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

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Academic papers grounded in empirical research or focused on the social realities of Central and Eastern Europe are particularly welcomed.

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Special event

Organized by the Faculty of Sociology and Social Work of the Babeș-Bolyai University Cluj-Napoca on the 12th of October 2017

The investiture of Distinguished Professor Katherine Verdery as Doctor Honoris Causa of the Babeș-Bolyai University


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STUDIA UBB SOCIOLOGIA, 62 (LXII), 2, 2017, pp. 9-16
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THE ANTHROPOLOGIST INVERSED

LAUDATIO

FOR DISTINGUISHED PROFESSOR KATHERINE VERDERY, CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK, GRADUATE CENTER, ON THE OCCASION OF THE AWARD OF THE DOCTOR HONORIS CAUSA TITLE OF BABEŞ-BOLYAI UNIVERSITY

IRINA CULIC[1]

Pro-rector, Vice-president of the Senate, Professor Verdery,
dear colleagues and students, ladies and gentlemen,

I have the special honour and great joy to pronounce the *laudatio* for Professor Katherine Verdery in the name of the Department of Sociology. For most of its members, grown as sociologists and anthropologists after 1989, her work has been constitutive. The professional field that we embraced, learning the power of ideas, the practical form of knowledge, and the relational and historical character of the social world, has been considerably shaped by the nuanced and complex understanding that she gave us through her studies. They have Romania as site of empirical investigation, and socialism and its successors as space of theoretical elaboration.

Professor Verdery is Julien J. Studley Faculty Scholar and Distinguished Professor of Anthropology at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York since 2005, and Acting Chair, Department of Anthropology, City University of New York. Her extraordinary professional trajectory developed in two of the core centers of American academic Anthropology, at Johns Hopkins University, in Baltimore, Maryland and University of Michigan, in Ann Arbor.

She received a BA in Anthropology from Reed College, Portland, Oregon, and an MA in Anthropology from Stanford University, Stanford, California. In 1977 she is awarded a PhD in Anthropology from Stanford University, for a

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thesis based on seventeen months of ethnographic fieldwork in Transylvania, carried out between 1973-74 in the village of Aurel Vlaicu – Binţinţi, in Hunedoara county, Romania.

The 1970s represented an important interval of reappraisal for the two parts divided by the Cold War, to which the presence of a number of social anthropologists in Romania contributed in a very distinct way. Katherine Verdery, alongside Gail Kligman, Sam Beck, David Kideckel, Steven Sampson and others, aimed to understand how actually existing socialism functioned, in its own terms (Verdery 1983: 18-26). Through their work in Romania, they opened an important space of critique of the capitalist forms, engaging theoretical positions from the margins (Verdery 1983, 1991). They set about to "combat both the stereotypical, propagandizing notions of it so common in the U.S. media and also the utopian and idealized images held by Western leftists who had not experienced living in it" (Verdery 1996: 11). By the essence of the profession itself, to know a society through the immediate and profound experience of its lived life, these researchers performed the double task of interpreting and translating the society into which they entered, through and for the society from which they came.

Meeting the Other at the level of everyday interaction, in a context of existential dependence, generates continuous conceptual decentering and recentering of the social and cultural categories employed. The political tension of the Cold War marked significantly what could be asked and explored, where and how this could be done, and the historically situated self of the anthropologist.

After four more months of fieldwork and archival research during 1979-80, the social history of the village of Aurel Vlaicu was published at University of California Press in 1983, as *Transylvanian Villagers: Three Centuries of Political, Economic, and Ethnic Change* (Verdery 1983). The book recounted little about the socialist system in Romania at that moment, partly owing to author's ethical dilemmas on how to answer the generosity of the Romanian government, and the villagers alike, during the time they had hosted her in their home (Verdery 1983: 20-25; 2013: 37). What Verdery did, however, was to assemble a formidable narrative unfolding on several scales, that brought together historical, sociological, and ethnographic material to describe the evolution of villagers' lives throughout three centuries. The book investigates how three types of relations weave together and are spoken out: relations with political layers that succeed each other culminating with the modern state; economic relations within feudal structures that are absorbed into the peripheries of global capitalism; and relations among groups who identify in different ethno-national terms (Verdery 1983: 3).

Meanwhile, the observation that the most sensitive topic debated in the Romanian public sphere was national identity defines the next research project with which Katherine Verdery returns to Romania for eleven months in 1984-

85, completed with another five months in 1987 and 1988 – the role of history-writing in crystallizing national consciousness (Verdery 2004: 140; 2013: 38). The project gradually transforms when, disturbed by the constant interference of the Securitate surveillance, the work moves from the village to the city. It acquires ideas and interpretations that connect the books and newspapers read in the libraries, with the conversations held with Romanian intellectuals, and with the experience of everything that happens around her. The project grows, and the gaze expands towards the whole field of cultural production. Detailed, nuanced, and precise analyses expose the struggles among historians, writers, philosophers, literary critics, and sociologists, and the representatives of the authorities, that mobilise symbols and meanings of the nation. They reconstruct and perpetuate the national ideology, which, gradually, will erode the discourse of Marxism and its forms of legitimation. The resulting book, *National Ideology Under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceaușescu's Romania* (Verdery 1991) is sent to the press on November 8, 1989 with the conviction that its publication will make impossible the return to Romania. The following day the Berlin Wall is torn down.

This work, together with the next book, *What Was Socialism and What Comes Next*, published by Princeton University Press (Verdery 1996), consecrate Katherine Verdery as one of the most influent voices to give an understanding of how socialist societies functioned, and into what forms they were recomposing. In tension with the theories and methods of political science, the dominant discipline to provide models during the Cold War and after the fall of the Eastern bloc (Verdery 2013: 41), her analyses are built on notions and explanations produced by authors formed in the socialist systems of Eastern Europe, and are supported by years of engaged interaction with the people and their institutions.

Her prodigious work of this period, which comprises, next to a large number of influent articles, two edited collaborative volumes (Banac and Verdery 1995, Burawoy and Verdery 1999), calls for suspending judgment about the outcome of post-socialist transformation, and for questioning the ideological layers of concepts like market, civil society, or privatisation, rather than automatically taking them on and reinforcing them (Verdery 1996: 10-11). The understanding of socialist systems and of what succeeded them enables the development of the critique of Western economic and political forms, through the eyes of those who are living their construction, in a perpetual quest to devise and appreciate habitable alternatives of social arrangements.

Translated into Romanian several years after their publication, *Compromis și rezistență. Cultura română sub Ceaușescu* (Verdery 1994) și *Socialismul. Ce a fost și ce urmează* (Verdery 2003b) had a huge influence on the Romanians who read them – different generations, for whom the experience of the present, the

memory of the past, and the imagination of the future are very different things. Such objectifying mirror, which takes apart and recomposes our notions of our identity and of the traces we leave in the world, generates self-interrogations and repositionings, bringing pain, frustration, revolt or rejection, but also understanding, compassion, reflection, enchantment.

Enchantment is what Verdery proposes with her 1999 book *The Political Lives of Dead Bodies: Reburial and Postsocialist Change* (Verdery 1999), published in Romanian in 2006 as *Viața politică a trupurilor moarte. Înhumare și schimbare postsocialistă* (Verdery 2006). The wish to animate, to enliven, a field of political analysis become bland is the source of inspiration for this study, which searches the meanings of frequent movements of dead bodies in post-socialism: the repatriation, circulation, disinterment, and reburial of the bodies of personalities or common people, and the overthrow, removal or relocation of statues of former leaders and ideologues. On the one hand, the study of post-socialist transformation is reinvigorated by bringing in the symbolic-cultural interpretive dimensions, and the classical analytical entry-points of anthropology; on the other hand, the places of political action and political processes are discovered in less expected areas. Nationalism is thus explained as part of kinship, spirits, ancestor worship, and the circulation of cultural treasures, rather than as a matter of territorial borders, state-making, "constructionism," or resource competition; legitimation processes are seen as reorganisations and reorderings of a meaningful universe (Verdery 1999: 26).

The Vanishing Hectare, published in 2003 (Verdery 2003), occasions a forceful re-entry on anthropology's playground. The book contributes one of the most valuable analyses of post-socialist transformations, pivoting around the political process of land property reform. De-collectivisation, or undoing the socialist agricultural property, is followed at the level of people who live it every day. Their experiences, feelings, actions and relationships are located in local power structures, specific regional dynamics, governmental policy constraints, and directives of financial international organisations. In this book, Verdery gives, and copiously illustrates with ethnographic material, an unparalleled conceptualisation of the notion of property as cultural system, organisation of power, and set of social relations, which emerge in social processes. This work receives large professional recognition and is awarded numerous accolades. A year later, the question of the constitution and re-constitution of property, and its relation with the value it generates, is examined as a central element of global relations in the collection co-edited with Caroline Humphrey, *Property in Question: Value Transformation in the Global Economy* (Humphrey and Verdery 2004).

Paired with this research is another large-scale professional adventure taken up by Katherine Verdery at the beginning of the 2000s, together with her fellow Romania scholar and friend Gail Kligman, Professor of Sociology at the University of California, Los Angeles. They invite representatives of several disciplines – History, Anthropology, Sociology, Law, and Literary Critique – to form a team of fifteen scholars, who will investigate the process of the collectivisation of agriculture in Romania. Most of them are working within institutions in Romania; two of them, Călin Goina and Virgiliu Țârău, are members of our university. The project is interdisciplinary and international, but also intergenerational: alongside established researchers, the team included five Romanian doctoral students, three of whom were studying with Verdery and Kligman. Their investigation takes them to twenty one localities spread all over the country, and employs research techniques and sources from all the disciplines represented, especially archival material, official statistics, legislative documents, and oral history interviews – an intense process of mutual learning and shared field experience.

Within the space of this project one can grasp, at scale, the influence of Professor Verdery's work in Romania. First, she gave shape and face to anthropology, and to its specific method, ethnographic fieldwork, in a professional space where what bore these names was limited to one aspect of discipline's scope only. Her research projects, all carried out in Romania, represented exemplary practice - of anthropology and beyond anthropology, when their purpose relocated into other areas of the social sciences, in times of adversity. Traversing disciplinary boundaries left decisive marks on the methodological strategies and the epistemic constructs of Romanian history and sociology. Second, Verdery engaged the scientific work of her Romanian colleagues, attenuating the colonizing and self-colonizing forms of scholarly work done in the region, before and after 1989. Her analyses, minutely assembled, vividly documented and supported by an alert and precise reflection, often overturned autochthonous ideological versions or heroic stereotypes about facts, people, symbols, and social processes, circulated within the Romanian political and scientific fields alike. At the same time, she offered Romanians a phenomenal mirror into the past and into the present, the result of countless hours and days and months of life lived with and through them.

The study of collectivisation produced an important number of reports, narratives, interpretations, articles and books by the participants in the project. In 2005 was published the volume *Țărănimea și puterea: Procesul de colectivizare a agriculturii în România, 1949-1962*, edited by Dorin Dobrincu and Constantin Iordachi, under the coordination of Kligman and Verdery (Dobrincu and Iordachi 2005), later translated to English as *Transforming Peasants, Property, and Power: Collectivization of Agriculture in Romania, 1948-1962* (Dobrincu and Iordachi 2009). It comprised a general depiction of the process of collectivisation, and the set of

case studies. In 2011, after almost as many years as the collectivisation itself had lasted, the book *Peasants under Siege: The Collectivization of Romanian Agriculture, 1949-1962* came out at Princeton University Press (Kligman and Verdery 2011), and was soon translated to Romanian as *Ţăranii sub asediu: Colectivizarea agriculturii în România* (Kligman and Verdery 2015). This work is saluted by the academic community and beyond, and rewarded prestigious prizes in recognition of its value.

While doing documentation work in the Securitate Archive, Verdery is urged to claim her own file. Opened in 1974, and active until 1988, it contains 2769 pages of notes and reports from over seventy people - friends, collaborators, and persons met by chance. The encounter with this material is an unusual occurrence for the anthropologist, because it completely reverses the angle of investigation and the position of the relation between researcher and her subject.

The strategies we use to arrive at formulations that express knowledge of the social realm are variable, from discovery to construction, representation and revelation, recuperation and salvation, indicating different points of view and relations with the object under study, and particular concerns of the researcher. For the anthropologist, empirical data are not found on an abstract plane, in objective form, waiting to be discovered, collected, and processed. Her material is exactly what she generates in everyday interaction with her subjects, in the life lived alongside them, and which engage her equally emotionally and physically, as well as intellectually. Her person – her body, sentiments, reactions – is the main instrument of investigation employed by the anthropologist. What she has to confront on field are both the exaggeration, disinformation, deception, and resistance from the researched, as a reaction to the particular symbolic violence exerted by the anthropologist, as well as her own vulnerability or repression. This common space of signification, between the anthropologist and the other, implied by ethnographic work, is one that gets reconfigured continuously. The understanding and the knowledge generated by the anthropologist is predicated on interruptions and eruptions, on the constant unmaking and remaking of the liminal common culture constructed by the anthropologist and her subjects in their interaction (Rabinow 1977: 153-54). In this space, her emotions and her reactions, when the anthropologist strives for critical distance and reflexive temperance, may effect mindful and bodily dispositions that allow deeper access to the layers of the real (Culic 2010: 201).

Read in this key, the Securitate file that Verdery had in front of her was a turning point as anthropologist. The blow, the feeling of betrayal, the pain of this unexpected reality that has always already been there, are immense.

All of a sudden, an inversion takes place. Her own person is produced as source of data and object of investigation, exactly like her own subjects were transformed into field notes. The objectifying researcher becomes the researched

object. Securitate's methods are strikingly similar to those of the anthropologist. Verdery is presented precisely with an ethnography of her own person, of what she was representing at that moment politically – the West. The Enemy.

The inversion happens on several planes. From author interpreting the reports of her subjects she becomes the subject of their reports. Their modes of interpretation are determined by the reporting conditions that the Securitate's presence within the Romanian society created. Anthropologist's presence modulates not only the space of interaction between her and her subjects, but alters their whole relational space – with the others, with the authorities, with themselves, by forcing them to an examination of their own conscience when the Securitate request for collaboration is made.

During this period of pondering, suffering, and revolt, the stake that remains is to maintain the personal and the professional integrity. Verdery does this with consistency. She takes the inversion straight to the original point of anthropological practice and methodology. She transforms Securitate's acts of violent extraction and the emotional and physical reactions they produce into as many occasions of intellectual reconsideration and further reflection. But, just like with the classical anthropological terrain, the anthropologist cannot engage in questioning and redefining twenty-four hours a day (Rabinow 1977: 38). The experiences triggered by this ethnography get normalized. Out of these chronicles of projections and introjections, the personhood and wholeness of the person evoked, and of those who evoked her, are recuperated (Culic 2010: 200). They cannot be separated from the social conditions of their production. Life almost confounds with the field – a dialectic between reflection and immediacy (Rabinow 1977: 38).

For all these, for her presence here, the ceremonial of induction into the Babeş-Bolyai University family formally avows what had happened already, imperceptibly, just like with her families in Vlaicu. This ceremonial is a public declaration that she belongs here, and a moment of shared joy. Thank you.

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SPEECH GIVEN ON THE 12th OF OCTOBER 2017 ON THE OCCASION OF BEING AWARDED THE DOCTOR HONORIS CAUSA TITLE OF THE BABEŞ-BOLYAI UNIVERSITY CLUJ-NAPOCA[1]

KATHERINE VERDERY[2]

Esteemed Pro-rector Rus, Dean Hărăguş, Professors Raţ and Culic, honored guests,

Thank you for your most-beautiful words and for this wonderful occasion. It is an unequalled honour, for which I am deeply grateful – especially to my fellow sociologists. Even though I call myself not a sociologist but a "social-cultural anthropologist," my relationship with Sociology is a long and cordial one. It began at university when I took the course "Introduction to Anthropology," only to learn that much of the material had been written by sociologists. For the rest of my career I have maintained a certain confusion about the division of labour between these two fields of investigation of human life. Today you confirm their resemblance, acknowledging the kinship relation between them. In a word, you have adopted me, and it's good: I feel at home.

If you do me this great honour, I should thank you in your own language. I apologize for the unavoidable mistakes and for the fact that this speech is given in a simpler language – a language that was learned not primarily from books, but in a village, talking with people.

Because my audience today is mixed, I thought that rather than presenting a summary of my work in Romania, I would offer something more personal, about this work's "infrastructure" in my relations here. Instead of giving a new interpretation of some material, I would like to present a brief homage to a few people in Romania who supported the career that I built here and without whom I couldn't have advanced much in my projects. Because the list is very long, I will mention only a few names. You will see that my talk also concerns the methods of ethnography.

[1] Translated from Romanian by Irina Culic and revised by Katherine Verdery.

[2] Distinguished Professor of Anthropology, Graduate Center of the City University of New York, e-mail: *kverdery@gc.cuny.edu*.

I start with Professor Mihai Pop, who was the head of the Institute of Ethnography and Folklore when I arrived in 1973. Without him I wouldn't have gotten to Romania at all. For my first research, I had applied for an academic exchange fellowship (IREX), but the Romanian authorities rejected me. Since American-style anthropology did not have a disciplinary partner in Romania, my project fell between two stools: too sociological for folklorists, and too folkloristic for sociologists. But IREX's president, Allen Kassof, called Professor Pop directly and asked him, as a personal favour, to take me under his wing. The professor accepted and, throughout that year, when I visited Bucharest he would tell me about village life in Romania, in particular as seen from his birthplace, Maramureș. He suggested that I should settle in Hunedoara County for my project, and, after I unintentionally drove my Mobra moped right into a military base there, the professor took the train from Bucharest to Deva, an eight-to-ten-hour trip at the time, to talk to the "chiefs" there and find an acceptable place for me in another part of the county. After that, I called him "nănașu'" (godfather).

I don't know if Professor Pop realized from the beginning that, although I was a nice girl, I knew very little about ethnography. I was far too caught up in sociological macro-theories and had no fieldwork training. My doctoral program in Anthropology at Stanford, like everywhere else in the United States at the time, did not offer fieldwork methods. Either his intuition or just his everyday professionalism led Professor Pop to do something for me that was absolutely extraordinary. After we had arrived together in Aurel Vlaicu, the site of my research, and he had persuaded an unfortunate couple to provide me lodging, he asked the wife to give a small party towards the evening and to invite her parents, some neighbours, and the director of the village school. When they had poured the wine and served the cakes, the professor started interviewing those present, offering me a splendid example of precisely what I lacked. He talked about village history, marriage and kinship, internal migration, and many other topics. He kept an alert, but also relaxed, friendly pace. I noted his unfailing smile, his courtesy, the way he addressed questions in a down-to-earth way of speaking, reducing the social distance between them. It was the best possible lesson for a novice fieldworker.

Regrettably, his lesson was not fully learned.

A skilled ethnographer must keep her ears open all the time, to understand *what the world looks like* from the viewpoint of her interlocutor. By contrast, I tended to listen only up to a certain point and then start expressing my own ideas, which kept me from discovering theirs. Let me give you an example. One day I stopped at one of the women I had made friends with, Veca. I caught her in a bad moment, as she was lying in bed on her stomach and her sister-in-law was applying suction cups to her back. The sister-in-law held a small glass in

her hand; with the other she used a candle to light a little stick wrapped in cotton and soaked with alcohol; she put the burning stick into the glass, and immediately after, the glass on Veca's back. The little glasses stuck there and bruises began to develop under them. What the hell!?, I thought. I asked them why they were doing that, and they explained that Veca had caught a cold and the suction cups would pull the cold out of her – as already seen in the bruises. I looked at them stupefied and started to talk about aspirin, cough syrup, maybe antibiotics, and so on. I didn't try to explore their ideas, these practices of popular medicine: I told them they shouldn't do it. To this day I am still ashamed of myself.

Professor Pop was not the only one to try to teach me research methodology; so had his colleague, the Romanian sociologist I most admire: Henri H. Stahl. Professor Pop introduced me to him in 1973, and I started visiting him every time I travelled to Bucharest from Vlaicu. In our first discussion, he advised me how to work with the villagers in the field. Among other things, I should bring some forms of witchcraft, to trade for theirs. He explained to me how he himself had learnt this lesson. It seems that around the time of his research in the 1930s, he took his typewriter to the village, a thing of wonder for everyone there. Increasingly fascinated, more and more people came to ask for him to type all sort of things. Late one night, the village witch came to his place, seemingly displeased by this competition in the Dark Arts. "All right," she said. "Tell me what I have to do to make you leave." Through examples like this one, Professor Stahl wanted to warn me that the ethnographer always has to be alert and far-sighted, that the villagers are not "simple people" at all, as town dwellers believe.

Maybe my self-criticism is too harsh, but I feel that at the beginning I did not know how to do ethnography, despite the example of these two master fieldworkers, to whom I now offer praise. To support this self-critical opinion, I cite from my Securitate file a part of a telephone call between two colleagues, "F" and "N," from Cluj.

> F: – I have the impression that the ethnography she does *picks and chooses* from a number of domains without going into depth in the European style. I don't know if this is good or bad but I've seen like with her discussion of Philosophy, three words from here, four from there…
> N: – Pretty much. Probably it's an excellent instrument for informing the public over there, because she synthesizes things admirably, you know… It's just that it's as if *taken from an airplane*.

If after my first research I nonetheless succeeded in writing a book that was well received, I believe I owe that to professors Pop and Stahl and to my endless discussions not with the villagers, but with them.

Another person to whom I wish to give homage is Maria, my first hostess in Vlaicu. She was a warm, generous presence, with a somehow saintly air, for which reason I baptized her "Meri" (Mary), the English name of Jesus's mother. After Professor Pop's departure for Bucharest, I remained alone with Meri. We started talking and quickly became friends. She immediately convinced me that, although she had finished only seventh grade, she had a sharp mind and unusual powers of observation and synthesis – ideal for a beginning ethnographer. We still love each other now, forty-four years later, when she is age ninety-one.

Meri was my most valuable interlocutor in Vlaicu. I spent countless hours with her, talking about everyone in the village: where every villager was from, their nicknames, their godparents, where they worked, what people said about them, etc. She sent me to various families who became essential interlocutors and integrated me into her circle of friends. I also became and remained good friends with her son and his family, who still live in Vlaicu, and with her daughter in Bucharest.

In an interview for a documentary, Meri explained something I had not realized before.

> I liked her right from the moment I met her. My daughter had just gotten married and moved to Bucharest, and my heart was aching because she went away. And so, when Kati came, I told myself it was good to have someone around here, with me.

Translating our relation into the language of kinship, she has often told me that she loves me like her own daughter. And I her, like a mother. Such a relationship generates a context for gaining knowledge that is completely different than in other social sciences.

I became close to many Vlăiceni, but for this first year of research I mention only three, to whom Meri sent me: the families of uncle Petru Bota, aunt Lina Iancu, and Phillip Schmidt. The first two of them had completed fourth grade and were born in Vlaicu in 1891 and 1894, he to a family of day-labourers, she to a rich peasant family; they were already old when I met them and had a lot of time at their disposal. Both had keen minds and were full of good will. Aunt Lina shared many memories about the relations between Romanians and Hungarians, and uncle Petru, to whom I dedicated my first book, taught me a lot about the village economy in the past. The third person, Phillip Schmidt (the population of Vlaicu comprised 20 percent Germans), a warehouseman in a factory who

had graduated from a trade school, was a treasure of information about the nineteenth-century Swabian colonization of the village. The evenings spent with his family truly felt like a seminar (only with better food).

These are several of the people without whom my first research and the resulting book would not have been possible. For the second book, *National Ideology Under Socialism* (translated into Romanian as *Compromis și rezistență*), the most influential character was Professor David Prodan. I met him in November 1979, during a short visit to the state archives in Budapest, where the director of the Transylvanian archive introduced me to him. I saw before me a little old man wearing a navy blue beret over rich grey hair. His eyes sparkled with ferocious intelligence through his big glasses. I fell for him instantly. During the conversation he offered to help me access the state archives in Cluj, which he later did, persuading a reluctant director to accept me and provide me with a translator for the documents in the Hungarian language, which I don't know. Not only did he introduce me to the world of the Hungarian aristocracy in Transylvania, a world that came to fascinate me; he also introduced me to the library of the Academy, where I began a long and productive reading of the history of Transylvania and made friendships that would last until today (two of these friends are present here).

More important in the help that he gave me, however, was his explosive reaction to a mistake I had made in the book based on these readings: two jokes using ethnic stereotypes about Romanians, Germans, and Hungarians, intended to state the theme of the book (changes in interethnic relations in Transylvania across three social systems: feudalism, capitalism, and socialism). At home, for their intended audience the jokes opened a window onto a place about which Americans knew nothing. But – in a classic problem of transcultural translation – here the jokes were seen as an insult. The professor (alongside many other Romanians) got terribly angry. From his reaction I quickly understood that the jokes had been a stupid idea and I was full of remorse. I would have much better used the joke that he himself had told me: Transylvania, 1896. A Hungarian and a Romanian are chatting. The Hungarian, boasting about the thousand-year anniversary of Hungarian presence in Transylvania, asks the Romanian, "So, what about you? When are *you* going to celebrate *your* millennium?" And the Romanian answers, "Well, no need, since we're from here."

I suffered his anger for four months. Eventually we made up, but meanwhile I had learnt that I had no clue about the power of the national idea, so deeply rooted in the souls of all Romanians. As a result, in my next project, I decided to explore this subject more thoroughly, learning that the formation of national ideologies is a more complicated process than the theories I had brought from home assumed. This research produced *National Ideology under Socialism,* dedicated to professor Prodan, who had inspired it.

For my next book, *The Vanishing Hectare*, the conditions were completely different. In the summer of 1991, after the fall of Ceauşescu, I went to Vlaicu to see how people were doing. *Everybody* wanted to talk to me, to tell me their story about land restitution. I had not been particularly interested in the subject of property until then, but I remembered the word of one of my colleagues: research goes better when the topic is of interest for the researched population too. So I started to read about decollectivisation and returned to Vlaicu to investigate it.

This time, the research did not have a principal "godfather," like the rest. My initial dialogue partner was beloved professor Ioan Aluaş from Cluj, whom I had met in 1980. Until his sudden death that winter, he helped me very much indeed, and I dedicated to him an article entitled "The Elasticity of Land," which encapsulated the results of my investigations. But more than ever before, this time I owed the progress of my work to the help of many Vlăiceni, not to one or another professor. For example, Dorina and Lucreţia, the two heads of the agricultural association; Florin and Ana, and other state farm directors; and, above all, the villagers who were claiming their lands and were eager to tell me about their victories and their disappointments. I mention Mărioara lu' Pompi (the daughter of Auntie Lina), Iosif Bota (the nephew of Uncle Petru), Ion Caraşca a lu' Niţu, and Maria lu' Relu, in particular, with whom I spent countless hours discussing how they coped with the demands of their restored hectares. This was my most successful research because, finally, I had learnt to do ethnography and had ceased to believe that *I* knew the right answer; people were eager to recount what they were going through; and, even though rumours that I was spying persisted (as in the past), the majority of Vlăiceni didn't care anymore.

I pass over the book about collectivisation (*Peasants under Siege*) because you have heard about it from my colleague and friend Gail Kligman, with whom I wrote it. I only mention that our colleagues in our research team had great influence on the result; from Transylvania, I mention Virgiliu Ţârău, Julianna Bodó, Sándor Oláh, and Călin Goina.

My two most recent books, *Secrets and Truths* and *My Life as a Spy*, concern my Securitate file. I hesitate to thank the Securitate officers for the data they collected for me, or for the whole nightmare of reading the file and writing the books, which were extremely difficult experiences. Still, in the spirit of knowledge, I admit that the experience was fascinating and taught me very much. I give you two examples.

The first regards a close friend, whom I call "Mariana." We became friends in the 1980s, going even beyond her 1988 confession that she had given reports about me to the Securitate. Even though we hadn't discussed the details then, since she was ashamed, I returned to the subject in 2010 after I had read her

reports from the file. We talked for two full days, relating how she had been recruited, how she had felt, her meetings with the officer, the sleepless nights, her denying the label of "informer" ("I didn't feel that I had done something important, interesting. I never felt like an 'informer,' and I find it hard to use this word about myself."). After several hours of discussions, she said to me, "You did me so much harm!"

I thought a lot about these last words, trying to understand how a person who had reported on me could consider herself the *victim* and not the *perpetrator*. I went through several phases: months when I rejected her completely; months when I realised that a person who considers herself a *victim* can still keep her social relations – so crucial in Romanian society – while a perpetrator risks losing them; other months when I wondered whether a peculiar feature of the language of the reports – the use of the third person rather than the first, for the actions of the informer ("the source met target KV, who invited her to dinner") – produced a split of the perpetrator part from the self, preserving the integrity of the person; months when I saw her as a victim of the regime; and, finally, the conclusion that had I understood better how the regime functioned, had I not considered myself so clever without understanding myriad things, maybe I wouldn't have participated unknowingly in creating the trap in which she felt compelled to inform on me.

My reactions to these meetings with Mariana convinced me of the truth of an idea expressed by the famous American anthropologist Margaret Mead, who wrote, "the surest and most perfect instrument of understanding is our own emotional response, provided that we can make a disciplined use of it." My experience with Mariana fully proved the value of this idea – especially for ethnographers; sociologists' methodology does not usually invite such affective involvement. Thus, I can understand Mariana when she tells me "You did me so much harm!" – even though at the same time I believe that an informer has to admit her own responsibility for the role she has taken on. I praise Mariana for her courage in our meeting and for her power of self-analysis, which prompted me to analyse myself as well, and to confront seriously the dilemma she had posed for me: Who is the victim, and who is the perpetrator?

My last example is not an *homage* but another example of Margaret Mead's idea, which takes us to unexpected forms of knowledge. In September 2014, I discovered a website containing phones and addresses from Romania. I had a hunch and searched for information on several of my Securitate officers, and I found two. When I came to Romania several months later, I looked for one of them. I had brought with me a bunch of chrysanthemums. When I pressed the intercom, a voice answered; I said "I've got flowers for you" and the door opened. What the hell! What do I do now? I didn't have a plan, just some general questions.

I will not bore you with all the details, but this meeting gave me a profound shock. I saw myself smiling so much my face hurt; talking at breakneck speed, incapable of calming my emotions; saying all sorts of nonsense to please him (how I understood why they followed me, because I had driven my Mobra into a military base, etc.). After a while, the man sat down on a chair (he had remained standing after I sat) and entered the dialogue. We talked for at least an hour, the atmosphere welcoming and pleasant. When I got up to leave, he extended his hand saying, "Please come again. Maybe we'll go out somewhere."

This meeting shook me powerfully – in the first place, by showing me first-hand how "friendly" a securist could be, bearing important consequences for his relations with informers. Later I realized that, in a way, he had recruited me, seduced me, despite the great fear I had had for his organisation. Several nights I couldn't sleep at all, with his image in my head, having the ridiculous feeling that I had made a new friend. (When I approached him a year later, he rejected me.) I had a similar experience with the second securist I had found through the telephone website: friendly, nice, a recruitment/seduction. These two meetings showed me that, although I had the courage to approach them, I did not have the strength to confront them.

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Moving towards a conclusion, my main idea concerns the relation between theory and empirical data and what I have learned about it here. What separates my first two books (on ethnicity, and on national identity) from the others (two about villagers' relations with the land, and two about the Securitate) is the weight of theory in relation to field data. The first book, *Transylvanian Villagers*, was based on anthropological theories about interethnic relations, alongside sociological theories about "World Systems" - a huge framework in which the villager from Aurel Vlaicu, where I had conducted my research, could become lost. More than half of the book came from research in libraries and archives, not from relations with living people. *National Ideology under Socialism* was similar: a lot of readings and fewer conversations, all organized by theories of Pierre Bourdieu and Michel Foucault.

But in the book about decollectivisation, *The Vanishing Hectare*, the words of Vlăiceni and others represented the overwhelming source of my analysis and presentation. Because of this I consider it my best book, and also because the theoretical part did not overwhelm the empirical material. With this book I truly became an ethnographer. One can see this even in my last book, *My Life as a Spy*, about my relations with the Securitate, which is full of people's words – my friends from Vlaicu, Cluj, and Bucharest; excerpts from the documents in my file; conversations with some of my officers and informers, etc.

For someone who started off with the most fashionable macro-sociological theories, the fact that I end up with kinship and clientelism (very old topics in Anthropology) is, to say the least, surprising. But here is where my life and research in Romania brought me: to the overwhelming importance of the social relations that construct not only people's lives – but also *knowledge* about it. This may seem a modest achievement, but it is of the essence, and it is something I learned here, from Romanians.

I have spoken about several of the Romanians with whom I had important relations across the years and who influenced the way I understand your society. Under this guise I spoke about the ethnographer's methodology – a methodology which implies an epistemology. There were, of course, many other people – in Cluj, for example, there were Aurel Răduţiu, Pompiliu Teodor, Mihai Gherman, Liviu Maior, and the Marga and Ursuţiu families. I wanted to emphasize two ideas. First, that while starting from macro-models and a certain intellectual arrogance, I learned that ethnography demands a continuous desire to listen to people's opinions, and at the same time to use myself – my reactions, my sentiments – as an instrument for knowing. These practices distinguish ethnography from other social sciences. Second, that if my research has produced several good books, I owe these achievements less to my talents than to my Romanian colleagues and friends – to you – who have tried to teach me how to do better ethnography. The great honour awarded today should not be conferred on me alone, but on *our collaboration*.

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EXPLAINING TURNOUT DECLINE IN POST-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES: THE IMPACT OF MIGRATION

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ABSTRACT. Turnout decline in former communist countries has attracted a great deal of scholarly attention. In this paper, I re-test some of the previous hypotheses on new data and I propose a new hypothesis that considers the impact of external migration. Using multivariate regression models on a dataset of 272 presidential and parliamentary elections held in 30 post-communist countries between 1989 and 2012, I have found strong support for the "migration hypothesis": other things being equal, an increase of migration rate by 1 percentage point reduces voter turnout by around 0.4 percentage points. Most of the previous hypotheses related to causes of turnout decline are supported too.

Keywords: voter turnout, turnout decline, migration, post-communist countries

Introduction[2]

Turnout decline represents a major theme in the field of electoral studies. Scholars and politicians agree that political participation is one of the main pillars of democracy. Without citizens' involvement (seen as a continuum from choosing representatives to participating in the decision-making process) a democracy cannot function properly (Dahl, 1998; Verba *et al.*, 1995). Participation in the election of representatives is the "most frequent and basic form of political participation" (Blais, 2000; Verba *et al.*, 1995). From a normative perspective that gives preference to high levels of participation (Lijphart, 1997) a low turnout is indicative of a weak democracy. Moreover, low turnout can be seen as a threat to democracy because it implies a lack of legitimacy of the elected

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government, which leads to a lower acceptance of governmental decisions (Czesnik, 2006; Hadjar and Beck, 2010). Even more, low turnout is associated with unequal political representation of different socio-demographic groups (Patterson, 2002; Teixeira, 1992; Wattenberg, 2002; White and McAllister 2007) and consequently their unequal political influence (Lijphart 1997, 1998). In addition, low and falling turnout is considered a sign of disengagement and lower(ing) commitment to democratic norms and duties (Norris, 1999; Teixeira, 1992). In the context of new democracies, these concerns are even more relevant as they bring into the spotlight the unidirectionality of the democratization process (Huntington, 1991; Lijphart, 2000).

Turnout decline in former communist countries has attracted a great deal of scholarly attention. In order to explain turnout level and/or decline, most of the previous studies (Brady and McNulty, 2011; Inglehartand Catterberg, 2002; Kostadinova, 2003; Pacek, *et al.,* 2009; Steiner, 2010) have proposed and tested hypotheses which focused on factors such as post-communist demobilization, socialization period, civil society, social capital, "post-honeymoon effect", deteriorating economic and political conditions, "electoral stakes", economic globalization and supra-national integration. In this paper, I re-test some of these hypotheses on new data and I propose a novel hypothesis that considers the fact that the former communist countries have experienced high rates of their citizens' transnational migration (I include here temporary, short and long term transnational migration). Using multivariate regression models on the original dataset of 272 presidential and parliamentary elections held in 30 post-communist countries between 1989 and 2012, I have found strong support for the "migration hypothesis": other things being equal, on average, an increase of migration rate by 1 percentage point reduces voter turnout by around 0.4 percentage points. Most of the previous hypotheses related to causes of turnout decline are supported too.

The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents empirical evidence of turnout decline in post-communist states after 1990. Section 3 discusses the main explanatory theories of turnout decline, then the theoretical link between migration and voter turnout is presented and discussed (Section 4). Section 5 outlines the situation of post-communist transnational migration since 1990. Unlike Western European countries, states from Central and Eastern Europe have negative balances of transnational migration, i.e. they "send" more migrants than they receive. Sections 6 and 7 present the data, the method, the analyses and the main findings. Finally, the implications of these findings for different areas (democratic theory, citizen's political rights, election results, and puzzles about turnout explanations) are discussed.

Turnout decline in post-communist states

Most studies show that voter turnout (VT) is in a process of ongoing decline in post-communist states (Bernhagen and Marsh, 2007; Kostadinova and Power, 2007; Kostelka, 2014). This decline was theoretically expected because turnout in the founding elections reflect general hope and enthusiasm, but afterwards it declines due to the fact that "voters learn that elections are not a panacea and become less excited about the transition to democracy" (Turner, 1993). Nevertheless, an IDEA study (Lâopez Pintor, Gratschew, Adåimåi, & International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2002) did not find significant difference in VT between the first election and other subsequent elections (second or third wave) in new democracies. On the other hand, taking into account a larger time span and including relevant covariates, later studies identify a downward trend in VT after the founding elections (Bernhagen and Marsh, 2007; Kostadinova, 2003; Kostadinova and Power, 2007). Moreover, the descending trend continues for the subsequent elections (from the third to the fifth wave), even for the already lower rates. Controlling for institutional and socio-economic factors, the drop was 8 percentage points for the second election, 6 for the third and 5 for the fourth election (Kostadinova, 2003).

Recent data about voter turnout (VT) in former communist countries indicate similar trends across the region (Figure 1). Since the fall of communist regimes, VT has declined in average by almost one percent per year. If the average turnout was around 80% in the case of founding elections, the more recent ones have a turnout as low as 60-64%. This descending trend is common for most of the former communist countries. Only six out of the 30 countries analyzed here present a different picture: turnout is relatively stable in Hungary and is slightly increasing in Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Serbia, and Tajikistan.

Figure 1. Turnout decline in former communist countries (1989-2012)





Source: Author's calculations based on IDEA Voter Turnout Database (VAP = voting age population).

Explaining turnout decline

Why is turnout declining after the fall of communist regimes? Based on the explanatory frameworks identified in the Western World, and considering the particularities of the East and Central Asia, previous studies have proposed several hypotheses.

According to Rose (1995) turnout decline is the result of post-communist demobilization: because the citizens are now free, they chose to not participate.[3] Rose's hypothesis is not fully supported. Considering electorates from Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic, Kostelka (2010) has found, on average, a higher VT among cohorts who socialized under the communist regime compared to those who socialized during the democratic period. Other factors that could lower the turnout are a weak civil society and a low level of social capital (Howard, 2003;

[3] From the opposite view, one can argue that only in democracies electoral choices are real and meaningful and, consequently, people should participate more (Bernhagen & Marsh 2007).

Norris, 2002), but their effect is also not clear (Norris, 2002). Moreover, because these two explanatory variables are rather invariant (at least in the first decade of post-communist period), these hypotheses are rather static (Kostelka, 2010), and therefore are less adequate for explaining a long term phenomenon.

A second set of hypotheses adopt a more dynamic approach. The "post-honeymoon effect" hypothesis (Inglehart and Catterberg, 2002; Kostadinova, 2003) states that right after the fall of communism citizens are enthusiast, have high expectations but, shortly later, they become deceived and, consequently, absenteeism is growing. Even if this hypothesis has found support, it refers to the period shortly after the fall of communist regimes and, consequently, it cannot explain the persistence of turnout decline in the later elections. A more adequate explanation from a long-term perspective asserts that turnout decline is linked to the deteriorating economic and political conditions. The first years of new democracies have been characterized by severe and growing economic hardship (such as hyperinflation and high unemployment rates) which had a negative impact on VT (Bell, 2001; Fauvelle-Aymar and Stegmaier, 2008; Mason, 2003; Pacek, 1994; Pacek, Pop-Eleches, and Tucker, 2009; Tworzecki 2003). Other studies (Blais, 2000; Blais and Aarts, 2006; Blais and Dobrzynska, 1998; Fornos, Power, and Garand, 2004; Kostadinova, 2003) report no clear relation between the economic conjuncture and turnout (Blais, 2006).[4] After an initial phase of relative stability, the political conditions in post-communist states have worsened, including extreme inter- and intra-party instability, political scandals, corruption, illegal practices within parties (Hutcheson, 2004; Kostadinova, 2003; Kostadinova, 2009; Stockemer, LaMontagne, and Scruggs, 2013; Sundström and Stockemer, 2013; White and McAllister, 2004). Such processes could contribute to turnout decline. Political instability, measured as party fractionalization, is generally negatively correlated with turnout (Blais, 2006; Blais and Dobrzynska, 1998; Kostadinova, 2003), even if a meta-analysis (Geys, 2006) has not found a conclusive relation.

The third hypothesis, the "electoral stakes" hypothesis (Pacek *et al.,* 2009), states that after the fall of communism people gradually learnt to identify which elections are more important and, consequently, worth their time and effort. This hypothesis has found empirical support even after controlling for a series of alternative explanations (Pacek *et al.,* 2009).

A fourth set of factors leading to turnout decline are linked to economic globalization (Brady and McNulty, 2011; Steiner, 2010). According to this approach, international economic integration reduces the ability of national

[4] Economic downturns increase turnout at high and low levels of welfare spending, but depress it at intermediate levels, so, overall effect is nil (Radcliff 1992).

governments to shape outcomes; citizens are aware of such constraints; because the type and size of benefits are depending less on the national governments, citizens vote at lower rates. This hypothesis was tested only in the case of OECD countries (Brady and McNulty, 2011; Steiner, 2010), but I expect it to be true for the former communist countries as well. Following the same line of thought, integration in supra-national political structures could have similar effect, so one should consider it.

Migration and turnout decline: a theoretical link

All previous studies have ignored (temporary) transnational migration as a potential explanatory variable of turnout decline. In the case of former communist states, transnational migration is a relatively new and growing issue. Migration can have a major impact on VT due to several factors such as the cost of voting (time and money), being part of a social network, and bureaucratic barriers.

One of most common theories, the cost-benefit analysis, states that a person will vote when the inequality C<P*B is satisfied, where C represent the cost of voting, B the benefits associated with "winning" elections and P the probability that a single vote will decide the winner (Downs, 1957). Because the returns (B or PB term) from voting are usually low, a small increase in the cost of voting may significantly reduce turnout (Downs, 1957: 266; Niemi, 1976). Sometimes the term D - civic duty - is added to the right side of the equation.

According to Downs (1957) the principal cost of voting is time: one needs time to gather information about the political candidates, to register, to deliberate, to find and to go to the polling station, and to vote. In addition to time, if the polling station is far from home, some amount of money must be spent on travelling. Because time and money are scarce resources, voting is inherently costly. Generally, information and decision-making costs are fairly low (Aldrich, 1993). The direct costs associated with the act of voting itself are also low (Niemi, 1976). Consequently, distance to the polling stations, measured by time and travel cost, has most probably a significant impact on turnout decision. More clearly, it is expected that a higher distance will reduce the probability to cast a vote in person. This applies to in-person vote. If the electoral legislation allows mail or Internet voting, the distance to the pools becomes irrelevant. That is why multivariate analyses should include as control variables these alternative channels of casting a vote.

The studies about the influence of distance to the polling station on turnout clearly identify a negative, nonlinear relation (Bhatti, 2012; Brady and McNulty, 2011; Dyck and Gimpel, 2005; Haspel and Knotts, 2005; McNulty,

Dowling, and Ariotti, 2009). For the context of our research, it is important to add that all these studies are about local elections and that the maximum distance to the polling stations is generally low.[5] Moreover, a small increase in the distance to the polling station reduces the turnout quite much,[6] but the relation is non-linear (it declines as the distance becomes longer) being mediated by the presence of a car in the household.

If so small distances have such a large impact on turnout declining, one can expect that migrants vote at much lower rates than their conationals in national election. This would happen because the number of polling stations from abroad is small[7] and, consequently, the average distance to the closest polling station is much higher. Even if a migrant is willing to vote, the cost of voting is generally so high in terms of time and money that the turnout probability is close to zero in the case of migrants. Besides the distance factor, the costs of finding relevant information about parties or candidates (Lafleur and Chelius, 2011) and searching for the polling station location[8] are sensible higher.

Another channel of influence regards the changes in the social networks after migration. This kind of change could influence the VT of both migrants and their home network (relatives, friends, neighbours, coworkers). Regarding the migrants, living in a new social context, defined by a disruption of social connections that results from moving abroad, reduces the social pressures to vote (Gerber, Green, and Larimer, 2008; Highton, 2000; Panagopoulos, 2011). The social theory of VT (Rolfe 2012) brings more explanation for the lower turnout of migrants. Viewing turnout decision "as a conditionally cooperative response to cooperative decisions made by friends, family, neighbours, and coworkers"

[5] In Denmark, most of voters are living at no more than 5 kilometers from a polling station (Bhatti, 2012). In US, the distance is generally below 10 miles for county level elections (Dyck and Gimpel, 2005), and half a mile in average for city level elections (Brady and McNulty, 2011).

[6] Some empirical findings are quite relevant: an average increase of 0.3 miles to the polling station reduces the turnout by 3 percentage points (Brady and McNulty, 2011); for voters without a car the likelihood of voting drops from 0.664 at a distance of 0.01 miles to 0.418 at the median distance of 0.69 miles; if a car is available, voters are much less sensitive to changes in distance: the likelihood of voting drops from 0.444 to 0.392 over the same distance range (Haspel and Knotts, 2005); for those living 5 miles from a precinct site, nonvoting increases by 3.1 percent, and at 12 miles of distance, by 4.5 percent. (Dyck and Gimpel, 2005); an individual living 1-1.2 km from the polling station has a 4.9 percentage point lower probability of voting than a person living next to it (Bhatti, 2012).

7 For example, considering Romania, the number of polling stations from abroad was 170 in 1992, 119 in 1996, 152 in 2000, 153 in 2004, 221 in 2008, 294 in 2009, 306 in 2012 (BEC – INSSE). The average number of migrants per voting section from abroad lies between 9000 and 10000, which is quite far from national average of around 1000 (own computations).

[8] Benefiting from a natural experiment, Brady and McNulty (2011) showed that the consolidation of voting precincts (change in polling place) increased the search costs, that in return caused a significant drop of turnout.

(Rolfe, 2012: 4) and because migrants' social network is disrupted, VT is negatively affected. Regarding the network of migrants from the country of origin, one could expect also a change in VT. Consider the following scenario: one member of a social network migrates; the migrant is politically, socially and professionally more active (which is the case) in comparison to their social network; at the network level, the social pressures to participate socially, VT included, are decreasing; closer the connection between the migrant and a member of the network, less social pressure to participate upon that member; the consequence could be a decrease of turnout at network level.

As a direct consequence of all these factors I expect that turnout rate among transnational migrants will be much lower compared to national (internal) rates. To illustrate this statement, I present and compare the turnout rates in the Romanian national elections for the two types of polling stations: national (internal) and abroad (external) (Figure 2). On average, the internal turnout rate surpasses the external turnout rate by a factor of 13 (the variance is rather high, with a minimum of 4 and a maximum of 38).

Figure 2. Voter turnout rate in Romania: internal (national) vs. external (abroad)



Source: Author's calculations based on WB and BEC Data on Parliamentary and Presidential elections: 1992-2004
Parliamentary elections: 2008, 2012.
Presidential elections: 2009, 2014 (round 1 and 2).

Post-communist migration

After the fall of communist regimes it seems as if a whole continent would have started moving towards the West (Black, Engbersen, Okólski, and Panţîru, 2010a). This move has not happened overnight, but in time, and after certain Western European states relaxed their restrictive entrance rules (such as easier access to travel in the Schengen Area, the introduction or extension of special employment programmes and a tacit tolerance of irregular residence or clandestine work) or after the enlargement of the European Union towards Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) (Black, Engbersen, Okólski, and Panţîru, 2010b).

The estimation of the size of transnational migration and its dynamics is not an easy task. According to some studies (Mansoor and Quillin, 2006), around 3.2 million people migrated from ten CEE states to West Europe between 1989 and 2004. Shortly after the EU accession of new CEE member states (in 2004 and 2007), the number of transnational migrants increased a lot, even if official data underestimated it (Black *et al.,* 2010b). The lack of reliable figures on migration is due to the inclusion of only registered workers without accounting for the large segment of unofficial labour migrants.

Figure 3. Migrant population in former communist countries (1989-2012)



Source: Author's calculations based on WB Data.

Based on World Bank[9] data related to the migration rate (the percentage of migrants from the total population) across countries, I have estimated the

[9] Using this source has the main advantage that includes migrant population estimates for all countries (origins and destinations), while Eurostat includes only data related to migration from one European Country to another. The problem is that data are not available for all years of interest. In order to fill the gaps, I imputed the missing values using one out of two regression models (linear or logistic, depending on data distribution shape).

values of this indicator corresponding to a series of elections from 30 post-communist countries for 1989-2012 (Figure 3). As one can observe, on average, the percentage of migrant population increased from around 10% to 15% (from total population). Also, in the case of EU new and (potential) candidate members the increase is even larger. Based on these figures, one could expect a negative impact of migration on turnout.

Data and method

To answer the research question and test the hypotheses, I have considered 30 former communist countries[10] and almost all presidential and parliamentary elections held in these countries between 1989 and 2012. The dataset has 272 cases (elections), with a minimum of four cases for Kosovo and a maximum of 13 for Poland. The source of turnout data was for most cases IDEA, but few cases were corrected or included from other sources when missing. For missing turnout figures and in order to control political variables, I have considered the following sources: Database of Political Institutions (DPI), Polity IV, Database on National Parliaments (IPU PARLINE), Psephos Adam Carr's Election Archive, European Election Database, ACE - The Electoral Knowledge Network, and Election Resources on the Internet. For socio-economic control variables I used: World Bank (WB), KOF Index of Globalization, Labour Force Survey (LFS), United Nations (UN), The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Freedom House (FH), and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In a few of the cases, for some data related to the beginning of the post-communist period, I have consulted a series of papers and books about post-communist transition (the full list is available upon request).

Generally, VT is measured in two ways: registered turnout (the number of voters divided by the number of registered voters) and voting-age-population (VAP) turnout (the number of voters divided by the number of citizens above the legal voting age). Both alternatives have advantages and disadvantages, and opting for one or the other depends on the researcher's interests. Also, both estimates can be affected by measurement errors. For example, if there are citizens that compose VAP who are not registered, VT will be overestimated; if there are citizens that have no possibility to vote (inaccurate electoral

[10] Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Yugoslavia, FR/Union of Serbia and Montenegro.

registers: deaths, double listings, delinquents and mentally disturbed persons), VT will be underestimated. Because alternative measures such as turnout estimates based on voting-eligible-population proposed by McDonald and Popkin (2001) for the US are not available, I have conducted all the analyses using as a dependent variable each one of the turnout estimates at the time, in a similar way as Steiner (2010).[11] As the two estimates are highly correlated (0.81), I expect the results to be similar.

Not all explanatory models of turnout decline presented above are appropriate for modelling VT change at aggregate (country) level. In some cases, explanatory variables are rather invariant, in other cases potential variables of interest are missing for most elections. Considering these constraints, I will re-test the impact of the deteriorating economic and political conditions, electoral stakes, globalization and supra-national integration. Initially, I have included several macroeconomic measures such as GDP per capita, GDP growth, GDP growth one year before election, GDP growth in all the years after first election considered, and also unemployment rates and inflation (consumer prices). However, in models discussed in this paper I have only kept GDP growth one year before election.[12] In order to measure political conditions defined as intra- and inter-party instability, I have considered the fractionalization index (the probability that two deputies picked at random from the legislature will be from different parties) and opposition fractionalization index (the probability that two deputies picked at random from among the opposition parties will be from different parties) as defined and computed by DPI. Electoral stakes have been measured as the importance of election, considering that presidential elections in presidential systems or parliamentary elections in parliamentary systems are more important (Pacek *et al.*, 2009). Globalization was measured using the KOF overall index of globalization (Dreher, Gaston, and Martens, 2008). Integration in supra-national political structures was measured by EU status in the election year: EU member and EU (potential) candidate.

Any explanatory model of turnout at country level should include control variables related to the political context (regime type, political institutions, and elections characteristics), economic context, and socio-demographic context. The most relevant models are presented below.

Indicators of the regime type (degree of democratization, polity fragmentation) are connected to VT (Geys, 2006; Kostadinova and Power, 2007). Former communist countries are closer to the democratic ideal in various degrees. Some countries can

[11] Most studies that use turnout as dependent variable use one of the two measures (Geys, 2006).

[12] I decided to skip these factors for reasons related to the ratio between the available sample size and the number of predictors and lack of statistically significant relations. Data source is World Bank and own calculations based on these data.

be regarded as full democracies; others are rather autocracies. Democratic contexts may influence VT by allowing people to abstain without any concerns for potential penalties or by imposing citizens, more or less directly, to cast a vote. The fragmentation of polity varies from one country to the other. It can have an impact on VT, but I have no expectations about its magnitude and direction.

A second set of control variables are related to political institutions: the type of democracy (presidential, assembly-elected president, parliamentary), the type of electoral system (proportional or majoritarian), compulsory voting, the existence of a vote threshold, the number of chambers, and the size of districts. Even if there are questions and controversies about these relations (Blais, 2006), generally, VT it correlates positively with district size (Blais and Aarts, 2006; Kostadinova and Power, 2007), it is greater when voting is compulsory (Blais and Dobrzynska, 1998; Franklin, 2004; Geys, 2006; Stockemer and Scruggs, 2012), in unicameral systems (Fornos *et al.,* 2004; Kostadinova and Power, 2007), in presidential systems (Stockemer and Calca, 2012), and in systems with proportional representation (Blais and Aarts, 2006; Blais and Dobrzynska, 1998; Geys, 2006). According to some studies (Endersby and Krieckhaus, 2008), the last finding is true only for fully democratic countries in systems with proportional representation, but other studies show that the relation between electoral disproportionality and VT increase in time even in the new democracies (Gallego, Rico, and Anduiza, 2012).

Electoral context is defined by characteristics like the type of election (parliamentary, presidentially, or both), the importance of election, margin of majority, the availability of voting from abroad, the possibility of voting by mail or on-line, and the extent of electoral fraud. Generally, concurrent and presidential elections attract a higher turnout (Geys, 2006; Kostadinova and Power, 2007; Kostelka, 2010). Margin of majority has systematic negative effect on VT (Geys, 2006; Stockemer and Scruggs, 2012), but sometimes the impact is rather small (Blais, 2006; Blais and Dobrzynska, 1998; Kostadinova, 2003).

Most studies have found that VT is higher in more developed countries (Blais and Dobrzynska, 1998; Fornos *et al.*, 2004; Norris, 2002). Other measures of socio-economic development related with VT are human development (positive) (Pacek *et al.,* 2009) and economic inequality (negative) (Solt, 2010). Other studies (Stockemer and Scruggs, 2012) failed to find a connection between income inequality and VT.

Socio-demographic context is defined by variables like population size, population density, percentage of the young population, percentage of the rural population, and distribution by religious affiliation. Because one vote counts less in larger countries, it is expected that the size of electoral body would be inversely

related to VT (Blais, 2006; Geys, 2006; Steiner, 2010). Due to lower turnout rates among the younger electorate, a larger share of the young population has a negative impact on VT (Blais and Dobrzynska, 1998; Franklin, 2004). Population density and percentage of rural population are sometimes related to VT (Fornos *et al.,* 2004; Kostadinova, 2003), but the findings are rather inconsistent (Blais, 2006; Geys, 2006). Compared to other religions, Islam followers seems to vote at lower rates (Bratton, Chu, and Lagos, 2010).

Analyses and findings

The dataset produced for the analyses is a cross-sectional panel. Due to serial auto-correlation, spatial auto-correlation, and panel heteroskedasticity, OLS regression is not appropriate (could produce smaller standard errors). In this case, one needs a statistical technique that allows for temporal and spatial auto-correlation and heteroskedasticity. Among the available techniques, the best choice seems to be Prais-Winsten regression models with heteroskedastic panels corrected standard errors; for example, the same technique was used by Pacek *et al.* (2009). Because I am interested in both the cross-country and the within-country effect of migration (and of other variables), I computed random-effects models. All statistical analyses were performed in Stata (13.1). I used the xtpcse procedure with the following options: correlation ar1 (specifies that, within panels, there is first-order auto-correlation AR(1) and that the coefficient of the AR(1) process is common to all the panels), hetonly (assume panel-level heteroskedastic errors), and np1 (weight panel-specific auto-correlations by panel sizes).[13]

As the regression results indicate (Appendix: Table 1a and 1b), in post-communist states VT is declining between two consecutive national elections (election sequence variable, meaning election rank), in average, with 1.7-2.1 percentage points. The tendency is in agreement with findings from other studies (Kostadinova 2003; Kostadinova & Power 2007), but, because my dataset includes more recent elections (have a more stable VT), the decline is not so steep.

Election sequence (time) accounts by itself for more than half of explained variance of VT (registered or VAP) decline. What is happening in this period to produce such a large decrease in turnout? The control variables reduce the impact of time and increase the explanatory power of the models

[13] The results are quite robust to changing the options (PSAR instead AR or independent instead hetonly).

(Appendix: Table 1a and 1b). Control variables with a positive impact on VT are autocracy level (in average, VT is 9-16 percentage points higher in autocracies), assembly-elected president (0-5 points), simultaneous Parliamentary and Presidential elections (3-9 points), presidential elections (1-4 points), margins of majority (5-9 points), and proportion of rural population (0.2-0.4 percentage points for each percent of rural population). A negative effect is observed for polity fragmentation (in average, in countries with serious fragmentation VT is 2-6 points lower compared to countries with no fragmentation), population density (VT increases by 0.0-0.1 points for each percent of increase in rural population), and Islamic countries (VT is reduced by 4-12 points). Contrary to expectations, the possibility of external vote and the possibility to vote by mail or the Internet are correlated with a lower VT but, most probable, these rights were approved especially in low turnout countries or in countries with a significant decrease of turnout in order to boost the VT.

Deteriorating economic conditions (negative GDP growth compared to the year before the election) have a significant negative impact on registered turnout. Political conditions, measured as party fractionalization, have a negative impact too, opposition fractionalization being the most important factor (there is a 7-9 percentage points difference in VT corresponding to the difference between the minimum and the maximum values of party fractionalization). The "electoral stakes" hypothesis (Pacek *et al.,* 2009) is supported by the analyses: the people are learning to identify which are the most important elections according to their national political context: on average, turnout in parliamentary elections in parliamentary system or presidential elections in presidential system is seven points higher. Even if overall globalization seems not to be related to VT, the level of integration in supra-national political structures has a statistically significant negative effect on VT: EU members have the lowest turnout, followed by (potential) EU candidate and third-countries which are not related to the EU have the highest turnouts. The models that are testing for the impact of deteriorating economic and political conditions and globalization-integration add just a little (1 percentage point) to the explained variance of VT decline. "Electoral stakes" hypothesis receives the largest support (the explained variance is increasing by 7-9 percentage points). Including these variables altogether does not change the picture too much. To sum up, the results support the conclusions from previous studies about factors associated with turnout decline in former communist countries (Bell, 2001; Hutcheson, 2004; Kostadinova, 2003; Kostadinova, 2009; Mason, 2003; Pacek, 1994; Pacek *et al.,* 2009; Tworzecki, 2003) and strongly support the predominant impact of "electoral stakes" on VT decline.

None of the previous studies has included migration among factors related to turnout decrease. As outlined above, there are some important theoretical links between migration and VT. Based on these links one could

expect a negative impact of migration on VT. To test this relation, I computed two regression models (including as controls the variables from previous models), one for each turnout type (registered and VAP). As one can see, the results are quite similar (Figure 4; Appendix: Table 1a and 1b).

Even if the explained variance does not change, migration rate has a significant negative effect on VT and, equally important, the impact of election sequence (election rank) is no more statistically significant. In both models, the regression coefficients associated with the measure of migration indicate that the impact of migration on VT is significant and quite large. An increase with one percentage point in migration rate lowers the turnout rate in average by around 0.4 percentage points. The same picture results from analyzing predicted values of turnout (Figure 4). Corresponding to the difference between the minimum and the maximum migration rate (0% to 30%), there is a decline in turnout (VAP or registered) of 12 percentage points.

Figure 4. The impact of migration rate on voter turnout (predictive margins with 95% Cis; models with control variables included)



Source: Author's calculations.

In order to assess the robustness of the findings to sample selection, I estimated the final model considering only certain types of countries: EU member (present), EU candidate (present), non EU (present), EU member, EU member / candidate, European country, the extent of electoral fraud, and non-autocracy. As the results presented in Table 3a and 3b from the Appendix indicate, the impact of migration on turnout is rather stable, with one exception: for the subset of EU countries, the impact of migration is positive in the case of VAP turnout.

To assess the robustness of the findings to model specification (control variable combination and regression technique), I used "mrobust" procedure in Stata (Young and Kroeger, 2015). As control variables I included the same variables as those from the original model. As regression techniques I considered OLS, OLS with option vce (robust), robust OLS, fixed-effects and random-effects (reg, rreg and xtreg from Stata). Robustness tests show that there is almost no uncertainty about the estimates (impact of migration on turnout). Tables 3a and 3b (Appendix) reports the two models (registered and VAP turnout) robustness results. There are no critical modelling choices, meaning none of the control variables or regression types have a high impact on estimates. Across the 1,310,720 possible models (combinations of 18 control variables and 5 regression techniques), the effect of migration rate is always negative, respectively negative and significant 97% of time (the few nonsignificant coefficients are all coming from the fixed-effects models – the marginal effect of this technique on estimates is -0.28, respectively 0.10). The mean estimate of migration rate effect from all models is -0.66, respectively -0.51, and the total standard error (incorporating both sampling and modelling variance) is 0.29, respectively 0.25, yielding a robustness ratio of -2.23, respectively -2.07. Figure 5 shows the modelling distribution as a density graph of all calculated estimates; the vertical dashed line marks the 0.38 and 0.41 percent point estimates from Tables 1a and 1b. The majority of estimates are ranging from 0.4 to 0.8 for registered turnout, respectively 0.2 to 0.8 for VAP turnout. All these results indicate a strong, robust negative effect of migration on turnout.

Figure 5. Modelling distribution of the migration effect on turnout



Source: Author's calculations.

Note: Kernel density graph of estimates from 1,310,720 models. See Tables 3a and 3b (Appendix) for more information about the distribution. The vertical line shows the preferred estimate from Tables 1a and 1b. As shown, these estimates are rather conservative related to the aggregate distribution of migration effect.

Theoretically, the impact of migration rate on VT could differ across conditions. To check for this, I had run the main model including few potential interaction effects with the possibility of external voting, the possibility of Internet / mail voting, the extent of vote fraud, type of the country (European vs. non-European), and autocracy vs. non-autocracy (Appendix: Table 4a and 4b, Figure A6). Most interaction effects are low, not statistically significant and inconsistent, but two, both related to registered turnout: the impact of migration rate on VT is smaller in countries that allow for external vote or are non-European.

Conclusions and implications

The analyses presented here indicate that economic and political conditions, "electoral stakes", economic globalization and supra-national integration are closely related to turnout decline in former communist countries. Among these hypotheses, "electoral stakes" hypothesis (people are learning which elections are more important) receives the strongest support. The main finding of this paper is that migration contributes to a large extent to turnout decline in former communist countries. Related to this main finding, one can identify implications for several areas of research: democratic theory, citizens' political rights, election results, and turnout puzzles.

The link between migration and turnout, seen as a key element of democracy, can be described as follows. Most of transnational migrants remain citizens of their countries of origin; their abstention reduced the legitimacy of elections because fewer people vote and because the interests of a specific social category, i.e. transnational migrants, are underrepresented; migrants' decisions to remain abroad or to return in their home countries largely depend on their sentiments of belonging to their countries of origin and also on how major national institutions represent their interests. A sizeable segment of transnational migrants keep contact with their countries of origin; some of them plan to return home, they buy houses and plan to start a business upon their return; many of them send money to their relatives, etc. Because transnational migrants act like small investors, they expect to be involved in public policy decisions. In their destination countries, migrants have contact, directly or mediated, with old and consolidated democratic cultures, they see how established democracies work, how state institutions respond to citizens' demands, and how political decisions are made. Consequently, their political culture changes, they start questioning the functioning of democratic institutions in their countries of origin, and they share their experiences with their relatives from home. In this way, migrants influence democratic processes from their home countries.

In two cases (Albania and Armenia), voting from abroad is not allowed by electoral rules (Ellis, Wall, International Institute for, Electoral, & Instituto Federal 2007). With some exceptions (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovenia), voting from abroad is possible, but only in person. Allowing different forms of external voting (postal, e-voting) could raise the participation of migrants by reducing the cost (time and money) of voting. Even if, probably, turnout increase will not last, as it happened in the case of Estonia (Ellis*, et al.,* 2007: 228), it is important for democracy that different categories of citizens have the same voting rights, they are equally represented, and that they contribute equally to the legitimacy of elected bodies.

Another argument about the importance of turnout is related to the fact that, in some of the new democracies, the referendums are considered valid only if a specific threshold is fulfilled (30% or 50% plus 1 of the registered citizens cast their votes). In circumstances like this, estimating the denominator (the number of citizens with voting rights), becomes sometimes a major political issue (see the presidential impeachment referendum held in Romania in 2012) given its serious implications. If migrants are included in the denominator, the number of voters will need to be larger in order to validate the referendum.

In some circumstances, voters from abroad could change the winner of the elections. This happened in the 2009 Romanian Presidential elections,[14] when Mircea Geoană received few more votes from domestic voters but lost the contest after Traian Băsescu surpassed him by winning more votes from abroad. Even more, voters from abroad could influence the voting choice of their relatives and close friends from their countries of origin. This was the case in 2014 Romanian Presidential elections, organized under the Victor Ponta as prime minister at the time, but also one of the competitors for presidency. The government did not take any real measure in order to facilitate the voting process in the diaspora, such as to increase the number of polling stations from abroad, for example. In some cases, polling stations were situated at hundreds of kilometres from the Romanian communities abroad. The voting process was in general slow and rigid, and sometimes the polling stations had insufficient staff and voting stamps. Consequently, at both election rounds, in many voting places from abroad (from big cities especially), thousands of voters waited in queues for many hours, and many of them could not even vote before the closing of polls. In some cases, voters that were unable to vote protested against the closing of the polling stations and local police was called by the embassy staff to disperse the crowd. In the context of these problems, and in order to preserve the voting rights for Romanian citizens living abroad, the electoral legislation could have

[14] The case of Romania is relevant because of his high rate of migration.

allowed mail and / or e-voting, but this did not happen. This way, the cost of voting (time and money) could be reduced and a larger share of the diaspora could cast a vote in the future elections. Adopting new methods of voting can raise security and other issues, but new democracies can learn from Western experiences in this respect.

Furthermore, these findings could add to the debates about the dynamic of turnout and the size of turnout decline, contribute at explaining the differences in turnout level and trend among East European countries, and also between Eastern and Western democracies. By including migration in multivariate models of VT (or by using turnout rates adjusted by migration rate), scholars could avoid the problem of omitting explanatory variables, better identify significant effects and evaluate their relative importance, or explain more accurately time associated changes in variances and relationships. Also, the link between citizens' transnational migration and their turnout could explain some (apparent) turnout puzzles like: Why is turnout declining if educational level and partisanship were increasing? Why are the citizens of Eastern Europe less likely to vote than those of Western Europe (Karp and Milazzo, 2015; Kostelka, 2014), even after controlling for a series of variables but migration? Considering the findings of this paper, the aforementioned puzzles can be solved by including into the explanatory models of turnout, besides education, partisanship or other usual explanatory and control variables, the rate of citizens' transnational migration as well.

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Appendix

Table 1a. Explaining turnout decline in post-communist countries (registered turnout) †

Independent variables	Time	Controls	Economic conditions	Political conditions	Electoral stakes	Globalization	All	All + Migration
Election Sequence	-2.11**	-1.67**	-1.58**	-1.72**	-1.72**	-0.84*	-0.85*	-0.50
Polity Fragmentation		-3.12**	-2.16+	-2.77*	-3.39**	-3.69**	-2.83**	-1.66
Polity IV: Autocracy		11.56**	13.03**	12.16**	13.06**	12.22**	16.01**	13.49**
Assembly-Elected President		4.92*	3.86+	3.58+	4.96*	4.23*	2.00	1.85
Vote Threshold (log + 1)		-4.22	-2.75	-3.56	-3.14	-2.95	0.14	0.01
Sim. Parl. & Pres. Elections		3.50	2.85	3.81	6.34*	3.38	5.67*	6.59*
Presidential Election		2.82**	2.87**	3.05**	1.37	2.74**	1.55+	1.27
Margin of Majority		9.22**	8.83*	6.26	7.01*	7.17*	4.67	4.81
External Vote Possible		-3.20	-3.60+	-3.33	-2.02	-3.40+	-3.34+	-3.00
Postal or E-Voting Possible		-2.51	-3.04	-2.13	-2.96	-1.33	-2.22	-1.60
Vote Fraud		1.65	2.82	0.49	1.66	0.17	0.29	0.77
Population density		-0.10**	-0.11**	-0.10**	-0.10**	-0.09**	-0.11**	-0.09**
% Youth (15-34) Pop.		0.49	0.58	0.50	0.34	0.30	0.23	0.18
% Rural Pop.		0.33**	0.35**	0.33**	0.41**	0.31**	0.42**	0.29*
Islam Country		-11.17**	-12.23**	-10.88**	-11.79**	-9.91**	-11.84**	-7.67*
Non-European Country		-1.41	-2.90	-1.37	0.15	-5.18+	-4.96*	-4.02+
GDP Growth (t-1)			-0.13**				-0.13**	-0.11*
Fractionalization Index				-1.46			1.92	3.67
Opposition Fract. Index				-7.30*			-6.46*	-6.63*
Election Importance High ††					6.94**		6.76**	6.90**
EU Status - Member †††						-6.07+	-6.95*	-7.29**
EU Status - Candidate †††						-6.31**	-5.53**	-5.14**
Overall Globalization Index						-0.15	-0.16+	-0.24**
Migration rate								-0.38**
Constant		55.97**	52.68**	63.15**	53.84**	70.42**	68.65**	78.96**
R^2	0.57	0.64	0.64	0.65	0.72	0.66	0.74	0.74
N	272	272	272	272	272	272	272	272

Regression coefficients (xtpcse); 30 countries; 272 cases (elections); + $p<0.1$; * $p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$

† The initial model included some other independent variables which were excluded from the final model for reasons related to low sample size, too many predictors and non-significance (Freedom House Index, Political System – Presidential, Proportional Representation, Unicameralism, District Magnitude Candidates (log), Human Development Index, Gini Index, GDP Per Capita, PPP (constant 2005 int. $), GDP Growth (annual %) related to the first year in the dataset (sqrt * 10), Unemployment (% of total labor force), Inflation, consumer prices (log+10)).

†† Parliamentary Elections in Parliamentary System or Presidential Elections in Presidential System.

††† at the time of elections.

Table 1b. Explaining turnout decline in post-communist countries (VAP turnout) †

Independent variables	Time	Controls	Economic conditions	Political conditions	Electoral stakes	Globalization	All	All + Migration
Election Sequence	-1.71**	-1.09**	-1.06**	-1.16**	-1.15**	-0.49	-0.49	-0.07
Polity Fragmentation		-5.30**	-4.93**	-5.19**	-5.36**	-5.88**	-5.61**	-4.43**
Polity IV: Autocracy		9.19**	9.78**	10.59**	10.37**	10.11**	13.42**	10.57**
Assembly-Elected President		1.68	1.17	0.84	1.61	1.21	-0.19	-0.40
Vote Threshold (log + 1)		-7.08**	-6.48*	-5.72*	-6.19*	-5.83*	-2.98	-3.10
Sim. Parl. & Pres. Elections		5.86*	5.54+	6.72*	8.63**	5.82*	8.72**	9.82**
Presidential Election		3.52**	3.57**	3.74**	2.15*	3.42**	2.25*	1.96*
Margin of Majority		7.37*	7.25*	7.50+	5.70+	6.21+	7.17+	7.75*
External Vote Possible		-4.85*	-4.95*	-5.35**	-3.66+	-4.86*	-4.91*	-4.56*
Postal or E-Voting Possible		-9.06**	-9.23**	-8.60**	-9.56**	-7.84**	-8.21**	-7.45**
Vote Fraud		2.81	3.24+	1.73	2.91	1.76	1.21	1.69
Population density		0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.03
% Youth (15-34) Pop.		-0.31	-0.28	-0.29	-0.38	-0.50	-0.56	-0.66+
% Rural Pop.		0.20*	0.21*	0.20*	0.25*	0.20*	0.27**	0.13
Islam Country		-5.14	-5.49	-5.21	-5.69	-4.44	-5.68+	-1.24
Non-European Country		-4.48*	-5.05*	-3.88+	-3.28	-6.69**	-5.65*	-4.45*
GDP Growth (t-1)			-0.05				-0.05	-0.03
Fractionalization Index				4.20			7.39*	9.83**
Opposition Fract. Index				-9.27**			-8.42**	-8.42**
Election Importance High ††					6.51**		6.40**	6.55**
EU Status - Member †††						-5.89*	-6.82**	-7.21**
EU Status - Candidate †††						-3.84+	-3.22+	-2.57
Overall Globalization Index						-0.09	-0.12	-0.23**
Migration rate								-0.41**
Constant		77.92**	76.88**	79.25**	74.61**	87.82**	83.04**	95.14**
R^2	0.52	0.57	0.57	0.57	0.66	0.59	0.67	0.67
N	272	272	272	272	272	272	272	272

Regression coefficients (xtpcse); 30 countries; 272 cases (elections); + $p<0.1$; * $p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$

† The initial model included some other independent variables which were excluded from the final model for reasons related to low sample size, too many predictors and non-significance (Freedom House Index, Political System – Presidential, Proportional Representation, Unicameralism, District Magnitude Candidates (log), Human Development Index, Gini Index, GDP Per Capita, PPP (constant 2005 int. $), GDP Growth (annual %) related to the first year in the dataset (sqrt * 10), Unemployment (% of total labor force), Inflation, consumer prices (log+10)).

†† Parliamentary Elections in Parliamentary System or Presidential Elections in Presidential System.

††† at the time of elections.

Table 2a. Robustness checks: Explaining turnout decline in post-communist countries (registered turnout) †

Independent variables	All cases	EU member (present)	EU candidate (present)	Non EU (present)	EU member †††	EU member / candidate †††	European country	Electoral fraud	Non-Autocracy
Election Sequence	-0.50	-1.39*	-0.07	1.20+	-0.74	-0.70	-0.35	-1.57	-0.47
Polity Fragmentation	-1.66		-5.07**	0.70		-4.65*	-0.24	-3.22	-0.74
Polity IV: Autocracy	13.49**			13.85**				13.51*	
Assembly-Elected President	1.85	-3.04	9.12	-7.94**	-13.36+	-2.74	0.80	-5.25	1.65
Vote Threshold (log + 1)	0.01	-7.62*	-17.37+	3.07	-7.78*	-5.45*	-0.51	5.41	-0.66
Sim. Parl. & Pres. Elections	6.59*	5.74	3.27	-1.48		11.16+	6.72*	-3.88	6.03*
Presidential Election	1.27	2.57	-10.58**	7.54**	2.19	2.17	-0.94	9.90	0.65
Margin of Majority	4.81	-2.51	0.02	0.50	35.95	15.80+	2.32	-8.69	5.63
External Vote Possible	-3.00	-2.13	2.49	-2.37	-15.07	5.74	-2.77	3.34	-3.31+
Postal or E-Voting Possible	-1.60	-1.78	2.56		6.74+	1.78	-1.32		-1.19
Vote Fraud	0.77	5.59	-1.71	0.30			3.32		0.83
Population density	-0.09**	-0.02	-0.22*	-0.20**	-0.04	-0.04	-0.09**	0.02	-0.08**
% Youth (15-34) Pop.	0.18	-0.33	-0.01	0.89	-1.47*	-0.02	0.35	3.92**	0.26
% Rural Pop.	0.29*	0.11	0.36	0.29	-0.14	-0.11	0.11	-0.06	0.23+
Islam Country	-7.67*		15.66	-10.98*		12.10	-2.00	-10.06	-5.47
Non-European Country	-4.02+			-16.98**				-16.93*	-3.85
GDP Growth (t-1)	-0.11*	-0.17+	-0.02	-0.16**	-0.01	-0.12	-0.10*	-0.03	-0.09*
Fractionalization Index	3.67	7.20	10.66	3.93	47.91*	23.74	5.92	3.80	5.14
Opposition Fract. Index	-6.63*	-13.26**	-4.80	-2.84	-22.75*	-7.22	-8.36**	-3.96	-8.02**
Election Importance High ††	6.90**	9.88**	-4.20**	0.13	10.12**	9.26**	5.28**	-1.87	6.45**
EU Status – Member †††	-7.29**	0.30				-8.33**	-7.85**		-6.73*
EU Status - Candidate †††	-5.14**	1.07	-5.74*				-3.99*		-4.48*
Overall Globalization Index	-0.24**	-0.33**	0.13	-0.81**	1.01+	0.22	-0.25*	-0.45	-0.28**
Migration rate	-0.38**	-0.34	-1.23**	0.15	0.31	-0.60*	-0.83**	-0.87*	-0.52**
Constant	78.96**	110.00**	87.86*	82.24**		35.63	88.20**	-3.81	81.44**
R^2	0.74	0.79	0.88	0.73	0.95	0.54	0.75	0.74	0.73
N	272	95	59	118	31	85	183	57	238

Regression coefficients (xtpcse); 30 countries; 272 cases (elections); + $p<0.1$; * $p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$

† The initial model included some other independent variables which were excluded from the final model for reasons related to low sample size, too many predictors and non-significance (Freedom House Index, Political System – Presidential, Proportional Representation, Unicameralism, District Magnitude Candidates (log), Human Development Index, Gini Index, GDP Per Capita, PPP (constant 2005 int. $), GDP Growth (annual %) related to the first year in the dataset (sqrt * 10), Unemployment (% of total labor force), Inflation, consumer prices (log+10)).

†† Parliamentary Elections in Parliamentary System or Presidential Elections in Presidential System.

††† at the time of elections.

Table 2b. Robustness checks: Explaining turnout decline in post-communist countries (VAP turnout) †

Independent variables	All cases	EU member (present)	EU candidate (present)	Non EU (present)	EU member †††	EU member / candidate †††	European country	Electoral fraud	Non-Autocracy
Election Sequence	-0.07	-0.26	-0.64	0.75	-0.96*	-0.01	-0.24	-1.92	-0.03
Polity Fragmentation	-4.43**		-6.48**	0.19		-6.35**	-4.73**	-6.57**	-4.49**
Polity IV: Autocracy	10.57**			12.31**				9.48+	
Assembly-Elected President	-0.40	-2.53	12.65+	-8.94**	-19.57**	1.46	0.15	-4.42	-0.05
Vote Threshold (log + 1)	-3.10	-10.66**	-18.45	5.25	-10.77**	-4.88*	-5.74*	5.50	-4.19+
Sim. Parl. & Pres. Elections	9.82**	7.86	3.52	12.83**		11.97*	7.05*	3.70	9.35**
Presidential Election	1.96*	3.90*	-6.41**	8.00**	3.65	3.48+	0.23	8.53	1.01
Margin of Majority	7.75*	2.87	-12.76	1.13	38.37*	22.53*	5.65	-4.94	7.96+
External Vote Possible	-4.56*	-3.50	6.47	-3.47	3.58	2.92	-2.03	4.35	-4.10*
Postal or E-Voting Possible	-7.45**	-7.37**	-16.00+		5.32*	-4.23*	-8.53**		-7.35**
Vote Fraud	1.69	5.73	4.44	2.61			2.84		1.10
Population density	0.03	0.11*	0.07	-0.09+	0.11+	0.10*	0.02	0.36**	0.04
% Youth (15-34) Pop.	-0.66+	-1.11	-1.42	1.51*	-3.63**	-1.62**	-1.27**	1.75	-0.80*
% Rural Pop.	0.13	0.13	-0.01	-0.20	-0.05	0.15	0.17	-0.55+	0.13
Islam Country	-1.24		21.17	-6.60		4.75	5.09	11.37	-0.23
Non-European Country	-4.45*			-13.89**				2.63	-3.49
GDP Growth (t-1)	-0.03	0.16	-0.01	-0.06	0.26+	-0.03	-0.01	0.13+	-0.00
Fractionalization Index	9.83**	12.21+	18.89*	9.60*	52.18**	18.53	12.93**	3.47	11.70**
Opposition Fract. Index	-8.42**	-16.55**	-5.19	-8.43*	-27.23**	-10.75+	-8.99**	-3.43	-10.13**
Election Importance High ††	6.55**	9.81**	-1.12	0.18	10.23**	9.68**	5.15**	-0.74	5.74**
EU Status - Member †††	-7.21**	0.87				-9.36**	-6.07*		-7.71**
EU Status - Candidate †††	-2.57	2.64	-5.15+				-1.13		-2.57
Overall Globalization Index	-0.23**	-0.60**	0.33	-0.73**	1.19**	-0.01	-0.23*	-0.20	-0.23*
Migration rate	-0.41**	-0.35	-0.78+	-0.29+	1.75**	-0.21	-0.63**	-1.08**	-0.47**
Constant	95.14**	129.90**	107.71*	70.58**		74.47**	116.01**	34.49	99.86**
R^2	0.67	0.80	0.76	0.67	0.99	0.65	0.69	0.72	0.65
N	272	95	59	118	31	85	183	57	238

Regression coefficients (xtpcse); 30 countries; 272 cases (elections); + $p<0.1$; * $p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$

† The initial model included some other independent variables which were excluded from the final model for reasons related to low sample size, too many predictors and non-significance (Freedom House Index, Political System – Presidential, Proportional Representation, Unicameralism, District Magnitude Candidates (log), Human Development Index, Gini Index, GDP Per Capita, PPP (constant 2005 int. $), GDP Growth (annual %) related to the first year in the dataset (sqrt * 10), Unemployment (% of total labor force), Inflation, consumer prices (log+10)).

†† Parliamentary Elections in Parliamentary System or Presidential Elections in Presidential System.

†††at the time of elections.

Table 3a. Model robustness of the migration effect on turnout

Model Robustness Statistics	REG	VAP
Mean(b)	-0.655	-0.513
Sampling SE	0.221	0.191
Modelling SE	0.193	0.158
Total SE	0.293	0.248
Robustness Ratio	-2.233	-2.072

Number of models 1,310,720

Significance Testing	REG	VAP
Sign Stability	100%	100%
Significance rate	97%	97%
Positive	0%	0%
Positive and Sig	0%	0%
Negative	100%	100%
Negative and Sig	97%	97%

Table 3b. Model robustness of the migration effect on turnout*

Independent variable*	Marginal effect of variable inclusion		Percent change from mean(b)	
Turnout	REG	VAP	REG	VAP
Polity fragmentation	-	0.112	-	-21.8%
model: xtreg(FE)	-0.280	0.098	42.8%	-19.2%
model: xtreg(RE)	-0.116	-	17.6%	-
Election sequence	0.086	0.066	-13.1%	-12.8%
Population density	0.071	-	-10.8%	-
Overall globalization	-	-0.055	-	10.8%

* Only independent variables with percent change from mean greater than 10% are presented.

Table 4a. Interactions effects: Explaining turnout decline in post-communist countries (registered turnout) †

Independent variables	No interactions	External vote	Mail / E-vote	Electoral fraud	Non-European	Autocracy
Election Sequence	-0.50	-0.41	-0.47	-0.54	-0.34	-0.46
Polity Fragmentation	-1.66	-1.95+	-1.85	-1.74	-1.31	-1.67
Polity IV: Autocracy	13.49**	12.03**	13.50**	13.92**	13.00**	10.56
Assembly-Elected President	1.85	1.54	1.90	1.96	1.04	1.75
Vote Threshold (log + 1)	0.01	-0.25	-0.31	-0.05	-0.33	-0.08
Sim. Parl. & Pres. Elections	6.59*	6.01*	6.23*	6.35*	6.94*	6.70*
Presidential Election	1.27	1.12	1.23	1.32	1.14	1.24
Margin of Majority	4.81	4.13	4.76	4.91	4.30	5.06
External Vote Possible	-3.00	-9.65**	-3.06+	-3.13+	-3.46+	-3.19+
Postal or E-Voting Possible	-1.60	-1.46	-3.71	-1.59	-1.01	-1.46
Vote Fraud	0.77	1.07	0.78	5.70	0.57	0.57
Population density	-0.09**	-0.08**	-0.09**	-0.09**	-0.11**	-0.09**
% Youth (15-34) Pop.	0.18	0.19	0.18	0.23	0.23	0.19
% Rural Pop.	0.29*	0.27*	0.30*	0.28*	0.26*	0.29*
Islam Country	-7.67*	-6.30+	-8.34*	-8.41*	-5.28	-7.72*
Non-European Country	-4.02+	-4.04+	-3.72	-3.90	-15.16**	-3.96
GDP Growth (t-1)	-0.11*	-0.11*	-0.11*	-0.10*	-0.10*	-0.11*
Fractionalization Index	3.67	3.83	3.63	4.00	3.98	3.93
Opposition Fract. Index	-6.63*	-6.71*	-6.42*	-6.71*	-8.30**	-7.02*
Election Importance High ††	6.90**	6.95**	6.91**	6.87**	7.08**	6.90**
EU Status – Member †††	-7.29**	-6.63*	-7.19**	-7.49**	-7.09**	-7.17**
EU Status - Candidate †††	-5.14**	-4.77**	-5.21**	-5.30**	-4.80**	-5.03**
Overall Globalization Index	-0.24**	-0.26**	-0.24**	-0.22*	-0.30**	-0.26**
Migration rate	-0.38**	-0.77**	-0.40**	-0.32*	-0.63**	-0.40**
Migration rate # External Vote		0.52**				
Migration rate # Mail / E-Vote			0.16			
Migration rate # Vote Fraud				-0.33		
Migration rate # Non-European					0.65**	
Migration rate # Autocracy						0.20
Constant	78.96**	84.30**	78.86**	76.26**	86.99**	79.69**
R^2	0.74	0.75	0.74	0.74	0.74	0.74
N	272	272	272	272	272	272

Regression coefficients (xtpcse); 30 countries; 272 cases (elections); + $p<0.1$; * $p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$
† The initial model included some other independent variables which were excluded from the final model for reasons related to low sample size, too many predictors and non-significance (Freedom House Index, Political System – Presidential, Proportional Representation, Unicameralism, District Magnitude Candidates (log), Human Development Index, Gini Index, GDP Per Capita, PPP (constant 2005 int. $), GDP Growth (annual %) related to the first year in the dataset (sqrt * 10), Unemployment (% of total labour force), Inflation, consumer prices (log+10)).
†† Parliamentary Elections in Parliamentary System or Presidential Elections in Presidential System.
††† at the time of elections.

Table 4b. Interactions effects: Explaining turnout decline in post-communist countries (VAP turnout) †

Independent variables	No interactions	External vote	Mail / E-vote	Electoral fraud	Non-European	Autocracy
Election Sequence	-0.07	-0.01	-0.09	-0.07	-0.04	-0.10
Polity Fragmentation	-4.43**	-4.57**	-4.33**	-4.43**	-4.37**	-4.41**
Polity IV: Autocracy	10.57**	9.88**	10.56**	10.59**	10.48**	13.16*
Assembly-Elected President	-0.40	-0.56	-0.42	-0.40	-0.56	-0.32
Vote Threshold (log + 1)	-3.10	-3.23	-2.92	-3.11	-3.11	-3.07
Sim. Parl. & Pres. Elections	9.82**	9.53**	10.03**	9.81**	9.87**	9.71**
Presidential Election	1.96*	1.88+	1.97*	1.96*	1.94*	1.97*
Margin of Majority	7.75*	7.39+	7.78*	7.76*	7.57+	7.53+
External Vote Possible	-4.56*	-7.72*	-4.50*	-4.57*	-4.62*	-4.40*
Postal or E-Voting Possible	-7.45**	-7.40**	-6.48+	-7.44**	-7.33**	-7.57**
Vote Fraud	1.69	1.84	1.68	1.91	1.57	1.91
Population density	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.03
% Youth (15-34) Pop.	-0.66+	-0.66*	-0.66+	-0.66+	-0.65+	-0.66+
% Rural Pop.	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13
Islam Country	-1.24	-0.59	-0.91	-1.27	-0.67	-1.21
Non-European Country	-4.45*	-4.45*	-4.60*	-4.44*	-6.93	-4.51*
GDP Growth (t-1)	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03
Fractionalization Index	9.83**	9.94**	9.86**	9.84**	9.88**	9.57**
Opposition Fract. Index	-8.42**	-8.38**	-8.55**	-8.42**	-8.84**	-8.00**
Election Importance High ††	6.55**	6.58**	6.54**	6.55**	6.58**	6.54**
EU Status – Member †††	-7.21**	-6.89**	-7.25**	-7.23**	-7.16**	-7.34**
EU Status - Candidate †††	-2.57	-2.36	-2.53	-2.57	-2.47	-2.70
Overall Globalization Index	-0.23**	-0.24**	-0.22**	-0.22**	-0.24**	-0.21*
Migration rate	-0.41**	-0.60**	-0.40**	-0.41**	-0.46**	-0.38**
Migration rate # External Vote		0.25				
Migration rate # Mail / E-Vote			-0.07			
Migration rate # Vote Fraud				-0.01		
Migration rate # Non-European					0.14	
Migration rate # Autocracy						-0.18
Constant	95.14**	98.03**	95.07**	95.02**	97.07**	94.42**
R^2	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67
N	272	272	272	272	272	272

Regression coefficients (xtpcse); 30 countries; 272 cases (elections); + $p<0.1$; * $p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$

† The initial model included some other independent variables which were excluded from the final model for reasons related to low sample size, too many predictors and non-significance (Freedom House Index, Political System – Presidential, Proportional Representation, Unicameralism, District Magnitude Candidates (log), Human Development Index, Gini Index, GDP Per Capita, PPP (constant 2005 int. $), GDP Growth (annual %) related to the first year in the dataset (sqrt * 10), Unemployment (% of total labor force), Inflation, consumer prices (log+10)).

†† Parliamentary Elections in Parliamentary System or Presidential Elections in Presidential System.

††† at the time of elections.

Figure A6. Interactions effects: Explaining turnout decline in post-communist countries (predictive margins with 95% Cis; models with control variables included)




Non-European country
European
Non-European
Predicted Turnout (Registered)
Predicted Turnout (VAP)
Emigration Rate
Autocracy
Non-Autocracy
Autocracy

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HOW FOREIGN OF A COUNTRY IS THE PAST? COLONIAL ARCHIVES, CUSTOMARY LAW AND LAND TRANSACTIONS IN GHANA

RALUCA PERNEŞ[1]

ABSTRACT. This paper looks at a set of documents produced in the early 1950s in the Gold Coast to establish land boundaries in a region and to contribute to the crystallization of customary law for future reference and use. The material is placed in a longer historical flow and seen as one of the results of transformations in the metropole, in the colony, and in their relationship over the first decades of the century, and as a significant landmark collection that has been used in land transactions ever since. The analysis pleads for treating the archives in an ethnographic and not just in an extractive manner (Stoler, 2002, 2009), suggesting that the making, the form, the authors' stances and the use of the documents can be useful supplementary tools in making sense of the already heavily edited representations of the past that we have access to. The focus on this particular archival material contributes to the discussions about the pitfalls of basing land management on, as Sally Falk Moore would put it, "customary" law.

Keywords: colonial ethnography, historical anthropology, archives, Ghana, Gold Coast

Introduction: Colonial archives, history and ethnography

Through the lens of anthropology, as well as through most other lenses, any attempt to make sense of the present without looking into the past could only range somewhere between naïve and misguided. But while the use of historical data and, increasingly after the 1990s, of the archives (Stoler, 2002) have joined the mainstream toolbox of the anthropologist, there is a long way to consensus as far as their epistemological standing is concerned. In researching the past, just as in researching the present, the search is for a tentative, not for an absolute truth. Yet, in theory, the present is out there for exploring in all its

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complexity, while the past is already heavily edited. What do we make of what we have of it? This paper explores some of the tensions, contradictions, ruptures and continuities incorporated in the content of a set of historical documents, as well as in the circumstances of its production and of its later use. It investigates a particular sliver of colonial history, the area where "engagement with the uses and abuses of the past" (Stoler, 2002:89) is the most pervasive.

Historical documents are a specific form of representation of the past, that may be fragmentary and possibly at least partly inaccurate. Their first layer that comes to light is that of their actual content, and the major risk – that this will remain the only layer to be revealed. In the postcolonial context, there might be a temptation to necessarily frame the analysis in terms of the rupture between the colonial and the rest of history. Documents are in danger of being "invoked piecemeal and selectively to confirm the colonial invention of traditional practices or to underscore cultural claims" (Stoler, 2002:90), while their potential to be used as bona fide ethnographic material goes neglected.

Archival documents often present themselves as the voice and the position of states and their institutions in relation with their subjects and with the world those subjects inhabit. We have known for some time now that they are a lot more than that. Documents produced by a state, at home or in the colonies, do not just describe reality to the best of their authors' ability, through their particular viewpoint, whatever that may be. They bear the weight of an agenda. They are systematically and strongly biased towards instrumentalizing their insights for making the world legible, and thus governable (Scott, 1998). Official documents remain one of the main sources through which we can glimpse into "how colonizers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries tried to make the categories through which they classified and surveilled their subjects" (Cooper and Stoler, 1997:4).

Over the last few decades, there is a widening circle of anthropologists trying to avoid the previous pitfalls of dealing with historical data and to move past these crucial, but crude stakes of the historical documents. One of the possible radical approaches is for the anthropologist to make their own alternative archive to give depth or challenge the perspective afforded by official papers, the way Jean and John Comaroff do for South Africa, where they look at "textual traces" in the shape of newspapers, novels, songs, or children's games (Comaroff and Comaroff, 1992). But when the archive remains the main object of the investigation, the anthropologist can still consciously move away from an extractive to an ethnographic use of it (Stoler, 2002, 2009), looking at the making, the form and the use of the archives; making sense of the positions of the individuals producing them, beyond the main agendas of their employers; treating the moment in time in which they are created as the product of previous history and generator of future history.

Turning historical sources into the object of ethnographic research need not mean limiting the scope of their meaningfulness, from a piece that can make sense in the puzzle of global history to one that is relevant to a very particular set of circumstances. On the contrary, "[t]he phenomena we observe may be grounded in everyday human activity, yet such activity […] is always involved in the making of wider structures and social movements" (Comaroff and Comaroff, 1992:32). Colonial history needs to be assembled from precisely this type of material, in which the metropole and the colony are present simultaneously (Cooper and Stoler, 1997), and which speaks to global structures as well as local specificities.

In what follows, I take the example of a set of data put together towards the very end of the colonial period in the Gold Coast, nowadays Ghana. These documents were produced under the provisions of the Land Boundaries Settlement Ordinance of 1950 and comprise interviews conducted with 184 witnesses (chiefs, family elders, land surveyors) in 1954 and the report of the settlement commissioner, finalized in 1955 and published in 1956. Their purpose is to identify the principles of land ownership and use and to outline the land boundaries of the Shai State, Ningo, and Prampram, an area of about 500 square miles in the south of Ghana, starting about 30 km east from the capital of Accra.[2] The following year, in 1957, the Gold Coast was to become the first colony in West Africa to gain its independence from the British Empire, and the significance and use of these documents was to change completely. Nowadays, Ghana uses a system of legal pluralism, with land matters dealt with by traditional authorities under the principles of customary law, in its ethnic-based and often specifically local incarnations. The findings from the 1950s therefore still hold direct relevance.

In zooming in on these documents, I am interested in land policies and practices around the time of Independence, as generated by the tensions and conflicts, as well as the congruencies and continuities between the Empire and the colony, and as codified by the settlement commissioner and the witnesses. I aim to understand this particular configuration of land practices in the Gold Coast as a result of previous processes and a premise for future transformations, as well as an outcome of a meeting of the knowledge and intentions of individuals driven by their agendas. The archival text is not merely a source of information, but an object of research in itself.

[2] I look at this set of archival material as part of a larger research into land tenure, allocation and use in a periurban area in Southern Ghana, part of the region covered by these documents. Throughout, I plead against the fetishization of tradition and attempt to understand the intensifying struggle for land in this particular context as a symptom of global processes, rather than solely as a consequence of postcolonial configurations of legal pluralism and modernity.

Customary law in the Gold Coast under colonialism

Throughout Africa, the formalization of colonialism ostensibly brought about very little change in terms of land management;

> in both British and French colonies rural people were integrated into the colony through customary law, which provided them with rights to land and obligations to chiefs, who were empowered to make local bylaws (Amanor, 2008:131).

Needless to say, the label of "customary law" gives a semblance of homogeneity that covered then, as it covers now, an incredible array of different arrangements. Within this frame, the metropoles and the colonized too were bound to have various specific interests in land rights. These eventually catalysed interrogations, challenges to and transformations of local formulations of customary law at different scales and with different outcomes. Apart from the certainties of universal statutory laws, customary law continued to change, contained and controlled only at the level of semi-autonomous social fields (Falk Moore, 1986). Though it needs to be said that customary law must have been changing beforehand as well, the new configuration brought pressures of a different scale.

In the Gold Coast, the first attempt at systematic change came with the Crown Lands Bill of 1894, vesting waste land, forest land and minerals in the British Crown. The Bill was met with resistance by the elites of the colony, who were prompt to point out that "according to native ideas, there is no land without owners" (Sarbah, 2017:66). Large tracts of land were indeed not used, but according to this interpretation of customary law, that was not to say they did not come under the authority of any (collective) owners. The Bill was rescinded and in 1897, the Crown issued the Lands Bill. This preserved the Africans' settlers' rights but also introduced the practice of transmitting property rights in accordance with the English law, in parallel with customary law. Land certificates issued in this manner gave Europeans firm land titles and consequently security of tenure for their investments in the Gold Coast (K. Amanor, 1999; Lentz, 2013). Soon after, J.W. Sey, J.P Brown, J.E. Casely Hayford, and John Mensah Sarbah founded the Aborigines' Rights Protection Society (ARPS) to oppose the bill. The ARPS comprised the local elites, members of the commercial bourgeoisie and intellectuals, some of them of mixed European-African descent, most of them educated abroad and typically in London. Several of the prominent members were lawyers. In negotiating with the metropole, they combined accurate and appropriate arguments from the British law and interpretations of the local customary land laws, whereby the latter were

looked at through the lens of the former. The ARPS manufactured a common denominator between the two legal systems, as the only device that could make the Gold Coast practices readable and intelligible, and most importantly legitimate, to the British. In 1898, the ARPS was ostensibly successful in its demands and the Lands Bill was rescinded. The British, however, labelled the "traditional" land tenure system as an obstacle to progress and recommended the gradual privatisation of lands (Lentz, 2013).

In any interaction between the metropole and the colony, there is a matter that reasserts its relevance, namely that of the articulation of a grammar of difference (Cooper and Stoler, 1997) between the two entities. But, as the example of the negotiations around the Lands Bill showed clearly, the premise of homogeneity within any of the two does not stand to empirical scrutiny, and neither does the radical difference between them. In terms of language, education, tools, categories, and occasionally even in terms of power and interest, the elites of the colony resemble more closely the business class in the metropole, than the popular classes of the colony. When resisting the actions of the metropole, they stand up for their own specific interests as entrepreneurs and players on the global market, and not for some generic interest of the weak at the margins of the empire. The categories of powerful and weak, of modern and traditional, are thus rendered fluid in the exercise of the interactions.

The clashes around land laws in this period did eventually result in the first codified version of customary land laws in the Gold Coast, the effects of which are still visible today.

> The invented traditions of African societies whether invented by the Europeans or by Africans themselves in response - distorted the past but became in themselves realities through which a good deal of colonial encounter was expressed (Ranger, 1983:212).

Over the next half a century, the legal regime that regulated land ownership and use did not change, but, in both the metropole and the colony, events led to shifts in positions and practices.

In the Gold Coast, in this period, the cocoa economy continued to grow (Amin, 1973; Hill, 1997). Cocoa cultivation was atypical in the region as it was a large scale business initiated and managed by local farmers and entrepreneurs, which practically took on the form of a merchant capitalist enterprise. For the metropole, cocoa farms offered an unusual but welcome system of production without wage labour (Cooper, 1996), as long as it could eventually be incorporated into commercial networks regulated by the empire. Colonial administrators, however, did not interfere at all until the 1940s, when they stepped in to order

cutting down the cocoa trees affected by the swollen shoot disease. Throughout this period, the constantly expanding cocoa belt in then Gold Coast welcomed new farmers. Most bought land collectively, through the organization of what they called "companies", in which members were allocated rights in lands. Others, hailing from the area, bought rights to family lands and organized in the form of an *abusua*, another type of group organization that can be mobilized for farming, based on extended family ties (Hill, 1997). In her comprehensive study of cocoa farming in the Gold Coast, Polly Hill (1997) shows that arrangements around lands sales and leases for cocoa cultivation were extremely intricate and variable, yet still attached to the spirit of what she herself calls, in between brackets, "traditional organisation". But most of the practices in the cocoa belt did not conform to the most popular tenets of customary law, especially because outright sales of lands were permissible and common.

The other major transformation in the colony, in first half of the 20th century, was the growth of a class of salaried workers in the fields of industry, construction, transport, and mining, whose activity and cooperation was essential for the good run of the colony. Starting with the 1920s, these workers, who were perceived by the metropole as "tribal", became increasingly discontent with their labour conditions and wages and, at the same time with workers across other African colonies, repeatedly joined forms of social unrest. Throughout the 1930s, workers in the West Indies started striking. They were soon followed by the miners in Northern Rhodesia in 1935, a general strike in Mombasa and a dock strike in Dar es Salaam in 1939. Also in 1939, the Gold Coast saw the strike of the railway workers of Sekondi, who had already struck in 1918 and 1921. In 1941 the railway workers of Sekondi started another strike and were joined by other workers, including those in the main harbours at Takoradi and Accra. In 1942 workers in Nigeria and Kenya were also protesting and striking again. Throughout the 1940s, major strikes continued to occur across the continent, culminating in the Gold Coast railway and gold mine strikes of 1947 and the Accra riots of 1948 (Cooper, 1996).

It was only at the end of World War II that the metropole was prepared to revisit the categories in which it understood the fates of its subjects in the African colonies. By then, the British Empire had lost its Asian colonies and became even more reliant on Africa for the tropical commodities it needed. Development, welfare and good standards of living finally came to the top of the agenda for the colonies, with the assumption that they, too, could leave behind traditionalism and at least partly embrace modernization. This was not going to make good bedfellows with customary law.

In 1949, Charles Arden-Clarke took over the governorship of the Gold Coast in the aftermath of the Accra riots. By 1950, he had made substantial amendments to the ten year plan for the colony he had inherited from the

previous administration. In 1951, following the elections under the new constitution, political leader and self-governance advocate Kwame Nkrumah went from imprisonment for instigating strike violence straight to the position of leader of government business under governor Arden Clarke. In 1952 he became the first prime minister of the Gold Coast. For this brief period, the Gold Coast was, for all intents and purposes, run by a colonial governor and a local leader. This represented an important shift in the relationship between the empire and its colonial subjects. While up to World War II the metropole had structured hierarchies that were variations on the relation between master and servant (Ranger 1983), and the colonized accepted or resisted them to different extents, this period marks the change of paradigm to a partnership where both associates envision a future where the colony will become independent of the empire.

In the interval between the two wars, the increasingly loud voices of the local intelligentsia had argued for changing the status of autochthonous forms of knowledge and social organisation, but they did so from an implicit assumption that this would take place in the frame of the empire. By the early 1950s, both the people of the Gold Coast and the British administrators had changed their minds about that assumption. Arden-Clarke and Nkrumah were cosmopolitan intellectuals and knowledgeable participants in the global political processes. Their debates about the present and the future of the Gold Coast were taking place on common terrain that was shaped, in Said's terms, by a cultural shift foreshadowing the political and economic processes. Native resistance to imperialism fed on metropolitan doubts about and opposition to the empire (Said, 1994).

Priming the Gold Coast for independence. Research on customary law under the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Ordinance of 1950

This was the context in which, during the early 1950s, land commissioners undertook the arduous task of mapping land boundaries across the colony. The British were ready to withdraw from the Gold Coast, but, as was the case with the other colonies, were aspiring to continue an economic relationship with it. For this to be feasible, the British needed to integrate a paradox: to affirm that land use by the locals in the colony was conducted based on African rules, while at the same time striving to incorporate those rules into structures so as to afford the possibility of conducting business in European structures. At the turn of the century, the local intelligentsia had been motivated to

describe and codify local land tenure systems in terms of English law, playing down its Africanness; by the middle of the century, the British, in order to support their projects for the future, needed to both account for the specific Africanness of autochthonous land systems and to systematize them so as to permit their future development and co-optation into western-centred economic relations.

Many of the colonial administrators proceeded in earnest to amass information about land boundaries, a process that produced copious amounts of spectacularly contradictory descriptions representing interpretations and simplifications of local arguments, in themselves a product of on-going negotiation at the local level. The research and mapping that followed the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Ordinance of 1950 made up the basis of three types of documents: interview transcripts and maps; the findings published by the Ministry of Interior; and larger studies, based on fieldwork and documents including court records, that synthesize land tenure systems in the colony and put them in a comparative perspective. R.J.H. Pogucki, an assistant commissioner of lands, gathered his notes and interpretations in "Gold Coast Land Tenure", a four volume study published in 1950 focusing on the Northern Territories, the Adangme and the Ga. It is the most organized of the reports of the period. Pogucki (1955) stressed the gaps in knowledge that exist about several of the areas on which he reports. Nonetheless, like many of those doing similar work, he phrased his findings strictly in ethnic terms, smoothed over excessive variation by assimilating smaller ethnic groups to the larger ones in the area, and based his extensive study on a research of just seven months (Goody, 1958).

John Jackson acted as a lands commissioner in the last years of the colonial rule in the Gold Coast. Jackson had been a judge in the Nigerian High Court between 1935-45, and then a judge of the Gold Coast's Supreme Court from 1945 (Rathbone, 2000). In June 1954, he conducted 184 interviews with chiefs, land surveyors, family heads and clan representatives from the area between Shai Hills and Ningo, as a measure of the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Ordinance of 1950.

I decided to take a closer look at this material once I realized that those involved in land contestation in the area covered by it used it as one of their key pieces of evidence in courts of law. Traditional leaders, themselves legitimate repositories of oral histories under customary law, embraced and made use of the superior type of legitimacy granted by a document that had been codified in writing and had the backing of official institutions from decades previous. Technically, the information about land boundaries, tenure and allocation is contained in the final report and in separate lists of land boundaries coordinates. The interviews are the raw material on which these

are based. Methodologically, I looked at these documents only as a first step for the factual information they contain. The purpose for which I used them, as is often the case with the anthropological gaze on the archive, is not the purpose for which they were designed. I delved into the interviews to investigate their relation with the report, without taking it for granted, and looked at the social implications and effects of this specific set of archival material.

I went to look for Commissioner Jackson's interviews and reports at the Public Records and Archives Administration Department (PRAAD) in Accra. The setting seemed befitting: a large, airy building with modernist architecture, sharing a carefully manicured compound with the History Museum, staffed by affable clerks who handled forms, demanded for documentation, and disappeared behind doors that must have hidden the yellowing mountains of paper of my imagination. I shouldn't have bothered. In the end, I became familiar with Jackson's interviews in the form of bounded piles of freshly photocopied paper, of which there were many in the region it documented. Gone was the half-risk, half-anticipation of the archive fever – pace Steedman (2002), rather than Derrida. There would be no dust inhaled during my forays into the stacks of documents, and therefore no induced febrile anxiety about unmanageable tasks within the confines of the archives' building; there would be no opportunity to face – or excuse to romanticize – the occupational hazards that come with working in the archives (Steedman, 2002). Away from the confines of the purpose of their author, the documents took on a life of their own post-colonialism.

My request at the Archives was typical, I learned, and treated as a standard order. The situation was echoed in the other coastal areas, where litigants in cases concerning land ownership – usually tied to the right of first arrival/conquest – jostled each other to persuade the courts to (re)codify their versions of the (historical) truth, which were partly expected to be tied to this artefact of colonial administration on its last legs. Archival documents and rare, obscure legal anthropology texts were certainly not the province of the historian or the social scientist in these circles.

Whether confined to the safety of the archive our out in the world, colonial documents – all documents, for that matter – do not have the power to conjure the truth. The knowledge about the circumstances of their production can only ever be fractional, and our engagement with them is necessarily politically tinted by our own histories and positions in the world. We can only have versions of and understandings of truths. Yet there is a lot to be learnt from these documents about the nature of imperial rule, its agents, and its subjects (Stoler 2009).

Declaratively, the task of the land commissioners was to document the land boundaries in their allocated areas. In following this objective, they were engaging in the colony in one of the typical exercises in rationalization and standardization that were the trademark of modern European statecraft (Scott 1998). They needed to reach common denominators, to simplify, to pick and choose and cull and eventually formulate an administrative instrument amenable to use by the state. Land boundaries are a but a minuscule aspect of the lives of people and their relationships with their ancestors, kin, communities, ethnic groups, neighbours, as well as colonial administrators and institutions. To speak about them in isolation is to sequester a sliver of reality and make claims to it making sense on its own; moreover, to very likely embrace the fact that the privileged public that finds it intelligible is the administrative apparatus itself.

The anticipated output was to be not just a map of land boundaries in the delineated region, but rather a "map of legibility" (Scott 1998). By the fact of being committed to paper as official documents, these decontextualized fragments of reality were endowed with the ability to further transform reality through the power vested in them by the authorities. And while oversimplifying reality is always a daunting task, state-making in the colony comes with the compounded difficulty of reducing to the perceived bare bones a complexity that is narrated through the filters of language and cultural difference.

Traditional leaders on Adangbe law and custom

The interviews are conducted by Jackson as part of a legal investigation and meant to substantiate the systematization and conclusions he would later assemble in a report. But they would eventually serve, as we will see later, as a source of factual information and they also prove to be rich in ethnographic detail. I take a closer look at the examination and cross-examinations of one of Jackson's informants to give a sense of the type of material the commissioner gathered, in all its complexity, self-assuredness and imprecision.

The first witness interviewed by Jackson after hearing the statements of the land surveyors is Okanta Obrentri II. The identification data logged for this interview tells us that he is a male, speaking Twi, and is the Benkumhene[3]

[3] In the Akan chieftaincy tradition, the Benkumhene is one of the subchief positions describing military flanks, namely the one who holds the left flank of the army's formation. It is not clear if the interviewee uses the Akan term because he is speaking Twi or because he wants to make the position intelligible to the commissioner.

of Lartey[4] of the Akwapim State, enstooled about one and a half years previously. One can not really evoke the atmosphere in which these conversations took place. We have no knowledge of the information the witnesses were given beforehand about the purpose of their statements, no idea how accurate the transcripts of the interviews were, no clue as to the competence of the translators. We jump straight into the heart of the matter with the first question: "You claim the land which Shai occupy as being Akwapim State Land?" The interviewer is clearly informed in advance of the positions the witnesses are going to take, and they rarely disappoint. "How did the Shais come to settle on this land?", the second question, prompts a typical answer from the toolbox of land politics. It is a story that purports to be of first settlement, widely recognized as the basis for land claims already in the ARPS descriptions of half a century earlier. It is, for all intents and purposes, a founding myth.

The chief describes the journey of the Larteys from Bonny in Nigeria to Labadi, now incorporated in the south of Accra. Here, they left behind the Labadis and moved on to "the hills of the monkeys" that are the Shai Hills. From this spot, they wandered off for lack of water and finally settled in the Akwapim mountains, where water was sufficient. The thread of the story is interrupted by the commissioner trying to pinpoint a detail: "What do you call your race?" "The Les." Then, perhaps counter intuitively for a story of first settlement, we find out that the Larteys ran into some people on the Shai Hills. And we do not find out more, since the story is cut short by another precise question: was there, at the time, an Omanhin[5] of Akwapim? "I cannot say, as they were not then in Akwapim", the chief retorts. It is a classical misunderstanding, repeated many times over the pages of transcripts. The commissioner is supposedly asking the chief whether his own ethnic group had, at the time of the story, a hierarchical organisation ruled by an Omanhene. The chief's defensive repartee most likely refers to the Akan Akwapims, of which the Guan Lartey Akwapims, his own group, are not a part. He takes the question as a sign of the interviewer tricking him into admitting that the Akan Akwapims had already settled in the area at the time of his story. He is fully unaware of having already admitted there were other people living in the area at the time, thus potentially voiding their right of first arrival. Also, the chief is not having it with the interruptions and continues unperturbed with his tale. When the hunters reported the presence of some people in the hills, the Lartey chief Asiedu Kokor sent one of his subchiefs to find out about them. The strangers, handily

[4] Lartey, also spelled Larteh, is a sub-group of the Guan speaking Akwapims. There is also an Akan (Twi speaking) branch of the Akwapim group.

[5] The Omanhin or Omanhene is the king of an ethnic group. The word is often translated into English as "paramount chief".

enough for some people just wandering about in the Shai Hills, could send over five of their elders. The elders, named as Doku Yumu, Duku Churu, Tettey Kwa, Mlayo, and Tettey Fiakpa, ostensibly explained they had moved to the hills in the aftermath of tribal wars and they wanted to be under the Chief of Lartey for protection in case of attacks. The Lartey chief and the elders later met to drink fetish "to ensure fidelity". The Shais were given rights to cultivate and enjoy the proceeds of the farms. "What happened in 1892?" There are time marks the interviewee needs to check so as to allow for the greater narrative in the mind of the interviewer. In 1892, the Shais were removed from the hills by Government soldiers. The Larteys allocated them new lands at the foot of the hills, where they could be close to the Larteys and out of the way of the soldiers.

After a brief talk about boundaries and founders of specific villages, the discussion moves on to another group, the Ningos, who apparently were attracted to the area by a newly established market and ended up begging for land from the Larteys. Some of them bought land, but the chief admits to not having any documentary evidence of the sales and to not having been present at any of the transactions, although he is "between 53 and 54" years old. Later in his statements, he also returns to withdraw or rectify some of the facts he listed, based on the information gathered from his elders in between hearings.

The type of information gathered from every individual witness is extremely intricate and, by virtue of the topics they are discussing, they are all implicitly invited to be unreliable narrators. There is no evidence to back up any of their reports about the details of events from centuries ago. The other witnesses often have wildly different stories about the same lands. And where two or more happen to agree, there is still a chance they will have a completely different interpretation of the events. There is also a high risk to suspect that, where stories of ethnic groups, migrations, wars or first settlements are in concordance, this only happens because the groups with opposite interests can tell they can better stake their claims when they refer to a common frame of events. If there is a message driven home forcefully by such interviews, it is that the very premise of customary law for land management is inherently shaky.

Jackson's report

The outcome of Jackson's effort was a set of findings regarding the stool lands boundaries settlement for Shai State, Ningo and Prampram, published in an extraordinary issue of the Gold Coast Gazette on the 3rd of August 1956. The purpose of the text is legal, and the language and type of data it mobilizes

often show it. Nonetheless, this is no dry inventory of information. Jackson's report is based on a lot more than the interviews and the fieldwork conducted to establish the land boundaries. He reviews historical and legal literature. He delves into linguistic explorations, is occasionally generous with ethnographic detail, ventures into comparisons (especially with Nigeria) and pieces together local histories.

The scope of the report is to give an account of customary law as practiced by the Adangbe living in the area. The main premise of customary law as understood in this context is that things are done the way they have previously (always?) been done, based on initial rights in land gained through first settlement. At this time, there seems to be a consensus between the commissioner and those he interviews as to the decisiveness of first settlement, although it is likely it has been reached over the course of the colonial period and possibly influenced by the categories laid down by the ARPS around the turn of the century. Nonetheless, as apparent in the interviews themselves, sometimes the same rights are claimed by virtue of conquest. Perhaps more significantly, also as seen in the interviews, it is not clear what qualifies as first settlement, and several of the historical accounts of the smaller ethnic groups researched by Jackson describe placing roots as "first settlers" in areas that were already inhabited.

There are several such lines of tension running through this analysis that might have been apparent to its author as well. Customary law is, by definition, based on practices in the past. As Jackson states,

> to understand the problem it is essential to give careful attention to ancient history, to the alliances, friendships and enmities of the several tribes, or even clans within a tribe, which are so long remembered, and which tend to cloud and prejudice an accurate assessment of each communities' rights (Jackson, 1956:1037).

Yet, the stakes of the exercise are not related to the past, but to establishing current guidelines for future use: "The scope of the enquiry is to determine what interest in land *is* vested in the Shai, Prampram and Ningo Stools, and not what *may have been* vested at some remote point in history" (Jackson, 1956:1041). But, potentially, every right in land at any given time can become subject to contestation through questioning that ancient history.

In a larger perspective, this is part of a wider tension inherent to Jackson's work. Over several months of fieldwork, examination of witnesses and investigation of historical sources, he gathers and aims to take into account an impressive amount of incredibly detailed information, painting incomplete, unreliable and often contradictory representations of customary

law. But what he feels he needs to produce based on all the tiny details is a set of clear cut, general rules. Jackson is well versed in this exercise and looks at Adangbe customary law comparatively, seeing similarities with the practices of the larger ethnic groups in the colony, as well as with other British West African colonies:

> in principle there is little by way of distinction between the Akan and the Adangbe law, indeed from some 25 years experience in land litigation in the Southern Provinces of Nigeria and more particularly in the Western Provinces there the principles regulating land tenure are different in form rather than in substance from those prevailing in the Gold Coast (Jackson, 1956:1048).

In the eyes of the commissioner, there is no doubt that general principles are more worthy than minute ethnographic details; in fact, the latter might be dangerous or destructive.

> It is all a question of form or even verbiage, rather than substance, and it appears to me to be academic and unreal to try to dissect and tear away the flesh in order to examine microscopically the bone structure. In law one must bring one's facts within the ambit of broad and guiding principles and be able to discuss the substance rather than the form, without which there can be no orderly social progress (Jackson, 1956:1048).

Here, Jackson's agenda is transparent, as is the very purpose of the Land boundaries ordinance that he is implementing – in this context, researching customary law is not some gratuitous historical exercise; it is the necessary premise for a more efficient management of land contestation and conflict, which would amount to a form of modernisation of the land tenure system in the colony that can facilitate smoother dealings with the European businesses. Perhaps along with the metropole, Jackson's view of the Gold Coast and its possibilities in relation to the western world has switched from the crude dichotomy of superiority – inferiority to a slightly less limiting evolutionist perspective. According to this, his systematization contributes to making Gold Coast land practices more legible (Scott, 1998), a prerequisite, here as well as in the metropole, for the advancement of a modern state.

Methodologically, the report fails to resolve the main problem with customary law: the substance, that is, the guiding principles, can only be implemented if there is agreement about the form, which is made up of the details of the first settlement or conquest histories and of the use and allocation practices of the particular groups. Jackson earnestly tries to figure out the "truth"

about these details, using the best available practice in his profession. He incorporates the relevant information in all the available historical sources: Barbot's "Description of the coasts of North and South Guinea" (1732), Bossman's "Description of the Gold Coast" (1705), Reindorf's "History of the Gold Coast and Asante" (1889) and Ward's "History of the Gold Coast" (1948). As stated by Jackson himself, the first two were produced for practical interests during the slave trade; the third is based on interviews conducted by a missionary, while the fourth is based solely on secondary sources. The main failure of these previous histories, Jackson feels, is that they risk including errors because of lack of cross-examination. So, in conducting his own research, he relies heavily on cross-examination. Nonetheless, the interviews display vast amounts of contradictions and disagreements that he tries to smooth over. Jackson feeds the fantasy that, if only one assembles the ultimate assessment, based on the most accurate and complete data available, this can become a point of reference to be used without contestation in the future.

Alas, it was not to be. Jackson's report came out a year before Independence and so had very limited opportunity to be used for the direct purpose for which it was designed. Yet, it never became an obsolescent trace of colonial administration. It is in fact very likely that, given the transformations that had taken place in the relationship between the Gold Coast and the metropole in the previous years, the colonial administrators themselves aimed for the reports of this ordinance to be used by the eventually independent colonies in their future administrations and in their dealings with the British businesses. Indeed, the report and the data it is based on became a point of reference and, as shown before, is still being widely used today in the region. The manner in which this happens, however, would have disheartened Jackson.

Most of the lands in the area in which he worked became increasingly desirable and valuable over next few decades. The state stepped in to acquire land for subsidized farming; wealthy entrepreneurs developed high profile projects, such as the campus of a large private university; real estate developers came in to build several gated communities with expensive family homes; from both Tema and Accra, people moved in and assembled new communities; pushed away from the lands in the capital, exotic vegetable producers came over; part of the Shai Hills was turned into a nature reserve, while the beaches became interesting for small touristic businesses. Development was extremely unequal and some areas became wildly sought after. In this context, contestation over land continued and became more and more intense. Clans and families competed for the right to lease out the land, many plots were sold multiple times and several major cases got stuck in courts of law for years.

Jackson's material did not end up gathering dust in some corner of the Archives, but got bounded and printed as a standard order for all those involved in land cases, of which there are several. It was used equally confidently by opposing parties, which means that the commissioner's aspiration of establishing some ground truths ultimately proved futile. It is the ambiguities and the contradictions of his witnesses that are still used as evidence in contemporary cases, rather than the substance he saw in them. The rights in these lands are still not settled definitively. There is no way to definitively establish some unquestionable truth about events that took place hundreds of years ago, of which there is little proof and no material evidence. Without them, customary law is doomed to remain – and in fact has so far remained – the playground of endless debate and contestation by those who feel entitled to rights in lands, and by those who have the resources and aplomb to stake claims in lands even though they might not believe they are rightfully entitled to them. As Jackson himself put it some six decades ago, showing self-awareness and vulnerability "Are the persons interested in these lands just untruthful, or is it that they do not know […]? In my view, there is an element of both" (Jackson, 1956:1052).

Concluding remarks

In a rush for analytic and symbolic reparations in the postcolonial period, one might find it easy to label a work such as Jackson's as intrusive, oversimplifying, presumptuous and perhaps even condescending of the people he worked with, considering he aimed to grasp some truth beyond what the people themselves had access to. It is facile to see the commissioner himself as simply a tool of colonialism, instrumentalizing a set of information to contribute to the crafting and reinforcement of a relationship of domination and exploitation. And we do need remain vigilant and look at the situation first and foremost through that lens. After all, it is easy to see the outcome of the Land Boundaries Ordinance was a standard example of "the processes by which disparate, even divisive discourses were fused into a consistent ideology" (Comaroff and Comaroff, 1992:35). But, as illustrated by the mobilization of the Gold Coast elite since the turn of the century and by the colony's workers throughout the first half of the century, they were perfectly capable to fuse fragments and articulate ideological positions of their own. In this context, the researcher needs "to attend more directly to the tendency of colonial regimes to draw a stark dichotomy of colonizer and colonized without themselves falling into such a Manichaean conception" (Cooper and Stoler, 1997:3).

In itself, the production of these interview transcripts and report does not make them into a part of the hegemonic discourse. The Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Ordinance was repealed a few years after Independence, in 1962. But once produced, official documents take on a life of their own. The Ordinance repealed, they had ceased to be a support on which power relations were inscribed and turned into technologies of rule themselves (Stoler, 2009). Maybe less intuitively, they also turned into instruments of disorder and contestation and into tools that are accessible and are used, more or less successfully, by the weak and the powerful alike, in the postcolonial configurations.

This is a story of a particular episode in the discussion of customary law as applied to land management. It is perhaps more significant than others because, by taking place in the very last moments of colonialism, it helps blur any certainties related to the agenda of the metropole and or to the powerlessness of the colonized. It is one of many windows into the intricacies of customary law at work, but shows that, regardless of the moment in time we choose to investigate the issue, there is a fundamental problem that means customary law can not work efficiently for land management in areas with competition for land. The analysis of any contemporary debacle in this field needs to take into account specific circumstances, but also account for this inherent difficulty.

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FOOTBALL AND ROMANIAN MASCULINITY. HOW IT IS CONSTRUCTED BY THE SPORT MEDIA?

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ABSTRACT. The present article is focusing on hegemonic masculinity represented and expressed by the professional footballers. Based on the empirical study using text analysis of leading articles published in central Romanian sport newspapers I draw the ideal-typical picture of the normative model of Romanian hegemonic masculinity in which the domestic coaches play a determinant role. Their personal-individual and collective-professional features like *determination, steadiness, honesty, pride, mutual respect, knowledge, tenaciousness, sense of vocation, solidarity, spirit of fighting* are the corner points of the constructed Romanian manhood, or hegemonic masculinity during social change. The manliness is traced along the inner characteristic of the coaches but in strong contradiction with the foreign trainers. In this respect I can state that football is connected not only with masculinity but in some respect also with the national characteristics embodied by the Romanian coaches especially those working home.

Keywords: football, hegemonic masculinity, media, discourses

Introduction

Football and masculinity had been connected: ball games were played by men as early as in the antiquity and in the Middle Ages. It can be assumed that the "game", often leading to fights, hitting and affray, provided an opportunity to men to express and show their physical strength, resolution and masculine qualities to the women of the community. Playing ball games meant public/ community events, during which participant men could leave the monotonous routine of everyday life behind and could show off their masculine features to their audience.[2] Team sports represent socializing frames in which competing or contesting men acquire and express the institutional and organized standards of their masculinity (Anderson, 2008). A range of research prove that sexually

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[2] These masculine features changed during history, and are different by culture.

segregated sports promote orthodox forms of masculinity, reproduce and cultivate sexist, anti-feminist attitudes against women (Anderson, 2008: 275). In this article I am going to present the connections between hegemonic masculinity and football as well as the normative forms or Romanian men based on text analysis of 3,287 written leading articles in specialised sport newspapers (ProSport, GSP and Digisport) for the 2008-2013 period.[3]

Manly Football and the Football Man

Hegemonic masculinity is the central and controversial concept in masculine studies, developed by Connell (1983, 1995, 2002) after conducting a study on social inequality in high school (Connell et al., 1982 in Connell–Messerchmidt, 2005: 830). They found that class position and gender has a great influence on inequality. Certain forms of culturally constructed masculinity – an idealised male body along with the personal experiences and meanings regarding men's own bodies – allow men's dominance over women and over other forms of masculinities. Later, studies conducted on men life histories, including sportsmen (Connell, 1990), produced new accounts. This type of masculinity influences and determines gender relations in favour of dominant, usually white, heterosexual, urban, upper-middle class and educated men in society. Using the Gramscian notion of hegemony, hegemonic masculinity is a dynamic feature, which can change over time and context, due to cultural transformation. We are dealing with different types of masculinities: not just hegemonic and subordinated masculinity but also with immigrant worker masculinity and other alternative forms of non-hegemonic, alternative masculinities. There is a struggle and competition in making of the dominant masculine form (Connell–Messerchmidt, 2005: 831) specific for different social and cultural milieu. Nevertheless, the "here and now" valid form of hegemonic masculinity has a normative function, but is not the normal form of masculinity; it is 'embodied' only by a minority of men in society. The mediated football has an important role in the cultural construction and ideological legitimation of the ideal and normative model of hegemonic masculinity (Messner, 2004). In this respect, the media representation of sportsmen works

[3] The research was supported by the Department of Art and Culture Studies, University of Jyväskylä. Parts are based on the thesis Péter, László (2014) *Soccer and Society in Romania. Issues and Problems in Soccer Discourses*, Jyväskylä: University of Jyväskylä (see pages 43-57 and 290-295). This period is very interesting, even unique: in these five years, the Romanian professional championship was dominated by teams outside from Bucharest. The winners came from the province: CFR 1907 (3 titles), Unirea Urziceni (1 title) and Oțelul Galați (1 title). This ignited the soccer discourses treating many social problems, too, ranged from masculinity to inter-ethnic relations, regional conflicts, labour rights.

as instrument promoting what it means to be a man (Trujillo, 1991). Trujillo, in his study on baseball player Nolan Ryan states that there are five masculine features highlighted by the sport media on masculinity: physical force and control, occupational achievement, familial patriarchy, frontiermanship and heterosexuality (290-291). So, we see football as an instrument to shape, to create and to represent the socially required and desired/valued form of masculine traits and male bodies.

It is a fact that we almost obvious think that football is primarily a men's sport: mostly men play it and a considerable part of the spectators are men. In spite of the fact that the number of female spectators is continuously increasing, football has yet been connected with masculinity.[4] Watching football matches, knowing the footballers' names by heart, recalling the names of old members of the team – all these are considered to be masculine activities. It seems that some type of enthusiasm towards football is a compulsory element to be followed by the masculinity established by society. The auditorium is a social space reserved especially for men, just as the adjacent activities. A popular female coach or authentic female commentators are still unimaginable: stadiums remain the space of masculine competition and of competitive masculinity, one of the scenes where modern man is born (Hadas, 2003). In this respect, the function of media[5] is of utmost importance (Archetti, 1999).

The promotions of the transmitted derbies also indicate the close relationship between football and masculinity. For example, the match previews

[4] My statement is valid where football is the most popular sports. I am aware that models of masculinity are not determined or mirrored back solely by football. In comparison with ice-hockey, classical masculinity transmitted by present-day football is more "feminine" than what we find in Canada, the USA or in Finland: players hardly have body hair, and the metrosexual model before the economic crisis was stronger than in the case of hockey players, where the majority have beards and the occurrence and intensity of legitimate violence – body check, toss and sometimes punching – is much higher. Presently, after the crisis this "warrior-like" image is specific to football, too. The scene of hockey is the locus of war likeness, of "elegant macho". I consider important the masculine models appearing alongside football because the model of masculinity becomes socially normative, it gives models. Masculinity is not only constituted in stadiums: players are presented on screens in numerous situations, thus the dresses, jewels, watches, poses, styles of speaking provide further elements to the model of present-day masculinity.

[5] The sponsor of the Romanian Cup is the Timişoreana beer factory. The division by gender, and the division of labour according to gender of the performers appearing in the 40-second official promotion video is expressive in this respect. According to the moral of the video entitled *Timişoreana Carries on the History of Romanian Soccer*, the history of football practically is the story of men bringing the name of Romanian into repute. Women appear solely in secondary roles paying attention to male supporters and not to the match; in stadiums and bars only men are present. The female roles are limited to provide men with beer, and exclusively at home – this being an organic part of their housekeeping tasks. In segregated homosocial spaces, we can see exclusively men. These male supporters represent the real characters of football history developed in time – suggesting that football is a masculine business.

transmitted by DigiSport channel are generally built on the aggressive appearance of the team leaders or players considered to be more violent, on their stout war-whoop, cruel "declaration of war" addressed to the opponent team, on their symbolic intimidating. In these short films with plenty of action, football players are presented as men capable of anything, going to war dressed in tribal colours, promising death to the members of the opponent team. The atmosphere, colours, background music of these videos quote the sombre world of ancient warriors, where men are physically and spiritually prepared to the final clash for the common good, the "stake" of which is to defend the members of the lineage tribal community, to finally destroy the opponent tribe and to protect the old, the children and the women. The portrayed males are physically strong, committed to their community, well organised, and stand by each other; they are ready for the greatest sacrifice at any time (it is often announced that "if it's necessary we are ready to die"). Men fulfil an instrumental role, their importance is strategic, and they are the sources of solidarity for the community, strengthen the collective consciousness. In other words, they are the symbolic (tribal) *representatives of hegemonic masculinity.*

Football, Masculinity and Homosocial Male Spaces

Social situation, self-image and legitimate roles of men are determined by social conditions. Options of masculinity have changed with the transformations of historical contexts, which changed both men's social situation and dominant meanings and characteristics of masculinity. Present masculine forms are in crisis according to Kimmel (Kimmel, 1996 in Nylund, 2007: 7) as a result of the uncertainty generated by the quick change of the economic structure of post-industrial societies. According to Nylund (2007) masculine options are limited; there has hardly remained a social space for the post-modern Western man to experience and express his masculinity without social limitations (8-9). So sports are one of a few legitimate arenas to express masculinity.

In urbanizing world, men had the opportunity to create homosocial social spaces (spaces created by people of the same gender), in the growing cities, where they could rediscover and practice their masculine characteristics: clubs frequented by men, university unions, rodeos, shooting galleries, boy-scout associations, blue collar jobs, trade unions (Nylund, 2007). In this context men had calculable quasi-macho, modern men's parts, which in spite of being politically incorrect, especially from the point of view of women/wives forced into housekeeping, served as a basis for the important feeling of stability and calculability. The success of feminist and civil rights movements perfecting

themselves following the sixties "corroded" and quickly eroded the foundations of the modern roles of males and masculinity connected to it: men found themselves in heterogeneous roles, which were not only unknown, but also new for them. The quick spread of the family model with two earning members, the engagements into the education of children narrowed down the old legitimate forms and the possibilities of expression of modern masculinity. Nonetheless, the multiculturalism, the movements and the positive discrimination of sexual minorities, as well as the normativity of politically correct common talk becoming dominant clearly excluded the reversion to any macho masculine model. So, at the turn of the millennium the two main forms of commercialised masculinity have developed, which constitute the frame for possible masculinity in the post-modern era.

The masculine types and roles called the *"new man"* and *"new lad"* (Nylund, 2007: 9-11) represent behaviour models and masculine traits adjusted to post-Fordist economy. *"New man"* denotes a conformist consumer man, who is pro-feminist, accepts women as equal partners, he is sensitive and emphatic (with "girlish" features, which he considers natural), he is a good and ambitious father and husband, expressing his opinion in a political correct way (regarding homosexuality, racial-ethnic minorities). Against this, the *"new lad"* is sporadically sexist, nostalgic and revisionist towards old (e.g. modern) masculinity, rather hedonist and looks for homogeneous masculine spaces; a kind of post-lad, the chav/YABBO or macho of global corporate capitalism. However, both of these masculine roles are self-reflexive, self-ironic, and filled with a feeling of uncertainty (Nylund, 2007: 12). Both of these roles are exposed to the movements of the labour market, to the dynamics of family and couple relationships. These two roles are completed by a more narcissistic third one, the *metrosexual* masculine role, which does not only approach the elements of earlier male and female roles but unifies them.

In Romania, modern masculine roles significantly changed during the de-industrialization, when the unemployment affected the working classes, which this way lost its earlier privileged position both in society and family. Under the circumstances of forced urbanization and industrialization, the majority of working men were characterised by macho-masculine roles, which expressed themselves in the public spaces of workplace, family and residence. Working class attitudes characterised everywhere by a culture of workers, and the ethos of work were dominant: there existed a prominent functional and value difference between the genders, and women's work was considered of lower value here, too. Prestige of women's work was negligible compared to men's work (which meant "hard physical work"). In workers' culture, besides the difficulty of men's work (it demands a lot of energy, firmness, resolution) there is also a strong

sexual charge (Willis, 2000). In speaking, posture, movement, the showing off the objective features of physical strength (muscles, moving heavy objects) are the expressions of valuable masculinity. All of these are the means of making power conditions conscious, of continuously representing and expressing the relationships between men and women, men being the possessors of the power over women, including the disposition over them. But becoming unemployed created a new situation also in the relationships between genders, because many men were practically "forced into housekeeping", they had to do "housework": the work that they had undervalued earlier in comparison with their work in the factory. However, the majority of women held their jobs, because following de-industrialisation the demand for typical women's jobs like shop assistant, waitress, cashier and dressmaker remained stable on the labour market.

Women had to do their housework too, so this way they were charged by double burden, which became the source of series of conflicts. Ex-workmen insisted on the patriarchal model that had been socialised earlier, because it remained the only resource of their identity. In the eyes of men, the value of women's work, as well as the women's earning work types were low; in spite of the fact that these assured the outliving of the household (Pásztor, 2002). But by and large the masculine roles emerging after 1989 are similar to the two main types described by Nylund (2007), which are completed with the metrosexual type appearing mainly in the world of football and celebrities.[6]

Nylund, in his paradigmatic book *Beer, Babes and Balls. Masculinity and Sport Talk Radio* (2007) maintains that for unstable and changeable masculinities sports, or more precisely sports radios represent a "fix point", which dissolve the social pressure weighing upon post-modern men (pressure coming from the job and family), and help men collectively and discursively build up an acceptable and functioning masculine identity. He argues that sports radios create a third space – besides workplace and family – most men are in need of, as because of the continually growing work time and expanding family tasks they need to deal with themselves as men, to construct, express and experience their male-self, while the two former spaces do not give them the possibility for this: in their workplace, they fulfil the role of an employee, and at home they find themselves in the role of a partner/companion. As an active member of the audience that calls into sports radios, the masculine role of post-modern men comes into the foreground, and thus this symbolic community becomes suitable to shape up *"male romance"*; where men can appear, take a position, play jokes, be self-ironic starting from the same status as the other men, without risking possible sanctions. This *speech community*[7] fulfils an extremely important positive function: it creates a bond

[6] Adrian Mutu, as well as fashion designer Catalin Botezatu impersonate this form of masculinity.
[7] In my case the reader community.

with the other men, strengthens male traits, and provides an acceptable identity. In practice, all this is attained along the practice of discursive divergence: by the parody of female athletes, the underrating of sports branches considered unmanly, thus womanly, by the ridiculing of erring athletes. Along common topics ("the science of soccer"), words and expressions that can only be decoded by men, specific rules and norms of speech developed and applied during the debates. Moreover, specific procedures, linguistic forms and ways of expression, meanings, contemporary men are able to build and live a masculine identity that is needed to get along under the stressful circumstances of everyday life, on which they can rely. Sports radios do exactly that: they provide chance and opportunity for the callers and the male audience to dissolve the cumulated tension of everyday life along topics related to beer, girls, and the soccer ball, to mitigate the insecurities of post-modern masculinities, and offer an acceptable pattern of masculinity (2007: 155-165).

The model described by Nylund can well be applied also in Romania. Although with lesser audiences, there were two sport-talk radio stations functioning in Romania: GSP Radio and Sport Total Radio. Both talked about football and they had call ins. Both the hosts and the men calling in made sexist remarks, posing as football experts.[8] In one word: although they talked about

[8] Just take a look at the 28 March 2013 programme of GSP Radio, broadcast between 14-15 hours, entitled pariori.ro. Dan Bara and Dan Chilom were the hosts. In the transmitted programme the chances of the teams playing on the Friday rounds are pondered, providing assistance to the audience interested in pools. That day the "face" of the radio station, Gabi Safta was invited; this is typically a talk show type broadcast, where the issues are debated together with the callers. The topic was the performance of the Romanian national team in Amsterdam, as it had been defeated two days earlier by 4-0 by Holland, in a qualifying match to the 2014 Brazil World Cup. The discussion was about the alleged revelry after the match of some of the representative players of the national team from Steaua, respectively the evaluation of coach Victor Pițurcă. Several supporters called in to repeatedly express their bitterness in connection with the serious defeat, and to criticise the coach and the light-minded players. The conversation started around the alleged "revelry" of the players, as there had been some rumours that five players only returned to their quarters at dawn. In the beginning, they only talked about their staying out, subsequently the conversation was diverted towards revelry and drinking, until finally (as one of the hosts expressed his view that clubs in Amsterdam all close at two in the morning, therefore the players must have spent their time in the Red-light district), by the time the first call came in, it was taken for granted that the players had spent their time drinking with prostitutes. The issues that were debated according to this were related to *marital fidelity/infidelity*, *professional obligation, poor performance*, *incomes of soccer players comparing to the income of supporters and their rightful expectations* and the tensions within these. Both the hosts and the callers condemned the players for spending time with prostitutes, a fact that was placed in sharp contradiction with their performance during the match, respectively with the lack of obligations towards their respective wives and girlfriends. In the view of the callers, the soccer players had betrayed the confidence of spectators and soccer fans, had played irresponsibly, thus failing to meet the rightful expectations of supporters. They were ridiculed and their market value was evaluated cynically. The high incomes of football players as opposed to the shrinking salaries of crisis stricken supporters only highlighted the unacceptable,

soccer, most of the things they said were also about Romanian men and their social circumstances.

Football, Nation and Hegemonic Masculinity

Soccer does not only play a role in the crystallisation of individual masculine identities, and the momentary and virtual dissolution of internal tensions, but it can decisively contribute to the birth of modern nations, and the symbolic expression of national identity which is perceived as primordially masculine by Archetti (1999). According to the Argentinian anthropologist football and modernization, respectively nation building, are closely intertwined with the masculine features of typical males.

Football could gain such significance in the course of the specific evolution of social history of the Argentina. The country started its journey on the road of industrialization and modernization as a result of British influence, and by the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century it became popular in the eyes of Europeans; particularly Italian and Spanish immigrants. In less than forty years by the time of the outbreak of WWI six million immigrants arrived on the land of the pampas, resulting in an extremely heterogeneous population. The mix of the cultural characteristics of traditional (rural and agrarian) and modern (urban and industrial) traits, as well as those of the natives and the freshly large arriving immigrant groups resulted in a remarkably colourful cavalcade; Archetti used the term *hybridization* for this macro level social process (1999: XV), but he denotes the micro level manifestation of the phenomenon (the local, specific type of hybridisation) by the term of *creolization*, and sometimes the equivalent *miscegenation* (Archetti, 1999: 23-

immoral character of their "deeds". Talkers agreed that in the case of an occasional victory all this could have been forgiven perhaps, but a defeat of 4-0 cannot but underline the moral deficit of the players. Only men called in during the programme. Wives or girlfriends were only regarded as extensions of the soccer players themselves, prostitutes in Holland were obviously disparaged, and there was a consensus that they were nothing but sexual objects that corrupt the players. In connection with the alleged deeds of the players, the ambivalence was continuously present that something is allowed or forbidden depending primarily on the performance of the players. Generally speaking, a man with a good professional performance can rightfully commit an "offence" (drinking, adultery), while unsuccessful men better "sing small". All of the men calling in reflected upon their own (insecure) employment situations, which would never permit them to stand against their superiors in a case of bad performance at their works – comparing the relationship between players and their coach as a relationship between subordinates and their bosses. In what concerns language usage, speakers (especially the hosts) used notions with a double meaning, or with a sexual connotation, underlining the homosocial, masculine character of the programme – just like in the case of The Jim Rome Show analysed by Nylund (2007).

45). It can be understood that under these quickly changing circumstances, the "invention", and the planned elaboration of modern Argentinian nation became urgently important for the local elites – just like in Eastern-Europe. The nation, as an imagined community, can be shaped along common features, which they thought they had found in football, tango, and polo (Archetti, 1999). The "unification" of high degree social heterogeneity into a political nation seemed to be feasible through football, and its accented masculine traits were transposed to typical Argentinianism. This is how the overall general discourse on specific football style and male footballers could become a dominant discourse on the nation, thus constituting a deep, moral bond among multiple identities based on ethnicity, origin, region and affiliation to social segments (Archetti, 1999: 226). So, football became an instrument for nation building, with the primary task being not only the construction of the nation and of national consciousness, but also implicitly the drawing of *Argentinian masculinity*, regarded as typical. All this meant the elaboration of a hybrid, the setup of a moral pattern that could be described by gendered features (*gendered morality*), in which *the physical body of the Argentinian male*, *its aesthetic beauty*, *the manifestations of his behaviour* and the common *national morality* were linked organically. All this was well mapped by football: mutually respected rules (fair play as morality), the players (their physical bodies, movement, as the representation of common social body) and the spectacle of the game (its aesthetic beauty) were symbolically able to shape this male hybrid, and present it repeatedly for the society. As a result, the *criollo* style of play became equal with national identity, naturally wearing masculine traits (Archetti, 1999: 46-54).

Stressing upon masculine features and characters they created a *creole*, Argentinian type of soccer as a peculiar local hybrid. The *criollo* style built on refined body movement, on spectacle, and on spectacular solutions meant to dazzle the audience. In this logic masculinity – as a creole hybrid – bears the marks of restless, individualistic, talented and agile individual features, in which elegance is of central importance. The cult of dribbling (Archetti, 1999:56-65) expresses the two main Argentinian masculine virtues: *creativity* and *liberty*. In contrast with the logic of the British playing style built on the mechanic, rational division of labour and the simple execution of tasks, the style of creole soccer is animated, creative, full of unexpected solutions, beautiful, spirited. The movement of the player is virtuosic, just like the performances full of surprises of violinists and pianists. To demonstrate the differences between the British and creole style (and between English and Argentinian men) one could say the soccer of the British (and their society) is built on instrumental rationality, whereas the playing style of the Argentinians (and their national community) on communicative rationality. In other words, while the style of the British reminds us of *work*, the

creole playing style of Argentinian men evokes *theatrical performances*. All this has got a social historic determination. English men have learnt to play the game in school, under stern and rigid supervision, under the supervision of teachers and coaches, as part of the compulsory curriculum. Power and unequal social relationships are automatically encoded in this connection. Argentinian children – the men of the future – discovered football on the grounds (*potrero*), outside school, uncompelled, and together with their mates, finding pleasure in it. Because of the narrowness of the ground and the large number of children, goals could only be scored after the successive dribbling of the others: for that it was important that players have the ability to keep the ball, and prevent others from taking it away. This became a national masculine quality that defined Argentinian men: they had to rely on their inventiveness, ability to manoeuvre in order to succeed in life. In this *criollo* style the beauty of the game overwrote success; and this is the essence of local masculine philosophy, the central nucleus of *potrero-ideology* (Archetti, 1999: 173).

The archetypical character of Argentinian males and football is the *pibe* (Archetti, 1999: 181), the permanently free man, the "true son of the people" (*pibe del oro*). The pibe evokes the image of a child (a *child*, not a *son*), who achieves social appreciation using his own resources, who is perfect as a player, can rise from tight corners, is resolute, but also elegant and creative – but deep inside continues to be a child, honest and most importantly: free... Maradona stands closest to this hegemonic character.

Based on the model developed by Hadas (2003) I will take a look at how football and the modern Romanian man is constructed by the domestic sport media where the presented contradictions and moral differences between local and foreign coaches resembles to Archetti's interpretation.

Football and Romanian Masculinity

Based on the attributes used in the football discourses I can sketch the image of current Romanian men. The general attribute is "*Latin"*. The following are of great importance: *character, perseverance, determination* and *discipline*. Manly players are characterised by *self-confidence*, are creative and able to manoeuvre well among quickly changing circumstances and opponents. Besides *creativity*, *trickery* represents further value. The true Romanian (football) men are able to set things right around themselves, and conveys authority, prestige towards their environment: the most often used term in the discourse about football is *order*; *tactics* and *knowledge* only comes after that. In soccer slang there is an attribute that cannot be translated easily, and that is "*tupeu"* – some sort of

cheekiness, denoting a self-importance respected and accepted by the others, but which is also coupled with outstanding talent. This also means that the respective person is a boss on the field.

These particular values resemble the characteristics of Argentinian men in many respects; probably due to the comparable power-related and historical factors. If there is a difference that is mostly connected to the fact that in our case we are talking about the Austrian political-historic influence rather than the British, and the reference is Viennese/Danubian or Bucharest football and foreign coaches. But let's have a look how the hegemonic masculinity is constructed in football discourses *in which the local coaches play a central role.*

The media narrative on masculinity is a coherent story, and the chosen individual cases are well-composed pieces of a meta-history. The "small stories" rendered to the coaches are not biographical stories but "here and now" snapshots about their works and solutions. The drawn biography of Romanian coaching is built of these momentums – which, alongside the common characteristics point beyond the particular cases. The narration is built on the stories of two different types of coaches. There are the "great names", such as Mircea Lucescu, the "*greatest Romanian coach presently*", László Bölöni, the "*the great ex-player and a successful coach*" or Cosmin Olariu *"of the young generation."* There are the *"talented"* Dan Petrescu, or Dorinel Munteanu, "*the coach presently working abroad"*. They are characterised by coaching abroad – they are talented without doubt, have reached outstanding results, but cannot work in the Romanian conditions either because *"they are too elegant and sophisticated"* (Bölöni), or *"too expensive and independent"* (Lucescu, Petrescu) or they had "*unpleasant experiences"* earlier (Olăroiu). Under the present conditions – although Romania would really need them – they are not in the country. In the narration they are a kind of luxury "strawberry pickers" leaving their country to be successful abroad. Dorinel Munteanu – nicknamed by the funs as the "German" for his seriousness, hard work on and off the pitch and for his successful career in Germany - is also mentioned as a "healthy" form of Romanian masculinity, in opposition with "toxic" masculinity represented by the club owners (embodied by FC Steaua stakeholder George "Gigi" Becali), but he never became the central figure in the media narratives. Interestingly, active and well-known players like Marius Nicolae or Raul Rusescu are totally missing from the soccer discourses regarding the masculinity. So, the essence of Romanian masculinity is built around local coaches.

The other group is composed of those working at home, but under problematic working circumstances; they were either dismissed, (e.g. I. Andone), or they are successful, in spite of a bad coach-club owner relationship (L. Reghecampf), or they work unknown, far from the attention of the audience, at smaller regional teams (P. Grigoraș; C. Pustai; I. O. Sabău). They are the ones still working at home or "*have not yet left the country*".

The successful coaches of the third group (like Jenei I.; Kovács I.; V. Stănescu) direct the attention to the glorious past. The narrative creates by them stresses the continuity within the community of coaches, the organic relationship between football past and present, the direct lineage of hegemonic masculinity.

> Yes, we speak after several years with the gentle and good-tempered Emeric Jenei, the coach of the great victory in Sevilla. True, he was then younger with a quarter of a century. That is what Uncle Imi told his pupils in the times when Anderlecht or Honvéd fell like heads of corn in Ghencea. Equally true that the great coach also had listeners to address. (ProSport, 16.02.2012)

The *human qualities* – determination, steadiness, honesty, pride, mutual respect, knowledge, tenaciousness, sense of vocation, solidarity, spirit of fighting – on the basis of which they performed their successes in spite of the *surrounding external impediments,* are valid for each of the coaches mentioned above as models. In this approach, inner qualities constitute the token of success, inner qualities, which, according to the narration, are rather scarce especially amongst the club owners, but also within society. The values in question construct the normative model of Romanian masculinity. Because there is another similarity among the mentioned coaches: all of them are Romanians, or if they belong to an ethnic minority (like Jenei, Bölöni, Kovács), they are accepted as Romanians. Rarely appear foreign coaches in this pantheon (C. Bergodi, but the end of his Romanian career was attributed to his excessive stylishness and decency).

> Bergodi scored a moral victory as all of the past and future conquests of technical players going through Ghencea. Steaua has to thank the Italian that he had given them an example of professionalism and manhood. Because he behaved like a coach and not like a slave. Without making a fuss of it. In fact there is nothing heroic in his gesture. This is normality. (GSP, 18.09.2009)

So these masculine qualities belong to the *Romanian coaches,* and by the application of linguistic transitivity they also indirectly mean *Romanian masculinity*.

> Why do they believe in Dorinel? He is totally devoted to his work (…). He knows exactly what he wants (…). He creates the atmosphere. Although the man of record caps at the national team, Dorinel does not take pride in this, neither outside, nor inside the locker room. He gains respect from his competence. The player respects him because he gets uprightness in evaluation, knowledge in the preparation for matches, diversity in trainings in exchange. He does not consider the possessor of absolute truth, he is a good receiver of the useful ideas of the team. All these create that binding atmosphere, the background in which the results appear. (GSP, 28.10.2008)

Among central symbols I found expressions like trophies, performance, and masculinity. The applied discursive strategy presents outstanding coach performance and masculine behaviour, it blows up the significance of successes and puts them in sharp contrast with the Romanian conditions of football, considered limitative. The presented identity of the coach is equated with the status of the employee, to which the perspective of the narrator also corresponds: the story of coaches in the narrative is built up from this point of view, and gets completed with the identity of the average employed Romanian man. Its function is to show up the coaches' real working situation, and to draw the traits of Romanian men, in order to provide an answer to the nature of general masculine identity.

The narrators apply the instruments of description and transitivity, while football serves the aim to give a basis to discursively build up individual identity and masculinity. For the coaches, the ball game constitutes the medium through which they can express their identity and can implement the qualities characteristic to the real Romanian man. The narration approaches positively the coaches – in contrast with the club owners and sports leaders – they are the main characters of this story. The topic of masculinity is more complex to be related solely alongside talkative positive examples. It also relates about what does not constitute the model of Romanian masculinity. In parallel with this, I present in the following additional material about further circles responsible for the present state of affairs of the "soccer situation" – its lack of success, corruption, conflicts between the characters.

This narrative on masculinity lacks ambivalence: it denotes fake, pseudo-masculine manifestations in negative terms. The majority of the subjects – about whom the narrative contrasts – are trainers from abroad[9] or celebrity players, but several club owners consciously looking for the attention of the media also belong to this circle.[10] The discourse functions by a simple strategy. It solely constructs negative cases, which can obviously be condemned. It strongly blows up the subjects' weaknesses, but hides and conceals positive exceptions – for instance successful foreign trainers[11] and the performances of foreign players. Here the presented characters wear strong labels, to which negative meanings are rendered. The texts make each label unambiguous, not making possible any positive connotations. Not only the names, but also even the scenes where they appear get negative values. Such scenes are TV studios late in the evening, night clubs and places of entertainment, but even unsuitably prepared training fields.

This has got two iconic symbols: Italian trainer Dario Bonetti and Dinamo's ex-player Adrian Cristea, the celebrity player of the team U Cluj during my

[9] Primarily José Peseiro, Luis Caro and Dario Bonetti.
[10] Primarily Cristi Borcea from Dinamo.
[11] Cristiano Bergodi or Dusan Uhrin jr.

research. In discourses Bonetti obtained the label of *the Buffoon* (Bufonul), while Cristea the "rank" of *The Prince.*

> (...) The Prince played against CFR with a plus of an ambition and even a plus of a speed, but the general impression is that he still remained indebted. Inasmuch according to a larger opinion, he enters the narrow category of the football players who – benefitting of the many talents they had received from nature – should be able to win a match all by themselves. Not always, perhaps, but at least every now and then. As he failed to do so again on Saturday, it became clear that it takes little for Adi Cristea to be satisfied, he proves to be a man of pleasure. Because of this the whole community suffers, but mostly Adi Cristea himself does. (GSP, 21.11.2011)

The case of Bonetti is simple: a former Italian player who had made it into the national team, and then, at the beginning of his career as a coach, signed a contract in Romania, in June 2009, with Dinamo Bucharest. The goal set by the club is to win the national championship and make it for the Champions League in the next season. Bonetti's activity comes to a sudden end in October, when he is fired. Parting is scandalous; the parties each cast the blame on the other side in their declaration on TV (the club frequently mentioning the performance that failed to come, while the coach the promises unfulfilled and the benefits not received). In the April of 2012, he suddenly "returned" to the team with a mission to save the season, when the team was the seventh on the league table. His career proved to be a short once again; he was dismissed once more in November, while the team continued to be the seventh on the league table.

The tow unsuccessful attempts, and the many declarations in which he posed in the role of the saviour, made him an ideal scapegoat. His arrogance disturbed the authors. "*I am only arrogant with the ignorants*", he declared.

In spite of his intentions, Bonetti has become one of the main symbols of foreignness in this narrative.[12]

> I was ignorant: I have never heard of Bonetti until his first term at Dinamo. (...) I claim my right to be ignorant: as I say that Bonetti used to be a great player, I also have to affirm that as a coach he is only one in a dozen. Just like Dinamo has become under his guidance. (...) I ignore my unjust arrogance: immediately after League 1 had escaped "una grande partita", I heard one of the commentators trying to elegantly save the appearances: "Good thing that he left!". (...) And the bottom-line is: before leaving for the Caribbeans, Bonetti would have liked to take another tour in the old downtown, together with his lads from the Nuova Guardia. (ProSport, 16.11.2012)

[12] The other one was the captain of CFR Cluj, Ricardo Cadú.

His false masculine manners were the subject of critical remarks and parody, xenophobia and racism, but also sexism rose to the surface in connection with his personality. All this in connection with the fact that the number of foreign players playing in the Romanian championship had increased continuously since 2001, with an increasingly sharp competition between autochthonous and foreign players on the transfer market, in favour of the latter. It is not uninteresting either, that the performance of the national squad started to deteriorate, while the proportion of foreign players continuously and steadily increased, and after 2000 Romania failed to qualify to any international competition. The two processes do not necessarily correlate, but the general public and the commentators began to talk about them more and more frequently as interconnected phenomena.

Adrian Cristea ran another course. The Dinamo player Cristea had been the player of the Iasi team (2001-2004), he played here until 2010. Thus Bonetti was his coach for a while. In the beginning the nickname of Prince was used by the media in a positive sense, to denote a talented hope. It had been attributed earlier, in the late sixties and early/mid-seventies of the last century to a legendary football player, Nicolae Dobrin (wearing an aristocratic nickname like the Prince even meant risk). Thus the Prince evoked a "new Dobrin" in Cristea, but the meaning of the word increasingly slid towards mundane behaviour, the role of a mediatise heartbreaker celebrity and less and less referred to the status of a football player, or to his (wasted) talent. The term of "Prince" gradually became a label/stigma, while the narrative discovered in him the symbolic representative of all irresponsible players, a false masculinity. A significant part in that played his boisterous and overly mediatised relationship with a celebrity miss, Bianca Draguşanu.

> I find Adrian Cristea sympathetic. He is some kind of a James Dean lost in time and space, with a glance hovering above waters, as if he was always laughing at everybody and particularly of himself. Always living at another speed than the others – in Dean's case it had been the fury of adrenalin, at Cristea it is the mania of challenging silence, of shrewd deceit. Anything, just to be different from the rest. (...) He's heading for a crash. (...) Cristea is the poster of a generation left to fly without wings and which constructs from "Fronde" the vocation of falling. Some sort of twisted Spartans, a sacrifice of wasting. (GSP, 01.12.2009.)

So, the unprofessional, pseudo-masculine coach and false player identity appears, presented by the speakers from the symbolic position of a true Romanian male (coach). Its aim is to defend the market interests of Romanian coaches and to deconstruct the pseudo-masculine patterns of the "foreigners": to strengthen the autochthonous Romanian model of masculinity, to point out the well identifiable circle of those responsible, too. Those, who can be made

responsible for the weak performance of Romanian football, and the loss of ground on the labour market of domestic coaches and players. All these in spite of the fact that the number of foreign coaches is low in the Romanian championship. The total number of fifteen coaches[13] appeared in the period of my analysis. Among the applied means, generalisation, and description, respectively stereotyping can be observed, while the story against the subjects is clearly condemning, strongly satirical. Among the central notions of the narrative I found Dinamo, Bonetti, Cristea, impertinence. Yet football only creates the basis for the deligitimization and deconstruction of pseudo-masculinity, and the strengthening of true Romanian masculinity.

But then what does not count as masculine? The way of speech articulated along coordinates like *Romanian coach–foreign coach*, and *professional–unprofessional* identified pseudo-masculinity along external marks, to which it explicitly placed itself in opposition. Bonetti was clearly unsuccessful; he was Italian and he frequently made self-confident declarations. This constituted the "realistic" basis of the constructed image of Bonetti. He failed to save Dinamo; thus he cannot be a professional either. If he is not a professional – only presents himself as such – then he cannot be masculine either (as we have seen, professionalism and masculinity are closely connected). The picture drawn is not at all flattering. He behaved spectacularly in his outward appearance, *dressed unconventionally* (Italian style), *could hardly speak Romanian* (foreigner), *talked in an off-hand manner with old players* (arrogant), and *preferred foreigners* (looked down on Romanians): the image of an ideal scapegoat. Thus pseudo-masculinity can be caught in the constructed image *in its external habitual features*, whereas real – implicitly Romanian–masculinity – means *internal qualities*. Cristea-type mundane, celebrity, outward behaviour does not count as real masculinity.

The fact that Bonetti is an Italian cannot be neglected. Romanian football sees Italian football as a model it tries to "copy". A part of the coaches are great admirers of the tactics of the Italians, and the press calls many of the "clones" of Italian coaches – for instance often speaks about Mihai Stoichiță as "the Lippi of Romania". The victory over Italy in 1983 counts as one of the peaks of Romanian football history. At the same time, Italy has been one of the most popular targets of Romanian foreign workers since 2007. The incidents widely publicised in the Italian press about the unlawful acts of Romanian immigrants, come down hard on Romanian public opinion and they also have soccer connections.[14]

[13] Maurizio Trombetta; Ales Jindra; Dusan Uhrin Jr.; Toni Conceicao; Toni Conceicao; Andrea Mandorlini; Jorge Costa; Paulo Sérgio; Dario Bonetti; Jose Peseiro; Massimo Pedrazzini; Cristiano Bergodi; Ronny Levy; Augusto Inácio; Lopez Caro.

[14] In the fall of 2008 Nicolae Mailat was accused of murdering a wife of an Italian admiral. The news generated anti-Romanian manifestations. After the event, in the Olimpico Stadium in Rome, the spectators shouted racist insult and booed at Mutu, calling him a "Gypsy".

The "botcher" coach in this context is an excellent opportunity to turn the Italian-Romanian relations "upside down", and to equalise an unequal situation. This is what the narrative does in fact, while it also defends the interests of domestic coaches and players. The criticism of professionalism and unworkmanlike behaviour appears in a xenophobic tone that is legitimised by the narrative: it instils that *they are too many.* Foreign players appeared in the Romanian championship after 2000. Earlier the migration of Romanian players to foreign teams was more characteristic. As the population of the country became more and more engaged on the international labour force market, the number of those undertaking work in Romania also started to increase. The majority of these were company leaders and soccer players.

Their proportion increased steadily. In the 2001/2002 season their proportion in the starting teams[15] was only 1 percent, which was negligible. This did not really change until the 2006/2007 season, when the presence of one foreign player becomes regular in starting teams. Two seasons later we already find three foreigners on average in a team on the pitch, and in the 2011/2012 four. Their distribution is obviously very unequal: in the case of stronger teams the majority of the selection is made up of foreigners; among these the CFR in Cluj had a pioneer role. In the 2012/1013 season, more than two thirds of all the players of the CFR were foreigners, whereas there were only five of twenty-nine in the team of the main rival Steaua. No surprise that xenophobia became closely linked with CFR, which appeared as "foreign team" as compared with "autochthonous" Steaua.

The fact is that in the narrative mostly calibrated in Bonetti, the question of foreignness is in the foreground. It is also expressive that the term of *foreigner* is frequently used instead of foreign legionnaires. The term *legionnaires* and the Italian sounding *stranier* is reserved to designate Romanian football players playing abroad. The way of speech does not only find the number of foreigners too high, but often presents value judgments: "*only the scrap comes*", *"they could not be successful elsewhere*", "*they are worthless*". Players coming from Africa for instance are often only referred to as *"blacks*" that have got *"civilisation problems".* In this respect, it is very expressive how CFR player Lacina Traoré was presented in the press. About the player from Ivory Coast, who came to Cluj as a teenager in 2008, they considered important to remark that he had never seen shampoo before and had never taken a shower. In the case of the player, who has since played for AS Monaco and presently playing for the English Everton, it is expressive that words like *black* or *African* work as a marker, and over-emphasising his exotic features is racist.

[15] The proportion is calculated for all the teams, a number of 18 in total.

The connection between unworkmanlike – unmasculine behaviour – and racial origin is even more explicit in the case of Osumane N'Doye, a player who had played for several other teams before. The Senegalese forward, an offspring of rich parents, is often in the limelight because of his happy-go-lucky way of life. *"*N'Doye is not a bad boy, N'Doye is just unprofessional**.** A professional player means in the first place rules. Rules, rules, rules*."* (GSP, 21.11.2010)

The connection between the black and/or African marker and the "fancy nightclub" underlines foreignness and the lack of masculinity. The picture is further shaded by the fact that the narrative explicitly shows an ideal-type of hegemonic masculinity: the Serbian Novak Martinovic, who demonstrated the male model to follow on the "field of actions". Martinovic became a "celebrated warrior" during a match between Petrolul Ploieşti and Steaua Bucharest.[16] In 45th minute of the half-time, a local supporter ran onto the pitch, and hit George Galamaz with an iron rod on the back of his head. The aggressor continued to run with further intentions to attack, but Martinovic kicked and thwarted him with a quick and accurate movement, while his companions only watched paralysed. By his deed Martinovic became an instant hero: the articles praised him with words like "*a true man*", with "*determination*", "*self control*", "*powerful*", "*combating*". The posing of the issue draws a central characteristic of masculinity. Thus he became a Romanian, a "Real Man", embodiment of domestic hegemonic masculinity completing the features of local coaches.

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THE DIMENSION OF NORMATIVITY IN INFORMAL SOCIAL RELATIONS

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ABSTRACT. The aim of this article is to discuss the character of regularities occurring in informal social bonds, be they friendships, romantic partnerships, competitions or rivalries. Since Simmel's work is emblematic for the theme of social norms involved in durable informal bonds, I take his original concept of forms of association as my point of reference. The argument I propose challenges several of Simmel's assumptions, namely his objectivist stance, his formal sociology and the autopoiesis of systems of reciprocal effects. Based on this critical rereading of Simmel, I introduce the concept of "socially constructed typical bonds" as a more dynamic and versatile alternative to the static patterns of forms of association. By bringing a subjectivist turn (inspired by Berger, Luckmann and Butler) to Simmel's forms of association, I argue for the recognition of the blurry, diverse and contradictory understandings of the typical social bond as the ground for relational normativity.

Keywords: social bonds, form of sociation, normativity, phenomenology

The theoretical problem of the regularities of social life, be they framed as social norms, values, social order, morality, has haunted writers and readers of sociology alike for over two centuries. Finding one's way through a literature of the richness, diversity and density of the Amazonian Jungle is already a great task, let alone saying anything innovative in relation to it. However, as it often happens with many aspects of social theory, I believe a great entry point is constituted by the work of Georg Simmel, and there are two reasons for it. The first is the originality of Simmel's analytical approach to the social world, and I am referring here mainly to his pivotal role in setting up a relational approach in sociology. The second is the long-term neglect of Simmel in some agenda-setting scholarly circles. While in the United States his work was more popular than in Europe in the first half of the 20th century especially due to his influence on

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the Chicago School (mostly Parks) and the New School (mostly Schütz), this influence faded away, particularly as a result of Simmel's ideas not being discussed in Parsons' "The Structure of Social Action" (Levine et al., 1976, Levine, 1991). In Europe, a mixture of his courageous, but often uncomfortable ideas and the unfavorable historical context, made his work even less known than in the US for most of the 20th century (Frisby, 1992). This situation blocked many of Simmel's nascent ideas in incipient phases and left an important part of his heritage underexplored.

Over the last decades, a number of accomplished academics, like Levine in the US, Frisby in the UK and Rammstedt in Germany (Cantó Milà, 2005: 14) established Simmel's work as one of the foundational contributions for a variety of sociological subfields and traditions, ranging from structuralism (through his forms of association), symbolic interaction (through his attention to detail and the unfolding of everyday life), to urban sociology (through his depictions of the city), the sociology of emotions (through his views on love, faithfulness etc.), social inequality (the poor) or migration (the stranger). This re-popularization of Simmel, or the so-called Simmel renaissance (Blegvad, 1989), meant systematic efforts and has had great success in tracing a variety of current developments back to Simmel and in familiarizing the uninitiated social researchers with his work. However, the previous lack of attention towards Simmel's work has been counterbalanced by what is, in my reading, a sort of Simmelian orthodoxy. It was, perhaps, not only an understandable, but also a necessary approach to point out his remarkable contributions. Yet, with these steps having been taken, the moment has come, I argue, to not only trace existing theories back to Simmel, but also to build on his own work, to challenge it, to adapt it, in awareness of its strengths and limitations. This path will reveal not only the facets of Simmel's thought that managed to influence sociology (despite him often not getting the credit for it), but also, and more importantly, ways of adapting his theory and allowing it to generate new insights.

One of the seeds that Simmel planted and never gained its deserved attention in sociology is the attention paid to the social bond, to that which ties people together. This statement might look unusual, when thinking of the amount of work that has been done on themes like social relations, social interactions or the link between selves and others. Yet it is my conviction that very few of these follow Simmel's thought. The main point of rupture with Simmel's social bond is the disregard of relational stability, in favour of an analysis either of situational sequences of togetherness (Blumer, 1969; Goffman 1959, 1961 or Garfinkel, 1967) or of measurable behaviours considered as the material that constitutes social bonds and their distances (Granovetter, 1973; Marsden & Campbell 1984; Gilbert & Karahalios 2009; Grabowicz et al., 2012).

Behind both of these approaches there is a common conceptual confusion: that between a social interaction and a tie or a bond. It is a distinction that, although not elaborated upon, is signalled in Simmel's ([1908] 2009) work by the use of the concepts *Wechselwirkungen* (for interconnected actions and effects) and *Wechselbeziehungen* (for interrelations). Despite the fact that the difference between the two concepts is intuitively accessible, they are at best not discussed in relation to each other and at worst used interchangeably. And given the empirically observable character of social interactions in concrete behaviours, it is often the case that the analysis of social interactions takes over the category of social relations, not the other way around.

In order to avoid this pitfall, I will go on to clarify the ways in which the two concepts are used during the course of this text. Drawing on Schütz (1967) I understand social interactions as instances where the actions of a particular social actor are either directed towards communicating certain contents to another actor, or read by the other actor as addressed to him/her. The actors need to take each other for granted as capable of acting meaningfully and as capable of interpreting each other's actions as meaningful. These conditions are typically met in contexts of copresence, but they can also occur in letter writing, phone conversations or e-mails. Social interactions are discrete, recurrent events. The regularities which are inherent in social interactions and which constitute normativity at this level are derived from the presentational character of the social self, as Rawls (1987) points out following Goffman (1961, 1983). This shapes interaction in terms of making a good showing in a given situation, managing conversations with the other or avoiding discomfort or distress for those involved.

Social bonds, on the other hand, transcend the concrete situations of communication between social actors. They are observable through interactions, but they are more than the sum of these interactions. While it is very difficult to draw precise lines about when a social bond is established or when it stops, it is sound to assume no bond emerges between two people who meet for the first time in an elevator and talk about the weather in an attempt to avoid an embarrassing silence (for a discussion about the constraints of the interaction order, see Goffmann 1983 and Rawls 1987, 1988, 1989). The reason why such an assumption sustains itself is that, besides the social interactions, there are other elements that enter in the construction of a social bond. Namely, I am referring to the reciprocal emotional investment (i.e. love, trust, respect), the construction of certain expectations about the other's future actions, the construction of a horizon of possibilities about what the other would or would not be capable of doing and the reciprocal consequences the ones who are bonded have had and expect to have on each other's lives. While interaction

order is described above as sui genesis and relying on certain particularities of the self as inherently social, normativity in social bonds is more complex. On the one hand, we can link the rules and patterns of bonds with those of interacting and with characteristics of selves. On the other hand, we must account for the fact that social bonds are shaped in previous experience with the other, and in (more or less clear) social scripts that describe what a particular bond is, how people should behave towards each other as part of the bond or what they should feel about each other by virtue of their bond. From this point of view, the behaviours of those who are bonded form a system that is meaningful only through the lens of the bond. It does not make sense for me to go out on a day when I am not feeling well because someone else wants me to go, unless they invited me and we are friends. In that case, friendship itself makes our actions concerted and constitutes a sufficient "because motive" (Schütz, 1967) for me to go out. The bond insures the elements of action that Parsons ([1937] 1966: 75) would call "normative", by legitimizing action that has otherwise no particular purpose. Furthermore, it legitimizes not only a certain action in a given context, like a norm of interaction would, but it legitimizes an entire constellation of stable expectations and emotions towards another.

As Parsons himself pointed out (quoted by Levine, 1991), Simmel's theory cuts through his own. By this statement, he refers, most likely, to his interest in systems of action, in which a normative dimension is included, in comparison with Simmel's approach which is focused on the normative dimension itself, through forms. Parsons places human action and interaction in the centre of his theory and he seeks to explain it at least partially through the means of a shared basis of normative order. However, restating the critique brought forth by Habermas (1987, 1996) and Strydom (2001), Vanderstraeten (2002) points out that Parsons' solution to double contingency, and consequently, his stance on social order is rooted in a "past-oriented, objectivist and reified concept of culture" (Vanderstraeten 2002: 83). The limits of Parsons' vision become evident when we shift our emphasis from the analysis of action to an analysis of norms in themselves while still maintaining Parsons' concept of common culture. In doing so, we are confronted with questions about the emergence and functionality of norms, which a theory of social action cannot account for. Simmel's forms of association, on the other hand, are an analytical tool designed precisely for the study of social regularities as such, not as background for a system of action. Looking at norms (like Parsons) as a means of understanding the (inter)actions they inform necessarily requires us to take them as fragmented and frozen in the shape they had when manifested in a particular context, in a given moment of time. Taking social norms (like Simmel) as the object of study reveals their emergence, their continuities and disruptions in shaping a variety of interactions. In other words, Simmel does not subordinate his structuralist analysis to a functionalist

one. I will come back to the specifics of Simmel's theory, with its advantages and shortcomings, but at this point it must be affirmed that I consider his non-functionalist structuralism to favour a depiction of norms as dynamic, processual, relational, although Simmel's theory does not always present them as such.

The need for a conceptualization of social norms which accounts for their emergence and flexibility has also been remarkably covered by authors writing in a post-structuralist vein, from Foucault to Butler, yet both their theories are centred on the level of the laws/ institutional order, and less on informal normativity, on the one hand, and on subjectivity, rather than bonds, on the other. So, the agenda of this article is Simmelian rather than (post)Parsonian also in this respect. Thus, the current argument is developed as an analysis of the social norms which shape and are shaped by the behaviour of social actors through bonds, not as an analysis of the behaviour of bonded social actors which is conditioned by norms.

My seeking of a way of looking into social norms as non-reified, processual, might lead one to link the position I am adopting with Luhmann's system theory, which is not as static and not as reliant on social actors. Unlike Parsons, Luhmann (1995) regards double contingency as something that cannot be overcome in social interactions, which ultimately presupposes contact between two autonomous systems, non-reducible to each other. Thus, rather than on action, he insists on communication as a generator of order, as frail and sensitive as it might be. Yet, as Rawls (1988) points out in her response to Fuchs (1988), "for Luhmann copresence […] provides the organizational centre for interaction." (Rawls, 1988: 126). This brings me back to the earlier distinction between social interactions and ties and bonds. And if we are to accept bonds as different from, and more durable than social interactions, than our understanding of social norms needs stability as much as it needs to avoid reification. It is this stability of norms which I believe is lacking from Luhmann's work and which makes it less suitable for a discussion about social bonds.

The normativity inculcated in informal social bonds (e.g. the norms/ rules/expectations in a romantic partnership or in a friendship, by which I mean neither the legal norms, nor the norms which shape a particular interaction with the other), although touched upon in many ways, has been a peripheral preoccupation for most social theorists and it continues to be so, even after the revival of Simmel's ideas. As I mentioned above, Simmel's approach to the norms involved in social bonds is not always open and flexible, but it does have two merits: 1) that it discusses the normativity of durable social bonds to begin with, and 2) that it leaves room for his approach to be opened and given flexibility. Let us take a closer look of his theory about the patterns and regularities of bonds.

While Simmel never offers an unequivocal definition of his forms, he does discuss them extensively. Synchronized with the themes of his time, Simmel's theory is grounded in the need to establish sociology as a distinctive science with the purpose of studying society. Society is understood as unity, resulting from the interconnectedness of its elements (yet unlike in Luhmann's system theory, this unity transcends copresence). Be that as it may, society was already the object of study of various fields. In an attempt to circumscribe a more specific disciplinary scope that does not collide with pre-existing social sciences, Simmel proposes sociology as the study of forms of association. For him, a sociological systematic analysis of the social world requires a differentiation between forms and content, although what is given to us empirically is only society as unity. Simmel ([1908] 2009) describes content as:

> everything that exists in individuals, the immediate concrete locus of every historical reality - such as impulse, interest, purpose, predisposition, psychological state, and incitement in such a way as to say that on account of them people affect one another and are in turn affected. (Simmel [1908] 2009: 23)

Forms are just as diverse and, as Levine (1981, 1991) notes, they can be broken down in many subcategories, following the terminology of contemporary sociology:

> In the collection of sociological essays Simmel assembled in the great Soziologie, he included such disparate topics as superordination and subordination (chap. 3), conflict and competition (chap. 4), the stranger and the poor person (chaps. 9, 4), secret societies (chap. 5), group expansion and the development of individuality (chap. 10), and the quantitative aspects of groups (chap. 2). […] The study of social forms, following Simmel, can focus on relationships, or interaction processes, or roles, or collectivities, or developmental patterns, or structural variables. (Levine, 1991: 1106)

What is relevant for the present argument is that form is an abstraction meant to capture, among other aspects, the regularities that structure what I have previously defined as a social bond. A form is that which shapes reciprocally directed behaviours of social actors, but also their expectations, their emotional investment, and their way of making sense of the other and of the boundaries of what one shares with the other. In one of the clearest descriptions of forms, Simmel affirms:

> [The area of forms] may be called "pure sociology", which abstracts the mere element of sociation. It isolates it inductively and psychologically from the heterogeneity of its contents and purposes, which, in themselves, are not societal. It thus proceeds like grammar, which isolates the pure forms of language from their contents through which these forms, nevertheless, come to life. (Simmel 1950: 22)

Here, he compares forms to grammar, elsewhere to geometrical abstractions, both comparisons indicating on the one hand the abstract, purely analytical differentiation between form and content, and the empirically graspable manifestation of forms through the way in which they structure content, or life, to use his later terminology. Yet, these comparisons end up creating ambiguity more often than not. One instance of such ambiguity is the oscillation between the objectification of forms, by their divorce from the contents of the minds of social actors, and the Kantian standpoint he explicitly assumes. This stance is even more unusual when taking into account that his adaptation of Kant's work to sociology starts with the assumption that, unlike in nature, in society unity is given from within, thus positioning himself at a more subjectivist angle than Kant had adopted. It is because of such ambiguities that even social thinkers who devoted themselves to understanding Simmel have difficulties theorizing forms:

> But perhaps he was aware of his uncertainty concerning what "formal" sociology was designed to study; at any rate, whether aware or not, he actually was not clear in regard to the nature of the 'forms'. (Wolff, 1950: XXXIX)

Simmelian scholars often argue that his concept of forms needs clarification and that it needs organization, but that it still stands. I believe this approach is a mistake. According to Levine (1991), Simmel's work becomes vulnerable as a result of "viewing the dispositions to engage in social interaction as pre-social" (Levine, 1991: 1111), a vulnerability that was pointed out by authors as early as Durkheim. However, this is a very serious critique that has repercussions over Simmel's entire theoretical construction and brushing it under the carpet or minimizing it makes Simmelian perspectives just as vulnerable as the original work that inspired them.

When talking about forms of association as abstractions, this category relies on the very assumption that content, understood as that which is not form, is pre-social. Contents are, however, as interactionists (but also post-structuralists) have shown after Simmel, profoundly social, as they are shaped by norms of behaviour, by dominant discourses, by roles and expectations etc. One eloquent

example in this sense is Goffman's work. Goffman's (1959) metaphor of the dramaturgy of everyday life draws on the premise that individuals take up different roles in order to create an idealized version of their selves. These roles vary according to different contexts and according to what the audience expects as appropriate behaviour. Consequently, he makes a distinction between "expressions given and expressions given off", where the latter consists of uncontrolled manifestations of the "true self". Despite bringing in the idea of a "true self" that escapes the social scenario, Goffman takes one step further than Simmel in the direction of the social nature of motivations, behaviours and intentions. To him, that which an individual tries to convey in a social context is inherently social and is originated in expectations and role taking. More concretely, an example of how the social component is present in one's motivations is the concept Goffman (1967) calls "face". Making a good showing for oneself can be, in Simmel's terms, a personal intention or wish, which manifests itself in certain patters in which reciprocal actions and effects unfold. While we can envision this intention being expressed differently in the context of friendship as compared to the context of having just met someone, the fact that "the rules of the game" are social does not mean "the stake and the unfolding of the game" are any less social.

Going even further than Goffman who still leaves "the real self" outside of social norms is Hochschild's (1979) approach to emotional management. Since emotions are probably the last bastion of imagined autonomy of the individual from the social, her arguments make a very strong case for the claim that there is nothing one feels, does, believes that is not "contaminated" by the social life he/she has had. When talking about the regulations that shape our experience, she points out that Goffman's actors actively manage outer impressions, but they do not actively manage inner feelings. On the contrary, for Hochschild (1979, 1983), there is an even deeper layer of control that does not imply putting on a role or a mask, but working on one's own emotion. Moreover, there are rules of social acceptance or desirability in regard to the appropriate feelings associated to certain circumstances. A socialized individual "should feel" something very specific at one time or another:

> A feeling rule shares some formal properties with other sorts of rules, such as rules of etiquette, rules of bodily comportment, and those of social interaction in general (Goffman, 1961). A feeling rule is like these other kinds of rules in the following ways: It delineates a zone within which one has permission to be free of worry, guilt, or shame with regard to the situated feeling. (Hochschild, 1979: 565)

One could argue that Goffman's social role or Hochschild's feeling rule also circumscribe a sphere of the normative, similar to Simmel's forms and, to a certain extent, they do. However, the insistence on the issue of socialization (particularly Hochschild), reveals a different character of structure: namely, structure as internalized. The implications of this approach are not only related to how structure manifests itself, but also to what structure is. And for Hochschild, feeling rules are a social construction, although still a slightly too reified one, I would argue. Simmel's forms, on the other hand start off as autopoietic social constructions, but they are necessarily reified when one makes the methodological choice of distinguishing them from content, because in doing so, one does not only miss how forms structure life, but also how they are deconstructed and reconstructed.

Form, at least in its crystallized stage, solidifies patterns. In Simmel's work, competition, subordination and all the other forms are discussed outside of lived experience. They are abstract norms according to which reciprocal actions and effects unfold. Consequently, they lack versatility. Rather, if we descend the social patterns (as well as social roles or feeling rules, for that matter) from forms to the experience of social actors, they become subject to interpretations, doubts, questions, misunderstandings and they lose their law-like status.

In a certain sense, Simmel gives the social actor plenty of freedom. One example is the following quotation:

> As a result of the inherent flexibility and dislocation of our boundaries, we are able to express our essence with a paradox: we are bounded in every direction, and we are bounded in no direction. (Simmel 1971: 355)

However, it must be noted that the flexibility comes on the level of praxis, not on the formal level. He explains human life as forever bound to two poles, richness and determinacy. And forms represent determinacy. They are boundaries that we can step over, but knowing them and stepping over them, does not mean denying their existence. For Simmel, they represent the exterior, uniform, stable, and predictable layer that is filled with life. I find this metaphor of separation and given empty forms which are than paired with their corresponding events very misleading for the relation between patterns/ regularities and social reality as a whole.

Thus, coming back to the issue of contents not being pre-social, this marks an important shift that needs to be accounted for, since it means an analysis of forms of association is an analysis of social life. Simmel (1971: 351-352) himself talks about forms as fixed and as not keeping up with the dynamics of life, but

he feels this is an appropriate depiction of the actual stability of norms. I argue that this fixity is constructed discursively through notions such as "form" to begin with. Judith Butler (1997: 88-91) points out that standards of universality must be seen through the lens of their historical articulation, for it is through that very articulation that they establish the notion of universality as substantive. Transferring Butler's argument to Simmel's relational forms, I claim that friendship and "what friends should do", or couples or competitors, are only typifications of various bonds, and the categories created this way depict an artificial unity between instances of social bonds that sometimes are not even similar. Furthermore, not only the practices of friendship, but also the idea of "what is normal" which emerges and which accompanies the practices of the social relation is not unitary either. Simmel's forms might apply to laws, but informal social bonds are far too little institutionalized for this concept to be used. In this sense, instead of forms, I argue that a better concept to serve Simmel's preoccupation for a) structure in itself (not subordinated to function) and b) for the norms that shape social relations is "the social construction of the typical social bond". This new conceptualization allows us to approach a Simmelian thematic in different and more nuanced terms. By this I mean a full recognition of the inescapably social character of every aspect of our reality and an account of normativity as an imaginary universality eternally under both subjective and objectifying construction.

Some would say that Simmelian scholars have already made significant efforts into giving flexibility and openness to the concept of forms and that proposing a new concept to capture the patterns and norms of social bonds is just terminological nitpicking. I consider it not to be, because taking the social construction of the typical bond and not the form as the focus of our study has two particular purposes: a) counter-reification of the normative element of bonds and b) building a link between the unfolding and the lived dimension of particular bonds and the meaning of the bond on a societal level (to the extent to which we can talk about something like that). In an attempt to further clarify my stance, I will now turn to a different entry point in Simmel's work, namely the one emphasizing the flowing and dynamic character of life.

It must be said that my presentation of Simmel's thought throughout this paper has been very schematic and monochrome. As Pyyhtinen (2010: 68) points out, Simmel was not particularly concerned with the consistency and accuracy of his conceptual apparatus, as he often used the same term to designate different ideas, or two different terms to describe similar situations. Furthermore, I would add, different fragments of his writings are not always compatible with each other, particularly regarding Kantian transcendental idealism and in relation to society as a web of interconnections. Faced with

Simmel's own occasional incongruity, the emphasis on specific facets of his theory is, more often than not, a question of the reader's interpretation. One alternative interpretation from my own is the following:

> Simmel regards the independent and autonomous forms of sociology as merely secondary phenomena compared with the real reciprocity/ *Wechselwirkung* between individuals (GSG 2: 130). In these crystallized forms, 'the forces of reciprocal effect [*wechselwirkelnden Kräfte*] have already withdrawn [*auskristallisiert*] from their immediate bearers' (GSG 11: 32). For Simmel, it is only the 'delicate, invisible threads that are spun from one person to another', not the 'final finished pattern' of society's 'uppermost phenomenal stratum' (GSG 8: 292), that constitute 'the real life of society provided in our experience' (GSG 8: 277). (Pyyhtinen, 2010: 73)

While I agree with Pyythinen that this type of distinction between form and life (or content) is representative for Simmel, I disagree about Simmel's preference for the lived over the formalized element. Simmel repeatedly stated his faithfulness towards "formal sociology" or "pure sociology" and has dedicated most of his work to discussions about forms, so at least from this point of view, forms are not secondary:

> To separate, by scientific abstraction, these two factors of form and content which are in reality inseparably united; to detach by analysis the forms of interaction or sociation from their contents (through which alone these forms become social forms); and to bring them together systematically under a consistent scientific viewpoint - this seems to me the basis for the only, as well as the entire, possibility of a special science of society as such. (Simmel 1971: 25)

As Fitzi (2002) shows, the fluctuating aspect of life and the fixed, objectified form are for Simmel two poles, and, from this point of view, even accepting Pyyhtinen's claim about the pre-eminence of reciprocity, processuality and events over forms, the dichotomy itself is what I am challenging with the concept of "social construction of the typical social bond".

Furthermore, replacing forms with constructions of the typical also implies incorporating elements of a Weberian view on society. Pyyhtinen (2010: 76) points out Simmel separates "the real reciprocity/ *Wechselwirkung* between individuals" from the individuals who live it. With Simmel, he argues, individuals do not only act, but are also affected; there is a dimension of passivity in social happenings. Life as an interconnection of reciprocities conceptualized outside of the actors acting and being affected by these reciprocities is afterwards

crystallized into forms. I see two problems with this train of thought. One is a shift from a constructionist view of everyday life to a structuralist view derived from the concept of forms of association. The other is that for Simmel, the emergence of stability in the pre-formal stage of social bonds can only be viewed as an autopoiesis of the system of reciprocities, like it is for Luhmann (Poli, 2010: 5-6). Let us think, in a Simmelian vein of an episode where reciprocal actions and effects occur without them being shaped by a particularly crystallized form of association. That episode and very similar ones occurring after it would lead, for Simmel, to greater formalization, as a result of the self reproduction of the system of interconnections between people. The reoccurrence of similar events should not be read through the lens of how the participants to the events found them meaningful and how that meaning became gradually taken for granted, because the system of reciprocal influences is the logical unit from which we started, not the individual who is caught in the system. However, as Poli mentions: "In the end, it is fair to acknowledge that neither Parsons nor Luhmann were able to spell out the details of this major ontological problem (note: the problem of the reproduction of social systems)" (Poli, 2010: 7). To add to Poli's statement, I would say neither does Simmel's theory explain how crystallization comes about in the case of social bonds. Taking the example of "friendship" as a form of association, how can we make the step from particular events where reciprocal actions and effects are unfolding in a certain way to the crystallized form? How does this autopoiesis of the system that is the social bond work in practical terms? My claim is that understanding friendship, for instance, as a social bond with its normative dimension requires a "descent" from a form with its imagined universality into the occurrences of fluctuating life on the one hand, but also into the subjective meaning constructions from which it draws its relative stability. Put briefly, I believe that both Simmel's and Luhmann's work lack in accounting for the genealogy of the stability of bonds as a result of their objectivist stance. The outcome are norms that are either too fixed (in Simmel), or not fixed enough (in Luhmann).

At the same time, it is important to question to what extent a notion such as "the social construction of the typical social bond" maintains the Simmelian relational standpoint and to examine the risk of solipsism that comes from bringing elements of subjectivity into our conceptual apparatus. My answer is that such an addition does not take anything away from a relational approach. The focus remains on the regularities of social bonds, viewed as emerging from the flow of systems of reciprocal influences, but human consciousness becomes part of these systems as well. It is not my intention to deny the condition of passivity of human beings throughout their social life, but only to include elements of active meaning constructions beside

that passivity. To be sure, those meaning constructions are already shaped by social norms, but they will also be shaped by individual biographies, by different ways of socialization, by exposure to various practices and they will end up being unique. These subjective ways of making sense of social bonds are actually part of a relational account of the normativity of bonds. It is because social bonds involve people that those bonds are stable, contested, reshaped, negotiated, irrational, profitable, contradictory all at the same time. As a result, I consider the view I am proposing for discussing the Simmelian agenda about the relatively stable aspects of durable social ties is relational with a subjective twist. As it might have been intuited in the course of the argument, this twist draws heavily on Berger and Luckmann's "Social Construction of Reality" (1967). The reason for my choice is their refined understanding of institutionalized/objectified social reality as part of a theory with a decidedly subjectivist foundation (Weber and Schütz). I believe this rethinking of Simmel in light of Berger and Luckmann's work solves the problem of the reification of forms, and perhaps more importantly (since it is less discussed by Simmelian scholars) the problem of the autopoiesis of systems of reciprocal actions and effects from which forms emerge.

Namely, Berger and Luckman (1967) write:

> All this (note: institutionalization in nucleo) changes in the process of transmission to the new generation. The objectivity of the institutional world 'thickens' and 'hardens', not only for the children, but (by a mirror effect) for the parents as well. The 'There we go again' now becomes 'This is how these things are done'. A world so regarded attains a firmness in consciousness; it becomes real in an ever more massive way and it can no longer be changed to readily. […] Since they (note: the children) had no part in shaping it, it confronts them as a given reality that, like nature, is opaque in places at least. (Berger and Luckmann: 76-77)

As the authors state unequivocally in the fragment quoted above, their perspective is not proclaiming self-determining agentic subjectivity and utterly untouchable diversity at the core of the social world. They talk about an institutional order, one that even *becomes objectified*, but not one that *is objective*. Berger and Luckmann regard social order as "an ongoing human production" (idem, p. 69). This means that social norms, or in the case of this article the norms that condition social bonds, start off through repetition, habitualization and when both the actions and the actor performing them are typified in a taken for granted way, institutionalization is born. Yet, they point out this institutionalization solidifies over generations. I would add that the process of passing on institutionalizations in nucleo is not necessarily

generationally bounded. Particular situations might become meaningful in a given way on a small scale and those meaning constructions might impose themselves fast on a community or societal level in a relatively short period of time, if let us say, the ones who generated them are in positions of power. However, power distribution is not the focus of the current argument. What I wish to insist on instead is the origin of the objectified norm. For Berger and Luckmann, like for Simmel, the norm is born from a flowing system of interdependencies. Yet, these interdependencies are mediated by meaning constructions and the actual process of normalization of otherwise contingent reciprocal influences gains its stability from those meaning constructions. From here, it follows that even if the "final product" (although Berger and Luckmann would certainly not use this syntagm) is an objective norm, its character is fundamentally different than in Simmel. Namely, the norm is constantly emerging and being reconstructed, it is not there and it is not filled.

At the same time, it is important to note the importance of typifications from the early stages of the process of institutionalization. In this respect, Berger and Luckmann's work also converges with Butler's, despite the different level of the analysis taken up. Berger and Luckmann's concept of typification draws heavily upon Schütz's earlier use of the same term. Schütz (1967) understands typification as inherent to making sense of the world. For him, any meaning construction relies on typifying, which is a linguistic mechanism. It is only by calling/thinking of an object we see as an apple that we typify it as such and view it as meaningful. Butler (1997) takes a similar stance on the issue of language in her analysis of hate speech. She writes: "[…] it is by being interpellated within the terms of language that a certain social existence of the body first becomes possible." (Butler 1997: 5) In other words, the social existence of the body is conditioned by language, because, like Schütz was claiming, language is the vehicle of typification and typification is meaning. Thus, in order for the body to be social, it needs to be meaningful (or typified). This train of thought is applied by Berger and Luckmann when talking about social relations, which also become meaningful linguistically through typifications of courses of action and of actors. From this standpoint, language does not only sustain or threaten the social existence of the body, but it does the same with the existence of the bond. These are the aspects through which I believe the concept of the construction of the typical social bond can enrich the original concept of forms of association.

Following Berger and Luckmann's (1967) view about the institutionalization of social order, I will outline some main features of socially constructed typical bonds:

1) they do not correspond to actual social bonds;
2) they are abstractions based on the typification of various empirically lived/ observed/ heard about bonds as having certain common features;

3) they are sedimented enough that they cannot be traced back to the original meaning constructions from which they emerged;
4) they are generated subjectively and tend towards objectification when certain (inter)actions, reactions, emotional expressions that contribute to the bond gain taken for granted meanings by virtue of the existing meaningful bond (e.g. "you cheated on me, so you do not value our couple");
5) they are never entirely objectified;
6) through meaning constructions which include both particularities of a given experience of togetherness and the version of the social norms in the social actors' stocks of knowledge, bonds gain both stability and flexibility.

At the same time, we must keep in mind that the institutionalization that Berger and Luckmann talk about, as well as the construction of the sexed and gendered body in Butler's work, refer to a stronger "this is how things are done" than informal social bonds. By this, I do not mean that social bonds do not have a well circumscribed normative core, but I mean they also have something else besides this nucleus. If we take the example of the normativity embedded in couple relations, some elements of sexuality are entirely socially regulated (e.g. incest and paedophilia). In this case, both the course of action and the actor are typified in a straight forward socially homogenous way. Monogamy is not as socially regulated. Flirting is even less socially regulated. Based on an adaptation to Simmel's theory, Blatterer (2013) was writing about the relative normative freedom of friendship. My claim is that in any typical informal bond, one can distinguish layers ranging from non-negotiable social norm (the *condicio sine qua non* of typicality) to norms that have a status weak enough to make debatable their inclusion in the construction of typicality.

In informal social bonds, many of the norms are in this diffuse middle ground. In quotidian conversations, we often hear people worrying about whether they should end the romantic relation they are in, whether they should tell their boss how they feel about their schedule or whether to rely less on their friends. Besides the possible (inter)action norms involved in these decisions (e.g. "Is it appropriate to tell someone something unpleasant in a straight forward way?"), what is being questioned is the normativity of the bond. Does the romantic relation that the individual views as typical end over the grounds one is considering ending one's own? Do they even have a clear construction of the typical bond according to which to map the meaning of their own? If not, it is that construction that they are trying to achieve in order to understand the bond they are part of. Alternatively, opposite well solidified constructions of typical bonds can collide, challenging and reshaping what had previously been read as typical.

Of course, not every aspect of a social relation goes through the filter of the normativity of the typical bond in order to be meaningful. Various events, emotions or doubts will be interpreted according to other frames of meaning or the normalized and regulated will come into play. Nevertheless, in this case, as in the examples above, social norms reveal themselves as nothing if not patterns of meaning construction.

Conclusions

The aim of this article has been to explore the issue of normativity in informal social bonds, insisting on the paradox of its dynamic and structured character and on its sources of freedom and stability. This approach is founded on my strongly held belief in the need for further debate on the relation between normativity and lived, nuanced experience, in the context of durable social bonds.

My contribution to this debate starts with a conceptual distinction between social interactions and social bonds and the types of normativity they involve. Social interactions are recurrent events occurring between individuals who direct their actions at each other and who take each other for granted as meaning makers. Social bonds involve durable connection between human beings who, with or without copresence, are linked by emotions, expectations, memories of past common experiences, imaginaries about each other or future plans that involve the other. If the interaction order can be considered *sui genesis* and based on the ritual nature of selves, the patterns of bonds appear to us as social scripts and hypostases of "what is normal", which cannot be accounted for only in terms of the presentational character or the need for sociality of selves.

Setting out to explore the issue of normativity in the patterns and regularities of durable informal social bonds connects the argument of this article with discussions on forms of association, double contingency and social order. In relation to this field, I place my text according to several coordinates. Namely, I argue for an analysis of normativity in social bonds with certain durability, not episodic interaction. I am interested in the patterns of informal relations, not in the constructions of subjects or of order at the institutional level. I am focused on regularities in social bonds, their emergence, their flexibility and fixity, and their contestation, not on the role or application of norms as 'ingredients' of social action. By making these choices, I position myself in the vein of Simmelian sociology.

However, the core of my argument states that there is a need to reconceptualize Simmel's forms of association in order to achieve a more versatile, more grounded and more transparent understanding of regularities

and their normative character in durable social bonds. Firstly, one of the main ideas I challenge in Simmel based theory is the dichotomy between forms and content/life and the consequences of this dichotomy on interpreting patterns within social bonds. My claim is that once we have reached an agreement over the social conditioning of every aspect of our lives, any dichotomy based on formalization loses its meaning. Secondly, when thinking of social regularities as emergent from reciprocal influences and effects between various forces, another side of Simmel's work that I believe needs to be questioned is the implied autopoiesis of social systems. Thirdly, I regard both the first and the second points as stemming from a problematic objectivist stance towards social reality.

As a consequence of this analysis, I propose the Berger and Luckmann inspired concept of social construction of the typical social bond as a more suitable notion than forms of association for capturing the subjectively informed objectivity under construction that makes up for the norms of durable social bonds. While I believe many Simmelian scholars embrace this view, there is a certain reluctance in replacing the original terminology of formal sociology. This reluctance results in a perpetuated ambiguity and in a constant tendency of theoretical reification of fluid empirical phenomena which come hand in hand with an uncritical reading of the initial conceptual apparatus.

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Critical Reviews

Editorial Note:

This section provides reviews and critical reflections upon recent evolutions in social research, with focus on changing societies and current dilemmas.

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(RECOMMENDED CITATION)

BOOK REVIEW

Apostolatul antisocial. Teologie și neoliberalism în România postcomunistă (*The Anti-social Apostolate. Theology and Neoliberalism in Post-communist Romania*) by Alexandru Racu, Tact Publishing House, 2017, 275 pages[1]

SORIN GOG[2]

Alexandru Racu's book 'The Anti-social Apostolate. Theology and Neoliberalism in Post-communist Romania" represents one of the few successful attempts in contemporary Romanian social sciences that analyses the post-communist political developments within Eastern Christianity and its relationship to the capitalist transformations and radical neo-liberal reforms that took place during the last decade at the periphery of European Union. The book focuses on the writings of some of the most prominent Orthodox intellectuals and theologians from Romania and carefully scrutinizes the religious and cultural legitimations of capitalism which they produced after the fall of communism. The study also details the ways in which these new religious arguments and narratives depart from previous Orthodox tradition and practice. Drawing on the work of Cornel Ban (2014, 2016), who masterfully analysed the neo-liberal specificities of economic reforms and brutal shock therapies implemented in Romania, and more generally on Tawney (1938) Karl Pollany (2013) and Peck (2010), the book discuses the emergence of cultural and religious forms of neo-liberalism that accompanied, and gave extensive credit to, the implementation of one of the most radical neo-liberal projects in Central and Eastern Europe.

The relationship between Orthodoxy, social modernization and capitalism has been an important feature of the Romanian social history debates. Already in the interwar period Eugen Lovinescu was making the argument in his 'History of Modern Romanian Civilization" (1924) that Orthodoxy played a pivotal role in preventing the formation of a national culture and a Western civilisation. Orthodoxy, he claimed, contributed to the 'orientalization' of Romanian society and represented a traditionalist and retrograde force that hindered the cultivation of a genuine Latin

[1] I would like to thank Valer Cosma and Simion Pop for their kind comments and suggestions. The views and limits of this review belong solely to the author.

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culture that could enable the institutionalization in Romania of an advanced Western national culture (Lovinescu 1924:8-9). Unlike Protestantism and Catholicism which were important vectors for the creation and consolidation of nationalism, modern civilization and high culture, Orthodoxy generated a Slavic path dependency and so kept the Romanian society in obscurantism (Lovinescu 1924:13-22).

The theme of 'Ex Occidente Lux' was revived in the Romanian social history debates in the early 90's, after the fall of communism. Ioan Petru Culianu, an expatriate at that time, was trying to give a sociological and historical grounding to the argument that Orthodoxy has an anti-modern and anti-capitalist essence. In a study written in the 80's, which aimed at reconstructing the cultural space and the Romanian ethno-political movements that dominated the formation period of Mircea Eliade, his intellectual master, Culianu was pointing out the ill-fated influence the 'poporanist' movements had on the modern Romanian culture (Culianu 1995). These have produced a wide spectrum of historiographical and political projects that transformed Orthodoxy into the central dispositive of imagining the Romanian nation (Culianu 1995:165-168). Proceeding from the classical Weberian thesis regarding the spirit of capitalist, Culianu (1995: 168-174) outlined the specific ways in which the Orthodox ethic was incompatible with social modernization and the modes in which this religious culture was blocking a meaningful integration into the global capitalist structures:

> The Romanian had a spontaneous, visceral, repugnance of capitalism. If he would've heeded to scrutinize this profound feeling, he would've understood *that exactly his Orthodox ethic hindered him to understand capitalism and to integrate into the rules of this system*. From a historical point of view the error would not have been a fatal one if, on its part, capitalism, simultaneously as an ethic and as an economy, would not have been the economic *system* of the entire modern world, in whose enslavement all the nations of the world gravitated. So the ethical gap is transformed into an economic gap, and this into a chronological gap, the Orthodox *Commonwealth*, now passed to the Russian presidency, still fights through all means against this gap, threatening to destroy the entire world, because it did not understand that it is condemned to a historical backlash because of its *social ethic* itself. (Culianu 1995: 171, underlines in original)

Culianu's study then shows how the biggest part of the cultural production of the Romanian intelligentsia (with the sole exception of Slavici) was marked by this fundamental aversion towards capitalism. It is important to note that the epistemological device that allows Culianu to explain the anti-capitalist essence of the Romanian culture is rooted, according to him, in the other-worldly orientation of Orthodoxy and its incapacity to produce the ethical subjectification required by the capitalist system. Not even communism would manage, according to Culianu, to dislocate Nicolae Iorga's historiographical legacy who emphasized Romania's

belonging to the Slavic-Byzantine Orient: "the Orthodox brothers can always come to an understanding among themselves because they have a common enemy to abolish: capitalism." (Culianu 1995: 174)"

This anti-capitalist trope of Orthodoxy is not a feature only of Romanian social history debates, but also of contemporary international relations and European political sciences scholarship. The integration of two Orthodox countries (Romania and Bulgaria) into European Union generated an increased attention to the role national religious cultures play in successfully incorporating transnational democratic mechanisms and the EU communitarian aquis (Spohn, 2009, Byrnes and Katzenstein 2006). Several political scientists have emphasized the capacity of Protestant (due to religious civism) and Catholic (due to religious corporatism) countries to generate public institutions and a political culture which enabled them a swift integration into EU structures. On the other side, the EU integration of Orthodox countries has been considered an 'incomplete and failed process' (Spohn, 2009). What explains this alleged incompatibility is the predominant authoritarian religious culture (Byrnes and Katzenstein, 2006), neo-Byzantine political practices, fundamentalist rejection of democracy, human rights and religious pluralism, autocephaly which contributed to the emergence of closed forms of nationalist systems (Philpott and Shah 2006) and disdain for liberal democratic values and cosmopolitanism (Perica, 2006). All this amounts to a radical anti-Europeanism that spreads from the Orthodox clergy to society and political institutions alike, through religious socialization (Ramet, 2006:150). Within this sociological epistemology, the Orthodox religion becomes the main reason that accounts for alleged popular anti-Western feelings and the incapacity to generate viable institutions and political culture required for a meaningful European integration (Byrnes and Katzenstein, 2006). Orthodoxy is portrayed as being in its very essence a non-Western and non-European retrograde religion.

The Romanian theologians and intellectuals that Racu's book analyses is captured by these wider debates regarding the position of Orthodoxy in relation to Western modernity. They want to articulate an Orthodox Christianity that addresses these forms of criticism and emphasize that its political theologies are not incompatible with Western culture and social modernity. Although Alexandru Racu dwells little on this wider context that structures these specific theological positions within the religious field, he briefly hints to these logics (Racu 2017:271) and to the mechanisms that make these religious intellectuals so popular. Nevertheless, a wider analysis of this tradition of cultural criticism of Orthodoxy (see for example Barbu 2000, 2001 for religious attitudes toward work, or Stan and Turcescu 2007 for Orthodoxy and European Union) to which the post-communist Orthodox intellectuals react, could enable a better understanding of the rationalities, motivations and imaginaries that the Orthodox intellectuals crafted shortly after the fall of the Communist modernity project. By this I mean for example the contextual debates regarding the secularization of urban strata and the need of a

form of Christianity that addresses the intellectual preoccupations of the emerging urban middle class that becomes more culturally dominant or debates regarding secularism and anti-clericalism that spreads in both popular and literate culture and which requires new forms of apologetics of existing religious ontologies. The reconstruction of this wider context and the position of his sharp and well-documented criticism within this larger cultural debate, would've made Racu's own socialist agenda more intelligible, which is neither that of a secular Marxist who thinks of religion as the opium of the masses, nor that of an Orthodox religious nationalist who wants to prevent the contamination of Orthodoxy by Western modernist ideas and practices. But it is clear from the writings of the Orthodox theologians and intellectuals he analyses that the Romanian theologians who endorse neo-liberalism are connected to wider cultural debates that address Romanian ethno-nationalism, social modernization, urban culture, attitudes toward work, secularization, geo-political rationalities and aim at re-imagining a Christian narrative that addresses these debates. One specific feature of their answer to these issues is the religious embracement and justification of neo-liberalism, who so becomes intelligible not only in terms of its opportunistic relationship to existing political structures (of which they clearly take advantages, as Racu shows) but also in terms of the relational positionality to other Orthodox political-theologies (for example ethno-nationalist ones) or to secular criticism.

Alexandru Racu's excellent study focuses mainly on this specific neo-liberal dimension of the Romanian post-communist theology and on the moral ontologies it produced in order to endorse the post-communist capitalist transformations. The liberalization of markets, wide-spread privatization, deregulation of labour and the creation of new industrial reforms that produced one of the most unbalanced capital-labour arrangements and a corporate governance that could attract Foreign Direct Investment were important features of the Romanian neo-liberal reforms (Ban 2014, 2016; Bohle and Greskovits 2012; Stoiciu 2012; Trif 2016). What sets Romania and the Baltic countries apart from the neighbouring CEE countries is the radical reforms and austerity measurements implemented here, whereas in other CEE countries more embedded forms of economic transformations were experimented with which were sensitive to the preservation of welfare policies and allocated significant state subsidies to national strategic economic sectors (Bohle and Greskovits 2012). The growing social inequalities, vast de-industrialization and unemployment, labour migration, peripheralization of poverty and ghetto formation represent direct consequences of these neo-liberal policies. None of these policies could've be enacted and maintained without cultural legitimations and popular social justificatory narratives (Racu 2017: 13-30). Alexandru Racu focuses on a specific form of cultural neo-liberalism, namely the theological arguments articulated by leading Romanian Orthodox intellectuals and theologians in favour of these transformations: Horia-Roman Patapievici, Teodor Baconschi, Mihail Neamțu, Ion I. Ica Jr. and Radu Preda.

The book is divided into two sections: the first one discusses the patristic sources regarding the social doctrines of the Early Christian Churches, their positions towards wealth and social distribution, the early social institutions created by Christianity and its teaching regarding private property, social justice and welfare practiced in the Byzantine Empire. The aim of the first two chapters is to give a solid grounding to how Early Christianity developed a substantial social doctrine and rejected the private appropriation of wealth. This argument is further developed in the following two chapters which explore the Catholic social doctrine and the not-so-developed Orthodox one. The author is well-versed in historical theology, ecclesiology and dogmatic exegesis and points out very clearly the fundamental communitarian aspects of Christianity and the charity and compassion imperative that characterize both Eastern and Western Christianly. Orthodoxy did not manage to produce and implement formal social doctrines and to articulate positions similar to the Catholic encyclicals such as Rerum Novarum (1891), Gaudium et Spes (1965) or Pope Francis' bold condemnation of inequality and economic injustices in Evangelii Gaudium (2013), but, in spite of this, it experimented with different ideas of Christian socialism (2017:90-93). This first section represents an important part of Racu's argument because it enables him to show what a radical departure the political theologies of Romanian post-communist theologians are from the social doctrines of both Catholic and Orthodox Church.

The second section of the book represents one of the most rigorous and well documented sociological, political and theological criticism of Romanian post-communist theology and constitutes a masterful analysis of sociology of (religious) elites and their role in developing and embedding cultural neo-liberalism. Each individual chapter carefully analysis the arguments, narratives, professional development and intellectual debates of some of the most important contemporary figures of Romanian Orthodox theology and the specific ways in which they endorsed capitalism and the brutal neo-liberal reforms. Racu exposes a wide spectrum of libertarian and capitalist religious anthropologies that played an important role in popularizing theological neo-liberalism: Patapievici's arguments in favour of the sanctity of private property, the redemptive nature of markets and their capacity to transform 'private vices into public virtues', the religious valorisation of individual entrepreneurialism; Baconschi's attempt to build a Christian Democracy based on an subsidiarity principle in detriment to the social solidarity principle, his religious defence of a minimal state and the 'moral' requirement of welfare retrenchment; and Neamţu's theological development from Christian socialism to the endorsement of spiritual entrepreneurialism, religious moralization of success and motivational programs that equip the religious believer with the necessary tools to create profitable enterprises. The two case studies regarding professional theologians, Radu Preda and Ion I. Ica Jr., emphasize not so much a radical support for neo-liberalism, as is the case with the previous three Orthodox intellectuals, but outline the confusions and incoherence regarding the social doctrines

of the Church. The second part of the book represents an in-depth assessment of the post-communist political theology and constitutes a breakthrough analysis of the relationship between Orthodoxy and the endorsement of capitalism in the context of dramatic economic transformations and reforms taking place in contemporary Romania. The criticism makes a rigorous inventory of the conceptual apparatus, theological discourses and legitimizing religious narratives of capitalism emerging in Romania and brings a significant contribution to the understanding of increasing popular forms of cultural neo-liberalism. The book also discusses the potential reasons why the Orthodox Church did not distance itself from these neo-liberal intellectuals (Racu 2017:272-275) and the way their symbolic capital was used by the Church for cleaning its public images in the wake of recurrent criticism for it collaboration with the communist regime (see for example Gillet 2011, Luestean 2008).

The book concludes with a discussion of how can these findings be extrapolated to a) Romanian Catholicism and b) every-day religious practices. The author rightfully outlines the conditions of validity of his findings and confines his argument to religious elites. His analysis focuses rather on discourses and not so much on urban and rural clergy, religious institutions, every-day spiritual practices and socializations of religious subjects. It remains to be determined to what extent this theological neo-liberalism is a characteristic of the wider Orthodox populations and if within this religious community a religious endorsement of capitalism is much likelier to emerge then in Protestant and Evangelical religious communities. Anthropological research (Gog 2016) suggests that popular religious legitimations of capitalist accumulation, individual competition, private initiative and libertarianism are still little developed within the discourses of the Romanian Christian churches and denominations, in comparison for example to the wide spread programs of personal and spiritual development that cultivate a radical neo-liberal subjectivity for which the entrepreneurialisation of inner human resources constitutes the most valuable asset for personal-growth, prosperity and individual success.

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