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## POPULISTS ON SOCIAL MEDIA A QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF EUROPEAN RIGHT-WING PARTIES, MOVEMENTS AND NEWS SITES ON FACEBOOK

RÉMI ALMODT<sup>1</sup>

**ABSTRACT.** The new media have shaped the public sphere in several ways. Not only online did political discourse and political marketing change in form and content, but also the places and the ways of communication have changed. One channel, that experienced the most drastic and dynamic changes is the online environment. Social networking sites have combined a multitude of functions and offer users an interactive experience, to get access to all kinds of information, including public sphere, political sphere and traditional media. In the context of recent election results and political events in different European countries, this work tries to examine the way social media is used by right-wing populists in order to promote political ideas and values. Therefore, a data set of around 16,000 Facebook posts from Germany, Austria, France and the United Kingdom were analyzed and compared, in order to present. It furthermore examines the form and type of content used, in order to determine, whether right-wing populists in Europe share a similar agenda, similar strategies and a common narrative, when it comes to topics.

**Keywords:** populism, European right-wing parties, right-wing movements, news sites, Facebook

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## **Introduction**

Right-wing populism as a phenomenon is nowadays not only an ideological stream, to be found in Parliaments among parties or deputies. For a long time, right-wing media and alternative news sites are taking to the internet and especially to social media, such as Twitter, YouTube and Facebook. The latter is very popular among parties, news sites and movements. Facebook allows communication on a whole different level, in comparison to a simple web page or a Twitter feed. On Facebook, like-minded people can socialise in anonymous groups, follow pages of their liking and obtain news and information, according to their beliefs. The social network lets people share content, either created on Facebook itself (native content) or allows them to share links with short previews from other webpages on the outside. According to Reuters' Digital News Report, 51% of Germans, 65% of Brits, 63% of Austrians and 61% of French people were active on Facebook in 2017 (Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism 2017), making Facebook the most important platform among other social media. In this work, I will therefore analyse right-wing populist players on social media, by conducting both qualitative and quantitative analysis of their posts and content.

Furthermore, features of modern day online companies, such as Facebook and Google have to be discussed, which will include audiences and preferences but also algorithms and fragmentation of online audiences. In the light of political communication and political marketing, the web and especially social networks provide new means for politicians, parties and activists, in order to promote certain sets of values and points of view. Here I will discuss the public sphere, agenda setting and agenda building, political communication in the online media and the creation of biases through fragmentation. In order to provide a clearer understanding of what populism in the 21 century means, this will also be subject to an examination of theoretical concepts and approaches to the topic. Populism cannot be described as a right-wing nor a left-wing phenomenon and neither as recent, as parties such as Front National have their roots in the late 1970's and the Austrian FPÖ in the 1980's and 1990's.

With right-wing populists, acting on social media, to improve their political marketing, this work tries to determine methods, types and contents. The qualitative character in this analysis will broaden the image, in order to understand and identify right-wing narrative. In order to make comparisons between the different actors that are the subject of this work, it is of importance to also clarify topics and terms used by the actors. Also, the results will then project (even if limited to four countries) a more international, European context on the similarities and differences in form and context of right-wing populist narrative.

## I. Social Media

When talking about communication in the 21st century, the terms of social media and social network sites are impossible to ignore, as a vast number of today's communication happens on such sites and applications. Simon Lindgren (2017) writes that "[p]opular sites that emerged in the 2.0 era are Wikipedia, YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter, and these differ largely from the old web as they are designed to allow for new levels of user interactions, and to fill very different functions altogether", giving a first insight on how social media are connected to the idea of web 2.0, also called the social web. Castells (2011) connects with Web 2.0 and Web 3.0 "[t]he development of horizontal networks of interactive communication that connect local and global". He further mentions his own predictions about "the formation of a multimodal, multichannel system of digital communication that integrates all forms of media" (ibid., 2011).

The important emphasis here remains the root, the so called *web 2.0 era* and its evolution and transition, which makes it important to examine significant differences in social media themselves, as well as the changes of the early stage of the social web, from the early 2000's, compared to today. When examining the beginnings of social media, networks and other online communities, it can be noticed that "most

Web 2.0 platforms started out as indeterminate services for the exchange of communicative or creative content among friends. These services often emanated from community-bound initiatives – a group of college students, photo aficionados, video enthusiasts – who adopted a specific niche of online interaction and developed a mediated routine practice” (van Dijck 2013). Another important characteristic is also given by Taddicken and Schmidt (2017) in their manual for social media, stating that “[s]ocial media also changes the structures of social public: They break the dominance of ‘mass communication’ mode and its institutionalized forms, as they provide other modes, arenas and contexts, which make different communication contents accessible, for a (potentially) larger number of persons” highlighting the shift that social media can provide to users and content generators, often making both one and the same. The individual can address another or the group, be a consumer and a producer at the same time and reach a rather large audience with a comparatively low effort by re-packaging already existing content, that is already accessible in the same community or on the same platform.

Cass R. Sunstein (2018) refers to “the power of personalization, or gated communities, which can diminish individual freedom and endanger self-government itself”, when referring to echo chambers. Furthermore, Sunstein emphasizes that “[t]hese claims raise serious questions about online behaviour and uses of social media, and the astonishing growth in the power to choose-to screen in and screen out” (ibid., 2018). Sunstein highlights that in a functioning democracy, echo chambers or bubbles would not exist, as the flow of different information with opposing view points would not be prevented by such spaces or processes. Williams et al. (2015) see that “[s]uch grouping of like with like on social networks (‘homophily’) is believed to arise from both preferential connections to similar individuals when forming/breaking links and also from peer influence making linked individuals more similar”.

Chan and Fu (2017), when referring to a work published by Sunstein, state that he “lists out three possible reasons to explain why

polarization is caused by cyberbalkanization, namely selective exposure, social comparison, and social corroboration. However, his explanations rest only on online information seekers (readers)". This furthermore, sees the initiation of the process more on the side of the consumer, rather than the provider or the producer.

## II. Political Communication

For Jürgen Habermas (2006), the *political public sphere* stands at the core of political communication and within it, the political system, with its institutions and the outcome, that can be seen in the decision making measures. He continues by stating that "[a]t the periphery of the political system, the public sphere is rooted in networks for wild flows of messages [...] from various types of actors" (ibid., 2006). He furthermore sees such messages "selected and shaped by mass-media professionals and received by broad and overlapping audiences" (ibid., 2006). In his concluding remarks, Habermas furthermore states that "[i]n the context of liberal regimes, the rise of millions of fragmented chat rooms across the world tend instead to lead to the fragmentation of large but politically focused mass audiences into a huge number of isolated issue publics" (ibid., 2006). This will later be discussed, as the idea appeals to the previous paragraph of algorithms and the way, they change and fragment communication. When examining Habermas' theory of the public sphere and the proposed model of communication, Dahlberg (2004) states that "it must be noted that the conception is an idealization, useful for the critical evaluation of the democratic value of everyday informal deliberations, and only able to be approximated in practice". This point reflects the opinion of my theorists, who are critic of Habermas' idealized model of political communication and the public sphere. Nevertheless, Habermas (2006) gives one of the most considered approaches in creating a model of communication, that includes the political sphere, the public sphere and the diffusion and flow of communicative action and information through intermediaries, such as mass-media, lobbies or civil society.

Dahlgren (2005) finds that “[n]ot surprisingly, recent research has shown that online discussions do not always follow the high ideals set for deliberative democracy”, in an early article on political communication that also takes online communication into consideration. He further emphasizes that a lack of rationality and tolerance can be observed, when different viewpoints find confrontation in an online medium, and also highlights the way of communication, stating that “the forms of interaction are not always so civil” (ibid., 2005).

In the light of mass communication, Manuel Castells also introduces the discussion for social movements, stating that these “tend to be fragmented, localistic, single-issue oriented, and ephemeral, either retrenched in their inner worlds, or flaring up for just an instant around a media symbol” (Castells, 2011). He sees such movements or groups gathering around certain similar attributes or what he calls identities in this case, which can also be observed with fragmented audiences online. Furthermore, Castells sees that “mass communication in the traditional sense is now also Internet-based communication in both its production and its delivery” (ibid., 2011). He states that “[n]ewsrooms in the newspaper, television, and radio industries have been transformed by the digitization of news and its relentless global/local processing” (ibid., 2011). Castells highlights the approximation of different media on social platforms as parts of the internet, which combines these media to a new form of mass media.

As for the promotion of political ideas, programmes or public policy, “[t]argeting key voter groups within the election cycle is important if parties are to retain, or gain, office. Similarly, parties also need to maintain and enhance their image and policies outside the election cycle, if they are to succeed in the current political climate” (Baines, Paul R.; Harris, Phil; Lewis Barbara R. 2002). For political communication, social media and social networks such as Facebook and Twitter could therefore be a useful tool for political parties and interest groups. Political marketing can therefore be done through such channels. Furthermore, Baines, Harris and Lewis also found that “[t]his includes amassing and analysing constituency data (from various

sources), determining who are the main sources of competition, identifying and targeting individuals and groups of voters, and then performing a post-mortem to determine where the process could be modified to make it more efficient in future political campaigns” (ibid., 2002). In the light of recent developments, where it gets more and more necessary for actors on social media, to base campaigns on the data of target audiences, these findings highlight the importance of social media and mass communications outside the traditional media for political actors.

### **III. Populism**

At its core, this work aims to examine right-wing populist parties, movements and news sites on social media and it is important to also present and examine different theoretical approaches on the topic, term and the different political streams. Katrin Priester (2008) writes about the term itself that “as a media-reinforced negative attribution, populism means nothing more than demagoguery. Demagogues have been understood since ancient times as peoples’ seducers, who use hounding and agitation to appeal to emotions, fears and prejudices, and are more sensitive to feelings and instincts than reason and political judgment”. Priester highlights here the contrast between feelings and reason, that is often referred to, when discussing populism as a political stream. This goes hand in hand with her reference to the appeal to emotion, which shows another motive in recent discussions over the term and actors that could be counted as populists, being parties, groups or individuals.

Francisco Panizza (2005) writes that “populism is part of the modern political landscape and will remain so in the future”. He states that populism is “a mode of identification available to any political actor operating in a discursive field in which the notion of the sovereignty of the people and its inevitable corollary, the conflict between the powerful and the powerless, are core elements of its

political imaginary” (ibid., 2005). Panizza already highlights characteristics, such as the definitions of a *we* and *them* in populist rhetoric and also emphasizes the discourse itself as an important element of populism or populist political streams themselves. Albertazzi and McDonnell (2007) give a similar definition of the term by stating that populism is “an ideology which pits a virtuous and homogenous people against a set of elites and dangerous ‘others’ who are together depicted as depriving (or attempting to deprive) the sovereign people of their rights, values, prosperity, identity and voice”. Here, not only the competitive component of one entity against another is included but also the focus on rights, values, prosperity, identity and voice, attaching a further socio-political and arguably cultural meaning or requirement to the term. A topic based approach to populism, Gianpietro Mazzoleni (2017) states that “[i]n Europe, The US and in other liberal democracies, there were appearing signs of new directions in domestic politics, new climates of opinion, new clames that had to do with the challenges of globalization, immigration, corruption”. Furthermore, he introduces a focus on issues that today’s populism is working with. He writes that “the controversial issues are devolution, defence of national sovereignty, anti-Islam sentiments, no-euro, and others” (ibid., 2017), drawing an image of a nationalistic, protective populism in Europe and the United States, on the basis of these issues.

On a topic based approach to populism, Gianpietro Mazzoleni (2017) writes that “[i]n Europe, The US and in other liberal democracies, there were appearing signs of new directions in domestic politics, new climates of opinion, new clames that had to do with the challenges of globalization, immigration, corruption”. Furthermore, he introduces a focus on issues that today’s populism is working with. He writes that “the controversial issues are devolution, defence of national sovereignty, anti-Islam sentiments, no-euro, and others” (ibid., 2017), drawing an image of a nationalistic, protective populism in Europe and the United States, on the basis of these issues. Pajnik and Sauer (2017) set this in an even broader context, when it comes to

populism and mass media. It is stated that “[t]he analysis of media positioning and use of 19 European right-wing populist parties and movements has revealed multiple convergences and spillovers in the triangle of mainstream media, online media and right-wing populist political actors”. Through a case study, their work highlights the interdependence of populist actors and media, either traditional or online. They highlight that actors “seem to be particularly succesful in creating and applying multi-directional online-offline spillover effects, most successfully with blogs, web pages and social network profiles or by organizing and staging events” (ibid., 2017). Pajnik and Sauer here also highlight the effect of online channels on offline publicity and furthermore, the interaction between different spheres that his therefore created. This is also explained by the example of UKIP (UK Independence Party), shifting strategies in mass-media communications, by adapting speeches and content, in order to create a friendlier, non-extrememist image of the party. This makes the relationship between contemporary populist actors and their communication modes in mass and mainstream media another major point of analysis and interest, also when it comes to the examination and observation of these actors in social media.

Another important feature of new populist actors around Europe, is the internationalization of nationalists, as their agendas often correlate, and many parallels can be observed, from national sovereignty, over anti-Islam and anti-Refugee stances to sentiments to Euro scepticism. Swyngedouw, Abts and Van Crean (2016) say that for now, “research has focused only on the domestic programme of neo-populist parties and movements. That only limited attention is paid to the international agenda of modern populist movements is remarkable, since their rise is often linked to the consequences of political, cultural and economic internationalization and globalization”. On a Flemish example they further state that “[e]thno-nationalistic populism [...] also finds expression in the international programme of the *Vlaams Blok*” (ibid., 2016). This is only one example for a number of parties from all over Europe, applying similar programmes and concepts.

#### **IV. European right-wing parties, movements and news sites on Facebook**

##### *Objectives and research design*

In this paper I will conduct a qualitative analysis of right-wing populist parties, movements and news sites on social media (in this case Facebook as an example) in Europe. Therefore, this work combines different fields of theory and study. On the one hand, a main topic are the new media, and in this case especially online media. In this regard, a guiding question will be, whether or not a fragmentation of audience is taking place with the influence of right-wing populist ideology. Here also the discussion for echo chambers will be of importance. On the other hand, as the analysis deals with right-wing populist parties, movements and news sites, also a discussion on political communication and populism will be introduced. I will therefore raise the question, how the use of social media and the promotion through such channels reflects itself in the process of political marketing and political communication. A follow-up question will here be, in what ways certain agendas, either on national or international scale are projected in discourse and what biases result through such agendas.

As a part of the analysis will also focus on news sites and alternative media, the question whether or not such media is of importance to the other actors analysed will be raised as well. This will help in order to understand whether or not a mutual support exists between parties, movements and news sites on both a national and international scale. Are actors from different countries supporting themselves through form or content of messages? The last objective of this paper will be to determine, whether or not, right-wing populists have a common agenda and whether or not they are using similar methods, formats and contents. Do they share certain narratives, subjects and motives, which can be grouped to categories? After I determined all these factors, I will then try to draw a conclusion, combining the reviewed literature and theories with the outcome the analysis.

Concluding on the proposed subjects and considerations on process and topic, the research will try to answer the following research questions:

- **RQ1:** What are the frames and biases of right-wing populist narrative and information from news sites?
- **RQ2:** Do right-wing populists from different countries in Europe share a common narrative and agenda?
- **RQ3:** Does the network of right-wing populist parties, movements and news sites result in a mutual support and a common, national and international bias or frame?

## Methods

In order to draw conclusions on the behaviour of right-wing populists on social media and also to establish whether a similarity in form, content and topics exists, I chose to analyse a total of twelve Facebook pages from four different countries in Europe. The full data set consists of 16,110 posts, which were further examined on comments, likes, shares and reactions.

In order to cover all spheres of political and public life, I then decided to include one party, one civil movement and one news site with a right-wing populist character in this work, to be analysed. All actors represent the highest amount of likes on Facebook in their field, which was a further criterion for the choices I made regarding the actors included.

On a large scale, these countries have been chosen according to mediated events, that all had impacts on a European scale. In the cases of Germany, France and Austria, the decisive events were parliamentary or presidential elections. Germany and Austria elected their parliaments on September 24<sup>th</sup>, 2017 (Germany) and on October 15<sup>th</sup>, 2017. France held its presidential elections on the 23<sup>rd</sup> of April and the 7<sup>th</sup> of May, 2017. In all three cases, right-wing populist parties were major

influences to the events, either on a power scale or on a topic scale, as populists also influenced the public discussion about important topics. In France, Marine Le Pen was likely to win the election, in Germany AfD (Alternative für Deutschland - Alternative for Germany) was predicted to score a major result for the German Bundestag and in Austria, right-wing populist party FPÖ is now part of the governing coalition. Another important topic in this time frame is marked by the UK referendum, which was held on June 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2016. In all the mentioned countries, the event was highly mediated, so that also British actors were decided to be part of this work. Movements represented in this work are Pegida (Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes - Patriotic Europeans against the islamisation of Europe) from Germany and the Leave.EU movement from the UK, which was involved in the Vote Leave campaign for the referendum. For France, I chose the Génération Identitaire, as it is one of the most present right-wing movements, not only in France, as it has also branches in Austria and Germany. For Austria, the same movement has been chosen. News sites included in this work are Compact-Magazine from Germany, which is one of the biggest right-wing publications nowadays. In Austria the Wochenblick page was chosen, as it covered most likes among similar sites. In France the news site Fdesouche has been chosen for the same reasons and also Westmonster for the UK.

In order to create the data set for the mentioned timeframe between 2015 and the end of 2017, the Facebook page ID's were introduced in Facepager. This application allows the user to fetch data according to certain preferences. Here, I chose to fetch all posts, comments on posts, number of shares, likes and reactions, as well as the type of post and the message included. The fetched data was then stored as an Excel and further introduced in two other applications to process and visualize the data. 4899 posts from Germany, 3676 posts from Austria, 3491 posts from France and 4044 posts from the United Kingdom were analysed by the previously presented methods.

With Tableau Public, I chose to visualize a ranking of the ten most popular posts per country, according to shares. The last graphic was further worked upon, in order to establish fields of discourse and topics, in order to create an overview of subjects.

KH Coder was then used for further qualitative analysis. The application allows the user to generate tables and infographics, based on word and sentence similarities. On the one hand, a graphic was created for each country, showing the relationship between words used more often. This further sets the words into groups and establishes topic relationships. Then, two more graphics were created for each country, with prepared codes, based on topics which were discussed by each actor. The codes were written manually, according to an overall comparison of all actors and the content obtained. It consists of a list of words, taken from the data, so that fields of topics could be established. The list for each language consists of the same set of words. Here several main fields or categories were established, in order to create these visualisations. One shows a focus on categories by source, the other one shows the categories and the intensity of their appearance on a time scale for each year.

### **Case study: Germany (4899 posts)**

Alternative for Germany (AfD – Alternative für Deutschland) is the youngest party elected to the German Parliament during the general election on September 24th, 2017. Since the founding of the party in 2013, she is now present in several federal Parliaments and obtained 12,6% of votes during the general election. “This right-wing populism is not conservative, even though a lot of its demands sound like they are from the 50’s. On the contrary: It wants, as a response to the challenges of time, another society” (Drobinski 2016), writes German newspaper *Süddeutsche Zeitung* about the party and its political orientation.

The PEGIDA movement (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the West – Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes) was founded in late 2014 in Germany by Lutz Bachmann and other individuals, organizing several protests in the eastern part of the country in cities like Dresden or Leipzig. The movement then spread all over the country and several other branches were founded all over the country. “In Dresden they organized demonstrations against the immigration and asylum policy in Germany and Europe” (Zeit 2015) writes German newspaper *Die Zeit* about Pegida’s topic orientation. Furthermore, the newspaper writes that who wants to find out about Pegida, “ends up at the beginning, in the end: on Facebook. There, the group around Lutz Bachmann, promoted their first demonstrations. There she still does it today” (Schönian 2017).

Popular posts - Germany

<p>AfD(photo): “Bei der Polizei melden sich 80 Menschen, die angeben, Opfer von Straftaten geworden zu sein. 60 Anzeigen wegen Sexualdelikten und Diebstählen liegen vor. „Wir gehen von weiteren Taten aus, die uns noch nicht angezeigt wurden“, sagt Albers. Der Polizeipräsident sprach von Sexualdelikten in sehr massiver Form und einer Vergewaltigung.“ Ist dies das “weltoffene und bunte” Deutschland, was Merkel sich gewünscht hat? Ist es dies was sie meinte, als Sie davon sprach, fremden Kulturen gegenüber Offenheit, Toleranz und Nächstenliebe zu zeigen?</p>	<p>AfD(photo): +++Teilen! Merkel gibt uns den Rest!+++ Ab 2018 dürfen allein 390.000 Syrer ihre Familien nachholen. Geht man von 5 Familienmitgliedern aus, bedeutet das eine zusätzliche Einwanderung von 2 Millionen Personen! Welche immensen Auswirkungen dies auf die I. 11.007 shares</p>	<p>AfD(photo): +++Teilen! Anreize abschaffen: Vorbild für Deutschland?+++ Wer tatsächlich vor Krieg und Vertreibung flüchtet, der benötigt ausschließlich Schutz und eine menschenwürdige Unterkunft - und das soll er, nach Meinung der zukünftigen Regierungskoalition aus</p>	<p>AfD(photo): Nadja N. deckte als Mitarbeiterin der</p>	<p>AfD(video): +++Teilen: Zweites Deutsches Fakefernsehen in Aktion!+++ Gestern bei “Klartext” im ZDF: Kanzlerin Merkel stellt sich den Zuschauerfragen. Hört sich zunächst mutig an, war es aber gar nicht- denn während der Sendung hielt der Moderator versehentlich und</p>
<p>AfD(photo): Wer als Asylbewerber sein Gastrecht verwirkt, weil er andere wegen ihrer Volksgruppe, Religion oder Sexualität attackiert, muss gehen! Eine getrennte Unterbringung der Flüchtlinge nach Ethnien und Religionen, wie von Thüringens Ministerpräsident Ramelow gefordert, ist unsinnig und nicht durchdacht. Wie soll bei getrennter Unterbringung eine Integration möglich sein? Soll die Trennung von anderen Volksgruppen solange dauern, wie diese Menschen hier leben? Denn was ändert sich an dem Konfliktpotential, wenn man das Aufeinandertreffen verschiedener Kulturen zeitlich verzögert? Genau, auch die Auseinandersetzungen würden nur zeitlich verzögert. Typisch Linke Ideologie, fernab jeglicher Realität. Der Staat hat die Pflicht, die Menschen zu schützen. Toleranz kann nicht so weit gehen, dass der Rechtsstaat aufgegeben wird.</p>	<p>AfD(photo): +++Teilen: Das muss Deutschland wissen!+++ Deutschland ist ein Land, in dem vor allem im Bundestag gut und gerne gelebt wird. In der fast 12jährigen Regierungszeit Angela Merkels, also zwischen November 2005 und September 2017, genehmigten sich die Abgeor</p>	<p>AfD(photo): “Einer der Gründe, weswegen muslimische Männer Frauen vergewaltigten oder belästigten, ist, wie sie gekleidet waren. Wenn sie halbnackt und parfümiert herumlaufen, passieren eben</p>	<p>AfD(photo): Weil die</p>	<p>AfD(video): Frau Merkel beim Ablegen Ihres Amtes! Die Gegenüberstellung der Eidesformel mit der Realität offenbart das Versagen der Bundeskanzlerin in ihrem ganzen Ausmaß! Musik: “Low Horizon” von Kai Engel Attribution 4.0</p>

Type

- photo
- video

Figure 1. Most popular posts – Germany



In a raking of the ten most popular posts issued by German Facebook accounts (according to shares), several main categories could be established, when taking the content into consideration. All in all, eight posts featured photos and two posts had a video attached to them. Furthermore, all most popular posts were published by the account of AfD. The most popular topics were on the one hand Asylum and Refugees, as AfD writes that “[u]ncontrolled entry means that criminal cannot be identified” (Alternative für Deutschland 2016). On the other hand, the projection of Angela Merkel as the only responsible person and a representative of the political system and established parties is another main topic. AfD states that “Merkel gives us the rest” (Alternative für Deutschland 2017), implying the government would prefer refugees over German citizens. An establishment critique was the third most favourite category. Furthermore, topics such as the European Union, criminal Immigrants and Islam also appeared throughout the posts.

On a scale of co-occurrences in the discourse of German Facebook pages it can be observed, that AfD holds the biggest part of discourse. On the scale of topics, it can be observed that refugees and asylum seekers but also Islam and Muslims are major topics of discourse. Established parties such as social democrats (SPD) and Christian democrats (CDU) are mentioned repeatedly and also together. Also the focus on party leaders, such as Frauke Petry, former chairwoman of AfD, can be observed, as her name was mentioned repeatedly as well. Other topics can be observed in mentioning Euro and Greece, Turkey and Erodgan, as well as Russia and the USA.

The main topic of the analysis of sources and topics, shows that Europe and the EU were a main focus in the messages and posts of all three German pages, mostly mentioned by AfD. Also the topic of refugees co-occurred with the topic of nation and people. It can also be observed, that messages also combined migration with messages about borders and inner security. Compact-Magazine and PEGIDA had a closer discourse than AfD and the other two pages.

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


Figure 3. Topics in time - Germany




Figure 4. Topics by source - Germany

When observing the development of topics over the three years, it can be observed, that Europe and the EU were the main focus in 2015 and 2016, whereas in 2017 not anymore. Also refugees, nation and people show a similar development, which can also be correlated to the influx of refugees, with a peak in 2015.

### **Case study: Austria (3676 posts)**

The FPÖ (Freedom Party of Austria - Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs) nowadays can be counted among the established parties in Austria and has a comparatively long history, compared to other parties presented in this work. Currently, FPÖ are part of a government coalition as a result of the general election in 2017. The party holds 51 seats in the National Council, being the third strongest represented there. Anton Pelinka (2002) writes that “FPÖ can be described as a populist party for several reasons: since its founding in 1956, it has criticized with varying degrees of intensity the specific characteristics of the representative democracy of the Second Republic, "proportional" or "concordance democracy"; and in principle it did not rely on an anti-democratic, but on a democratic justification”. Famous party leaders can be seen in former chairman Jörg Haider or Heinz-Christian Strache, currently Vice-Chancellor of Austria.

The Identitarian Movement Austria (Identitäre Bewegung Österreich) represents a rather new phenomenon among right-wing movements, in appearance and methods of marketing as well. Roland Sieber (2016) writes about the Identitarian Movement that “[t]he modern appearing viral marketing strategy has been copied by Austrian and German right wingers from the action-oriented French ‘Génération Identitaire’ and the Italian fascists of ‘Casa Pound’, which among other things occupy buildings, establish right ‘cultural centers’ and ‘flash mob’ against austerity”. The movement is one of the most active actors on several platforms and social networking sites, including Twitter, Facebook and YouTube. The Austrian head of the movement can be seen in Martin Sellner, who is also the face of most events and one of the most present actors among identitarians, leading actions and events in all over Europe and not only in Austria. The Identitarian Movement can be seen as a rather international one, as it also consists of branches in Germany, France and other countries, who are working hand in hand.

The Austrian newspaper *Wochenblick* is a rather young product, as it was founded in 2016. On their webpage, viewers can find usual pieces of news, mixed up with headlines about identity, criticism about the European Union and Islam, as well as articles on violent refugees. Hasnain Kazim writes for *Der Spiegel* that “[a]lso weekly newspapers and news sites such as the Upper Austrian ‘Wochenblick’ (main topic: ‘Home-Affairs’) and their website *Wochenblick.at* (‘Fortunately, there is not only multi-cultural Merkel in Europe: Orbán, Zeman, Sulik and Klaus – is the sun rising politically in the east?’) [...] are taken seriously by many readers and spectators” (Kazim 2016).

Popular posts - Austria




Figure 5. Most popular posts - Austria

The most popular categories (according to shares) of these postings were on the one hand refugees and asylum. Identitarians here “urge all Austrians who are dissatisfied with this asylum policy to join us” (Identitäre Bewegung 2015). Another main category of Austrian populist discourse was the focus on the president Alexander Van der



discussion for established parties and the system in general. Also the name of Alexander Van der Bellen reappears in this table, which could be seen as a personification of established politics as well. Same as in Germany, FPÖ chairman Strache’s name appears to be mentioned multiple times as well.




Figure 7. Topics in time - Austria




Figure 8. Topics by source - Austria

On a scale of topics appearing in Austrian posts, it can be noticed that the subjects of Europe and European Union stand in the focus of discourse. This is further combined with the field of border and protection. In both cases, Identitäre Bewegung is the actor, who mostly referred to these topics. Overall, most of the established categories were discussed by identitarians.

On a time scale it can be noticed that topics such as border and protection or Europe and the European Union were much more in the focus of discourse in 2015 and became less discussed or mentioned in 2016 and 2017. A similar development can be noticed for the categories about refugees and nation and people. On the other hand, Europe and the EU shows another small increase between 2016 and 2017.

### **Case study: France (3491 posts)**

The Front National has one of the longest histories among the parties presented in this work. Its roots reach back to the 1970's, founded under its old leader Jean-Marie Le Pen, until he resigned in 2011. Since then, his daughter Marine Le Pen is the face and leader of the Party. Aurelien Mondon writes that "[i]n fact, after decades of doctrinal readjustments and ideological reframing, it appeared the Le Pens had succeeded in moving their party closer to being a mainstream contender" (Mondon 2014), highlighting on the one hand the party's long history but also the many changes in appearance and structure inside and outside the party itself. Mondon further states that "the 2012 French presidential elections appeared as a reliable gauge for the distance covered by populist and neo-racist ideas in the mainstreaming of extreme-right politics in France" (ibid., 2014), highlighting a more recent upswing for the party's ideals. Jens Rydgren further states that "[t]he Front National shares an emphasis on ethnonationalism with other radical right-wing populist (RRP) parties which is rooted in myths about the distant past and its programme advocates strengthening the nation by making it more ethnically homogeneous and returning to traditional values" (Rydgren 2008), showing a more topic based approach on presenting the party.

Les Identitaires (The Identitarians) are the original movement, out of which several branches came out to existence in other countries, such as Austria and Germany. Cahuzac and Stéphane (2013) write that “[t]he expression ‘identitarian’ is a generic term referring to a current of the French far-right, which appeared in April 2003, through the creation of the identitarian Bloc-European Social Movement on the ashes of Radical Unit, but whose ideas had existed since the late 80s”, showing the ambivalence between old ideas and a rather new and seemingly young movement, adopting subcultural styles and methods of protest, formerly known from left-wing movements. Furthermore, they write that “[f]or the identitarians, it is a question of safeguarding them against the danger that extra-European immigration (xenophobia) and miscegenation (mixophobia) would weigh on its durability” (ibid., 2013), showing one of the major motives in identitarian rhetoric, either in form of multimedia or being in speeches on one of their events across all over Europe.

Popular posts - France

Fdesouche(video): Vidéo exclusive de la fusillade au Bataclan 164.986 shares	Fdesouche(video): Intervention de Marine Le Pen suite aux attentats - 14/11/15 46.596 shares	Fdesouche(video): Tranche d'insécurité routière à Calais 45.920 shares	Fdesouche(photo): 224.963 shares
Fdesouche(video): Vincent Moscato sur l'hypocrisie concernant les migrants 69.865 shares	Fdesouche(video): Evacuation du Stade de France : le public chante la Marseillaise 43.435 shares	Fdesouche(video): Ils fêtent la victoire de Macron à Hayange : "on va continuer à gratter la France" 39.547 shares	
Fdesouche(video): Allemagne : il donne de la nourriture aux migrants, ils lui volent son sac (vidéo) 46.627 shares	Fdesouche(video): Les controles à la frontière rétablis ? Test à Menton 37.801 shares	Front National(photo): Il faut redresser l'école et non rabaisser la langue ! Le Front National dit NON à la "réforme" de l'orthographe. 78.475 shares	

Type
<span style="color: blue;">■</span> photo
<span style="color: orange;">■</span> video

Figure 9. Most popular posts - France

Fdesouche represents itself as a news site of national and international character. Accessing the publications web page, viewers will find articles on violent refugees and Muslims, defaming Islam, the European Union and, what the page sees as EU representatives, such as Angela Merkel, Jean-Claude Juncker or Emmanuel Macron. Founder of the site is Pierre Sautarel, a former activist for the traditional Front National and in recent reports, often referred to as a cyber-activist for right-wing, identitarian ideology. French newspaper *Le Monde* writes that “[t]he French fashosphere has become a good school, to the image of Pierre Sautarel, main animator of the far-right site FdeSouche, former poster collector and traditional activist who launched a line of clothes ‘Pepe the Frog’ in order to seduce this new, young electorate and infatuated with mocking” (Audureau 2017).

The most popular posts from French populist Facebook pages (according to shares) also focus on the use of video and photo material. In a ranking of ten, eight videos were used and two photos were attached to postings. In this ranking, the most popular page is Fdesouche, followed by Front National. When comparing categories, it can be noticed, that French pages had their most popular posts on the topic of immigration, asylum and refugees. Fdesouche for example shared photo videos of stealing immigrants or refugees, walking on a highway, hindering traffic and being kept aside by truck drivers. Furthermore, a second main topic can be seen in content on terrorism. Fdesouche again shares speeches by Marine Le Pen on the Paris attacks and also amateur footage from the shooting. All in all, it can also be noticed that this page shares such footage on a regular basis. Other topics in this ranking are *borders and controls, violent Islam* and also *policies*.

When analysing the co-occurrences in discourse and messages, several main fields can be noticed in the focus. On the one hand, the mentioning of Marine Le Pen, chairwoman of Front National, is one of such topics. She seems to be projected as the central figure of affairs. Also, another main topic can be seen in Europe and the European Union. This is also connected to national affairs, which could be identified as a third main topic of French populist discourse. In this field, words like nation, liberty and defence co-occur.

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


Figure 10. Co-occurrence - France

When observing topics discussed in relation to the sources, it can be observed, that also here, the most common topics are Europe and the EU and also nation and people. Both topics are further linked in discourse, as they appear together. Another strong field of messages for Front National can be seen in established media and politics and for the French Identitarians, topics such as migration, and Islam seem to be of higher importance. Fdesocuhe mainly focusses on the field of migration. All in all, it has to be noted that French populists often speak if immigrants and migration, also when referring to refugees and asylum seekers.



Figure 11. Topics in time - France




Figure 12. Topics by source - France

Comparing topics on a time scale during all three years of analysis, it can be seen that established media and politics experienced a steady increase over the years. A similar trend can also be observed for the category of Europe and the European Union and the field of nation and people. Migration on the other hand experiences a decrease from 2015 to 2016 and stagnates in 2017. This can be seen in the peak of the refugee crisis in 2015. Furthermore, the field of migration is also connected to the topic of nation and people, as well as to Europe throughout the French messages. Also other topics such as Islam and Terror, who are also interconnected in the analysed discourse experience an increasing focus over the years.

### **Case study: United Kingdom (4044 posts)**

The United Kingdom Independence Party was officially founded in 1993 but had its rise in the late 90's and early 2000's, under its most prominent figure Nigel Farage, who officially became UKIP's leader in 2006. In 2016, Farage announced his resignation as the party's leader. "UKIP's main policy stance is of course withdrawal from the European Union, but one of the party's five manifesto pledges is 'Freedom from overcrowding', arguing that immigration was clogging up roads, railways, doctors' surgeries and hospitals, and even the countryside" (Margretts, John and Weir 2004). A main success celebrated by the party was the 2016 referendum, when a majority of votes voted for the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union. Currently UKIP holds several seats in the European Parliament (17), three seats in the House of Lords, five in the National Assembly for Wales and two seats in the London Assembly.

The Leave.EU campaign was founded in the wake of the UK Brexit referendum, which took place in 2016. The campaign got active already in 2015 and was a main force in rallying for the UK's leave,

next to other parties and politicians. Virdee and McGeever write that “many of the key leaders of L.EU articulated a narrative of British nationalism that was more insular and Powellite in tone (i.e. Britain for the British). At the centre of this perspective were concerns around immigration” (Virdee and McGeever 2017). *The Guardian* writes that “Leave.EU would release starker, more right-wing messages designed to appeal to Ukip voters and ensure that staunch Leavers cast their vote. Immigration was their key battleground” (Savage 2018), showing similarities in topics and policy preferences to the ones of UKIP.

The Westmonster news site is a rather young news outlet, founded by UKIP supporter and multimillionaire Arron Banks. The site features articles about criminal immigrants, Muslims and refugees, opposing viewpoints on European Union policies and takes on key politicians of the European Union, such as Angela Merkel for example. British newspaper *The Independent* writes that “Westmonster, co-owned by Michael Heaver, former press adviser to Nigel Farage, launched on Wednesday night with a welcome message stating the establishment had “taken one hell of a beating” in 2016 and encouraging viewers to “stick around” (Bulman 2017). *The Guardian* further states that “[t]he site intends to harness the social media following built up by Banks’ Leave.EU campaign to rapidly build a large audience. The Leave.EU Facebook page has 800,000 likes and its Twitter account more than 115,000 followers. Heaver said both would begin sharing content primarily from Westmonster rather than established news outlets” (Jackson 2017). This further shows the close ties between all three accounts chosen from the populist right-wing spectrum in the United Kingdom.

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Popular posts - UK

<p>Leave.EU(video): WATCH: A brilliant, short animated movie that explains why you should vote Leave on 23 June! A must watch. Credit to Piffle TV for the video <a href="https://t.co/37ZYacSla">https://t.co/37ZYacSla</a> 275.813 shares</p>	<p>Leave.EU(video): WATCH: Anne Tvinneireim, Deputy Leader of the Norwegian Centre Party, recalls the scaremongering that was heard before her country's last referendum on EU membership. Sound familiar? "They said we would lose 100,000 jobs. They said the biggest businesses would leave Norway and there would be no more investment. They said the interest rates would increase</p>	<p>Leave.EU(video): WATCH   Former SAS serviceman, Phil Campion talking sense once again. When will our politicians listen? "These people killed last night, they probably sat there last week thinking to themselves, 'How terrible that was in Manchester' and now it's happened to them, and nothing has been done in the mean time!" "If</p>	<p>UK</p>
<p>Leave.EU(video): WATCH   Former SAS serviceman Phil Campion's passionate message in the aftermath of the Manchester terror attack. "They're actively targeting and killing our children. We now have to act and do something quickly. "All these people who have shown intent, no matter how big or how small - whether it be a photograph waving a black flag or turning up to a demo, if you've got stuff on your phone or your IP addresses are reeking of this ideological rubbish, you need to be dealt with straight away. That means you go back to wherever you came from or alternatively you're locked up. "Now is the time to do something about it. They've taken it up to the next level."</p>	<p>Leave.EU(video): WATCH: Lies told to Norway before it rejected EU membership in 1994. Don't listen to project fear. Let's make June 23rd our Independence Day! 53.112 shares</p>	<p>Leave.EU(video): Worrying scenes in Europe neglected by the British Media. Vote LEAVE for a safer future. 45.005 shares</p>	
	<p>Leave.EU(video): WATCH: Former Chancellor of the Exchequer, Lord Lawson, shoots down Brexit scaremongering from the Director of the EU funded CBI. (She wasn't happy) 52.106 shares</p>	<p>Leave.EU(video): WATCH   Welcome to Europe in 2017. What a mess our clueless political elite have made of the place. 34.728 shares</p>	

Figure 13. Most popular posts - UK

Type

- photo
- video

In the overall ranking of the most popular posts of British pages (according to shares), it can be noticed that in the top ten posts, eight were issued by Leave.EU and another two were published by UKIP. British accounts here used mostly video material and photos. A total of eight videos and two photos were published here. Most posts in this ranking belong to the Leave.EU campaign page and another two to the UKIP page. When observing categories in the posts, it can be noticed, that the most common topics were on the one hand the EU referendum, on whether the UK should remain in the EU or not and on the other hand the EU as an opposed, established system. Two of the videos shared by Leave.EU feature a Norwegian politician, trying to explain methods used by the EU and the Vote Yes campaign, in order to deceive British people. Further topics in this ranking are violent immigrants, also projected by amateur footage and also terrorism. Terrorism is here

referred to right after an attack in Manchester on May 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2017. Also posts on policies and border protection in connection to the British nation are among the most popular messages. When analysing co-occurrences in the discourse of posts, it can be observed that also here several fields and topics can be established. On the one hand the connection of Nigel Farage, as chairman and popular face to his party, UKIP. The field around UKIP further expands to terms such as border and control but also immigration. Furthermore, another field is Europe and the EU, where also words such as leave and referendum co-occur. Also migrant and crisis appear as a connection, and also the BBC and question, which could be seen in the field of criticism on mainstream media.




Figure 14. Co-occurrence - UK

When observing the analysis of sources connected to topics, it can be observed that the most common subjects were on the one hand Europe and the EU and on the other hand the field of nation and people. For all three pages, these two fields were the most common objects of discourse. Also, it can be noticed that the messages of both categories show connections. The third largest category appearing throughout the posts are borders and protection. For Westminster, also terror and migration play an important role in messages. Observing the topics in comparison with the chosen time frame, it can be noticed that the field of Europe and EU received more attention in 2015 and lost popularity in the following years. Nation and people experienced an increase in focus from 2015 to 2016 but also lost attention in 2017. A similar trend can be observed for the field of borders and protection. A field that got increased attention is the topic of terror, which experienced an upward trend from 2015 until 2017. Especially in the last period, the focus on terror increased significantly in comparison to the previous years.





Figure 15. Topics in time - UK



**Figure 16.** Topics by source – UK

## Findings

On the level of concrete content and narrative, the analysis has shown, that the established categories matched the content of different pages, not just on a national but also on an international scale. Most pages issued content about Islam, immigration and Muslims, which was also connected to the fields of terrorism, borders and protection. Furthermore, the category of Europe and the European Union has shown to be a major topic for all pages. In a more detailed analysis of posts, it could also be noticed, that this category is also interconnected with a critique of establishment politics and the personification of certain national personalities, such as Angela Merkel, David Cameron, Emmanuelle Macron or Alexander Van der Bellen. The personality cult is also used by populists, in order to create faces for their parties. Frauke Petry, Heinz-Christian Strache, Marine Le Pen and Nigel Farage have all been found to be part of the narrative in all countries, when analysing co-occurrences throughout the postings.

## V. Conclusions

In the first place, it can be noticed, that populists on social media, have a good understanding of narratives and types of content, that appeal to their kind of audiences. In many cases, the results showed that the chosen pages included native content inside their postings, using mostly audio-visual material, in combination with text. In the cases of Austria, France and the United Kingdom, the majority of posts in the top ten ranking had video material attached. Only in the case of Germany, where the most popular posts were all issued by AfD, photo material was favoured.

Having a closer look on common topics, the analysis focused on two major aspects. On the one hand to determine subject fields or categories of right-wing populist discourse, by grouping key words and phrases, which were later grouped to fields. On the other hand, the top ranking showed, what form of post and what type of content could be identified as the most successful. All pages showed a strong interest in the topic of Europe and the European Union. Clear content analysis shows that especially the European Union serves populists as a sort of enemy image, which is used for two major motives. On the one hand, an institutionalized personification of a possible enemy, which can be served to an audience. On the other hand, by the use of EU representatives, populists also have a national character or political actor to blame. This could be observed in the co-occurrences for example, as David Cameron, Emmanuelle Macron, Angela Merkel and Alexander Van der Bellen appeared in the messages several times. But this personality cult also works differently for populists, in order to promote the image of their parties. In all cases, several party key figures also appeared in the visualized data. Nigel Farage in the UK, Marine Le Pen in France, Heinz-Christian Strache in Austria and Frauke Petry in Germany. All parties could be observed to focus on their key actors, while promoting different political messages. Vice versa, this serves the parties, to brand themselves and give themselves a face. In most cases, this face is the chairman or chairwoman. Next to Europe, the EU and

certain focusses on personalities, also the topic of nation and people could be observed in a multitude of messages. In all cases, posts could be determined, in which a context was established, that showed the specific connection of the topic to the discourse and contents. Nation and people were mostly referred to as in the need of protection, either by stricter policy or by guarding the borders. A common narrative here was the critique of the open borders attitude of some European countries. Furthermore, the category of nation and people was also connected to the field of identity. Especially in the narrative of Identitarians, either from France or from Austria, it could be observed that for them, nation and people go hand in hand with culture and values. Identitäre Bewegung Austria speaks in this case about “the value of their homeland, freedom and tradition” (Identitäre Bewegung 2016). Another key finding shows the connection between immigrants and Islam in the discourse of populists. Even though both topics do not necessarily share similarities, populists mix them up in their narrative and create new images of migrants, who, in their views, are most likely to be dangerous, different and most importantly, Muslims. As also suggested in the theoretical chapter of this work, a key element of populist actors is the demarcation from establishment. As already mentioned, several figures for established parties could be observed in the analysis. A second part of this opposition focusses on mainstream media. Pegida for example states in this regard “that the rulers and the lying press have managed to brand it negative if you are campaigning for those who are not as well” (PEGIDA 2016). Especially for Germany, the term *Lügenpresse* (lying press) is very common among the here presented actors and in right-wing populist narrative as well.

For the news sites, another trend can be observed. Populists do not have to rely on traditional media outlets anymore, if they want to spread information. Parties can either rely on their own channels or on seemingly exterior channels, such as the news sites, that were also part of this work. Examples were also given for connections between parties, politicians and these news sites, with the most transparent case in the UK, where UKIP was heavily involved in the Leave.EU campaign and

UKIP affiliates were also in charge of Westminster. Also Fdesouche shows a similar approach, as its founder was a former Front National activist. Similar examples can also be observed in Germany, where Compact is promoting AfD and also in Austria, where FPÖ has built a vast communications network, also including biased news platforms such as FPÖ-TV or the platform unzensuriert.at (uncensored.at).

In this regard, Web 2.0 and Web 3.0 definitely show the possibility of a fragmented audience, as populists are working and are also succeeding in creating such presented echo-chambers of one-sided, biased information for their political views and values. This is not only exemplified by the news sites but can also be observed in the narratives and co-occurrences that are the subject of this work.

Next to the conclusion, this work also presents several limitations. On the one hand, a larger conclusion on right-wing populism could have been drawn, if more actors from other countries would have been included. Hungary's Fidesz party of Viktor Orbán, Poland's Law and Justice Party or the Dutch Party for Freedom of Geert Wilders could have provided data for such a broader and more accurate conclusion. Also a longer time frame, resulting in more data could have provided a more accurate image of types, contents and narratives. Furthermore, it could have provided a better view on the development of discussed topics and the change of focus on different subjects.

The advantages of this research show themselves in the possibility to compare the strategies and methods of right-wing populists on a European scale, rather than a national scale. In my work, it has been mentioned, that the European right-wing populists met up and chose to work together. In order to learn about this cooperation, this research provides data and results on a common agenda of such actors. Furthermore, it shows how populist narrative works on the basis of events and connected topic categories. It shows how subjects are combined, in order to create certain biases and frames. A further advantage presents itself on the findings about cooperation among populists on a national and international scale. This work thus provides an insight on how populist networks work in an online sphere and how

mutual support looks like, among pages. This serves, to understand the mentioned fragmentation and creation of echo chambers in online media, also on the basis of the presented literature.

Further research on the basis of this work could be inspired by some limitations presented previously. The data set could be broadened and increased with further data from other countries and other pages, in order to also broaden the context and the conclusions. Furthermore, a quantitative and qualitative analysis in the form of another case study with the focus on different social networking platforms, such as Twitter or YouTube could give further insights on narratives, similarities and differences among European right-wing populists. The already existing part of the research could also be extended on the qualitative part, by manually analyzing a larger number of posts, as presented here in a top ten ranking per country. This could be broadened to up to 50 posts, in order to increase the quality of findings throughout the analysis.

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## FIVE TRENDS TO WATCH IN JOURNALISM<sup>1</sup>

LINDA L. AUSTIN<sup>2</sup>

**ABSTRACT.** So much is changing in journalism and media, where should you focus your attention to be prepared for the next big thing? Through statistics and cases studies, this keynote speech suggests watching these five trends: mobile, messaging apps, voice, artificial intelligence and audiences. It offers a key takeaway for each trend. Discover the implications for users and publishers as audiences consume more news via mobile devices, messaging apps and smart speakers. Identify the opportunities and pitfalls of the increased use of artificial intelligence in the creation of news stories and the increased reliance on audiences to finance newsgathering.

**Keywords:** journalism, trends, mobile, messaging apps, voice, artificial intelligence, audiences, future, news delivery, revenue, smart speakers, aggregation, chat apps, robo-journalism, computer vision, personalization

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<sup>1</sup> A keynote speech delivered at Media Culture Days at the College of Political, Administrative and Communication Sciences, Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania, on May 17, 2019. Funded by the Fulbright Specialist Program of the United States State Department.

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Thank you for the opportunity today to discuss with you five trends to watch in journalism. For each, I'm going to offer the statistics for why it's a trend and then a case study of a media outlet that's used that trend to its benefit and a takeaway for you.

So, what's in this for you? Can anyone identify the people in this photo?

## What's in this for you?

"The harder you work and  
the **better prepared** you  
are, the more luck you  
might have."

– **Ed Bradley**,  
U.S. journalist



*Photo credit: National Archives via pingnews*

Many of you will recognize former U.S. President Jimmy Carter on the left. The man on the right is Ed Bradley, who was the first black TV correspondent to cover the White House. As Bradley said, "The harder you work and the better prepared you are, the more luck you might have." My goal here is help you be better prepared for what's coming in journalism and therefore luckier.

### **Trend No. 1: Mobile.**

How many of you have a smartphone? How often do you check your phone? How many, at least once an hour? How many, every half hour? How many, every quarter hour?

In the United Kingdom and the United States, research indicates people check every 12 minutes. (Asurion, 2018)

Have you ever accessed news on your mobile phone? How often do you access news on your mobile phone? Once a day? More often?

Use of mobile for news has doubled in the last six years in most of the 36 countries that the Reuters Institute surveys. Now, 62 percent have used mobile to access news in the last week, compared with 64 percent who used a computer. (Newman, Fletcher, Kalogeropoulos, Levy, & Nielsen, 2018)

In Romania, two-thirds are now consuming news on smartphones, a 10 percentage-point increase from last year. More are using computers at 71%. In the U.S., news consumption on mobile is now higher on the phone at 56 percent than on the computer at 54 percent. (Newman, Fletcher, Kalogeropoulos, Levy, & Nielsen, 2018)

### **Case study: Quartz or qz.com**

How many of you are familiar with the Quartz app, or Qz.com?

Quartz is a business-news outlet directed at younger businesspeople globally. It focused on mobile delivery from its start in 2012. It did not even have a desktop website at launch. It started with a staff of 20. Last year, Atlantic Media sold it to Uzabase, a Japanese company, for \$75 to \$110 million. Its staff has since grown to 215, and it has an audience of 20 million, half of whom come from outside the U.S., with editions in India and Africa. (Heath, 2018)

What's in this for you? Do any of you have a newspaper with you? If so, take a single sheet, fold in half, and that takes it down to tabloid size. Fold it in half again, and that takes it to tablet size. Fold it in half again, and it reduces it to the size of a smartphone screen. Notice how little real estate that leaves you for storytelling.

LINDA L. AUSTIN


What is this a photo of?



*Photo credit: Joyce Pedersen under CC BY-NC 2.0*

Yes, it's the Sistine Chapel in the Vatican. It is the equivalent of the broadsheet newspaper.

What is this a photo of?



*Photo credit: Greg Younger under CC BY-SA 2.0*

Yes, a lovely Romanian Easter egg. It is the equivalent of the smartphone screen.

Please look on your phone at a website you follow for news. How many of you are looking at a solid wall of text?

What could you add to break up the text? Here are possibilities:

- Bullet points
- Bolded words
- Lists, such as “What we know/what we don’t know” about a breaking-news event
- A map

- Audio clips
- Annotation
- Embedded social media posts
- Chart or infographic
- Photos or video

**Key takeaway for you for Trend No. 1 – Mobile:** Mobile requires a different presentation for scanners in a hurry. Think Easter egg instead of the Sistine Chapel ceiling.

### **Trend No 2: Messaging apps.**

How many of you use a messaging app? Which messaging app do you use? WhatsApp? Facebook Messenger? Viber? How many of you consume news on that messaging app?

What would you say are the four top messaging apps globally in terms of users? They are WeChat, Viber, WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger.


And what would you say are the four top social networks globally? They are Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn and Instagram. As of 2015, the combined user base of the top four messaging apps surpassed that of the combined user base of the top four social networking sites. The combined total monthly active users of the top four messaging apps topped 4.1 billion in 2018. (Smith, 2018) That means more than half of the Earth's 7.7 billion people are on messaging apps.

Even Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg gets it. A recent article in The Washington Post suggests that Zuckerberg plans to go all in on the faster-growing messaging apps his company owns – WhatsApp and Messenger – to counter declining user numbers for Facebook in the United States. (Dwoskin, 2019)

How many of you use WhatsApp? How many of you use Facebook Messenger?

Well, the most popular app in Romania is WhatsApp, and in the U.S., it's Messenger. (Bobrov, 2019)

How many of you use WhatsApp to get news?



(Barot & Oren, 2015)

The proportion of people in the Reuters Institute's global sample who use Facebook for news has been falling since 2016, and is now at 36%. But the proportion using WhatsApp for news has doubled to 14% in four years. (Newman, Fletcher, Kalogeropoulos, Levy, & Nielsen, 2018)

## Case study: Bloomberg | Quint

Our case study for messaging apps comes from India. Bloomberg | Quint is India's first WhatsApp news service, which launched in November 2017. It is a partnership between the U.S. business-news service, Bloomberg, and India's Quintillion Media. It has a level of personalization with stock market watchlists.

It has grown to more than 400,000 subscribers and gets around 5 million page views a month.

It has generated ad revenue through logo placements and native advertising. Who can tell me what native advertising is? It is content that resembles the online publication's editorial content but is paid for by an advertiser and intended to promote the advertiser's product.

Bloomberg | Quint has also used it as a tool to drive subscriptions to a new premium product called BQ Blue, which costs about 9 Euros a month. Eighty percent of the subscribers to that product are coming from WhatsApp. (Gupta, 2019)

**Key takeaway for Trend No. 2 - Messaging apps:** Messaging apps provide too big an audience to ignore. According to Ankit Dhadha, Bloomberg | Quint's head of marketing and digital product, providing news on WhatsApp:

"has helped create a completely new and relatively unexplored avenue for traffic and revenue generation for publishers. Moreover, it also helps drive considerable loyalty among users, without the challenge of having to compete with multiple publishers, such as on search engines and social media." (Dhadha, 2019)

Please note: a change in WhatsApp policy in June 2019 could adversely affect publishers' efforts to deliver news on WhatsApp: "In an effort to crack down on 'automated or bulk messaging, or non-personal use' on the platform, WhatsApp will no longer allow publishers to send out newsletters through the app as of December 7, 2019," NiemanLab reports. (Owen, 2019)

### **Trend No. 3: Voice.**

How many of you have a smart speaker in your home? Amazon Echo? Google Home? Can you describe how you use it? A smart speaker is a digital assistant, powered by cloud-based software, that understands voice commands and can complete tasks and fetch information for you. How many of you are on a first-name basis with Alexa or Siri or Google on your phones? It's the same concept but with a different device.

In 2017, only 7 percent of Americans owned smart speakers. As of January 2019, 21 percent, or 53 million U.S. adults owned smart speakers. In 2018, there were 14 million new smart-speaker owners in the U.S. (Edison Research, 2019)

“Usage in the UK (10%) and Germany (5%) is a little lower but has roughly doubled in the last year,” according to the Reuters Institute. (Newman, *The Future of Voice and the Implications for News*, 2018)


Amazon was the first to develop smart speakers, offering them in November 2014. (Newman, *Journalism, Media and Technology Trends and Predictions 2019*, 2019) Voice interfaces have been adopted faster than nearly any other technology in history, according to Recode.net. (Molla, 2018) And the Business Review in Romania projects that by the end of this year, 250 million smart speakers will be in use globally, turning smart speakers into a \$7 billion industry. (Dragan, 2019)

In the United Kingdom, the no. 1 use of smart speakers — at 84 percent — is for music; 46% percent use it for news, but for only 1 percent of users is news the most valued use. (Newman, *The Future of Voice and the Implications for News*, 2018)

Seventy-eight percent of publishers polled in a Reuters Institute study predicted that voice will change how media is accessed over the next few years. (Newman, *Journalism, Media and Technology Trends and Predictions 2019*, 2019)

# What are they used for?

Top/most valued features on smart speakers (UK)



Q. Which, if any, of the following features do you use/is most important on your speaker? Base: UK All that own a smart speaker & are aware of its features = 185.

<https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/our-research/future-voice-and-implications-news>



(Newman, *The Future of Voice and the Implications for News*, 2018)

## Case study: NPR

NPR, or National Public Radio, already shares the top spot in the U.S. with CNN for delivery of news on smart speakers because few people change the defaults on Amazon or Google. (Simon, 2018) By last year, 16 percent of the live streaming that NPR was experiencing was coming through smart speakers versus mobile devices. (Macholan, 2018)

But the true potential for NPR to exploit smart speakers goes back to an app it launched in 2014 called NPR One that tracks which stories you like and recommends similar stories. And now, NPR just announced the ability to provide an NPR One-like feed personalized for you to Amazon's Alexa. (Benton, *Asking Alexa for news no longer has to stop with the latest headlines*, 2019)

The Reuters Institute projects that over the next few years, voice will become increasingly embedded in every part of our lives. We can see that already with the introduction of smart speakers with screens, and cars that talk to us, and Amazon is even offering a microwave that has Alexa built into it. (Newman, *The Future of Voice and the Implications for News*, 2018)

**Key takeaway from Trend No. 3 – Voice:** Voice will grow. And global ad spending on voice assistants – currently nonexistent – is projected to reach \$19 billion by 2022, nearly the size of the current magazine-ad business, according to Juniper Research. (Juniper Research, 2017)

Will news get a share of that ad market? As media futurist Amy Webb says:

“News execs are discounting the importance of voice or giving away their content for free.... They aren’t modeling out how our information consumption habits will evolve once we’re all talking to the various machines in our lives.” (Webb, *AI Is Journalism’s Next Big Threat (or Opportunity)*, 2017)

#### **Trend No. 4: Artificial Intelligence.**

Smart speakers provide an easy transition to our fourth trend: artificial intelligence, or AI. Google Home, Alexa, and Siri are just portals for AI, Webb says. What’s in it for you? Well, of course, the fear for journalists is that AI will put them out of work. This video shows a news anchor that was created using artificial intelligence to simulate a real anchor on Chinese TV. (Xinhua's first English AI anchor makes debut, 2018)

How do you define artificial intelligence? It has two key elements, according to a free online course from a Finnish university: (University of Helsinki, 2018)

1. **Autonomy:** The ability to perform tasks without constant guidance by a user.

2. **Adaptivity:** The ability to improve performance by learning from experience, which for computers means being fed more and more data.

That is what Spotify does for you with music, learning from your choices.

Artificial intelligence has at least three current uses in journalism:

1. The AI-powered news anchor is an example of robo-journalism.
2. NPR One demonstrates the personalization of content for audiences. Several Chinese news apps are leading the world in their use of AI to deliver personalized news from a range of providers. Toutiao has 120 million users who are spending more than an hour a day with it. However, the Chinese government suspended Toutiao in April 2018 for carrying obscene and false information. Popularity-based algorithms were encouraging clickbait and other sensational material on it. (Newman, *Journalism, Media and Technology Trends and Predictions 2019*, 2019)
3. “Computer vision” can help editors quickly classify and organize huge amounts of images and video, speeding up editing and helping journalists to source evidence for investigations.

For example, The Associated Press used satellite imagery from a company called DigitalGlobe to secure photos of a particular ship to document slavery in the seafood industry; its reporting won the Pulitzer Prize for Public Service in 2016. (Marconi, 2017)

Artificial intelligence can also be applied to vast quantities of data, not just images, to help journalists “in situations where they know what information they are looking for in large amounts of documents but finding it would take too long or would be too hard,” writes Marina Walker Guevara, who studied expanding the use of AI in reporting as a 2019 John S. Knight Journalism Fellow.

“Take the examples of BuzzFeed News’ 2017 spy planes investigation in which a machine learning algorithm was deployed on flight-tracking data to identify surveillance aircraft (here the computer had been taught the turning rates, speed and altitude patterns of spy planes), or the Atlanta Journal Constitution probe on doctors’ sexual harassment, in which a computer algorithm helped identify cases of sexual abuse in more than 100,000 disciplinary documents.” (Guevara, 2019)

### **Case study: The Associated Press (AP)**

Our case study for AI comes from The Associated Press, or AP. In 2014, AP began automating the writing of stories on corporate earnings. In 2016, it added automation of stories on minor league baseball games.

By 2018, AP was producing 3,700 earnings stories per quarter, 12 times more than before automation – with fewer errors. It was also saving 20 percent of its business journalists’ time, allowing them to produce other, more complex stories. (Marconi, 2017)


By the end of 2019, AP plans to have produced 40,000 automated stories, mostly in business and sports news, according to the Reuters Institute. (Newman, Journalism, Media and Technology Trends and Predictions 2019, 2019)

**Key takeaway from Trend No. 4 - Artificial Intelligence (AI):** “We’re already seeing new roles such as automation editors, but all journalists will benefit from...having understanding of these processes and their potential effects,” according to an AP Insights e-book. (Houshmand, 2018) Artificial intelligence is man-made, meaning that all the ethical and editorial issues involved in producing any news content still apply. (Marconi, 2017)

### Trend No. 5: Audiences.

The future of journalism will increasingly depend on audiences paying for the news directly, as Facebook and Google take up the lion's share of digital-advertising dollars.

By 2020, the top three – Facebook, Google and Amazon – are projected to capture 63 percent of the digital-ad market in the U.S. That means every other media outlet – from weekly newspapers and tiny radio stations to The New York Times and CNN – is scrambling to get a scrap from the one-third of the market that is left.




(Newman, *Journalism, Media and Technology Trends and Predictions 2019, 2019*)

FIVE TRENDS TO WATCH IN JOURNALISM

No wonder that 52 percent of the 163 publishers interviewed by the Reuters Institute said that subscriptions are their main revenue focus for 2019. (Newman, Journalism, Media and Technology Trends and Predictions 2019, 2019)

How many of you pay for digital news?

In Romania, about 11 percent of the population pays for digital news, compared with 16 percent in the United States and 30 percent in Norway. Globally, the figure is 14 percent pay, according to the Reuters Institute. (Newman, Fletcher, Kalogeropoulos, Levy, & Nielsen, 2018)



(Newman, Fletcher, Kalogeropoulos, Levy, & Nielsen, 2018)

## Case study: Dagens Nyheter

Dagens Nyheter is a daily newspaper published in Stockholm, Sweden.

Like many newspapers, its print circulation has been declining. It lost 30 percent of its print circulation in the five years ending in 2018, but during that same time, its total number of subscribers – including digital subscribers – grew by 30 percent. (Jönsson, 2018)

In 2015, Dagens Nyheter had only 5,000 digital subscribers.

By 2017, digital-subscription revenue was up 92%, and that increase in digital-subscriber revenue was greater than the drop in print-ad revenue.

By 2018, it had 146,000 digital subscribers, and for the first time since 2012, the newsroom's budget increased, allowing key hires. (Jönsson, 2018)

**Key takeaway for Trend No. 5 – Audiences:** Publishers' focus on revenue from audiences could mean better journalism – for some. Instead of producing clickbait to increase traffic and boost ad revenue, increasing numbers of media outlets will try to create quality products that meet their audiences' needs and impel them to subscribe. The down side is that people who cannot afford to pay may miss out on quality news. What's an alternative way to tap readers for revenue? How many of you have ever read The Guardian? On every article is a request for a donation, and it just turned an operating profit for the first time since 1998. (Benton, Want to see what one digital future for newspapers looks like? Look at The Guardian, which isn't losing money anymore, 2019)

So, these are the five trends to watch:

1. Mobile
2. Messaging apps
3. Voice
4. Artificial intelligence (AI)
5. Audiences.

What others would you add?

I hope you feel better prepared and luckier for the hard work ahead!

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Xinhua's first English AI anchor makes debut (2018). [Motion Picture]. China. Retrieved July 8, 2019, from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GAfiATTQufk&feature=youtu.be>

## BEING A JOURNALIST IN THE COMMUNIST PRESS OF THE '60s IN ROMANIA. THE ACTIVITY OF ION BRAD FOR *SCÂNTEIA TINERETULUI* (1960-1962)

MIHAI CISTELICAN<sup>1</sup>

**ABSTRACT.** Author Ion Brad lived most of his life under the Communist regime, starting his career when the Communist system was founded in Romania and retiring in 1989, when the totalitarian system was abolished. This present study aims at analyzing the articles which author and journalist Ion Brad had published for one of the most prominent newspapers during the Communist regime in Romania, in the '60s, *Scânteia tineretului*. Directed especially at young people but not only, the newspaper reveals the various practices of the Communist state to impose on the collective minds. We have chosen this particular publication and this period of time in Ion Brad's activity because this is when, in our opinion, he did the most intense work in the political journalism. As an author, he wrote hundreds of articles and tens of books in the cultural field. This study can also be helpful for further research on the political issues approached in *Scânteia tineretului* or even on economic issues, in which one can analyze the reports about the construction of various towns in Romania under the Communist regime.

**Keywords:** Ion Brad, Communism, newspapers, *Scânteia tineretului*, Romania, Romanian Communist Party, monarchy, industrialization.

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## 1. Preamble

*Scânteia tineretului* used to be one of the most well-known “workshops” of the Communist representatives. Entire speeches of the party leaders were published there and it was an efficient instrument of propaganda amongst the population. Whenever they were away for work (in the Soviet Union, for instance), the speeches of the Romanian and Soviet officials were equally reflected in the newspaper, no more, nor less. An enormous amount of people worked for the newspaper: 180 employees<sup>2</sup>. Ion Brad started to collaborate with *Scânteia tineretului* before being employed as editor-in-chief, via his poems. In 1960, he was offered a part-time position for the culture section of the publication. Besides being editor for the culture section, he was also at times “a clear head”<sup>3</sup> for the paper. As expected, the editorial staff consisted of key people for the Communist regime in Romania, people having studied at Workers' University of the Romanian Communist Party, for example (future „Ștefan Gheorghiu” Academy): “At *Scânteia tineretului*, Anghel Paraschiv was promoted instead of Ion Brad; he had graduated from the Institute of Cadre «Ștefan Gheorghiu», coming from a workers' family. Cornel Răducan, who had worked under the previous regime, husband of a remarkable dancer, occupied the position of assistant editor-in-chief.”<sup>4</sup>

The press and journalists of the time were very useful in spreading ideas. This is also obvious in the official data from the speeches. We cautiously present such information (it is difficult to say if this is accurate or not), related by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, leader of the Romanian Communist Party at the time: books had an annual circulation of about 35 million copies, newspapers had an annual

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<sup>2</sup> *Apud* Ilie Rad, *Conversations with Ion Brad: “spring to fall” (April-October 2013)*, Eikon Publishing House, Cluj-Napoca, 2013, p. 177.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 177.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 174.

circulation of 900 million copies<sup>5</sup>, whereas the writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin had a circulation of 1.300.000 copies<sup>6</sup>. It was at the same time that the leader of the Romanian Communist Party asked those in charge of the propaganda to deal with the “practicability of the socialist construction”<sup>7</sup>. In one of his memoirs, Ion Brad declared the newspaper had paid him RON 700<sup>8</sup>.

The interval 1960-1961 is of great importance in the rise of Ion Brad in the Communist hierarchy. Until 1961, he was a candidate for the position of member of the Romanian Workers' Party. In 1961 he was welcomed in the party, even though 3 years earlier, in 1958, they had removed him from his position as editor-in-chief with the children's magazine *Cravata roșie* (accused of having spread religious and mystical ideas). This is how the party took good care of their new members, consequently they allowed Ion Brad to publish. They also invited him more and more to take part in the conferences of the relevant organizations of the time. In 1961, Ion Brad was officially welcomed in the Romanian Workers' Party, a position he kept until 1989. This interval shows his rise in the hierarchy. In a photo taken during a national conference of the writers, Ion Brad is standing next to the supreme leader of the party, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej.

## 2. Beginnings of his collaboration with *Scânteia tineretului*

Ion Brad had published lots of poems in *Scânteia tineretului* since 1959, most having proletkultist titles such as: *Un strop din vocea lui* (A drop of his voice), *Piscul de lumină* (The light summit), *Brigăzi, în șiruri* (Brigades, in rows) or *Mândria noastră, tinere miner* (Our pride,

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<sup>5</sup> Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej, *Report of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Congress of the Romanian Workers' Party*, Political Publishing House, Bucharest, 1960, p. 18, available under <https://goo.gl/gfpaQk> (accessed on 16.04.2018, at 18:21).

<sup>6</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 97, (accessed on 16.04.2018, at 20:53).

<sup>7</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 97, (accessed on 16.04.2018, at 20:53).

<sup>8</sup> Ilie Rad, *Conversations with Ion Brad: "spring to fall" (April-October 2013)*, Eikon Publishing House, Cluj-Napoca, 2013, p. 178.

*young miner*). Analyzing the articles published by Ion Brad in the period of time 1960-1962 in *Scânteia tineretului*, I concluded that the themes approached by the author render in one way or another the political beliefs of the time. The journalistic activity he had with the publication proves his complete and utter adherence as a writer to the rules. Up to that moment and after that, his articles never rendered such obvious political beliefs. We could say that the period of time 1960-1962 stands for the climax of his writing activity in the political press. For more accuracy, I had a look at the articles written in the previous years (1959) and the years after he left the publication (1962 – he left at the beginning of the year). There is a total of 45 articles signed by Ion Brad, some of them consisting of public statements made during writers' conferences. In some of the articles – if there was necessary – I also explained the political and social context in which the articles were published, so that anyone could better understand why the author needed to take a certain stand. Apart from that, I included in my study further different titles I found in the same issue, in order to highlight additional points of interests of the Communist press. Due to space limitations, I chose to present only the most prominent articles. It is also worth mentioning that I performed a chronological analysis, thus I had to mention some historical details among the relevant articles.

It is of relevance to say when it comes to the writing activity of Ion Brad for *Scânteia tineretului* that he didn't fail to stick to the instructions given by the leader of the Romanian Workers' Party, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej. This is an example of how Dej established rules in the field of press and propaganda: "The propaganda and agitation department, the press and radio, must ensure that the provisions of the 6-year plan, both general and individual for each branch and each group, should be thoroughly known by all working classes."<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej, *Report of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Communist Party Congress*, Political Publishing House, Bucharest, 1960, p. 99, available under <https://goo.gl/gfpaQk> (accessed on 16.04.2018, at 20:59).

### 3. Articles written by Ion Brad for *Scânteia tineretului*

At the end of 1959, Ion Brad published his first articles in *Scânteia tineretului*. December 19<sup>th</sup> 1959, he published his first article *Uneori "...dragostea pe sine se iubeste"* (*At times, love loves itself*). The plot is about an impossible love story. Young girl Dorina Grigore, fascinated and in love with young Mircea Dima, experiences a profound drama after having been neglected by him. She sends a letter to the newspaper, and the author of the articles tries to find the young lover at his workplace to request some explanations for his behavior. After a brief interview, he describes Mircea – a shallow young man, a fan of parties – the author tells Dorina to think more clearly and not let herself fall into her own illusions (Brad agrees with the Russian writer Maxim Gorki on the verse "love loves itself" from the poem *Fata și moartea* (*The girl and death*), his source of inspiration). According to Ion Brad, getting such situations sorted following the Communist pattern requires "romantism through reason, not babbling and confused sentimentalism"<sup>10</sup>. Brad finishes his article by urging his readership to find answers to questions related to the normal relations between two young people. This sort of "recommendations" that Ion Brad made for young girls show the "teachings" of the Communist officials for the young generation: young men need to be hard working and build a family, because too many parties never serve a useful purpose; he who only parties and won't have a family, is no good – so girls should not consider marrying them.

#### 3.1. Anti-monarchy articles

The day of January 3<sup>rd</sup>, 1960, marks the beginning of the harsh articles against the former monarchy and the king. The first 1960 article is supposed to describe the New Year Eve's party which he attended at the Palace of the Republic (former Royal Palace). The choice of words

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<sup>10</sup> Ion Brad, *At times "...love loves itself"*, in *Scânteia tineretului*, XV, 2nd series, no. 3297, December 19<sup>th</sup>, 1959, p. 4.

“is supposed to describe” the party is not an accident. This is an occasion when political opinions are spread and people are manipulated against the royal family. The article contains a black and white photo in which young people dance. In the attacks presented in the newspaper, the author refers to the former King of Romania, who is described as a dragon, a monster with a venomous and saliva spitting tongue<sup>11</sup>. This kind of writing approach will be the stance of Ion Brad’s articles in *Scânteia tineretului*. I will now present the pro-Communism ideas of the author and those against the royal family. I’ve selected the most obvious and relevant paragraphs. This is what the author stated about Michael I of Romania: “Can’t get emotional in front of a king whom our parents chased away before it was late, asking him to go away using the same words that people had used a century ago: «Pack your things/ Get your lady/ Off you go/ To far off places/ Only come back here/ When slavery is a wish of Romania.» In other words, never again! No, we, as guests of the Palace, have no emotions at all.”<sup>12</sup> In a different paragraph he said: “It (my note, Mihai Cistelican: Romanian Workers' Party) placed in the hands of the mob the sparkly sword 12 years ago, to cut off the last head of the dragon who snuggled down all over our country, getting pleasure in tens of palaces and coiling around fortresses’ towers and hitting with his tail as far as eyes can see the so-called personal lands. Isn’t that a youthful gesture, cutting off in just one stroke the venomous and fiery tongue, leaving the monster with just a snoring and spit throwing stump, which the wind blows back on its own cheeks!”<sup>13</sup> In an interview<sup>14</sup> I had for the magazine *Acasă*, soon to be published, Ion Brad admitted his anti-monarchy attitude was an overreaction, stating that the environment and the context had modelled his beliefs: “Yes, a lot has changed. I was overreacting [...].

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<sup>11</sup> *Spit* s. f. – saliva (thick, foamy) produces in the mouth of adults, children and animals.

<sup>12</sup> Ion Brad, *We were invited to the Palace*, in *Scânteia tineretului*, XV, 2nd series, no. 3308, January 3rd, 1960, p. 1.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 2.

<sup>14</sup> Ion Brad: „My attitude towards Michael I of Romania was over the top under the Communism”. Interview by Mihai Cistelican in the magazine *Acasă*, soon to be published.

When Carol II of Romania ran away with Elena Lupescu, everyone considered that an act of treason. As refugees in Portugal, they lived from the sale of very valuable paintings.”

On March the 8<sup>th</sup>, Ion Brad suggested the readers of *Scânteia tineretului* an analysis on women in the Romanian folklore. He picked some female personalities from Romanian recognized masterpieces and described their qualities. Be it *Miorița*, be it the myth of Meșterul Manole (roughly The master builder Manole), the author positively describes the very well-known women: Ana Ipătescu, Ecaterina Teodoroiu, Elena Sârbu and others. Indirectly, the author underlines that women have a much better life under Communism, using phrases such as: “(personal note: referring to the old regime) women were considered as low as slaves” or “in such a world, love and marriage themselves could be traded in, whilst «harmony» within family was an enormous lie told by the exploiters”<sup>15</sup>. To support these beliefs, Ion Brad uses verses meant to reinforce his readers’ beliefs. Furthermore, he uses traditional songs in which love and affection are rendered playfully and easy to understand by all Romanians. Later on, he drops several hints about the lack of love of the Romanians towards wealthy people, indirectly referring to the rich peasants (kulak): “As expected, once our people had untangled the web of a society which harmed souls and turned women into slaves, then built a new world, new poetry came into being. These poems celebrate women as proud beings, after being released from the bourgeois constraints, her involvement in all artistic fields, her light giving love.”<sup>16</sup>

It is not surprising at all that such articles written about heroines, hard working women and women involved in the reality were very common in the communist society<sup>17</sup>, and Ion Brad wrote a lot of such articles to support those ideas. We cannot comment on all of those articles due to space limitations.

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<sup>15</sup> Ion Brad, “Can’t tell if it’s moonlight or it’s daylight,/ My beloved walking out...” – Women in folklore –, in *Scânteia tineretului*, XVI, 2nd series, no. 3363, March 8th, 1960, p. 2.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 2.

<sup>17</sup> <https://www.historia.ro/sectiune/general/articol/femeia-comunista-mama-eroina-muncitoare-activista> (accessed on 4.1.2019).

The article dated June 19<sup>th</sup>, 1960, is another article consisting of ideas and themes taken from the speeches of the Communist officials or on the meanness of the “bourgeoisie”. The articles came out a day before the 3<sup>rd</sup> Congress of the Romanian Workers’ Party. During a conversation Ion Brad had with two young actresses, they emphasize how tough and humiliating it was to be an actress before the Communist regime, and how enjoyable it was in the socialist society. “The party of the working class rescued the new generation from the drama of the old generation of creators and artists who, so many times, had been forced by the bourgeoisie to let go of the liberty and dignity of true, great art”<sup>18</sup>, noted Ion Brad. Prostitution, pornography and intimidation - at least that’s what they claimed during the communist society - it was the way to treat young women aspiring to become actresses in the monarchy: “We are lucky to have skipped over the humiliating performance of the former actors, forced to perform in front of a bourgeois audience requesting framed pornography and prostitution as «substitution» instead of «the sacred stage performance».”<sup>19</sup> Theatre used to be, based on the article, an elitist form of art, only affordable by wealthy people: “It is worth mentioning - said Ileana Predescu - which was the first question they asked young women knocking on a theatre’s door most of the times: «Tell me, girl, who’s going to buy your dresses and jewelry?» Luckily, we’ve only heard from third parties of such questions.”<sup>20</sup>

### 3.2. How Brad described the Communist Party in his articles

The 3<sup>rd</sup> Communist Party Congress was thoroughly presented in the newspapers (articles about this event were written even 10 days after); The speech of the leader Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej shows a bigger attention to the importance of the Party and less attention to the Soviet influence - as it was the case until the end of the ’50s. A possible

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<sup>18</sup> Ion Brad, ...*And of the artist, as messenger of communist beliefs*, in *Scânteia tineretului*, XVI, 2nd series, no. 3451, June 19<sup>th</sup>, 1960, p. 2.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 2.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 2.

explanation of this slight change in attitude at the beginning of the '60s might also be the fact that the Soviets had already left Romania in 1958, consequently the communist leaders were facing a De-Stalinization stage. Ion Brad also signed such an article, more precisely *Each, being the best!* The author praises the projects and speeches held at the Congress and writes about some young men who are happy the metallurgical issues they were interested in got sorted out. Everything was done under "wonderful" conditions which "our party" made available. The phrase "our party" shows the lack of ambiguity the author wants to induce: "The brigade decided that all young people should take admission exams and enroll in schools – so that all could become well educated workers, masters of technical studies, up to the wonderful standards which our party makes available to those who are willing to learn. And again, even in terms of education, each, being the best!"<sup>21</sup> The importance of the party has increasingly become a common theme in his articles, even when he writes about villas and holiday places. These constructions were most likely event venues and had been built – the author was eager to mention – by "the working class, through the good care of the unbeatable architect which is our party."<sup>22</sup>

This article too<sup>23</sup> approaches the theme of the bourgeoisie. Ion Brad claims that before the Communism the bourgeois and the "royal entourage" attended these villas. Similarly, Brad presents what people used to do at the former casino in the mountain resort Sinaia before the Communism: they used to gamble the millions they had stolen from the pockets of the poor. Brad does not give details, he is good just generalizing this issue using slogans. Well, in the Communism, says the author, you don't see such things: artists and performances replaced the wrong-doing bourgeois.

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<sup>21</sup> Ion Brad, *Each, being the best!*, in *Scân-teia tineretului*, XVI, 2nd series, no. 3460, June 30th, 1960, p. 3.

<sup>22</sup> Ion Brad, *To the working class – have a nice rest!*, in *Scân-teia tineretului*, XVI, 2nd series, no. 3482, July 26th, 1960, p. 2.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 2.

What's interesting is that Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej spoke about bourgeoisie at the 3<sup>rd</sup> Communist Party Congress, and Ion Brad seems to use that as a source of inspiration and brings forth arguments taken from the speech of the former leader of the Communists. Dej shows in his speech that the bourgeois morals should be deleted from the conscience of the citizens: "Founding a socialist conscience and erasing the influences of the bourgeois education and moral is a long-term task. [...]"<sup>24</sup>, said the former leader of the Party.

In another one of his articles - *Maturitate (Maturity)*, Brad analyzes the concepts of youth, enthusiasm and maturity under the socialist and royalist regimes. As expected, these virtues are presented as positive in the communist society whereas everything was useless under the royal rule. The arguments Ion Brad brings forth are party-related: "Twenty years ago, when the present enthusiasts were born, what reasons did the youth of this country have to be thrilled about? Poverty was harshly stopping, failing to satisfy, destroying and suffocating all hopes. No. At the time, youth could not go hand in hand with enthusiasm."<sup>25</sup> On the other hand, when he speaks about the Communist youth participating in the 3<sup>rd</sup> Congress of the Union of Communist Youth, Brad says that "the maturity of the minds and words of these young people left a strong impression"<sup>26</sup>. Furthermore, the author of the article identifies in the young generation a "clear" and "bright" purpose: the construction of socialism. Obviously, socialism could not be constructed without "the immensity and clearness of the plans drafted by the party", and "its wonderful ideology - Marxism-Leninism -."<sup>27</sup> Analyzing what Gheorghe

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<sup>24</sup> Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej, *Report of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Communist Party Congress*, Political Publishing House, Bucharest, 1960, p. 101, available under <https://goo.gl/gfpaQk> (accessed on 16.04.2018, at 20:08).

<sup>25</sup> Ion Brad, *Maturity*, in *Scânteia tineretului*, XVI, 2nd series, no. 3504, August 20th, 1960, p. 1.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 1.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 1.

Gheorghiu-Dej said at the 3<sup>rd</sup> Communist Party Congress, Ion Brad seems to have used that as a source of inspiration, as he had the same ideas about the role of the party in society<sup>28</sup>.

In an article about August 23 (the day when Romania turned on the side of the Allies in World War II and against Germany) the author describes in a propagandistic manner the first history lesson a child is taught. After watching on TV or listening on the radio the military parade on 23<sup>rd</sup> August, the little ones would ask their parents questions such as: why was he injured (with regard to the soldiers fighting against fascists)? How was the fight? Who were the enemies?<sup>29</sup> The answers to all these questions are presented several rows below: "From that point onward, phrases flow naturally, hatred finds place in the heart against the fascists who brought death in the country, words gain fire wings. Children feel that their eyes sparkle in an unusual light. And they gradually understand why the sacrifice of the soldiers and the granite with which the hand of the nation scribbled the everlasting inscription «August, 23, 1944»"<sup>30</sup> laid the foundation of freedom, of the country and their own homes. The theme of "fight" is deeply rooted in the minds of Communists, and obviously in the mind of Ion Brad. Along Communist history, we have faced the fight against class enemy, fight to do better and fight of the new man etc. The military terminology used in the public Communist language, such as "fight" or "mobilization", were also used in economy whenever they wanted to emphasize the growth of production or the growth of the Party, as shown by the critic and literary historian Nicolae Manolescu<sup>31</sup>.

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<sup>28</sup> Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej, *Report of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Communist Party Congress*, Political Publishing House, Bucharest, 1960, p. 89-90, available under <https://goo.gl/gfpaQk> (accessed on 16.04.2018, at 20:34).

<sup>29</sup> Ion Brad, *First history lesson*, in *Scântea tineretului*, XVI, 2nd series, no. 3507, August 25, 1960, p. 2.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 2.

<sup>31</sup> *Apud*. Nicoleta Mihai, *Wooden language of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej*, in Ilie Rad (coordinator), *Wooden language in press*, Tritonic Publishing House, Bucharest, 2009, p. 218.

As of 1960, the work of Ion Brad gradually consists of articles in which the main theme is peace. This is not surprising at all considering that this year indicates new orientations of the Romanian communists; though timid at first, they speak more and more about “the beloved party” and “peace”. The subject matters related to peace are various, however they all seem to follow the same pattern: arguments related to the importance of peace all over the world, the role of Communists in this respect, the desire of “royalists” and “bourgeoisie” to maintain conflict and war, as well as launching a peace call to the readership.

Such an example would also be the article about the official trip of the Romanian delegation and Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, to New York, to participate in the 15<sup>th</sup> UN General Assembly. Talking about train engines with the young men working at the train station of Grivița, Ion Brad subtly speaks about peace in the world: “Train engines along people must have experienced horrible dramas in the last world war.”<sup>32</sup> Who else could have brought peace in the world if not communists when they took over the reins: “It has been 16 years since we started to lead our people towards achievements instead of disasters.”<sup>33</sup> Just like in other articles signed by Brad, bourgeoisie and royalists seem to want war: “Their thoughts and aspirations for peace and understanding amongst people, for knowing and collaborating with the youth all over the world, for defending and putting an end to war and the desires of the royal troublemakers who want revenge.”<sup>34</sup>

A certain detachment from a given time can easily be perceived in the articles written by Ion Brad. The Stalinist patterns and phrases he used in the '50s now turned into slogans of the '60s. Anyways, the entire press of the time indicated a relaxation after the departure of the Soviet troops from Romania. Thus, Ion Brad uses the first person in

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<sup>32</sup> Ion Brad, *Fondly thinking of our group of delegates at UN Assembly. May train engines only pull along peaceful coaches in the world*, in *Scântea tineretului*, XVI, 2nd series, no. 3526, September 16, 1960, p. 3.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 3.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 3.

his articles, he has his own opinions and generally writes in a more personal way. On the other way, even the propaganda technique turns slightly different in his articles. On the whole, he praises the regime but always uses real data and situations, he positively presents the salary and life of workers and then, at the end of the article, he makes clear statements (as a conclusion) about the Party, the Communism, the supreme leader and Soviets. For instance, closely following this structure, we mention the article "*The giants*" of our times, referring to the workers who "build" Communism. The clarification is only made at the end. The article tells the story of a wood-processing plant, built in Târnave region, and also speaks about the young workers working there or studying in the nearby schools<sup>35</sup>.

### 3.3. Reports from the building sites of the country

Ion Brad wrote his first article in the year 1961 after a trip taken for professional purposes in Galați. He wrote a report on site and showed how things were done in the local factories and plants. All along his article he was keen to show how resonant and how meaningful the word "constructor" was in socialism. He was absolutely sure that based on a survey on the frequency of the words used at the time, the following would have come first: "party", "home country", "socialism", coming second "work", "achievement", "plan", "construction", "well-being". After all, he might have been right considering the titles present in that issue of the magazine *Scântea tineretului: Well-organized work has good outcomes*<sup>36</sup>, by Romulus Lal, *Worker, pupil and innovator*<sup>37</sup>, edited by Petre Marin, titles rendering the exact words mentioned by Brad.

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<sup>35</sup> Ion Brad, "*The giants*" of our times, in *Scântea tineretului*, XVI, 2nd series, no. 3562, October 28, 1960, p. 1.

<sup>36</sup> Ion Brad, *Well-organized work has good outcomes*, in *Scântea tineretului*, XVII, 2nd series, no. 3639, January 27, 1961, p. 2.

<sup>37</sup> Ion Brad, *Worker, pupil and innovator*, in *Scântea tineretului* XVII, 2nd series, no. 3639, January 27, 1961, p. 4.

As long as he worked for *Scânteia tineretului*, the author wrote many articles from the construction sites of the country at the time. We only mention some. The author's attitude can be explained once the leader of the Workers' Party requested that socialist industrialization should be more thoroughly debated in the papers of the time: "Even on such a crucial issue of the party policy, which is socialist industrialization, some of the materials issued have approached matters in a stereotypical and static way, without reflecting the rich experience gained by the party in the industrialization process, its most prominent aspects in the current stage of our economic development"<sup>38</sup>, said Dej. Later on in the article, the author says how many families received a flat (1300) from the communist regime and how many were about to get one (1700) in the following year, whereas the number was to increase to 20.000 in the coming 4 years. He also presents the strong connection the deputies were going to have with the word – "constructor" – taking into account that they decided to set up a factory in Galați, during the 3<sup>rd</sup> Communist Party Congress.

Ion Brad makes one comment in his article and this comment could summarize communism. Some young men come to join a club of constructors working on a building site: "And of course, for everyone something is possible."<sup>39</sup> This final phrase is somehow defining for the old regime: regardless of what line of work you did, the Party always had something for you to do so that you, in your turn, could then prove your devotion to it. All you had to do was to accept and support the regime (same is valid for press, great Romanian writers joined the lines of the regime). Press and cinematography also. It would be of relevance to note the use of this concept in communist cinematography, because apparently it was implemented on different cultural levels. Writer Cristian Tudor Popescu identified this way of raising a matter in the

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<sup>38</sup> Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej, *Report of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Communist Party Congress*, Political Publishing House, Bucharest, 1960, p. 102, available under <https://goo.gl/gfpaQk> (accessed on 16.04.2018, at 21:15).

<sup>39</sup> Ion Brad, *Resonances of the constructing word*, in *Scânteia tineretului* XVII, 2nd series, no. 3639, January 27, 1961, p. 4.

film *Faleză de nisip* (*Sand cliffs*), which premiered in the cinemas in 1982: "First scene in *Faleză de nisip* – the thin silhouette of young Vasile who, after feeding a stray dog, flirts with Turkish girl Oana Pellea, buys himself a doughnut and then eats it up, then is busy throwing flat rocks in the Black Sea. He commits the first serious anti-social crime: he does nothing, has no job, just hangs out on the beach dressed in a T-shirt and with his jeans lifted up to his knees."<sup>40</sup>

Ion Brad wrote many articles full of admiration about the construction of the Galați steel works, using such phrases: "to give even stronger steel wings to our socialist industry in the years to come"<sup>41</sup> or "on the solid ground of human souls they laid, if we could say that, the deep foundations of construction."<sup>42</sup> In his biased attitude about the steel works and environment in Galați, the author analyses a letter sent to the building site, in which a young lady expressed her eagerness to work on the site<sup>43</sup> or situations in which young men wanted to see the manager in person to get a job. Most articles written at the beginning of 1961 praise the construction of new plants in the country and new achievements (an example of a headline on the cover of *Scântea tineretului: Agricultural engineering defeats drought*). The series of articles Ion Brad wrote while being on site, in Galați, is continued in a further issue of the paper. He beautifully describes the town on the bank of the Danube. What's interesting about this article is the more pragmatic approach, as he does not focus that much on the ideas so well-known up to that point, at least at first. The author uses 1<sup>st</sup> person singular and describes a meeting at a young worker's house – he is presented as a hero in the communist press: "Certainties have become louder, the satisfaction of personal work has brilliantly been interwoven in the collective work, actually it has become a satisfaction of the whole

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<sup>40</sup> Cristian Tudor Popescu, *Silent film in silent Romania: politics and propaganda in Romanian motion movies (1912-1989)*, Polirom Publishing House, Iași, 2011, p. 268.

<sup>41</sup> Ion Brad, "I ask and respectfully intervene...", in *Scântea tineretului*, XVII, 2nd series, no. 3641, January 29, 1961, p. 1.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 1.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 1.

country. A satisfaction of our socialist industry"<sup>44</sup>, concluded the author. Brad thought that the choices the leaders made were to be blamed for all these wrongdoings. Everything was just a farce, emphasized the author: "We all know very well who those gentlemen were. Demagogy forces them to say in gargling and snoring tones words such as «people» and «democracy», being supervised from behind by bobbies and coshes"<sup>45</sup>.

Another false idea spread by Ion Brad in this article is his statement according to which the citizens of Romania elected the Communists, failing to mention the influence of the Soviets in this process. On the other hand, the detachment from the Soviets had already been obvious in the press since 1961. Such comments are to be found in Ion Brad's article: "it is only in our years of popular democracy that the reins of the country were taken over by the true representatives of the people, who had elected them."<sup>46</sup>

### 3.4. Changes in orientation

Romania pulled back from Moscow for a number of reasons; historians offered a lot of versions for "this change of attitude". The beginning of this attitude was basically put into practice when Romania refused the Soviet ideas in terms of economic specialization (DIVISION OF LABOUR) in the countries under "its wing"<sup>47</sup>. Plus, in Romania, in the '60s, the trend was to densely populate towns by bringing peasants from rural areas. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej made his position and desire for independence even more noticeable through the famous "Declaration of independence" or "Declaration of April 1964" which asserted the right to independence for communist

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<sup>44</sup> Ion Brad, *A radiogram for constructors*, in *Scânteia tineretului*, XVII, 2nd series, no. 3642, January 31, 1961, p. 3.

<sup>45</sup> Ion Brad, "I look at my country today" – *New popular poems*, in *Scânteia tineretului*, XVII, 2nd series, no. 3650, February 9, 1961, p. 3.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 3.

<sup>47</sup> Florin Constantiniu, *A Sincere History of the Romanian People*, Univers Enciclopedic Publishing House, Bucharest, 1997, p. 494-495.

parties – which truly means independence from the Soviet Union –<sup>48</sup>. The relations between Dej and Khrushchev were not some of the best at the time either. Dej's private secretary mentioned in his memoirs that the Romanian leader sometimes would privately curse him and call him names such as "redneck"<sup>49</sup>.

Ion Brad gives special attention to the new social demographic phenomenon of moving peasants from the countryside into towns in one of his articles. He approaches the issue in his typical way, focusing on details. He wrote about the "village from yesterday", being subject to major changes in the period of time 1950-1960, during collectivization. The author agrees to the fact that the village from "yesterday" has changed but he says this is due to people. Ion Brad expressed his thought in a A-list communist newspaper by making use of an interesting comment made by a communist (atheist in theory): "According to an old saying, a good farmer makes a good farm."<sup>50</sup> Brad also says that rich peasants (kulaks) were no longer present at the time: "the biggest exploiting class and the related exploitation forms in agriculture."<sup>51</sup> With regard to the jobs and the opportunities young people had in the countryside, the author claims there were few during the monarchy, and he presents them in a bleak way, using words such as: "Tractor drivers? A job unheard of at the time. [...] They used cows to plough the fields, until they fell down to the ground. Cows, those who had them."<sup>52</sup>

### 3.5. Schools before and during Communism

^This is an analysis regarding the children attending school before and during Communism. Before: "Among those who 20 years

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<sup>48</sup> <https://www.historia.ro/sectiune/general/articol/gh-gheorghiu-dej-in-istoriografia-actuala> (accessed on 10.05.2018, at 16: 49).

<sup>49</sup> Paul Sfetcu, *13 years in Dej's waiting room*, Selection, foreword and notes by Lavinia Betea, Publishing House of the Romanian Cultural Foundation, Bucharest, 2000, p. 300.

<sup>50</sup> Ion Brad, *At sea*, in *Scân-teia tineretului*, XVII, 2nd series, no. 3663, February 24, 1961, p. 3.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 3.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 3.

ago went barefoot to their 4-class schools until snow set in, carrying in their bags full of damaged books a chunk of cold polenta”<sup>53</sup> – based on our calculations, it must have been in 1941, during World War II, when Romania was an ally of Germany. During Communism: “Some of them still go to school with their schoolbags full of free books from the State, others already attend technical schools for agriculture.”<sup>54</sup>

In 1961, elections were called in Romania for the Great National Assembly. United by the same aspiration, which is the Alliance of the Democratic Popular Front (FDP), Romanian political parties (communist parties) and trade unions win with a considerable score: 99,7% of the national vote<sup>55</sup>. In this context, Ion Brad writes a report in the villages and townships located in the valley of Someș. He wanted to find out what electors and candidates had to say. As expected, it is a positive article for the candidates for FDP. Manipulation is easy to notice here as well. The use of figures and key words is meant to support the idea that communism has brought along welfare, whereas FDP enjoys full trust and love from the people. One of the key words Ion Brad heard on the lips of electors/voters is “constructions”; some of the figures are: 473 families (all of the villagers) entered into “a collective farm”, value of the goods sold in 1960 by the locals: RON 3 million or a number of 147 of newly built houses and further similar information. “Our party’s policy for socialist transformation of agriculture is thriving. Peasants say that in clear words and they are proud of it”<sup>56</sup>, noted the author.

The presentation of statistical data (for instance, number of houses built) is part of a wooden language often used by authorities, and also an instrument for manipulation: the more exact the numbers, the most reliable they seem. The figures used in the press of the time are a way to mystify reality<sup>57</sup>. For example, they never published

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<sup>53</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 3.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 3.

<sup>55</sup> <http://www.timpuldevalcea.net/?p=11383> (accessed on 27.04.2018, at 16:44).

<sup>56</sup> Ion Brad, *What electors and their candidates had to say*, in *Scântea tinerețului*, XVII, 2nd series, no. 3665, February 26, 1961, p. 3.

<sup>57</sup> Nicoleta Mihai, *Wooden language of Gheorghie Gheorghiu-Dej*, Ilie Rad (coordonator), *Wooden language in the press*, Tritonic Publishing House, Bucharest, 2009, p. 211.

figures that could have presented in a negative way the communist regime in Romania. Communist leaders also used difficult to verify data<sup>58</sup>. Ion Brad referred quite often to the achievements of the socialism. Be it newly built plants or households, they used a lot of numbers and generalizations in those articles. According to researcher Gabriela Rusu-Păsărin, the excessive use of generalizations gives the reader the feeling of the irreversible<sup>59</sup>. Plus, political reality was made clear in the papers: a quick look in *Scânteia tineretului* was enough for anyone to notice the detachment from the Soviets and the “nationalist” policy in the articles which indeed anticipated Romania’s position towards the situation in Czechoslovakia, clearly against the Soviet intervention in the area.

Election day in 1961 finds Ion Brad on the field, at the polling stations, in order to find out how the process is going, he takes interviews and describes the support for FDP candidates. To be noted the atmosphere he describes: “It was before 06:00. March 5<sup>th</sup> starts, it is election day. At the polling station no. 1 Grivița Roșie, citizens knew they were going to vote comrade Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej for the Great General Assembly – beloved son of the working class and of the entire people.”<sup>60</sup> This sort of doctrine for the Party and idolatry of the “comrade” was to increase dramatically in the press during the Socialist Republic of Romania.

### 3.6. New: how peasants watched TV news

In 1961, Ion Brad goes on a working visit in the village Zăpodeni (Vaslui County). The author speaks highly about the region and makes an interesting comment on Mihai Eminescu: “and the somehow sad pride that he once was visited by the miserable school inspector Mihail

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<sup>58</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 211.

<sup>59</sup> *Radiophonic message between information and manipulation*, by Gabriela Rusu-Păsărin, Ilie Rad (coordinator), *Manipulation techniques of the public opinion: National Symposium of Journalism*, Tribuna Publishing House, Cluj-Napoca, 2008, p. 222-223.

<sup>60</sup> Ion Brad, *At dawn, down Calea Griviței*, in *Scânteia tineretului*, XVII, 2nd series, no. 3672, March 6, 1961, p. 1-2.

Eminescu.”<sup>61</sup> Back to the main ideas present in the article, Ion Brad summarizes all the cultural events organized in the village on the 40<sup>th</sup> celebration of the Romanian Communist Party. Another aspect of “the cultural life”, quite new for those times, which Brad highlights, is how villagers used to watch TV news at the local community center. This is even more significant considering that television broadcasting was relatively new in Romania, as of 1956. What Ion Brad does is to describe how TV programs looked like 5 years after being released: “Even though the sound is not synchronized and images are not always the best, people eagerly watch the news (which are slightly outdated)”<sup>62</sup>. During a working visit in Zăpodeni, Vaslui County (he wrote before about it), Ion Brad writes a new article about Mihai Eminescu, to be published in a different issue. The author approaches it in the same way communists approached other artists and writers. The procedure was simple, manipulative and interpretable. Basically, what they did was to identify a great personality in the artistic or cultural field, then they tried to spot articles, books, performances or scientific events similar to the values which the issuer had and with which they could have identified themselves. In this article, the author published the notes Eminescu made when he was a school inspector and then compares those to how things were during Communism. The conclusion of the author is eloquent in this respect: “If Eminescu inspected today the 8 schools in Zăpodeni and the surrounding villages [...] he might scribble again «insufficient staff» in his notebook. However, this wouldn’t refer to 7 pupils taught by starving teacher Ciureanu, but to those over 800 pupils taught by 35 teachers and educators sent by the Party and our state to bring to life the Eminescian dreams.”<sup>63</sup> In the winter of 1962, Ion Brad leaves the magazine *Scânteia tineretului*, after having been appointed secretary of the Writers’ Union of Romania.

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<sup>61</sup> Ion Brad, *Sunday in a Moldovan village*, in *Scânteia tineretului*, XVII, 2nd series, no. 3688, March 24, 1961, p. 1.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 5.

<sup>63</sup> Ion Brad, *Eminescu walked by*, in *Scânteia tineretului*, XVII, 2<sup>nd</sup> series, no. 3708, April 16, 1961, p. 2.

#### 4. Conclusions

Analyzing the entire activity of the author Ion Brad during Communism, I can say that his time with the magazine *Scânteia tineretului* stands for the most intense period in his career when he writes articles supporting the system. And that's not all – he also becomes a member of the Party. Consequently, it is difficult to mention objectivity and neutrality in this context. Keeping an impartial look at the author, from a distance, he was the typical writer of the Communist era eager to create a name of his own in the field and a career. He starts working for a magazine in a different city (Cluj-Napoca), then he moves on into the capital and goes through all the stages until he ends up working for the most prominent youth newspaper.

The articles he signed in the period of time 1960-1962 also reveal the social activities of the time. The author, and it was not just him, used to write in support of the Romanian Communist Party, he described in favorable words and phrases the politicians during elections (example: “the policy of our party in terms of the socialist transformation of agriculture is thriving. Peasants say that clearly and are very proud of it.”<sup>64</sup>), whereas collectivization was presented as being very good and efficient (they wouldn't explain how collectivization came into being and all the related abuses); it was many times that they brutally attacked in writing the rich and the royal family, presenting information in various contexts (be it agriculture, culture or the social life of people); corruption was presented as a phenomenon of the former system; it is also worth mentioning the articles we identified in which the author uses as a source of inspiration the speeches of the party leader. As a comparison, our current newspapers are full of articles about young people working in famous IT companies, whereas, at the beginnings of Communism in Romania, the articles focused on subjects about young workers who were in the process of building a bright future for themselves.

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<sup>64</sup> Ion Brad, *What voters and their candidates have to say*, in *Scânteia tineretului*, XVII, 2<sup>nd</sup> series, no. 3665, February 26, 1961, p. 3.

As his articles only had a few ideas/opinions different from the communist beliefs (especially from a religious point of view; an example in this respect is the article “a good farmer makes a good farm” published in *Scânteia tineretului*, XVII, 2<sup>nd</sup> series, no. 3663, February 24, 1961, p. 3), we cannot say that Brad tried in a way or another to fight against the communist censorship. Furthermore, him writing partially communist articles for *Lucefărul* (1958-1960) and later on his intense political activity for *Scânteia tineretului* (1960-1962) put the author in the category of the journalists close to the regime. That’s why (this may not have been just a random thing), in 1961, Ion Brad became a member of the party, which may be seen as a reward of the party for all those who got politically involved. Based on this article, further studies can be completed, such as: describing in the press elections during Communism; how enemies of the communists were described in the press; anti-monarchy propaganda in the communist press.

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## DIASPORA AND IDENTITY IN THE DIGITAL AGE: CULTURAL COMMUNITIES AND THE NATION.

VANDANA PEDNEKAR-MAGAL<sup>1</sup>

**ABSTRACT.** The following article is based on a keynote speech on Diaspora and Identity in the digital age. Cultural Communities and the Nation delivered at Media Culture Days at the College of Political, Administrative and Communication Sciences, Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania, on May 17, 2019

**Keywords:** cultural identity, diasporic cultural communities, digital diaspora

Thank you for inviting me – it’s an immense honor. Also, I am very happy to come back to visit BBU.

Today, I’d like to speak about media and society – in relation to each other, since much of my academic work is grounded in the study of media, culture and society.

With the advent of digital technologies, we have seen the evolution of an information ecology where mass media and horizontal /social media have formed a media landscape that we are grappling to make sense of. What we know is that we are in the throes of the digital era. Meaning that digital technologies are central to contemporary society – in that, digital interaction is the defining characteristic of all human activity, and where by all social, economic, political activities are dependent on information and communication technologies aka ICTs. So media as such are to be conceptualized as deeply integral to social interaction at a local, national and global level.

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To put it simply, in the past decade and half or more we have seen a tectonic shift in the media landscape.

What about changes in society? Every nation around the globe has experienced globalization – in various degrees, national borders are porous very in a variety of ways. So we see a shift in how to understand national society.

Since the past two decades, the movement of populations across counties, regions, and across national borders has risen at an unprecedented degree. Most urban areas, most cities across the globe experience an extraordinary arrival of new populations. This of course is in the wake of the complex processes of what we call globalization. Guest workers, exiles, refugees, immigrants, tourists, now constitute any metropolis, or cities across the globe. The large cross-border dispersal of populations is intensified by the global deployment of production processes and human capital by multinational corporations; and other factors such as ethnic conflicts and war across many regions of the world. Movements of people or shifting populations have altered the local/ national landscape. These movements are well-documented by scholars as Arjun Appadurai.

So let us focus on what happens with movements of population across national borders. Historically, these populations form some kind of new cultural community in the nation of arrival. Yet, they keep some form of connection to their heritage country. Whether, through money remittance (sending part of their income to their relatives or community in the home country), cultural activities, building places of worship (church, temple, mosque), creating local language media, food, ways of dressing and so on.

In contemporary times, the connections are much deeper – enabled by global media, information and communication technologies.

So today in my talk I want to underline this argument that in immigrant nations such as the United States (and also many European nations) the diasporic cultural communities and their contemporary usage of media and communication technologies have altered the notion of the public sphere and to a large extent, disrupted the idea of the nation-state itself.

Let's consider the idea of the nation, and how media have historically been implicated in construction of national identity, or a national consciousness.

By the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century in immigrant societies like the United States the nation state created the concept of nationhood and citizenship that created an inclusive structure for the vast numbers of immigrants and refugees into a community of the nation (Arnason, 1990).

The material sense of citizenship via official state documents were useful yet the nation state would need allegiance from its constituents – citizens - to participate in national projects including during war against other nations.

A national consciousness, a sense of belonging towards fellow community members was being cultivated. Benedict Anderson in his influential book, *Imagined Communities* has described how the thrust of “print capitalism” along with other extraneous factors such as Protestant Reform movement that spread through mass printing – Martin Luther’s theses nailed to the chapel door in Wittenberg were printed in German and reached every part of Germany in fifteen days), assisted in this building of national consciousness.

One of the earliest forms of capitalist enterprises – book publishing, and their quest for markets had established printing branches all over Europe, ignoring national frontiers. A first global enterprise, Book publishing was ironically instrumental in nation building. In their continuous search for markets, to reach largest numbers of consumers or readers, printers assembled related vernaculars into a print language (French in Paris, English in London) that later on became “official language” of the state. The official vernacular of print media and its devoted readership has its contribution in the decline of imagined community of Christendom and the rise of imagined community of a secular nation (Anderson):

*These print languages laid the bases for national consciousnesses in three distinct ways. First and foremost, they created unified fields of exchange and communication below Latin and above the spoken*

*vernaculars. Speakers of the huge variety of Frenches, Englishes, or Spanishes, who might find it difficult or even impossible to understand one another in conversation, became capable of comprehending one another via print and paper. In the process, they gradually became aware of hundreds of thousands, even millions of people in their particular language-field, and at the same time that only those hundreds of thousands, or millions so belonged. These fellow readers to whom they were connected through print formed, in their secular, particular, visible invisibility, the embryo of the nationally imagined community. (Anderson, p, 44).*

The newspaper, that was 'extreme form of the book' sold on mass scale even while its contents ephemeral, reiterated this very sense of secular community, Anderson points out. The act of reading the newspaper served as a mass ceremony:

*Each communicant is well aware that the ceremony he performs is being replicated simultaneously by thousands (or millions) of others of whose existence he is confident, yet whose identity he has not the slightest notion. Furthermore, this ceremony is incessantly repeated at daily or half-daily intervals throughout the calendar. What more vivid figure for the secular, historically clocked imagined community can be envisioned..... community in anonymity which is the hallmark of modern nations. (Anderson, p, 35)*

A pan-national language became an important component of national identity providing a sense of homogeneity for national societies.

Immigrants or linguistic groups pose a challenge to this homogeneity of language and so to an imagined national culture and ideology. Societies and nation states have developed ways of inclusion or exclusion of newcomers – the inevitable flows of different ethnic or linguistic groups entering national borders. Linguistic commonality underlines membership in the constructed imagined community of the nation.

So the idea of the nation and national identity thrives under these conditions until the early decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

In fact, in the post-colonial nations in the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century, mass media were heavily used to cultivate national consciousness and allegiance to the republic or the nation carved out disparate princely/tribal states unified into a modern nation-state. India is an example where the regional monarchies were stripped of political power to form a modern nation-state, and the republic's first Prime minister enlisted poets and song-writers whose work was aired on the state-owned All India Radio to cultivate a sense of national consciousness.

Subsequently, most of the late 20<sup>th</sup> century witnessed large scale dispersion of populations across national borders – what we call diasporas. Of course due to many factors – war, conflict, emerging ideologies, and certainly faster efficient transportation technologies.

In the past century these dispersed populations came together across borders in new in physical spaces. A Chinatown, a Little Italy, or Little India became features of large metropolitan cities such as New York, Philadelphia, Toronto, London, or Singapore. These 'ethnic enclaves' are spaces in the city where diasporic populations of particular national, linguistic, cultural affinity clustered. Their shared language and cultural history enabled them to form networks and garner 'social capital' that eased their transition to the new country and facilitated economic, cultural and political life. For people dispersed from a region or a nation, these spaces of arrival in enclaves would not seem so far apart from spaces of departure.

In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, in the age of hyper globalization, there is yet an accelerated, prodigious movement of people across borders. Diasporic populations swell exponentially. Also, these contemporary diasporic populations are too diverse - in that they are from many varied linguistic, cultural and socio-economic backgrounds, to be contained in enclaves. Their need for 'social capital' is different from the immigrants of 20<sup>th</sup> century.

Now, in the digital age, 'connectivity' to their heritage culture - a key notion of diasporic cultural life does not depend on physical proximity. the local physical networked formations do exist but global online networks have gained far more currency beyond those local networks. Some have called this 'transglobalization.'

Further, these diasporic populations are not only tied immediately to territory of their departure (or their heritage nation) but through electronic capabilities, are connected with multiplicity of nations and cultures across the globe. So they are connected with diaspora in other countries. For example, within the online ecology consisting of news, literature, music videos films, fashion and entertainment bulletins, the Indian diaspora in the USA would be very much connected to the Indian diaspora in England. Or the Indian diaspora and the Pakistani diaspora connect over Bollywood films and music channels.

So while the very local micro-spheres of communicative practices within the diasporic communities practiced through: cultural events, celebrations such as Independence day- (of India, South Sudan), church, poetry readings, musical events, community centers or clubs, tend to continue; in the digital era, the diasporic communities have acquired a a veritable online life. The communicative practices of diasporic communities are predominantly a measure of the online ecology. And so the existence of digital diasporas.

Alright, so what do these developments mean for the nation and the idea of a national public sphere?

I want to suggest this:

In the digital age, the texture of every day diasporic/or immigrant life is transformed. The infrastructure of digital networks has forged unprecedented transnational diasporic networks - in that immigrant populations live veritable hyphenated lives - with hyphenated national identities. For example, we have Vietnamese-Americans, Bosnian-Americans, Chinese-Americans whose lives are literally straddled across national and cultural borders as they are connected with relatives, friends religious/or cultural communities across national borders.

Thomas Faist (2008), has suggested that the new transnational approach to mobility goes beyond the traditional binary concept of emigration and immigration. By contrast, contemporary transnational mobility should be understood as manifold processes linking together countries of origin, destination, and onward migration, and as a nexus of networks for sustained and continuous cross border transactions. So from the vantage point of diasporic cultural communities, the idea of a nation state and belonging is very much disrupted.

Further, as Stuart Hall (1990) argues, the new diasporas are a product of interlocking histories and cultures... a product of a "diasporic consciousness." This then is vastly different from the notion of "national consciousness" that the nation-state of 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century tried to cultivate. Most diasporic populations at their various gatherings will sing the national anthem of the country but also the national anthem of their heritage country.

What then about media and the national public sphere?

There is a variable geometry of relationship here - between the local and transnational news media networks; between media (top down information) and horizontal (social media networks) communication. Then there are the vibrant multidirectional flows of ethnic or language media content across national borders - for example, Chinese language content on Chinese satellite TV, Brazilian Telenovelas, Mexican soap operas, Bollywood films, country specific news networks in language media watched by ethnic populations. All this has fragmented the national public sphere and rendered it a massive global dimension.

So if mass media had once contributed to building a national consciousness, a national identity today's convergent, fragmented global media might have advanced a global or a multi-national consciousness or multi-layered identity.

I leave you with this thought. Thank you.

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## MEDIA REPRESENTATION OF THE PROTESTS AGAINST THE G20 2017 SUMMIT. AN ANALYSIS OF THE GERMAN MEDIA

ANNA THEOBALDT<sup>1</sup>

**ABSTRACT.** In 2017 Germany has had the presidency of the G20 and organised the annual summit between the 7th to the 8th of July. The chosen location for this event was Hamburg, and it was disputed because of the high difficulties to secure the city accordingly to the security requirements. Police from all around Germany were positioned in Hamburg for the days of the summit to protect the city from the rioters.<sup>2</sup>

The first protests that took place were rather peaceful and without major crimes, however starting with the „Welcome to Hell“ demonstration on Thursday, the 6th of July, rioters began throwing glass bottles, burning down cars and aggressing the police. But this is only one side of the truth. Peaceful protestors were also aggressed by the police<sup>3</sup>.

In this article we intend to analyse if the ethical reporting standards were respected by the German media, in their coverage of the G20 summit protests.

**Keywords:** framing, protests, Germany, media ethics, G20

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<sup>2</sup> <http://www.spiegel.de/panorama/justiz/g20-gipfel-in-hamburg-wie-die-polizei-sich-ruestet-und-womit-sie-rechnen-muss-a-1154613.html> (12.12.2017)

<sup>3</sup> <https://g20tohell.blackblogs.org/> (12.12.2017)

## The German media self-regulatory system

The German Press Council, formed by 5 newspaper publishers and 5 journalists in 1956 to avoid a Federal Press Law, adopted the German Press Code in 1973, as an instrument used to guarantee the liberty of information, the liberty of press and the liberty of opinion in Germany. It is a code of honour and should be taken as a guideline for ethical journalism by all German journalists.

The German Press Code is divided into 16 sections in order to make an ethical approach for journalistic work measurable. Those sections are continuously being kept up to date. For example, in 1978, because of women's complaint about sexist pictures of women in a newspaper, a section against the discrimination of different groups was introduced.<sup>4</sup> Today, the German Press Council is taking the digitalisation of journalistic work into consideration. The goal is to modify the German Press Code, in order to make it fit to the changes in journalism, as for example the function of online comments.<sup>5</sup>

Readers can complain about a disrespect of the ethical code. The German Press Council receives those complaints. The most complaints in 2016 were directed against regional and local press (523) followed by popular magazines (191) and boulevard press (178)<sup>6</sup>. Thus, 67,2% of the complaints in 2016 were against online articles and 24,2% against print articles<sup>7</sup>. Readers can send complaints to the council per post or online. In meetings, the chairmen of the four mayor organisations who form the council (The Federation of German Newspaper Publishers, The German Journalist Organisation, The

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<sup>4</sup> [http://www.presserat.de/pressekodex/chronik/#panel-faelle\\_die\\_den\\_kodex\\_veraenderten](http://www.presserat.de/pressekodex/chronik/#panel-faelle_die_den_kodex_veraenderten) (17.01.2017)

<sup>5</sup> [http://www.presserat.de/pressekodex/chronik/#panel-digitalisierung\\_im\\_blick](http://www.presserat.de/pressekodex/chronik/#panel-digitalisierung_im_blick) (17.01.2017)

<sup>6</sup> <http://www.presserat.de/beschwerde/statistiken/#panel-beschwerdegegner> (17.01.2017)

<sup>7</sup> [http://www.presserat.de/beschwerde/statistiken/#panel-verhaeltnis\\_zwischen\\_print\\_und\\_onlinebeschwerden](http://www.presserat.de/beschwerde/statistiken/#panel-verhaeltnis_zwischen_print_und_onlinebeschwerden) (17.01.2017)

German Journalist Union from ver.di<sup>8</sup> and the Union of German Newspaper Publisher) discuss about the relevance of the complaint. Is the complaint relevant, three actions can be taken: First, a hint, were the editorial department is non-publicly told that the article disrespected the ethical code. Secondly, a disapproval, which is also not public. And third, an objection, which is the hardest sanction from the German Press Council. The editorial department is asked to print the objection, except if a victim has to be protected.<sup>9</sup>

## **The ethical provisions relevant for our research**

### *Section 8: Protection of Personality.*

Section 8 does not advice to publish a full name or an image of a person without their consent. In the case of public figures such as politicians, actors or artists, two parameters are important for the question whether the names and pictures can be used or not. First of all, its the space. Is it a public space or is it a private space? If its a private space, there cannot be a general interest into publishing the name or picture. And secondly and more complex, is the question about the context. What situation is the person in? Why could it be important for the public, what is this person doing?

And why is it important to dispose of the right of ones picture and name? During our research we found an article, which showed pictures of people throwing rocks or bottles during the demonstrations against the G20 summit. The article said, that these people were chased by the police and that any advice would be more than welcome.<sup>10</sup> But these people were never searched for by the authorities. The pictures were used by the media outlet, so that everyone could recognise those

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<sup>8</sup> a german labour union

<sup>9</sup> <http://www.presserat.de/pressekodex/uebersicht-der-ruegen/> (17.01.2017)

<sup>10</sup> <http://www.bild.de/news/inland/g20-gipfel/wer-kennt-diese-verbrecher-52493328.bild.html> (12.12.2017)

people on the streets. Neighbours, the colleagues and family could recognise this picture in the media outlet. All of them will think, that the authorities are looking for those people who's picture were shown. But there is no truth behind it.<sup>11</sup>

Another situation where the protection of privacy is important, is in interviews. Sometimes, the content which a person is stating in an interview could bring them into trouble. With authorities, with a certain group of people or with individuals. It could be because they witnessed something, for which people are looking for them or because they have a special kind of interest which is against the beliefs and values of a certain group of people. It is crucial for those interview partners to have the right to dispose of their image and their name stay undercover and to protect themselves or their family.

### *Section 9: Protection of Dignity.*

The first article of the German constitution of 1949 is based on the human dignity<sup>12</sup>. The law is protecting the individual but equal values of human beings, despite their religion, their gender or age. Also everyone who is ill, whose parents are dead or if they fled to Germany is integrated into the protection of human dignity implied by the first article of the German Constitution. If an individual or a group feels their rights are being impinged, they can sue the state in any court.<sup>13</sup>

One importance of this section is again found in the historical context. German media was controlled by a regime to fit to their beliefs and values, to build one valid truth in the minds of the people (s. Introduction). Horrible things happened which do not fit to the notion of an equal and individual worth for every human being. The idea behind the basic law is to prevent the unequal treatment of human beings by the state. The idea is to take the power of the state to discriminate people because of their religion, their gender or their age.

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<sup>11</sup> <http://faktenfinder.tagesschau.de/inland/gzwanzig-147.html> (12.12.2017)

<sup>12</sup> [http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/gg/art\\_1.html](http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/gg/art_1.html) (11.12.2017)

<sup>13</sup> <http://www.bpb.de/politik/grundfragen/politik-einfach-fuer-alle/236724/die-wuerde-des-menschen-ist-unantastbar> (12.12.2017)

But after more than 68 years after the inauguration of the basic law in Germany, there are still inequalities. Highly discussed at the moment is the Gender Pay Gap<sup>14</sup>. Women nowadays in Germany are earning one fifth less than men for the same job done. Moreover, the protection of human dignity includes the freedom of opinion and religion. On the 9th of December 2017, demonstrations against Trump accepting Jerusalem as the capitol of Israel took place in Berlin. Protestors burned Flags of Israel and chanted anti-semitic slogans.<sup>15</sup>

In times of political instability, it is crucial for media and journalists to protect the human dignity in their work. It does not give the right to media or journalists not to protect the human dignity, because certain individuals or groups are doing it. Media and journalists should not be influenced by this and stick to the ethical code in order to guarantee people to make their own opinions.

### *Section 11: Sensational reporting, protection of young people.*

But why is it important to refrain from sensational reporting? Media outlets should easily be accessible for everyone, without regard on their religion, gender or age. In different forms as newspapers, online or television, to skip the burden of media accessibility caused by social inequalities and a digital divide.<sup>16</sup> Everyone has the right to build their own opinion, and this is why the accessibility is highly important. However, this easy access also implies that younger people are confronted with those reports - in which form does't matter.

But why do children need to be protected in front of violence if it is a fact? We will explain with Edward Bernays, Sigmund Freuds nephew, who knew, that it is easier and more successful to trigger the emotions of the masses instead of their reason. He was responsible for the public relations of different products such as Lucky Strike, Procter

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<sup>14</sup> <http://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2017-03/gender-pay-gap-lohnunterschied-frauen-maenner-deutschland-bezahlung-statistisches-bundesamt> (12.12.2017)

<sup>15</sup> <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/berlin-antisemitismus-bei-protest-gegen-jerusalem-beschluss-die-fakten-a-1182687.html> (12.12.2017)

<sup>16</sup> <http://whatistechtarget.com/definition/digital-divide> (12.12.2017)

and Gamble or Cartier. What he did, was creating an incident, this incident would create a message and this message a demand.<sup>17</sup>

Putting Edward Barnays system into our context of the sensational reporting and protection of young people would mean, that the violent events presented in media sent a message to the public which will then create a demand. Sensationalist media causes people who do not have the ability to differentiate (because of a lack of access to different information, lack of media literacy or other reasons) to create one certain message and then create a demand. It could be, that one ethnic group is shown in a violent act. The message will be either, that this group is bad or that it is ok to act like this. The demand followed would be either to punish this ethic group or to do the same they did.

Therefore, the protection against sensational reporting is important for everyone. The protection and education of children is crucial, to ensure an ethical future of our society, as children are the adults of tomorrow.

### **Research objective**

In this research we intend to examine German media outlets and how journalists implement the German press code. How ethically correct is journalists' work? What are the differences between the different media outlets concerning the information published? What crimes during the G20 protests are represented and how? The following paragraphs present the research methodology.

### **Research Questions and Hypothesis**

To narrow down my field of interest and for the purpose of having precise results, I formulate the following research questions and hypothesis.

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<sup>17</sup> <http://www.spiegel.de/einestages/pr-erfinder-bernays-a-948512.html> (12.12.2017)

### *Research questions*

1. Regarding the respect afforded to the provisions of the ethical code  
In which degree do the media outlets respect the German press while reporting on the protests?
2. Regarding the media representation of crime and criminality
  - How do the media outlets differ with regard to the published information in the three chosen points in time?
  - How do the media outlets differ regarding the manner the information is published ?

### *Research hypothesis*

1. Regarding the respect afforded to the provisions of the ethical code
  - Overall, German media does respect the ethical code.
  - Seldom, some of the media products published during the summit that disrespect the ethical recommendations of the code
  - The right and the left media outlets will break the ethical codes than the centrist ones.
2. Representation of crime

The main information will not vary from the conservative media outlets to the left ones. Some information will only be found in individual media outlets

### **Methodology**

In order to verify if the work of german journalists is ethical, we chose three sections from the German press code which we examined: Section 8: Protection of the personality, Section 9: Protection of dignity, Section 11: Sensational reporting, the protection of young people. Are the journalists sticking to those particular sections? To answer this question, we examined if the indicators reflecting the chosen sections

are present or absent in the examined media products. If we couldn't find those indicators in an article, the journalist is working ethically correct, and if we did find the indicator, the article is ethically challenging. But what do the different sections mean?

We will further on briefly explain the chosen sections and their relevance for the research. First, we are going to explain section 8. This section is about the respect of the private life of a person and his or her right to self-determination about personal information. However, the code also states, that information can be published, if a person's behaviour is of public interest and publishing the information would not only be for sensationalism. We chose this section for the research about the representation of criminality, as we are interested to see, if the German media respects this section. Do they publish personal details? If yes, who does it? What kind of details? About what person?

Section 9 also presents interest for the paper: Protection of the Dignity. This section is against the violation of people's dignity with inappropriate representations in word and image. However 'dignity' is never well-defined. To explain the importance for this research, it is crucial to understand, that the German constitutional law is based on the human dignity. It stands against discrimination of all groups. For this research, it is interesting to see how the chosen German media outlets are protecting the dignity of the different groups involved. Police, demonstrators, rioters, witnesses: All of them are stakeholders in the protests and the riots. How are the German media outlets coping to represent the events authentically and still protecting the dignity?

Last but not least, we chose to use section 11 for our research. This section gives advice about the protection of young people. Sensational description of violence, brutality and suffering is therefore not advised. Guideline 11.2 specifies how to report acts of violence. Again, the press should weigh the public interest against the interest of the victims and other people involved whilst reporting. The media should report in an authentic way, but shouldn't use as a tool of the criminals. No interviews shall be given during an act of violence. And, the media should not try to mediate between criminals and the police.

This is interesting for our research, as the riots have been violent. The demonstrations haven't. Did the chosen media outlets represent the violent riots in an authentic way without crossing the line to sensational report?

The following table presents the chosen sections and the matching indicators for this research.

Section 8 PROTECTION OF THE PERSONALITY	Section 9 PROTECTION OF THE DIGNITY	Section 11 SENSATIONAL REPORTING THE PROTECTION OF YOUNG PEOPLE
Names published <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• predators</li> <li>• suspects</li> <li>• witnesses</li> </ul> Pictures published <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• predators</li> <li>• suspects witnesses</li> </ul>	Discrimination <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• opinion</li> <li>• race</li> <li>• gender age</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• description of violence</li> <li>• pictures of violence</li> <li>• interview of predators during act of criminality</li> </ul>

### Media monitoring

We chose to analyse seven German online media outlets from different political backgrounds to be able to give a broad view on the representation of crime in German media. We have therefore selected two conservatively positioned, one liberally positioned, two left-liberally positioned and two politically left positioned<sup>18</sup>. In the following graph the media outlets are classified through their political orientation, and their runs are stated below their logos.

<sup>18</sup> <https://www.eurotopics.net/de/> (13.12.2017)



## Results

First, we are going to sum up the results of our research regarding the respect of the ethical code on the part of German media outlets when reporting about the G20 protests. Secondly, we will sum up the results regarding the representation of crime in the chosen German media outlets during the three periods of time previously identified. The presentation of the results will follow the structure of the research questions and hypothesis, however the presentation of the results regarding the media representation of crime, criminality and protests will include an ethical discussion as well, as the subjects were unseparable.

### 1. Respect of the ethical code

*In which degree do the media outlets respect the German press code in regard of their representation of the protests?*

We found out, that 14 out of 77 articles did not respect the provisions of the German press code that were monitored for, which represents 19% of the articles published on the subject. All of these disrespecting articles were published in the conservative media we used in our research. 9 disrespects were found in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and 5 disrespecting articles in Bild Zeitung. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung therefore published 60% of the articles disrespecting the recommendations of the ethical code and the Bild Zeitung 40%. This also means however that the liberal and left media outlets all respected the ethical code in all published articles we looked at for this research. Regarding the chosen periods of time, our research shows that 4 disrespects were found before the summit, 5 during the summit and another 5 after the summit. One can conclude, that the disrespects of the ethical code does not depend on the period of time as the amount is similar during all the periods examined.

Concerning the hypothesis that section 9 of the German press code, the protection of dignity, will be the most disrespected section, the qualitative analysis indicated that the hypothesis doesn't verify, as section 8 of the ethical code regarding the protection of personality was disrespected the most. Section 8 was disrespected 12 times, which is 86% out of all disrespects of the ethical code. Section 9, the protection of dignity was disrespected 2 times, which is 14%. Section 11, the sensational reporting and protection of young people, was always respected.

All in all, the majority of German media outlets respected the German press code. Our research shows, that mostly the conservative media disrespected the provisions, and these are the media outlets which have the highest publishing rates in print. Therefore we conclude that the hypothesis that the majority of German journalists are respecting the ethical code is verified and proven accurate.

## 2. Representation of crime

*How do media outlets differ in regard to the published information in the three chosen periods of time?*

The research shows that the disrespect of the ethical code does not differ significantly in the three periods of time monitored, as we found a balanced distribution of the situations in which the recommendations of the German press code were disrespected, 4 being identified in the reporting before the summit, 5 during the summit and equally 5 after the summit.

However, the different media outlets did not publish the same information. Even if the timing of the events, the numbers and the stakeholders are identified and presented mostly the same in the different articles, some information is always left out. For example, only the Tageszeitung did report about Neo-Nazis also taking part at the protests against the G20 summit. Or the Bild Zeitung was the only

one to look for accused rioters. In the light of these results of the media monitoring, we cannot accept as correct the hypothesis that the main information will not vary between the different media outlets chosen.

*How do media outlets differ in regard to the way the information is published?*

In order to answer the question regarding the way information is published, we made notes during the research about what surprised us or what we noticed to be particular. We noticed, that the Bild Zeitung and the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung had similarities, as they are often not quoting names. They are quoting ‚an expert‘ or ‚someone‘. What those two media outlets also had in common, was that the demonstrators and rioters were not separated from each other. All of them were described as ‚Left-slobs‘. Moreover, to describe the demonstrations, those two media outlets used the pictures of the rioters: burning cars, people throwing bottles or a black masked mob.

The left and liberal media outlets reported differently about the demonstrations and riots. They did not use the pictures of the rioters to report about the demonstrations as they used peaceful images or no images at all. The liberal and left media outlets also separated the rioters from the demonstrators and accused the rioters of harming the peaceful demonstrations. Moreover, they asked questions to find out how those violent acts were possible. Either by direct or indirect conclusion, according to the media outlets, the police and security measures were found guilty or the choice of Hamburg as location for the G20 summit was identified as being the main reason for the identified problems.

All in all, we found out that the conservative media outlets we chose had similarities in reporting about the G20 summit, just as the other media outlets. In the next part, we will first discuss the overall importance of an ethical code and then discuss the results we worked out in this research.

## Discussion of the results

As the majority of the chosen media outlets respected the German Press Code, we can conclude that the chosen media outlets do respect the Ethical code.

We have found interesting to see which media did not respect the ethical code: the conservative one. The ones with the biggest runs. The ones which are the most accessible. The Bild Zeitung can be found everywhere in Germany, it doesn't matter in which part of Germany, even the smallest town will sell the Bild Zeitung. Either in a Kiosk, in a Supermarket or a special vending machine only for the Bild Zeitung. Also, the Bild has a website, a Twitter account, a Facebook page and an Instagram account. Bild has therefore a lot of possible touchpoints for the public. Of course, to address as many people as possible, it is important to speak a language everyone understands, even those with a lower education background. Bild is therefore using an easy sentence structure, strong images and emotional phrases that everyone can understand. So the Bild Zeitung entertained people to get as many persons as possible to read their article. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung did not put such a strong accent on entertainment, as they rather gave incomplete information. They used quotes of 'someone' or 'an expert' - no names were stated or more information given. This media outlet is focuses on another target group. They want to reach more educated people who have a conservative way of thinking. We believe that the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung looks more serious and therefore better researched than the Bild Zeitung. Each author has its own specialisation and has its picture next to the article. They usually quote people - even if the quotes are sometimes not very meaningful.

The conservative and nationalist movements are regaining power in Germany and other European countries at the moment. We do believe, that the pretended seriousness and narrow framed information given in those kind of media is reinforcing this movement in the society. They feed the public, which is looking for explanations and people to accuse with answers - even if they are not right. Even if there is more to talk about and to think about.

We think that it is crucial to have a diverse media landscape and believe that the Bild Zeitung and the Frankfurter Allgemeine should be aware of the impact they are having on the consumers of their media. Instead of using their articles for sensation, they should inform people.

Leftist media outlets Tageszeitung and Neues Deutschland were broader in their reporting. They reported about rioters., demonstrators, police violence. They reported about police being kind. They reported about Neo-Nazis demonstrating. Their reports are not black and white, the contrasts are not really strong. Their reporting is nuanced, as the world is a complex one, which cannot be understood through a simple 'bad or good' frame.

In the reports of the protests and riots, the liberal media went on a meta-level. Those articles discussed the reason why these riots were so violent and how it was possible for a lot of individuals to act as one mass and forget their own moral barriers. Therefore we have to admit, that these media gave more than just information. They delivered processed information, opinions, to the public. But the difference is, that these authors shared their way of thinking with the consumer. Bild is only giving the result of this process.

The limits of this research makes it hard to state which information given was ethical and which not not. Moreover, the limits depend on the educational background, on the experiences one has, what kind of people one is surrounded by, where one lives, what kind of culture one is used to. It is really hard - or even impossible - to forget about all of this and to judge something on the basis of its degree of ethical correctness.

## **Conclusion**

Our research showed some big differences in the way German media has represented these events, when it comes to comparing the left-wing outlets to the conservative ones. While the liberal media

mostly published nuanced representations of reality and more or less focused on putting each stakeholder group into the light, the latter has heavily emphasised the sensational aspects of the stories. Although ideological bias cannot be denied in either of the cases, our research has identified a clear tendency of breaking the German press code especially in the case of the conservative media.

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