorstellung eines anderen Dinges [zu] bilden, das leibartig wäre“¹⁶. Anders gesagt bin ich imstande, soweit mir mein eigener Leib (unmittelbar) gegeben ist, andere Dinge als Leiber – d.h. psychophysische Einheiten, deren unterste Stufe die schlichte Körperlichkeit ist – durch Analogie mit meinem Leib zu apperzipieren.

Die Begründung der Einfühlung in der analogisierenden Konstitution des fremden Leibkörpers, ist aber einer der wesentlichen Punkte, in denen Husserl mit Lipps nicht mehr übereinstimmt und der als Ausgangspunkt der Entwicklung einer selbstständigen Theorie der Fremdwahrnehmung gesehen werden kann. Denn Lipps wendet sich ausdrücklich gegen eine in der Analogie wurzelnde Konzeption der Einfühlung¹⁷ und rechtfertigt seinen Vorbehalt mit dem Argument, erst durch die Beobachtung anderer werde ich „von der sichtbaren Beschaffenheit vieler eigener Lebensäußerungen überzeugt“¹⁸ und nicht erst aus der Beobachtung der „eigenen Lebensäußerung“, wie diese infrage gestellte Theorie der Einfühlung voraussetzen scheint. In einer Aufzeichnung aus dem Jahr 1913 weist Husserl dieses Argument als „unwesentlich“ zurück, mit der leicht nachvollziehbaren Behauptung, dass es nur für die Gesichtsgebärde anwendbar sei.¹⁹ Husserl weist jedoch nicht nur die lippsische Kritik des Analogieschlusses zurück, sondern vor allem einen bestimmten Teil seiner Konzeption der Einfühlung, die im Folgenden skizzenhaft erörtert werden soll. Lipps erklärt die Einfühlung als ein „Hineinprojizieren“ oder eine „Selbstobjektivierung“, die er auf einen „nicht weiter zurückführbaren Instinkt“ zurückführen will, der uns „unerklärbarerweise“ ermöglichen kann, verschiedene „sinnlich wahrgenommene Vorgänge und Lebensäußerungen – die wir dann nachträglich als Lebensäußerungen oder als sinnliche Erscheinung eines anderen

¹⁴ Ebd., 52.

¹⁵ Ebd., 6: „Fände ich in meinem Bewusstsein keine Erscheinungen, die ich als andere Leiber apperzipieren dürfte, so gäbe es für mich kein Du (und somit kein Ich im Gegensatz dazu) und umgekehrt. Ich hätte keine Vorstellung von einem anderen Bewusstsein oder würde nicht darauf verfallen, eine solche zu bilden.“

¹⁶ Ebd.

¹⁷ Th. Lipps, *Leitfaden der Psychologie*, Leipzig, Verlag von Wilhelm Engelmann 1906, S. 35.

¹⁸ Ebd.

¹⁹ Vgl. Hua XIII, 71.

„Individuums“ bezeichnen – [...] unmittelbar [...] als eine Lebensbetätigung, ein Fühlen, ein Wollen etc.“²⁰ zu empfinden.

Diese Auslegung der Einfühlung als eine Art Widerfahrnis oder als eine passive und quasi-instinktive Leistung des Ich, die eine unmittelbare Wahrnehmung des „fremden“ Ich veranlassen sollte, muss Husserl als zutiefst beunruhigend und schlechthin unphänomenologisch erschienen sein. Die Theorie der „unerklärlichen Instinkte“, die von Husserl einmal sogar als „Refugium der phänomenologischen Ignoranz“ charakterisiert wird, wird sofort abgelehnt, und nicht nur aus methodologischen Gründen, sondern auch, weil die Idee einer unmittelbaren Fremdwahrnehmung (wie im Falle der „Instinktlehre“) mit der Perspektive Husserls überhaupt nicht verträglich sein kann.²¹

Auch wenn für Husserl Lipps' Theorie der Einfühlung phänomenologisch im besten Falle rudimentär erscheinen musste, nimmt er die lippschen Argumente gegen den Analogieschluss (vor allem das zweite und das dritte Argument) sehr ernst. Das zeigt sich vielleicht vor allem darin, dass der Begriff einer in der Analogie gründenden Einfühlung ein wenig später für Husserl selbst problematisch wird und er sie anhand einer kritischen Auseinandersetzung mit der von Benno Erdmann formulierten Theorie des Analogieschlusses auf das fremde Ich als „Hauptsophisma“ bezeichnet und als Mystik ablehnt. Auf den ersten Blick ist die Begründung dieser Ablehnung nur die Tatsache, dass die Analogie eben das voraussetze, was sie eigentlich beweisen sollte, nämlich dass die inneren Erlebnisse des fremden Leibes auf dieselbe Art und Weise mit dem fremden Ich verknüpft sind „wie mein Ich mit meinem Leib“. ²² Genauer besehen ist aber das, was Husserl hier in erster Linie kritisiert, eben ein bestimmtes Verständnis der Analogie als ein Syllogismus, als eine Art „Schlussverfahren“, als ein Denkakt, der mich notwendigerweise zur Annahme des Seins des anderen führen sollte. Warum wehrt sich aber Husserl so energisch gegen eine solche Auffassung der Analogie? Die Antwort auf diese Frage ist schon in den früher erläuterten Überlegungen zum Thema der Fremdwahrnehmung gegeben, die im Rahmen der *Logischen Untersuchungen* entstanden sind. Hier besteht Husserl ausdrücklich darauf, dass die auf die psychischen Erlebnisse der fremden Person deutenden Anzeigen als *nichteinsichtiges Motiv* für die Vermutung vom Sein derselben und nicht als Beweis ihres Daseins dienen sollen. Das Sein des anderen kann nicht mit „logischer Apodiktizität“ gesetzt werden, eben weil es mir immer mittelbar und indirekt

²⁰ Lipps, *Leitfaden der Psychologie*, 36.

²¹ Vgl. auch Hua XIII, 242: „Lipps' Auffassung der Einfühlung kann ich mir nicht zu eigen machen. Mit unerklärlichen Instinkten kann ich nicht operieren.“

²² Vgl. ebd., 36f.

gegeben ist, also nicht durch einen Denkakt, sondern durch eine verähnlichende Apperzeption.²³ Wenn aber die Theorie des Analogieschlusses keine angemessene Erklärung der Einfühlung liefern kann, wie ist dann der Begriff der Einfühlung zu verstehen?

2. Entwicklung eines neuen Einfühlungsbegriffs

Um der eben beschriebenen Gefahr zu entkommen entwickelt Husserl in der Zeit zwischen 1905 und 1910 einen viel engeren Begriff der Einfühlung, der nicht mehr allgemein als Fremdwahrnehmung verstanden, sondern nur in Bezug auf Empfindungen und Empfindungsfelder angewendet werden kann. Wie soll man aber diesen engeren Begriff der Einfühlung verstehen? Husserl macht das am Beispiel der Auffassung einer fremden Hand deutlich, die bestimmte ästhesiologische Schichten „fordert“. Diese Schichten oder Empfindungsfelder sind analog zu den Empfindungsfeldern meiner Hand und sind demzufolge „in der Weise einer Vergegenwärtigung mitgesetzt“.²⁴ Es folgt daraus, dass eine notwendige Voraussetzung einer solchen Einfühlung der Empfindungsfelder, die Konstitution meines Leibes als „Urleibes“ ist, sodass „das fremde Feld mit dem meinen vergleichbar [ist], so wie ich mein erinnertes Tastfeld mit meinem jetzt erfüllten Gegenwartsfeld vergleiche. Und in der Deckung stellt es sich als ein anderes heraus.“²⁵ Diese vergegenwärtigende Mitsetzung des Empfindungsfeldes ist offensichtlich keine schlichte Wahrnehmung, sondern eine Appräsentation oder Apperzeption, die nicht als ein logischer Schluss, sondern als eine besondere „Form der Auffassung“, als „Ergänzung“ durch Einfühlung²⁶ verstanden werden sollte.

Auf Basis dieser Auslegung der Einfühlung versucht Husserl in einem späteren (um 1910 geschriebenen) Text doch eine stufenartige Theorie der Einfühlung zu entwickeln, deren unterste Stufe eben die Wahrnehmung des Leibes als empfindendem, d.h. der „Empfindungsfelder mit ‚einzelnen‘ Empfindungsdaten“²⁷ ist. Es gibt, Husserl folgend, noch drei Stufen der Einfühlung, die „Wahrnehmung der gegenständlichen Transzendenzen ‚darstellenden‘ Erscheinungen“ – oder anders gesagt, die Wahrnehmung verschiedener Ausdrücke des seelischen Lebens –, die „Wahrnehmung“ verschiedener Stellungnahmen, die auf diese Ausdrücke bezogen

²³ Vgl. auch E. Husserl, *Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge*, hrsg. von S. Strasser, Den Haag, Martinus Nijhoff 1973. (Hua I), 141.

²⁴ Vgl. Hua XIII, 40.

²⁵ Ebd.

²⁶ Ebd., 45f.

²⁷ Ebd., 62.

sind, und letztendlich die „Wahrnehmung‘ des empirischen Subjektes“²⁸, d.h. des *alter ego* und seiner Zustände. In diesem Zusammenhang kann die Rede von Wahrnehmung jedoch verwirrend sein – auch wenn das Wort in Anführungszeichen gesetzt wird –, da es sich hier eigentlich überhaupt nicht um eine (sinnliche) Wahrnehmung, sondern eher um eine „Wahrsetzung“ oder Apperzeption handelt.

Diese Idee einer stufenartigen Einfühlung und die Behauptung, dass die erste Stufe der Fremdwahrnehmung aus „d[er] Erfassung des fremden Körpers als empfindlichen“²⁹ besteht, sodass das Verstehen aller „Ausdrücke des Seelischen“ und sogar die „Wahrnehmung‘ des empirischen Subjektes“ von dieser grundlegenden Stufe der Einfühlung ermöglicht wird³⁰, ist eine Idee, der Husserl bis 1913 treu blieb. Ob ein solches Modell überhaupt zu tragen vermag, darf allerdings bezweifelt werden. Denn diese Idee, dass „ein Leib schon da sein [muss], damit sich in ihm, in seinen wechselnden leiblichen Vorgängen gewisser ausgezeichneten Art, Gedanken, Gefühle, Entschlüsse, Gespanntsein, Erwarten, Aufmerken etc. ‚ausdrücken‘ können“³¹, ist eigentlich alles andere als unproblematisch, eben weil sie die alte cartesische Dichotomie des *res extensa* – *res cogitans* wieder ins Spiel zu bringen scheint – eine gefährliche Dichotomie, die Husserl später ausdrücklich zu vermeiden versucht.³² Darüber hinaus bleibt die Frage, was einen Leib zu einem Leib macht, wenn „das Auffassen der ‚Äußerung‘, des ‚Ausdrucks‘ seelischer Akte und Zustände schon durch die Auffassung des Leibes als Leibes [vermittelt ist]“³³, gewissermaßen unbeantwortet. Ist es nicht vielmehr so, dass, sobald verschiedene Bewegungen eines Körpers als Äußerung oder Ausdruck bestimmter seelischer Akte gedeutet werden, der Körper selbst als beseelt, d.h. als Leibkörper gesehen werden muss? Ist die Erfassung des fremden Körpers als empfindlichen tatsächlich die erste Stufe der Einfühlung, die uns letztendlich die „Wahrnehmung“ des anderen Subjekts ermöglicht, oder muss man, sobald man von einem Leib spricht, eigentlich schon ein in ihm „waltendes“ *alter ego*, das diesen Leib „beseelt“, voraussetzen?³⁴ Denn Empfindungsfelder und vor allem Empfindungen sind eigentlich nicht im Leib

²⁸ Ebd.

²⁹ Kern, „Einleitung des Herausgebers“, in: Hua XIII, XXVIII.

³⁰ Hua XIII, 70.

³¹ Ebd., 62 f.

³² Vgl. z.B. ebd., 69.

³³ Ebd., 70.

³⁴ In einem späteren Textfragment (von 1914 oder 1915) scheint Husserl selbst diese Auffassung zu vertreten. Vgl. Hua XIII, 239 f.: „Der Mensch hat eine Leiblichkeit, oder sagen wir zunächst, er hat eine Körperlichkeit, und damit ist er Glied der Natur. Der Nebenmensch hat einen Leib, der mir gegeben ist wie jedes Naturobjekt. Leib ist er aber durch die einverständene (und sich in einverstehenden Akten weiter ausweisende) Geistigkeit.“

lokalisiert, wie Husserl selbst oft zuzugeben scheint³⁵, und wenn wir über Empfindungen des Leibes sprechen, meinen wir eigentlich die Empfindungen des Ich. Alle möglichen Empfindungen sind *meine* Empfindungen, d.h. Empfindungen eines *ego*. Die Hand oder die Augen sind nicht eine Art Werkzeuge, die tasten oder sehen können, sondern das *ego*, das Ich sieht mit den Augen und tastet mit der Hand.³⁶ Anders gesagt kann ich eines Leibesteils Empfindungsfelder oder Empfindungen empfinden nur insofern mir das andere *ego* als solches durch eine Art Appräsentation (Einfühlung) schon gegeben ist. Das würde aber natürlich heißen, dass diese stufenartige Konzeption der Einfühlung, die früher grob skizziert wurde, in einem *circulus vitiosus* gefangen ist.

In einem sehr bedeutenden Text von 1910/11, der den Titel „Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie“ trägt und als Vorlesung im Wintersemester 1910/11 gehalten wurde, scheint sich Husserl selbst der eben formulierten Kritik anzuschließen, indem er wortwörtlich behauptet, dass „Freude und Trauer nicht im Herzen [sind], so wie das Blut im Herzen ist, Tastempfindungen nicht in der Haut sind wie Stücke ihres organischen Gewebes“. ³⁷ Er erklärt aber nicht weiter, wie genau, wenn überhaupt, dieses „Lokalisationsproblem“ zu lösen ist. Demzufolge ist nicht auszuschließen, dass nicht nur die im Wintersemester 1910/11 vollzogene Erweiterung der Reduktion auf die Intersubjektivität, sondern auch und vor allem der aporetische Charakter dieser oben skizzierten Konzeption der Einfühlung eine neuere und tiefergehendere Auffassung derselben forderte. Somit gilt es nun, die selbstkritische Feststellung Husserls, dass nicht die Einfühlung verschiedener Empfindungen oder Empfindungsfelder, sondern nur „die Nullerscheinungsweise eines Körpers die Auffassung [derselben] als Leib fordern [kann]“³⁸, unter die Lupe zu nehmen.

3. Erste Ausarbeitung einer Theorie der Fremdwahrnehmung

3.1. Die Rolle der Leiblichkeit in der Konstitution des *alter ego*

Schon in den ersten Paragraphen der im Wintersemester 1910/11 gehaltenen Vorlesung *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, in der die Untersuchung der Grundverfassung des Bewusstseins angekündigt wird, widmet sich Husserl der

³⁵ Hua XIII, 43.

³⁶ In einem Manuskript von 1914 oder 1915 sagt Husserl ausdrücklich: „[...] *ich* empfinde da Berührung, *ich* nehme mit diesem Organ tastend die Rauigkeit wahr, *ich* sehe mit den Augen etc.“ (Hua XIII, 272, Herv.d.V.). Eine ähnliche Argumentation wird auch in einem Forschungsmanuskript aus dem Jahr 1931 entwickelt (vgl. Hua XV, 293).

³⁷ Hua XIII, 115.

³⁸ Ebd., 329.

verworrenen Frage nach der Leiblichkeit des Ich. Er geht von der Feststellung aus, dass jedes Ich sich „jederzeit als Zentrum (s)einer *Umgebung* [findet]“. ³⁹ Nicht nur seine Gedanken, Erinnerungen oder Gefühle sind keinem anderen außer ihm zugänglich, sondern auch seine ganze dingliche Umgebung ist immer um ihn und ihn alleine „gruppiert“ ⁴⁰. Dem Ich ist aber nie seine ganze Umwelt durch unmittelbare Wahrnehmungen zugänglich, sondern nur ein bestimmter Teil derselben, eben weil das Ich, ohne mit seinem Leibkörper zu koinzidieren, immer verleiblicht ist und alle möglichen oder wirklichen Wahrnehmungen, alle Dingerscheinungen nur in Bezug auf diesen einen Leib – also in bestimmten Abschattungen – denkbar sind. ⁴¹ Das verleiblichte Ich wird daher als Zentrum seiner raumzeitlichen Umgebung gedacht, als Mittelpunkt oder „als Nullpunkt des Koordinatensystems [...], von dem aus es alle Dinge der Welt, die schon erkannten oder nicht erkannten, betrachtet und ordnet und erkennt“ ⁴².

Dank der natürlichen Beweglichkeit des Leibkörpers ist dieser Mittelpunkt auf keinen Fall bloß statisch, sondern dynamisch zu verstehen: Ich kann meine Stellung im Raum ändern, von hier nach dort gehen und eine andere Perspektive auf die Dingwelt haben, damit bin ich aber keineswegs mein „absolutes Hier“ losgeworden, sondern verwandle nur das Dort in einen neuen „Nullpunkt der Orientierung“, in ein neues „absolutes Hier“. ⁴³ Die ganze Analyse der Räumlichkeit des Daseins – und vor allem der Begriff der Ausrichtung –, die Heidegger in *Sein und Zeit* ⁴⁴ ausarbeitet, verdankt sich höchstwahrscheinlich diesen Überlegungen Husserls zur Leiblichkeit und räumlichen Lokalisation des Ich, die eigentlich schon 1907, in der berühmten Vorlesung *Ding und Raum* entwickelt worden sind. ⁴⁵ Weil Heidegger überhaupt keinen Begriff des Leibes hat und die Verleiblichung des

³⁹ Ebd., 112, Herv.i.O.

⁴⁰ Ebd., 113.

⁴¹ Vgl. Ed. Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie*. Zweites Buch: Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution, hrsg. von Marly Biemel, Den Haag, Martinus Nijhoff, 1952. (Hua IV), 56: „So hat also jedes Ding, das erscheint, Orientierungsbeziehung zum Leib, und nicht nur das wirklich erscheinende, sondern jedes Ding, das soll erscheinen können.“

⁴² Hua XIII, 116.

⁴³ Vgl. auch Ed. Husserl, *Analysen zur passiven Synthesis. Aus Vorlesungs- und Forschungsmanuskripten. 1918–1926* (Hua XI), hrsg. von Margot Fleischer, Den Haag, Martinus Nijhoff 1966, 298: „Wie immer sich die Dinge bewegen und wie immer mein Leib sich bewegt, an diesem allgemeinsten Erscheinungsmodus ändert sich nichts, der Leib bleibt Zentrum, und die sonstigen Dinge bleiben außerhalb.“

⁴⁴ Vgl. Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, Tübingen, Max Niemeyer Verlag 1967, §23 und §24.

⁴⁵ Vgl. z.B. E. Husserl, *Ding und Raum* (Hua XVI), hrsg. von Ulrich Claesges, Den Haag, Martinus Nijhoff 1973, S. 328.

Daseins im Rahmen von *Sein und Zeit* nicht einmal wirklich problematisiert, bleiben seine Überlegungen letztendlich nur von den Analysen Husserls her verständlich.⁴⁶

Diese eben skizzierte Auffassung des Leibes wird einige Jahre später⁴⁷ eine zentrale Rolle für eine neue Umgrenzung des Begriffs der Einfühlung und für die Grundlegung einer wirklichen Theorie der Fremdwahrnehmung und Intersubjektivität spielen⁴⁸, denn die Leiblichkeit wird jetzt nicht mehr über die Möglichkeit, einem Körper Empfindungen oder Empfindungsfelder einzufühlen, definiert, sondern radikal anders, d.h. vom Ich her, als Nullpunkt des Koordinatensystems gefasst. Als Zentrum meiner Umwelt, die mir nur leiblich zugänglich ist, ist mir mein Leib aber primär in einer „inneren Erscheinung“⁴⁹, in einer Nullerscheinung gegeben. Die Nullerscheinungsweise meines Leibkörpers, der mir immer unmittelbar durch Selbstwahrnehmung und Selbsterscheinung⁵⁰ gegeben ist, wird stark mit der Erscheinungsweise aller anderen Körper kontrastiert, die mir immer in äußerer Erscheinung gegeben sind. Sogleich erwächst die Frage, inwiefern diese Unterscheidung der Sache angemessen ist, denn mein Leib ist mir auch (wenigstens teilweise) in äußeren Wahrnehmungen gegeben: Ich kann meine Hände sehen, meinen Herzschlag hören usw. Diese Frage, die auch Husserl beschäftigt hat, versucht er folgendermaßen zu beantworten: „[M]ein Leib ist zunächst Körper so wie ein anderer, trotz seiner perzeptiven Nullerscheinungsweise, die faktisch nur für ihn bestehen kann und für ihn immerfort besteht. In diesem Faktum liegt eine einschränkende Regel, wonach [...] durch die perzeptive Nullerscheinungsweise andere Erscheinungsweisen meines Körpers motiviert sind.“⁵¹

Was es mit dem Begriff der Motivation auf sich hat und worauf er mit ihm hinauswill, ist Husserl selbst nicht ganz klar, denn an dieser Stelle gibt er uns keine weitere Erklärung dieses Terminus und merkt sogar in einer Fußnote an: „In diesem

⁴⁶ Für eine ausführlichere Erörterung dieses Problems vgl. P. Sandu, „Konstitution oder Deduktion des Eigenleibes? Paradoxien der Leiblichkeit in der transzendentalen Phänomenologie Husserls“, *Meta: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy* 10 (2), 317-332.

⁴⁷ Es handelt sich um ein Manuskript, das in den Jahren 1914 oder 1915 entstanden ist (vgl. Hua XIII, 250ff).

⁴⁸ Vgl. auch Hua IV, 81: „Man merkt, dass die Leibesauffassung eine besondere Rolle für die Intersubjektivität spielt [...]“.

⁴⁹ Vgl. Hua XIII, 261 f. In einem Forschungsmanuskript von 1921/22 nennt Husserl die Eigenleibapperzeption „urwesentlich“ und bestimmt sie als „die erste und [...] die einzige völlig originale“ Leibapperzeption (vgl. auch Ed. Husserl, *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass*. Zweiter Teil. 1921–1928 (Hua XIV), hrsg. von Iso Kern, Den Haag, Martinus Nijhoff 1973).

⁵⁰ Vgl. Hua XIII, 263. Der problematische Begriff der Selbstwahrnehmung kann hier nicht thematisiert werden.

⁵¹ Hua XIII, 258.

„motiviert“ liegt aber die Schwierigkeit. Wie ist diese Motivation verständlich?“⁵² Die Schwierigkeit, diesen Begriff zu definieren, liegt aber vielleicht darin, dass Husserl den unmittelbaren Charakter der Selbstwahrnehmung und Selbsterscheinung an dieser Stelle nicht ausführlich ausgearbeitet hat. In Anlehnung an Kern⁵³ liegt es aber jedenfalls nahe, zu sagen, dass Husserl in diesen Texten eine neue Auffassung dieses Begriffs entwickelt, die sich jetzt nicht mehr mit der Idee einer bloßen psychophysischen Erfahrung deckt, sondern eine Selbstwahrnehmungssphäre⁵⁴ meint, die „die Wahrnehmung ‚meiner‘ äußeren Körper ‚vom‘ Hier aus, [die] Gesamtheit der äußeren Erscheinungen, die zum Hier gehören [sowie] [a]lle auf meinen Leibkörper und auf meine spezifische Leiblichkeit und auf die Welt, die mir erscheint, und ihre Erscheinungen bezogenen (angeknüpften) [umschließt].“⁵⁵

Aber unabhängig davon, wie man diesen Begriff der Motivation und der Unmittelbarkeit der Selbstwahrnehmung versteht, ist es dennoch klar, dass die äußere Erscheinungsweise meines Leibkörpers keineswegs zur Konstitution desselben als meines Leibes, d.h. als „Träger der Sensualität“, beiträgt. Diese Konsequenz ergibt sich auch aus der Tatsache, dass durch solche äußere Wahrnehmungen keineswegs der ganze Leib, der Leib als Einheit gegeben wird, sondern nur bestimmte Aspekte desselben. Hiervon ausgehend sollte es natürlich eine Selbstverständlichkeit sein, dass ich meinen Leib gar nicht sozusagen „von außen“ sehen kann, ohne ihm die Leiblichkeit abzusprechen und ihn in einen bloßen Körper zu verwandeln. Ich kann mir aber nichtsdestoweniger vorstellen, nicht mehr hier, sondern woanders zu sein, nicht mehr diese Perspektive auf meine Umwelt, sondern eben eine andere zu haben – eine Vorstellung, die von Husserl als „widersinnig“ oder „unmöglich“ charakterisiert wird. Diese imaginierte Möglichkeit hat nichtsdestoweniger, so Husserl, einen Sinn, „nämlich sie hat den guten Sinn, dass eine ‚Verdoppelung‘ des Ich möglich ist, so wie eine Verdoppelung eines sonstigen Realen. [...] Es wird nämlich bei Vollzug dieser widersprüchlichen Vorstellung klar die Möglichkeit zweier Subjekte mit zwei Körpern.“⁵⁶

Auch wenn es einem Ich grundsätzlich unmöglich ist, gleichzeitig an zwei verschiedenen Orten zu sein, ermöglicht ihm eine solche Fiktion, sich ein anderes, ihm ähnliches Ich vorzustellen, das sich dort befinden könnte, wo sich das in der

⁵² Ebd.

⁵³ Vgl. Kern, „Einleitung des Herausgebers“, in: Hua XIII, XLIVf.

⁵⁴ Die Idee einer Eigenheitssphäre, die Husserl viel später entwickeln wird, hat ihren Ursprung in dem Begriff der Wahrnehmungssphäre, der hier allererst thematisiert wird.

⁵⁵ Hua XIII, 250.

⁵⁶ Ebd., 263.

Fantasie hinausgerückte Ich befindet.⁵⁷ Das fremde Ich wird also – wenigstens der Möglichkeit nach – als Analogon des in der Fantasievorstellung hinausversetzten Ich schon vor seinem wirklichen Erfahren gegeben. Jede Erfahrung eines fremden Körpers als eines fremden Leibes – und somit jede Erfahrung eines fremden Ich – wird demnach nur als Analogie mit dem „ich im Dort“ möglich, also nur insofern ich an es die Form der Nullerscheinung „heranbringen“ kann – was Husserl in einem Wort „Nullabwandlung“ nennt.⁵⁸ Das heißt aber natürlich nicht, dass die Fremdwahrnehmung eine Art Schlussfolgerung wäre, die sich auf die Analogie meines Leibes mit dem fremden zum Leib gewordenen Körper stützte, denn eine solche Konzeption der Analogie wurde von Husserl schon in seinen früheren Überlegungen zu diesem Begriff abgelehnt. Diese analogisierende Fremd(leib)wahrnehmung kann auch keine unmittelbare Wahrnehmung des anderen sein, sondern muss unbedingt als eine ganz einzigartige Appräsentation oder mittelbare Mitsetzung des anderen – was Elliston „mediated form of intentionality“⁵⁹ nennt – verstanden werden. Das Erfassen des fremden Leibes und die darauf gestützte Fremdwahrnehmung setzen also vielmehr eine „*Interpretation*“ eines dem meinen ähnlichen Leibkörpers als Leibes und damit als Trägers eines Ich (eines dem meinen ähnlichen)⁶⁰ voraus.

Was es mit diesem hier erwähnten Begriff der Interpretation auf sich hat, muss unbedingt näher untersucht werden. Zuerst gilt es aber noch einmal, die wesentliche Rolle des eigenen Leibes – in seiner zweifachen Funktion als Körper und Leib – für die Konstitution des anderen Leibes hervorzuheben: Der andere wird nur dank der Verleiblichung meines Ich erfahrbar und nur in „eine[r] leibliche[n] Erfahrung [...], weshalb Intersubjektivität als konkrete Beziehung zwischen Subjekten eine Beziehung zwischen Leibern ist“⁶¹. Auch wenn diese Ausdrucksweise Zahavis einigermaßen problematisch ist – denn die konkrete Beziehung zwischen Subjekten ist zwar durch die Leiber vermittelt und kann auf keine andere Weise entstehen, erschöpft sich aber keineswegs in einer leiblichen Beziehung –, das ändert nichts an seiner Feststellung, dass unsere Erfahrung eines Körpers als Leibes eines

⁵⁷ Vgl. auch Hua XIV, 143 f. In diesem Forschungsmanuskript von 1921/22 erwägt Husserl erneut die Bedeutung der „Umfiktion des Ich“ für die Frage der Fremdwahrnehmung und kommt zu dem Schluss, dass eine solche Umfiktion nicht nur die Möglichkeit, sich ein anderes Ich vor seiner wirklichen Erfahrung zu denken, „sondern sich eine Vielheit von Ich zu denken: also Bedingungen der Möglichkeit der Kompossibilität“, ist.

⁵⁸ Vgl. z.B. Hua XIII, 265.

⁵⁹ Fr. Elliston, „Husserl’s Phenomenology of Empathy“, in: ders./P. McCornick (Hg.), *Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals*, Indiana, University of Notre Dame Press 1977, 222.

⁶⁰ Hua XIII, 267, Herv.d.V.

⁶¹ D. Zahavi, *Husserl und die transzendente Intersubjektivität*, Dordrecht/Boston/London, Kluwer Academic Publishers 1996, 29.

anderen notwendigerweise voraussetzt, dass der andere selbst jenen Körper eben als seinen Leib erfährt.

3.2. Einfühlung und Analogie – Fremdwahrnehmung als eine besondere Art der Vergegenwärtigung

Die in der Nullabwandlung durch Analogie mit meinem Leibkörper konstituierte Fremdleichlichkeit hat sich als ein wesentliches Moment der Konstitution des *alter ego* erwiesen. Es wurde aber noch nicht hinreichend erklärt, wie genau ich „dazu ,komme“, wenn auch nicht mich als einen anderen zu setzen [...] so doch überhaupt einen anderen zu setzen und zunächst vorzustellen? Ein Ich, das ich nicht bin, das mein Objekt ist“⁶². Aber bevor man sich auf die Suche einer Antwort auf diese Frage begibt, muss man den eigentlichen Sinn dieser Frage in diesem ganz besonderen Kontext verstehen. Wie schon gesagt wurde, kann ein fremder Körper nur dann als Fremdleich aufgefasst oder konstituiert werden, wenn zwischen ihm und meinem Leib „im Dort“ eine Analogie nachgewiesen werden kann. Eine besondere Schwierigkeit einer solchen auf Analogie gestützten Wahrnehmung liegt auch darin, dass „nur Weniges vom Leiblichen jeweils wirklich in die Erscheinung fällt, nur Weniges in direkter Beseelung erscheint, während sehr vieles ,supponiert“, mit aufgefasst, mitgesetzt werden kann und mitgesetzt wird in mehr oder minder unbestimmt-vager Weise, was mitgesetztes Leibliches ist und mitgesetzten Sinn hat.“⁶³

Die Frage nach der Möglichkeit, „ein Ich, das ich nicht bin“ zu erfahren, ist also eigentlich nichts anderes als ein Versuch, diesen Begriff der Analogie und ihren Geltungsbereich verständlich zu machen. Husserls erster Schritt zur Verdeutlichung dieses Begriffs geht in die Richtung einer Präzisierung seiner Leistung. Nur ein Körper, der sich genauso wie mein Körper bewegt und benimmt, kann mir den Anlass geben, „mich in ihn hineinzusetzen, ihn mir als meinen Leib zu denken“⁶⁴. Diese Idee einer „dynamischen“ Analogie, die sich nicht in einer einzigen Erfahrung erschöpft, sondern auf eine Mannigfaltigkeit von aufeinander bezogenen weiteren Erfahrungen angewiesen ist, kommt am deutlichsten in den *Cartesischen Meditationen* zum Vorschein, wo Husserl diese Idee ganz präzise ausdrückt: „Der erfahrene fremde Leib bekundet sich fortgesetzt wirklich als Leib nur in seinem wechselnden, aber immerfort zusammenstimmenden *Gebaren*, derart, dass dieses seine physische Seite hat, die Psychisches appäsentierend indiziert, das nun in originaler Erfahrung erfüllend auftreten muss.“⁶⁵

⁶² Hua XIII, 289.

⁶³ Hua IV, 241.

⁶⁴ Hua XIII, 289.

⁶⁵ Hua I, 144, Herv.i.O.

Inwiefern ist jedoch diese Präzisierung des Begriffs der Analogie für die Erklärung der Fremdwahrnehmung nützlich, wenn ein „Analogieschluss“ von vornherein auszuschließen ist? In diesem Punkt scheint Husserl wirklich in Verlegenheit zu geraten und ist sogar versucht, die Idee der Analogie aufzugeben: „Es ist nun die Frage, ob statt des Hineinversetzens meines Ich nicht eine Fantasiemodifikation meiner eigenen Erlebnisse möglich ist, die eben nicht ‚mein‘ Ich mit sich führt, sondern so, dass die Scheidung von Ich und anderes Ich ermöglicht ist.“⁶⁶

In einigen Textpassagen aus den Jahren 1914 und 1915 wird mit großer Akribie der Versuch gemacht, die Fremdleibwahrnehmung als eine vergegenwärtigende Fantasie – die mir ermöglichen würde, in den Körperleib des anderen zu „kriechen“ – verständlich zu machen. Im Laufe einiger Textpassagen aus denselben Jahren erhebt aber Husserl selbst zwei Einwände gegen eine solche Interpretation. Zum einen besteht Husserl ausdrücklich darauf, dass, wie auch immer ich mich als anders seiend vorstellen würde, dies nie hieße, dass ich mir „ein anderes Subjekt, ein zweites Subjekt, einen ‚anderen‘ mir gegenüber fingieren [kann]. Ich bin noch immer, auch in der Fiktion, Ich“⁶⁷. Zum anderen sind die fremden Empfindungen, Wahrnehmungen etc., die ich dem anderen zuschreibe, nicht nur als möglich, als meine fantasierten Erlebnisse, sondern notwendigerweise als wirklich und gegenwärtig zu denken. Darüber hinaus ist zum Beispiel mein Mitleid für den anderen keine bloße Fantasievorstellung, kein fantasiertes Gefühl, sondern muss notwendigerweise – solange man über *Fremdwahrnehmung* sprechen will – ein wirkliches Erlebnis sein. In einem späteren Text (von 1921/22) verdeutlicht Husserl diese Idee mithilfe einer Unterscheidung zwischen impressionaler und imaginativer Darstellung: „Habe ich ‚dasselbe‘ Gefühl wie das eingefühlte meines Gegenübers, so habe ich, möchte man sagen, impressionale Darstellung, habe ich kein solches Gefühl, so habe ich eine imaginative. Eine eigentliche Bildlichkeit ist das sicher nicht. Mein eigenes Gefühl ist nicht ein Bild des fremden Gefühls. Dann wäre mein eigenes Erlebnisphantasma ein Bild des Fremden.“⁶⁸

Die Schwierigkeit, eine Theorie der Fremdwahrnehmung zu entwickeln, besteht also darin, dass, obwohl der andere „selbst da“ ist, eins mit seinem Leibkörper, sowohl er selbst wie auch seine Erlebnisse eben nicht wie sein Körper originär gegeben sind (d.h. in einer unmittelbaren Wahrnehmung) und auch überhaupt nicht zur originären Gegebenheit – gebracht werden können. Mit anderen Worten, die Erlebnisse eines anderen Ich und sein Bewusstseinsstrom sind mir nur durch eine Art Vergegenwärtigung, „die ihrem Wesen nach die reelle

⁶⁶ Hua XIII, 289.

⁶⁷ Ebd.

⁶⁸ Hua XIV, 162.

Immanenz ihrer intentionalen Objekte ausschließ[t]“⁶⁹, zugänglich, genauso wie meine vergangenen Erlebnisse mir nur in Erinnerung – die auch eine Form von Vergegenwärtigung ist – zugänglich sind. Ist also Fremdwahrnehmung eine Form von Erinnerung? Die Antwort Husserls ist ein emphatisches Nein, eben weil „das Ich der Gegenwart, das aktuelle Ich, Träger des fließenden Jetzt, und das vergangene Ich, das wiedervergegenwärtigte, Träger des fließenden vergangenen Jetzt“⁷⁰, sich decken, ein und dasselbe sind, wobei im Falle der Fremdwahrnehmung das vergegenwärtigte Ich sich von dem vergegenwärtigenden Ich prinzipiell unterscheidet. Wie ist dann diese Vergegenwärtigung des fremden Seelenlebens zu verstehen? Um diese Frage zu beantworten, greift Husserl den Begriff der Einfühlung wieder auf: „Genauso wie ich in meiner Vergangenheit oder in einer Fiktion dabei bin, so im Seelen- leben des anderen, das ich mir in der Einfühlung vergegenwärtige. Dieses Dabeisein ist nun aber nicht verbunden mit der Forderung der Identifikation wie in der Erinnerung an die Vergangenheit [...]“⁷¹

Die Einfühlung scheint demnach eine wesentliche Rolle in der Konstitution des anderen *ego* zu spielen, indem sie den äußeren Erscheinungen eines Körpers, die unmittelbar wahrgenommen werden, durch vergegenwärtigende Mitsetzung Innenerscheinungen zuordnet, die nicht mir und meinem Erlebnisstrom zugehörig sind, sondern eben einem anderen Leib und einem anderen *ego*, die jetzt als solche konstituiert werden. Die Einfühlung sollte mir also die „Hineinversetzung“ in den meinem Leib ähnlichen Leibkörper des anderen ermöglichen. Die Frage der Fremdwahrnehmung scheint also eine befriedigende Antwort bekommen zu haben, auch wenn dem früher erwähnten Begriff der Interpretation hier überhaupt keine Rolle mehr zugewiesen wird und obwohl beide Begriffe – der Analogie und der Einfühlung – einer weiteren Erläuterung bedürfen. In einigen Fragmenten aus derselben Zeit zeigt sich aber Husserl mit dieser Auffassung der Fremdwahrnehmung unzufrieden und stellt sogar die Frage, ob „ein neues Ich (für mich ein transzendentes) sich nur auf dem Wege über die Konstitution der Leiblichkeit [konstituieren kann]“⁷².

Auch wenn die Antwort auf diese Frage die vorhergehenden Überlegungen bestätigt, zeigt sich Husserl doch skeptisch, dass „das Verstehen fremden Seelenlebens“ als „Einfühlung des Ich in den fremden Körper“ verstanden werden sollte. Der hier erwähnte Begriff des Verstehens ist mit großer Wahrscheinlichkeit

⁶⁹ Ed. Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie*. Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie. 1. Halbband (Hua III/1), hrsg. von Karl Schuhmann, Den Haag, Martinus Nijhoff 1977., 87.

⁷⁰ Hua XIII, 318.

⁷¹ Ebd., 319.

⁷² Ebd., 335.

eine Anspielung auf den früher diskutierten Begriff der Interpretation, der mit dem Begriff der Einfühlung eigentlich unverträglich ist. Wenn mir die Interpretation (der äußeren Erscheinungen des fremden Körpers) das fremde Seelenleben und letztendlich das fremde Ich zugänglich macht, welche Rolle soll dann der Einfühlung zukommen? Husserl scheint aber nicht nur den Begriff der Einfühlung aufgeben zu wollen, sondern stellt auch den Begriff der Analogie infrage: „Also würde ich sagen: Es findet eigentlich keine Einfühlung statt, wie ich abermals sage. Und es findet auch keine Analogisierung statt, kein Analogieschluss, keine Übertragung durch Analogie, obwohl die beständige Bezogenheit in der vergegenwärtigen- den Vorstellung auf mein Bewusstseinsfeld es mit sich bringen muss, dass ich öfter Analogien ziehe, dass ich mir interpretiere.“⁷³

Dem Begriff der Einfühlung wurde in fast allen vorherigen Überlegungen zum Problem der Fremdwahrnehmung eine wichtige Rolle zugeteilt. Warum erklärt sich Husserl jetzt mit einer solchen Leichtigkeit und Entschlossenheit bereit, den Begriff aufzugeben? Gewiss auch, weil der von Lipps übernommene Begriff von Anfang an mehrdeutig war und viele Missdeutungen veranlasste, aber in erster Linie eben, weil die Einfühlung nichts anderes als „eine imaginäre Vorstellung“, die mir das Hineinversetzen in den anderen ermöglichen sollte, ist, also ein „Verwandeln“, das aber „schlechthin unmöglich“ ist.⁷⁴ Die Rolle der Einfühlung und der einfühlenden Apperzeption wird indessen von dem „Einverstehen“ und von der einverstehenden Apperzeption übernommen, die „ohne Weiteres die ‚Apperzeption‘ des fremden Seelenlebens vollzieht“⁷⁵. Es gilt nun, die Frage danach aufkommen zu lassen, wie dieses Einverstehen – als Alternative zur einfühlenden Apperzeption – zu verstehen ist.

4. Die einverstehende Apperzeption – eine alternative Theorie der Fremdwahrnehmung?

Die bisher leitende Frage für die husserlsche Auffassung der Fremdwahrnehmung war, wie man einem (materialen) Ding die Form der Nullerscheinung zubringen kann. Ein Leib musste daher zuerst als Körper konstituiert sein, um dann in einem zweiten Schritt – durch analogisierende oder einfühlende Apperzeption – als Leib konstituiert zu werden. Im Fall der einverstehenden Apperzeption wird jedoch „der fremde Körper in seiner äußeren Erscheinung [ohne Weiteres] als Leib

⁷³ Ebd., 338.

⁷⁴ Vgl. ebd.

⁷⁵ Ebd., 339.

[verstanden]“⁷⁶. Aber bevor dieser Frage der einverstehenden Apperzeption nachgegangen wird, muss von vornherein eine wichtige Präzisierung gemacht werden. Wenn Husserl hier über eine Apperzeption, die „ohne Weiteres“ vollzogen wird, spricht, heißt das auf keinen Fall, dass er jetzt auf eine unmittelbare Art der Fremdwahrnehmung gestoßen zu sein glaubt, sondern damit meint er eigentlich zweierlei: Zum einen scheint er wenigstens vorläufig zu behaupten, dass dieses Einverstehen von keiner Analogie und keiner Einfühlung überhaupt Gebrauch machen muss, um den Fremdkörper als Fremdleib zu fassen; zum anderen – und dieser Aspekt ist vielleicht der wichtigste: Durch die einverstehende Apperzeption wird nicht zuerst ein physisch erscheinendes Ding wahrgenommen und erst in einem zweiten Schritt das an ihm „angeknüpfte“ Physische, sondern beide werden in einem wahrgenommen: „Die Menschenauffassung ist eine solche, dass sie als ‚Sinn‘ durch die Körperauffassung hindurchgeht: nicht als ob hier von einer zeitlichen Folge die Rede wäre, erst Körper- und dann Menschenauffassung, sondern es ist eine Auffassung, die die Körperauffassung als fundierende Leiblichkeit konstituierende Unterlage hat für die comprehensive Sinnesauffassung: im Grunde und in der Hauptsache ebenso wie der Wortlaut der ‚Leib‘ ist für den beseelenden ‚Sinn‘.“⁷⁷

Es gibt keinen Zweifel darüber, dass zwischen dieser und vielen anderen Passagen aus dem zweiten Band der *Ideen* – wo das andere Ich als „beseelender Sinn“⁷⁸ des Leibkörpers bestimmt wird – und den eben diskutierten Textstellen aus dem ersten Band zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität ein enger Zusammenhang besteht; und es ist sehr wahrscheinlich, dass all diese eng verwandten Überlegungen zur selben Zeit entstanden sind. Das zeigt sich vielleicht vor allem darin, dass die Parallelen, die Husserl zieht, um diese Perspektive verständlich zu machen, fast identisch sind, auch wenn die Überlegungen in *Ideen II* in einigen entscheidenden Hinsichten viel weiter gehen. Um die Idee der einverstehenden Apperzeption des fremden Seelenlebens zu veranschaulichen, fragt sich Husserl, ob es einen Vergleich zwischen dieser Art der Apperzeption und dem Verstehen eines Wortes oder einer Rede gibt.

In einem Manuskript von 1914/15122 konzentriert sich Husserl vorwiegend auf die Gegenüberstellung zwischen einverstehender Apperzeption und Zeichenapperzeption (sowohl das Wort als auch die Rede sind hier ausschließlich als Zeichenstrukturen gedacht). Dabei stellt Husserl fest, dass, während das Zeichen etwas von ihm Verschiedenes meint, der fremde Leibkörper und das fremde

⁷⁶ Ebd., 399.

⁷⁷ Hua IV, 240.

⁷⁸ Vgl. z.B. ebd., 96. Husserl spricht aber auch von „begeisteten“ Objekten (vgl. ebd., 236).

Subjekt nicht voneinander zu trennen sind.⁷⁹ Darüber hinaus wird im Falle der Zeichenapperzeption nicht über eine Wahrnehmung gesprochen, wogegen die einverstehende Apperzeption notwendigerweise als Wahrnehmung – wenn auch eine vermittelte, nicht originäre Wahrnehmung – definiert werden muss: „Ich vollziehe nun mit der Leibkörperwahrnehmung eine vergegenwärtigende Setzung, die das originär nicht Gegebene der höheren Schicht des Realen mitsetzt mit der gegebenen Körperlichkeit, die objektiv mit ihr eins ist.“⁸⁰ Sobald sich Husserl fragt, wie eine solche Mitsetzung überhaupt möglich sei, wird er gleich merken, dass sie „auf unsere eigene Leiblichkeit und Geistigkeit“ und somit auf die „Selbstwahrnehmung“ zurückgewiesen und dementsprechend zu einer in der Analogie gründenden Apperzeption zurückgeführt werden muss.⁸¹ Einige Seiten später stellt Husserl zwar die Frage, ob es in diesem Kontext richtig sei, „von einer Rückbeziehung auf meine Selbstwahrnehmung zu sprechen“⁸², geht aber unmittelbar danach zu der Erörterung eines neuen Begriffs der Apperzeption – die jetzt als „analogisierende Interpretation“⁸³ verstanden werden sollte – weiter, ohne den Versuch zu machen, diese Frage wenigstens skizzenhaft zu beantworten.

Auch wenn die Überlegungen zu diesem Thema, die Husserl in den *Ideen II* entwickelt, einen ähnlichen Ausgangspunkt haben, bilden ihre Ergebnisse eher einen Kontrast zu den in den unveröffentlichten Manuskripten entwickelten Gedanken. Das verdankt sich nicht zuletzt der Tatsache, dass Husserl jetzt einen neuen Begriff ins Spiel bringt, nämlich den Begriff des (geistigen) Sinnes. Das Wort oder die Rede sind jetzt nicht mehr in erster Linie als Zeichen verstanden, die zum Bezeichneten nicht gehören, sondern als sinntragende Gebilde, wobei „der geistige Sinn, die sinnlichen Erscheinungen beseelend, mit ihnen in gewisser Weise verschmolzen [ist] statt in einem verbundenen Neben- einander nur verbunden“.⁸⁴ Die Menschauffassung läuft ähnlich wie die der „geistigen Objekte“, also nicht als Apperzeption einer bloßen nachträglichen „Zusammenknüpfung“ zwischen Seele und Leibkörper, sondern als einheitliche Auffassung des anderen Menschen.

⁷⁹ Vgl. ebd., 340: „[W]ährend eben Zeichen und bezeichnete Realität nicht eins sind und das Zeichen, wo immer es Ausdruck ist, keine reale Einheit hat mit dem Bezeichneten, ist hier der Leibkörper eben selbst Leib und Träger eines Seelenlebens.“ Vgl. auch Hua IV, 234 f.: „[W]ir finden da nicht zwei äußerlich miteinander verflochtene Sachen: Leiber und Personen: Wir finden *einheitliche* Menschen, die mit uns verkehren, und die Leiber sind mit in der menschlichen Einheit.“ (Herv.i.O.)

⁸⁰ Hua XIII, 340.

⁸¹ Vgl. ebd., 341 f.

⁸² Ebd., 343.

⁸³ Vgl. ebd., 344 f.

⁸⁴ Hua IV, 238.

Die Körpererscheinung wird also nicht nur als Medium oder Ausdruck⁸⁵ des an ihn angeknüpften Geistigen, sondern in eins mit ihm und damit als zu ihm gehörend erfahren. Zwischen diesen zwei Auffassungsarten besteht jedoch ein wichtiger Unterschied, denn „die Einheit von Leib und Geist konstituiert sich [...] als höhere Einheit zwei[er] realer Einheiten“⁸⁶, wobei Wortlaut und Sinn nur eine irreale (also von uns gestiftete) bilden. Diese Fremdwahrnehmung als Menschauffassung ist aber nur aufgrund einer Einstellungsänderung möglich, die Husserl in den eben diskutierten Text- manuskripten von 1914/15 nur andeutet⁸⁷, ohne sie explizit zu machen. Wie diese Einstellungsänderung verstanden werden kann, ist den Überlegungen in den *Ideen II* zu entnehmen. Diese Einstellung, die eine solche einheitliche Menschauffassung ermöglichen kann, wird von Husserl geistige oder personalistische Einstellung genannt und scharf von der naturalistischen Einstellung abgetrennt.

Im Gegensatz zu der personalistischen richtet sich die naturalistische Einstellung auf die dingliche Welt, auf die Welt der Kausalzusammenhänge, die ausschließlich naturwissenschaftlich zu erforschen sind, und blendet gleichsam alles Geistige oder Subjektive aus.⁸⁸ Im Rahmen dieser naturalistischen Einstellung wird mit anderen Worten das Seelenleben selbst nur insofern es Teil des ganzen Kausalzusammenhangs der Natur ist, in Betracht gezogen. In einem Textfragment aus dem Jahr 1910, das zur Vorbereitung der 1910/11 gehaltenen Vorlesung *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* gedient hat und in dem beide naturalistische und personalistische oder geistige Einstellung skizzenhaft dargestellt werden⁸⁹, wird diese methodologische Perspektive auf das Seelenleben, das einer „kausale[n] Analyse und kausale[n] Erklärung“⁹⁰ unterzogen werden muss, zuerst ganz explizit gemacht. Das Endziel eines solchen Unternehmens ist jedoch nicht, bei den Kausalzusammenhängen haltzumachen, sondern vielmehr, „die psychischen Zustände, die in der Erfahrung zu wirklicher Gegebenheit kommen können, zunächst abgesehen von ihrer kausalen Funktion [zu] betracht[en], [zu] beschreiben und [zu] klassifizier[en]“⁹¹. Da eine ausführliche Erörterung der personalistischen Einstellung viel zu weit führen würde, soll es hier genügen, anzumerken, dass die naturalistische Einstellung zwar auch eine Art Fremderfahrung ermöglicht – Husserl nennt sie

⁸⁵ Ebd., 245.

⁸⁶ Ebd.

⁸⁷ Vgl. Hua XIII, 339.

⁸⁸ Vgl. Hua VIII, 286.

⁸⁹ Vgl. Hua XIII, 90. Die naturalistische Einstellung wird hier „naturwissenschaftlich“, die personalistische „subjektiv“ genannt.

⁹⁰ Ebd., 91.

⁹¹ Ebd.

*Introjektion*⁹² –, aber sie bestimmt sich eben dadurch, „dass sie beim Fremdkörper halt[macht] und die fremde Seele dahinter [setzt] als etwas von jenem und von der materiellen Natur überhaupt funktionell Abhängiges“.⁹³

Erst im Kontrast zu der naturalistischen Einstellung ist der unmittelbare Charakter der Menschauffassung, die Husserl wieder als eine Art Einfühlung versteht⁹⁴, endgültig geklärt. Was aber jetzt unbedingt unterstrichen werden sollte, ist, dass diese zwei Arten der Fremdwahrnehmung keineswegs Alternativen zu der transzendentalen Grundlegung der Fremdwahrnehmung sind, sondern sie ausschließlich aufgrund dieser verständlich werden können. Denn beide oben erörterten Einstellungen setzen zwar eine Art *Epoché* voraus, diese unterscheidet sich aber wesentlich von der phänomenologischen *Epoché* eben dadurch, dass sie den Rahmen der natürlichen Einstellung weder problematisiert noch verlässt. Die zwei früher diskutierten Einstellungen sind zwar nicht gleichrangig, aber solange sie beide der natürlichen Einstellung untergeordnet sind, kann auf ihrem Boden die Frage nach der transzendentalen Konstitution des *alter ego* überhaupt nicht gestellt werden. Die Ausschaltung der natürlichen Einstellung, die in den *Ideen I* (§31 und §32) schon vor 1913 ausführlich beschrieben wurde, schließt natürlich auch die Einklammerung der intersubjektiven (natürlichen) Welt und der anderen Ichsubjekte ein.

5. Abschließende Bemerkungen

Nach all dem bisher Gesagten kann man somit den Schluss ziehen, dass das Problem der Fremdwahrnehmung oder der Konstitution des *alter ego* nur auf dem Boden der transzendentalen Einstellung adäquat zu klären ist und die Frage, ob es „richtig“ sei, im Falle der Fremdwahrnehmung „von einer Rückbeziehung auf meine Selbstwahrnehmung zu sprechen“⁹⁵, nur eine einzige Antwort bekommen kann: Es ist nicht nur richtig, sondern sogar notwendig, die Fremdwahrnehmung von Selbstwahrnehmung – also von der durch die phänomenologische Reduktion gewonnenen transzendentalen solipsistischen Sphäre – her zu denken, eben weil sie keine unmittelbar oder originär gebende Wahrnehmung ist, sondern nur aufgrund der Apperzeption fremder Körper als Leiber möglich ist. Dies ist auch der Grund, warum Husserl in den unmittelbar danach folgenden Textmanuskripten –

⁹² Vgl. Hua IV, 175, 205.

⁹³ Theunissen, *Der Andere*, 117.

⁹⁴ Vgl. Hua IV, 375.

⁹⁵ Hua XIII, 343.

wie auch in allen späteren Ausführungen zum Thema der Konstitution der Fremdwahrnehmung – Zentralbegriffe wie Analogie und vor allem Einfühlung wiederaufnehmen und neu interpretieren wird. Dass ist auch der Grund, warum in den *Cartesianischen Meditationen* Husserl auf systematische Art und Weise die Idee einer zweiten thematischen Reduktion, die er „Reduktion der transzendentalen Erfahrung auf die Eigenheitssphäre“⁹⁶ nennt, entwickelt. Der Sinn dieser zweiten Reduktion ist die Ermöglichung einer phänomenologisch adäquaten Erklärung der Fremderfahrung – und somit die Entschärfung aller Solipsismus-Vorwürfe –, die nichts von dem, was sie zu erklären hat, voraussetzen darf. Der eigenheitlich reduzierte Fremdkörper des nachmals anderen kann nun keineswegs das Seelenleben des Letzteren ausdrücken. Die Kategorie des Ausdrucks wird sodann durch die Reduktion auf die primordiale Eigenheitssphäre völlig außer Kraft gesetzt. Deswegen kann nun nicht mehr von einem Ausdruck oder einer Kundgabe des fremden Seelenlebens – die als „fundierte Erfahrungen“ fungieren – die Rede sein ohne das, was infrage steht, schon von Anfang an vorauszusetzen.⁹⁷ Durch die Reduktion zur primordialen Eigenheitssphäre werden alle Ausdrücke des fremden Leibes zu bloßen Anzeigen einer Abwandlung meiner Leiblichkeit.⁹⁸ Sie zeigen also nicht mehr das fremde Seelenleben, sondern mein eigenes – oder genauer, eine Abwandlung, eine Möglichkeit meines eigenen Seelenlebens, insofern es von meinem Leibkörper zum Ausdruck gebracht werden könnte. Demzufolge, wird die Frage nach der Fremdwahrnehmung, also die Frage wie auf dem Boden meiner originalen Erfahrung ein Außenkörper als Leib konstituiert werden konnte, folgendermaßen umformuliert werden: Wie ist es überhaupt möglich, den in der solipsistischen Einstellung zu bloßer Anzeige reduzierten „Ausdruck“ des Fremdseelischen als vollen Ausdruck desselben zu fassen? Diese komplexe Frage, die hier nicht mehr zur Diskussion gebracht werden kann, steht im Zentrum des phänomenologischen Projekts Husserl und wird ihm eigentlich zur Entdeckung einer neuen (radikalisierten)

⁹⁶ Schon 1921/22, also viele Jahre vor der Verfassung der *Cartesianischen Meditationen*, entwickelte Husserl die Idee einer „solitären Reduktion auf das solitäre Ich (Monade)“, deren Leistung – in der Terminologie dieses Forschungsmanuskripts die Umgrenzung einer „solitären Erfahrung“ – identisch mit der Leistung der in Hua I entwickelten zweiten Reduktion sein sollte (vgl. Hua XIV, 264).

⁹⁷ E. Husserl, *Erfahrung und Urteil*, Hamburg: Felix Meiner 1972, S. 56. Vgl. auch eine viel frühere Passage aus Hua XIII, 70. Hier sagt Husserl ausdrücklich, dass „das Auffassen der ‚Äußerung‘, des ‚Ausdrucks‘ seelischer Akte und Zustände [...] durch die Auffassung des Leibes als Leibes schon vermittelt [ist]“.

⁹⁸ Vgl. auch Hua XIII, 62 f.

Reduktion führen⁹⁹, deren Hauptkonsequenz die wesentliche Umgestaltung der husserlschen Transzendentalphilosophie sein wird und die – in Anlehnung an Zahavi¹⁰⁰ – als *intersubjektive Transformation* seines phänomenologischen Projekts verstanden werden muss.

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⁹⁹ Cf. Fink, „Die Spätphilosophie Husserls in der Freiburger Zeit“, in: ders., *Nähe und Distanz: phänomenologische Vorträge und Aufsätze*, hrsg. von F.-A. Schwarz, München/Freiburg, Karl Alber 1976, 224.

¹⁰⁰ Vgl. Zahavi, „Husserl’s Intersubjective Transformation of Transcendental Philosophy“, in: Donn Welton (Hg.), *The New Husserl. A Critical Reader*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press 2003.

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INTERTWINEMENT: THE MODALITIES OF THE UNGRASPABLE*

Alzbeta KUCHTOVA**

ABSTRACT. The aim of this paper is to accentuate the distinction between the ineffable, the unrepeatable and the conceptually ungraspable. These are to be considered as three modalities of the ungraspable language that enable us to understand Derrida's attitude to negative theology. While he distanced himself from an apophysis of negative theology *Comment ne pas parler. Dénégations*, in *Différance* he stated that *différance* is not a concept, not a word – it is an inexpressible. Therefore, there are at least three modalities of “ungraspable” language: “inexpressible,” “conceptually ungraspable,” “unrepeatable” as non-iterable.

Keywords: Jacques Derrida, Conceptually Ungraspable, Inexpressible, Ungraspable, Iterability, Intertwinement, Deconstruction of Negative Theology

Introduction

In this text, I would like to retrace the possibility to distinguish between different modalities of what I call the ungraspable. My inspiration comes from Jacques Derrida and his position towards negative theology, which can be clearly linked to a form of the ungraspable. Indeed, Derrida has often been taken for a modern successor of negative theology,¹ but he works with a different type of ungraspable than the negative theology, his approach emphasizes the importance

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¹ Cf. Dominique Janicaud, *La phénoménologie éclatée*, Paris: Éditions de l'éclat 1998, p. 25.



of the inscription of the ineffable and he also emphasizes the impossibility to separate the ungraspable from the graspable (which is not true for negative theology). Presently, Derrida's position with respect to negative theology is a subject of discussion.² As I will show it in the conclusion of this paper, Derrida's approach is different from the approach of negative theology because he has a different conception of the ungraspable, which will serve as a source of inspiration for distinguishing between the different modalities of the ungraspable and for describing the relationship between oppositions that are related to these modalities.

Derrida does not use the word *ineffable* or *ungraspable* systematically as philosophical concepts. Yet in the following passage he speaks about the ineffable:

Deconstruction does not consist in passing from one concept to another, but in overturning and displacing a conceptual order as well as the nonconceptual order with which the conceptual order is articulated.³

By ungraspable I mean something that, in principle, cannot be grasped by any concept. The adverb 'in principle' is used to distinguish the radical ungraspability, different from the trivial ungraspability.

The case of trivial ungraspability occurs, for example, when we are unable to express something due to a lack of time or lack of capacities.⁴ In this text, my reflection on ungraspable and graspable will be focusing only on the language and conceptuality, whose possibility is exactly *difference* as something non-conceptual.⁵ It is possible that the relations between ungraspable and graspable that will be more clearly defined in the conclusion of this paper, are applicable more generally and therefore concern also the ungraspable that is outside of the sphere of the language.

I will try to answer the following question: Is it true that, when Derrida mentions the overturning of the conceptual order, he means that in deconstruction, he wishes to go beyond concepts in order to reach the ineffable? We should not forget that we are dealing here with a philosopher who once and for all condemned the metaphysics of presence: metaphysics of presence so full that it would not need any writing, neither speaking to supplements and substitute them. We could argue

² François Dastur, *Déconstruction et la phénoménologie*, Paris: Hermann 2016.

³ Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy*, p. 329.

⁴ Definition of ungraspable based on the radical character of ungraspable is compatible with what Derrida says in a different text about another substantial concept of deconstruction – about the *différance*. It is the ungraspable par excellence: "But we 'already know' that if it is unnameable, it is not provisionally so, not because our language has not yet found or received this name, or because we would have to seek it in another language, outside the finite system of our own." *Ibid.*, p. 26.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 155.

that the sentence "There is nothing outside the text"⁶ which we can find in Derrida's first book *Of Grammatology*, says that there is no ineffable and no ungraspable. Can the ungraspable incorporate the thesis *There is nothing outside the text* or not? If yes, what is the nature of this ungraspable?

Difference is ungraspable

In this part of my paper, I will focus on the ungraspable in Derrida. My main subject will be *différance* understood as ungraspable, as something non-conceptual. *Différance* is a condition of appearance of any elements in general.⁷ This means that the *différance* is a condition of possibility of everything and it produces *différences*. We have to note that the word *différance* has common characteristics with the normal concept of writing.⁸ Derrida compares *différance* to writing symbolically in order to highlight the importance of something that was seen as inferior and as an substitute. In *Of Grammatology*, he claims that in the history of western philosophy speech was given priority over writing, because it was seen as something that is closer to the soul, the continuity of consciousness.

However, Derrida compares *différance* to the notion of writing in a specific way: according to him, both phenomena have in common that they are composed of repeatable elements, which is their main characteristics. This means that they could not be characterized by continuity. This becomes clear when we realize that the meaning of the word 'difference' from which this concept is derived. In the end, it is the main characteristic of *différance*: it is difference, the opposite of continuity; it reveals the discontinuity and the rupture.

At the same time, *differentiation* is the condition of possibility of any system. It is the origin of everything, but it is derivated and secondary. In this respect, it is also the origin of oppositions. It is not, however, a positively defined origin, which would mean it is full of the presence of being, because difference could be the origin on the condition that there is no origin defined by interiority or presence. This also underlines the ungraspable character of the *différance* as origin: although it is an origin, it is impossible to define it as such. Despite this, Derrida does not

⁶ Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, trans. by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press 2016, p. 177.

⁷ Jacques Derrida, *De la grammatologie*, Paris: Minuit 1967, p.70.

⁸ By normal concept of writing, I mean the writing as inscription and representation of the speech. It is a possibility to repeatedly inscribe and repeat the speech and distribute it. Normal concept of writing presupposes the concept of sign composed from signified and signifier.

claim that by postulating such an origin, we can go beyond metaphysics absolutely - he does, however, claim that *différance* precedes, and therefore exceeds metaphysics, because it is impossible to express *différance* by metaphysical concepts (and therefore by any concept), "because the force and form of its disruption explode the semantic horizon."⁹

When Derrida says that it is not even possible to grasp the word 'difference' exactly, he refers to the fact that it is a neographism created from the commonly used word 'difference'. In this way, he uses writing as a mean to grasp the difference that is ungraspable when it is pronounced, in speaking. We cannot doubt it is a word play: "The a of *différance*, thus, is not heard; it remains silent, secret and discreet as a tomb..."¹⁰ but the idea that this wordplay expresses remains valid. The *différance* is not a concept and in a certain sense, it is not a word either:

This is precisely because I would like to attempt, to a certain extent, and even though, in principle and in the analysis it is impossible, and impossible for essential reasons, to reassemble and a *sheaf* the different directions in which I have been able to utilize what I would call provisionally the word or concept of *différance*, or rather to let it impose itself on me in its neo-graphism, although as we shall see, *différance* is literally neither a word nor a concept.¹¹

Very often, it is assumed that the sentence composed of a subject and of a predicate is the most common form of a definition of a concept, as an answer to the question: *What is x?* The *x* is the notion we want to define, and the predicate is an order of words that we do not need to explain and these are not, at the same time, synonymous with the notion we want to explain. Derrida refuses this form of subject-predicate writing:

"...if we accepted the form of the question, in its meaning and syntax ('what is,' 'who is,' 'who is that'...), we would have to conclude that *différance* has been derived, has happened, is to be mastered and governed on the basis of the point of a present being, which itself could be some thing, a form, a state, a power in the world to which all kinds of names might be given, a *what* or a present being as *subject*, a *who*."¹²

⁹ Jacques Derrida, *Positions*, trans. by Alan Bass, Chicago: Chicago University Press 1981, p. 45.

¹⁰ Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy*, p. 4.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 15.

The question *What is...?* is then according to Derrida an ontological question, it concerns the presence and the essence of *différance*. This question presupposes that its object can be given as a thing that exists; but *différance* has no essence in the sense of the metaphysics of presence, it represents the absence. Indeed, Derrida does not want to ask the question *What is x?*; and he does not want to answer it either, reacts to it with his theory of *différance*.

Therefore, the question *What is x?* presupposes some particular conception of the sign which is, according to Derrida, the most common in the history of philosophy: the sign is composed of the signified and of the signifier, while the signifier is subordinated to the signified. The signifier is only a supplement, a substitute and a complement of the signified as something that can appear in the mind or in the consciousness without any writing or any speaking. The possibility of providing a definition composed of subject and predicate presupposes that we are able to determine the object of the definition as it really is, separated from the predicate that describes it.

However, Derrida is convinced that it is impossible to separate the signifier and the signified. Thus he rejects definitions composed of a subject and a predicate, and he wishes to speak about *différance* only vaguely. If you are looking for Derrida's explanation of the word 'difference', you will understand that he only refers to another word that is, in some ways, its synonym, doing so on 'ad infinitum,' never putting an end to the chain of meanings by some final concept that would clarify it exactly and whose essence he would show, because he in fact never answering the question: *What is x?*

Denials of the Ungraspable

Now, I will analyze a sentence that could be identified as a denial of the aforementioned and it could support the thesis that Derrida denies any form of the ungraspable. It is the sentence "There is nothing outside the text"¹³. It is important to emphasize that this sentence also means that the opposition *outside/inside* cannot be applied on *différance*. The word 'outside [dehors]' refers to something inauthentic in the Western tradition: *outside* is derived from *inside* which is its origin and source. The *outside* is only a substitute for the *inside*, knowing that it is possible to separate the *outside* and *inside* from each other; the inside can be purified from the outside.

¹³ Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, trans. by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press 2016, p. 177.

The opposition *outside/inside* is important in the context of *Of Grammatology*: Derrida refuses the superiority of speaking over writing, he refuses that writing would be derived from speech as from its *inside*. This sentence means that the opposition *derived/non-derived*, linked to the opposition *outside/inside*, cannot be related to the origin of everything, to *differance*.

Differance is the spacing of everything, which means that everything is differentiated and therefore it is iterable; it follows that by the phrase "There is nothing outside the text", Derrida apparently refuses the existence of a non-derived sphere of *difference*, and therefore he refuses the non-iterable. Iterability means

"The possibility of repeating and therefore of identifying, marks is implied in any code, making of it a communicable, transmittable, decipherable grid that is iterable for a third party, and thus for any possible user in general."¹⁴

Indeed, according to Derrida, nothing is such that it would be impossible to iterate it in a system.

If it were true that by the sentence "There is no outside text" Derrida refuses the ineffable, it would be necessary to identify the non-iterable (which is linked with, for example, the inexpressible as something that cannot be repeated in any language) with the ineffable. Indeed, it would seem that the sentence implies the following conclusion: if the sphere of non-iterable entities is impossible, it will be impossible to speak of the sphere of the ineffable as such. What is important, however, is to distinguish between iterability or repeatability and the possibility of grasping something by concepts. This will make it possible to determine whether, by the sentence "There is nothing outside the text", Derrida really refuses the ineffable.

Deconstruction of Negative Theology

In the following, I will examine Derrida's position in regards to negative theology, but also the position of negative theology in regards to the ineffable. My aim is not to analyze Derrida's deconstruction of negative theology from a historical point of view, but rather to draw attention to his approach to the ungraspable, which he intends to be different from the approach of a negative theology. Although

¹⁴ Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy*, p. 315.

there is not one unified position of negative theology,¹⁵ Derrida aims to define some of its characteristics: the creation of a circle of insiders, of an isolated community, the concept of absolute secret as its leitmotif, the order or the imperative to do not speak of God because he is ungraspable. According to Derrida, negative theology insists on these points because negative theologians want to guarantee an access to something that is even more encompassing than being, to something that reaches beyond being in its totality. Indeed, in relation to the hyperessentiality of God every predicate, every predicative language, remains inadequate.

The main reason Derrida refuses to identify his position with the position of negative theology is that he refuses the category of being/non-being as such, that he does not want to think being, not even in its negative form as non-being.¹⁶ But first of all, Derrida does not want to navigate his readers to any higher position in the hierarchy than is the position of the being/non-being opposition. Negative theology also wishes to remain outside the category of being/non-being, wishing to go beyond it. Maximus the Confessor¹⁷ says in his commentary on the treatise *On the Divine Names* of Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagite that one would not know what God is or in what way he exists, because it is impossible to describe him. God is also the Cause of Nothing, because everything exists only after him, he is the cause of being and non-being. Maximus the Confessor adds, however, that non-being or nothingness is the absence of something. But the non-being is also derived from God, because the notion of non-being already implies the idea of being and the idea of the beyond being (beyond God). God is everywhere whilst he is not a person and he surpasses everything, he is beyond everything and he is beyond essence.

However, by postulating *différance* Derrida does not want to reach beyond being, nor to any higher hierarchical position. On the contrary, by postulating *différance*, he wants to underline the unjustified character of the conceptual hierarchies and

¹⁵ Cf. Jean-Luc Marion, *Figures de phénoménologie*, Paris: Vrin 2015. Jean-Luc Marion corrects Derrida by saying that negative theology is only an invention of modern, positive theology, knowing that, in his opinion, Derrida misinterprets it in his text *How to Avoid Speaking: Denials* by saying that it belongs to the metaphysics of the presence. See Jacques Derrida, "How to Avoid Speaking: Denials", in *Psyche. Inventions of the Other II.*, trans. by Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University, California: Stanford University Press 2008, pp.143-196.

¹⁶ "What 'difference', 'trace', and so on, 'mean-to-say' - which consequently does not mean to say anything - would be 'something' 'before' the concept, the name, the word, that would be nothing, that would no longer pertain to being, to presence or to the presence of the present, or even to absence, and even less to some hyperessentiality." Derrida, "How to Avoid Speaking: Denials", p. 148.

¹⁷ Dionýz Areopagita, *O mystické teologii. O božských jménech. S komentáři Sv. Maxima Vyznavače*, transl. by A. Černohous, Praha: Dybbuk 2003, p. 108.

the instability of concepts. Even if it was a hierarchy of the presence that would like to be the absence, because 'not being' would mean 'higher' and 'closer' to the authenticity or to the origin.

The second reason why Derrida does not want to be considered a negative theologian follows from the fact that in negative theology, there is a modality of an isolated place where God resides, whose presence is translated into the most divine and highest objects of contemplation and understanding which, nevertheless, are only hypothetical notions and 'subcategories' of God because divine goodness cannot be brought "down (since it is present both above and below), but we ourselves are raised up toward the most sublime splendors of its brilliantly lit rays."¹⁸ Here it is necessary first of all to underline that there is thesis on separation of the what we can say from the ineffable, and subsequently the separation of the graspable from the ungraspable.

Although Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagite claims that the divine is present in the whole of being, the fact remains that the whole of being is not present in the divine. We can approach the divine by prayer, but the place where the divine resides is not determined by local movement, i.e. God does not move from one place to another. The divine is not exhaustively defined by its presence in the whole of being. Derrida says that access to the sphere of the apophatic is limited and guaranteed by a group of initiates and by the correct type of prayer that is like "brilliantly lit cord, suspended from the highest heaven and brought down to us."¹⁹ While we are praying, we rise to God who, however, does not approach us, remaining as an immovable rock: we approach God by praying, but he does not approach us. Although Derrida accepts that there are things that can never be named, he would never agree with the postulation of the separation of the graspable from the ungraspable. In negative theology, there is a thesis on the dependence of the graspable on the ungraspable,²⁰ on the independence of the divine from the mystical writings.

The third point Derrida makes his position towards negative theology even more firm leads him to claim that the absolute ungraspable (secret) is impossible. In his view, the very texts of negative theology postulating the ungraspable make it clear. Derrida observes that negative theology works in a double register, the secret,

¹⁸ Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagite, *The Divine Names and Mystical Theology*, transl. by John D. Jones, Milwaukee Wisconsin: Marquette University Press 1999, p. 129.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ "The sacred writings do not only celebrate God as logos because it is the provider of logos, intellect, and wisdom. They also celebrate it as logos because it has uniformly anticipated in itself the causes of all, because it goes through all extending (as the writings say) to the end of all, and because before these the divine logos is simplified beyond every simplicity and is absolved from all: beyond all as beyond being." Ibid., p. 180.

the community and the religious order on the one hand and the philosophical, the exposition and the argumentation on the other. To what extent are these two registers linked, what is their relationship? Negative theologians admit themselves that, to a certain extent, they need rhetorical compositions as tools to show the divine to the most holy ones. Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagite recognizes that the ineffable is intertwined with the said; it is possible, and at the same time impossible, to participate in the divinity.

Nevertheless, Derrida reveals what he believes negative theology itself would not wish to acknowledge: apophatic discourse must be articulated in some way, we could even say it should be convincing, in order to prove that thanks to it we gain privileged access to God. To reach God, we need an intermediary, such as prayer. However, according to Derrida, prayer is not just a complement, a supplement (as, in his opinion, the negative theologians claim so, recognizing at the same time its necessity), but a fundamental moment of transition towards the emptiness that God would represent. For Derrida, prayer is characterized first of all by two things: firstly by the fact that in prayer, we turn towards the other who is God and secondly, the performativity of the act of prayer which is not a constative statement.²¹

Prayer is nothing else than worshiping or calling upon the presence of the Other, but it is a calling that is outside the category of asking and giving; because the worshipper cannot expect a reply from God, and so, in a sense, he cannot ask for anything at all. However, for the apophatic initiates, the prayer (ὑμνεῖν) replaces speaking. But if prayer is fundamental for us in order to be able to reach God and at the same time it is speaking, how could it be the absolute apophasis? Because although prayer is not a constative statement, at the same it remains to be a statement. If it is true that Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagite distinguishes the Christian prayer from any other kind of prayer which is considered by him to be only an act of worship and not the true dialogue with God, is this not then an establishment of the hierarchy and distinction between good²² (Christian) and bad (non-Christian) prayer - and therefore the determination of the possibility to reach God that should have remained negative? Master Eckhart, for example, claims that reason is the temple of God, while being is only an entrance of this temple:

²¹ Derrida refers to the division between constative and performative statements, the performative ones acquiring no truth value and being uttered with the aim of provoking a certain effect, whereas the constative acquire a truth value. For a more precise definition of this division (that is surely questionable, but it has a some affirmative value in my opinion) see John L. Austin, *How To Do Things with Words*, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1962.

²² "Thus the early leaders of our divine wisdom of God, who are dying every day on behalf of the truth, testify as is natural and by every word and deed to the single knowledge of the truth of the Christians: that it is simpler and more divine than all and, indeed, that it is the abiding, true, one, and single knowledge of God." Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, *The Divine Names and Mystical Theology*, p. 180.

When we grasp God in being, we apprehend him in his antechamber [vorburge], for being is the antechamber in which he dwells [wonet]. Where is he then in his temple, in which he shines as holy [heilic]? Intellect [vernunfticheit rationality] is the temple of God.²³

Would not the most rigorous apophysis imply we should stay in the entrance, in the zone of silent being? But the temple of God is situated in reason: on the one hand, we want to enter the temple of God, which equals entering the reason, on the other hand we command silence. Derrida asks: and even if prayer would give us access to the pure experience, would negative or positive theology be then still needed? And how would theology be possible without iterability and without *différance*, even if theology wants to do without it? There are reasons, why we should to ask these kinds of questions.

The main thesis of the text *How to Avoid Speaking: Denials* can be summarized in a following way: the absolute ungraspable does not exist. Nothing is possible without *différance*, the absolute in-différance as the non-iterable and the absolute ungraspable is not possible.

Conclusion

Derrida cannot be considered to be a thinker of the absolute ungraspable, however, this does not mean that deconstruction does not work with some kind of ungraspable. It is therefore right that he cannot be considered to a *silent* meditative philosopher. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, Derrida does not want to focus on the fullness of non-being that could be contemplated only in the silence of the soul and impossible to describe by language, which would remain a poor tool; he refuses the absolute ineffable and the absolute non-iterable as the absolute unrepeatable. Secondly, he does not agree with the thesis according to which the ungraspable is situated in a well-guarded sphere which is especially well separated from the words. So how can Derrida be a thinker of the ungraspable, but not of the absolute ungraspable? How can he claim that *différance* is ungraspable and that it is iterability and repetition of the word at the same time? The question about the relation between the graspable and the ungraspable can be answered by distinguishing between the absolute ungraspable, the ungraspable and the non-iterable.

²³ Eckhart, (Q. 150; 257), quoted by Derrida, *Psyche. Inventions of the Other II.*, p. 186.

The absolute ungraspable would be that something that is absolutely impossible to express in any language - which means that it is something that we cannot describe. Any conceptual description is absolutely inadequate for it in this context, it does not contribute to any better knowledge of the absolute ungraspable (ineffable).²⁴ It would be impossible to speak about it - and it would probably makes no sense to approach it with words either. Yet, whenever we speak of the ungraspable, we do not necessarily mean this kind of the absolute ungraspable. For Derrida, the ungraspable is not absolute; because otherwise any conceptual description of *the difference* would be undesirable, inadequate.²⁵

Derrida conceptualizes *différance* in language many times, while claiming that it is neither a concept nor a word. The description of *différance* is also designated as inadequate, but it is crucial precisely because of its incompleteness - it should draw our attention to a certain radical incompleteness in the conceptual sphere. Indeed, Derrida wants to deconstruct the conceptual systems from the inside, while considering as incorrect the tendencies leading towards the absolute absence of the conceptual systems. In his opinion, it is necessary to use the paleonymy, which means a strategy consisting in reusing the old concepts that had a stable position in a system and attribute them a new and old role, showing that the limits between graspable and ungraspable are not so stable, only in appearance.

²⁴ As Pseudo-Dionysius says: "Necessarily the Outlines of Theology and the unfolding of the Divine Names are more briefly spoken than the Symbolic Theology; for the higher we ascend the more our language becomes restricted by the more synoptic view of what is intelligible. Now, however, that we are to enter the darkness beyond intellect, you will not find a brief discourse but a complete absence of discourse and intelligibility." Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, *The Divine Names and Mystical Theology*, p. 217.

²⁵ Lets notice that Marion's reasoning does not escape this ruse of the ungraspable either, because he writes:

It is not a question, for the "theologian," of reaching that which his discourse speaks (well or poorly - what does it finally matter, for what norm in this world would decide?) of God, but of abandoning his discourse and every linguistic initiative to the Word, in order to let himself be said by the Word, as the Word lets himself be said by the Father-him, and in him, us also... We can therefore only speak of God thanks to God himself who is the only one who understands himself. Our words about God are then always inadequate to God himself, their source is in God who speaks in a completely different way than us and who teaches us to speak his language. Marion's God is indeed a crossed out God, but the crossing out only leads to an even more authentic theology that nevertheless also postulates the independence of divine word and writing from human word; and Marion therefore postulates a separation and superiority of God who is intertwined with us, because he teaches us, but he does not completely mix with us, because he also stays enclosed in himself. However, Derrida's *différance* never stays enclosed up in itself in this a way. See Jean-Luc Marion, *God Without Being: Hors-Texte*, trans. by Thomas A. Carlson, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press 2012, p. 144.

We can thus see that if Derrida condemns the absolute ungraspable as impossible, while at the same time speaking of the ungraspability of *difference*, he does not necessarily contradict himself in a trivial way, because he is speaking about two different modalities of the ungraspable: about the ungraspable as distinguished from the absolute ineffable. The ineffable or the absolute ungraspable is a subject for negative theology or for anyone who would want to claim that language is an obstacle if we want to reach the ineffable. This presupposes that it is possible to separate the language from the ineffable, which is its opposition. The absolute ungraspable is linked to the ineffable, to the pure unsayable. Indeed, as soon as, following the example of Dionysius, we postulate the separation of the conceptual and the non-conceptual meaning that these two domains can be separated from each other, we reach the ineffable, the absolute silence, the absolute ungraspable. And in this absolute silence reigns the hierarchy: it is the reign of the absolute ungraspable which is defined as something higher the graspable, of which it is necessary to get rid of, because it is only a substitute. The third modality is the non-iterable or the irrepeatable, while this concept is even broader than the two preceding ones, because it does not only concern language, but repetition in general: the non-iterable would be something that can never be repeated. Of course, Derrida denies the possibility of the absolute non-iterable in language, and I can only agree with this position (How would even the absolute irrepeatable in language look like?).

Indeed, there is an intertwinement of the graspable with the ungraspable. The intertwining excludes the absoluteness, provided we exclude the possibility of synthesis in the form of a third element, which would again be hierarchically higher than the two members of the opposition. There is not the interweaving of two separated spheres, but of the interweaving of the two spheres in each concept. As Derrida writes in the preface to the book *Dissemination*, no concept escapes deconstruction, and this is so in two ways: the first characteristic of the concept is that it remains within the conceptual system, its second characteristic is its exteriority to this deconstructed system. Derrida claims that negative theology could go on ad infinitum and that it forgets that it does not take position in relation to a solid system of concepts, but that some instability already exists inside the system of concepts. Derrida postulates the irreducibility of language, and thus of grasping. And although any expression of words is always imperfect, we cannot do anything without it. The absolute silence claimed by negative theology is therefore impossible.

All we have is an incomplete system of categories; Derrida tries to show its incompleteness. Take notice that the characteristics of these concepts: we are unable to determine exactly and clearly the set of all concepts in such a way that nothing would remain non-determined in principle, with respect to the object of

this sphere. However, the unspeakable does not represent a layer succeeding the sphere of concepts as something that is absolutely excluded from it; on the contrary, it is the indispensable intertwining of the conceptual with the non-conceptual in every concept. It is the same for grasping on the level of sensible experience, as for example seeing or touching. What the hand grasps is not separated from what it can no longer grasp; the ungraspable is given in as mixed and in the heart of the grasp.

In each concept, we see that it continues towards the ineffable. We can see it in every movement of the body, that it is extended towards the ungraspable. In this way, the ungraspable something that the dissemination, the dispersion of the sense, shows and thanks to it, the sense becomes irreducible to the concepts, to the grasped. From this point of view, Derrida's deconstructive effort is that he is trying to attribute a philosophical importance to everything is not of the conceptual order - which should not, however, lead to any total abandonment of language, which is encouraged by negative theologians.

THE RECEPTION OF PARTICIPATORY ART. THE CASE OF DOCUMENTA FIFTEEN

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ABSTRACT. Documenta fifteen in 2022 was par excellence the space for participatory art, so this edition can be seen as a touchstone for it. The research of the phenomenon of participatory art is based in this text on the one hand on the curatorial texts of ruangrupa, the collective that ensured the artistic direction of this edition of the documenta, and on the personal experience of the author as a visitor of the exhibition. Among the many issues raised by participatory art, the present text focuses on the aspect of reception of art in the case of the projects presented at documenta fifteen, and by extension, reflects on the experience of the receiver and the artistic value of participatory art projects.

Keywords: participatory art, documenta fifteen, lumbung, reception of art, evaluation of participatory art

1. Participatory art – a short introduction

Participatory art is a type of art created through a participatory process. In his article on participatory art in the *Encyclopaedia of Aesthetics*, Tom Finkelpearl notes that the terminology for this relatively recent phenomenon is still fluid, with several competing terms: “interactive, relational, cooperative, activist, dialogical, and community-based art”¹. Hence, “[d]iscussion of participatory art seems to be in its infancy.”²

In a 2006 article, Claire Bishop, one of the most distinguished researchers of the phenomenon, lists the various relational practices, which are also part of the

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¹ Tom Finkelpearl, ‘Participatory Art’, in *Encyclopedia of Aesthetics*, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

² Finkelpearl.



corpus of participatory art: “socially engaged art, community-based art, experimental communities, dialogic art, littoral art, participatory art, interventionist art, research-based art, collaborative art.”³

This art form distances itself in all aspects from the modern paradigm of art – along the lines of the author, the artwork, and its reception.

The author: In the case of participatory art, it is often difficult to determine who the author is. The primary author willingly shares the role of the “creator” with other participants. The original author (artist) usually develops a concept, which in order to come to life needs the co-participation of others. In this new context, it is difficult to decide what qualities are necessary for someone to be an artist. It seems that originality is still a requirement, although it seems to have lost the central role it had until now in art. At the same time, qualities traditionally associated with being an artist, such as dexterity in drawing, colouring, composition, etc., do not seem to be important. According to Kant, the specific quality of artistic genius is to create the aesthetic idea (which is more than we can express through the conceptual apparatus). It is difficult to determine whether this “aesthetic idea” is found in participatory art projects. According to Grant Kester, the artist is characterized not by the ability to elaborate the aesthetic idea, but by openness and the ability to listen to others: “a dialogical aesthetic suggests a very different image of the artist; one defined in terms of open-ness, of listening and a willingness to accept dependence and intersubjective vulnerability”.⁴

Collaborative projects by several artists (e.g. Andy Warhol and Michel Basquiat) are not considered participatory art; “[i]n participatory art people referred to as citizens, regular folks, community members, or non-artists interact with professional artists to create the works”⁵.

The artwork. Perhaps here we find the clearest departure of participatory art from the modern paradigm of art. In the case of participatory art, instead of the “artwork” (thought of as an object: painting, sculpture, installation, etc.), we find a “project”. Claire Bishop, one of the leading theorists on the subject, describes this trend as follows:

“[a] project in the sense I am identifying as crucial to art after 1989 aspires to replace the work of art as a finite object with an open-ended, post-studio, research-based, social process, extending over time and mutable in form.”⁶

³ Claire Bishop, ‘THE SOCIAL TURN: COLLABORATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS’, *Artforum*, 44.6 (2006) <<https://www.artforum.com/print/200602/the-social-turn-collaboration-and-its-discontents-10274>> [accessed 30 April 2022].

⁴ Grant H. Kester, ‘Conversation Pieces: The Role of Dialogue in Socially Engaged Art’, in *Theory in Contemporary Art Since 1985*, ed. by Z. Kocur and S. Leung (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), pp. 76–100.

⁵ Finkelpearl.

⁶ Claire Bishop, *Artificial Hells: Participatory Art and the Politics of Spectatorship* (London; New York: Verso Books, 2012), p. 194.

If the spatial and temporal dimensions of an artwork are easy to determine, the dimensions of a project are much more unstable. The artwork often has no temporal dimension (e.g. paintings or sculptures), but a project necessarily unfolds over time. If preparing a painting is not part of the work, preparing a project often is.

The forms of participatory art are varied and greatly differ from the classical artwork. "Since the 1990s, the project has become an umbrella term for many types of art: collective practice, self-organised activist groups, transdisciplinary research, participatory and socially engaged art, and experimental curating."⁷

The artwork itself appears as difficult to pinpoint, "a work whose identity is wilfully unstable"⁸. For example, during the two years of preparation of documenta fifteen, the curators and the other collectives had many discussions, and took many decisions together. The conclusions of the discussions were expressed graphically through "harvests" by the participating artists, and these "harvests" were published in the documenta handbook. So, are these "harvests" – infographics, texts, drawings – part of the artwork or not?

The artwork's reception: If the reception of a painting or sculpture seems to require a kind of contemplation in front of an accomplished object that this contemplation does not physically change, in the case of participatory art the "consumer" of art is invited to actively participate in the production of art. Participatory art requires presence in the time and space of the work or project. Art viewers who are not present can at best contemplate the documentation of the process, which raises serious questions about the reception of this type of art and its meaning for non-participants. In what follows I will focus precisely on the reception aspect of participatory art.

2. The concept of documenta fifteen

Documenta is an art event held every 4-5 years in Kassel, Germany. Documenta fifteen is a premiere from the point of view of the artistic direction of the event. Among the curators of the documenta we find such big names as Harald Szeemann, Okwui Enwezor, Carolyn Christov-Bakargiev, Adam Szymczyk, under whose leadership the documenta has become a kind of perennial vanguard of art. As art critic Jerry Saltz wryly noted, "[i]ts curators are often super-brainy mandarin globe-trotting movers-and-shakers"⁹. Thus, documenta has been seen as a concentrated

⁷ Bishop, *Artificial Hells*, p. 194.

⁸ Claire Bishop, 'Antagonism and Relational Aesthetics', *October*, 110 (2004), 51–79 (p. 53) <<https://doi.org/10.1162/0162287042379810>>.

⁹ Jerry Saltz, 'Jerry Saltz: Eleven Things That Struck, Irked, or Awed Me at Documenta 13', *Vulture*, 2012 <<https://www.vulture.com/2012/06/saltz-notes-on-documenta-13.html>> [accessed 8 August 2022].

vision of what is innovative, relevant in contemporary art, no doubt primarily through the lens of Western culture. At its last few editions, documenta opened up to aspects that at the time had not yet been exploited by the art market, but which subsequently became trends: outsider art, feminism, post-colonialism, etc. As their website puts it, “documenta increasingly became a seismograph of developments in contemporary art”.¹⁰

In 2017 the International Finding Committee decided that the 15th edition of the documenta will be curated by the Indonesian art collective ruangrupa. The decision has created an unprecedented situation: it is the first time that the artistic direction is entrusted not to an individual but to a collective, and this collective is not European but Asian.

Ruangrupa in turn invited other artistic collectives, so that on the one hand the number of participating artists amounted to about 1500, on the other hand authorship has become quite difficult to identify. One of the most well-known projects – due to the accusation of anti-Semitism and the fierce debate that followed – is the *People’s Justice* mural by Taring Padi, who is not an artist, but an artistic collective, whose members are not identified and individualized in any way.

The central concept of documenta fifteen is that of the *lumbung* – in Indonesian culture, a barn where a community gathers its surplus harvest, which can be used as needed by the community. A description of the *lumbung* is also found on the cover page of the documenta fifteen handbook:

“LUMBUNG: Word for a communal rice barn in rural Indonesia. A place where farmers share harvest surplus. Only the surplus! If they have nothing, they don’t need to put anything there. A way of relating to each other. Sharing and building together. We don’t have standards for that: we trust people to know what they need for themselves, and what they can give.”¹¹

The whole organisation of the documenta followed this principle of collective sharing: decisions were taken collectively, considering the interests and views of the collectives. Many meetings have been organised – mostly online due to COVID-19. The essence of the discussions was drawn up graphically by the participants – these graphics, drawings being the “harvest”, the results of the discussions provided in graphic form. We encounter these “harvests” (artistic recordings of discussions and meetings) in many forms, including on the pages of the handbook.

¹⁰ Documenta, ‘About - Documenta’

<https://www.documenta.de/en/about#16_documenta_ggmbh> [accessed 18 July 2022].

¹¹ Ruangrupa and others, *Documenta Fifteen Handbook*, ed. by Ruangrupa (Berlin: Hatje Cantz, 2022).

In the Glossary printed on the cover of the handbook we also find the lumbung values around which the event was organised: “the basic principles of lumbung and of the practice of lumbung members. These include: Generosity, Humor, Local Anchoring, Independence, Regeneration, Transparency and Sufficiency.”¹²

The concept developed by ruangrupa was consistently implemented in Kassel on several levels.

One of the principles followed by ruangrupa was that of **local action**. Thus, what we see “exhibited” in Kassel is just a kind of *aide-mémoire*. The invited collectives attempted a translation of their work: “translation of their local practices to Kassel”¹³. Ruangrupa motivates this strategy by the very specificity of the work of the collectives present at the documenta, by the inextricable unity between life and art in these projects:

“Art is rooted in life. The ensuing objects and methods help in thinking through the issues at hand and in finding solutions that are useful to the community. In this way it is impossible to separate art and life, and it is meaningless to exhibit the objects in Kassel without finding translations of the processes that give rise to them.”¹⁴

In many cases we find reference to the fact that a particular project links the city of Kassel to the region from which the artists or collectives originate, and part of the activities take place in these ex-Kassel territories. Thus, through Dan Perjovschi’s mediation Kassel was connected with Sibiu (Romania), where part of the funding obtained by the artist was channelled towards the operation of the Visual Arts Platform during the Sibiu International Theatre Festival in various locations in the city. The installation in front of the train station in Kassel, “decorated” with Perjovschi’s drawings, is thus seen as a “translation” of the horizontal newspaper in Sibiu.

A central concept of ruangrupa is the **ekosistem**, by which the authors refer to a practice of local collaboration. In Kassel the curatorial group was not interested in the historical or cultural significance of the documenta, which every five years makes the small German city the centre of the art world. Ruangrupa saw Kassel as a small German town, not too detached from the surrounding countryside. Hence, they sought connections with local producers, craft groups, and identified specific issues such as the importance of the river Fulda in the life of the town, bees, or the Brothers Grimm. We could find these themes in several of the documenta’s projects.

Another goal of the ruangrupa collective was **to erase the concept of individual authorship**. It is precisely for this reason that they have primarily invited artistic collectives, and not individual artists to participate at the documenta.

¹² Ruangrupa and others.

¹³ Ruangrupa and others, p. 9.

¹⁴ Ruangrupa and others, p. 30.

In the case of individual artists, what mattered was their experience in projects involving the community. Thus, from Romania, they invited Dan Perjovschi, renowned for his involvement in social projects (e.g. Roşia Montană), cultural projects (Pata Rât) and taking a stand on current issues (e.g. anti-COVID vaccine campaign, or the war in Ukraine).

In the case of collectives, we do not necessarily know the names of the participating artists: the notes accompanying the artworks often only give the names of the collective, not the individual artists. The exception are those collectives which in turn invited individual artists. Thus, the OFF Biennale collective from Hungary offered the RomaMoma project, which exhibited paintings by Roma artists (e.g. Mara (Omara) Oláh, Ceija Stojka, Tamás Péli, Małgorzata Mirga-Tas) in a space and in a way reminiscent of the practice of the white cube. In the Bootsverleih Ahoi space on the banks of the river Fulda, they exhibited the floating gardens of the artist Ilona Németh, the relaxation space designed by Eva Kořátková, the unusual objects of Ádám Kokesch, as well as the space for the powerful video installation of *Randomroutines* (Tamás Kaszás & Krisztián Kristóf).

In the case of other collectives, we don't know who the individual artists are who create under the name of the group. For example, as regards The Black Archive from the Netherlands, if we search the internet, we can find out who the initiators are, namely that The Black Archive is organised by the New Urban Collective. This collective does not define itself as a collective of artists, or even as an art-making collective: they want to promote a multicultural society and help young people with diverse cultural backgrounds.

"New Urban Collective is a network initiated by students, young people and young professionals with a heart for the multicultural society. (...). We organize activities, projects and advise organisations and individuals in the fields of education, labour market, diversity and human rights." ¹⁵

The New Zealand FAFSWAG Collective, which celebrates the "gender fluidity" of Pacific people, presents itself in the documenta handbook as a collective whose composition varies, currently having 12 members. El Warcha in Tunisia produces temporary urban furniture and art installations with residents (especially unemployed youth). At the same time, it also operates as an enterprise that manufactures pieces of furniture at the request of residents. The project now has branches in London, Lisbon, and Davis, California. It does not have a stable composition, just two managers, but one cannot find any record of artists who

¹⁵ 'The Black Archives', *The Black Archives* <<https://www.theblackarchives.nl/about-us.html>> [accessed 10 August 2022].

would be part of the collective. Taring Padi is an Indonesian collective that has been active for more than 20 years, originally formed by art students, that aims to defend the interests of peasants and workers. The group had an overflowing presence at documenta fifteen. Their works, primarily large murals, posters, cardboard cut-out dolls with anti-capitalist messages, and banners were used at protests and festivals. In Kassel, they filled the space in Hallenbad Ost, decorated the facade of the C&A building in the city centre, stood in front of the Fridericianum until, following accusations of anti-Semitism, the organisers decided to revoke the artwork. We do not know who is part of the group: in the photo accompanying the presentation of the group in the documenta handbook one can count more than 20 people and some huge cardboard cutout dolls. Statements are always made on behalf of the group; individual names do not appear.

Ruangrupa from Jakarta is also an organization of artists which always acts as a group. If we access the organisation's website (<https://ruangrupa.id/tentang/>) we will find portraits of ten people, presumably the founders and members of the collective.

The intention of the ruangrupa collective, the curatorial collective of the exhibition, is clear: ownership of art – both in the form of buying and owning works of art, and also in the form of authorship, or claiming authorship (as the work of someone, of the individual who conceived and created it) – must be overcome, because it is part of a social organization that the collective considers unjust, based on negative values (competitiveness, greed, exploitation, and extraction):

“different ways of producing art will create different works, which, in turn, will ask for other ways of being read and understood; artworks that are functioning in real lives in their respective contexts, no longer pursuing mere individual expression, no longer needing to be exhibited as standalone objects or sold to individual collectors and hegemonic state-funded museums. Other ways are possible. In this way, we are resisting the domestication or taming of these different practices.”¹⁶

At the time of writing the handbook of the documenta, the concern for this reversal of the situation appears in the form of a question about the success of the approach: “Will the much-needed dissolution of ownership and authorship happen in documenta fifteen?”¹⁷ The question is still open.

The focus on **sustainability** is also visible. One of the convictions of the ruangrupa is that everything must work locally, from small to medium size, because large sizes produce the undesirable effects we see in the globalism of capitalism.

¹⁶ Ruangrupa and others, p. 17.

¹⁷ Ruangrupa and others, p. 17.

Large scale development has proved unsustainable – it is time to try smaller sizes. Also, for the purpose of sustainability, it is important to return to a closer relationship with nature, to natural and reusable materials. These aspects are in a tense relationship with the aesthetics and design requirements. The place of white walls, tables, and elegant showcases was taken by plastic crates, usually used for transporting and storing goods, especially agricultural products, and barrels, which functioned as display stands, tables, chairs, etc. This solution was ingenious and also worked aesthetically, with its surprising, rudimentary, rough aesthetics, and in complete harmony with the overall concept of the exhibition. The look and feel of many of the sites has been more studio than exhibition, emphasising the notion that art is not about objects but rather about processes. The documenta handbook, information notes, map, and exhibition booklet are all printed on recycled paper. As for the handbook, this aspect does not detract from the quality of the volume, but in the case of the information notes on the walls of the exhibition, the aspect of sustainability has led to a text that is difficult to read, in small print, crowded against a dark background, and often located in places that are difficult to access (sometimes at knee level). The concern for sustainability and ecological balance has been intertwined with an indictment of the capitalist mode of production and the policies of developed countries that export their problems, metaphorically and literally, as the garbage produced in the “global south”, as in the installation created by The Nest Collective, called *Return to Sender*.

Since what we have is participatory art, it is to be expected that there will be a concern with social issues: economically disadvantaged groups, disadvantaged ethnic groups, groups with different sexual preferences, etc. For example, the collective Project Art Works from the UK brought to Kassel a corpus created under the motto of “neurodiversity” – in fact, a very interesting material, and an oasis for those thirsty for visual experiences, a rare treat at documenta fifteen. The social aspect is quite hard to separate from the political stance, and many of the projects have embraced **political messages**. Left-wing positions exposing exploitation and tension between the poor and the rich or the cruelty of political and military power are characteristic of the Taring Padi group. The cardboard puppets carried messages such as: *No human is illegal, No state without corruption, Law not for sale, Women’s rights are human rights*, etc., as well as many messages in Indonesian, (presumably) indecipherable to the average European visitor. In fact, the artifacts produced by Taring Padi are not art objects in the first place, but propaganda materials used at demonstrations and festivals. Similarly, the *Archives des luttes de femmes en Algérie* project, although it does not produce material for the ideological struggle, digitizes such material produced by activists and archives it. Algerian women artists in recent decades have produced material used in demonstrations: posters, texts, photographic material. In this case, the (woman) artist and the (woman) activist is

indistinguishable, although individualized: the personal archives of three artists/activists are presented, as well as interviews with them. Last but not least, Denmark's Trampoline House collective has embraced the refugee issue, criticising the Danish state's unfriendly stance on migration and refugees.

From the point of view of criticism of the way the art world works, however, we must give ruangrupa credit for a rather important change: more than 1500 artists, mostly from the "global south", were involved in the current edition of the documenta, invited by the collectives invited in turn by ruangrupa. Many more artists benefited from the opportunity to be exhibited in one of the most important artistic events, many of them with no previous connection to the artistic centre of the world, than in any of the previous editions. Is it a lot, is it still too few? Will this experiment change the way the art world works? We shall see.

From the visitors' point of view, documenta has certainly not become more accessible. The entrance fee is double that charged at the Venice Biennale, the geographical spread of the works and their number makes it impossible to cover them in two days, the informative materials are difficult to locate, and the visitor is often perplexed by unfamiliar phenomena, to which he is not helped to find his or her way.

Although one of the values explicitly promoted by the organisers was **humour**, the truth is that I didn't seem to encounter any more humour than in other similar exhibitions. Of course, the work of Dan Perjovschi, who dominated my first contact with the 15th edition of the documenta, by using the Fridericianum columns as a backdrop for his drawings was, as always, witty, ironic, with a lot of good quality humour. The documenta's visual appearance, with its bright colours and playful design, gave a cheerful, boisterous tone to the space. The works of the Paring Tari collective also bring cartoon humour, satire, and incisive irony. A complex experiment which does not lack humor was studio Wakaliga Uganda's film, *Football Kommando*.

3. The experience of the documenta fifteen

Documenta fifteen is an experiment. An art collective with a very different conception of how art is made and exhibited, even opposite to the understanding dominant in the Western/Northern art world, invited other collectives to "translate" their local art practice in Kassel. The general concept (lumbung), the values pursued, the mode of cooperation have been, in my opinion, achieved in an exemplary, particularly consistent manner. The most problematic aspect of documenta fifteen, however, and perhaps of participatory art in general, is the issue of reception. The ruangrupa project changes not only the way art is created, but, as a necessary consequence, also the behaviour expected of the viewer. Basically, the visitor to the exhibition is expected to become a co-participant.

Having had the opportunity to visit documenta fifteen, I will attempt an assessment of the event from the perspective of the visitor, the art recipient. Beyond the ethical appreciation of the *lumbung* concept (particularly topical and generous) and the curatorial coherence of the exhibition (which is remarkable), as a visitor who did not attend the opening events but visited documenta fifteen during the week, three weeks after the opening, the most overwhelming feeling was of a certain lack. In what follows I will try to articulate this sense of something missing.

The lack of aesthetic pleasure

In the modern paradigm of art, a central element is the disinterested aesthetic pleasure aroused in the subject by the encounter with beauty. Of course, one might object that since Kant there have been radical changes in art: beauty is no longer at the centre of artistic concerns (perhaps since Picasso's *The Maidens of Avignon*), and aesthetics itself is no longer necessarily a requirement for art (perhaps since Duchamp's *Fountain*). My conviction is, however, that the specificity of art is the ability to express the idea in a sensitive form, to embody the idea. The idea is immaterial, but art is able to embody it. This body of the idea can be seen, heard, etc. – and when we perceive the artistic body of the idea, we are enchanted not primarily by the idea itself, but by the form of the body. I think this is how I would translate disinterested aesthetic pleasure, the object of which would thus be a much broadened notion of “beauty”. Modern art has moved far away from the concept of “fine (or beautiful) art”, one could even say that on the agenda of modern art has been the goal of transcending its own boundaries as fine art. In a process described by Clement Greenberg, art (painting) left aside everything that proved non-essential: resemblance to nature, perspective, figurativeness, subject matter, etc. As I see it, participatory art goes one step further and tries to eliminate the moment of reception as well. It is an art form without a viewer (recipient of art). An art not concerned with form, nor with the aesthetic effect on the viewer. The desired effect is rather an ethical one. The viewer should become an active participant (activist?). But how can this transfiguration take place, if not through the effect of aesthetic experience?

I am not saying that aesthetics was absent from documenta fifteen. A kind of exotic, noisy, and vibrant aesthetic was certainly present; something we could call the “warehouse” aesthetic, created by recycled packaging, wrapping, and transporting materials: plastic crates, rusty tin walls, barrels, reused cardboard and such. But what I am saying is that in most of the spaces, obviously intended for activities that take place from time to time, what could be experienced were the leftovers of the actual “feast”, the lifeless toys. The aesthetic effect on the viewer does not seem to be a goal for most of these projects. Participatory art seems to be an art ***without any recipient, without a viewer.***

The lack of participation

The aspects mentioned above were probably determined by the fact that when I visited documenta fifteen, I did not catch any ongoing activity. In the El Warcha workshop we were greeted by the “do not use” message displayed on the tools with which we could have assembled urban furniture. At Eva Kořátková’s installation we were warned not to use the exhibits (which basically would have functioned as a kind of sack jumpsuits providing comfort – soft touch, warmth, protection, etc. – when worn). We saw Cuban artist Tania Bruguera preparing a reading in her space in the Halle, but we didn’t catch it, nor the possible discussions it may have sparked. We went to the ook_visitor centrum, where theoretically many collectives had programs. When we arrived, in the courtyard of the building they have been packing a lot of shoes that have been exhibited, as in a flea market, on a low wall – but we did not recognize the purpose of the action. We found flyers on the tables about past events, and some people – apparently organizers – were talking amongst themselves. Our group sat down on a bench, and we prepared ourselves for the journey back to the city centre, leaving the centre without realising how “knowledge is produced and changed”¹⁸ in this space, which was quite frustrating.

The documenta handbook boasts that “Fridskul turns the Fridericianum from a museum into a living space”¹⁹. But what we encountered at the Fridericianum, at least in the Fridskul space, was neither museum nor living space. There was no activity going on and visitors could at best imagine what it would be like if something just happened. It would probably have been beneficial if the design and organisation of the whole event had been more visitor/receiver centred. In our experience, what we encountered at the documenta fifteen was ***participatory art without participation***, which was all the more annoying because participation is the essence of this form of art.

The lack of universality (the sense of exclusion)

Within the modern paradigm of art, the work of art is unique, but its meanings are universal. In principle, anyone who comes into contact with the works of Edvard Munch can decipher the “message” of his paintings. In this sense, his work has a sense of universality: in principle, it has a message for everyone, from every culture, now and in the future.

¹⁸ Ruangrupa and others, p. 162.

¹⁹ Ruangrupa and others, p. 36.

Of course, in reality, things are different. Not everyone is able to contemplate a Munch – some do not have the financial means to go to a museum or to pay the entrance fee, others have not benefited from an education that would have aroused their interest, or do not have the knowledge of art history that would make it easier for them to appreciate it, still others belong to another culture and find it difficult to digest this kind of art, etc. But in principle no one is excluded and theoretically the artist addresses everyone and anyone.

By contrast, I have had the feeling with many Documenta projects that they are made for the local group with which the collective interacts, or for the collective itself, for whom these artistic projects bring real value. The problem is precisely the difficulty of communicating this type of art to those who are not part of the collective. If it's art, it has to be communicated – and *how* it is communicated is at least as important as the message itself. Documenta is, after all, an exhibition – this is not denied by the curators of the 15th edition – and being an exhibition, it is aimed at a visiting public, the recipients of art. There are many interesting points in the exhibition, where aesthetic, artistic experiences are born – for example, the installation of the MADEYOULOOK collective from South Africa in a hotel ballroom, rethought in an aesthetically uncomfortable space, in order to make us rethink the way we want to inhabit the world. In my opinion, it was a wise decision not to attempt a “translation” of this Johannesburg activity for Kassel, but to design an installation that would present the outsider in a sensorial form with the concerns of the collective. Such moments were, however, an exception. There have been many projects that were born in a specific socio-geographical area – e.g. Asian, rural, in an economy of scarcity, within disadvantaged groups, etc. These projects are undoubtedly valuable in their intention to promote marginality, pluralism of values, equity, etc., and no doubt many of them have had, and are having, a positive effect on the communities directly involved. Being “exhibited” in an exhibition, perhaps their role should have been to mediate between the visitor – usually European, usually in an economic position that allows her or him to travel to Kassel and pay the 45-euro entrance fee, usually a city dweller accustomed to museums and galleries – and the specific problems of the original communities of artists' collectives. However, I had the feeling that this mediation failed. Everywhere we read about how these projects link the artists' hometown or region to Kassel – i.e. one local level to another local level, one particular to another particular. But the problem is that the visitor probably doesn't belong to any of these particulars. In order to have access to the meaning of the projects, however, they should probably have risen to a more universal level, as a point of mediation between the various particularities. Without this effort to communicate to everyone, the visitor often feels excluded, passively (“how does this project concern me?!”) or actively (“I'm part of the culture criticised as exploitative, extractive, greedy, destroying the local

areas that these projects are about"). Reading the documenta fifteen handbook ("We refuse to be exploited by European, institutional agenda that are not ours to begin with")²⁰, as "Europeans", it is difficult to identify with the curators' position, but on the other hand the sense of belonging to European culture is also stirred. Thus, Michaela Schabel's opinion is in line with what we experienced in Kassel: "For an exhibition like the documenta with global aspirations, this collective activist approach seems far too one-sided, too monotonous and deeply excluding, because art from the other hemisphere is completely absent"²¹.

Participatory art is an engaged art that works for the benefit of the community, and thus fights against the exclusivist elitism of the art world. For this reason, to experience as a visitor the feeling of exclusion was disturbing, and it went against the very essence of this type of art. The important question arises: how can the participation of the potential recipient, who is not a member of the original community of the project, be included? In my opinion, documenta fifteen has failed to address this issue in a viable way.

Conclusions

Assuming that everything we encounter at the documenta fifteen is art (thus without getting into the controversy about the art quality of these projects), what has become apparent is the deficit of reception of participatory art among those non-professionals who do not participate. Does the thesis of the necessity of artistic experience, of direct contact with the work, still hold or not in the case of participatory art? Was it a mistake to travel to Kassel, given the curators' aim to promote local art – and so perhaps it would have been sufficient for us to travel to Sibiu? Is everything we need on the internet anyway, and should we have just read the information and watched the discussions on YouTube? And if this is the case, we would still have grounds to call these projects "art"? I still believe that art, with few exceptions, must be experienced and must address the receiver – visitor, viewer, participant, or whatever we may call him or her.

Can an artistic value of these projects can be discerned, beyond their social relevance? If yes, is this related to an aesthetic experience of the receiver? How can the supposed artistic value of these projects be conveyed to people other than those directly involved in the artistic project? Can these projects be relevant for

²⁰ Ruangrupa and others, p. 12.

²¹ Michaela Schabel, 'Kassel - "Documenta 15" - a Missed Opportunity - Schabel Culture Blog', 2022 <<https://schabel-kultur-blog.de/ausstellung/kassel-documenta-15-eine-verpasste-chance/>> [accessed 15 August 2022].

posterity? These questions were not answered in Kassel but remained as unsettling as before the documenta fifteen experience.

The more or less serious slogan of document fifteen was: MAKE FRIENDS, NOT ART! Of course, by this the curators do not mean that what they do is not art, but a kind of overturning of values: the most important thing is not art, but harmonious relationships between people.

The aim of ruangrupa was extremely ambitious: the values they promote (Generosity, Humor, Local Anchoring, Independence, Regeneration, Transparency and Sufficiency) are central to today's society. At the same time, this edition of the documenta attempts to create a new art space – without excessive (physical, financial, etc.) dimensions, without elitism, without individual ownership of art, without competitiveness, and without greed: a local, sustainable space, by and for collectives. The concept is consistently implemented, despite its – in my opinion – utopian character. The large-scale experiment character is recognised by the curatorial team:

“we are still curious to see whether the 100 days of documenta fifteen will only result in pragmatic exercises – a temporary ‘time-off’ for artists and initiatives to learn from – only to swing back to the old system of doing things, relapsing to state funding and/or free art-market system, or even the biennial circuits.”²²

The bigger issue, however, is the question of the reception of this kind of art – or of the lack of the receiver, the visitor, the viewer from the agenda of the curators. During a 100-day exhibition, projects can't run all the time, and artists can't always be present. Thus, the visitor cannot truly become a participant and an activist – which would have been one of the essential purposes of this documenta. We can accept the argument that “different ways of producing art will create different works, which, in turn, will ask for other ways of being read and understood”²³. The problem is that these new ways of “reading and understanding” artworks have not been convincingly developed, even though documenta fifteen abounds with texts. The critic Adrian Searle exclaims: “Words, words, words. So many words everywhere in Documenta 15; it is a wonder anyone has time for anything else.”²⁴. These texts are ultimately not very useful, and perhaps precisely because there are so many of them. The viewer is urged to participate, but it is not clear what

²² Ruangrupa and others, p. 17.

²³ Ruangrupa and others, p. 17.

²⁴ Adrian Searle, ‘Welcome to the Fun House! Sharks, Skaters and Smelters Liven up Documenta 15’, *The Guardian*, 23 June 2022, section Art and design
<<https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2022/jun/23/fun-house-sharks-skaters-smelters-documenta-15-kassel>> [accessed 15 August 2022].

participation means. The Britto Arts Trust collective from Bangladesh is concerned about food issues and has brought a complex project to Kassel, including a family kitchen where they invite immigrants to prepare food, share stories, and organise events. Does the visitor, who is not an immigrant, become a participant by tasting the food? If he or she enters the space, sits at a table, and listens (in what language?) to the stories? If (s)he takes a few pictures and posts them on Instagram? Ultimately, what do you have to do, to go from visitor/viewer to participant?

The tensions related to the reception of art are sensed by ruangrupa, but the Gordian knot of reception is abruptly cut by simply negating the viewer and the reception: "We try to produce a new aesthetics – an ethical paradigm where the viewer is obsolete." The viewer's presence is not justified at this documenta: "they should not be there to observe but to be part of the process". Moreover, the viewer, who hitherto was in a position to make an aesthetic or artistic value judgement, should now refrain from judging works: "our work should not be judged by an outsider but in terms of the benefits that it brings to the community which creates it"²⁵. This is how a local art is born here, for the participants, which can only be experienced and judged by the participants themselves. Fortunately, we can hear the so long reprimed voice of Global South – but unfortunately, we could not hear the voice of Nord, so, we do not experience a dialog, only a monolog.

The major question is whether these defects related to reception (lack of aesthetic experience, lack of participation and lack of inclusion) are only accidental or they are structurally built into the fabric of participatory art?

Certainly, those who participated directly in the creation of the projects presented had the opportunity to work together, to experience the *lumbung*, the unparalleled feeling of community that comes from co-participation in a common project. I doubt, however, that the average visitor had the opportunity to make friends during the few days of feverish searching for various spots in Kassel. Thus, without the opportunity to make friends, the visitor was left with only the hope that he or she would still be able to experience the liberating and motivating effects of art at documenta fifteen in Kassel from time to time.

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CORPS EN SOUFFRANCE / CORPS EN VACANCES. L'ÉCRIVAIN M. BLECHER ET LA PEINTRE LUCIA DEM. BĂLĂCESCU DANS LE SANATORIUM DE TEKIRGHIOL

Ligia TUDURACHI*

ABSTRACT. *Suffering bodies/ bodies on vacation. Writer M. Blecher and painter Lucia Dem. Bălăcescu in the Tekirghiol sanatorium.* What we propose is an analysis of the creative sharing that two artists, M. Blecher and Lucia Dem. Bălăcescu, both suffering from a bone disease, developed it during their joint hospitalization in the C.T.C sanatorium in Tekirghiol for a year, in 1933-1934. The characteristic of this space is the presence of over 300 children, the sanatorium only exceptionally housing adults. From these children, who have their own way of using play and toys to hide their illness, the two artists learn a childlike way of living their own suffering and feel suggested to cultivate (and) forms of a miniature art. Lucia Dem. Bălăcescu makes a series of 50 mini-gouaches, which he calls *Surrealist Fantasies*. Blecher, like Robert Walser did in the same years, fantasizes about a miniature writing, designing drawings whose lines are made up of small words to the limit of illegibility.

Keywords: sanatorium, heterotopia, collaborative creation, dilettantism, miniature, miniature writing, puppet theater, toys.

Motto : « Les malades ont, eux aussi, certaines satisfactions, croyez-moi, ils sont bien gâtés » (Dem. Bălăcescu 1979, 107).

Je reste dans les cadres de la même réflexion sur les modes dans lesquels une atmosphère de vacances et le programme journalier qu'induit une telle atmosphère, avec l'installation, toujours provisoire, dans une routine avec quelques

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activités obligatoires qui sont « biffées » par tout le monde – arrive à produire des « effets » artistiques. Se constitue, à l’occasion de ces installations et de ces rencontres, une communauté « estivale », elle aussi provisoire. Entre ces communautés-là, celle qui va m’intéresser ici, c’est la communauté de sanatorium. Après l’apparition, en 1924, de *La montagne magique* de Thomas Mann, on a beaucoup réfléchi sur la vie quotidienne dans les sanatoriums et sur les situations où la maladie devient une occasion, une force et une forme créative. On a parlé même d’une « ère sanatoriale » (Villate 2018) pour la période entre les deux guerres. Le cas que je vais discuter est roumain, de la même époque. Il ne vise pas un sanatorium de maladies pulmonaires, mais un sanatorium de maladies osseuses. La question qui m’intéresse est liée à ce qui se passe quand une souffrance physique est vécue sur un fond de loisir, quand la maladie et la relaxation deviennent inséparables.

Le sanatorium a une vocation à isoler autant qu’à soigner, il se présente comme un lieu de séquestration qui finit par se croire volontaire. Roland Barthes le caractérise comme un endroit qui tient « de la peuplade, du couvent et du phalanstère » (Barthes 1999, 640), où on organise un succédané de la vie. Mais il y a aussi un divertissement qui se produit sur le fond de la vie oisive sanatoriale, surtout quand l’asile est situé (d’ailleurs assez fréquemment) dans des endroits de vacances : au bord de la mer ou en haut de la montagne. Ces formes variées d’amusement (thé dansant, bal masqué) qui sortent les malades de leur passivité et de leur irritation ont intéressé un peu Thomas Mann aussi.

Pendant l’été 1933, et pour presque une année, il arrive que Max Blecher et Lucia Dem. Bălăcescu passent ensemble leur temps de guérison dans le sanatorium C.T.C. de Tekirghiol¹, au bord de la mer Noire. C’était un sanatorium fondé en 1894 par le docteur Dona. Ils y sont installés depuis juin 1933 jusqu’au mai 1934 (Lucia y restera un peu plus, son séjour prendra fin le printemps 1936). Futur écrivain, Max Blecher, qui avait 24 ans en 1933, se trouvait encore avant son début en volume. Il avait publié à ce moment-là un seul texte en Roumanie, *Herrant*, dans la revue *Bilete de papagal*, et encore un autre, *L’Inextricable position*, dans *Le Surréalisme au service de la révolution* d’André Breton. Il était, en effet, déjà un peu fameux (grâce à sa relation avec les avant-gardes françaises), sans avoir presque rien écrit. Diagnostiqué avec spondylodiscite (mal de Pott, considérée à l’époque incurable), quand il avait à peine commencé ses études en médecine à Paris, il allait mourir de cette maladie en 1938. Toute sa carrière littéraire, qui l’impose parmi les écrivains roumains les plus intéressants, se concentrera entre 1934 et 1938. Née en 1895, la peintre Lucia Demetriade-Bălăcescu était de 14 ans plus âgée que Blecher. Elle souffrait d’une tuberculeuse osseuse qui s’était déclenchée, suite d’un accident, à

¹ La station s’appelait à cette époque-là Carmen-Sylva.

l'âge de trois ans. Moins grave que celle de Blecher, sa maladie lui permettra de survivre jusqu'en 1979. En 1933, Lucia était déjà une artiste consacrée : après une petite exposition personnelle ouverte en 1919 dans l'enceinte d'un magasin bucarestois, elle recevait en 1924 son premier prix, pour une gouache exposée au Salon officiel de Bucarest ; en 1926, elle organisait sa première exposition importante, très bien reçue par les critiques, avec des tableaux qui exploraient d'une manière fantaisiste la vie des boyards roumains. Chose qui n'est peut-être pas sans importance pour ce qui se passera à Tekirghiol, avant ce séjour-là, partagé, Lucia et Blecher avaient tous les deux passé une période de guérison dans le sanatorium de Berck-sur-Mer en France, là-bas sans s'être croisés². Avec la conscience qu'ils ont, déjà, raté un partage, ils se hâtent, à Tekirghiol, à se lier d'une amitié qui, sur le fond d'une complicité tout aussi médicale qu'intellectuelle, ne va pas exclure les implications sentimentales ; quoique Lucia soit mariée et Blecher se trouve lui aussi engagé dans une relation avec Maria Ghiolu³. Nourrie de cette amitié, c'est une forme de création collaborative qui s'œuvre. Chacun des deux artistes y pratique son propre art (Blecher écrit, Lucia peint), mais ils commencent aussi à s'illustrer dans l'art de l'autre (Blecher dessine, Lucia écrit)⁴.

² Deux des hôtels-sanatorium de Berck-sur-Mer étaient « Regina » et « Normande ». En juillet 1931, Blecher avait été logé dans la « Villa Normande ». Lucia fera une intervention chirurgicale à Berck en 1932, après laquelle elle restera logée dans la même villa Normande, pour encore six mois (Blecher 2017, 1417).

³ Ayant deux années de plus que Blecher, Maria Ghiolu l'avait connu en 1933. Elle avait une sœur malade, qui était internée dans le sanatorium C.T.C. de Tekirghiol. En 1970, Ghiolu publiera un roman qui s'inspire de son amour avec Blecher, après ce qu'en 1934, l'écrivain lui avait dédié son premier volume de vers, *Corps transparent* [Le Corps transparent]. Paul Cernat observe la réussite, chez Ghiolu, des portraits des « créatures petites » (le groom bégayé de madame Silelis, la nièce de Marie, « Lucia-la petite », Domnica, la fille de la sœur Cristinne, etc). Il serait donc possible que l'intérêt de Lucia et Blecher pour les figures d'enfant et l'univers enfantin, tel qu'il se configure dans le sanatorium de Tekirghiol, soit partagé avec Ghiolu, et influence celle-ci également : Minu (le personnage qui incarne Blecher) y est d'ailleurs désigné comme un « enfant cher mal chanceux » (Cernat 2011, 14).

⁴ La ressource documentaire la plus importante qui informe sur la relation de Lucia et Blecher est le corpus épistolaire des lettres qu'ils s'étaient envoyées dans le sanatorium. 48 lettres de ce corpus, conservées dans l'archive du Musée National d'Art de Bucarest, ont été éditées en 2000 par Mădălina Lascu dans *M. Blecher mai puțin cunoscut* [M. Blecher moins connu] et ont été reproduites ultérieurement, avec de petites modifications et adjonctions, par Doris Mironescu dans l'édition de M. Blecher, *Opere* [Œuvres] de 2017.

1. Le sanatorium de Tekirghiol : les trois cents enfants

Ce qui va m'intéresser en ce qui suit sont les ressorts de cette communion créative et, de manière encore plus précise, le rôle qu'a joué l'espace singulier de Tekirghiol dans le choix de la formule bouffonne-naïve de cette création. Tekirghiol ne fonctionne pas pour les deux artistes internés ici comme un simple décor du *vivre-ensemble*. La particularité du sanatorium de Berck-sur-Mer la faisaient les gouttières, et les promenades que les malades effectuaient tous seuls, allongés sur ces gouttières tirées par des chevaux, en ville ou à l'extérieur de la ville, dans la nature. À Tekirghiol, le spécifique de l'ambiance était lié à la présence des enfants. Les adultes internés y étaient plutôt exceptionnels, le sanatorium accueillait surtout des enfants. En 1933, leur chiffre dépassait les trois cents. Or, c'est justement l'image de ces enfants-là, allongés sur la plage ou dans les dortoirs communs avant de s'endormir, avec leurs jeux menés entre la vie et la mort, qui s'est inscrite, d'une manière matricielle, dans la perception de Blecher et de Lucia Dem. Bălăcescu. La présence quantitative de ces enfants souffrants a non seulement obligé les adultes présents à observer une manière enfantine de vivre la maladie, mais leurs a aussi induits une manière semblable de souffrir. Il y a quelque chose d'immature, d'irresponsable, de non assumée, qui intervient dans leur peine : tout comme il y a un besoin d'improvisation et de jeux qui devient indissociable de leur douleur et du supplice supporté.

Dans *Vizuiua luminată* [La tanière éclairée], roman de Blecher qui n'aura qu'une édition posthume, en 1971, on retrouve cette description d'atmosphère :

C'était une sorte de longue serre, une sorte d'écurie avec plusieurs portes en verre par lesquelles la lumière entraît plus agressive et plus froide qu'elle ne l'était à l'extérieur. Au fond, un mur très long était peint en blanc et les malades étaient allongés l'un à côté de l'autre jusqu'au bout, les charriots collés et sans laisser comme lieu de passage que l'équivalent de quelques pas devant les portes. Derrière, une sorte de couloir blanc cassé et hygiénique avec trop de malades et un bredouillement assourdissant. Je crois qu'il y avait, enfilés, plus que trois cents charriots. Dans un coin, deux paravanes en tissu fine séparaient pour les adultes, hommes et femmes, très peu nombreux, un espace restreint [...]

Pour nous réchauffer un peu, on avait fermé toutes les portes ; tout à coup, la serre avait contenu dans son couloir d'espace blanc et raréfié, toute la rumeur de trois cents enfants qui dans le même endroit parlaient, chuchotaient, respiraient, toussaient et chantaient. Et c'était surtout ça : ils chantaient. Tous avaient commencé, après avoir terminé de manger, un

cœur avec des chansons agaçantes et très connues, avec des refrains de taverne, trois cents bouches qui, réunies, entonnaient, criant presque les mots, quelque chose impossible à décrire, un bourdonnement sonneur et violent, comme une tempête de sons. Je sentais que les murs allaient s'écraser, comme pour un bâtiment qui était en cours de s'effondrer, que le plafond va tomber et que les vitres des portes vont s'écraser, sous l'assaut des sons qui devenaient de plus en plus menaçants. Tout m'aurait été insupportable, si ce bruit n'avait pas eu, en réalité, le rôle spécial de couvrir et de cacher discrètement d'autres bruits plus faibles d'une toute autre origine. C'était comme une sorte de rideau de « borborigmèles » et de coliques des trois cents enfants qui, le soir, avant de s'endormir, se faisaient, tous, les choses intestinales (n.tr.) (Blecher 2017, 474-475).

Ce qui se voit bien dans ce tableau de la peine enfantine est surtout la dissimulée de la souffrance. Ici, il s'agit de chançonner, fredonner, psalmodier – pour couvrir des bruits embarrassants. Autre part, on retrouve une « mise en théâtre » de la souffrance, qui fait appel aux maquillages et aux masques (« Il y avaient – note Blecher dans une de ses lettres adressées à Lucia⁵ – des fillettes de douze-treize ans, les joues maquillées violement, bien que, elles me l'ont dit, elles n'allaient pas jouer justement sur la scène »). Sur la plage, ce seront surtout les jeux et les jouets qui vont dissimuler la maladie. Il y a toujours une régie – spontanée et collective – qui y est impliquée dans l'obtention de cette apparence d'une parfaite normalité de l'enfance ; et toujours un effort s'y consomme dans la réalisation et la promotion de ces images apparemment communes. Le jeu n'est jamais, pour ces enfants, un « jeu heureux », il n'est jamais innocent et purement gratuit. C'est un dispositif/ ou plusieurs, qu'on implique dans la maladie, afin de la rendre supportable et de l'apprivoiser, afin d'estomper sa morbidité et sa brutalité, afin de la décaler, pour un court moment, du temps présent. Et pour ce faire, la communauté est nécessaire, plus que pour d'autres souffrants. C'est seulement la communauté qui rend possible le vécu d'un temps présent qui ne soit pas tout à fait présent. Or, toute provisoire et locale qu'elle soit, momentanée, cette communauté de souffrance peut, de cette unique manière, précisément, se réaliser comme une communauté de loisir.

Pour les quelques adultes qui s'associent à cette ambiance, il devient difficile, voire impossible, d'afficher, par rapport à ces enfants, une attitude parentale. Dans une lettre tardive, (qui date de 17 octobre 1935) que Lucia envoie à Blecher déjà installé dans la maison de son père, dans la petite ville de Roman, en Moldavie, après avoir quitté le sanatorium, elle le prévient sur le fait que le médecin qui le

⁵ La lettre 21 de Blecher adressée à Lucia (Blecher 2017, 820).

traitait à Roman avait un fils malade, interné lui aussi à Tekirghiol. L'information est suivie par cette précision curieuse, rédigée en français : « toutefois, veuillez savoir que *nous ne sommes nullement parents* et que je ne l'ai jamais vu de ma vie » (n.s.) (Blecher 2017, 849). C'est étrange comme, ici, le fait de ne pas arriver à se situer « en adulte » par rapport aux enfants du sanatorium s'associe avec l'idée de ne pas les voir, de ne pas les observer en tant qu'individus, comme des singularités. C'est donc une perception groupale que les enfants induisent, et c'est conséquence à cette perception-là que les adultes se lâchent assimiler dans le groupe enfantin. Ils ne restent pas extérieurs, comme des observateurs ou comme des instances critiques, ils ne gardent pas la distance « parentale », qui assumerait la responsabilité du soin, l'affection du *care*. Mettre côte à côte des enfants et des adultes souffrants, et souffrants de la même maladie, finit par produire, à Tekirghiol, une communauté infantile, élargie. Le terme d'*hospitalité*, tel que l'avait défini Derrida en 1995 – la préséance de l'accueil, l'hospitalité inconditionnelle, « pure », absolue de la *visitation*⁶, par laquelle on laisse sa maison ouverte à n'importe qui qui peut arriver – pourrait peut-être exploiter dans ce cas une *hospitalité* en contexte d'asile, avec sa proximité avec l'*hospitalisation*, mais, encore plus, il permettrait d'observer ce qui se passe dans une situation où l'installation préalable et majoritaire d'un certain patient (identifié, cette fois, par l'âge) arrive à situer celui-ci dans une position de hôte qui ouvre la possibilité d'un accueil : le projette comme « maître », comme « patron » de cet accueil. Son identité sera respectée et protégée. L'*hospitalité* comme situation de s'exposer à l'autre se présente, pour les patients adultes arrivés à Tekirghiol, comme une *visitation* qui finit par les faire partager la manière de l'enfant (de l'enfant-en-communauté d'enfants) de vivre cet espace et la maladie dans ses cadres.

2. Le dilettantisme : l'invention d'une irresponsabilité créative

Ce qui se produit, pour Blecher et pour Lucia, conséquence de ce partage d'une manière infantile de se rapporter à la maladie, c'est la reprise de cet infantilisme dans leur conduite artiste. On retrouve chez tous les deux une forme d'irresponsabilité face à leur propre création. Ils expérimentent à Tekirghiol, de manière volontaire, un certain dilettantisme. On peut l'observer non seulement dans leur oscillation entre la littérature et les arts plastiques ; mais aussi dans leur

⁶ V. à ce titre la différence que fait Derrida entre l'*invitation* – quand je reçois chez moi volontairement, en fonction des règles en usage, et la *visitation* – quand je laisse ma maison ouverte pour qui que ce soit (Derrida 2022). V. aussi *hospitalité* dans sa définition de *Derridex*. *Index des termes de l'oeuvre de Jacques Derrida* (<https://www.idixa.net/Pixa/pagixa-0604010913.html>).

intérêt à s'illustrer chacun dans l'art de l'autre, avec le sentiment d'une simple plaisanterie, du pur amusement. L'énergie de l'espace hétérotopique se convertit, de la sorte, en détermination de sortir de l'art pour laquelle on se sent doué – qu'on est en cours de professionnaliser (Blecher) ou qu'on avait déjà professionnalisé (Lucia) – pour s'orienter vers un art dans lequel on est convaincu d'être et de rester à jamais un simple amateur. Tekirghiol offre, de cette manière, à Lucia et à Blecher la possibilité de s'aménager un espace second – secondaire en même temps pour leur vie et pour leur art (espace alternatif à celui « premier », sur lequel la maladie, tout comme l'art, ne pouvaient être prises qu'en sérieux et assumées pleinement), où on peut se laisser en proie à l'improvisation, où on se plaît à être « irresponsable ».

2.1. Les tableaux – à travers la littérature

Les critiques d'art qui avaient analysé les tableaux de Lucia qui dataient d'avant 1933 lui avaient parlé d'une « narrativité » de son style pictural. Ils avaient observé que tous ses tableaux racontaient des histoires. Au sanatorium, dans la compagnie de Blecher, qui va bientôt commencer à lui écrire des « scénarios » pour ses prochains tableaux, Lucia se voit encore une fois confrontée à cette narrativité qui soit la sienne. Mais ce qu'elle saisira de plus avec lui, quant à cette narrativité, c'est à quel point elle était littéraire : déjà « littérature ». Cela la convainc à écrire de petites proses, qu'elle lit et discute avec son ami Max (ces proses ne seront jamais publiées).

Les mêmes « scénarios » que lui écrit Blecher prédisposent Lucia à un geste dilettante dans sa peinture. À la base de ces schémas narratifs, elle réalise une série de 50 mini-gouaches, qui seront exposées en mars 1934 sous le titre de « Fantaisies surréalistes » (Blecher écrit, également, la *Préface* du catalogue, et, pour douze des 50 gouaches, il rédige de petites présentations). Il n'y a rien de vraiment « surréaliste » dans ces desseins, exposés, cependant, exactement au moment où le surréalisme était en vogue. Lucia parle, dans leur cas, d'un « surréalisme pour rigoler » : « C'est lui [M. Blecher] qui m'avait parlé pour la première fois du surréalisme. *Pour rigoler*, j'ai exécuté une série de petites compositions que j'ai intitulée « surréaliste » – elles étaient, certes, beaucoup plus réalistes que « surréalistes ». Je les avais désignées ainsi *ironiquement, un peu aussi pour cracher sur le travail des autres, mais surtout parce que cela me distrayait, d'essayer ce que je n'aurais jamais essayer, et je voulais aussi me faire un caprice* » (n.s.) (Dem. Bălăcescu 1979, 102). Dans la réalisation de l'exposition, Lucia s'investit, donc, comme une écolière dans une farce jouée à ses professeurs, pour voir avec quelle réaction ils lui répondront. Comme un enfant

gâté, elle fait « son caprice ». Les critiques ne vont pas tarder à lui donner satisfaction. Gheorghe Dinu et Ion Călugăru, pour le groupe surréaliste roumain, dans un numéro de 1934 du journal *Adevărul literar și artistic*, l'accuse d'imposture⁷.

Que le diable m'eût poussé à oser toucher le fameux « surréalisme » (note Lucia dans ses confessions), qui, à ce moment-là précisément poussait ses cornes chez nous, ayant comme magister le bien talentueux Victor Brauner, avant qu'il ne parte pas à Paris. Gheorghe Dinu m'a appelé immédiatement aux ordres : comment est-ce possible que je donne un tel titre à des esquisses qui n'aient absolument rien à faire avec le « sacrosaint » Surréalisme ? Je vous demande : quel péché si grave avais-je commis ? Ces petites gouaches étaient du point de vue plastique (c'est un peu stupide de le dire moi-même), *délicieuses*, je ne sais pas si je pouvais jamais produire d'autres semblables ... (n.tr.) (Dem. Bălăcescu 1979, 103)⁸.

S'il y a du « vrai » surréalisme, quelque part dans cette exposition, c'est dans les scénarios de Blecher qu'on doit le rechercher. La prose que Blecher écrira après cette période passée à Tekirghiol, ce qui deviendra sa littérature à plein terme, reste imprégnée par la fabulation et le mélange entre la réalité et le rêve, produit, ici, par une perception souffrante et disproportionnée (entre l'« irréalité », qui apparaît dans le titre de son premier volume de prose, *Aventures dans l'irréalité immédiate*, et la surréalité des avant-gardistes, on peut mettre l'équivalence⁹, même s'il n'y a pas eu une affiliation explicite de Blecher au mouvement avant-gardiste roumain). Toutefois, durant la période de sanatorium, Blecher écrit surtout pour Lucia, donc pour la création d'un autre, qu'il veut suggestionner. Il le fait, lui aussi, en simple jeu : comme moyen de divertissement – et de passe-temps amoureux.

On sent bien, dans ces narrations, l'orientation de Max vers Lucia. Visualiser la main de Lucia avançant sur la page pour réaliser le dessin, vouloir guider cette main, dans son énergie et ses directions, devient partie prise de l'histoire imaginée. L'intimité est bien importante dans cet effort d'invention : la volonté de Blecher est moins de prédéterminer – que de prévisionner et de prévisualiser ce que Lucia puisse réaliser suivant ses mots. Sa propension est vers un art fusionnel. Et pour ce

⁷ Il y a eu, tout de même, une réaction positive ; elle a été singulière, mais importante, car assumée par Marcel Iancu (Iancu 1934).

⁸ L'une de ces gouaches, la seule conservée, se retrouvait à l'époque, selon l'information de Lucia, dans la collection du professeur Al. Rosetti.

⁹ M. Blecher est considéré comme un précurseur du surréalisme en Roumanie. C'est Sașa Pană qui parle du surréalisme, pour *Corps transparent*, le volume de poésie que Blecher publiait en 1934 (l'année « Tekirghiol »), observant les modes de transfiguration de la matière et de la pensée.

faire, il a besoin de s'initier, en préalable, dans l'esthétique de l'image, connaître les techniques du dessin.

Voici le nu que vous devrez travailler, le sujet importe peu, c'est une dormeuse avec une écharpe bleue sur les hanches, mais je vois surtout la réalisation : le corps de la femme brune est dessiné comme les deux femmes que vous mettez sur le catalogue, les contours du corps se feraient par des touches fortes d'encre de Chine, genre Braque, comme vous m'avez montré à « L'Art », et l'harmonie du brun, noir et bleu sera celui même qu'on trouve dans « L'Art » et qui est immensément artistique. Vous pouvez placer la femme sur un divan et ne pas la laisser dormir en l'air, dans ce cas-là, les fleurs du divan seront au pinceau comme dans le dessin de Dufy, le tableau qui pend au mur (Blecher 2017, 801)¹⁰.

Cette femme allongée, elle revient de manière en quelque sorte obsédante dans plusieurs scénarios. Comme dans ce « triptyque » appelé *Vin-Amour-Jalousie*, où la projection d'une femme morte est suivie par celle d'une femme endormie est, après, par celle d'une femme tombée dans la rue. Toutes les trois sont des corps étendus, tel que l'est Lucia elle-même, à cause de sa maladie.

Pour le vin : groupe de trois personnages, construction en triangle. En bas une femme morte avec une blessure au cœur et le couteau du crime à côté. Par-dessus, l'homme assis sur une banquette qui *aspire* de ses regards une coupe de vin que lui offre une femme avec le sourire. La femme morte et celle qui offre le vin doivent ressembler, faites-leur par exemple la même coiffure blonde. Ici le vin sera le symbole de l'oubli – comme d'ailleurs sa réalité aussi.

Pour l'amour, il y a d'abord la photo ci-jointe qui n'est pas sérieuse. Le sujet sérieux serait : un homme nu regardant dans une glace énorme une femme endormie, expression de bonheur de l'homme. Son corps doit se refléter dans la glace. C'est l'image de l'amour proustien. L'amour par reflet, et dans lequel entre toujours du narcissisme.

Enfin *pour la jalousie* je crois votre idée très bonne, pourquoi la changer ? Vous pourriez peut-être faire une femme tombée dans la rue, les bras étendus, une vraie croix humaine sur le sol, tandis que plus loin s'éloigne un jeune homme au bras d'une très jolie femme en robe à longue traîne et dont la traîne est un peu sur le corps de la femme étendue, comme si les deux amoureux auraient passé par-dessus son corps. Les ongles de la femme tombée pénètrent dans le sol, de douleur. Veuillez me renvoyer la photo truquée. Merci (Blecher 2017, 801-802).

¹⁰ Pour cette correspondance de sanatorium, Blecher et Lucia utilisent eux-mêmes le français. Ils le font pour offrir plus d'intimité à leur relation ; mais peut-être aussi, en souvenir de leur passage par Berck-sur-Mer et de la rencontre qu'ils avaient ratée là-bas (c'est la langue d'une rencontre manquée).

Comme Blecher le dit explicitement dans « *Pour l'amour* », le corps féminin allongé reprend en reflet le corps de l'amant *narcissique*. Le voyant représenté, on regarde du coup les deux amoureux, malades et fusionnés. Il faut noter que la récurrence de ce corps féminin, et cette obsession, ce n'est pas Lucia qui l'entretient, mais Blecher. Il y a cependant un « accent » qui porte la marque de la peintre : la peau de cette femme doit être brune.

Titre *Desen pentru o povestire erotică* [Dessain pour une histoire érotique]. Vous avez deviné de quoi il s'agit. Mon bonhomme (*geambaș de cai*), melon (qu'il garde dans la chambre !), cravate rose, pardessus, bague aux doigts, sur une chaise. Premier plan : petite table chargée de tartines, „*samovar*”, confitures. Femme blonde en peignoir vert, ouvert devant de tout son long, debout, prépare une tartine ; sur le canapé femme allongée, brune, nue, très longs bas de soie, fleur rouge dans les cheveux, pantoufles rouges. Le bonhomme a la bouche ouverte, il explique quelque chose ; faire ressortir le contraste entre les femmes « toutes choses » et le type ahuri qui n'a même pas enlevé son pardessus (Blecher 2017, 805).

ou

Je viens de trouver le sujet de la troisième histoire – qui *dépasse de beaucoup* les deux autres : il y a dans celle-ci une négresse, ainsi que vous l'avez désiré, une bête, un singe, et un blanc ; il y a aussi les voluptés les plus rares et la fin me paraît l'atrocité la plus horrible que l'on puisse imaginer (Blecher 2017, 807).

Ce détail n'est point anodin. Car la reprise de cette fille de couleur – et non pas d'une femme allongée quelconque – déplace visiblement l'investissement de Blecher dans ces scénarios du côté sensuel vers le côté-jeu. On observe de cette manière le fait qu'un seul personnage – la négresse – traverse plusieurs textes. Et si Lucia « détient » ce personnage (« il y a dans celle-ci une négresse, ainsi que vous l'avez désiré »), si c'est son préféré, alors l'effort de Blecher de lui offrir des histoires avec cette négresse a moins affaire avec son goût pour une certaine littérature (certes, un exotisme y est impliqué, qu'on retrouve également dans la littérature avant-gardiste), qu'avec son désir de proposer des jeux à son amie. Cette exploitation d'un objet unique pour nourrir des narrations différentes – toutes bien courtes et ne faisant rien d'autre que tourner autour de l'objet – rappelle la manière de l'enfant de décider sur un (seul) objet préféré, à partir duquel il demande tout le temps aux adultes de lui inventer des histoires, s'il ne les invente pas lui-même, sans fatigue. Cette négresse est, de ce point de vue, assimilable à un

jouet ; elle fonctionne comme une poupée. Une relation incontestable s'établit entre les narrations « à négresse » de Blecher et un tableau que Lucia va plus tard exposer sous le titre *Negresă* [Négresse]. Ce qu'on voit chez elle (image 1) c'est une femme noire mi-nue, *allongée* sur un divan, qui, si elle n'est pas avec « une bête, un singe, et un blanc », l'est – au moins – avec un grand perroquet blanc, qui grignote quelque chose sur sa main tendue, un autre oiseau sur sa table de toilette à la droite du divan et, dans un coin de la chambre, sur le sol, une étrange assemblée animalière, qui compte un hibou, une huppe, et encore un autre perroquet, plus petit, orientés les uns vers les autres comme pour une discussion.

Le ludique y est prégnant. Il surclasse, dans les narrations de Blecher comme dans le tableau de Lucia, les visées esthétiques ; de la même manière que le côté-jeu de la relation surclassait le côté sensuel (et le jeu d'enfant, le jeu amoureux). Pour Lucia existait un précédent en ce qui concerne un tel emploi de la poupée. Le tableau qui l'avait imposée, en 1927, s'était fait justement à partir d'un tel jouet qui – Lucia le dit explicitement dans *Destăinuiri* – lui avait servi, à ce moment-là, pour une représentation de soi.

L'idée m'était venu spontanément, de composer un pastel « la dame avec son peintre ». À quelle raison ? Se trouvait à l'époque, rue Calea Victoriei, une vitrine devant laquelle je passais beaucoup de temps et que je regardais avec avidité. Qu'est-ce qui m'y attirait l'attention ? Une poupée magnifique, avec une cape d'un vert véronnois, comme portaient les dames envers 1860-1870, genre Manet ou « les premiers Manet ». Une sorte de réplique à la tunique de Manet (chez nous !), sauf qu'elle fût verte [...] Cette poupée, elle était construite à la dimension humaine, quant à son costume, on ne peut pas dire avec combien de minutie il était travaillé. Je l'avais installée dans un fauteuil Biedermeier, qui lui allait merveilleusement, et j'ai demandé à Vasile Popescu de me poser. Lui, bon collègue, il s'est sacrifié. Inspiré par « Mademoiselle Rozi » (c'est ainsi que je l'avais baptisée), je me suis mise au travail. La composition : deux personnages à pied, séparés par un chevalet. Je me suis servie d'une partie de ses habits et – je vous dis un secret, la « dame » dans le tableau, c'était moi-même. Bien sûr, « transformée », les chevaux blonds, avec quelque chose de changé. Personne ne m'avait reconnu, le subterfuge m'avait réussi, donc j'étais contente (n.tr.) (Dem. Bălăcescu 1979, 74).

Attachée vivement, de manière presque obsessionnelle à une poupée, l'utilisant pour un autoportrait, à côté d'un homme (le peintre Vasile Popescu), Lucia prouve, évidemment, une tendance narcissique ; elle s'esthétise – mignonne – à travers ce jouet, elle s'offre « en poupée ». Mais on décèle, en même temps, dans cette

projection, une absence de soi-même à l'intérieur de la représentation de soi, une incapacité de se poser, vivante – et debout elle aussi, à côté du peintre Popescu, « vivant » et début. Elle y reste un simple objet de décor. C'est une absence de vie, et une souffrance cachée dans l'appel à cette substitution par un corps en plastique « construit à la dimension humaine » : c'est un retraitement de soi, sur fond d'exposition. Rien, dans ce tableau, ne fait penser, une fois avec la poupée, au jeu et à la joie. Un manque de sourire le caractérise, qui charge quelque chose de morbide.

À Tekirghiol, pour arriver à se voir plus intensément, Lucia et Blecher vont demander au directeur du sanatorium¹¹ le temps pour réaliser un portrait : Blecher devait poser pour Lucia. Ce qui résultera, comme mise en œuvre de ce temps partagé, ne sera pas un portrait de Blecher, mais un tableau qui porte le titre « Avec M. Blecher ». On y voit Lucia et Blecher ensemble (image 2). Le tableau de 1927 y est réitéré. Cette fois, au lieu de « madame et son peintre », c'est « madame et son écrivain » (on sent, bien plus qu'en 1927, cette relation de possession). Le chevalet est disparu, il n'y a pas d'objet qui sépare les deux corps, ils sont l'un à côté de l'autre. Pas début, allongés ; comme allongées étaient toutes les femmes des scénarios de Blecher pour Lucia. La chose essentielle qui se transfère du tableau de 1927 tient de la maintenue de la représentation de Lucia en poupée : en habits marins, estivaux, chapeau de soleil, chemise à rayures, pulpeuse, avec des formes arrondies, Lucia, en plan second, est tournée vers Max, qui, en premier plan, est allongé sur le dos, la main gauche sous sa tête. Lui aussi, il est bien fait, on le devine musclé, même si une couette le couvre jusqu'au cou. L'attention de Lucia pour Max dénote sa vivacité et sa présence dans la scène. La main portée sous la tête de Max signale, en parallèle, une mobilité qui n'est pas caractéristique pour les maladies osseuses. Ils sont deux malades, qui ont l'air bien sain : ils se reposent sur la plage. Mais ce qui surprend, surtout, c'est le fait que tous les deux, ils sourient. Non seulement ils sont détendus, ils sont joyeux, d'une joie enfantine, aérienne, légère : ils sont en vacances. Si Lucia est, encore une fois, « poupée » dans ce dessin, cela dispose les deux corps dans une tout autre dynamique que dans le tableau de 1927. Ici, la poupée cesse d'être objet de décor (elle n'est point « en plastique »), pour instaurer elle-même, par sa présence, une atmosphère juvénile et amusante. Les

¹¹ Dans la lettre marquée « 15 » de la correspondance entre Blecher et Lucia, on tombe sur cette information : « Vous pourriez dire au directeur que vous désirez me faire un portrait, que trois séances par semaine ne sont pas suffisantes et qu'à partir de 4h30 de l'après-midi il fait déjà nuit et la bonne lumière pour peindre disparaît. Vous pourriez lui demander la permission pour que je vienne vous voir à d'autres heures, par exemple le dimanche en début d'après-midi » (Blecher 2017, 813).

deux corps s'y détendent parce qu'ils sont entrés dans la dynamique d'un jeu, même si, ce jeu-là, ils ne l'ont pas commencé effectivement¹².

C'est cela qui change, de manière fondamentale, pour Lucia et Max dans l'ambiance de Tekirghioli. Au milieu des 300 cents enfants alignés sur la terrasse, sur la plage ou dans le dortoir commun, la maladie découvre la soupape du jeu, une fois avec le plaisir de rigoler, de faire des blagues, de prendre les choses à la légère et se moquer de tout. Que cette ambiance devienne pour Max et Lucia un programme de guérison en soi, une recette de survie, on peut le comprendre de quelques lignes écrites plus tard dans *La Tanière éclairée* :

Il est suffisant que dans un moment tragique on ferme les yeux, pour retrouver une indépendance intérieure si stricte et hermétique qu'on puisse situer dans son obscurité n'importe quel souvenir, quelle pensée ou image qu'on veut : *on peut placer – au milieu du moment tragique – une blague, une anecdote, le titre d'un livre ou le sujet d'un film du cinéma* (n.s.). Les yeux ouverts, gardant l'apparence d'une attention extrêmement tendue, combien de fois quand j'écoutais quelqu'un qui me parlait gravement, j'avais commencé intérieurement à modeler, en parallèle avec son discours, une autre conversation, complètement différente et bizarre, parfois fantastique, autrefois seulement amusante. Et mon visage gardait l'air sérieux... Je me souviens même que des fois, de manière toute à fait « involontaire » et sans pouvoir me contrôler, pendant que quelqu'un me racontait, par exemple, l'épisode douloureux et atroce de la mort de quelqu'un, avec les détails les plus dramatiques, j'ai pu faire apparaître, sur la scène de *mon petit théâtre personnel*, la plus comique et excentrique équipe de petits animaux en caoutchouc, exécutant des danses des films de dessins animés, des acrobaties et des sauts drôles, extraordinaire, vraiment hilarants (n.tr.) (Blecher 2017, 58).

C'est un tel *théâtre personnel*, sur la scène duquel jouent des personnages drôles, que Blecher avait d'abord inventé dans les scénarios pour Lucia, pour qu'ils s'amuse tous les deux. Il spéculait parfois humoristiquement sur des réminiscences littéraires, comme dans cette petite histoire réécrite de Pasiphae, personnage bien connu de la mythologie grecque, la femme de Minos et la mère du minotaure

¹² Il vaut la peine de noter, dans le même ordre du jeu qui vient masquer la maladie, que trois des quatre fresques que Lucia va peindre sur les murs de la salle à manger du sanatorium de Tekirghioli, après le départ de Max, représentent des enfants grassouillets et sains, jouant au ballon, au tennis, montant à la corde, pratiquant le cheval d'arçons, jouant donc les jeux des enfants sains et saufs, comme si la maladie n'existait pas.

Asterios, qui s'était accouplée avec un taureau blanc, offert par Poséidon. Avec la femme, le taureau, et le mari de la femme, Blecher construit un triangle érotique.

Titre : *Pasiphae* : une jeune femme quelque peu démodée mais plantureuse, décolletée, velours, dentelles, ombrelle. Été. Prairie. Taureau regardant enragé derrière une haie. Expression un peu béate de la femme qui tient par les bras son mari, de toute évidence impuissant etc. C'est le titre, *Pasiphae*, qui fera ici tout (Blecher 2017, 805).

Le plaisir de rigoler peut aller jusqu'à l'impertinence. Max veut toucher Lucia par ses extravagances imaginatives, mais ils sont aussi bien ouverts, tous les deux, à pratiquer une conduite à la limite de l'insolence. Les commentaires méchants, cruels, sans empathie (on cite souvent, à ce sujet, une scène des *Aventuri în irealitatea imediată* [Aventures dans l'irréalité immédiate], la plus fameuse, dans laquelle, dans une salle de cinéma, on assiste, pendant que le film roule, aux commentaires malines de plusieurs garçons ; et c'est la caractéristique aussi des premières proses écrites par Blecher dans la période de sanatorium, *Buțu* et *Jenică*, publiés en 1933 dans *Adevărul literar și artistic*, et *Ioniță Cubiță*, une esquisse restée inédite jusqu'en 2000 – qui ont, toutes, comme personnages, des garçons méchants) font, eux aussi, partie de la recette de cet effort de « couvrir » la souffrance par diverses formes de comportements irresponsables. Plus que l'enfantin, on sent, en effet, chez ces deux artistes, l'enfant gâté. Immodéré, narcissique, immature. Comme celui-ci, passant au-delà de ce qu'on considère normalement le bon sens, ils ont besoin de tester, sur certaines séquences, les limites – morales et autres – des adultes.

2.2. La littérature – à travers les dessins

Chose curieuse en ce qui concerne Blecher, bien qu'il ait déjà claire la conscience que sa vocation soit littéraire et il avait déjà, à l'époque, la confirmation de cette vocation par les cercles français des avant-gardes (voir sa relation avec André Breton), il souhaite se présenter au public roumain comme le simple et modeste « compère » d'une peintre : Lucia. Celle-ci lui donne à « corriger » les lignes par lesquelles elle voulait justifier publiquement le fait de l'avoir choisi, lui, comme auteur du *Catalogue* de sa série de « Fantaisies surréalistes » : « D'habitude, la préface d'un catalogue est faite par un homme célèbre ou par un critique d'art. Moi, je me suis adressé à un poète (encore inconnu), peut-être parce qu'il me comprenait mieux » (Blecher 2017, 811). Si Lucia tient à souligner par le choix de son préfacier, et par ces lignes qui le présentent, que, dans sa sortie publique, elle mise jusqu'au

bout sur l'improvisation (non seulement avec le surréalisme « pour rigoler » de sa série), Blecher la suit avec conviction. Sur cet *encore inconnu*, sur ce temps à devoir s'écouler plus long *avant que* – avant qu'il soit un professionnel, il a son propre programme. Ce moment, il le veut à tel point inaugural pour lui, que c'est maintenant, à peine, qu'il choisit son « nom » littéraire. Après avoir beaucoup fabulé sur des pseudonymes fantaisistes, après avoir signé trois autres textes, en 1933-1934, avec « Mihai Bera » (Blecher 2017, 1420), il se décide spontanément d'adopter le nom de « M. Blecher » qui lui est proposé par Lucia dans le contexte de ce catalogue. Il prend donc comme nom d'écrivain le nom qui est en relation avec ces dessins, et, à travers eux, avec cette forme d'irresponsabilité créative.

Aux dessins qu'il exécute lui-même à Tekirghiol, on peut se rapporter, je crois, pour toutes ces raisons, comme à un « phase » de dessin dont il se sert comme d'une sorte de « préparation du roman ». Conservés dans l'archive de la famille (ils sont pourtant restés inconnus pour la famille elle-même jusqu'en 1946), ces esquisses à l'encre noir et rouge, avec beaucoup de rouge/ « beaucoup de sang », ont été perçus comme effrayantes par ses proches. Réveillant un sentiment d'horreur, ils ont été tenus pour de simples moyens d'exorciser la souffrance : comme un instrument thérapeutique¹³. Doris Mironescu (Mironescu 2011) a été le premier à observer qu'on y retrouve plus de « technique » que d'exorcisme. Et que cela ressemble plutôt à un exercice, et même à un exercice facile. Ces dessins sont, en réalité d'un surréalisme « d'école » – comme le dessin qui s'intitule *Viața inexorabilă* [La vie inexorable], daté 1934 (image 3). Sur une plage parsemée par plusieurs coquillages fusiformes, une créature féminine à double tête se tient verticale sur le corps qui soutient la plus expressive de ces têtes, et horizontale sur l'autre tête, collée au niveau de ses jambes. Pendant que le corps vertical tend les mains en haut, dans une expression de joie enthousiaste/ ou d'abandon, l'autre tête prolonge le pied qui le soutient par une main qui s'étend vers un cœur qui évoque un ballon de plage écrasé.

¹³ Voilà, dans ce sens, le témoignage de sa sœur : « Jusqu'en 1946, nous n'avons rien su de ses dessins. Quand je les ai vu pour la première fois, je me suis rendu compte pourquoi nos parents ne voulaient pas me les montrer. C'étaient des dessins en touche, noir et rouge, beaucoup de noir et beaucoup de rouge, avec des lignes qui exprimaient de fortes explosions. Ils étaient, certainement, des métaphores de ses propres souffrances, des transfigurations de la maladie qui le consommait. Les dessins représentaient des figures mystiques, des montres horribles, des figures diaboliques, la langue pendante et les yeux sortis des orbites, des gargouilles agressifs. Quand on les regardait, on sentait peine et terreur. Toute la mappe de dessins était restée longtemps dans la maison de nos parents, bien „cachée” » (n.tr.) (Blecher 2017, 105).

Il n'y a rien d'effrayant dans ce dessin. Pas de démon exorcisé. Ce qu'on peut remarquer c'est, en revanche, à quel point il communique avec une petite esquisse que Blecher appelle *Autoportret caricatural* [Autoportrait caricatural], datée toujours 1934 (image 4). Allongé sur un lit d'hôpital, couvert d'une couette épaisse et élevé sur plusieurs oreillers, il se figure ici non pas en adulte (comme on le voyait dans le tableau de Lucia), mais en jeune garçon. Il regarde devant, et sa main gauche, très mobile, est élevée, comme si elle indiquait quelque chose (la tête ne la suit pas) ou comme si elle saluait. Entre ce geste du jeune garçon et celui du corps féminin de *La vie inexorable* il y a une certaine continuité. Un élan, un enthousiasme, une énergie qui laisse pressentir la vitalité, rencontre son contraire : il est en quelque sorte détourné. La technique dans laquelle se réalise l'autoportrait est autre que celle de *La vie inexorable*. Ici, on a affaire à une petite animation. Mais on peut encore mieux comprendre l'affinité des deux dessins si on suit la curieuse fonction que Blecher va attribuer à cet autoportrait. Le répétant plusieurs fois, avec de petites variations, à la fin des lettres qu'il envoie à son ami Geo Bogza, il arrivera à transformer ce dessin dans une « marque postale interne » de ses missives. Le geste de salut devient ainsi plus clair – il s'associe souvent à une réplique, telle que « Je te salue/ je vous salue, venez chez moi ». Il se révèle, en même temps, une visée qui n'était pas auparavant détectable. La main allongée, elle s'allonge pour chercher un jouet : un ballon (image 5). Le ballon qu'on pouvait reconstituer en dessous du cœur aplatis sur la plage de *La vie inexorable* se correspond avec ce ballon roulé, en fin de lettre, vers l'ami absent. Saluer devient inséparable de l'invitation au jeu d'enfant, au jeu au ballon. Il devient clair que ce qu'on regardait dans *La vie inexorable*, c'était comment le corps se dédoublait, entre le malade et l'enfant, entre le corps immobile et le corps flexible, entre celui qui s'abandonne « au salut » et celui qui salue joyeusement des copains. C'est, en allégorie, la coexistence du corps souffrant et du corps en vacances qui y est représentée¹⁴.

Si c'est une certitude que ces dessins de Blecher sont préalables à sa littérature, c'est assez provocateur d'essayer de comprendre de quelle manière sont-ils préalables : quels effets produisent-ils dans l'écriture qui leur succède. Car loin de rester dans leur « mappe » fermée, comme l'a cru sa famille, simple thérapie nécessaire, mais inesthétique, on peut déceler au moins deux modes dont le visuel devient, pour Blecher, constitutif pour le discursif.

¹⁴ Un autre dessin, *Tuș* [Encre], daté 1934 représente, toujours sur une plage, un corps féminin décapité, monté sur un rocher, le dos vers la mer et, à côté de lui, un oiseau longue et riche queue, le plus probablement un paon, décapité lui aussi. À la place de sa tête, il porte une bouteille, le goulot orienté vers la femme. Celle-ci, torse nu, elle a la hanche et les pieds couverts d'une serviette de plage. C'est loisir, c'est souffrance, aussi.

J'observerais d'abord l'invocation systématique du *dessin*, dans ses proses, comme une technique naïve. Le dessin intéresse comme simple ligne de contour, qui laisse le noyau vide ; il est donc exploité pour son manque de volume, qui ne serait pas donné, mais obtenu. Il serait le résultat d'un processus, qui vise la réduction du mouvement de la matière, jusqu'à la rendre statique, immobile, et par cela, déjà inexistante. Cette réduction, Blecher la considère équivalente avec une réduction de la souffrance. Moins de matière il y ait, moins de douleur y reste. « Partout il y avait une simplicité élémentaire des objets comme s'ils étaient seulement dessinés et placés dans leurs endroits, aucune durée, aucun souvenir n'entrait dans les débris des murs et dans le goudronne des rues. C'était une nouvelle matière de la réalité qui bâtissait la ville et moi – j'étais juste au milieu, inédit, nouveau, sans poids et sans organes, *comme une simple ligne de mon propre contour* » (n.s.) (Blecher 2017, 79). Autrefois, le dessin est invoqué précisément comme pratique dans le cadre d'un jeu enfantin.

Existe ce jeu infantile qui s'appelle *figures à copier*, lequel, quand il n'est pas bien exécuté, et le papier se déplace un peu pendant la reproduction, les figures se produisent tordues et déformées. C'est le point de vue, bien surprenant par son inédit, de l'aliéné, pour qui, pendant qu'il « copie » la vie, la réalité se déplace de quelques centimètres, c'est-à-dire elle « perd sa tête » et produit ainsi des formes vraiment extraordinaires (n.tr.) (Blecher 2017, 73).

Dans un cas comme dans l'autre, le dessin n'est que ligne, que contour. Le dessin c'est pour vider : ce n'est pas pour remplir. Il est exécuté sans conscience, par maladresse ou par simple manque d'attention : il se décale toujours par rapport à la réalité. Si l'enfant et l'aliéné sont des égaux à produire de tels dessins, ce n'est pas leur imagination surabondante qui les y qualifie (le cas des avant-gardes) : c'est leur innocence, qui y est équivalente avec un manque de conscience. (Je trouve provocateur de comprendre, aussi, dans cette lignée de signification, la « perte de la tête » qui va se figurer comme décapitation dans plusieurs dessins de Blechers – ceux, surtout, qui ont été perçus comme les plus cruels). Blecher fait, d'ailleurs, une différence entre le *tableau* – qui charge le contenu du monde et rend possible sa compréhension, et le *dessin* – qui le décharge, rendant possible la distanciation. Dans *Vizuiua luminată*, on retrouve cette formulation :

Dans le monde existaient des gens et des tableaux qui allaient me rester à jamais inconnus, comme tous les événements qui se consumaient dans la matière impalpable de l'air, *sans traces*, et desquels je ne recevais aucun

écho et aucune conscience. Tout se passait ainsi autour de moi, les gens maniaient des tableaux et parlaient, et *je ne savais pas* qui étaient ces gens-là, quels contenus avaient ces tableaux et quelles explications ils se donnaient quand ils les regardaient (n.tr.) (Blecher 2017, 93).

Pour la naïveté qui imprègne les dessins de Blecher, il y a encore une source, différente. Doris Mironescu (Mironescu 2011, 107) croit que le style naïf étant caractéristique, comme la narrativité, à la peinture de Lucia, Blecher s'était laissé influencé par la manière de peindre de celle-ci. C'est peut-être un peu plus qu'une telle influence. Il est possible que Blecher fût sensible, plus précisément, à une pratique du dessin, chez Lucia, qui s'était réalisée en relation avec la littérature, et surtout avec la littérature pour les enfants. Un dessin qui n'existe pas *sans* littérature, qui se légitime par la littérature et la complète de manière nécessaire. Avant qu'ils se connaissent à Tekirghiol, Lucia avait réalisé l'illustration pour plusieurs textes littéraires. Le premier, c'était *Corigent la limba română* [Élève ajourné à la langue roumaine], un roman d'Ion Minulescu, publié en 1929, qui avait comme protagoniste un adolescent ; ensuite, en 1931, elle avait fait l'illustration pour *Cartea cu jucării* [Le Livre avec des jouets] de Tudor Arghezi, où les personnages étaient deux petits-enfants, Mitzura et Baruțu, la fille et le fils de l'auteur. Bien que l'industrie du livre pour les enfants eût déjà une tradition en Roumanie, à l'époque entre les deux guerres, Lucia s'y déclare une autodidacte. Son effort de s'adapter à un public jeune/ enfantin l'amène à réaliser ce que Șerban Cioculescu, un important critique littéraire de l'époque, a qualifié – parlant de ses dessins pour le roman de Minulescu – comme « dessins infantiles ».

Mr. Cioculescu a été bien indulgent : au lieu de formuler « illustré de manière infantile par L.D.B. », il aurait pu dire « de manière malhabile » ou « maladroite » ou un autre mot plus fort. En tout cas, Mr. Cioculescu a mis les choses au point et a arrangé un peu Minu [Minulescu], pendant qu'envers moi, il a lancé le compliment suprême, qui gagne une importance énorme aujourd'hui, quand les « dessins infantiles » constitue le dernier cri et sont valorisés au maximum (n.tr.) (Dem. Bălăcescu 1979, 92).

Cette qualification, ressentie comme péjorative fin des années 1920, va se fixer indéfiniment dans la mémoire de Lucia (elle écrit ces lignes les années 1970), à côté d'un autre qualificatif, reçu, cette fois, directement de l'auteur, pour ses dessins à *Cartea cu jucării* [Livre avec des jouets]. Après avoir vu les illustrations de Lucia à son texte, Tudor Arghezi lui aurait proposé, par l'intermède de l'éditeur, que le volume soit édité avec, sur la couverture, cette indication : « avec les gribouillis

de L.D.B. ». Lucia va refuser catégoriquement cette offre, qu'elle prend pour une insulte. Mais à la suite de ce refus, elle a une révélation. Elle réalise, subitement, la proximité entre ses illustrations et la miniature. C'est une sorte de hasard objectif, qui lui découvre sinon la vraie intention de son travail¹⁵, au moins son vrai potentiel :

La partie négative – pour moi – a été que Theo [Arghezi] s'est enflammé apprenant que je refuse d'accepter les « gribouillis »¹⁶ et il s'est vengé. Ils sont disparus de la couverture, mon nom a été imprimé seulement à l'intérieur, sur la première feuille, et de manière « microscopique », en bas d'un dessin, le seul conservé dans sa dimension « naturelle », pendant que les autres sont devenus un peu plus petits que la dimension d'une marque postale, leur finesse n'étant pas assez perceptible, malgré la grosseur des lettres du texte (n.tr.) (Dem. Bălăcescu 1979, 98).

Or, il me semble qu'une partie, au moins, des dessins de la « mappe » de Blecher fonctionnent dans une telle relation « d'illustration » avec la littérature/ la littérature pour les enfants. D'autant plus qu'il y a entre ces dessins une catégorie (comme ceux reproduits dans l'édition des *Œuvres* sous le titre *Bună dimineața, zice marchiza* [Bonjour, dit la marquise] (Blecher 2017, 1557) ou *Julien Sorel și Matilde de la Môle* [Julien Sorel et Matilde de la Môle] (Blecher 2017, 1556)) qui, même s'ils restent disparates – et ne vont jamais illustrer une édition Stendhal, sont, de manière explicite conçus en relation avec des textes littéraires préexistants. L'exercice est cependant plus fertile à faire sur quelques autres dessins. Celui, par exemple, qui porte comme titre *Prințul meu* [Mon prince] (Blecher 2017, 1561) – il représente, monté sur un cheval, un cavalier à pèlerine et à grosses chaussures cloutées, qui tient dans ses mains une autre tête, plus grande ; le cheval est un unicorne, mais en guise de corne, il a une couronne ; il est, aussi, orné d'une pèlerine, comme s'il était descendu d'un conte de fée. Peuvent aussi être ainsi

¹⁵ Ces dessins de Lucia, avec des jouets et des enfants, on apprend de ses mémoires exactement comment – en quelle technique et avec quels modèles, elle les avait conçus : « Mr. Rosetti m'a demandé de lui faire deux dessins de preuve, imaginant deux enfants, il m'a décrit les deux enfants du poète [Arghezi], comment *il voulait qu'ils soient dessinés*, sans aucun ombre, un simple dessin « ils ont vécu » (comme dit le Français). Cela allait bien avec mon goût, je venais justement de voir quelques dessins de Jean Cocteau¹⁵. Il avait publié un cahier avec toutes sortes de traits fins (influencé, je crois, par Picasso, avec qui il était ami, mais gardant un style personnel) » (n.tr.) (Dem. Bălăcescu 1979, 94).

¹⁶ Le mot utilisé en roumain, « *zmângălituri* », n'est pas tout à fait l'équivalent de « gribouillis » ; c'est une invention poétique, qui porte la marque de Tudor Arghezi, misant sur une déformation, elle aussi spécifiquement infantile, qui intervient dans la prononciation des mots.

analysées deux aquarelles datées 1934 (Blecher 2017, 1559, 1560). L'une figure un pain au milieu duquel est planté un couteau. Le morceau qui manque laisse se déverser un liquide abondant et visqueux, comme du sang/ de longs cheveux, pendant qu'à l'autre bout du pain, conservé, est accroché, suspendu de sa laisse, un chiot. Dans le coin droit du dessin, exactement en dessous du chiot, on voit une tête ronde de petit garçon, expression déçue et pleurnicheuse. L'autre aquarelle montre dans un paysage exotique, sous un palmier, et dans la présence d'un grand perroquet¹⁷ qui lui occupe l'épaule gauche, un géant à barbe noire et grands yeux. Sur ses genoux, un couteau à la main, il fait le geste de sacrifice pour un petit brebis. Il y a beaucoup de cruauté dans ces dessins, il y a du sang. On peut lire toutes ces trois scènes comme des scènes de décapitation. Cependant, ce qu'on ne peut pas ignorer, non plus, c'est la convention narrative selon laquelle ils se construisent, qui, elle, est celle des histoires pour les enfants. C'est chaque fois un enfant et son jouet qui sont disposés dans le tableau, un jouet qu'il garde, qu'il a perdu ou qu'il est en train de perdre. On sait bien que les histoires pour les enfants sont assez souvent cruelles (Chaudoye, Cupa et Marcovici 2011, 179-190). Si on n'a pas la certitude que Blecher a conçu ces dessins comme illustrations pour des livres pour les enfants, ce qui est sûr c'est que, au moins, comme schème mentale – influencée directement par le travail antérieur de Lucia, ils se sont réalisés en relation avec une telle littérature. Ils appellent donc comme un cadre interprétatif nécessaire.

3. La miniature

Ce qui « qualifie » cette discussion sur le partage créatif qui se réalise entre Lucia Dem. Bălăcescu et Max Blecher dans l'atmosphère sanatoriale de Tekirghiol, pour une réflexion sur les formules de loisir de l'écrivain liées à des formes littéraires, c'est, surtout, la production, ici, d'une telle forme. Suggestionnés par l'ambiance marquée par l'infantilisme et l'irresponsabilité, les deux – peintre et écrivain – découvrent du coup leur intérêt pour la miniature. Certes, un fort conditionnement vient aussi de la position – allongée sur le dos – qui leur est imposée par la maladie. « Il m'était impossible – écrit Lucia dans ses mémoires – d'exécuter autre chose que de petites toiles : des aquarelles, de gouaches, des esquisses, des crayons » (Dem. Bălăcescu 1979, 101).

¹⁷ La présence des perroquets, petits et grands, est très marquée aussi dans les tableaux de Lucia. C'est l'un des éléments de décor dont la circulation est la plus visible entre les dessins de Lucia et ceux de Blecher.

Mais « petit » ne veut pas nécessairement dire « miniature ». Avec une étymologie controversée, comme nous le montre les dictionnaires de spécialité (Olteanu 1992, 250), la *miniature* se trouve l'origine, d'un part, dans le lat. *minium* (minium en plomb), utilisé pour les initiales, les titres, les passages importants ou les ornements des manuscrits médiévaux (elle arrive après à nommer la peinture rouge, servant à tracer les lettres des enluminures). D'autre part, elle s'extrait du lat. *minus* (« plus petit »), duquel dérive un autre sens du mot, celui de peinture de petites dimensions exécutée sur parchemin, ivoire, bois ou autre matériel, et destinée, généralement, à décorer un bijou, une cassette, etc.

C'est dans ce deuxième ordre, du *minus*, que vont s'inscrire toutes les explorations des avant-gardes qui avaient recherché le ludique à travers des jouets, des maquettes et des maisons de poupée. On peut évoquer à ce titre non seulement l'intérêt des surréalistes pour le théâtre des marionnettes (Paul Klee, on le sait, confectionnait ces marionnettes de sa propre main), mais aussi l'invention de ce qu'ils ont appelé « théâtre-miniature » ou, autrefois, « théâtre d'objets ». Le projet symboliste du « Théâtre Minuscule », inauguré par les frères des Gâchons, en 1891, dans le cercle des amis et des rédacteurs de L'Ermitage, exploitait, lui aussi, la fascination des poètes et des peintres pour la miniaturisation du théâtre et pour son caractère supposément injouable. Tous ces projets ont opéré avec une réduction à l'échelle. Travaillant sur les « lumino-contes »¹⁸, forme qu'on invente dans le « Théâtre Minuscule », Sophie Lucet (Lucet 2001) observe combien cette forme est au service du petit (« expérience, signalant de toutes les manières possibles le mineur et le petit, et même le tout petit, avec un effet de redondance particulièrement remarquable ») ; et, en même temps, à quel point et comment la lettre-dessin et la lettre-texte se voient ici jusqu'à la confusion.

[...] au cours de ces séances, l'auteur – Jacques des Gâchons lui-même généralement – lisait un récit légendaire de sa composition, tandis que défilait dans un cadre une séquence de petits décors illuminés en transparence, destinés à *illustrer* les différentes scènes de conte : définies comme des « tableautins lumineux », de la taille d'une « page *in-octava* », ces scènes étaient soigneusement dessinées et peintes par André des Gâchons, artiste délicat, inspiré par les primitifs flamands et italiens. L'ensemble, constituant le « lumino-conte » à proprement parler, composait un exquis petit spectacle féerique – une féerie en miniature aux dimensions du livre – qui ravissait la poignée de spectateurs des séances de « cette petite scène intime » (Lucet 2001).

¹⁸ « Un rêve de poète et de peintre, proposant un mode de collaboration inédit entre peinture et littérature, sous les espèces d'un spectacle nouveau que ses concepteurs désignaient par le terme de « lumino-contes » (Lucet 2001).

La tradition occidentale dans laquelle se réalisent ces projets est assez riche (ce ne sera pas, bien sûr, la même situation pour la culture roumaine). Soit qu'on regarde vers le théâtre enfantin du XIX^e siècle – réalisé comme féerie, mimes et pantomimes ou spectacle de marionnettes ; soit vers le rôle qu'on attribue au bibelot théâtral dans le théâtre symboliste, ou à d'autres objets-jeu (Carrington 2011) ; soit vers les ombres chinoises silhouettes dans les deux célèbres théâtres d'ombre de France – Le théâtre de Séraphin (à Versailles dès 1770) et le théâtre du Chat Noir (dès 1881) ; soit, encore, vers le Théâtre de poche de Théophile Gautier (1855) ou le Théâtre des Funambules (1816). Toutes ces formes de théâtre rêvées au XIX^e siècle ont en commun une exploitation du *petit*, qui ne fait – de manière plus ou moins explicite – que situer l'enfant et sa manière de percevoir le monde, dans le noyau dur de la construction.

D'une part, il semble s'agir de ramener le théâtre à la simplicité d'un jeu d'enfant (que l'on se rappelle la « morale du joujou » de Baudelaire), et par là même de le rendre accessible à tout un chacun, voire à un seul, la simplicité des moyens, la puissance de suggestion du presque rien constituant, en outre, la garantie du libre jeu de l'imagination ; et d'autre part, mais peut-être s'agit-il de la même opération, la miniaturisation extrême et souhaitée du théâtre, le rêve de l'enfermer dans une coquille de noix, le voue à l'invisibilité, partant à l'inexistence (Lucet 2001).

Dans ses essais sur les jouets et sur la politique du théâtre pour enfants prolétarien dans les années 1928-1929, Walter Benjamin constatait que le besoin de l'adulte d'opérer une réduction d'échelle – et d'arriver ainsi à se situer à l'échelle de l'enfant, apparaît dans les situations où la réalité devient, pour lui, effrayante. C'est donc parce que l'adulte veut *diminuer* le monde, qu'il arrive à *jouer* des jeux¹⁹ : « Encerclés par un monde de géants, les enfants recourent au jeu pour créer un monde à leur taille [...]. Mais l'adulte, menacé par le monde réel et sans possibilité de le fuir, en éloigne la morsure en jouant avec son image réduite » (Benjamin 1999, 100-101). Benjamin rend ici compte aussi de l'intérêt croissant porté par les adultes « aux jeux et aux livres d'enfants depuis la fin de la guerre ». Ce n'est pas que l'adulte régresse au stade de l'enfance. Il cherche à alléger une vie devenue insupportable. Ce propos date de 1928, dix années après la Première Guerre mondiale. On retrouve Lucia et Blecher sur une position pareille, six années plus tard. Dans une réflexion récente, Giorgio Agamben (Agamben 2017), qui s'intéresse lui aussi à l'essence du jouet et au rapport que celui-ci entretient avec le temps, fait

¹⁹ C'est toujours en 1933-1934 que Bachelard réalise sa réflexion sur *Le monde comme caprice et miniature* (Bachelard 1933-1934, 306-320).

une affirmation dans le même sens. Le jouet – croit le philosophe italien – miniaturise le présent (Agamben 2017, 125).

Le caractère essentiel du jouet – le seul, à bien y réfléchir, qui puisse le distinguer des autres objets – est quelque chose de singulier, qu'on saisit exclusivement dans la dimension temporelle de l'« autrefois » et du « plus maintenant » (à condition d'entendre cet « autrefois » et ce « plus maintenant », comme le montre l'exemple de la miniaturisation, en sens *synchronique* et non seulement *diachronique* [...]) On s'est souvent demandé ce qui reste d'un modèle quand il est devenu jouet ; ce n'est certes pas son sens culturel, ni sa fonction, ni même sa forme (qui peut être reproduite à l'identique ou rendue presque méconnaissable, comme le savent tous ceux qui ont éprouvé la plasticité iconique des jouets). Ce que le jouet conserve de son modèle sacré ou économique, ce qui survit de lui après son démembrement ou sa miniaturisation, ce n'est rien d'autre que la temporalité humaine dont il était le réceptacle, sa pure essence historique. Le jouet est une matérialisation de l'historicité contenue dans les objets, qu'une manipulation d'un genre particulier lui permet d'extraire (Agamben 2017, 124-125).

Une réduction à l'échelle de l'espace (Benjamin) – une réduction à l'échelle du temps (Agamben). Ce qui s'obtient par le jouet comme « modèle réduit » des objets adultes – à travers « la miniaturisation en tant que sens chiffré du jouet »²⁰ – c'est donc, d'un part, une protection activée devant un monde qui est devenu trop envahissant pour l'adulte, qu'il n'arrive plus à maîtriser ; et d'autre part, c'est la possibilité d'ouvrir une durée dans un temps instantané, d'élargir le temps – effet surprenant et paradoxal quand il s'obtient par une diminution. Contrairement au rite, qui est une « machine à transformer la diachronie en synchronie », le jeu serait « une machine à transformer la synchronie en diachronie » : « Le jeu, quant à lui, procède à une opération symétrique et inverse : il tend à rompre le lien entre passé et présent, à dissoudre la structure, à la faire voler en éclats événementiels » (Agamben 2017, 129).

²⁰ « Selon cette perspective, la miniaturisation en tant que sens chiffré du jouet signifiât plus encore que ne le pense Lévi-Strauss, lorsqu'il décèle dans le « modèle réduit » (pris au sens large) le caractère commun au bricolage et à l'œuvre d'art. Car la miniaturisation n'apparaît pas seulement ici comme un moyen de connaître le tout avant les parties et de surmonter, en les mesurant d'un seul coup d'œil, ce que l'objet peut avoir de redoutable (« La poupée de l'enfant n'est plus un adversaire, un rival ou même un interlocuteur... ») ; elle est plutôt ce qui permet de saisir la pure temporalité inhérente à l'objet, et d'en jouir. En d'autres termes, *la miniaturisation donne le sens chiffré de l'histoire*. Plutôt que le bricoleur, c'est le collectionneur qui se présente ainsi comme la figure voisine du joueur. En effet, de même qu'on collectionne des objets anciens, on collectionne des objets en miniature » (Agamben 2017, 126).

On comprend mieux, dans cette perspective, quelle est la fonction et quelle est l'utilité avec laquelle Blecher et Lucia investissent les jouets. Et pourquoi le fait de vivre dans un sanatorium qui soigne trois cents enfants amène ces deux artistes non seulement à jouer des jeux (après avoir quitté Tekirghiol, dans la maison de sa sœur, à Roman, Blecher va continuer à proposer à son ami Geo Bogza de jouer « avec des bateaux »²¹) et à peupler leur création de jouets, mais aussi à cultiver la miniature. C'est que la miniature leur est, elle-même, nécessaire dans un moment de crise de leur vie adulte (qui se synchronise, pas tout à fait par hasard, peut-être, avec une crise adulte généralement ressentie à l'époque entre les deux guerres) afin d'arriver à substituer le corps en souffrance par le corps « en vacances ». Ils vivent ainsi, sinon joyeux, au moins irresponsables, une vie qui ait l'apparence de la normalité. Grâce aux jouets et à la miniature, ils arrivent à contrecarrer ces sensations que Blecher détaillait dans *Vizuina luminată* :

Voilà pourquoi je ne comprends rien de ce qui se passe autour de moi et je continue à « tomber » dans la vie parmi les événements et les décors, parmi les moments et les gens, parmi les couleurs et les musiques, de plus en plus vertigineux, seconde après seconde, de plus en plus profondément, sans aucun sens, comme dans un puits qui a les parapets illustrés avec des faits et des gens, dans lequel « ma chute » n'est qu'un simple passage et une simple trajectoire dans le vide, constituant tout de même ce que bizarrement et sans aucune justification pourrait s'appeler « vivre ma propre vie (n.tr.) (Blecher 2017, 274).

C'est quelque chose comme l'« illustration » de ce puits qu'ils s'offrent, en guise toujours d'« illustration », pour leurs textes, et pour leur vie à Tekirghiol. Je reformule ici l'idée que j'avais anticipée au début de ma réflexion, que le *corps relaxé* ne peut s'y obtenir qu'en relation, et comme produit d'un art dilettante (qui fantasme, d'ailleurs, beaucoup plus qu'il ne réalise), pendant que le *corps en souffrance* est conservé comme l'objet ferme et obligatoire de l'art assumé. Sont nécessaires les « dessins animés », afin de pouvoir « monter » ce que Blecher appelle (son) « petit théâtre personnel » : une scène sur laquelle « se joue » le relâchement, la décontraction, sur laquelle, figuré en petit garçon, il peut se lancer

²¹ Un autre écrivain ami proche de Blecher, Mihail Sebastian, note dans son *Journal*, quant à ces jeux : « Ce qui me réjouit et m'émeut chez lui, sont sa jeunesse, son humour, son exubérance, aux ressources encore intactes. Avec quelle foi, avec quelle application il me jouait à l'accordéon, toutes sortes de tangos et de fox-trot ! Y a-t-il un *effort pour retrouver une joie* en vérité irrémédiablement perdue ? Il m'a raconté ses jeux de cet été, avec Geo Bogza, qui était venu le voir. Ils jouaient au bateau. Blecher donnait le signal du départ et Bogza remorquait son lit. Ils avaient placardé un avis sur le mur : „Il est interdit de monter au mât et de cracher d'en haut dans la salle des machines” » (Sebastian 2007, 100).

de son lit – il tend la main, il aspire vers un jouet en caoutchouc. Avec cette disposition scénique pour créer un artifice, et avec ce goût pour la miniature, on reste, il est sûr, dans la proximité des avant-gardes. (La « scène pataphysique » d'Alfred Jarry, un autre passionné par le théâtre de marionnettes, n'était, elle aussi, que l'invention d'un système qui permet à l'auteur de vivre artificiellement à l'intérieur de son œuvre).

Un peu plus tard, en 1935, revenu à Roman, dans la maison de sa sœur, Blecher allait réaliser de petites figurines en argile, qu'il fait cuire dans le four de la fabrique de porcelaines de son grand-père (l'argile, c'est son beau-frère qui le lui apporte, de la même fabrique). Quelques-uns de ces objets, il va les offrir à son ami Geo Bogza, son partenaire, adulte, de jeu. Noirs, ces corps, eux aussi à l'échelle réduite, se trouvent en relation explicite avec les corps des enfants au sanatorium de Tekirghiol. Comme Blecher allait le formuler dans quelques lignes des *Aventures dans l'irréalité immédiate*, la première impression que lui avait faite ces enfants, prisonniers dans des corsets en gypse, pendant que, allongés, ils se laissaient brûlés par le soleil sur la terrasse, avait été celle des pots brisés qu'on répare avec du plâtre et on remet ensuite au four pour les recomposer. Ces corps-là, leurs schémas corporels, leurs grimasses, leurs mimes, seront exploitées, après-coup, pour créer effectivement des figurines-jouets.

En parallèle, dans la littérature que Blecher commence maintenant à produire, on trouvera une fascination pour l'ambiance de la fête foraine, pour le panopticum et les statuts de cire, pour les artifices et les objets de mascarade. Chez Lucia, c'est le cirque qui se fera illustrer comme thème nouveau des tableaux à partir de 1935²² et il continuera de préoccuper la peintre jusqu'au milieu des années 1970. L'idée qui soit réitérée par ces thèmes qui vont devenir privilégiés pour, cette fois, l'art assumé des deux artistes (la littérature de Blecher, la peinture de Lucia) est celle d'un divertissement apparemment banal et populaire, mais qui reste de manière essentielle lié à une contrainte. Il y a quelque chose de mécanique, un artifice, sinon une falsification, comme si l'amusement proposé ne pouvait plus jamais se dispenser non seulement de dissimuler une fragilité/ une vulnérabilité, mais, plus, de contrefaire une souffrance.

Si par tout ce qui tient du jeu et du jouet, la miniature cultivée par Lucia Dem. Bălăcescu et par Blecher – restant dans la proximité des avant-gardes, se retrace sur la lignée étymologique du *minium*, l'autre filière étymologique, concurrente, celle du *minus*, n'y reste pas sans illustration. Il est vrai, cela n'arrive pas en 1934-1935,

²² En 1935, dans une lettre datée 19 avril (Blecher 2017, 846), Blecher parlait à Lucia d'un petit récit avec le titre *Căluț de circ* [Petit cheval de cirque], qui avait besoin d'une « révision sérieuse ». Il n'est pas exclu qu'il continue, pour un certain temps, à produire de petits textes littéraires qui sont destinés à suggestionner la peinture de son amie.

mais après. En 1937, Lucia accepte un nouveau projet d'illustration de livre, pour un autre volume de Tudor Arghezi, *Ce-ai cu mine, vântule?* [Qu'est-ce qu'as-tu avec moi, vent ?], poésie. Le contrat lui parvient par l'intermédiaire du professeur Al. Rosetti, comme celui signé auparavant pour *Cartea cu jucării*. Cette fois-ci, la sollicitation vise, de manière expresse, la réalisation des dessins dans la tradition des enluminures, ce qui, au premier moment, étonne Lucia. Ensuite, elle s'en réjouit, découvrant de nouvelles possibilités – qu'elle n'aurait probablement pas exploré sans cette provocation – pour la production des miniatures :

-Faites-moi, s'il vous plaît, me dit le professeur Rosetti sur le nouveau volume qu'il voulait éditer, pour la couverture du volume *Ce-ai cu mine vântule?*, quelque chose qui ressemble à une « cretonne imprimée » ; dans le texte rien, que, à chaque commencement de chapitre, une lettre ornementale, comme vous les voulez. Les Français ont, comme personne d'autre, des dizaines de mots adéquats pour tous les termes qui regardent la plastique, le graphique ou le graphique du livre. Cela s'explique par le fait que, le long du temps, ils ont fait apparaître, avec une minutie inimaginable, des livres magnifiques [...] Dans le langage typographique, une lettre ornementale s'appelle « lettrine », *un diminutif* du mot « lettre ». Je n'ai pas eu assez de temps pour lire le texte, mais j'ai observé avec beaucoup de chagrin que (cette fois) ce qui était écrit ne se prêtait aucunement à une telle illustration. Qu'est-ce qu'on pourrait indiquer sur une simple lettre, qui ait relation figurale avec quelque chose du texte ? [...] J'ai oublié de dire que chaque petite histoire devrait se clore sur un petit dessin (de fermeture) nommé dans la typographie française « cul-de-lampe », en roumain « dos-de-lampă » (n.tr.) (Dem. Bălăcescu 1979, 127).

Si, pour Lucia, cet exercice de la miniature (en composition figurative d'une lettre ornée) est un résultat plutôt du hasard (bien que le rôle que Tudor Arghezi ait joué dans la réalisation, chez elle, de cette forme littéraire – en ce qui tient du jouet, comme en ce qui tient de l'enluminure, mériterait en soi une réflexion), il est plus intéressant de voir comment le *minium* et le *minus* arrivent à se croiser pour Blecher. Dans ses volumes de prose (*Aventures dans l'irréalité immédiate* ; *Cœurs cicatrisés* ; *La tanière éclairée*), il va souvent fantasmer sur l'idée d'un dessein qui cache, « déguisé », un texte, dont les lettres/ les lignes sont extrêmement fines. Comme dans cet épisode, dans les *Aventures dans l'irréalité immédiate*, où le narrateur se représente pendant qu'il regarde quelques dessins qui semblent avoir été faits d'après des photographies, avec le roi Carol I et la reine Elisabeta, pour avoir subitement la révélation que ce ne soient pas des dessins qu'il voit, mais des textes composés par l'enchaînement filigranât des mots *microscopiques*.

Le voisinage avec le pictogramme/ la picto-poésie est de nouveau certes. Mais je verrais plus dans cette projection imaginaire d'une écriture miniaturée. Elle se présente ici comme fascination pour une graphie à la limite de l'illisible. En tant que telle, elle ressemble beaucoup avec l'expérience que fait Robert Walser, avec ses « microgrammes » (récemment décryptées par Peter Utz et son équipe (Utz, Morlang et Echte 2004), après un assidu travail dans les archives). Le moment, d'ailleurs, est le même : les 126 feuilles couvertes d'une écriture minuscule en crayon de Walser (le « territoire du crayon »), dont la publication en 6 volumes vient de s'achever en 2000 – avaient été composées entre 1927 et 1930. Ces microgrammes sont non seulement « mini », elles sont aussi ludiques, et d'un ludique singulier. Qui plus est, leur production n'est pas sans relation avec une période asilaire. En 1929, Walser s'est interné volontairement dans la clinique psychiatrique de la Waldau, à Berne (il cessera d'écrire en 1933, après avoir été transféré contre son gré dans la clinique d'Herisau). Coïncidence ou non avec l'histoire qui approche Blecher et Lucia, il s'est lié étroitement dans ce dernier établissement (où il est resté interné jusqu'à son mort, en 1956) avec la lingère Frieda Mermet, avec laquelle il se correspond, qui lui devient l'amie-amoureuse, en même temps muse et confidente.

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Fig. 1 : Lucia Dem. Bălăcescu, *Negresă* [Negresse]



Fig. 2 : Lucia Dem. Bălăcescu, *Cu M. Blecher* [Avec M. Blecher]



Fig. 3: M. Blecher, *Viața inexorabilă* [La vie inexorable] (1934)



Fig. 4: M. Blecher, *Autoportret caricatural* [Autoportrait caricatural] (1934)




Fig. 5 : M. Blecher, Scrisoare lui Geo Bogza [Lettre à Geo Bogza]

REVISITING DONALD MOON ON THE MORAL BASIS OF THE DEMOCRATIC WELFARE STATE

Olanshile Muideen ADEYANJU*

ABSTRACT. Donald Moon argues that neither rights nor equality can serve as adequate moral or political basis for a welfare state in addressing the Hegel's dilemma. The Hegel's dilemma is that organisation of economic life through the market in a democratic state produces great wealth as well as great poverty and individuals in such state fall in either category. The wide gulf in wealth among individuals in a market economy is a problem which a democratic welfare state seeks to address but, for Moon, rights or equality is not adequate moral and political basis of the welfare state for solving the problem. He proposes the principles of economic management, provision of services and social insurance as alternative and adequate bases for a welfare state in addressing the problem. This paper queries Moon's proposal. The paper argues that Moon's proposed institutional principles are inadequate in addressing the problem without a fundamental moral and/or political basis upon which these principles can be justifiably founded. The paper posits that rights provide a plausible and adequate foundational moral and political basis for the principles in order to adequately address the problem created by the market economy without jeopardising the idea of human self-respect.

Keywords: Democracy, Equality, Social Insurance, Market Economy, Rights, Welfare State

Introduction

Human beings are social and political beings. They tend to function well when they live in close proximity with one another and engage in social relations with one another. However, because human beings have needs which are insatiable and the

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resources to satisfy these needs are limited, their political nature informs the formation of institutions that oversee, manage and control the social relations among them. When individuals come together to form a democratic political community, they do so with the aim to rule over themselves by constituting a government that manages their resources, affairs and interpersonal relationships. One aspect of the fellowship of human beings is that there are both benefits and burdens associated with their coming together. Thus, they must formulate a socio-political arrangement on how to distribute the benefits and burden of the society. One of such socio-political arrangement is liberalism which is the political doctrine that the justification of the social and political power of a state (that is, a political community) is based on popular sovereignty, rule of law, the neutrality of the state in the affairs of its citizens as regards the definition and determination of good life and the protection of the citizens' rights and liberties.¹ In liberal political communities, the state does not impose or determine the good life on its citizens but protects their freedom of choices and their rights to enjoy whatever benefits arise from their choices. The citizens are considered as free autonomous beings who are to compete for the limited resources of the society in a market economy where the forces of demand and supply determine prices of goods.

One objection against such socio-political arrangement is that it widens the economic gap among individuals in a society. It is criticised of favouring some at the expense of others based on the fact that equal opportunity to compete for the benefits in a society does not translate to equal outcome. The idea of a welfare state is a means by which a liberal political system tries to address this problem. "A 'welfare state' might be conceived as a state which views the welfare of its citizens as the primary claim on its policy, or it might be conceived as state which enacts particular 'welfare' policies."² The idea of welfare is to make up for the imbalance in the economic status of the individuals in a society. It also has an implication for the citizenship status of every individual in a society as T. H. Marshall argued that the social element of a citizen's rights is the "right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society."³ It is the state's effort in providing economic assistance to its citizens in order to promote

¹ See Cristiano, T. and Christman, J. "Introduction" in Cristiano, T. and Christman, J. (eds.) *Contemporary Debates in Political Philosophy*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2009, p. 5 and Minogue, K. R. "Liberalism" in Outhwaite, W. (ed.) *The Blackwell Dictionary of Modern Social Thought*, 2nd Edition. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2006, p.346.

² Hamlin, A. "Welfare" in Goodin, R. E., Pettit, P. and Pogge, T (eds.) *A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy*, Vol. 2, 2nd Edition, Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2007, p.852.

³ Marshall, T. H., "Citizenship and Social Class" in Jeff, M. and Michael, S. (eds.) *Inequality and Society*. New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 2009, p. 149.

their well-being. Such assistance could be in the form of free or subsidized public health care, free public education, nutritional support, social insurance, social security and so on.

Various moral bases are provided as justification for such provision of assistance to the economically disadvantaged. Equality is one. It is argued that there are circumstances beyond the control of individuals which contribute to their economic inequality. This is unfair and is to be eliminated. Hence, welfare is grounded on the basis of attaining equality among citizens of a political community. Another is rights. This is the understanding that parts of the entitlements of citizens of a political community include social and individual welfare packages which contribute to the well-being of individuals. This is to reduce the economic gap that a political system that operates a market economy creates.

The welfare state seeks to address the problem. However, Donald Moon argues that rights and equality as the moral and political bases of the welfare state in addressing the problem are inadequate. Moon claims that both equality and rights “neglect the value of self-respect and ignore the norms that specify what one has to be and to do to attain self-respect.”⁴ He posits that the welfare state can address the problem by establishing institutions that conform with economic management, universal provision of services and social insurance.

My aim, in this paper, is to argue against Moon’s position. I contend that his position is inadequate as any institution or policy that is to conform with the principles of economic management, universal provision of services and social insurance need must be organised on some foundational moral and political basis. I argue that rights provide a more plausible foundation for building institutions that can conform with the institutional principles in addressing the problem. To do this, this paper is organised in five parts. The first part is a critical exposition of the welfare state and Hegel’s dilemma. The second through the fourth parts involve an examination of Moon’s arguments ranging from his rejections of rights and equality as the moral bases of the welfare state to his proposal of the institutional principles, which he claims, adequately address the problem. The fifth part is an assessment of Moon’s argument and a critical presentation of the position that rights provide a fundamental moral basis upon which Moon’s principles can be justifiably founded in order to adequately address the problem of wealth differentiation created by a market economy.

⁴ Moon, J. D. “The Moral Basis of the Democratic Welfare State” in Bonevac, D. (ed.) *Today’s Moral Issues: Classic and Contemporary Perspectives*. Mountain View, CA.: Mayfield Publishing Company, 1996, p516.

The Democratic Welfare State and the Hegel's dilemma

In his paper, "The Moral Basis of the Democratic Welfare State", Donald Moon argues that the accounts of the welfare state that center on welfare rights and the objective of achieving equality fail to explain certain aspects of the welfare state such as the contribution of recipients (that is, the economically disadvantaged) in the social insurance scheme and the universal coverage of the welfare state programmes. Accounts of the welfare state that center on equality and right neglect the value attached to self-dignity, self-respect and self-understandings that individuals in a political community have with regards to how the social and political practices of their community dictate the distribution of benefits and burdens. Moon posits that a different understanding of the welfare state avoids these problems. The different account which he proposes is the understanding of the welfare state as "an attempt to solve a serious dilemma that necessarily results from the central role of markets in modern society."⁵

G. W. F. Hegel, in *The Philosophy of Right*, argues that modern political economy operates on a self-interested and utility-maximising patterns. The acceptability of such patterns is to be based on wider social and political values within which the political economy is a substratum. Given the patterns through which the economy operates which includes a laissez-faire arrangement, Hegel argues that there is a problem of great poverty alongside great wealth. The market economy is one where the government interference is minimal in determining market prices or regulating human choices. The market economy is ruled by stiff competition to make profits, and the commercial lives of individuals are riddled with rivalry against one another. This tends to create a wide gap between the rich and the poor. The poor suffers from the non-interference of the state in its citizens' commercial lives and they tend to lose out on everything that makes life better such as health care, education, shelter, food, clothing and so on.⁶

This, according to Moon, is a moral rather than practical problem since the justification for the market economy is the liberalist conception of human beings as rational and autonomous beings who have rights and self-dignity to determine the good life for themselves. On the contrary though, this is defeated since the market economy deprives some individuals of their self-dignity given the outcome of the wide economic gap between the rich and the poor which continues to widen.⁷ The more damaging effect of the great poverty that exists among certain

⁵ Moon, J. D. "The Moral Basis of the Democratic Welfare State", p.516.

⁶ Hegel, G. W. F. *Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Knox, T. M. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967.

⁷ Moon, J. D. "The Moral Basis of the Democratic Welfare State", p.517.

individuals in a liberal political economy is that poor people are “exiled” from the society that they are part of by virtue of circumstances beyond them. Poverty makes poor people strangers in their own political community as they lack the basic amenities of life. However, since Hegel understands the economy to be part of an ideal ethical state where human freedom is realisable, he rejects the idea of giving stipends to the poor. This, for him, does not solve the problem but undermines the citizenship status of the poor and their self-dignity. He proposes two solutions. One is that the state controls or regulates prices of commodities such that the poor can be able to buy so as to have a meaningful life. The second is that there be a corporatist system of public-private partnership or cooperative societies where individual members who are in need are assisted without having to feel the shame of losing their self-dignity.⁸

Moon argues that Hegel’s proposals are inadequate. The idea of state regulation of prices of commodities, for Moon, is only viable in times of war or natural disaster but could lead to greater problems for the state in providing subsidies for market prices which may in turn undermine both the state and the market.⁹ He also considers the public-private partnership as incapable of catering to the needs of the many poor people that a market economy creates in a political community.¹⁰ The moral conundrum associated with the problem of great wealth and great poverty created by the market economy has led some of the advocates of the welfare state – understood as a system that addresses the problem – to give an account of morally coherent system of state. The moral conundrum arises when one considers, on the one hand, that some human beings who are rational and self-dignified beings lack the basic amenities of life attached to the status of citizenship in a political community and, on the other hand, that the state has to promote the social and economic well-being of these individuals through the redistribution of wealth and provision of amenities minimal for the attainment of the good life for those who would otherwise be unable to attain it.

The goal of the welfare state is met with certain objections among which is that it erodes individual freedom by trying to take away from those who have to give to those who do not have especially when all human beings, both rich and poor, are exposed to the same opportunity to compete for the benefits of the society. It erodes the idea of state-neutrality and infringes on the rights of individuals. This is so since the welfare state means of redistribution of wealth may include imposing heavy tax on the rich in order to provide amenities for the poor. Another objection

⁸ Hegel, G. W. F. *Philosophy of Right*.

⁹ Moon, J. D. “The Moral Basis of the Democratic Welfare State”, p.517.

¹⁰ Moon, J. D. “The Moral Basis of the Democratic Welfare State”, p.518.

is that it reduces the humanity of the recipient of welfare package and tend to make them lazier and weaker and see themselves as less. This makes a point to the effect that human beings' self-worth is reduced and their vulnerability is stigmatised since the cases of redistribution of wealth is largely based on pity

Advocates of the welfare state argue otherwise. They maintain that the moral grounds for the welfare state are the moral aspects that underlie the actions and behaviours of the contributors to the welfare scheme and the recipients of welfare packages, that is the rich and the poor respectively.¹¹ Among such moral grounds are rights and equality. For Moon, neither of these moral and political grounds for the welfare state provides an adequate solution to the problem of wealth differentiation created by a market economy. In the sections that follow, I shall examine Moon's position on the accounts of rights and equality as moral and political bases of the welfare state and his proposal of institutional principles which, he holds, present an adequate solution to the problem.

Rights as the Moral Basis for the Welfare State

As members of a political community, human beings are entitled to the benefits (and burdens) that come with their union in a single political entity. The opportunity to enjoy these benefits are wrapped around the idea of rights. For the sustenance of both individuals and the political community at large, there are civic duties and obligations that guide interpersonal relationship and state-individual relationship. Following Marshall's formulation, there are three fundamental rights that make an individual a full and equal member of a political community. They are civic rights, political rights and social rights. Civic rights are the rights necessary for individual freedom, such as the right to own property, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, liberty of person and so on. Political rights are the rights to participate in the exercise of political power. Social rights are the rights to economic welfare and security to the right to share in the benefits of the political community and live a happy life in accordance with the standard of a happy life that prevails in the society.¹²

These rights, altogether, define the citizenship status of an individual in a political community and by extension, the idea of self-identity. The idea of self-

¹¹ Van Parijs, P. "On the Moral Foundations of the Welfare State: Three Research Programmes" in Koslowski, P. and Follesdal, A. (eds.) *Restructuring the Welfare State: Theory and Reform of Social Policy*. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1997, p. 383.

¹² Marshall, T. H., "Citizenship and Social Class", pp.148-149.

identity here implies the recognition of an individual's potential and qualities in relation to social context. An individual's sense of self-identity is such individual's ability to identify his/her potentials and as well be able to harness such for the attainment of self-fulfillment within the context of the political community. These are made possible by the presence of rights and, most especially, social rights which are majorly affected by the economic system adopted in a political community. As a moral basis for a welfare state, the idea of rights is that individuals are entitled to the economic conditions that will uphold their citizenship identity, help maintain their self-identity and provide the means of attaining the good life.

As a remedy to the problem of great poverty created by the laissez-faire economic system, the welfare state is grounded on the idea that every individual is entitled to an economic condition that is favourably disposed to their living a happy life. Thus, the motivation for redistributing wealth to reduce or eliminate the economic gap that exists between the poor and the rich is the idea of right. In other words, poor individuals have the right to enjoy the welfare package that the state provides in order to better their lives.

Moon argues that grounding welfare on the idea of right is inadequate in addressing the Hegel's dilemma. He states that even if it can be proven that human beings have social and welfare rights, the fundamental problem of losing the status of self-respect remains unsolved. He claims that such patterns that divides the society into two – the haves, the contributors, the active; and the have-nots, the recipients, the passive – is a demeaning pattern that reduces the self-worth of the latter divide of the society.¹³ He claims that even if it is agreed that individuals have the rights to welfare, it is a stigmatising right to exercise. Moon appeals to the psychological ideal of human self-esteem which is the belief that an individual has of himself or herself. The ideal of self-esteem is that of living up to a certain standard that serves as the benchmark for determining the self-worth and self-respect of every human. An individual strives to reach that benchmark and maintain the standard which is dependent on other factors, one which is independence. As autonomous beings and moral equals, human beings are expected to reciprocate the duties and obligations they owe one another. The idea of dependence jeopardises this reciprocity and reduces the independence of individuals. Hence, administering welfare reduces the independence of recipients and ultimately their self-esteem as human beings.¹⁴

Moon argues further that the inadequacy in basing welfare on the general theory of human rights also shows that the moral basis is not altruistic. Altruism, being the quality of selfless concern for the well-being of other people, is voluntary

¹³ Moon, J. D. "The Moral Basis of the Democratic Welfare State", p.518.

¹⁴ Moon, J. D. "The Moral Basis of the Democratic Welfare State", p.519.

and if the contribution of the rich to the welfare programmes is a form of obligation imposed by the state, then the contribution is not voluntary and cannot be said to be altruistic. The economically advantaged can, as an act of benevolence, voluntarily contribute to cater for the poor but the state's involvement and imposition of measures to take from the rich and redistribute to the poor erodes the freedom of the rich and invalidates the duty of benevolence.

As appealing as Moon's arguments seems, I do not agree with him on his account of the psychological ideal of self-worth. Human beings are, primarily, what they are because they have life. Any legal means to sustain this life is acceptable. My intention is not to discard the idea of the independence of individuals but to point out that Moon attaches too much to the relation between it and the idea of self-worth. In the life span of an average human being (say one who lives to a very old age), there is a number of years that such human being would certainly be dependent on others for the sustenance of his or her life. From birth till death, human beings have a number of years that they are dependent on others. This does not in any way reduce their self-worth as human beings. More so, even if it is granted that dependence on others or the state reduces one's self-worth, I think the insistence on self-worth would become secondary in the face of choosing to sustain life. If the market economy had created great poverty that human beings find it difficult to sustain their lives, I think the idea of self-worth becomes secondary while that of life-sustenance becomes primary. And if the welfare state is grounded on the basis that human beings have the right to welfare in order to sustain their lives, then it becomes the worthy thing to do. Moon's claim that the right to welfare is stigmatising and not one that is to be exercised is also faulty if one considers that having the right to something implies that others have a duty not to prevent one from having that thing, such duty is to promote one's interest. Hence, one is not to be embarrassed in enforcing the duty.¹⁵

Equality as the Moral Basis for Welfare State

It is a truism that the market economy creates inequalities among individuals in a political community. These inequalities are not the type that are associated with the choices of tastes or risk or unpleasantness attached to different works but the inequalities that arise as a result of circumstances that are beyond the control of individuals such as natural, ecological and sociological factors. For instance, genetic differences in the physical build-up of individuals give some the advantage

¹⁵ Waldron, J. "Rights" in Goodin, R. E., Pettit, P. and Pogge, T (eds.) *A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy*, Vol. 2, 2nd Edition, Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2007, p.746.

over others with regards to tasks that require physical strength. The less powerful do not have power (or choice) over their genetic build and the more powerful deserve no extra benefit since they did not work or 'deserve' their genetic build. To this effect, it is argued that the welfare state attempts to achieve equality among individuals.

Daniel Shapiro argues that justifications of the welfare state appeal to the principle of justice or fairness. One of such justifications is the egalitarian principle of justice which defends the view that human beings must have substantive material equality.¹⁶ The presentation of equal opportunity in a market economy does not yield equal outcome. Those, who advocate for the welfare state as an attempt to address the inequality that arises through no fault of individuals, propose measures that are to be taken to achieve the material equality. Ronald Dworkin, for instance, proposes,

...the periodic redistribution of resources through some form of income tax...a scheme of redistribution... that will neutralize the effects of differential talents... An income tax is a plausible device for this purpose because it leaves intact the possibility of choosing a life in which sacrifices are constantly made and disciplines steadily imposed for the sake of financial success and the further resources it brings though it neither endorses nor condemns that choice. But it also acknowledges the role of genetic luck in such a life. The accommodation it makes is a compromise...not a compromise of equality for the sake of some independent value such as efficiency.¹⁷

The great poverty created by the market economy can be reduced or eliminated by imposing taxes on the economically advantaged. This is fair since the wealth that the rich enjoy and the poverty that the poor suffer respectively are not what they deserved by their own doing. The justification for the quest of economic equality among individuals in a political community refers to the moral worth of human beings as equals. In the case of the Hegel's dilemma – great wealth and great poverty – the economic or financial difference among individuals makes the economically advantaged to gain power and control the affairs of the society and ultimately dictate the good life for the less economically fortunate. The method of income taxation in order to achieve equality also takes cognisance of the ideal of human self-worth as it would bring the economically less fortunate to the position they would have been in if fate beyond their control had not dealt with them.

¹⁶ Shapiro, D *Is the Welfare State Justified?* Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 2007, p.17.

¹⁷ Dworkin, R., "What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources", *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Vol 10(4), 1981:312-313.

Moon rejects the consideration of equality as a moral basis of the welfare state on two grounds. One is that as much as the method of income taxation to achieve equality may equalise income differences that arise as a result of factors that are beyond human control, it is also possible that it equalises income differences that arise as a result of human-controllable circumstances due to the willingness to bear risk, ambition and unpleasantness of task.¹⁸ For example, the risk attached to flying a plane explains the high pay of a pilot. Thus, it would be unfair to impose tax on a high-income pilot so as to equalise the pilot's income with that of a person who earns low income due to the less-risk associated with his or her job. The willingness to bear risk is not beyond human control. Individuals that go ahead to do high-risk jobs should not pay for the faintheartedness of others.

Second is that the idea of equality, as espoused by Dworkin, makes a rigid distinction between a person and his or her circumstances. Moon considers such conception of a person as narrow. For him, a person is sometimes inseparable from his or circumstances. Thus, the welfare state based on the principle of equality that separates a person from his/her circumstances is inadequate in addressing the Hegel Dilemma.

Further problems I want to identify with the principle of equality as a moral basis of the welfare state are the problems of feasibility and desirability. In the aspect of feasibility, in an economy of great wealth and great poverty, an attempt to equalise income differences may lead to a greater economic imbalance. It is a fact that the resources that make for beneficial life in every society is limited, although the market economy could have caused a great and disastrous disparity in the distribution of resources, the attempt to equalise income may lead to a situation where what is left of the rich (whom tax have been imposed to take care of the poor) is not enough for them to enjoy the benefits of life, while the poor too may now have too much on their hands. This shows that attempt to achieve income equality may also lead to income differences. Hence, it may not be feasible to attain equality in that respect.

The problem above merges into that of desirability. If equality is likely to lead to further inequality, then it raises the question of its desirability. There are other means of redistributing resources such as sufficiency and priority. In the case of the welfare state, I think sufficiency is a desired basis if the tastes of individuals can be regulated. Sufficiency is the view that every individual is to be guaranteed the minimum resources (or income) capable of enhancing the attainment of the good life.¹⁹

¹⁸ Moon, J. D. "The Moral Basis of the Democratic Welfare State", p.521.

¹⁹ Fleurbaey, M. "Equal Opportunity for Equal Social Outcome", *economics and Philosophy*, 11, 1995:40.

Moon on the Principles of Economic Management, Universal Provision of Services and Social Insurance

Having argued that rights and equality as moral bases of the welfare state fail to address the Hegel's dilemma, Moon proposes a set of "institutional principles" which governs the policies of a welfare state. These principles, according to Moon, provide an adequate solution to the Hegel's dilemma in a way that equality and rights do not.²⁰

The principle of economy management requires that the management of the economy be in the hands of the states in order to achieve full employment. The state as an organised institution that operates in a defined political territory with the monopoly of rule-making derives its legitimacy from individuals within the society.²¹ As part of its protection of the citizens' rights, the state also serves as the provider of vital social services and economic infrastructure that benefit the lives of individuals in the society. Since political legitimacy of the state resides in the citizens, the state's management of the economy in order to produce social and economic infrastructures does not yield to the erosion of human self-respect. The state exists because it is a formation of human beings, thus, its management of the economy sees to the fact that citizens who constitute it are provided with what will make them live a good life.

When the state provides full employment for its citizens, the dynamic nature of economy means that some jobs will disappear. Some people will be incapacitated to work while some will retire due to old age. Moon argues that the welfare state would be guided by the principles of universal provision of services and social insurance. The state's principle of universal provision of services which includes free education, for example, means that recipients of such services are not deprived of their self-respect.²² This is so since the recipient of such services are members from which the state derives some of its legitimacy. Universal provision of such services stem from the idea of duties and obligations that govern the relations between the citizens and the state.

The third principle, social insurance, is one that, according to Moon, addresses the differences in the needs of individuals in a political community. He explains the principle thus,

²⁰ Moon, J. D. "The Moral Basis of the Democratic Welfare State", p.523.

²¹ Dunleavy, P. "The State" in Goodin, R. E., Pettit, P. and Pogge, T (eds.) *A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy*, Vol. 2, 2nd Edition, Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2007, p. 793.

²² Moon, J. D. "The Moral Basis of the Democratic Welfare State", p.523.

...the establishment of social insurance enables people to receive differential benefits without violating the idea of reciprocity, which is fundamental to their sense of themselves as moral equals. Two obvious examples are social security and unemployment compensation. Both of these systems are set up as insurance schemes, so that those who collect benefits under them see themselves as...receiving something to which they have a right just because they have contributed their fair share to provision of those benefits.²³

The unique dimension of the welfare state to the observance of these three principles in the provision of public services is the generalisation of the services to a wide range of human needs. The principle of social insurance also maintains the self-respect of the recipients of social and welfare services since recipients are not passive but active contributors to the scheme.

Moon, thus, submits that the principles of economic management (being in the hand of the state), the universal provision of services and social insurance scheme plausibly address the moral breach in the society as a result of the market economy. This moral breach is the main crux of the Hegel's dilemma and, for Moon, his proposed principles address the dilemma without jeopardising human beings' self-respect.

Towards a Plausible Moral Basis for the Welfare State

I shall begin my argument by stating that I agree with Moon that the principles of economic management, universal provision of services and social insurance are good means of addressing the problem of economic differentials created by the market economy. I, however, disagree with him that these principles are adequate in addressing the problem. My position is based on the fact that these principles are only economic and political practices which aim to address problems associated with economic differentials among individuals in a political community without having to jeopardise their sense of self-respect. These principles are presented without a foundational basis in theoretical moral or political framework. In other words, Moon's position cannot satisfy the question of justification for the principles he proposes. For instance, it is intelligible to ask what the justification, moral or political, for the principles of social insurance and universal provision of services is. I posit that rights provide a plausible justification.

²³ Moon, J. D. "The Moral Basis of the Democratic Welfare State", p.523.

One of the most fundamental and basic human rights is the right to life. The right to life, according to J. O. Famakinwa, is parasitic and derived in the sense that it depends on the right to basic life-sustaining material goods.²⁴ Any lawful means adoptable in sustaining life is acceptable even if it sets aside the idea of self-respect. The import of the basic human right to life implies that the rights it is derived from – the rights to life-sustaining material goods – are as basic and important. Rights can then be said to be the fundamental moral aspect that underlies both public and private behaviours as well as state-individual relation. This is so since rights involve the entitlements that individuals in a political community have to sustain their lives. It is still reasonably possible to ask for moral or political background that individuals in a welfare state have in enjoying welfare programmes without the inclination to damage their self-respect. I think the claim of rights (to life, to protection of life, to sustenance of life) is a justifiable ground to address economic differentials without resorting to the damage of human's self-respect.

A more important reason for holding economic and social rights as plausible foundation for principles of economic management, universal principles and social insurance in the welfare state's quest to reduce or eliminate great poverty is that they satisfy a justificatory framework. James Nickel presents six structures to argue that economic and social rights to welfare programmes are justifiable. For the purpose of this paper, I shall adopt four of these structures. These structures require that economic and social rights to welfare programs: (i) fit the general idea of human rights (ii) be sufficiently important (iii) require the modality of rights rather than some weaker norm and (iv) impose burdens that are not wrongful on duty bearers.²⁵

The first justificatory structure raises the question if economic and social rights fit into the general idea of human rights at all. The response to this is clear, as earlier argued, as the more fundamental human right to life are parasitic on economic and social rights. Thus, the citizens' claim to welfare program is an extension and exercise of their human rights. The second structure derives from the claim that economic and social rights to welfare are not as important as civil and political rights which include the rights to individual freedom and political participation. The importance of economic and social rights to welfare resides in the fact that other rights are parasitic on it. For example, the rights to individual freedom may be jeopardised if the economic condition of an individual is nothing but great poverty. Economic power also determines political power. Hence, the implementation of other rights is difficult without securing economic and social rights.

²⁴ Famakinwa, J. O. "Interpreting the Right to Life", *Diametros*, 29, 2011:22-30.

²⁵ Nickel, J. W. "A Defense of Welfare Rights as Human Rights" in Cristiano, T. and Christman, J. (eds,) *Contemporary Debates in Political Philosophy*, pp. 441-449.

The third structure is about whether economic and social rights are necessary given other norms of welfare such as charity, self-help and assistance to family members. The problems with these other norms include that there is limit to charity as a source of welfare, there are people who are incapacitated to even help themselves while there are some who, by ill-fate, have no family members to assist them. In cases where these norms are possible, they are better as supplement to the implementation of economic and social rights which make up for their shortcoming or even absence. The last justificatory structure concerns whether the claim to economic and social rights place much burden of the state on individuals who bear the duty to right-holders. The welfare state is not a state of freebies but one of equal opportunity in order to address the inequality in resources/benefits. Both right-holders and duty-bearers of economic and social rights have a bilateral relation or reciprocity of duties and obligations. Thus, this reciprocity of duty avoids the placement of much burden on individuals as it can affect those targeted by the welfare state in instituting welfare programs too.

These justificatory structures satisfied by the rights to welfare are a validation of the position I hold that rights are a plausible moral and political ground for the welfare state in addressing the wide economic differentials created by the market economy. The institutional principles proposed by Moon must be grounded on rights if they are to be justifiable principles that govern the policies of the welfare state.

Conclusion

So far, I have argued that rights are a plausible moral and political basis for the principles that govern the policies of a welfare state. This argument is in response to Donald Moon's position that neither rights nor equality can address the problem Hegel identifies with the market economy – the problem of great poverty alongside great wealth.

I began by expounding the idea of the welfare state and Hegel's dilemma. I examine the welfare state, in line with Moon's presentation, as a quest to address the problem of economic differentials in a market economy. I proceeded to assess Moon's argument for rejecting rights and equality as moral bases for the welfare state. I disagreed with Moon's rejection of rights as moral bases for a welfare state. I maintained that his arguments put more emphasis on maintaining human self-respect than sustaining human life. I argued that human self-respect is dependent on human life and the rights to life-sustaining material and non-material goods are not damaging to self-respect.

I agreed that Moon's proposed institutional principles are helpful governing principles for the welfare state but posited that they require a justificatory basis. This basis, I argued, lies in rights – economic and social rights. This, I argued for, on the basis that the rights to welfare are in themselves justified basis for addressing the economic differentials – the wide gap between the rich and the poor – that exist in a market economy.

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ETHICAL ASPECTS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONING IN THE XXI CENTURY

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ABSTRACT. The article is devoted to the ethical aspects of artificial intelligence functioning. The problem of the safe coexistence of man and artificial intelligence is taking on increasing importance. The definition of artificial intelligence and the explanation of the difference between weak, strong artificial intelligence and super-intelligence are given. The first ethical problem of artificial intelligence functioning is the existential question of human redundancy due to the spread of artificial intelligence. The article emphasizes that artificial intelligence, on the one hand, frees a person from certain areas of activity, facilitating their existence, on the other hand, it makes them superfluous in production and in personal life. The second is the problem of responsibility for the actions of artificial intelligence. The article argues for the necessity of human responsibility for the actions of artificial intelligence because artificial intelligence does not have consciousness. The third problem is the intensification of the phenomenon of stupidity in society. Artificial intelligence creates the conditions for the increasing cleverness of some segments of the population and stupidity of others, which can result in even greater mental and property inequality.

Key words: intelligence, artificial intelligence, ethics, responsibility, legal responsibility, human existential state, problem of redundancy, stupidity.

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Introduction

The problem of the sustainable existence of humanity is becoming increasingly important in the XXI century. We are currently experiencing the COVID-19 pandemic that has claimed millions of lives on the planet, representing biological danger. The ecological crisis is no less acute. In addition to these two topical issues, humanity should not forget about the technological hazards, one of the varieties of which is the uncontrolled functioning of artificial intelligence. Today the world needs a philosophical reflection on the problem of the possibility of simulating human thinking by artificial intelligence systems and assessing the risks of implementing appropriate technologies in the present and future of humanity.

It should be noted that artificial intelligence was conceived as a way to replace humans in difficult situations, such as armed hostilities, police operations, space exploration, unmanned vehicle driving. It has proved effective in medicine, namely in processing ultrasound, computer tomography and magnetic resonance imaging data, drug testing, and mastering all available health care information. Also, it seems very suitable for those areas of human activity in which man cannot compete with new technology: fast and efficient processing of large amounts of information, perception and processing of all signals of the outside world, etc. According to O. Radutny, “artificial intelligence was designed as man’s great assistant that could offer a perfect solution in a particular field of human activity” (Radutny, O.E., 2021).

Despite the positive contribution of artificial intelligence to society, today a few risk factors of the existence of this phenomenon could be identified: digital, physical and political. The digital factor includes an automated phishing system or the creation of fake emails, websites, and links for stealing information; the physical one comprises the automation of terrorism with the help of commercial drones or autonomous vehicles as weapons; the political factor refers to propaganda through creating fake images and videos, censorship through carrying out automated search and deletion of texts and images (Franasyuk, Yu., 2018).

As it is known, skeptics’ philosophical credo is to refrain from evaluative judgments. In the XXI century, it does not lose its relevance as these judgments are aimed at complex phenomena of social reality, which cannot be unambiguously assessed in the polar categories of good and evil. To minimize the negative technogenic impacts it is necessary to develop and implement ethical and legal standards for the usage of artificial intelligence.

Thus, the **purpose** of this article is to analyze ethical aspects of artificial intelligence functioning.

Degree of studying the problem

The problem of artificial intelligence was examined by D. Barrat, E. Horwitz, N. Bostrom, E. Musk, D. Dyson, J. McCarthy, M. Minsky, P. Norvig, J. Searle, S. Russell, K. Kelly, R. Kahlo, P. Asaro, W. Wingham, A. Turing and others. Social, ethical and legal aspects of artificial intelligence functioning were studied by O. Baranov, V. Bryzhko, M. Karchevsky, O. Dobrovol'ska, V. Myslyv, V. Pylypchuk, N. Savinova, Ye. Kharytonov, Yu. Petrunin, A. Makovkin, M. Ryazanov, A. Savelyev, V. Shtanko, I. Tsidilo, Y. Karpenko, O. Radutny, Yu. Harari, M. Taddeo, L. Perry, K. Wakefield.

Methods

The methodological basis of the research is made up of the findings of representatives of analytical philosophy, such as D. Armstrong, J. Searle, D. Chalmers, D. Dennett, raising the issue of the interrelation between mental (consciousness) and physical (material), the ratio of consciousness and brain. Considering the problem of the interrelation between intelligence and consciousness, J. Searle believes that the creation of a computer program itself will never be a sufficient condition for the presence of intentionality: "mental states are determined by their causal roles, not by the stuff (neurons, transistors) that plays those roles" (Searle, J., 1980). The human mind is endowed with semantics, the machine, instead, perceives information through combinations of symbols (ones and zeros) without understanding these symbols, therefore it is impossible to talk about the presence of semantics, and hence consciousness. Thus, the overarching methodological guideline is the idea of the impossibility of endowing artificial intelligence with autonomous consciousness. This principle was followed by O. Dobrovol'ska and I. Shtanko ("Philosophical Analysis of the Evolution of Artificial Intelligence"), Yu. Karpenko ("Ethical Principles of Artificial Intelligence Application in Public Administration"), A. Makovkin ("Ethical Problems of Artificial Intelligence"). The authors emphasize the following philosophical problems of artificial intelligence functioning: the limitations of the computational approach, the inability of artificial intelligence to demonstrate self-reflection, sensations, creativity, and flexible behavior (Dobrovol'ska, O., Shtanko, I., 2019). That leads us to the suggestion that man should be responsible for artificial intelligence acts.

Results and Discussion

Definitions and classification of artificial intelligence

To figure out the stated problem, it is necessary to understand what artificial intelligence is and to follow the discourse of defining this concept. This term was proposed by the American professor John McCarthy, who first proclaimed it in 1956 by defining it "...as the science of creating intelligent machines and intelligent computer programs" (Moor, J., 2006), which became the starting point for the study of artificial intelligence.

The basic classification of all the aspects of this term was proposed by Yu. Petrunin: "1. a research area, which aims to simulate the processes of cognition and thinking, the use of methods of solving problems applied by man to increase the productivity of computer technology; 2. various devices, mechanisms and programs, which can be called intelligent according to certain criteria; 3. a set of ideas about cognition, mind and human being, which make it possible to pose the question of simulating intelligence" (Petrunin, Yu., 2018). S. Russell and P. Norvig in their book "Artificial Intelligence: Modern Approaches" classify it as follows: "a system that thinks like humans (e.g., cognitive architecture and neural networks), a system that acts like humans (e.g., the Turing test through natural processing language, knowledge representation, automated thinking and learning), a system that thinks rationally (including logical algorithms, inference and optimization), a system that acts rationally (e.g. intelligent software agent, creation of robots achieving goals through perception, planning, reflection, study, communication, decision-making and action)" (Stuart, Russell and Peter, Norvig, 2021).

On December 2, 2020, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine approved the order on "Concept of Artificial Intelligence Development in Ukraine", providing its vision of the term: "Artificial intelligence is an organized set of informational technologies, which makes it possible to perform complex tasks by using a system of research methods and algorithms for processing information obtained or independently created during work, as well as to create and use own knowledge bases, decision-making models, information processing algorithms and determine ways to achieve tasks" (On approving the Concept of Artificial Intelligence Development in Ukraine: Order of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine № 1556-p of December 2, 2020. The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine).

Thus, we can metaphorically say that artificial intelligence is non-human intelligence that has to solve human problems.

That is why, referring to the ethical problems of artificial intelligence functioning is justified, as it is caused by human fears about the safe coexistence of man and technology. The history of humanity demonstrates that any results of scientific and technological progress can be used both with progressive and destructive intentions; the simplest example of the negative impact of artificial intelligence on human existence is cybercrime.

Surprisingly, fears about the dangerous existence of artificial intelligence are formed under the influence of fantasy films and books where the world is captivated by human-like robots and where man is in a secondary place. Fantasies on this topic may be the most unexpected, but let us turn to a scientific analysis of the problem.

Research on ethical issues is divided according to the level of capabilities of artificial intelligence. The philosophy of artificial intelligence distinguishes the following types: strong, weak, superintelligence. Notably, “weak artificial intelligence is a tool that allows you to solve certain problems that do not require a full range of human cognitive abilities” (Makovkin, A.S., 2015). It is implemented in an expert system which is a program that replaces an expert in a particular field of knowledge or activities. (An example is the MYCIN program, which could be a physician’s assistant and which is aimed at treating blood infections. “MYCIN attempts to diagnose patients based on reported symptoms and medical test results”. It can request additional information about the patient and suggest more medical testing; such information will help the program to arrive at a possible diagnosis and to suggest a treatment).

Strong artificial intelligence is a powerful computer similar to the human mind. “Strong artificial intelligence is a computer that is programmed in such a way that it can be in any human cognitive state” (Cole, David, 2020).

The highest level in the development of artificial intelligence is considered to be super-intelligence, which can “think, reason, solve puzzles, make judgments, manage, plan, learn and communicate independently (Types of Artificial)”. Strong intelligence and super-intelligence are very similar, but the difference is that the former performs mental activity as a person while the latter exceeds the acts of its creator (Karchevsky, M., 2017). Therefore, according to their capabilities, ethical issues are distinguished.

The existential question of human redundancy due to the proliferation of artificial intelligence

The introduction of artificial intelligence in the industry, agriculture, transport, military affairs, space and ocean exploration, health care, education, etc. is expected to reduce the number of living people previously employed in these areas. Automation of production is currently contributing to rising unemployment, and the introduction of artificial intelligence can permanently exclude people from the technological process.

Today we can observe the embodiment of artificial intelligence in everyday life. World-famous Elon Musk, citing examples of artificial intelligence application, believes that the future lies in unmanned vehicles, which will replace conventional cars with drivers. In Japan, there are eating establishments served by robots. There are cleaning robots (women will adore them) as well as police robots that help to maintain public order, and so on. In today's infosphere and digital space, robots can be called real "natives", an integral part of the cyber environment (Floridi, L., 2021).

Naturally, the following question arises: does artificial intelligence possess more advantages or disadvantages by depriving a person of their job and earnings? On the one hand, competition with "smart machines" promotes individual's creative self-fulfillment and overcoming laziness, which becomes an impetus for harnessing other areas of activity and self-improvement. Economists argue that automation of production with the help of machines increases the number of jobs rather than decreases. Artificial intelligence application leads to the emergence of more highly paid and interesting specialties.

On the other hand, technological progress is indeed capable of leaving man "on the sidelines of history". A person gets a lot of free time. What should they fill it with? Where should they apply their abilities? Both scientists and average people are concerned with these questions.

The ethical facet of this issue foregrounds the problem of redundancy, replacing a person with artificial intelligence, when they firstly feel unnecessary in production, and then – in their own life. In this situation, we can talk about an existential facet of the problem, when a person is alienated from the labor process. Recalling Hryhoriy Skovoroda's concept of "immanent work", according to which man's vocation to a particular activity is laid by nature-God at the moment of birth, and therefore "man must be happy doing immanent work", we can assume that replacing man with artificial intelligence is a great ethical and social problem.

The problem of human responsibility for the consequences of artificial intelligence functioning

In our opinion, the problem of responsibility should be divided into two aspects. The first one refers to the question: who will be responsible for the mistakes made by nootechnology: the creator or artificial intelligence itself? The second aspect is the responsibility for human self-development in the conditions of spreading the activity of artificial intelligence.

The question of responsibility is directly related to the aspects of the control and decision-making that (Spence, E., 2021). A. Makovkin believes that at the current stage of development of artificial intelligence and society "... responsibility cannot be transferred from the specialist to the machine, but if computer systems positively make more accurate decisions than humans, in this case, the specialist's role will be levelled and the expert system will approach strong artificial intelligence, the use of which is associated with several completely different ethical issues" (Makovkin, A., 2015). J. Searle states that "according to weak artificial intelligence, the main importance of the computer in studying the mind is that it gives us a very powerful tool. For example, it allows us to formulate and test hypotheses more rigorously and accurately. But, according to strong artificial intelligence, the computer is not merely a tool for studying the mind; rather the properly programmed computer is a mind, in the sense that computers given the right programs can be literally said to understand and have other cognitive states" (Searle, J., 1980).

Naturally, the question arises: if we can create artificial intelligence that surpasses our own, then how will the relationship between people and machines develop? Fantastic stories make a frightening suggestion that artificial intelligence can surpass us in abilities and turn from an assistant to an enemy. Science fiction writers predict the end of the era of humans and the beginning of the era of super-intelligent machines. Perhaps strong artificial intelligence is the last man's creation. The author of this theory is the famous mathematician and science fiction writer Vernor Vinge. He calls it a technological advantage, noting that the creation of super-intelligent machines will mark the end of the era of humans. However, not everyone shares the science fiction writer's pessimistic offering options on how to prevent such a scenario. American futurist Eliezer Yudkowsky offers his version of the development of artificial intelligence, namely the concept of friendly intelligence, the essence of which is "to create artificial intelligence that will have a positive rather than negative impact on humanity" (Makovkin, A., 2015).

Isaac Azimov proposes “the three laws of robotics”, which present the ethical principles of robot operation: “A robot may not injure a human being, or, through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm. A robot must obey the orders given it by human beings except where such orders would conflict with the First Law. A robot must protect its own existence so long as such protection does not conflict with the First or Second Laws” (Levchuk, A., 2015). For robotics, these laws are still relevant today, although they were presented in 1942.

Stephen Hawking also spoke about the danger of intelligent machines, saying: “The development of full artificial intelligence could mean the end of the human race” (Stephen Hawking warns artificial intelligence could end mankind, 2019). Elon Musk, also negatively, called the creation of artificial intelligence “our greatest existential threat”. Although, it’s strange to hear it from the man who creates drones and believes that the future lies with them. An example of the uncontrollability of strong intelligence is robot “Sophia”, who in an interview in 2016 answered the question “Do you want to destroy people? Please say “no” with “Okay, I will destroy humanity”. She may have made a bad joke, or should we start worrying about it?

Researchers believe that the creation of ethical artificial intelligence is a prerequisite for creating super-intelligence. That is, it is a combination “...between formal mathematical systems and ethical principles” (Karpenko, Yu., 2019).

Scientists are most concerned about the safe existence of artificial intelligence in society. Thus, L. Perry believes that “the ultimate goal of the security of artificial intelligence is to create useful, not artificially directed intelligence”. Therefore, “what is useful remains an open question that is to some extent correlated by ethics”. Thus, “it is necessary to develop a philosophy or ethics of using artificial intelligence as soon as possible” (Karpenko, Yu.V, 2019). However, this ethics usually lies in the area of formal responsibility rather than morality, being focused on answering the question “Who should be blamed”, but not “How should the society form the proper attitude toward the development and further practical use of AIs, especially autonomous ones?” (Bartneck, C., et al., 2021).

Both global computer makers (Baranov, O.A., 2017; OECD Principles on AI, 2019) and religious organizations are expressing concern about the responsibility for artificial intelligence actions. For example, in 2020, “Bosch” company presented the “Code of Ethics for Artificial Intelligence”. This code is based on a single principle: man should monitor the decisions of artificial intelligence. “Artificial intelligence serves people. Our code of ethics for artificial intelligence gives employees clear instructions on how to develop smart products. We want people to trust our products based on artificial intelligence” (AI Code of Ethics: Bosch sets out the principles for working with artificial intelligence, 2020).

The Catholic Church has also offered several ethical warnings about the extensive usage of artificial intelligence. Thus, the Vatican discussed the ethical principles of artificial intelligence operation and development with two giants – Microsoft and IBM. All agreed that the artificial intelligence pillars should: “respect privacy, work in a robust and impartial way, respect human rights and act transparently” (Vatican joins IBM, Microsoft to call for facial recognition regulation, 2020).

Regarding the second aspect of the problem of responsibility for human self-development in the context of the extensive usage of artificial intelligence, it is necessary to take into account the factor of manipulating minds, which must be worthily resisted. In the information and high-tech spheres, this means, in particular, the necessary to: “1) make efforts to continuously improve one's literacy and education in the field of new technologies; 2) be aware at least in general terms of the current achievements of scientific and technological progress and use them in their activities; 3) check important information in several alternative sources; 4) be able to work with “information noise” – unnecessary, redundant, or untimely information that interferes with the perception of the useful one; 5) distinguish unintentional mistakes and reservations from intentional methods (propaganda, manipulative technologies, commercialization, etc.); 6) cultivate respect for oneself and the country; foster self-confidence; 7) be responsible for the dissemination of information; 8) think critically, be independent minded, etc” (Radutny, O.E., 2021). The area of AI development now is not just an engineering discipline; it is rather transdisciplinary. Therefore, not only wide general knowledge, but also proper professional education is important to form the responsible attitude toward the issues concerning the artificial intelligence (Dignum, V., 2020).

The problem of potential human degradation due to the spread of artificial intelligence

Another risk that researchers are paying attention to is the problem of “increasing human stupidity”. According to the Polish philosopher Jacek Dobrowolski, “stupidity is a set of phenomena of anthropogenic nature with manifestations of dysfunction or distortion of understanding” (Dobrowolski, J., 2014).

The paradox is that artificial intelligence should stimulate human mental activity, promote the fulfillment of human abilities. Instead, it provokes mental inactivity in many ordinary people, which leads to the formation of mass stupidity.

“The danger is that if we invest too many resources in the development of artificial intelligence and too little in the development of human consciousness, too sophisticated artificial intelligence computers will only exacerbate people’s natural stupidity” (Harari, Yu., 2018). No matter how much we cultivate the myth of equal opportunities, the society is increasingly stratified and divided into rich and poor. The rich will have the resources and improve their abilities, and the poor will lead a miserable life and blunt more and more, becoming primitive. According to Harari, “the development of artificial intelligence can destroy the economic value and political influence of most people, while the development of biotechnology will turn economic inequality into biological one” (Harari, Yu., 2018).

“Two processes – both bioengineering and the development of artificial intelligence – can lead to the division of people into a small class of superhumans and a massive lower class of unnecessary Homo sapiens. The situation is complicated by the fact that as the masses lose their economic importance and political power, the state loses... incentives to invest in human health, education and well-being” (Harari, Yu., 2018). In this way, a whole layer of degraded people will be formed. A degraded person is supposed to misuses perfect computers, destroying themselves and the world around them.

Conclusions

Summing up, it should be noted that artificial intelligence is a product of post-industrial society. Like many other fields of knowledge, the study of artificial intelligence is an interdisciplinary field that has developed at the intersection of computer science, psychology, physiology, philosophy and linguistics. Ethical aspects of artificial intelligence functioning are the focus of axiological priorities of postmodern science. Ethical issues of artificial intelligence are certainly important, but their importance should not be exaggerated. On the one hand, the fantastic stories that are read are only fantastic creations. As Yu. Harari writes, “the plot of almost all films and novels about artificial intelligence revolves around the magical moment when the computer or the robot becomes conscious” (Harari, Yu., 2018). But consciousness and intelligence are not identical phenomena. Intelligence is the ability to solve problems, and consciousness, in addition to intelligence, also contains an emotional component and the ability to self-reflect.

In addition to the problems of redundancy and responsibility, which have been discussed, society faces another problem of artificial intelligence functioning – the intensification of human stupidity. Society puts a lot of effort into the development of

artificial intelligence and very little into the development of human abilities, as a result people are slowly becoming stupid. And this is an important ethical and social issue.

On the other hand, humanity must decently cope with the challenges it faces. It is unwise to bury one's head in the sand, pretending that everything is fine. The relationship between humans and artificial intelligence is the reality that awaits us in the future. Similar to the biosphere which is formed by the interaction of all organisms on the Earth, the noosphere unites all minds that interact with each other. Human beings' wisdom is to tolerate coexistence with artificial intelligence to protect themselves and the world from inhuman thinking and inhuman actions.

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