AMBIENTUM BIOETHICA BIOLOGIA CHEMIA DIGITALIA DRAMATICA EDUCATIO ARTIS GYMNAST. ENGINEERING EPHEMERIDES EUROPAEA GEOGRAPHIA GEOLOGIA HISTORIA HISTORIA ARTIUM INFORMATICA IURISPRUDENTIA MATHEMATICA MUSICA NEGOTIA OECONOMICA PHILOLOGIA PHILOSOPHIA PHYSICA POLITICA PSYCHOLOGIA-PAEDAGOGIA SOCIOLOGIA THEOLOGIA CATHOLICA THEOLOGIA CATHOLICA LATIN THEOLOGIA GR.-CATH. VARAD THEOLOGIA ORTHODOXA THEOLOGIA REF. TRANSYLVAN
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Authors: ATANAS ANOV.
DOI: 10.24193/subbbioethica.2021.spiss.06
Published Online: 2021-06-30
Published Print: 2021-06-30
pp.24
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ABSTRACT: Parallel Session III, Room 1 Moral intentions could be used as criteria for actions. In medical practice, moral intentions take an interesting form when the problem is related to post-mortem reproduction. This paper will attempt to 1) interpret the problem of intentions from principalist perspective in medical ethics; 2) relate the problem of intentions to post-mortem reproduction; 3) develop an existentialist account for intentions and post-mortem reproduction. Peter Zhu’s case is the latest ethical challenge in post-modern reproduction. Its moral sensitivity is high due to his presume intent to reproduce and the possibility for post-mortem reproduction using donors’ material and a surrogate mother. If we presume that the concept of presume intent lies with the general idea for intentions, we must tackle the problem from the perspective of respect for autonomy. The problem with intentions is that the prospective intentional action to reproduce belongs to one person only. Yet it appears that someone else is going to perform this action and someone else will finish it. Who should we hold responsible for this action: the person who intended to do it or the person who is intending to perform it and finish it? In Peter Zhu’s case, there are participants with different intentions that are with different moral value. The existentialist account of post-mortem reproduction and intending to reproduce will try to present why we should be careful with respect for autonomy. The ethical and existential consequences of such reproduction are that the future child would be brought to a life of suffering and vagueness.
